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EDITORIAL

The year 2016 will be remembered to have marked a shacking political landscape for South Africa through the August local government elections. Although a lot of remarkable things happened in the country, but most South Africans will remember it to be a year which for the very first time in two decades, the African National Congress (ANC) accepted as a collective a shared responsibility of electoral poor performance. On the other hand, it will be remembered to be a year that South Africans saw how energetically black dominated parties rallied together to form a coalition government with the Democratic Alliance against the African National Congress. This being the case, many political analysts think it will teach the ruling party never to neglect the people that put them to power in the first place. In closing its final publication of the remarkable year of 2016, the *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives* provides eight articles addressing different content of Public Administration and development.

Madue presents a case study of the executive and the legislature's decision to trample on the powers of the Public Protector (one of the effective institutions supporting democracy in South Africa) and the subsequent cold contestations of the Constitutional Court judgment, all in the name of ignorance. The finding of the Constitutional Court on the matter of the powers of the office of the Public Protector Provides the public with the opportunity to observe the workings of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa in the quest for promoting good governance. **Mehlape** reports findings of a study that investigated factors influencing voter participation in the registration towards the 2016 South African Local Government Elections in South Africa using the case of Mankweng community. The article argues that there is a need for voter education in South Africa before the actual election process take place. Post 1994, South African government acknowledged that there were serious infrastructure backlogs, which includes roads, health, telecommunications and housing. On that **Mamabolo** uses the case study of Polokwane municipality in Limpopo Province to argue that well-resourced municipalities which were burdened with rural villages under their armpit continue to provide services which are perceived by affected rural communities as unequal and of a substandard quality at times. **Ngomane** introduced a controversial gender issue to the discussion. They conclude positively that even though women do most of the unpaid care and domestic work in South Africa, more men are now aware of the importance of sharing household labour and are getting more involved sharing chores with spouses than previously done. **April** provides analysis of the standing of local governance in South Africa's Eastern Cape Province development zones of Coega and East London to determine degree of implementation of local public administrations linkages involving the complex, absurd and dialectical decisions related to the deficits of good governance occasioned by the absence of government in-

teroperability within the localities of the Industrial Development Zones (IDZs). **Olorunfoba** examines the socio-economic development of Lagos state since 1999. The choice of Lagos state as the unit of analysis is informed by its central position as the economic nerve centre of Nigeria, the strides that have been recorded in socio-economic development over the past seventeen years and the nature of politics in the state versus the national government at least up to 2015. **Ramalepe and Shai** uses thematic content analysis and critical discourse approach in their broadest form, to evaluate Pretoria`s (the administrative capital of South Africa) mediation efforts in Lesotho, by comparatively assessing and appraising the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis and the 2014 attempted coup. **Akinsanya** and Johnson conclude this publication by examining the influence of communication tools on industrial conflict management handling styles with particular reference to state owned universities in south west Nigeria.

Editor: Professor Mokoko Sebola

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IN THE NAME OF IGNORANCE: TRAMPLING ON THE POWERS OF INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

SM Madue
Kemotheo Consulting

ABSTRACT

In Public Administration, good governance is generally associated with efficient and effective administration in a democratic state. In other words, good governance assures that corruption is minimised, the views of the minority are taken into account, and the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It specifically relates to the capacity of the centre of power of a political and administrative system to cope with the emerging challenges of the society. Therefore, governments across the world have constituted various mechanisms for promoting good governance. In South Africa, Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 is solely dedicated to the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy and by extension promoting good governance. This article argues that some Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy are more effective than others and the powers of the effective ones are often challenged by both the legislature and the executive, thereby trampling on the principles of separation of powers and those of good governance respectively. This article is premised on the understanding that governance means the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented. The article presents a case study of the executive and the legislature's decision to trample on the powers of the Public Protector (one of the effective institutions supporting democracy in South Africa) and the subsequent cold contestations of the Constitutional Court judgement, all in the name of ignorance. The findings of the Constitutional Court on the matter of the powers of the office of the Public Protector provides the public with the opportunity to observe the workings of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa in the quest for promoting good governance.

Keywords: *Constitutional Democracy, Corruption, Democratic state, Good governance,*

1. INTRODUCTION

This article examines the trampling of the powers and functions of Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa by the executive

and the legislature, with specific reference to the office of the Public Protector, from the notion of promoting good governance. On the one hand, governments promote good governance by providing rules that create

incentives or disincentives for various behaviours and actions that either facilitate or obstruct democratic practice (Colomer, 2001; Reynolds, 2002; Macyntyre, 2003). The rules are thus contained in the Constitutions, Acts of Parliament, Rules booklets and other policy documents. On the other hand, governments also promote good governance through the process of institutionalisation by which legislatures develop the autonomy, capacity and skills to fulfil their mandates and deliver political goods like protecting the rights of the citizens, ensuring transparency, accountability and responsiveness (Fukuyama, 2005; Matters, 2005; the Law Society of South Africa, 2015).

This they do through, among others, establishing institutions supporting democracy, developing accountability and oversight mechanisms, and promoting the independence of the judiciary. In South Africa, institutions supporting constitutional democracy are mandated to play their good governance role as stipulated in Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). Focusing on the office of the Public Protector, this article explores the manner in which parliamentarians and the executive alike tend to ignore the House Rules, the Court rulings, as well as the findings and recommendations of the institutions supporting constitutional democracy.

The article begins with a background of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy and the role they play in promoting good governance

in the South African democratic system. The article then turns its focus to a case study on the Public Protector and its powers and functions. The problem statement follows thereafter before research methodology and theoretical considerations are outlined. Since the focus of this study is predominantly on the Public Protector, the empirical study then concentrates on its recent findings and recommendations against the executive.

The court cases it has won in its quest for effectively exercising its constitutional mandates, powers and functions, without fear or favour, in accordance with the principles of good governance, are discussed. The article proceeds with a presentation of some findings and suggestions for further research. The findings of this article have provided some inroads for recommending further research on the effectiveness or lack thereof of other Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa before the article is concluded. Having outlined the structure of this article, the next section provides a snapshot of the historical background of Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY

This article is premised on the understanding that governance means the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented. Models for the Chapter 9 institutions were drawn from around the world. The first ombudsman was established in 1713

in Sweden (Murray, 2006). As search on the United Kingdom (UK) National Audit Office reveals that the idea of an Auditor-General is even older, although auditors are not always separated from government. The earliest antecedent of the Auditors-General or Audit Officers now common in Commonwealth countries may be the English Auditor of the Exchequer referred to in documents from 1314 (Murray, 2006; Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, 2012).

According to Hatchard, Ndulo and Slinn (2004), the first ombudsman in Africa seems to have been established in Tanzania in 1966. Murray (2006) posits that independent human rights institutions are a bit newer. In citing resolution 48/134 of the UK General Assembly of 20 December 1993, Murray elaborates that international guidelines for their status, composition, responsibilities and methods of operation were adopted by the United Nations in 1993 in the "Paris Principles".

It can thus be argued that the current South African Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) are modelled on the Paris Principles. Before 1994, South Africa had already established the offices of the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman. Thus the origins of South Africa's Public Protector can be found in the pre-constitutional structure of an ombudsman known as the Advocate-General, established in 1979. The *Advocate-General Act 118 of 1979* established an Advocate-General with the power to investigate mat-

ters relating to financial impropriety in the public sector. In that era, the Advocate-General was regarded as a distinctly South African institution which was unique to the Westminster parliamentary systems. In 1991 the name of this office was changed to Ombudsman and the title of the Act similarly amended.

The 1991 amendments also extended the powers of the office holder under the Act to matters in which "the State of the public in general is being prejudiced by maladministration in connection with the affairs of the State" (s 4(a) inserted by *Advocate-General Amendment Act 104 of 1991*).

However, after 1994, in a democratic South Africa, the Ombudsman was replaced with the Public Protector, which sometimes explains the ignorance (deliberate or not) of the powers of the Public Protector by the executive, the legislature and political parties respectively, as would be seen the later sections of this article.

3.CURRENT INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Constitution provides that the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy be established to promote the rights contained in its Chapter 2: Bill of Rights, and to strengthen constitutional democracy. The *Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated Institution (2007)* reports that:

"... with the advancement of democracy in South Africa in 1994, a human rights culture was made the cornerstone of a new constitutional dispensation and a wide ranging set of human rights, including socioeconomic rights, was inscribed in a Bill of Rights. In order to achieve this goal, a range of institutions were established in the Constitution itself and in national legislation, the purpose of which was to strengthen constitutional democracy in South Africa."

Chapter 9 of the Constitution provides that the following Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy be established, namely: the Public Protector; the South African Human Rights Commission; the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; the Commission for Gender Equality; the Auditor-General; the Independent Electoral Commission; and the Independent Authority to Regulate Broadcasting. Murray (2006) writes that although Chapter 9 of the Constitution brings together six distinct institutions, they have important things in common which suit them for their twofold roles as institutions intended both to monitor government actions and to contribute to transformation.

He states the three features of Chapter 9 institutions as: "... (a) Although they are state institutions, they are outside government; they are not "a branch of government"; (b) Like the courts, they are expected to be independent and impartial; and (c) To differing degrees they are "intermediary

institutions", providing a link between people on the one hand and the executive and Parliament on the other". The Law Society of South Africa (2015) stresses that the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy "... were brought into being to strengthen democracy, promote the rule of law and ensure proper separation of powers". The task of these institutions is to promote and protect those rights within the Bill of Rights which fall within their particular area.

They are impartial, independent and subject only to the Constitution and the relevant laws made in terms of the Constitution. They must exercise their powers and perform their functions "without fear, favour or prejudice". Section 181(3) of the Constitution stipulates that "... other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these institutions". One of the important organs of state in this regard is the National Parliament.

The role of Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa is purely investigative and administrative, providing a link between government and citizens (Matters, 2005; Murray (2006). The Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (2012) elaborates that these institutions are outside partisan politics to ensure that they are independent and impartial in their investigation of government affairs on behalf of the citizens. For the purpose of this article, the focus now

turns on the Public Protector since this institution has received both praises and criticisms, especially during the tenure of the now outgoing Public Protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela.

4. THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR AND ITS FUNCTIONS

The Public Protector protects citizens from unfair treatment by the state and its officials as well as from inefficient administration and dishonesty with respect to public money. In articulating the functions of the Public Protector, Section 182(1) of the Constitution stipulates that “the Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation – (a) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice; (b) to report on that conduct; and (c) to take appropriate remedial action.”

The Public Protector can investigate central and provincial government and local authorities. This includes all state department employees such as police officers, pension payout clerks or electoral officers. It can also investigate corporations or institutions performing a public function, such as Eskom and Telkom as well as statutory councils such as the Human Sciences Research Council and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Section 182(2) of the Constitution stipulates that the Public Protector has the additional powers and functions prescribed by national legislation.

Additional powers of the Public Protector are provided by the Public Protector Act of 1994 which outlines its mandate as follows:

- Strengthening constitutional democracy by investigating and redressing improper and prejudicial conduct, maladministration and abuse of power in state affairs;
- Resolve administrative disputes or rectify any act or omission in administrative conduct through mediation, conciliation or negotiation;
- Advise on appropriate remedies or explore any other expedient means;
- Report and make recommendations on findings;
- Advise and investigate violations of Executive Member Ethics Act 82 of 1998;
- Resolve disputes to the operation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000; and
- Public Protector discharges other responsibilities as mandated by the following legislation:
 - ✓ Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996;
 - ✓ Special Investigation Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996;

- ✓ Protected Disclosures ACT 26 of 2000;
- ✓ National Archives and Record Service Act 43 of 1996;
- ✓ National Energy Act 40 of 2004;
- ✓ Housing Protection Measures Act 95 of 1998;
- ✓ National Environmental Management Act 108 of 1999;
- ✓ Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000;
- ✓ Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999; and
- ✓ Lotteries Act 57 of 1997.

From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the Public Protector has more extensive powers than ombudsman institutions of other countries. In comparison, the jurisdiction of an ombudsman is more limited; certain public administration institutions may, for example, be exempted or excluded from an ombudsman's reach. On the contrary, the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2012:3) explains that the Public Protector has jurisdiction over all organs of state, any institution

in which the state is the majority or controlling shareholder and any public entity as defined in section 1 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. However, it should be noted that in terms of the traditional separation of powers, which entails the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, the Public Protector is not considered a branch of government. According to the Law Society of South Africa (2015), the Public Protector must ensure that good governance should be valued above all. While the powers and functions of the Public Protector are published and practiced in accordance with the above legislation, exercising such powers is often not an easy ride, more especially when dealing with matters affecting the executive. It is from this background that the focus of the following section is on the problem statement and research questions.

5. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy are especially needed in a young democracy such as South Africa, where many citizens still live in poverty, have limited access to services and the political leaders they have voted for, and where corruption amongst government officials is rife (Murray, 2006). Section 181(3) of the Constitution stipulates that "... other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect these institutions to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness". Although most of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional De-

mocracy in South Africa have well-established provincial offices across the country, the effectiveness of these offices is uncertain; citizens remain generally unaware of their existence, and are poorly educated on their purpose, powers and functions (Human Sciences Research Council, 2007). Citizens do not know where these institutions are situated and how to access them (Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, 2012). The only exceptions are the Auditor-General, the Electoral Commission and the Public Protector, more especially since the appointment of the current Public Protector seven year ago.

The Public Protector has over time proven to be the most popular and effective of all the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa. However, recent tendencies suggest that the executive, some members of Parliament, together with their political parties resort to questioning the mandate, findings and recommendations of the office of the Public Protector, especially when the findings appear not to be in their favour. Therefore, the research questions that this article was set out to address are:

- Why is the executive resorting to being less co-operative when the Public Protector exercises its constitutional mandates, powers and functions?
- How does the less co-operation of the executive impact on the Public Protector's contribution towards promoting good gover-

nance?

By answering these questions this article attempts to join in the discourse of the effectiveness of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy; thereby contributing new knowledge in the study and practice of Public Administration. In the following section, the research methodology and the theory that have guided this article towards systematically responding to the above research questions are discussed.

6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION

This article has adopted a qualitative research methodology and is thus exploratory in nature. According to Collins and Hussey (2003:42), exploratory research is undertaken when few or no previous study exists. Literature reviewed for this article suggests that studies on the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa are very few.

Therefore, the aim of this article is to contribute to the body of knowledge in this field. The article has explored the extent to which the powers and functions of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa are trampled on by the executive and the members of Parliament, all in the name of ignorance. The data collected for this article is largely drawn from the literature surveyed, a case study on the recent reports on the findings and recommendations of the Public Protector, political analyses, and the ob-

servations of public comments made by the executive and some members of Parliament. The research methodology of this article is informed by the systems theory. Theletsane (2014:836) posits that the systems theory argues that interconnectedness among components or systems should be encouraged in order to improve governance in administration. Thus this article leans more on the soft systems approach.

According to Checkland (1981), soft systems approach is an outstanding method for scoping the specific system that needs to be investigated. Therefore, in this article, the system that is being investigated is the complex relationship between the executive and the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa in the quest for promoting good governance. The nature of this relationship is complex, hence it can also be investigated from the complex systems theory approach. In complex systems, impacts are co-produced that act as primary obstructions to good governance.

Shepherd (2006:419) cited in Coetzee (2014:823) elaborates that the concept of "impact" includes effect, brunt, burden, shock, thrust, implication and repercussion. Undermining and/or ignoring the powers and functions of Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa impacts on good governance in a democratic system. Thus the article will conclude by the impact that trampling on the powers and functions of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democra-

cy might have on good governance. Having outlined the research methodology and its theoretical underpinnings in this section has laid a foundation for the empirical study to be presented in the following section in the form of a case study on the Public Protector.

7. EMPIRICAL STUDY – THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR AND ITS FINDINGS AGAINST THE EXECUTIVE

Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa collectively play an important role in supporting legislatures to carry out their constitutional mandate of exercising oversight over the executive. As such, in terms of the principles of systems theory, these institutions are expected to receive corporation from the executive, members of Parliament and other organs of state in exercising its powers and functions.

However, the effectiveness of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy as accountability and good governance mechanisms does not solely derive its guarantee from the constitutional declarations of their independence and impartiality but also from the cooperation of the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and other organs of state. This section is therefore aimed at answering the first research question. Why is the executive resorting to being less co-operative when the Public Protector exercises its constitutional mandates, powers and functions? The fact that the incumbents of the Institutions Supporting Constitution-

al Democracy are directly appointed by the President, and by extension the ruling party, often poses a challenge to their effectiveness. This might be the first explanation why their powers and functions are often trampled by the executive and its supporters.

Murray (2006:133) stresses that this is especially the case in a situation of one-party dominance where super majorities for appointment and dismissal are rendered ineffective in securing inter-party support because the governing party can choose the incumbents of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy. The incumbents of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa are constantly faced with the challenge to establish their credibility and to effectively fulfil their mandates. In the case of the Public Protector, the former incumbent, Advocate Lawrence Mushwana's credibility was often questioned.

The fact that he was generally viewed as leaning too much towards the governing party in exercising his mandate, the findings of the Public Protector were regarded, among other things, as whitewash (See The Sunday Times, 14 November 2006, <http://www.sundaytimes.co.za>). The former Public Protector's poor investigation of the Oilgate party funding scandal may be seen to support this view. On the contrary, the credibility of the current Public Protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela is intact. In fact, she has received accolades from the citizens, political parties, public agencies, academics

and international institutions for her outstanding work in carrying out her office's constitutional mandates. Ironically, criticisms levelled against her office and her personal capacity most came from the executive, the governing party and its alliance.

These bodies seemed to be adamant in trampling on the powers and functions of the Public Protector, more especially since her findings and recommendations on the case involving the State President were not in their favour. The fact that they regarded the Public Protector's findings and recommendations that remedial action be taken against the President as not binding suggests that they pleaded ignorance of the Constitution whose contents they are supposed to be highly knowledgeable of. Instead, the powers and functions of the Public Protector were suddenly equated to those of the Ombudsman. Again, this explain the deliberate trampling of the powers and functions of the Public Protector by the executive.

The Law Society of South Africa (2015:7) cautions that "... it is important for the office of the Public Protector does not get caught up in the debated regarding the binding nature of its findings, but to rather flesh out the appropriate remedial action and place its findings in the public domain". It can thus be argued that it is from this understanding that the Public Protector stood her ground, remained professional and ethical, amidst criticisms and in some instances, insults and threats. Instead of implementing the remedial actions

recommended by the Public Protector, the executive resorted to delaying tactics of, among others, constituting a committee of inquiry to scrutinise the report of the Public Protector, which resulted in the blame being put on the administrators and service providers. In the interest of protecting the integrity of the Public Protector, the opposition parties took up the matter to the highest court of in the land, the Constitutional Court.

On the 31st March 2016, the Constitutional Court presented an unequivocal judgement on the long-dragging Nkandla case broad about by the Public Protector's findings and recommendations for remedial action against the President. In the report titled "Secure in comfort", Public Protector found that the President and his family have unduly benefited from the supposedly security upgrades at his Nkandla homestead, a project that was funded by the taxpayer's money. While the powers and functions of the Public Protector are, arguably, clearly stated in the legislative framework, the President together with his legal team and members of the executive have vehemently denied that the findings of the Public Protector are binding; and tried all the tricks in the book to avoid implementing the remedial action recommended.

De Wet (2016) reports in *The Mail & Guardian*, 20 to 26 May 2016 that "... remedial action directed by the Public Protector, said the highest court in the land, was binding, and neither the president nor Parliament could simply

ignore it." The Constitutional Court ruling of 31 March 2016 is viewed as a vindication of jurisdiction and centralism of the Public Protector in protecting our most fundamental constitutional values. The Court characterised the Public Protector as an independent and essential fighter against public administration. Therefore, given the findings of the Constitutional Court, a further analysis of the treatment of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa is worth noting.

8. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2012) recognises the contribution of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in promoting good governance when stating that:

"... the legislature, executive government and judiciary together with the institutions that support the constitutional democracy and wider society provide the overall governance framework of modern democracies. The well-functioning of the Legislatures in collaboration with the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy is fundamental to promoting good governance" (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2012:1).

Although the Public Protector is entrusted with clear constitutional responsibilities and producing information that is critical to the exercise of oversight over the executive, it remains one of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy that the legislatures are not

making full use of to facilitate effective oversight (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, 2012:4).

The findings of this article suggest that while the functions of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy are well-legislated, their operations and recommendations are often challenged by the executive when they find themselves on the receiving end. The executive and the legislature are thus viewed as trampling on the powers and functions of Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa, thereby impacting on the principles of good governance. Thus a discussion of the impact that the undermining of the powers and functions of Institutions Supporting Democracy might have on good governance becomes necessary.

9.THE IMPACT THAT THE TRAMPLING ON THE POWERS OF INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY HAS ON GOVERNANCE

This section is dedicated to provide answers to the second research question of this article. How does the less co-operation of the executive impact on the Public Protector's contribution towards promoting good governance? In igniting the answers to the research question, the article acknowledges that good governance is an important part of holding the executive accountable, in line with the systems theory. Effective legislatures contribute to an accountable government by delivering on their constitutional mandates and thus performing functions that are crucial for

sustaining democracy.

Theletsane (2014:836) argues that poor governance may result from factors such as incompetence, ignorance and lack of efficient institutions. This article has argued that the degree of efficiency of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy varies, with some institutions being more efficient than others; thereby impacting on good governance. According to King (2006:15), governance involves fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency on a foundation of intellectual honesty.

Thus governments make use of mechanisms such as Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy, among others, to promote good governance. On the one hand, Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000:91) are of the view that governance will be good when a government achieves its ultimate goal of creating the conditions for a good and satisfactory quality of life for all citizens.

On the other hand, Bridgman (2007:14) views good governance as the qualitative state of excellence in decision-making and conformance, and that performance and governance can only be achieved when all institutional roles are operating collectively. It is from this perspective that Coetzee (2014:830) stresses that good governance includes the existence of sound corporate public sector and moral governance. On the same breath, Theletsane (2014:839) cautions that good governance manifest itself when (according to the systems thinking the-

ory) systems and structures function as intended. Therefore, the findings of this article suggest that trampling on the powers and functions of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy, in the name of ignorance, have a negative impact on good governance, especially in a new democracy like South Africa. The impact also touches on moral and transformational leadership.

10.RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Flowing from the findings of the empirical study, the above section has outlined the impact that the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa have on good governance. Thus in line with the tradition of providing recommendations just before concluding a research article or report, this section is meant to suggest some recommendations for further study.

While Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 details the functions and powers of the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy, this article has argued that some institutions are more effective than others. Literature surveyed for the purpose of this article has revealed that studies on the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa are minimal. The first recommendation of this article is that more research needs to be conducted on the effectiveness and barriers of other Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy, since this arti-

cle has mainly focused on the Public Protector. It is from this point that the second recommendation of this article is in a form of a suggestion for other researchers to consider conducting a comparative study, for example, of the extent to which the findings of the Auditor-General and the Public Service Commission are being implemented by government departments and/or municipalities.

The final recommendation emanating from this study is for the executive and Parliament to seriously take to heart the lessons learned from the Constitutional Court ruling of 31 March 2016 that the findings and recommendations of the Public Protector are binding. The same respect that is to be given to the Public Protector should thus be extended to all the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa.

Given that the term of office of the current Public Protector comes to an end in September 2016, it was considered proper to ignite the conclusion of this article in the words of the Executive Director of Corruption Watch, David Lewis (31 March 2016), when stating that "... Thuli Madonsela's term of office has underlined how important it is that the Public Protector be a person of integrity and courage."

The powers and functions of all the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa are central to holding the executive and other organs of state accountable. Finally, the executive, the legislature and the

judiciary should then cooperate with the Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy in compliance with the Constitution, the principles of good governance and the systems theory.

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VOTER PARTICIPATION FACTORS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS: INFLUENCES AND PROPOSITIONS FOR VOTER EDUCATION.

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ABSTRACT

Legitimate democracy relies on the widespread public participation in the election process. Voter participation is dependent on voter registration. Voters should indicate from a very early date determined by government their intention to participate in the voting process through a legitimate registration. The article reports findings of a study that investigated factors influencing voter participation in the registration towards the 2016 South African Local Government Elections in South Africa using the case of Mankweng community. The article argues that there is a need for voter education in South Africa before the actual election process take place. This is to increase a unified perception about the value of voter participation on democracy performance. The study applied a mixed method approach in which a sequential exploratory strategy was applied to data collection and analysis. The Mankweng Township within the Polokwane Local Municipality serves as a unit of analysis. Findings of the study revealed mixed perceptions amongst the variety of participants view on participation in the 2016 elections. This has indicated dichotomies amongst age groups and social statuses, about voting and participation significance in the current democratic dispensation in South Africa.

Keywords: Democracy, Democratic dispensation, Local Government Elections, voter registration

1. INTRODUCTION

Voter participation in local government elections is seen as an important measurement of the quality of elections and representation, democratic stability, civic and political culture of a country (Asante, 2014). According to Reynolds (2012: x), voting in elections by citizens is very much encouraged in all democracies as it is the basis of democracy and citizenship. A high turnout is therefore seen as a symbol of higher participation in deci-

sion making and a seal of approval or legitimacy of elections. In Ghana the introduction of the decentralization policy with the district assembly concept seeks to involve citizens at grassroots to participate in governance by playing a major role in decision making. It is for this reason that voter turnout at the District Level Elections are very relevant (Reynolds, 2012: x).

According to Iseghohime (2009:18), in other developing African countries, clientelism is common in political par-

ticipation as most people are poor and struggle to survive. Such people are very loyal and submissive to their patrons who do assist them in various ways, but control their votes, this can influence registration turnout of voters or citizens.

Looking at the previous local government elections, Gouliamos, Theocharous and Newman (2013:103) posit that the reason behind most of young people not registering in the 1995 local government elections was the lack of identity documents and probably political involvement. However, Pallister (2013:1) indicates that there are various factors that pose varying obstacles to participation, amongst others, the provision of voter education, mechanisms of casting a ballot, the distance voters must travel to reach a polling place as well as the differences in the requirements for voters' registration.

Therefore, since voter turnover is influenced by various factors, it is essential that the factors influencing voter participation on local government elections be investigated and possible strategies be tackled. The aim of the study was to investigate the factors influencing voter participation in registration towards the 2016 South African Local Government elections.

This is done by finding the factors from various age groups, identifying perceptions of citizens towards local government elections, determining their awareness of local government issues and the forthcoming elections and recommending options to inspire voter

participation in the local government elections.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Local government in South Africa

During the apartheid era, local government had racial segregations, financial constraints, protesting against a distorted system, and an incomplete transition. However, it does not mean that there are no longer financial constraints in South Africa currently. The South African local government currently comprises of different municipalities in which each municipality has unique different challenges.

There are Metropolitan Councils with Metropolitan Local Councils, district councils, transitional local councils, and rural councils (White Paper on Local Government, 1998). Powell (2012:11) states that the South African society is shaped by a larger political and economic forces, cleavages and problems; therefore, local government is seen as a mirror of the national government.

White Paper on Local Government (1998) indicates that as the basis for a democratic, integrated, prosperous and truly non-racial society, local government has to play its critical role in rebuilding local communities and environments. It must also promote the Bill of Rights which reflects the nation's values about human dignity, equality and freedom, and uphold the principles enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.

Van der Waldt, Venter, Van der Walt, Phutiagae, Khalo and Van Niekerk (2007:17) indicate that local government in South Africa is the closest to the people, and as such renders the bulk of services aimed at achieving a healthy socio-economic and political environment. It comprises of municipalities which help to deliver a wide variety of services.

2.2 The importance of local government elections

According to Alexander and Kane-Berman (2014:4) in local government elections, councilors are elected after every five years. Gallet in Bona magazines (2016:74) wrote that Jolene Steyn Kotze, an associate professor of Political studies at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University said that, "thirty years ago, the colour of our skin determined which jobs and resources you could assess.

Now that we have a choice of political parties and their actions for our lives, and we need to protect our inherent right to make choices, regardless of our identity or social class". Nyalunga (2006) indicates that the majority of South Africans were excluded from owning land in urban areas, employment, education, health and other basic services as a result of a system that was inherited by democratically elected government which aimed at providing quality services for a racially defined, privileged minority. According to Nkala (2014:4) elections serve as a pivotal instruments designed to express and simultaneously reinforce

the principles (representation, equality and participation) on which democracy is founded.

2.3 Local government elections and voter participation

According to Booysen (2012:1), one of the strongest expressions of the locals in South Africa is the concentration of politics around local government elections. Local elections are the lens through which it takes sense to view the politics of the coalface, the interface between citizens and government. Heywood (2013:196) indicates that elections are often thought of as the heart of the political process. Heywood (2013:203) further posits that elections are portrayed as the very heart of democracy by some thinkers. According to Africa (2013) elections in South Africa have become institutionalized.

There is a well-established electoral regulatory framework, electoral machinery and a culture of election observation in South Africa. It is further stated by (IDEA ,2007) in Reynolds (2012: xvi) that in terms of functions, elections serve the following purpose; educating voters, building of the legitimacy of leaders and the government in power, a function that is performed to some extent even by elections that are non-competitive or undemocratic, and strengthening elites.

Pallister (2013:10) indicates that because of more unclear information and a longer journey at a less convenient time, to complete a more complicat-

ed procedure, registration is usually seen more difficult than voting. In various countries there are reforms such as same day registration and later registration dates which seek to reduce the difficulties to voting posed by registration (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2004).

According to Madlala (2016) public participation through local government elections in many instances is perceived as an end in itself, where-by local citizens cast their votes and expect those they have elected to deliver on the voter's expectations and for candidate or political parties manifestos. It is further stated that the public participate in local government firstly by voting in municipal elections and secondly, by exercising their right to be involved in the running of the municipality, being aware of the municipality's plans for development, knowing who their ward councillor is and how to contact him or her (corruption watch,2016).

2.4 The importance of voter registration and participation

Mcebisi (2014:161) indicates that there is a need to stress the importance of registering to vote from the early date prior to when voter registration is no longer an option because a legitimate democracy relies on a widespread public participation in the election process and the importance of voting.

The reasons for citizens to register and vote in the voting district of ordinary residence are; to assist the Electoral Commission with efficient administra-

tive planning of elections and to ensure that voters do not vote more than once in an election (Municipal Elections Report, 2011). Booysen (2012:2) indicates that the relationship between government performance and voting on the local government level in South Africa is not one-to-one, yet it is a closer, more direct and exposed, relationship than what exists on the levels of national and provincial elections.

The hearts and minds of the people of South Africa are shown to a more extent in the local than in comparable national spaces. Christensen and Hogen-Esch (2014:213) also indicate that in a democracy, voters should be the most important influence on government, yet in local politics their interest and participation are often lamentably low.

According to Bowman and Kearney (2016:85) registration matters because in most instances people who are registered are likely to vote and votes translate into political power. Thus, groups anxious to increase their electoral clout will launch registration drives among their membership. Nkala (2014:4) indicates that elections and participation are organically linked and the existence of each depends on the existence of the other.

2.5 Registration procedures and requirements

Mistra-Dexter and February (2010:176) indicate that according to the Constitution of South Africa (1996) and the Electoral Act no 18 Of 2013, voter

registration procedures and election procedure are the sole responsibility of the IEC, although parties themselves lead voter registration drives. According to the Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa (2016) citizens can apply for registration during office hours at the local Electoral Commission office responsible for their voting district, or register to vote on special registration days often called registration weekends.

If citizens moved, they must then go back to a registration point and fill in a form to change registration details. According to Municipal Elections Handbook (2016), when a citizen applies to register as a voter the procedure involves: filling in a paper application form, Identity Document will be scanning and a barcoded sticker will be pasted in the ID or temporary identity certificate.

If a citizen will be registering with a smartcard ID, then separate form will be provided to paste the barcoded sticker which serves as a proof of application to register. However, if a citizen has completed a form and received a barcoded sticker or receipt does not mean they are registered. It will take at least seven working days to process the application.

Williams (2010: 125) states that in 1999 elections, it was required that every eligible voter register prior to election day, two days were set for registration to occur. For the success of this process, necessary rules and guidelines to those living in rural areas were commu-

nicated by chieftaincy structures on behalf of the government, it was also to help mobilize the people to register and then vote.

For this process to be successful in the rural areas, the government relied upon the chieftaincy structures to communicate the necessary rules and guidelines to those living in their areas and to help mobilize people to register and then to vote. According to Mcebisi (2014:194) South African voters have to register at their voting stations in order for them to vote. In order to register, an individual is req

uired to: be a South African citizen with a South African bar-coded ID, be over 18 years of age and be ordinarily resident in the district where he/she is registering.

3. METHODOLOGY

The study used the mixed method to collect and analyse data, following the sequential exploratory strategy. Qualitative research was conducted first in order to create quantitative questions. Interviews were conducted from 20 members of the communities within Mankweng Township and data analysed to create questionnaires. Questionnaires were distributed to 60 members of the same communities (Unit C and G). Non-probability sampling was used where participants were handpicked from the communities. The study investigated voter participation and factors in the South African Local Government Elections. In the study, respondents were required

through interviews and questionnaires to respond to as to whether they are registered voters or not, whether they had an understanding of Local Government Election knowledge, the role of Local Government, the importance of Local Government Elections, Why people should vote, the kind of government to vote for and what inspires people to vote. The results of their perceptions are presented hereunder:

3.1 Registration status

Orford (2011) indicated that the social factors that influence whether a person votes in an election are quite well known and do not vary much between the different types of elections or through time. Generally, turnout is larger in areas that have older and retired people, that have people who are more educated and are in professional or managerial occupations. According to Wang and Kim (2010:12) important variables that may describe the voting and registration gap include: socioeconomic status, lack of mobilization in these communities, the types of community in which the citizen resides, language issues, and administrative

discrimination. Bowman and Kearney (2016:81) agrees that one explanation for nonparticipation in politics is socioeconomic status. The respondents were required to confirm their registration status for the 2016 Local Government Elections in South Africa on the questionnaire. The results of the figure below shows that the majority of the respondents were not registered for

the 2016 Local Government Elections in South Africa from the Mankweng Community. A disturbing issue about this is that the majority of those not registered are the youthful group at the ages of 18-30.

Figure 1: Registration Status



53% of the participants indicated that they did not register to vote and then 47 % indicated that they registered to vote. This becomes a problem to the democracy of the country because, the government will deliver the wrong services to wrong people and there will always be protest because people do not participate in the local elections or local issues at large. However, it cannot be concluded that they do not want participate without having clear reasons for that. Thus this article investigated the factors influencing voter participation particularly in the local government elections.

Participants indicated that some of the reasons for not participating in the local government elections is that they are not interested in politics, because of long queues that they have to stand when registering to vote, poor service delivery in their communities and that some did not have knowledge of local government elections and they

were not aware of the registration. It is important for people to understand what local government elections are, why is it important to have them and the role that local governments play, particularly those people that are being voted for in the local government elections.

3.2. Understanding of local government elections


According to Orford (2011) the rate of turnout is prominently influenced by the political context of an election. People who live in safe seat areas are less likely to vote than in those where there is a close contest between politicians so called marginal seats.

This can be very striking in local elections where local councillors compete for seats in small areas called electoral wards. This may be as a result of politicians campaigning harder in the ward if the elections are nearby, encouraging and reminding people to go out and vote for them. Britain, parliament, House of Commons, Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2014: 7) indicate that people's feeling to vote and also their likelihood to be registered to vote in the first place are affected by several factors. These include political disengagement and dissatisfaction; the value of voting and concerns about where the power lies. The respondents were required to indicate their understanding and their attachment of value to Local Government Elections.

The figure below shows that respon-

dents provided various responses in relation to how they view Local Government Elections in South Africa.

Figure2: Understanding local elections



About 67% agrees, (27%) strongly agree, (7%) is unsure, (0%) disagrees, and another (0%) strongly disagree that local government elections is about electing councillors. On the second statement that local government elections are about ensuring people's needs are met, (40%) agrees, (23%) strongly agree, (25%) is unsure, (8%) disagrees and (3%) strongly disagrees.


On the statement of local government elections is about the process of participation within democracy, 47% agrees, 25% strongly agrees, 15% is unsure, 10% disagrees and 3% strongly disagree. On the last statement indicating that local government is about deciding who runs the local councils, (52%) agrees, (27%) strongly agree, (17%) is unsure, (5%) disagrees and 0% strongly disagrees.

3.3. The importance of local government elections

Abbott and Hetzel (2010:359) indicate

that the low registrations and resulting low voter turnout could be attributed to the time and expense of appearing twice in order to vote. Another problem was the lack of information surrounding the voting stations. Pallister (2013:1) indicates that there are various factors that pose varying obstacles to participation, amongst others, the provision of voter education, mechanisms of casting a ballot, the distance voters must travel to reach a polling place as well as the differences in the requirements for voters' registration. According to Jones, Jones, Woods, Whitehead, Dixon and Hannah (2014) the mapping of voting behaviour is one of the oldest elements of political geography. Voting patterns differ spatially and there is a relationship between these and the spatial distribution of other social and economic entities. The respondents were required to tell if they understand the importance of Local Government Elections. The responses from the figure below shows that people have different perceptions of the importance of Local Government Elections.

Figure 3: The importance of local elections



The diagram above shows that 60 % of the population agrees that the importance of local government elections is to choose citizens or representatives from the community, 23% strongly agrees, 5% is unsure, another 5% disagrees and 7% strongly disagree. 57% of the population agrees that the importance of local government elections is to allow people to contribute to and be involved in their local communities, 28% strongly agrees, 12% is unsure, 0% disagrees and 3% strongly disagree.


The results further show that 60% of the population agrees that it is important to have local government elections in order to be able to hold municipalities to account in the provision of services, 23% strongly agrees, 13% is unsure, 0% disagrees and 3% strongly disagree. Participants further continue to show by 63% that they agree that local government elections ensure that democracy rests on the right shoulder and 23% strongly agree, 10% is unsure, 0% disagrees and 3% strongly disagrees.

3.4 The role of local government

The roles of local government according to respondents in the study are: to deliver municipal services; to inform citizens about important issues in the communities; to provide a democratic and accountable government for local communities and to promote a healthy and safe environment.

The respondents provided varying perceptions as to what can be perceived as the role of local government.

Figure 4: The role of local government




A higher percentage of 65% agrees, 25% strongly agree, 8% is unsure, 0% disagree and 2% strongly disagree to the statement that states that the role of local government is to deliver municipal services. 56% agrees, 17% strongly agrees, 20% is unsure, 7% disagrees and 0% strongly disagrees with the statement that indicates that the role of local government is to inform citizens about important issues. In the statement that posits that the role of local government is to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities, 63% agrees, 23% strongly agrees, 7% is unsure and another 7% disagrees. 53% agrees, 20% strongly agrees, another 20% is unsure, 3% disagrees and 3% strongly disagrees that the role of local government is to promote a safe and healthy environment.

3.5. Options to inspire voter participation in local government elections

According to Blais et al, 2004 in Orford (2011) voting in elections is an important political and social issue. There are many factors determining whether a person will vote in an election. These include social factors, political factors and geographical factors. Wang and Kim (2010:12) state that most of the literature on political participation to date has focused on the gap in voter turnout, rather than the divergence in voter registration. Registration plays a central role in the nativity gap in turnout, and the factors of voting apply to the probability of voter registration as well. Options to inspire voters' participation included the following, voter education should be implemented to communicate information about when, where and how they should register to vote and vote; politics of local government should be made business of everyone; public awareness should be raised about the value of local government and role it plays in everyday lives and online system to register to vote and vote should be introduced.

Figure 5: Options to inspire voters' participation in local government elections.



A higher percentage (52%) agrees that voter's education should be implemented to communicate information about when, where and how to register to vote. 50% agrees that politics of local government should be made business of everyone. The issue to raise public awareness of the value of local government and the role it plays in everyday lives; a higher percentage of the population is agreed at (53%). 42% of the respondents indicated that online system to register and to vote should be introduced.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article revealed that the IEC has indeed introduced the voters' education, however, the teams are not effective as the public may realise that during or before the elections. Most respondents showed that they do not value the election processes for a variety of reasons. Such reveals that voter education done is not sufficient across the country about the voting processes. This study therefore recommend the following:

People in various communities should be taught about how local government works; we should be able to

follow the proper protocol when the issues arise. Therefore, the IEC team for voters' education should always be active.

- Local government issues should be the matter of every citizen because it is put in power by citizens' votes.
- Voting stations should be opened for the whole months before the 3 months of elections so that people can be given enough time to go and register to vote and IEC people should go door to door not only for people who are disabled or sick but rather for

everyone because some people are just lazy to walk to the voting stations.

- The government should provide people with what they need, for people to vote there must be improvement in our places, jobs must be provided.
- It can also be recommended that councillors should have enough time to spend with the citizens in the communities in which they serve to listen to their needs and this should be done on regular basis not only by the time of elections.
- Municipalities should ensure that the needs of citizens should be met; they should provide basic services such as water, sewage removals, municipal health service and street lights particularly in rural areas.

In conclusion, in order to ensure increase in voters' registration, it should be considered that the key pillars that influence voters to participate in local government elections registrations be addressed. The different factors should be addressed differently since they also differ. It is of paramount importance that citizens should be made aware of positive effects of participation in elections, through educating learners at an early age at school; this could stimulate youth participation in elections. Every citizen has the right to vote and voters' participation could

contribute to the improvement of the country. In local government elections, that is where citizens are given a chance to vote for the people who they feel will look after their service delivery interests such as water, electricity, streets, lights and etc. therefore, it is essential that citizens participate in the local government elections. Councillors should also take it in mind that they should be close to the citizens because many people complain about councillors only coming to them when they are campaigning towards elections.

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PROVISION OF QUALITY ROADS INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA: RURAL VILLAGERS' PERCEPTIONS, POLOKWANE MUNICIPALITY IN LIMPOPO PROVINCE

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ABSTRACT

The amalgamation of municipalities in South Africa poses a critical challenge of service delivery. Post 1994, South African governments have always acknowledged that there were serious infrastructure backlogs, which includes roads, health, telecommunications and housing. The new municipalities, created mainly on the bases of the need to share resources between the previously advantaged and disadvantaged municipalities, do not seem to have yielded good results to-date. The amalgamation of rural, townships and urban areas continue to display some form of inequality regarding the provision of services in some municipalities. Service provision and development projects, like before, continue to be centered around urban settlements. On the other hand, the 1996 Constitution of South Africa discourages unequal service provision to the populace. The question of quality infrastructure, especially roads is necessary in regard to the way it is provided in rural areas. While it is believed that ward councilors from rural, semi-urban and urban municipalities form part of the municipal council, there are concerns in the way they represent their constituencies, since it is not known how the disparities of service provision happen in the same municipalities. This article therefore uses the case study of Polokwane municipality in Limpopo Province to argue that well-resourced municipalities which were burdened with rural villages under their ambit continue to provide services which are perceived by affected rural communities as unequal and of a substandard quality at times.

Keywords: Service Delivery, Road Infrastructure, Village, Quality, Transport Costs.

1. INTRODUCTION

The provision of services by municipalities in South Africa is a constitutional right. One of the major concerns of service delivery in South African municipalities has been about lack of road provision. Poor provision of roads has been identified as a cause for loss

of business profitability, tourism and investments (Johansson, 2004: 15; Sebola, 2014; Duranton, 2015). Road Infrastructure Development has been a major course of concern in South Africa. Poor road infrastructure is said to be a major cause of road accidents, low economic output in areas of concern and a threat to the durability of

transport modes such as taxis. A further major concern about road infrastructure in South Africa is also connected to disparity in service provision. Such disparity is said to originate from the model used by the government in which previously advantaged municipalities have to share resources with the previously disadvantaged municipalities. The model was intended to ensure equal sharing of resources so that development would be equally achieved in targeted areas. The perception of the recipients of such services from rural areas amalgamated with urban or sub-urban settlements are overwhelmingly that unequal service provision continues to characterise such relationship, with the former receiving sub-standard service.

This article reports the results of a questionnaire survey which was designed around three major research questions: What is the perception of the rural communities of the Polokwane municipality about the status of roads service provision in the area?; What are the perceptions of the rural communities, selected motorists, the political leadership and the government officials' perspective about the quality of roads provision in the area?; and, What are the perceptions of the political leadership and government officials about the quality of services they provide to the study areas? The article presents literature relevant to this empirical study, mostly covering that on the role of local government in roads provision in South Africa and the notion of quality infrastructure provision; and latter, it interprets the survey

results and relates them to the theoretical principles formulated. First, though, and given the nature of the research conducted for the study wherefrom the material was drawn for this article, a brief description of the methodological design adopted in the study from which the material of this article was drawn.

2. METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH

The study from which the material for this article was drawn used a judicious combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods for data collection and analysis. The key instruments for data collection included desktop literature survey, questionnaires and personal face-to-face interviews.

In analysis of literature, this article draws from a set of sources that describe the service delivery tasks as conceived for the South African government, wherefrom the specifics of the role of local government in the provision of roads and road infrastructure was distilled, and the nature and status of roads were discussed to examine them as determinants of trade, transportation costs and economic growth. This article uses this literature material to formulate conceptual principles for the examination of the empirical data collected about opinions of the road infrastructure and its provision.

Further, empirical data was collected from four rural villages under the jurisdiction of the Polokwane Local Munic-

ipality, namely: Ga-Molepo, Segopje, Komaneng and Thabakgone. These villages were selected on the basis of convenience sampling design. Within each of the four villages, respondent households were sampled using a randomized technique and the specific respondent with whom the questionnaire was administered was conveniently selected as the eldest member who lived on full-time basis in the village. Eighty (80) questionnaires were administered in each of the four villages; and, the return rate was 100% as a total of 320 completed questionnaires were secured.

For interviewees, purposive sampling was used to identify motorists, ward councilors and local government officials for face-to-face interviews. Whereas the plan was to interview at least 5 motorists, 4 ward councilors and 4 local government officials, the success rate was limited as only one person in each of these categories was willing to make time for interview. This limitation should not detract from the accuracy of the general trends in communities' perceptions of road infrastructure and its provision because 320 voices more were analysed.

The study from which this article draws was ethically sound because the participation of respondents was voluntary; and, in the administration of questionnaires, respondents were thoroughly informed about the purpose of the survey and collection of the information. The same ethical standards were observed in respect of the interviews. All interviewees and ques-

tionnaire respondents were assured of confidentiality and anonymity as well as the right to withdraw from participation if, at any stage of the process, they felt uncomfortable.

Given the nature of data collection instruments used in this study two forms of data analysis methods were used. For qualitative results obtained through interviews, a qualitative analysis method was followed in which data was transcribed, sorted into themes and sub-themes for analysis. Quantitative data collected through questionnaires was analysed through the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), which sorted, arranged and presented data in the form of frequencies, percentages and graphs. Next, we provide a brief discussion of conceptual principles relevant to road infrastructure and its provision.

3. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT AND SERVICE DELIVERY TASKS

Service delivery in South Africa is a constitutional requirement. For roads provision such requirement is to be fulfilled through legislative frameworks such as the Constitution (1996), Municipal Structures Act 32 of 2000 and the Road Infrastructure Strategic Framework.

The compliance with these frameworks is ensuring the citizens of their right to equal quality service provision. Mokale & Scheepers (2011: 1) have noted that failure to adhere to legal frameworks by local government officials in South Africa is a function of the failure of service delivery mandate given to

government institutions. That has, as a matter of fact, denied the citizens of South Africa the socio-economic rights promised to them by their constitution. David, Theron & Maphunye (2005: 46) identified issues that prohibit the residents access to their constitutional rights as administrative complexity of legal provisions, poor implementation of existing legislation and lack of access to affordable legal service. To this extent, failure to address this limitation earlier to citizens' rights to quality service has caused the South African government more in financial terms. The citizens have responded through violence which destroyed available services provided.

That caused the government to first start by rehabilitating destroyed services before providing the service that was fought for. Johansson (2004: 8) considers roads as a factor that links all people and the society as a whole.

However, the South Africans did not complain more about road provision than other services provided, but have mostly complained about the quality of roads provided in the country. It is known however that all successful socio-economic activities are achievable in areas with good road infrastructure.

Road infrastructure delivery should therefore be considered a genuine shared responsibility among the three spheres of government in South Africa. Cooperation among the three spheres of government is significant to overcome the service delivery challenges

faced by the country (Reddy, Sing & Moodley, 2003: 43).

The independence, distinctiveness and the interrelations among these spheres is however still an academic matter than a pragmatic affair. It is argued that if there is no clear cooperation and co-ordination of activities among the three spheres of government, there will be very little chance for realising service delivery mandates to the satisfaction of the country's citizens.

4. THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ROAD PROVISION

The local government is the only sphere that is closer to the local communities for purposes of service provision (Ntonzima, 2011; Mle & Mclean, 2011; Sebola, 2015; Madue, 2015, Kgamanyane, 2015). Bekink (2006) emphasised that municipalities should strive to fulfill a constitutional mandate by delivering service to the South African citizens.

Being a closest sphere to the people it has to ensure that all developmental plans are achieved through a participatory approach in which citizens become part of the overall developmental agenda of the municipality. Lack or failure to facilitate appropriate participation by local communities is but a major cause of service delivery protests which results in public property destruction.

As Dipholo, Mafema & Tshisonga (2011) noted, participation have become a center stage of development

discourse. It is participation that will minimize a misunderstanding between the state and its own people.

All local governments in South Africa are responsible for managements of infrastructure projects in their areas of responsibility (Rural Infrastructure Development, 2000: 155). Manning & Shoji (2006) however argues that some delegated responsibilities of the local government are not easily achievable because such has to be achieved without proper funds and limited power to manage and maintain infrastructure projects in the rural areas.

Thus far however, it is notable that it is not only the little funds and limited power to manage that inhibit the municipalities to achieve their service delivery mandate, there are other factors such as capacity issues and lack of political will to perform public functions in South African local governments. While the majority of authors associated lack of infrastructure delivery at local government level with insufficient funds, Torres (2000: 98) argues that lack of administrative capacity in which most officials do not have necessary skills and qualifications to do municipal work causes them to fail to deal with the challenges of delivering service to a large scale population.

It can however be argued that while insufficient funds could be a contributor to service delivery failure, the administrative ability by municipal officials to manage those funds could be a major problem in delivering service to the recipients. The construction and

maintenance of roads services requires a substantial amount of sustainable cash utilisation.

5. SOUTH AFRICAN ROADS AND THEIR STATUS

It is the quality of road infrastructure in South Africa that will determine the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the citizens (Collinson & Patterson-Abrolat 2016; Gquaji, 2016). Since the 1994, the South African government has provided and improved a good number of services to the citizens.

Upgrading and construction of new infrastructure did take place; however, there was little appreciation from the (citizens) recipients who never complained about the quantity, but the quality of infrastructure provided. Featuring high on these complains were the quality of low cost housing and the tare roads that were easily swept away during rainy seasons. Fedderke & Garlick (2008) concluded that the quality of infrastructure provision in South Africa is high although it varies considerably between urban and rural areas.

This may be emanating from the assumption that quality is difficult to measure in absolute terms since it involves a variety of variables such as improvements of the physical infrastructure and the services it provides. Negote (2001: 3) added that South Africa's road network is attractive and unique. This is in comparison with other African countries in the continent. Jerome &

Ariyo (2004: 1) indicated that the quality of roads provision in Africa is by far much below standard in terms of both quality and quantity. Roads infrastructure quality has basically several significances in socio-economic activities and development namely: determinant of trade, determinant of transport costs and economic advancement.

5.1 Determinants of Trade

Quality infrastructure is considered to be the most important means of improving trade among countries (Felderke & Garlick, 2008: 4; Kgamanyane, 2015). Poor infrastructure such as roads may lead to countries opting for other means of transportation to deliver their merchandises which is a costly option. If infrastructure is important for trade, then infrastructure development is also beneficial for poverty alleviation.

The more road infrastructure develops the easier for trading with other sectors and that create more chances of promoting economic growth while at the same time directly reducing the level of poverty (Mbekeani, 2007: 1). Thus far in South Africa the quality of road infrastructure is not easy to measure, but transportation infrastructure is easy to measure as it only entails investigating the time that most South Africans travels from and to work.

5.2 Determinant of Transport Costs

Infrastructure is an important determinant of transport costs (Escribano, Guash & Pena, 2010). Kharadoo & Seetanah (2007: 2) argues that good

infrastructure condition may open up an opportunity for investors to operate successfully and avoid increased costs for firms. The delivery of products through road networks faces challenges in rural areas due to poor roads conditions. Often as captured by Nordas & Piermartini (2004: 3) poor quality infrastructure leads to risks of goods delivered to either be delayed or damaged on delivery which often leads to a loss and insurance costs to firms. On the other hand, it should be noted that it is the distance, geography and infrastructure that influences transportation costs (Micco & Serebrisky, 2004: 2).

Adequate infrastructure is a major determinant of more transport costs. It is however notable from studies conducted in this regard that transport costs for road and sea shows contradictory variables in terms of transport costs .i.e. with roads transportation the more the distance the more the transport costs increases while with sea transport the shorter the distance the slight increases of transport cost occurs. Korinek & Sourdin (2006) emphasised that if indeed distance is a determinant of transport costs then it will be difficult to determine the true effect of transportation costs.

5.3 Economic Advancement

Infrastructure development is central in the promotion of economic growth (Gquaji, 2016). This sentiment has been echoed several times by political leadership of the South African government. Umoren, Ikurekong, Emmanuel & Udida (2009) argue that improved

rural roads infrastructure is important in the rural communities' economy and advances their livelihoods.

Lack of adequate and quality road infrastructure in rural areas impact negatively on the life of the affected communities. Poor roads provision in rural areas continues to be a threat to economic advancement of local communities. Organisations wishing to venture into businesses are to a particular extend influenced or attracted by reliable and proper road infrastructure.

6. ROAD PROVISION IN RURAL AREAS

Lombard & Coetzer (2007: 2) indicated that the development of rural roads is a priority for most developing countries. This is mostly because the development of such roads is likely to reduce the highest level of poverty achievable through job creation to emanate from such projects. Department of Roads and Transport (2010) estimated that 70% of the gravel roads in South Africa are in the rural areas. In examining the status of road provision

this study probed the following: type of roads provided in the area, municipal responsive to road provision, condition of roads provided and maintenance in the area.


7. DISCUSSIONS OF RESULTS

This article probes three aspects of the research from where the material reported was drawn, namely: the perception of the rural communities about the status of road provision in their area, the quality of roads provided and their level of satisfaction. The discussion of findings unfolds in a few subsections hereunder.

7.1 Current Status of Roads Provided in the Area

The 2010 FIFA world cup has impacted positively on roads provision in South Africa (National Treasury, 2011: 164). Polokwane being one of the host cities is expected to have achieved more in road infrastructure development. Figure 1 below shows the level of road development in the rural areas.

Figure 1: Roads provided by the Municipality in the villages




The above figure reveals a highest level of road development of the rural areas under the jurisdiction of the Polokwane municipality. There are more (52.2%) tarred roads in the area than gravel roads (15%). Only few roads (2.2%) are paved. Such developments are not easily achievable in other rural municipalities.

This achievement can be linked to the amalgamation of municipalities in which the under resourced former black townships (Mankweng) was merged with Polokwane. The other attractive force for this development could be linked to the popularity of the Holy City of Morija which is close to the study areas.

7.2 Responsive to Road Provision

Makgoba (2006) argues that the level of satisfaction by the local municipalities is determined by the level of the municipalities responsive to local community's needs. Madumo (2012; Sebola, 2015) indicated that local governments provide basic and other municipal related services to the citizen's directly in a particular area of jurisdiction. The success of any municipality is determined by how they are perceived by their constituency in terms of services received. Constitutionally municipalities are to be responsive of the local needs. The perception of the Polokwane rural communities in this regard are as follow:

Figure 2: Local municipality is responsive in terms of road provision



The general perception of local communities is that the Polokwane municipality is not responsive to the communities in terms of road provision. The findings in this regard seem to be contradicting the results in Figure 1 which suggests a successful road provision in the same rural areas.

This may be linked to a thin line between the provisions of road infrastructure as against the quality of road infrastructure provided. Often communities demonstrate their lack of satisfaction by claiming that a provided service does not exist because of its quality. There are however 32% responses from members of the same communities that are of the opinion that the municipality is responsive in


terms of road provisions in the rural areas of Polokwane municipality.

7.3 Conditions of Roads Provided

The contribution of roads to the economic development is currently a significant focus of development (Karani, 2008: 1). Most countries are ensuring that the conditions of roads are improved for the purposes of economic upliftment of the surrounding communities.

The conditions of roads in areas of business interests determine their attractiveness to potential investors. The closure of the spatial difference between towns and rural areas is highly dependent on developed road infrastructure which will ultimately lead to the need for the improvement of transport infrastructure. Conditions of roads as perceived by the residents of the rural communities of Polokwane demonstrated as follow.

Figure 3: Conditions of roads in the villages



The overall perception drawn from the respondents on this aspect of study gives evidence that roads provided in the rural areas of the Polokwane municipality are not of a good standard. This may link well with contradictory perceptions in both Figure 1 and figure 2 about the municipal's successful achievement in road provision vis-à-vis unsuccessful response to the communities needs in road provision. This therefore infer to an assumption that the Polokwane municipality

is indeed providing roads to the local communities, but such roads are assumingly not in a good condition to satisfy the rural community's needs.

7.4 Communities' Level Of Satisfaction About Quality Of Roads Provided

As much as the level of satisfaction of human beings cannot be quantitative-

ly measured in absolute terms, Fourie (2006: 14) asserts that quality infrastructure in South Africa is difficult to measure. It is generally accepted from various studies on infrastructure development that South Africa's infrastructure is relatively good; however, the quality is doubtful and difficult to measure.

Acknowledging the difficulty and un-

reliable measurement techniques of quality infrastructure this study probed from the residents of the rural areas under the jurisdiction of the Polokwane municipality their perception about the municipalities ability to maintain roads regularly, quality of roads provided, provision of roads that is not well maintained and poor maintenance of roads as a major cause of roads accident in the area.


7.5 Regular Maintenance of Roads Provided

Road maintenance backlogs are common in most developing countries. Minkley & Phiri (2010: 21) argues that in South Africa provincial road

maintenance backlogs in 2006 was estimated at R 6.5 billion. Municipalities are likely to be highly affected by this since they have to generate their own revenue in order to deliver quality service to the residents.

Torres (2000: 88) argues that maintenance in Gauteng Province has high service delivery impressions in comparison with other provinces of the country. Perception of rural communities on the maintenance of roads reveals some interesting patterns. Those are demonstrated by the results shown in figure 4 that the quantity level of roads provided in the area does not imply satisfaction of residents about the service provided.

Figure 4: Regular maintenance of roads



The perception drawn from this analysis is that there is no satisfactory road maintenance by the municipality in the rural areas of Polokwane municipality. There is lower percentage (25%) of respondents that are of the opinion that road maintenance is done regularly. The reason for this difference perception could be linked to reasons of priority in terms of municipal development strategies in the area.

The assumption could be that residents of Thabakgone which is closer to Moria City may view road maintenance as regular because of such attraction. But the residents from Molepo, Segopje and Komaneng may have a different opinion.

This perception still links to the previous findings that while roads are said to have been provided, but their quality and sustainability fails to satisfy the needs of the locals.


7.6 Quality of Roads Provided

It is argued that in South Africa the focus is much more on the quantity of service delivery than the quality of service to be provided to its citizens. That assumption to a certain extent threatens the integrity of the institutions responsible for service delivery.

Parakesit (2002: 14) and Fourie (2006: 17) are of the opinion that the municipalities have limitations in providing acceptable services and should therefore use the services of the private sector.

Municipal roads are therefore likely to be poorly maintained because of lack of sufficient funds by municipalities. The perception of the residents of Polokwane on the quality of roads provided is as follow:

Figure 5: Poor quality of roads provided by the municipality



The overall analysis of this figure reveals that the residents of the four study areas in this research were of the opinion that the roads provided by the municipality are of poor quality. Only a substantial number of respondents (29, 3%) are of the opinion that roads are not of poor quality.

This shows that there are members of the communities who are satisfied about the provided service irrespective of its quality. Poor quality roads would however threaten the economic potential of such areas. Roads that are provided but not well maintained could be costlier to life when developing potholes. There is however good correlations among responses in this

study that the Polokwane municipality have indeed provided sufficient road infrastructure which could not be well maintained for a variety of reason and therefore its quality drops.


7.7 Poor Road Maintenance as a Contributor to Roads Accidents

May (1998: 8) explain that rural roads

are significant to reduce poverty and inequality and therefore requires more attention. Johansson (2004: 8) on the other hand argues that despite the significance of the development of rural roads, such roads remain in bad conditions and neglected. A neglect of such roads mostly contributes to accidents that cause the country a loss

of talents and economically active citizens. Therefore, the provision of quality infrastructure roads cannot be seen from the context of economy only but also from a perspective of the safety of life of the citizens. With regard to the conditions of the roads as contributor to roads accidents the respondents revealed as follow.

Figure 6: Poor road maintenance as a cause of numerous accidents in the municipality



An analysis that is drawn from this figure above demonstrates that poor road maintenance in the municipality is a major cause of roads accident in the area. This may as well link to what World Bank (1994) warned that inadequate maintenance and poor infrastructure development is universal among developing countries. South Africa also has been observed to be country that focusses mostly on implementing new infrastructure than upgrading and maintaining the existing ones. That ultimately undermines the government's objective of development since infrastructures exist but at the level of a quality that cannot be appreciated by beneficiaries. It is on the basis of poor infrastructure maintenance in South Africa that citizens perceive such as a cause of major roads accident in the areas concerned.

7.8 Motorists, Political Leadership And Government Officials

Data collected through interviews in this regard showed that there is gap between what is called the public, government officials and the politicians. In all fairness the inclusion of these groups in the study was to qualify the authenticity of data obtained from

the overall communities of the study. It came out clear that the perception of the respondents is different as their experiences of service delivery are from a different background. It came clear from the findings that the selected motorist's view of road provision aligns its perception to the views of the local communities, while on the other hand the view of the political leadership in

the study areas have their perception tying to that of the government official interviewed. This reveals the notion of the lack of clear participation strategies between politicians, communities and government officials. From this analysis, it is clear that the municipality of Polokwane is indeed capable of providing the required services as dictated by the national government strategic objectives, but that is mainly guided by the quantity that the government want to achieve than the quality required by the citizens of the country. Failure to manage this gap between the two camps is what mostly leads to service delivery protests which often lead to citizens destroying the existing infrastructures hence exacerbating a backlog for government need to provide more infrastructures.

8.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The article addressed one of the significant aspects of development in South Africa. From the analysis and findings of this two significant aspects came out clear; firstly, that the perceptions of the rural residents of Polokwane municipality are that the services they are provided with in terms of road infrastructure is of a sub-standard quality. Secondly, this article also revealed that Polokwane Local Municipality has been able to provide a quantifiable number of roads infrastructures in the areas of study. This therefore means that the municipality is facing a challenge in regard to providing quality road infrastructure that will satisfy their rural residents. That is a challenge that

they have to deal with in order to reduce the level of citizen dissatisfaction with regard to government services.

Given the orientation of the study wherefrom material for this article was drawn, specific recommendations became inevitable. From the findings and analysis of the survey results three recommendations were made on provision of quality roads, investment in road infrastructure, and cooperation among community members, politicians and government officials.

Provision of quality roads: The quantity of roads infrastructure in South Africa is sufficient and therefore only the quality is not of acceptable standard. Responsible authorities should consider the needs of the citizens and satisfy them. Snieska & Simkunita (2009) argues that it is the quality of road infrastructure that underpins the life of the people. In South Africa the taxi industry is a major contributor to the local economies, but such potential is limited by the conditions of roads which causes regular mechanical damages to their vehicles. Roads that are not properly maintained are indeed a liability to the state than a solution. Maintenance of roads could be expensive if infrastructures are neglected for a long time. Quality roads infrastructure reduces roads accident and increase safety and life span of transport facilities used.

Investment in road infrastructure projects: Roads infrastructure is a significant tool to achieve local economic development. It is road infrastructure

projects that can open up ways for enhancing growth and poverty reduction (Lombard & Coetzer, 2007: 4). Investment in infrastructure is to be ensured by all government institutions in order to achieve the service delivery imperatives of the government. Road development infrastructures are significant projects in employing and using local skills and expertise.

Co-operation among locals, politicians and government officials:

Reddy, Sing & Moodly (2003: 43) emphasised co-operation among stakeholders as a solution to address developmental challenges. One of the critical finding of this study is that there are different perceptions of service delivery achievements by the above-mentioned stakeholders.

The different perceptions in this regard imply that they are working in isolation from each other. If working together through a transparent participatory approach, communities would understand the existing challenges of development in their areas without blaming the state for lack of attention to their interests and needs.

As much as the state requires inputs from the local communities, they should also communicate their challenges to the communities so that those are known to them.

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SOCIETAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS EQUAL SHARING OF UNPAID CARE AND DOMESTIC WORK WITHIN HOUSEHOLDS BY MEN AND WOMEN IN MPUMALANGA PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to examine societal attitudes towards the equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work within households by men and women in the Mpumalanga Province of South Africa. It is argued that unpaid care and domestic work is mainly done by women due to patriarchal historical practices which puts women in compromising positions that subordinate them to men. Women's contribution to the economy through unpaid care and domestic work is said not to be recognised as important because it is difficult to assign any economic value to it. This article used semi-structured interviews to probe societal attitudes towards the equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work within households by men and women. The article concludes that even though women do most of the unpaid care and domestic work in South Africa, more men are now aware of the importance of sharing household labour and are getting more involved than previously done.

Keywords: Domestic work ,Economy , Patriarchal ,Unpaid care,

1. INTRODUCTION

South Africa is a signatory to the Beijing Platform for Action which was promulgated and signed by one hundred and eighty-nine (189) states in 1995. South Africa is therefore obliged to take into consideration the requirements of the treaty which calls for the recognition of unpaid care and domestic work performed by women as contributing to the economy (Budlender & Brathaug, 2002: 1). Women's unpaid work is argued to be crucial in contributing to poverty alleviation (Waring, 2003) mostly because it is done voluntarily. The treaty calls for governments to implement gender impact analysis

of economic policy making to ensure equal opportunities for women, to undertake legislative reforms, to give women equal access to economic resources and to measure unpaid care and domestic work performed by women. The article aims to investigate societal attitudes towards the equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work within households by men and women. Unpaid care and domestic work done by women is argued to be contributing to the world's economy and yet this is not recognised since it is work done by women (George *et al*, 2009: 10; Kabeer, 2012: 14; Orr & van Meelis, 2014: 33 UN-Women, 2015:83).

Women spend more time on unpaid care and domestic work than men because patriarchy relegates unpaid work to women because it is deemed to be inferior and has no economic base. In achieving objectives of this article, the authors' uses literature to contextualise unpaid care and domestic work, using the Marxist theoretical perspective for unpaid and domestic work, the putting of unpaid and domestic work into national accounts and the division of unpaid work and domestic work at household's level and the discussions of the results collected in the four municipalities of Mpumalanga province.

2. DEFINING UNPAID CARE AND DOMESTIC WORK

Unpaid care and domestic work refers to work that is necessary for the subsistence of life and health, care of the elderly, handicapped, child bearing and rearing, socialisation of children, teaching, feeding, transporting and all essential emotional and psychological work which goes into developing people so that they become productive members of society, which is mainly done by women (ECLAC, 2007:6; Budlender, 2008: 1; Kabeer, 2012: 14; Orr & van Meelis, 2014: 34; UN-Women, 2015: 82). Unlike paid work which normally happens between 9h00 am and 17h00 pm (George et al, 2009: 13), unpaid care and domestic work has no time limits. It happens throughout the day and sometimes depending on whether there are sick family members who need care, or the availability of children. It is argued that men are able

to work and contribute openly to the economy because women, whether sisters, mothers, aunts supply free care and domestic work for them (George et al, 2009:11). The involvement of women in the care of their families makes it possible for them to contribute directly to economies whilst women's contribution remains indirect and thus discreet or invisible to the eyes of patriarchal remnants.

3. MARXIST PERSPECTIVE WITH REGARD TO WOMEN AND UNPAID DOMESTIC WORK

The Marxist perspective argues that the reason women find themselves in the position where they are exploited, oppressed and discriminated against is because of the way men in society have been socialised. Men have been socialised in a way that they regard the exploitation, oppression and discrimination of women in the workplace and at home as a normal practice. The oppression, discrimination and exploitation of women in the workplace by men is said to be regarded as normal to the extent that it naturally spills over into the homes and relationships with women everywhere. This also leads to the economic exploitation of women because the position that men occupy is that of power in which men are able to make decisions that favour them than women. Women are then consistently socialised into submission and doing unpaid labour such as domestic work in the households. They also see themselves as the sole care providers hence their roles are determined as domestic workers

and child minders and not in positions where they can influence sound decision making issues about own life and issues around and about themselves.

The Marxist perspective suggests that women often find themselves in a master servant relationship with. This reveals itself well in circumstances where women do unpaid work both in the household and on cultivated land. This behaviour is seen as a capitalist behaviour in which men benefits more than women in the relationship. This is comparable towards the Marxists calls employer – employee exploitative relationship. What is important about this perspective is that despite the unequal power relationship between men and women which is as old as nature itself, men are however not seen or regarded as enemies of the women folk. This is because even though the relationship is seen to disadvantage the other party (women), both parties have worked to see to it that it works, as it has for decades and to date. Marxist feminists however indicate that for equality to prevail, for discrimination, oppression and exploitation to cease, the capitalist system needs to be overthrown by the oppressed and the exploited mass (Pati, 2006: 14; Sarikakis, Rush & Grubb-Swetnam, 2009: 505; Standford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2010: 3; Zake, 2011; Tschurennev, 2013: 266) so that a democratic and free society can be achieved. The exploitative relationship as mentioned by Marx above is the cause of women being regarded as a source of cheap labour for men, both inside the house and in the community, hence the need for

equal distribution of household labour between men and women.

4. THE INCLUSION OF UNPAID CARE AND DOMESTIC WORK IN THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

The International Conference of Labour Statisticians agreed in 2013 to include unpaid care and domestic work in the System of National Accounts (SNA). These are internationally agreed standard set of economic activity in accordance with strict accounting conventions based on economic principles. It is used to measure, analyse and evaluate the performance of an economy. It thus provides information about the economy's assets and liabilities and the wealth of its inhabitants at a particular period. It also provides information about the behaviour of institutional units such as non-financial and financial corporations, government units, households as units by giving information on production, consumption an accumulation of assets about them (EC, IMF, OECD, UN & World Bank, 2008: 1; Budlender & Brathaug, 2002: 1). The shortcoming about SNA is that it is mainly concerned with services that are produced and sold in monetary terms which exclude services that are produced but cannot be measured in monetary terms even though they contribute indirectly to the economy such as women's unpaid care and domestic work.

Unpaid care and domestic work is said to be falling outside the scope of the SNA (STATS SA, 2010: 1; UN-Women, 2015: 83) hence the call during the

International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 2013 to include unpaid care and domestic work in the System of National Accounts. The challenge however remains on how to put financial value on unpaid care and domestic work done by women.

According to Budlender & Brathaug (2002: 6), Budlender (2008: 34), and George *et al* (2009:13), assigning economic value to women's unpaid care and domestic work can be done by calculating (i) replacement value, which is calculated on how much it would cost to replace unpaid labour with paid labour on current wages for the same work; (ii) opportunity value, calculated based on how much women would be earning if they were participating in the labour market instead of doing unpaid work; (iii) labour input, calculated by considering the average wages plus benefits earned by the lowest and highest paid multiplied by hours spent on each task; (iv) output method, where a household is regarded as a producer and thus production and calculation is based by pieces of work done such as number of laundry pieces washed, number of children cared for, number of rooms cleaned and so forth.

Each has to be counted and priced; and finally (v) through pay equity, which involves the calculation of jobs based on skill, responsibility and effort. The focus is on the job and not the person doing it. However, there are those responsibilities such as hugging and lovemaking which cannot be measured in economic terms.

5. THE DIVISION OF UNPAID CARE AND DOMESTIC WORK AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL

Women need enhanced influence over household decision-making, especially with regard to decisions about the division of household labour so that they can also influence its direction. Socialisation of humanity is said to have played a role in determining division of household labour. There are responsibilities traditional responsibilities for men and women which were determined by one being female and male respectively which still dominate human society today. This kind of socialisation has often reinforced the position of women as inferior to that of men. There is a need for women to have enhanced influence over household decision-making, especially over household division of labour including the use of household income. Some perspectives of literature on the gender division of labour at household level, argues that reproductive roles or Non-SNA production performed by women disadvantages them because these roles are not seen as important and relegated to women whilst productive roles or SNA production is performed by men.

Customary practices relegate Non-SNA production such as taking care of the family, fetching of firewood, water, taking care of the sick, attending community engagements like funerals, to women. These roles are important but do not have financial value placed on them unlike productive roles like making decisions about what crops to plant, access to the markets, profit

made from sale of crops, which are assigned to men. It thus becomes important that the gender division of labour in the household does not disadvantage women and make it difficult for them to participate in the broader economy (Brown, 1994: 27; Reeves & Baden, 2000: 8; Prakash, 2003: 2; ECA, 2004: 69; UN, 2005: 10; Blackden, 2006: 5; UN, 2009: 5; World Bank, 2012: 217). Better educated women are said to have more bargaining and decision-making powers than women with low literacy levels (Brown, 1994: 35; Argawal, 1997; Marks, Bun & McHale, 2009; Domingo, 2013: 7). It is argued that better educated women have knowledge of structures that support them and due to their education know their rights than most rural women, who have low literacy levels and are economically dependent on their men. The independence of women with high literacy levels puts them in better position to pay for domestic work instead of doing it themselves because unlike women with low literacy levels, they have the means to do so.

6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodological approach adopted in the article was mainly qualitative in nature. Semi-structured Interview schedules were used to collect data from members of the community in the Mpumalanga province of South Africa. The purpose was to investigate their attitudes towards equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work within households by men and women in their Province, which is one of the nine (9) provinces that make South Africa.

The study was conducted within the three districts in the province, namely, Gert Sibande, Ehlanzeni and Nkangala. The province has a total of seventeen (17) local municipalities but only four of the municipalities were chosen because of their proximity to the capital city (Nelspruit). A sample size of one hundred and twenty-three (123) members of the community was considered in which data was collected by utilising semi-structured interview schedules with identified participants.

7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The article examined societal attitudes towards equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work within households by men and women in the Mpumalanga Province. The South African society, especially the Nguni group (*Swazi's and Ndebele's*) that forms the greatest part of Mpumalanga province are highly patriarchal in practice. This article therefore used semi-structured interview technique to solicit information from the communities' perception of equal sharing of unpaid and domestic work between males and females.

This study was conducted intentionally to determine how culturally conservatives' communities in the Mpumalanga province view our countries constitutional obligations of gender equality. In attempting to determine that the semi-structured interview questionnaire probed the following in order; 1) gender of the respondents, 2) Communities perceptions on equal sharing of households labour and 3) Communities perception of equal sharing of


power and decision-making between men and women.

7.1 Gender of respondents

Until today gender studies still persists that women are still not considered in important decision matters. Gender

discrimination continues to be visible in all aspects of human life with women being discriminated against while men are favoured by the system. South Africa is one of those societies heavily affected by gender stereotyping (Sebola, 2015).

The respondents in terms of gender showed as follow:



The findings indicate that there were more males than females who participated in the study. Fifty-six percent (56%) of the respondents were males and forty-four percent (44%) females. The figure shows that women are in minority at 44% compared to 56% of males that participated in the study.

It is also not so clear on how males in the rural areas can dominate females on gender issues because an upheld view is that men in the rural areas are likely to be in minority as most of them are to be far away from their households working for their families.

This reveals an overrepresentation of male dominated opinion on the results to be obtained. Numerous studies unless if they are purposefully made for women ever shows male participating than women or unless not predetermined face to face interviewers will talk to a male in the family than a female and simply often because women have to get opinion of a man in the household in order to give an interview. This reality often goes against a held theory than there are more fe-

7.2 Responses of opinions of equal sharing on household labour


The family institution is key in socialisation and it is often blamed for socialising girl and boy children differently, fostering division amongst the two.

Boy children are naturally socialised to be brave, trained to be heads of households at an early age, to be leaders, whereas girl children are socialised to be home makers, passive

and strive to please men on the social environment (Kambarami, 2006: 2; Wallace, 2007; Marks, Bun & McHale, 2009; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2010: 10; Hamieh & Usta, 2011: 11; Sultana, 2011: 8).

In determining the perception of the residents of Mpumalanga of their perception of equal sharing of household labour between men and women, their responses showed as follow:

Figure 2: Perception on equal sharing of household labour



The majority of the respondents (75%) are of the opinion that equal sharing of household labour between men and women is appropriate. This shows a favourable progress and change of people's attitudes against tradition. It is very surprising considering the conservativeness of the area in which the study was conducted. But considering the fact that the majority of participants have their age group ranging from 18-40 (86%)

compared to 14% of age group ranging from 41-56, it may only mean that the participants are youthful and capable of understanding and coping with the changing social structures set by global gender associations.

Most of these participants mentioned modern phrases such as "bonding", financial independence of modern women and "equality clauses" in the constitutions as a reasonable ground to support the sharing of households labour between men and women.

A different opinion existed for the (25%)

of respondents who disagreed about the equal sharing of household labour. These are probably an older generation that is failing to cope with the democratic constitutional changes that promote equity between women and men in the social environment.

Their arguments are mostly old fashioned such as the patriarchal division of labour. They cite old practices such as "chores meant for women which cannot be done by men", women's responsibility to take care of a man and children", "house work as women's responsibility"

“uncommon chores for men in the kitchen” and that “men are economic providers in households”. Lobola is viewed as a justification enough for men and women to have different responsibilities in the household.

It is however important to note that women's financial contribution has been cited as a reason why women should share decision-making and have men assist with unpaid care and domestic work.

One point they argue clear is that as much as these change does not change the payment of lobola to the bride, women should continue doing households chores alone.

This literally means that women who do not contribute financially within households do not have a voice and must thus continue doing unpaid care and domestic work without assistance from men.

These can only confirm that patriarchy continues to relegate household chores to women because of their perceived inferior status in society (Reeves & Baden, 2000: 28; Coetzee, 2001; Johnson & Johnson 2001; Kambarami, 2006; Stopler, 2008: 1; Sultana, 2011: 2).

It can then be surmised that financially independent women have strong bargaining powers as compared to unemployed women.

Table 1: Below depicts the involvement of both men and women in SNA (paid work) and Non-SNA production (unpaid care and domestic work) by geographical area in South Africa.

GEOGRAPHY TYPE	SNA production			Non-SNA production		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Urban formal	48.7	36.1	42.2	70.9	90.2	80.8
Urban informal	52.6	40.0	46.5	75.9	93.1	84.2
Tribal areas	53.0	44.8	48.6	80.2	94.4	87.8
Rural formal	72.2	55.6	64.7	67.5	91.3	78.3
Total	51.3	39.9	45.4	74.1	91.8	83.3

Source: STATS SA (2010)

The participation rates differed very little for women and men across geographical areas which is an indication that men are getting involved in Non-SNA production albeit at a low rate, than previously thought.

The participation rate for SNA production by women remains the lowest in all geographical areas. This means that most women are either not employed or are employed


7.3 Responses on the equal sharing of power and decision-making between men and women

The gender division of labour at household level based on reproductive roles played by women such as fetching water and firewood, taking care of the sick, attending community activities such as funerals, disadvantages them because these roles are not seen as important. Household labour impacts on women's participation in the broader economy and equal sharing

of power and decision-making

(Brown, 1994: 27; Reeves & Baden, 2000: 8; Prakash, 2003: 2; ECA, 2004: 69; UN, 2005: 10; Blackden, 2006: 5; UN, 2009: 5; World Bank, 2012: 217). The variable was used to determine respondents' opinions on equal sharing of power and decision making between men and women which has a bearing on how the division of household labour is done.

Figure 3: Assessment of attitudes on equal sharing of power and decision-making between men and women



Eighty percent (80%) of the respondents agreed that women and men should share power and decision-making, whilst twenty percent (20%) of the respondents disagreed.

Those who agreed to equal sharing of power and decision-making said the South African constitution stated that everyone is equal. They also indicated that women are human beings and should enjoy their human rights too. They also indicated that the equal sharing of power and decision-making paved a way for good communication between couples. Others cited the financial contribution women make in

households as also giving them the right to have opinions and thus decision-making powers in households.

The Ehlanzeni focus group shared the sentiment and further indicated their dissatisfaction with the failure of countries to implement resolutions taken with regard to equality such as the signing of treaties like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-

crimination Against Women of 1979 and the Beijing Platform for Action of 1995.

Twenty percent (20%) of the respondents who disagreed to the equal sharing of power and decision-making said women were inferior to men according to culture and thus were in no position to share power and decision-making on equal basis with men.

They indicated that women can hold high positions at work but when they get home they must know their positions that they are women and not heads of households, a notion supported by perused literature which states that women are regarded as inferior to men (Brown, 1994: 27; UN, 2009: 5; Prakash, 2003: 2; Njuki, Kruger & Starr, 2013: 13). The Christian Bible is also said to affirm the low position of women in society (Kambarami, 2006: 4; Stopler, 2008). Physical strength was also quoted as contributing to the superior status of men. Women are cited as weak, emotional, irrational and lacking of the ability to make decisions. The sharing of power and decision-making by men and women is said to create problems in relationships.

The South African Constitution of 1996 which advocates of equality of sexes by eliminating all forms of discrimination is well known by the majority of the respondents. They all indicated that equality of sexes according to the constitution and hence advocated for the equal sharing of power and decision-making. Patriarchy is said to define women in terms of reproductive

roles and thus relegates them to inferior positions a statement disapproved by eighty percent (80%) of the respondents who advocates for equal sharing of power and decision-making. (Palama, 2008: 12; Albertyn, 2009; Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2010:9; Johnson & Johnson, 2011; Sultana, 2011: 3; Kabeer, 2012: 12). However, the small percentage of respondents who showed patriarchal tendencies in the responses confirms perused literature's affirmation about women being inferior to men.

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the information gathered and given in this article, it can be deduced that the role women play in society in terms of provision of unpaid care domestic work plays a crucial role in society by ensuring healthy and happy families, workforce and society. The invisibility of women's unpaid work as having an economic value however plays a role in the subordination of women in society. Those who are seen to make tangible contributions to the economies who are mainly men are seen by society as having power and that trickles down to family situations where women are regarded as not important.

Although societal attitude seems to be changing in terms of the equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work by men and women, it cannot be denied that it is women who still do the bulk of work because even if they are involved in paid work and contributing tangibly to economies, they are still

burdened with unpaid care and domestic work as compared to men who do paid work. It thus becomes important that the value of unpaid care and domestic work done by women be recognized for inclusion in the System of National Accounts. The study therefore recommends that:

- More research be done to determine societal attitudes towards the equal sharing of unpaid care and domestic work by men and women within household in different geographical settings in order to allow policy makers to analyse and compare results.
- More surveys on time use by women and men are done to assist in determining the economic value of unpaid care and domestic work.
- Countries that signed international treaties with regard to advancing gender equality and equity be compelled to report on work done with regard to the provision of the Beijing Platform for Action's dispensation which obliges countries to take into recognise the value of unpaid care and domestic work performed by women as contributing to the economy.
- Raise awareness on socialisation processes that subordinate women to men especially with regard to the equal sharing of unpaid care and

domestic work by boy and girl children and men and women.

Governments play a role in the provision of basic services such as water, electricity, health care and day care facilities in order to lessen the burden for women, such as walking long distances to fetch water and firewood. This will enable women to be involved in other means of contributing to the economy whilst lessening the burden of time poverty which is faced mainly by women.

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ASSESSING PRECONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES'S FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The rise to prominence of local governance has fueled the expectation that Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) would be domesticated for industrial development, especially within Special Economic Zones (SEZs). An SEZ is a geographical region that has economic and other laws that are more free-market-oriented than a country's typical or national laws. For developing countries, SEZs traditionally have had both a policy and an infrastructure rationale. However, the mere existence of benign national regulations does not provide for good environmentally-sensitive governance of FDI for industrialisation, especially within industrial development zones in developing countries, where enforcement responsibility is at the local scale of the municipality. Instead, starved of economic development, most developing countries scramble for the creation of local governance structures in the hope of processing investments within localities. A democratic South Africa's local governance has evolved into largely national liability due to unending qualified audits. The question is whether local governance is good enough to establish SEZs as conceived by the Department of Trade and Industry. This article provides analysis of the standing of local governance in South Africa's Eastern Cape Province development zones of Coega and East London to determine degree of implementation of local public administrations linkages involving the complex, absurd and dialectical decisions related to the deficits of good governance occasioned by the absence of government interoperability within the localities of the Industrial Development Zones (IDZs). The article shows that government interoperability within localities, described in the linkages at the local scale, is paramount to the success of the SEZs and could be attained by implementation of a combination of aspects of the One-Stop Shop (OSS) models.

Keywords: Industrialisation , Industrial Development Zones, Special Economic Zones, Local Governance , Foreign Investments

1. INTRODUCTION

The concept and practice of good governance has become a slippery buzzword in the 21st century, especial-

ly among developing countries (Pillay, 2004; Sebola, 2012). Whereas the concept of good governance has remained slippery, Public Administration and practitioners have increasingly es-

tablished a link between good governance and economic development. In the 21st century, the discourse on good governance was embedded with that on effective service delivery (Pillay, 2004; Sebola, 2012). Public Administration search for the determinants of good governance highlighted, among other principles, "government interoperability" (Cloete, 1999; De Lombaerde & Van Langenhove, 2007). Government Interoperability encapsulates the strive to establish processes and structures for harnessing qualities of good governance practices such as legislative implementation and performance legitimacy, at various levels of government, the public sector and beyond.

The primary goal of government interoperability is to improve the potential for economic growth and development. The principle of government interoperability holds that the implementation capacity for government action is relevant to economic development in respect of the capacity to process Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) for domestication and service of national public interest (Cloete, 1999; De Lombaerde & Van Langenhove, 2007; Tang, 2008; Magubane, 2012). That is, enhanced government efficiency and transparency, coupled with the delivery of basic public services to all citizens, are seen as essential to the domestication of FDI and translation into local economic growth through industrial development (Tang, 2008; Magubane, 2012).

The significance of industrialisation as

an engine of economic growth and development cannot be overstated. Industrial production creates job opportunities at higher skill levels, facilitates denser links across the services and agricultural sectors, between rural and urban economies and between consumer, intermediate and capital goods industries (Tang, 2008; Magubane, 2012). However, industrialisation does not occur automatically. A concerted governance effort is necessary to create an enabling local development environment that is attractive to FDI and establishment of industries. To this extent, most developing states have taken notice that their macro-economic and political circumstances are generally unattractive to foreign investors; and, they established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) wherein foreign capital could invest under special legislative regimes.

Establishment of SEZs, which are localised, entailed legislative provision for local governance and processing of FDIs. Such governance, however, has often been associated with excessive liberalisation that allows multinational capital a free ride in respect of labour laws and environmental regulations. Striking a balance between the interests of foreign investors, local labour and the environment is a protracted and, sometimes, controversial undertaking. This article seeks to determine the standing of local governance in South Africa's well-established SEZs in the Eastern Cape Province from the perspective of domestication of FDI through industrial development and economic growth. A disclaimer needs

to be made at the outset that the article would not insinuate that good governance for foreign investors, local industrialisation and economic growth could be generalised for labour and environmental regulations and standards. The article concedes that the concept of "good governance" is "relative", rather than an absolute prescription of practice, rendering local public administration of SEZs.

The fundamental requirement for the successful SEZs presented in this discussion is the creation of government interoperability, in addition to the momentous infrastructure investments, though the implementation of the DTI's One-Stop Shop SEZ models. Given the challenges in implementing national government strategic industrial efforts, this article examines South Africa's local governance for the capacity to process FDI and enhance prospects of industrial development, economic growth and exportation.

The article is based on research that was carried out on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) in order to determine a possible One-Stop Shop (OSS) model for governance implementation at various Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in South Africa. The One-Stop Shop involves a single location where all of the needed services for a particular activity are provided in a timely manner, thereby eliminating steps in the administrative process, with parallel rather than sequential approvals. The OSS models are designed to reduce bureaucratic delays by facilitating access to inves-

tors for all required permits and licenses and other informational requirements in a timely manner and provide after-care to existing investors. However, caution has to be exercised because the degree of flexibility and efficiency embraced could as well create possibilities of flagrant disregard of laws, especially those relating to labour and environmental regulations.

One of the key indicators of the adequacy and accuracy of implementation of the OSS model is in the establishment of the national and local government level linkages of, among others, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Labour, the Department of Environmental Affairs, the South African Revenue Services, Eskom and Transnet. These links provide critical services required by investors at the OSS industrial zones.

The DTI (2012) provides that the SEZs local government scale links should make provision for company and SARS registrations, work and residence permits for foreign workers, employee and property registration, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and construction permits, electricity and waste management, port authority clearance and other economic incentive schemes. These linkages present a template of indicators for observing and measuring the adequacy and accuracy of local public administrations' implementation of the OSS model for the DTI SEZs. Indeed, it is not the existence of an SEZ regime, master plan, fully built-out infrastructure that would create enabling environment for do-

mestication of FDI; instead, local governance is a key consideration. That is, the governance interoperability described in the linkages at the local scale is paramount to the success of the SEZs.

2. SEZ's AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are commonly established with the aim of achieving one or a combination of the following policy objectives: (a) attract foreign direct investment; (b) serve as "pressure valves" to alleviate large-scale unemployment; and/or (c), support a wider economic reform strategy (Farlone & Akinci, 2011; Department of Trade & Industry, 2012). The rapid growth of SEZ programs around the world over the last two decades, and their success in contributing to export-led growth in regions like East Asia, is due in part to an unprecedented globalization of trade and investment that took place since the 1970s and accelerated during the 1990s and 2000s, which saw trade grow 85 percent faster than Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1983 and 2008 (Farlone & Akinci, 2011).

This growth was enabled by the vertical and spatial fragmentation of manufacturing into highly integrated "global production networks," particularly in light manufacturing sectors like electronics, automotive components, and especially apparel, which have accounted for the large majority of investment in traditional SEZs (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Monge-Gonzalez, Rosales-Tijerino & Arce-Alpizar, 2005).

Consequently, attracting FDI has become a central component of industrial policy in most developing countries across the world. However, the attractiveness of a country to foreign investors and the feasibility of the individual investment projects is closely linked to national policy environment. Equally, the practical administrative implementation of national policies is critical to creating the necessary enabling local development environment for FDI. These administrative procedures can pose serious impediments even in countries with an apparently liberal investment environment because of the inherently dialectical dilemmas of "good governance" for foreign investors or for labour and environmental sustainability. In order to address the complexities, a One-Stop Shop (OSS) model is often invoked and categorized into five broad functions, each catering to a different type of interests:

- *Planning*: It helps the investors to plan the development of the zones in terms of land assessment, office space selection and logistics
- *Licensing*: It simplifies the process of obtaining business licenses by integrating the licensing authority into one department providing access to different agencies
- *Utilities*: It facilitates a single point access to basic utilities required for setting up and operating industrial and other establishments

- *Financing*: It provides direct or indirect financial assistance to investors for setting up their business in the zones
- *Environmental compliance*: Assists in maintaining environmental standards, including labour regulations.

In practice, though, the mechanisms of OSS model are complex in regard to implementation. Challenges include the lack of cooperation between government services and their dispersed locations, bureaucracy, lack of policy alignment between national and local government, lack of facilities or access to water, electricity and so on. One of the complicating factor to the SEZ is that, as development zones, they are designed at the national scale for implementation at the local level, often creating a public administrative dilemmas for local governments that are torn between the well-being of their electorates and the interests of foreign capital.

For this reason, local public administration decisions and priorities of service delivery tend to be dialectical and absurd, overwhelmingly taking a bias in favour of the outsider in ways that have tended to precipitate local discontent and conflicts. However, the state of local government in applying the necessary services required by investors is essential for ensuring that OSS model is effectively implemented by government, and SEZs become productive in order to promote economic growth and development.

In most developing countries such as China and Brazil, the role of the State in promoting industrial development such as manufacturing of products has played a key role in attracting FDI and facilitating economic growth.

But these growth zones are also prominent for their environmental and labour abuses, as well as their neglect of the services that are needed by the locals because they prioritise those that favour the interest of foreign investors. China is one example where the development zones policy is synonymous with child labour, environmental pollution and products with questionable production health standards. In Western democracies, unlike in China and Malaysia, systems of checks and balances built into government structures have formed the core of good governance and have helped empower citizens for more than two hundred years. Sound public sector management and government spending help determine the course of economic development and social equity, especially for the poor and other disadvantaged groups, such as women and the elderly.

There is evidence of developing countries with successful SEZs in terms of industrialisation and economic growth, yet deleterious labour and environmental impacts. Balancing the principles of the OSS model is a complex process for local public administrations in developing countries where there are democratic provisions for environmental and labour rights such as South Africa.

Some of the challenges that have affected the ease of doing business include areas such as electricity, tax, and property, and work permits, where local households may have no reliable access to such services. According to the World Bank rankings, in regard to getting electricity for new buildings, South Africa's ranking dropped from 122 to 124. This was worse than the sub-Saharan regional average ranking of 122. Mauritius was 44th in getting electricity; Botswana was 91, Namibia 105, and Kenya 115, all ahead of South Africa. Another challenge involves the tax regime. On average, firms make nine tax payments a year, spend 200 hours a year filing, preparing and paying taxes and pay total taxes amounting to 24.4% (Jayanthakumaran, 2003; Monge-Gonzalez, Rosales-Tijerino & Arce-Alpizar, 2005).

The need for building relationships with institutions such as the South African Revenue System (SARS) is essential in reducing the timeframes for processing the required documentation. Local public administrations in the SEZs have to navigate this national legislative mesh in order to render the development zones attractive to foreign investors. The same is true in respect of the national requirements for environmental and labour law compliance.

Additionally, turn-around time for providing services necessary for businesses to enter the market in South Africa have been blamed on the lack of political will and ineffective state intervention, especially at the municipal level. However, the challenge has al-

ways been that the implementation of national decisions at the local public administrative level has not matched policy. Equally, South African industrial zones have not been exempted from the existing social legislation including labour law which contributed to minimal government intervention and interoperability, but local public administrative structures and systems would have never been adequate for the strict implementation of national policy decisions. To this extent, there is no guarantee that the existing SEZs in the Eastern Cape would have offered qualities that circumvented the drawbacks of the conventional EPZs. To achieve good governance entailed in the SEZs policy, structures and systems of good governance should be put in place at the local scale of the municipality.

3. ASSESSING SOUTH AFRICA'S INDUSTRIALISATION STRATEGY

In an effort to increase South Africa's industrial growth, the DTI compiled the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP2), which was launched in February 2010. IPAP2 is focused on sectors that include the automotive components, downstream mineral beneficiation, business process services and textiles; and, this plan also focused on skills development and employment (Bua News, 2010; South Africa Info, 2013). In 2012, the DTI gazetted a Bill aimed at boosting job creation and industrialization in South Africa's outlying areas by licensing establishment of SEZs (South Africa Info, 2012). Under the proposed SEZ legislation, municipal and pro-

vincial authorities, or even public-private partnerships, are empowered to approach government with plans to develop SEZs, where such concentration of industrial infrastructure could improve prospects for investment, growth and job creation over a sustainable period. The DTI claims that the SEZs are designed to favour domestic investments, and to expanding access for business opportunities to previously marginalised citizens and regions (Cisse, 2012).

These outcomes are expected to materialise because the establishment of the SEZs involves training local workers, and constructing infrastructure such as road and modern ICT facilities. The spatial agglomeration of services such as water, energy and transport, together with trained labour, is expected to create the economies of scale that would attract FDI for industrialisation (Cisse, 2012). For this reason, good local governance is important to process FDI that may flood into the localities, in order to ensure that the resultant economic growth is sound.

The post-apartheid official unemployment has consistently fluctuated around 24%, whereas the unofficial reached the 40% pick at times (Joffe et al., 1995). An economic perspective insinuates that the high rates of unemployment are a result of South Africa's inability to attract FDI and create international trade momentum. The DTI's SEZs policy is emboldened by this notion because it is hoped that once established, these development zones would promote export expansion.

Trade level is assumed to be an indicator of the vibrancy of industrial activities, or lack thereof. South Africa's exports are reported to be low relative to those of other middle-income countries. Between 1960 and 2004, South Africa's real value of exports grew by only 34% (about 0.7% per year), compared to 169% of Argentina, 1887% of Botswana, 4392% of Malaysia and 1277% of Mexico (Joffe et al., 1995). Since 1994, South Africa has imported more than it has exported, with the result that trade deficit rose sharply from 2004 (Joffe et al., 1995).

South Africa's industrial sector continues to, therefore, face significant challenges due to the need for further transformation of manufacturing operations to meet the needs of the domestic population, as well as the global competitive market through industrial development-friendly policies (Joffe et al., 1995: 15). In this context, a democratic South Africa set out to formulate appropriate SEZs policy to overcome the legacies of the apartheid EPZs provisions.

Thus, in 2007 the DTI began a review of South Africa's Industrial Development Zones (IDZs); and, the review highlighted a few fundamental drawbacks: the program design excluded certain regions that might benefit from different types of SEZs; the program lacked strategic planning and financing; guidance on governance arrangements was poor established; and, government agencies involved were poorly coordinated. Unsurprisingly, the DTI review found that only three IDZs were

fairly operational (Coega, East London and Richards Bay), attracting a total of 40 investors that spent about R11,8 billion between 2002 and 2010 (Chinguno, 2009; Department of Trade & Industry, 2012; Nicolson, 2012). Evidently, given the spatial expanses of South Africa, such a huge concentration into three IDZs should raise eyebrows about the capacity of different local governance structures for the creation of an enabling environment for FDI, industrialisation and economic growth.

The DTI has itself invested about R5,3 billion on the IDZs programme, creating a total of 33 000 jobs, most of which were short-term construction opportunities (Chinguno, 2009; DTI, 2012; Nicolson, 2012). Out of the DTI review, draft IDZs legislation was drafted to redesign and expand the IDZ programme in order to enable the development of diverse types of SEZs in accordance with the changing national economic development priorities, as well as regional development needs and contexts (Chinguno, 2009; DTI, 2012; Nicolson, 2012). The resultant 2012 SEZ's Bill and policy too seek to create an environment that would enable the development of diverse types of SEZ's across South Africa (Chinguno, 2009; DTI, 2012; Nicolson, 2012).

Currently, South Africa has four IDZs in Port Elizabeth (Coega), East London (ELIDZ), Richards Bay (RBIDZ) and Gauteng (OR Tambo International Airport); and, the fifth one in Saldanha is still under construction. These IDZs are defined as "purpose-built industrial estates"; and, they are all linked to either

an international port or airport, which are themselves specifically designated for new investment in export-oriented industries and related services (Chinguno, 2009; DTI, 2012; Nicolson, 2012). South Africa's IDZs are all exclusively government-owned, promoted and financed (Chinguno, 2009; DTI, 2012; Nicolson, 2012).

But the management and delivery of services to firms is the responsibility of zone operators, all of which are owned by provincial and local governments. Notwithstanding the provisions of the IDZs policy on diversity of types, South Africa does not as yet have an OSS model for variable geometry facilitation of the industrial sector. Instead the four IDZs have investment facilitation services for investors offering a variety of services, including consultation on South Africa's regulatory environment, facilitation of investment missions, information on incentive packages for investors and assistance with work permits (South Africa Info, 2013).

Almost 10 years after a democratic South Africa's IDZs were established and billions of rands of investment, their assessments suggest that they have produced mixed success. The DTI accepts that South Africa's conventional IDZs have historically underperformed prompting therefore the adoption of the modern SEZs principles. As indicated earlier, this article also presents an assessment of the potential legislative implementation challenges for the DTI's OSS model in two municipalities of Port Elizabeth (Coega) and East London (ELIDZ), in the Eastern Cape.

The assessments focus on the existing challenges between IDZ's, municipalities and state-owned enterprises in investment promotion.

The article highlights the significance of coherence of systems of governance amongst municipalities where SEZ's and OSS infrastructure are planned for implementation, calling therefore for a strategy for enhancement of legislation implementation and Government Interoperability design. One of the challenges highlighted in the DTI IDZs review revolves around the industrial zones qualifying criteria which heavily biased towards the provision of infrastructure, to the exclusion of these areas' potential to growth, attract and retain investments (Chinguno, 2009; Nicolson, 2012). The new policy provided for the establishment of a SEZ Board and more efficient procedure for the issuing of permits (Chinguno, 2009; Nicolson, 2012). The board will also manage a new SEZ fund in order to offer predictable financing and guide long-term planning (Chinguno, 2009; Nicolson, 2012). The fund is expected to strengthen governance arrangements including clarification of roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders (Industrial Prop News, 2012).

Existing industrial zones will operate under the new policy framework as SEZs, regulated by the SEZ Board instead of the Manufacturing Development Act. The SEZ Bill is accepted as a necessary legislative instrument that would better structure investment processes in South Africa. It is hoped that an improved interoperability amongst the

government departments, zone operators and stakeholder organizations, is a key enabler of the establishment, growth and sustenance of development zones.

From an administrative perspective, the ease of doing business in South Africa has improved with the implementation of the new Companies Act, which eliminates the requirement to reserve a company name and simplifies the incorporation documents (SA Good News, 2011; DTI, 2012). Currently, it takes only five procedures to start a business, one less than the previous year, and 19 days in contrast to 22 days in previous years. There have been other improvements such as the reduction of the cost of transferring property and the efficiency of transfer duty electronic filing. South Africa improved 14 positions in the ease of registering property coming in at 76 this year (SA Good News, 2011; DTI, 2012). Registering property now requires only six procedures, 23 days and a reduced cost of 5.6% of the property value (SA Good News, 2011; DTI, 2012).

Dealing with construction permits requires 13 procedures, 127 days and a reduced cost of 21.2% of income per capita; and, South Africa is now ranked number 1 in the ease of credit access, a position shared with the United Kingdom. It was ranked 10th for protecting investors, the same position as last year (Chinguno, 2009; SA Good News, 2011; DTI, 2012).

These indicators suggest that South Africa has created one of the most

enabling environment for industrial development; and, it is ranked number 35 in the world. However, there is discordance in the public administrations at the national, provincial and local scales. The various governances require meta-governance structures and systems in order to ensure coherence and consistency.

The local governance implementation challenges are the most compelling in respect of the SEZs policy because IDZs manifest within localities in municipalities.

4. INTEROPERABILITY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA:

The state of local government in South Africa is often described as a recurrent crisis administration and management, with successive qualified audits, rescue "packages", grandiose development plans and the parachuting promises of politicians and public functionaries who fail to achieve their municipal mandates (Pillay, 2004; Nkuna & Sebola, 2012; Sebola, 2012). One of the long-standing concerns about governance in South Africa involves leadership deficiency and lack of accountability, especially at the municipal scale (Pillay, 2004; National Planning Commission, 2012; Nkuna & Sebola, 2012).

Consistently, audits expose financial mismanagement and costly non-developmental purposes, which includes corruption and unplanned expenditure (Pillay, 2004; National Planning Commission, 2012; Nkuna & Sebola,

2012; Sebola, 2012). Also, municipalities have inadequate human resource capital necessary for ensuring professional administrations, and positive relations between labor, management and councils; additionally, most municipalities do not fulfill their legal requirements to create the possibility for active participation of communities in local government processes which, in return, precipitates "good governance deficit" (Thornhill, 2006; Sebola, 2012). In this way, most municipalities have abrogated their developmental mandates (National Planning Commission, 2012; Nkuna & Sebola, 2012).

For these reasons, there can be no hope that municipalities that have generally abrogated their developmental mandates and undermined the constitutional right for public participation would have the necessary structures to ensure "good governance" necessary for SEZs.

The discordance between national policy and implementation at the local scale is one of the serious areas of concern that localised public administrations in developing countries have not capably resolved (Pinto & Puppim de Oliveira, 2008; Glemarec & Puppim de Oliveira, 2012). For this reason, South Africa's local public administrations cannot be expected to have the capacity to attain a strict implementation match of policy decisions on the establishment of SEZs, especially under the prevalence of generally poor governance. Evidence suggests there exists a strong association between these local public administration defi-

ciencies, persistence of service delivery backlogs and the violent protests across South Africa (Tsheola & Sebola, 2012). For FDI processing in the SEZs, investors' perception is critical in decision-making; and, there is a general negative perception of the overall performance of the municipalities as well as the entire local government system. The 2009 State of Local Government Report highlights the rapid progress made by many municipalities in extending basic services since 2001, but acknowledges that challenges have emerged to varying degrees in different municipalities, which may require interventions beyond the scope of the affected municipalities (SANGONET, 2010).

It is against this backdrop that it is necessary to assess the necessary links between DTI at national level and the policy implementation in the IDZs in the Eastern Cape municipalities where Coega (Port Elizabeth) and the East London IDZ (ELIDZ) are located. The article seeks to determine, among other things, if the DTI "One-Stop Shop" model has been adequately and accurately implemented.

In 1996, South Africa's Constitution (RSA, 1996) mandated local government to pursue economic and social development. This developmental concept of local governance was taken further in 1998 when the White Paper on Local Government was released (RSA, 1998). However, according to the Freedom of Expression Institute, South Africa currently has one of the highest rates of public protest in the world (Tsheola,

2012), suggesting that the formalisation of local governance has not made significant improvements on the services for the local populations. Any South African municipality will demonstrate an endless array of essential services remaining unmet; and, the majority of communities living in informal settlements are subjected to exceedingly poor conditions of sanitation (Tsheola & Sebola, 2012).

Reasons underlying service delivery protests include allegations of rampant corruption and nepotism within local government structures, political opportunism, inadequate community engagement, dysfunctional ward committees and poor performance by the municipalities. It is apparent that in most municipalities, the poor service provisions would also have stifled the potential for economic growth.

South Africa is an anomaly as it has all the necessary legal frameworks and performance management systems in place to ensure sound public administration and management. However, like most African states, South Africa, continues to suffer from unsatisfactory and often dysfunctional local governance systems that include rent-seeking and malfeasance, inappropriate allocation of resources, and weak delivery of vital public services (Nkuna & Sebola, 2012).

Whereas poor local governance mutes public access to basic services, it also robs the localities of the potential for industrialisation, economic growth and job creation.

Importantly, the question of governance interoperability remains vexed because local government in South Africa have generally abrogated their service delivery and developmental mandates (Thornhill, 2006; Nkuna & Sebola, 2012). There are diverse OSS models, whose applicability is dependent upon the local contexts. The OSS models include the One-Door Shop (ODS), e-Governance, SEZ Administrative Manager, One-Window Shop (OWS) and the Integrated Registration Function (IRF) (Peters Pensive OASIS Symposium, 2007; Partdo & Burke, 2008; Money Web, 2012).

The ODS relates to a governance arrangement wherein all approval bodies are represented on the SEZ site with or without delegated approval authority (Peters Pensive OASIS Symposium, 2007; Partdo & Burke, 2008; Money Web, 2012). E-governance would also be essential as it provides a facility for completion of all relevant applications for registration, licenses and permits which would be processed online by the relevant authorities (Peters Pensive OASIS Symposium, 2007; Partdo & Burke, 2008; Money Web, 2012).

Whereas some of these models could appear attractive, it has to be recognised that South Africa is a developing country and that too much flexibility and responsibility at the local scale may allow for flagrant disregard of environmental and labour laws. But the SARS' e-filing makes for hope that South Africa possesses the necessary capacity to implement any combination of these OSS models for good

governance interoperability within the localities of SEZs.

Given the different degrees of advancement of states wherefrom South Africa receives FDI, and due to the variable geometry of the development of governance structures in different SEZs municipalities, the most sensible recommendation is that a suitable combination of the aspects of the five OSS models be devised on the basis of local contexts for each SEZ. Each of these models, One-Door Shop (ODS), e-Governance, SEZ Administrative Manager, One-Window Shop (OWS) and the Integrated Registration Function (IRF), have important qualities that can address different deficit in the local governance interoperability of the SEZs.

In South Africa, one complicating factor for the creation of local governance interoperability is the absence of inter-governmental Memorandums of Agreements (MoAs) to process investor applications. Government interoperability should also permeate the MoAs in order to capture the SEZ legislative conditions that different government departments have to uphold, the seniority and political clout of the designated SEZ managers and the public functionaries' responsibility for ensuring good local public administrations, inclusive of the roles of mayors, executive councils and municipal managers. South African government agencies' reputation has been to promote silo operations and provision of services. This disjointed governance yawns for interoperability because

it is very costly. On several occasions South African public functionaries from different government departments pay exorbitant costs to travel to countries where they meet and be surprised that their missions are so similar. There is need for government interoperability that brings together multiple policy domains in support of a broader investor need.

5. LOCAL GOVERNANCE INTEROPERABILITY DEFICIT IN THE EASTERN CAPE: THE COEGA AND ELIDZ CASE STUDY

The Coega IDZ is the largest in Africa (Tang, 2008; DTI, 2012). Government spent about R8 billion in developing the Coega IDZ; and, a further R3.1 billion was invested in the construction of the deep-water port, R2 billion for infrastructure, R2.1 billion for Eskom electricity and power supply upgrade (Tang, 2008; DTI, 2012). Transnet's contribution is estimated at R500 million for the upgrade of the rail facilities (Tang, 2008). Overshadowed by this highly-publicised Grand Coega IDZ, the East London IDZ is 430 hectares large with a fully-developed infrastructure and operational firms (Tang, 2008; DTI, 2012). The total cost for the establishment of the ELIDZ is estimated at R200 million (Tang, 2008; DTI, 2012). These IDZs have embarked on a diverse range of productions, but the most significant concern is whether these IDZs provide for good governance interoperability within the localities for the application and establishment of OSS model. As the zone management would argue, such governance interoperability for establishment of OSS would ensure

clustering of resources and capabilities wherein companies could tender as collectives (Magubane, 2012). Have these IDZs created the necessary linkages for good governance interoperability and creation of OSS within the localities?

Both IDZ, Coega and ELIDZ, despite their first world infrastructure investment and development, have not created the good governance interoperability necessary for the implementation of the OSS for the SEZ. For example, there are no employee registration services of the Department of Labour in these IDZs. A Zambian investor's experience in the ELIDZ confirms the difficulties related to obtaining a work permit, thus:

"[To] get a business visa was a nightmare as it was very bureaucratic. When I submitted my forms to the local Home Affairs office, for some reason it took the officials there three weeks to tell me that I needed to go to King Williams town to have my articles processed. When I was at King Williams's town, the official who received my application repeated to me several times that I needed to show proof of R1 million before getting the business visa. But I could not open a bank account without a work permit because the bank on the other hand needed a business permit. I must say that the ELIDZ officials were very helpful. The CEO himself has gotten to intervene on my behalf

to get my paperwork signed. Ultimately, it took some intervention by a Zambian Home Affairs official for my papers to be processed" (ELIDZ Investor Interview, November 2012).

These experiences are common and applicable to other services in both Coega and ELIDZ, because there is a deficit of good governance interoperability in these localities; hence, investors are sent from one office to the other, and they are made to travel distances after which they receive new information about documents that they should have submitted.

The local governance has not created the necessary linkages for the implementation of the OSS model. However, the challenge relates to the deficit of good governance interoperability wherein public functionaries, who seem to hold limited knowledge of the different aspects of processing the applications of FDI for domestication into the IDZs, do not seem to even care how they handle queries or provide services or inconvenience prospective investors. These experiences contradict the spirit and intent of South Africa's national policy decisions on the OSS for SEZs; and, the public functionaries involved continue to abrogate their duties with impunity. The challenges of doing business identified by the bank, electricity, tax, property and work permits are all government-related services, calling for the integration and streamlining of these operations through good governance interoperability in the localities of SEZs.

6. CONCLUSION

The challenge facing local governance in the 21st century Africa is the attraction of FDI for industrial development and economic growth that take into account environmental and labour laws. Industrial development is one of the key agencies of growth and development, without necessarily being guaranteed of sustainability and environmental standards.

Thus, the form of local governance in place for the implementation of the relevant legislations that avoids degeneration of development zones from the planned SEZs into conventional industrial zones of the form of EPZs is paramount. Local governance has, in recent years, risen in prominence with the ascendancy of environmentally-sensitive industrialisation in developing countries. The local governance process in South Africa has not been pivotal in industrial development and the implementation of development zones. Instead, the governance process in South Africa is marred by the on-going service delivery protests which threaten the legitimacy of the democratic dispensation (Nkuna & Sebola, 2012; Tsheola, 2012).

This article has argued that industrialisation and promotion of economic growth in developing countries is largely dependent upon the attraction and domestication of FDI into IDZs, with a strong export-orientation. It has shown that the conventional EPZs have the potential for deleterious human rights and environmental abuses.

For this reason, the article has expressed preference for the DTI's SEZs because they are founded on sound principles that entail locally-enforceable compliance with the diverse legislative and public administrative requirements from all relevant geographic scales. But the possibility of realising such enforcement and ensuring that implementation matches national policy decisions, is dependent upon the establishment of the necessary structures of good governance within municipalities. Such frameworks of good governance within localities of municipalities are a function of government interoperability, which could be achieved through implementation of a combination of various aspects of the five OSS models.

An inescapable conclusion is that the momentous public funds investments in South Africa's Eastern Cape Province IDZs of the Coega and East London in infrastructure is only a necessary step in the domestication of FDI in IDZs. To turn an IDZ into the DTI's SEZ vision entails the necessary step of good governance interoperability, wherein a mesh of flexible linkages of the different government department services are created and accessible from the localities of municipalities. The article contends that without such governance interoperability, the IDZs in South Africa would never evolve into SEZs as envisioned by the DTI.

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SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS STATE, NIGERIA.

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ABSTRACT

The main objective of any responsible government is the provision of the good life to citizens. In a bid to achieve this important objective, political elites or external powers (as the case may be) have adopted various political arrangements which suit the structural, historical cultural and functional circumstances of the countries concerned. One of such political arrangements is federalism. Whereas explanatory framework connotes a political arrangement where each of the subordinate units has autonomy over their sphere of influence. Nigeria is one of three countries in Africa, whose federal arrangement has subsisted since it was first structured as such by the Littleton Constitution of 1954. Although the many years of military rule has done incalculable damage to the practice of federalism in the country, Nigeria remains a federal state till today. However, there are concerns over the ability of the state as presently constituted to deliver the common good to the people. Such concerns are connected to the persistent high rate of poverty, unemployment and insecurity. Previous and current scholarly works on socio-economic performance of the country have been focused on the national government. This approach overlooks the possibilities that sub-national governments, especially at the state level holds for socio-economic development in the country. The point of departure of this article is to fill this lacuna by examining the socio-economic development of Lagos state, especially since 1999. The choice of Lagos state as the unit of analysis is informed by its central position as the economic nerve centre of Nigeria, the strides that have been recorded in socio-economic development over the past seventeen years and the nature of politics in the state versus the national government, at least up till 2015. A focus on sub-national unit of the Nigerian federation is particularly critical at this period in the life of the nation when divergences in centripetal and centrifugal forces continue to threaten the corporate existence of the country. The geographical differences in terms of poverty and inequality level between the North and the South also lend credence to a study of this nature, with the hope that lessons on leadership style (exemplified by modes of succession and quality of leadership), civic duty of citizens and resource mobilisation can be learnt by other sub-national units of the federation.

Keywords: Federalism, Governance, Protectorates, Political elites

1. INTRODUCTION

The amalgamation of Southern and Northern Protectorates of Nigeria by British colonial power in 1914 created the largest single political entity in Africa (Adedeji, 2012). The sheer size of the country both in terms of geographical spread and population; the heterogeneity of its peoples, the dynamism of its centripetal and centrifugal forces and the need for stability motivated the nationalist leaders to negotiate a federal political arrangement with the departing colonial leaders (Jinadu, 1985). Although, the British colonial government effected the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates for its administrative convenience, federalism was seen as the best appropriate political framework for sustainable and mutually beneficial existence by the various nationalities that make up the country.

Federalism in Nigeria has passed through various phases and transformations. Despite the strains and the stress that are inherent in its adoption, it has endured till today (Suberu, 2010). Nigeria's federalism is a unique one whose existence and sustenance is to a large extent dependent on a single resource; oil (Olukoshi, 2003, Obi, 2002).

While early post-colonial leaders attempted and indeed, succeeded in applying fiscal federalism, based on the principle of derivation in Nigeria's first republic from 1963-1966, the many years of military rule led to increased centralisation of power and excessive control of the nation's resources by the central government. The cen-

tralised system has been blamed for the variety of problems that confront the country today such as insecurity, conflicts, poverty, and intra-group disunity which pose permanent threat to its continued corporate existence. For instance, as Adamolekun (2005 cited in Suberu 2010:459) laments, 'the Nigerian federalism is at a cross-roads and has two options: devolution or death'.

There have also been concerns from the international intelligence community that given the various conflicts and flashpoints such as Jos, Plateau state, insurgency in the Niger-Delta, the Boko Haram campaign of terror against the Federal Government in the Northern part of the country, the tendency towards destabilisation is very high in the country (International Crisis Group, 2006). The dysfunctional public institutions, high rate of corruption and lack of capacity to carry through many ill-thought out development programmes have combined to ensure that more than half of the country's estimated 160million people still live on than less one US\$ per day (NBS, 2011).

Nigeria operates three tier-level federalism, with one central government, 36 states and 774 local governments and a federal capital territory. As a mono-cultural and structurally disarticulated economy, most of these units of government can only survive on the allocations that the central government shares with them. The 1999 constitution upon which the fourth republic is based ensures that 'revenues in the Federation Account are distributed vertically in the proportions of 48.50%, 26.72%, 20.60% and 4.18% to the fed-

eral government, states, localities, and centrally controlled special funds, respectively' (Suberu, 2010:467). Despite the huge resources being allocated to all levels of government, Nigeria still occupies one of the lowest levels in the global charts for measuring socio-economic progress (See UNDP, 2013).

Consequently, there are concerns over the ability of the Nigerian state as presently constituted to deliver the common good to the people. Such concerns are connected to the persistent high rate of poverty, unemployment and insecurity. Previous and current scholarly works on socio-economic performance of the country have been focused on the national government. This approach overlooks the possibilities that sub-national governments, especially at the state level holds for socio-economic development in the country.

The point of departure of this article is to fill this lacuna by examining the socio-economic development of Lagos State, especially since 1999, when Nigeria returned to democratic governance. Lagos State has been an exception to the rot in Nigeria as the state has witnessed massive turn around in the areas of infrastructural development, job creation, increased institutional capacity for service delivery, security and social re-engineering. The choice of Lagos State as the unit of analysis is also informed by its central position as the economic nerve centre of Nigeria.

A focus on sub-national unit of the Nigerian federation is particularly critical

at this period in the life of the nation when divergences in centripetal and centrifugal forces continue to threaten the corporate existence of the country. The geographical differences in terms of poverty and inequality level between the North and the South also lend credence to a study of this nature, with the hope that lessons on leadership style, vision and citizens and resource mobilisation can be learnt by other sub-national units of the federation.

What is responsible for the high level of transformation that is currently going on in Lagos State in terms of politics-policy mix, leadership characteristics or party ideology? What are the strategies that have been adopted to achieve such levels of transformation and what the social costs are in terms of dislocations and adjustment to the changes? A theory of multi-level governance and fiscal theories of state are adopted while secondary data was used for analysis.

After this introduction, the rest of this article proceeds as follows: presenting the extant literature on federalism as an ideal form of government for a polyglot and heterogeneous country like Nigeria. Examining the relationship between federalism and sub-national governance is also examined in this section.

Analysing, the performance of Nigeria's federalism in terms of socio-economic development, interrogating Lagos State as a sub-national unit within the Nigerian federation and the socio-economic development that is

taking place in the state, especially since 1999, its challenges, strategies and outcomes. And conclude by recommending other sub-national units within the Nigerian federation.

2. FEDERALISM

Federalism has been defined by various scholars as political arrangements where the various subunits that make up a country are in each of their respective spheres of influence semi-autonomous (Wheare, 1963). Carl Friedrich (1968:6 cited in Gana, 2003)) defines a federation as 'a union of group selves, united by one or more common objectives but retaining their distinctive group being for other purposes. Federation is, on the inter-group level, while association is on the inter-personal level.

It unites without destroying the selves that are uniting, and it is meant to strengthen them in their mutual relations. Suberu (2009:68) defines a federation as a 'polity that is divided into territorial sub-units that enjoy constitutionally entrenched autonomy in some policy-making domains as well as representation within the machinery of the polity-wide government'.

The main distinguishing feature of federalism from either a unitary state or a nonfederal one is the power that the constitution grants to the sub-national units of government. Such constitutional empowerment demonstrates joint-ownership and shared responsibility. It shows complementarity rather than subservience in the relationship between the central government and

the state or local governments.

A Federal system of Government is usually adopted by countries with diverse nationalities such that the interests of the diverse units are adequately taken care of. For instance, with the particular case of Nigeria, Jindau (1985:73) has argued that 'Federalism as a system of concurrent regimes ... developed in Nigeria in response to problems of governance created by this ethnic configuration (and that) it is deliberately structured to provide the legal superstructure within which the various ethnic fractions of the political class seek access to state power, with a view to controlling or influencing its exercise'. While the explanation above may be true to some extent, the overriding objective for the introduction of federalism in Nigeria was the need for administrative convenience of the colonialists. Examples of countries that are practicing federalism in the modern world include Australia, Canada, Brazil, United States of America, Switzerland, India and Nigeria. Federal States usually have different levels or tiers of government. Sequel to the constitutional requirements for the division of powers in a federal system is the presence of sub-national units of government. This can be in various forms such as province, regions, state, districts, local government or county. Nigeria operates a three tier structure of government, which are the central, state and local governments.

3. SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Sub-national governance is governance at the level below the na-

tion-state. It is important to state that while government is associated with the nation-state, 'the term governance is used here to describe a model in which social functions and processes are performed and implemented in different ways, by a variety of actors and at different levels' (Happaets, Van den Brande and Bruynincks, 2011:324). The role of subnational governments is significant for two reasons. First, they are often responsible for the implementation of national and international policies with regard to socio-economic development (Jørgensen 2007: 156; OECD 2001a: 51; 2002a: 19). Second, they are said to be closer to citizens and stakeholders, which is vital for socio-economic development of any country (Baker et al. 1997: 22). Berger and Steurer (2008: 32) therefore consider sub-national entities as the ideal level to tackle problems related to socio-economic development.

A study of sub-national governance is important because of the paucity of studies on this level of governance. The neglect of studies on sub-national governance has been noted by Gervason (2010:302) who argues that not much attention has been paid to this area of study. Yet, it is at the sub-national level of governance that the actions or inactions of government should be closely examined.

Most analysis on the actions or inactions of political actors on designing appropriate strategies for socio-economic development has been concentrated at the central level (Fayemi, 2013). Consequently, development indicators on Nigeria from both national

and international agencies such as the World Bank, National Office of Statistics and United Nations Development Programme and so on are usually based on national studies. One of the theories that have been used to explain the relationship between sub-national units of government and the central government is the fiscal theories of state. For instance, using this theory, Gervason (2010:302) posits that: Sub-national regimes are to a large extent explained by the magnitude and origin of their fiscal resources.

Low levels of democracy are to be expected where sub-national states enjoy plentiful central government subsidies and have a weak tax link with local citizens and business.

Gervason states the obvious that in resource rich countries, sub-national units often receive generous national subsidies and collect modest tax resources (Gervason. 2010). While this theory is true to a very significant extent with respect to many states in Nigeria, Lagos State is an exemption to this theory in many respects.

First, although the State receives monthly allocation from the Federal Government like any other State in the Nigerian federation, its economic viability and social responsibility to the state has been determined largely by the high internal revenue based, especially since 1999.

Tables 1 show the volume of internally generated revenue from Lagos State and allocations from the Federal Government from 2008-2012.

	2 0 0 8 NGN' Mil- lions	2 0 0 9 N G N ' Millions	2010 NGN' Millions	2011 NGN' 'Millions	2 0 1 2 NGN' Mil- lions
IGR	101,178	139,142	148,445	168,132	166,516
IGR Others	27,306	36,270	29,139	36,829	56,235
VAT	32,165	39,960	47,287	57,021	66,104
FAAC	49,777	42,426	48,213	61,806	61,395
Total Revenue	210,246	257,798	273,084	323,788	350,250

Source: Lagos State Government

From table 1 above, the Internally Generated Revenue of Lagos State was consistently higher than the allocation from the Federal Government. For instance, Lagos State share of federal revenue in 2008 (VAT +FAAC) was about #81billion while the internally generated revenue for the same year was about #128billion. In 2012, the Internally Generated Revenue in the state was well above #200billion. The capacity to generate revenue and manage it prudently is a far departure from what it obtains at the national level, where oil rents still constitute the larg-

est chunk of the federal government revenue. Although the Federal Inland Revenue Service has improved its capacity for tax collection, the degree of prudence in managing the collected tax is another issue entirely.

Second, Lagos State has been under the control of opposition party under various names such as the Alliance for Democracy, Action Congress, Action Congress of Nigeria and now All Progressive Congress. The State Government drew the ire of the Federal Government when in 2002, the then Governor Bola Tinubu government created additional 37 Local Government Areas. The controversy and the legal tussle that followed this decision, which is constitutionally allowed but political-

ly denied, led to the unconstitutional withholding of Federal Allocation to Lagos State by Olusegun Obasanjo who served as the President of Nigeria under the banner of the People's Democratic Party from 1999-2007. Notwithstanding the fact that Lagos state was denied access to its share of federal allocation for more than three years, it survived until the money was released by the instruction of the late President Yar'adua in 2007.

Third, contrary to the argument of the fiscal theory of state that citizens are generally detached from the governance at the sub-national level due to the lack of binding commitment to the State in form of taxation, Lagos State is a hotbed of civil society activism. The

large volume of Internally Generated Revenue shown above is largely attributed to the high level of tax compliance in the State. In order to ensure high level of compliance and to secure the cooperation of the citizens, the former Governor Raji Fashola regularly organised meetings with members of the organised private sector (OPS) and engaged in 100 days' media chat in which he briefed the citizens of the state on how the revenue collected was dispensed.

The fiscal theories of state also hold that provinces that are well-endowed resource wise or that received so much allocation from the central government are usually detached from their constituents, muzzling opposition and suffer from democratic deficit (Gervason. 2010). While this assertion may be true in some instances, the case of Lagos State is different. As mentioned above, there is a high level of connection between the government and the citizens through regular media briefings, town hall meetings and active social intervention programmes. The assumption that opposition political parties are muzzled in such a resource rich state like Lagos may also not be entirely correct.

In the various elections that have been held in the State since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, opposition political parties have been allowed to campaign for votes without molestation from the State government. In the general elections of 2015, the opposition political party (PDP) won several seats both to the state and national houses of assembly. However, the fact

that it has been extremely difficult for opposition parties to win any election in areas that are considered as the strongholds of the ruling party (APC), such as Alimosho Local government area of Lagos State raises some questions on the overall credibility of elections in Lagos State. For instance, this author is aware of the case involving Mr. Segun Adewale who contested for election to the Lagos House of Assembly under the Labour Party in 2007 and to the Federal House of Representatives under the PDP in 2011 and 2015, respectively.

In an informal discussion with him, he disclosed how the elections were rigged against him. Due to his popularity and mass-base support in the Alimosho Local Government area of the State, it was also assumed that he won the elections—at least by his personal account and those of the people who witnessed the elections. However, he was not declared the winner. His attempts to get justice from the electoral tribunals were not successful. In frustration, he told this author that he is quitting politics as it is almost impossible to win an election under the opposition party in the State. Although his account may be personal, the fact that the ruling party in Lagos State has been winning almost all the positions in the various elections in the State may seem to validate the theory as enunciated above. One may argue though, that the victory of the ruling party in the State may be on account of the performances of the elected officials.

The relationship between the Federal Government and other sub-national

units within the federation are defined by the constitution. The constitution spells out the functions of each level of government and provides the basis for resolving conflicts that may emanate from performing such functions. As Jinnadu (1985) argues, the relationship that exists between the central government and the sub-national units of government in a country like Nigeria was a response to the polyglot and heterogeneous nature of the Nigerian society. The various mechanisms such as affirmative action in form of consideration for Federal Character in appointment for jobs or political offices, zoning formula and rotation of elective offices between North and South and among the various ethnic groups in the country are clear manifestations of the understanding of the architects of the Nigerian state to ensure equity and political stability in the country.

4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA AND INDICATORS

The performance of Nigeria's federalism has been an issue of scholarly debate. While some scholars believe that the country has failed to live up to its huge potentials in terms of improvement in living conditions of the people, (See Adamolekun, 2005, Adebani and Obadare 2010), some believe that the country has performed well at least in terms of its political survival as a single indivisible entity more than fifty years after gaining political independence (Suberu 2010, 2009). For instances, Suberu (2009) compared Nigeria with other federations in Africa such as Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan and concluded that

the country stands out in its ability to contain large scale disintegration and internal disorder that have been the lot of other federal experiments on the continent. He attributed the 'successes' to the unique structure of Nigeria's federation, which has gone through some changes in form of creation of states and local governments since 1960 (Suberu, 2009). But one may wish to ask the question that at what costs to the socio-economic development and improvement in the living conditions of the people has the country been kept together as one political entity?

Despite being the eight largest exporter of petroleum in the world, Nigeria, in the words of Adebani and Obadare (2010) remains a nation in narration. It is a country mired in the contradictions of poverty in the midst of plenty, want in the midst of abundance, suffering in the midst of surplus. Acute governance deficits, which manifest in untrammelled and unconscionable degree of corruption, lack of willingness to implement policies to the benefits of the majority of people, political and bureaucratic ineptitude and a certain sense of spineless acquiescence to the logic of primitive and private accumulation under neo-liberal based global capitalism have kept the of country among low development groups of country (UNDP, 2013, Ihonvbere, 1989). Although by the logic of global capitalism in which economic growth has been substituted for development, Nigeria has been classified as a Middle Income country by the World Bank and was regarded as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa until

the recent collapse in the prices of crude oil (Economist, 2011), The rate of poverty in the country is still as high as 61 per cent (NBS, 2013)

Regionally, the Northern parts of the country are even worse as some of them have poverty rate of as high as 72 percent. The rate of unemployment is as high as 23 percent, while it is much higher among the youth (NBS, 2011). As Table 11 below shows, Nigeria was categorised alongside landlocked countries like Mali, Niger, Chad, Liberia and others as Low Development countries by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2013).

Table 2: Human Development in Africa

Very high and high human development	Medium human development	Low human development
Algeria	Botswana	Angola Liberia
Libya Arab Jamahiriya	Cape Verde	Benin Madagascar
Seychelles	Egypt	Burkina Faso Malawi
Tunisia	Equatorial Guinea	Burundi Mali
	Gabon	Cameroon Mauritania
	Ghana	Central African Rep Niger
	Morocco	Chad Mozambique
	Namibia	Comoros Nigeria
	South Africa	Congo Rwanda
	Swaziland	Congo Democratic Rep. Togo
		Cote d'Ivoire Sudan
		Djibouti SaoTome & Principe
		Eritrea Senegal
		Ethiopia Sierra Leone
		Gambia Tanzania
		Guinea-Bissau Uganda
		Kenya Zambia
		Lesotho Zimbabwe

Source: UNDP (2013).

Centralisation of power at the centre has produced concentration of corruption with negative multiplier effects at the other levels of government. Despite billions of dollars already expended on roads and generation of electricity, these infrastructures remain in disarray as road accidents and irregular power supplies remain the perennial experience of the country over the years. It is the context

of these contradictions of abundance and penury, surplus and lack in the assessment of the central government that the socio-economic transformations going on in Lagos State since 1999 are specifically examined below. How has Lagos State been able to achieve such a high level of infrastructures renewal, break new grounds in education and have been regular in payment of wages and salaries to its workers without default?

4.1 Socio-Economic Transformations in Lagos State: 1999-2013

Lagos State was created in 1967 by the military government under General Yakubu Gowon. It is located in the Southwestern part of Nigeria. As a mega city in the making, it is home to people from all ethnic groups from different parts of Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Until the military government of General Babangida relocated the administrative headquarters of Nigeria to Abuja in December 1991, Lagos State was the political capital of Nigeria.

Despite the relocation, it remains the economic nerve centre of the country as it boasts of three seaports, an international airport and a road linkage to neighboring African countries such as Benin Republic, Togo and Ghana. The head office of major Banks and multinational corporations in Nigeria are also located in the state. Its unique location and its sprawling population which is estimated at about 11.2 million people in 2011 (UN, 2011) but estimated by the New York Times at 21 million in 2012 (Campbell, 2012) make it an at-

tractive place for both business, skilled professionals looking for jobs and other categories of people.

4.2 Political and Governance of Lagos State: 1999-2013

Since the return to democratic governance in 1999, Lagos State has been governed by opposition parties under different names such as the Alliance for Democracy, Action Congress, Action Congress of Nigeria and now All Progressive Congress (APC). Although the names of the parties might have changed, with the exception of the former Alliance for Democracy, the personalities behind these parties have not changed much. One of the leading political figures in the opposition parties is Senator Asiwaju Ahmed Bola Tinubu. He was Governor of Lagos State from 1999 to 2003. He was the only Governor who survived the 'volcanic' onslaught of the ruling People's Democratic Party against the Southwestern states in 2003.

To a great significant extent, Asiwaju Ahmed Tinubu laid the foundation for the transformation taking place in Lagos State today in terms of infrastructures, revenue generation and governance. On revenue generation for instance, Asiwaju Ahmed Tinubu built on the legacy of the military in using consultants to collect revenue from corporate organisations. Although this has been criticised as being undemocratic, the State has been able to improve significantly on its Internally Generated Revenue over the past fourteen years. According to Campbell, (2013), tax revenues now exceed \$92m per

month, up from \$3.7m per month in 1999. The decision of the Federal Government to ban the use of Consultants for collection on Monday 21, October 2013 had serious consequences for the revenue generating capacity of Lagos State (LSG, 2013)

On the governance of Lagos State, it is important to emphasize that the choice of the incumbent Governor Raji Fashola as the successor to Asiwaju Tinubu was a strategic one. Fashola has served as the Chief of Staff to former Governor Tinubu from 2003-2007. Such experiences provided him with the requisite skill to take over the leadership of the state.

Fashola is not an everyday politician and one can argue that his distinctiveness and sense of purpose is a fall out of this separate identity. Also, following Woodrow Wilson Politics-Policy dichotomy, I argue that the relative success of Governor Fashola in transforming Lagos State owe so much to the back office role of past Governor Bola Tinubu in handling the political issues in Lagos State while the former concentrate on governance.

In a way, Fashola is shielded from the distractions that everyday politics give to the Governors. Although the issue of godfatherism has been a vexed one in the context of Nigerian politics, somehow, the duo of Tinubu and Fashola has managed to handle this well. They have tried to replicate the political practice on the old Action Group, where party leaders gave direction to political office holders in the overall interest of the electorates.

4.3 Socio-Economic Development in Lagos State from 1999-2013

Lagos State has received local and international media attention for the silent but remarkable transformation that has been taking place in the State since 1999. For instance, writing in the *Atlantic* after a research trip to Lagos (in which this author was partially involved), Howard French (2013:2) writes thus:

For decades, Lagos suffered one of the worst images of any city in the world, known widely as a place of thieving politicians, streets that crackled with danger, rotting infrastructure and go 'slows'...But with the outside world having almost written it off, Lagos recently enjoyed a prolonged run of economic growth, swelling its GDP to twice the size of Kenya's, the richest and most important nation in East Africa. And while booming like this, Lagos has also begun to quietly develop a reputation for one of the most effective local governments in West Africa.

Although French's article was in respect of the growth of urban centres in West Africa, his observation about the transformation that is going on in Lagos State is very apt. The growth in the Gross Domestic Product and the improvement in provision of infrastructure are incontrovertible testimonies to the commitment of the government to transformational governance.

Joseph (2013) shed more light on how Lagos State has been able to achieve what he prefers to call 'transformational exercise. Joseph states that:

In Lagos State, one of Nigeria's 36 states with a population comparable to Rwanda's of over 10 million, a comprehensive state-directed transformational exercise has been pursued since 1999 under former Governor Bola Tinubu (1999-2007) and especially his previous Chief-of-Staff and now Governor, Babatunde Fashola...Lagos State pursue a vast array of public-private partnerships along with a multiplicity of State created ventures in power generation, transportation, water supply, environment and physical security (Joseph, 2013:3).

It is instructive that while Lagos State has adopted a state-led development model, the central government has adopted various variants of neo-liberal economic doctrine such as deregulation, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and liberalisation of trade and finance. The policy making processes of the country has been under constant manipulation and control of the Bretton Wood Institutions, that is, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Amuwo, 2008).

The differences in result and outcomes in terms of deliverables to the citizens at both levels of government can be traced to the type of development models that have been adopted. It will be difficult to capture all the whole gamut of transformational socio-economic development that has been taking place in Lagos State over the past fourteen years of return to civil rule. However, French gives a glimpse into this when he notes:

Under the leadership of a succession of

ambitious, modernising governors from the opposition Action Party, Lagos has embarked on an unprecedented construction spree, building freeways, sub-Saharan Africa's first metro system outside of South Africa, and public housing units on a large scale. At the same time, this formally rough place has even added subtler quality of life improvements like the proliferation of public green spaces (French, 2013:3)

Since assumption in office in 2007, Governor Babatunde Fashola has a practice of celebrating what his government has achieved within every successive 100 days in office. This practice shows a kind of business-like attitude to governance in the State as it also provides a means of receiving feedback from the electorates on the effects of the policies of the state on their daily lives.

He also continued with the programme of his predecessor in organising an annual strategic session called Ehingbeti, where the State Government meets and dialogue with development partners in the private sector and the international community.

The intervention of the political leadership of Lagos State in its ongoing transformation covers various sectors such as education, infrastructure, transportation, power generation, security, agriculture, job creation, housing, industrialization, urban water provisions, and health care services. On education for instance, the Lagos State have a policy of compulsory free education from primary to secondary school levels. The State Government also pays the

examination fees of final year students at the Senior Secondary School level. Although the school imposed a prohibitive school fees at its only owned university, (the Lagos State University), which led to wide spread protest in 2011, the State makes provision for bursary for students. But in as much as the bursary cannot reach all the students, the prohibitively high school fees will prevent many brilliant but indigent students from pursuing their ambition. The Government has also strengthened the technical and vocational school to enhance that less brilliant students have access to alternative education.

The PATH Programme, which is an acronym for the four areas of priority of the administration include Power, Agriculture, Transportation and Housing. On Power, the state government has invested in power generation to enhance rural electrification and access to power in the urban areas through its Independent Power Project (IPP). Other programmes of the State Government are seeing in concerted efforts to boost food production through massive investment in farming and fishing.

The State has also acquired public buses under the Lagbus and Bus Rapid Transit scheme to aid movement of people within the state. Thousands of roads have been constructed while old ones are being re-habilitated. The 10-lane Lagos-Badagry expressway is an ambitious project that has high impact value in terms of cross-border trade and investment flow.

The fact that this is complemented by light rail mass transit routes has further

potential of easing the transportation challenges that the people of Lagos face. The efforts of the government on transportation are not limited to road construction as the administration also focused on water transportation. A new international airport is also being constructed in Lekki area of the State, where a multi-billion-naira Free Trade Zone is also being located.

Security of lives and property is a big challenge in any city of the size of Lagos State. The Government creatively engaged different stakeholders in the state to contribute to a Lagos State Security Trust Fund. This Fund has afforded the State Government to provide logistic support to the federally controlled but poorly funded Police Force.

The resultant effects of this was the drastic reduction in armed robbery by 75% and an unprecedented 85% achievement rate on recovery of stolen vehicles in the State. The State Government has also established a micro-finance institution, which give grants to small scale enterprises. Against the backdrop of the difficulty in access to finance in Nigeria, this initiative has contributed to employment generation in the State.

Lastly, the State Government has made provision of health for all and sundry, one of the keys objectives of the administration. The Government has expanded free health screening diagnostic and treatment services and strengthened emergency services through the provision of Mobile Intensive Care Units and a Toll free help line (LASG, 2013).

5. SOCIAL COSTS OF THE TRANSFORMATION

There is no doubt that the various social-economic transformations going on in Lagos State have some social costs to the people. While this may be deemed to be an inevitable outcome of a reform process, it is expected that the government should pay more attention to the plight of the poor and vulnerable members of the society, who are adversely affected by such changes. One of the main issues of social costs in the State is displacement of people whose houses are affected by road constructions. Although the State government pays compensation in some instances, it is not in all cases that this is done. In view of the fact that, many of the affected people depend on rents from such houses for their livelihood made their conditions to be unduly dire.

In a bid to rid the State of criminals and hoodlums, the Government has made several laws which affected the poor people adversely. For instance, the Ban on the use of commercial motorcycle in different parts of the State has affected several young people who depend on this trade for the survival. The ban was even more problematic within the context of the mass unemployment in the country. While it is important to keep the city of Lagos safe, the high rate of joblessness, which the ban on motorcycle brings can actually worsen the insecurity of the people in the State as many displaced people may be forced to take into criminality. Although the State Government has established many training schools

to train the displaced people, many were of the opinion that they should have been trained before being banned from operating in the State. Apart from the job effect of the ban, many citizens of Lagos State who live in the fringes of the city are facing difficult time commuting from their various houses to the offices.

The beautification project of the State has also affected many artisans and petty traders as they have been displaced from their places of daily job. The massive cases of social displacement have made some people to argue that the whole idea of Lagos mega city project is class-oriented, in which case the city is being prepared for the comfort of the rich people at expense of the poor (Adelakun, 2013). This has implications for social harmony and cohesion. It may also have political consequences for the ruling party in future elections.

While the revenue drive of Lagos State has been widely commended, it also has social costs to the members of the Organized Private Sector, who often complain about multiple taxations that they are made to pay by the State Government. During the World Bank's Investment Climate Program, in which this author was involved in 2007 and 2008, issue of multiple taxation both at the federal, State and Local Government levels was a constant one cited as being a hindrance to smooth operation of business in Lagos State.

Payment of tolls at expressways in the State has also been an issue of contestation. For instance, the State Gov-

ernment embarked on a Public Private Partnership arrangement for the construction of Lekki-Epe expressway on the understanding that the people will pay tolls for using the roads. Until this arrangement was terminated in 2013, payment of tolls by drivers, peasants, cleaners and other low income earners was at a high social cost to the people. Although an alternative route was made for those who cannot afford the tolls, many affected citizens of the State believe that as long as they pay their taxes, it remains the responsibility of the government to provide them with functional infrastructures, including roads.

Despite the general belief among the people and external observers such as Joseph (2013), that Lagos is being run on the principles of probity and accountability, there are people from the civil society who contend that the administration of the State is riddle with corruption and excessive spending on projects that are not beneficial to the poor. For instance according to Comrade Debo Adeniran, the Executive Chairman of the Coalition Against Corrupt Leaders, Lagos State Government 'has been characterized with unnecessary and excessive donations, lack of due process in budget implementation, illegal deduction and diversion of statutory allocated funds as well as inflation of costs of contracts (African Examiner, November 5, 2013).

While some of these allegations may be hard to prove as the State Government has consistently denied them, the issue of excessive, if illegal, control over federal allocations to the local

governments by the Lagos State government has been confirmed to this author by Local Government officials in the State. At two different encounters with Local Government Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen and Councilors in 2009 and 2011, these elected officers confirmed to this author that they have no control over the Federal allocations to the local governments. The Lagos State Government only release to the Local Governments what it deems fit (Per. Interview, 2009 and 2011). Such practices are key characteristic of the type of politics that is unique to the opposition party, which controls the State. Although it is patently illegal as it violates the letter and the spirit of 1999 constitution, whether such deductions from local government revenues has assisted the State Government in carrying out its socio-economic economic transformation is an issue for further research.

8. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article has examined sub-national governance within a Federal political system, with Lagos State as a case study within the Nigerian federation. In contradistinction to the general high level of poverty and inequality in Nigeria, the chapter shows how Lagos State Government, which is controlled by an opposition party has achieved some remarkable transformation over the past fourteen years of the return to democratic rule in the country. The high capacity of State Government to generate Internal Revenue from taxes and dues was highlighted. The socio-economic transformation

going on in the State was attributed to many factors. One of these is the politics-policy dichotomy in which the former Governor Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, (unofficially known as the Governor Emeritus) is pre-occupied with political issues, while his successor, Governor Babatunde Fashola face the business of governance squarely.

In view of the dependence of many of States in Nigeria on Federal allocations, Lagos State commends itself to an example of how a sub-national unit of a federation can work towards improvement in revenue generation. Although it can be argued that the peculiar position and location of Lagos State are partly responsible for its success rate, other States in Nigeria surely have unique resources and locations that they can tap into to make them less reliant on the federal government.

In order to continue the socio-economic transformation going on in the State, it is recommended that citizens of Lagos State should continue to ensure that capable people in terms of intelligence, selflessness and vision for a societal transformation are voted as the leaders in the State. The State should also continue to explore various avenues to shore its revenue base and expand opportunities for economic activities for its teeming population. In view of the identified social-costs of transformation and reforms, the State Government must put in place palliative measures to cushion the effects. Despite the high profile of Internally Generated Revenue in the State, Lagos State deserves to be treated with special status by the Federal Govern-

ment. As a former administrative capital of Nigeria, many roads in the State as well as the ports belong to the Federal Government. For too long these have been neglected, thereby adding to the financial burden of the State. Consequently, it is incumbent on the Lagos State Government to continue to engage the Federal Government to seek for its cooperation in granting additional funding to Lagos State.

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REVISITING A BIG BROTHER'S RELATIONSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO

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ABSTRACT

This article seeks to apprehend and highlight South Africa (SA) and Lesotho's ties looking at political, economic and diplomatic relations at both a bilateral and multilateral level. We see Lesotho as a country that needs to be politically reformed due to the ever reoccurring political instabilities that have plagued the country over the years. As such, this article uses thematic content analysis and critical discourse approach in their broadest form, to evaluate Pretoria's (the administrative capital of South Africa) mediation efforts in Lesotho, by comparatively assessing and appraising the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis and the 2014 attempted coup.

keywords: Bilateral Relation , Diplomatic , Diplomatic Relations, Historical Ties

1. INTRODUCTION

In geographical terms, Lesotho and SA are inseparable (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013). This is to say that Lesotho could be confused as one of SA's provinces. Lesotho is located right directly within SA. Furthermore, the ruling African National Congress's (ANC) military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) organised its guerrilla units in Lesotho during the heydays of apartheid. Considering its geographical proximity to SA, many MK operations and ANC secret meeting were held in Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Angola, among others. To a reasonable extent, it can be firmly stated that Lesotho played a very important role in the an-

ti-apartheid straggle by providing the SA's freedom fighters with a safe space to organise and manage cross-border attacks against the white minority rule (Holland, 1989:102).

For Cobbe (2014), the economies of SA and Lesotho are interdependent, with the latter providing a strategic resource to the former in the form of labour, skills and water. Ashton (2012:10) points out that more than 30% of Lesotho's economically active population are employed in South African mines. Ashton (2012:11) adds that about 50% of the income of Lesotho's rural households comes from family members employed in SA. Matlosa (2006) argues that the remittance constitutes

about 30% of the country's per capita Gross National Product (GNP). Therefore, economically, Lesotho receives disproportionate amount of its annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) directly from SA. Based on the findings of Ashton (2012:10), it can be argued that

Lesotho is profoundly reliant on SA for the supply of food, fuel, goods and services and linking infrastructure to the world. Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013:200) state that South African companies dominate the business landscape in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). This economic reality makes the South African business fraternity to rely on the BLNS. Lesotho and SA's strong political ties should largely be understood within the context of closer relationship between politics and economics. The post-apartheid government's re-admission in the international stage paved a way for Pretoria to actively engage with the world and the African continent in particular.

According to Selinyane (2011) Pretoria's foreign policy was tested shortly after its re-admission into the global community when it had to deal with the re-occurring political conflicts which occurred in the neighbouring Lesotho.

It is against this backdrop that this article focuses on Pretoria's political, economic and diplomatic relations with Maseru since the year 1994 to date, at both the bilateral and multilateral level. Despite this periodisation, the article carries a historical sensibility in order to

marry the past and present moment. Primarily, this article aims to evaluate Pretoria's mediation efforts in Lesotho with specific reference to the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis and the 2014 attempted coup.

2. HISTORICAL TIES

Traditionally, when the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, three protectorates were established and excluded from the union (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013:100). The protectorates included Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basotho-land. It was envisaged that they would be incorporated later when a proper native policy was approved by the British government (Umesh, 1992:204). Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013:107) contemplates that the relationship between the ANC and the people of Lesotho dates back to the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912. The political activities of the banned ANC inside SA had an impact on political developments in Lesotho and this laid the solid foundation for future cooperation.

For instance, the founder of the Basutoland African Congress (BAC) in Lesotho was Ntsu Mokhehle (later became a Prime minister of the country), who studied at the University of Fort Hare in the 1950s. He was a former member of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). After the banning of the ANC in SA in 1960, the party moved to establish structures outside the country. Some of its members, together with those of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC),

fled the heavy handed state crack-down on political activists and went to Lesotho (Ellis & Sechaba, 1992: 180). Therefore, the presence of the ANC in Lesotho dates back to the early 1960s. However, the political relationship was strengthened after 1976 June student uprising in Soweto when hundreds of youth fled to Lesotho for political asylum (Morrow, Maaba & Pulumani, 2004:37).

Complementary to this, Ferguson (2003:75) points out that Lesotho government made special provision for the education of all young South African refugees in schools within their borders. Furthermore, 25% of scholarships from the Lesotho government's coffers were offered to South African refugees for university education. Lesotho also provided a safe passage for refugees leaving the country (Morrow, *et al.*, 2004: 40). In the early 1980s, MK mounted numerous attacks in SA from neighbouring states such as Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho (Janet: 2012:120). According to the former President of SA, the late Nelson Mandela, the threads of history, language and daily experience hold Lesotho and SA's people so closely that the bond goes beyond friendship and alliance (Mandela, 1995).

These sentiments were echoed during Mandela's state visit to Maseru in 1995. Thus, from the above mentioned sentiments, Lesotho and SA are politically close. In addition, the South African President Jacob Zuma and Tom Thabane's (Lesotho's former Prime Minister) relationship cannot be put out

of the equation. Earlier in 2004, Zuma introduced Thabane to Atul Gupta (a key member of the prominent Indian business empire in SA) which subsequently led to the appointment of Atul as a special advisor to the presidency of Lesotho (Meintjies, 2014). It is within this context that the close ties Zuma's family has with the Guptas signifies that Zuma and Thabane's relationship goes beyond the political relationship.

3. SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS

3.1. The case of the Joint Bilateral Commission for Cooperation (JBCC)

South Africa and Lesotho enjoy healthy economic relations and have already established the SA-Lesotho JBCC, which was signed in April 2001 by then President Thabo Mbeki in Lesotho (BuaNews, 2001). According to Ferguson (2003:174) the JBCC constitutes an important basis for strengthening relations between the two countries. Ferguson (2003:170) highlights that areas for possible cooperation under which the desired results can be achieved are listed in the JBCC agreement. The areas listed includes; mutual economic integration, political, social, cultural, humanitarian co-operation, science and technology, good governance, peace and security and facilitating the movement of persons, goods and services. Therefore, the key objective of JBCC is to promote economic integration between the two states, with the aim of uplifting Lesotho from her current status of least developed country (LDC) to the developing coun-

try (Steinberg, 2005:7).

According to the Presidency of South Africa (2014) in August 2010, President Zuma visited Lesotho. Moreover, the Lesotho's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Relations (2013) affirms that the overall strategic objective of the August 2010 visit was to pursue the consolidation of the African Agenda which aims to further strengthen the bilateral political, economic and social relations between African countries. The state visit took place after the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) of JBCC between the two countries which was held at Maseru in April 2010 (Lesotho's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Relations, 2013). The SOM reviewed progress on the implementation of identified bilateral projects between the two countries. The outcome of the visit culminated into Zuma signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on economic cooperation between SA and Lesotho (The Presidency of South Africa, 2014). With regard to the aforementioned, Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013: 23) indicates that a further MoU on economic cooperation signed between the two countries lacked authenticity. Rosenberg and Veisfelder (2013: 25) further assert that the JBCC has been dysfunctional for the past nine years. For Lekhetho (2014: 2), the dysfunctionality among others includes cross-border passenger and cargo transport for Lesotho's exports, small business and medium enterprises (SMEs), study permits and work permits, which formed part of the important JBCC areas. Therefore, Lekhetho (2014: 6) argues that the JBCC has lost

its robustness compared to its launch by Mbeki. Equally important, Pretoria's foreign policy with regard to Lesotho is primarily anchored on economic grounds

3.2. Southern African Customs Union (SACU)

SACU dates back to June 29, 1910, when South Africa, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland signed the customs union agreement (CUA) of 1910. Draper and Dube (2010) content that only Britain and SA were involved in the 1910 negotiations which resulted in the 1910 SACU agreement. The 1910 SACU agreement lasted until the British Protectorates received independence in the mid-1960s. It was then renegotiated with the apartheid government, culminating in the 1969 SACU agreement (Hermann, *et al.*, 2013:332).

Furthermore, the 1969 SACU agreement effectively ensured that throughout the sanctions period three Frontline States (FLS) (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) continued to depend on SA for their imports and to a lesser extent their exports. Kirk and Stern (2003:56) point out that the agreement also included a revenue sharing formula for the division of customs and revenue collected in the union. The FLS received a significant proportion of their government revenue through this formula.

Moreover, when Namibia became independent from SA in 1990 it became a SACU member in its own right. However, by then, it was evident that the

1969 SACU agreement had almost run its course. Equally important, Mongardini, Benicio, Fontaine, Pastor and Verdier (2010:37) argue that the 1969 SACU agreement was tarnished by its connection to the apartheid regime. Therefore, the agreement in question ought to be reviewed as the political circumstances permitted in SA. The review process began prior to the first general democratic and inclusive elections in SA which were held in April 1994 (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013:112).

In October 2002 following a protracted and acrimonious negotiation process, the five SACU member states signed a comprehensive, far reaching revised SACU agreement (Mongardini, *et al.*, 2010:47). The most noticeable feature of the SACU 2002 agreement is that it revised considerably the revenue sharing formula among SACU nations. The 2002 SACU formula consists of the customs component, an excise component and a development component (Grynberg & Motswapong, 2010). The revenue obtained from SACU's common external tariff plays a crucial role in advancing economic development and preserving political stability in the Southern African region (Matlosa, 2006).

In addition, the revenue makes up approximately 50% of Swaziland and Lesotho's budget revenues and 30% and 17% of the budget revenues of Namibia and Botswana respectively (Draper & Dube, 2010). Tafirenyika (2011) contemplates that the 2002 SACU agreement meant that customs revenues

will be distributed according to intra SACU imports, which implies that SA will provide considerable compensation to the BLNS states for trade benefits, the so called polarisation effects that flow to SA. The excise component of the revenue sharing formula is determined according to the size of each of the SACU member states (Kirk & Stern, 2003).

Nevertheless, a troubling feature of this customs union is that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have signed an interim economic partnership agreement (IEPA) with the European Union (EU), much to the disappointment of SA and Namibia (Draper & Dube, 2010). Apparently, SA and Namibia have strict reservations about some of the provisions of IEPA and had subsequently refused to sign the agreement. Complementary to this, Draper and Dube (2010) opined that implementation of the IEPA negotiations with the EU would undermine the customs union. Thus, according to Mongardini, *et al.*, (2010: 27) SA and Namibia would need to enforce border controls to prevent leakage of IEPA goods into their markets.

It is understandable that SA could also decide to go its own way on trade issues since SACU's common negotiating mechanism would have failed (Tafirenyika, 2011). The outcome is this might lead to SACU's ultimate dissolution. Subsequently, the signing of the IEPA by Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland can be viewed as a demonstration of their sovereignty and their resentment of SA's dominance in the

customs union. Hence, it should be noted that an abrupt withdrawal from SACU by SA would effectively create a failing state in Lesotho and Swaziland with all the associated economic, social and political fall-out (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013:120).

3.3. Lesotho Highland Water Project Treaty (LHWPT)

Shortly after conducting a *coup d'état* in 1986, the military government in Lesotho unilaterally signed the LHWPT of 1986 with then apartheid regime of SA (Mashinini, 2010). Thus, central to this treaty is the agreement that Lesotho would sell water from its mountain areas to the SA in return for financial gain. Similarly, Cobbe (2014) maintains that the LHWP treaty proposed to create a profound economic, environmental, social and political ramification in Lesotho and between Lesotho and SA.

Swain (2004) claims that the LHWP is the largest bi-national infrastructure project between Lesotho and SA. The LHWP consists of dams, reservoirs, transfer tunnels and a hydroelectric power station. The project has four phases but initially only phase one was completed in 2004 while phase two is in progress (Mashinini, 2010). In addition, phase one of the LHWP included the construction of the Katse Dam, completed in 1997 and the Muela Hydroelectric Power Station, inaugurated in 1999 (Cobbe, 2014). The Mohale Dam was completed in 2003, also as part of phase one, which was celebrated with an official inauguration ceremony in 2004. On the other hand, Phase

two includes a pump storage scheme to generate 1 200 megawatts (MW) of energy and associated transmission lines (Wentworth, 2013). It is expected that the pump storage scheme will start generating electricity in January 2018 (Rosenberg & Veisfelder, 2013). Moreover, Cobbe (2014) outlines that the estimated costs of the pump storage scheme in 2010 were R7 600 million and will be borne by Lesotho. Lesotho sought a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) from Eskom and other large users in the region for the excess power that could be generated. Hence, the construction of Muela and Katse dams and related infrastructure will guarantee the desired level of water availability in Gauteng and the Vaal River water supply region in the most cost-effective manner. Mashinini (2010) asserted that in parallel with water conservation measures in the Vaal River, the LHWP phase two will influence the improvement of water quality and curb illegal water use. Furthermore, Phase two water delivery is expected to function from June 2020. The new phase will be funded off-budget. The foregoing means that funds will be borrowed from financial markets.

Similarly, Wentworth (2013:4) is of the view that, for Lesotho, the LHWP is a multi-purpose project and is widely seen as an opportunity to exploit its huge water reserves. Wentworth (2013:7) states that Lesotho will benefit from the royalty income paid by SA in return for water exports. With regard to benefits, Cobbe (2014) adds that Lesotho will further benefit from hydro-electric generation for con-

sumption, substituting imported power from SA. Wentworth (2013:7) contends that other benefits include provision of water for irrigation purposes and accompanying improvements in infrastructure. Therefore, for Pretoria, the LHWP serves a strategic importance as Gauteng relies predominantly on the project's success. As a result, Pretoria's engagements with Maseru are highly influenced by the LHWP.

4. SADC-SA ENGAGEMENTS IN LESOTHO

4.1. The 1998 constitutional crisis in Lesotho and SADC-SA's military intervention

During the 1998 general elections in Lesotho, the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won 79 of the 80 available seats for the national parliament (Likoti, 2007). Contradictory to the findings by observers, opposition parties complained that the elections were rigged. Selinyane (2011) contends that this overshadowed the validity of the elections outcome. It is important to mention that the 1998 elections took place against the background of deep tensions and bitterness between the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) and the LCD (Lodge *et al.*, 2002). Moreover, Kabemba (2003) points out that eight months before the elections, Mokhehle, the former leader of the BCP, who was also Lesotho's Prime Minister from 1993 to 1998, led a splinter group that created the LCD.

Following the disputed victory by the LCD, the government and opposition

parties requested SA to assist in settling the dispute. The disputing parties appeared committed to whatever outcome to arise from SA's mediation efforts. Subsequently, SA invited Botswana and Zimbabwe as part of the SADC Troika to form a mediation team, under the leadership of the South African High Court Judge, Chief Justice Pius Langa, to audit the election results (Makoa, 2004).

However, Matlosa and Sello (2006:10) state that before the mediation team had started with their investigation; supporters of the opposition parties had staged mass demonstrations and demanded that the monarch dissolves the newly formed government. The protests impacted on the functioning of the country's administration. Matlosa and Sello (2006:13) assert that all the speculation and rumours about the outcomes of the Langa Commission Report (LCR) intensified the tensions as security forces were divided in their support for the new government.

In addition, Matlosa and Sello (2006:13) posit that the tense situation escalated into a political crisis. In addition, the army chief gave orders that tear-gas could be used to disperse the demonstrating crowds. However, this act put the country further into crisis, as a contingent of troops aimed their ammunition at fellow soldiers, who then rescinded (Likoti, 2007). The division within the army was apparent. As explained by Likoti (2007), there were serious fears that conflict could arise between the factions of the army. Furthermore, there were also concerns

that the continued protest by the opposition parties could worsen these tensions. The situation was getting out of hand and government was not in control of the country. Civil disorder engulfed the streets of the capital city and gun-wielding opposition supporters effectively took over the capital, preventing civil servants getting to work, hijacking vehicles and closing down Radio Lesotho (Kabemba, 2003).

At the invitation of Prime Minister Paka-litha Mosisili, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) entered Lesotho on 22 September 1998 (Selinyane, 2011). Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa between 1994 and 1999, authorised 700 South African troops, supported by Botswana, to intervene in Lesotho in order to maintain law and order.

This occupation lasted for seven months from September 1998 to May 1999 (Hadebe, 2012:11). Hadebe (2012:14) asserts that the 1998 military intervention by SA was motivated by realist interests rather than humanitarian intentions. Hadebe (2012:14) further reasons that the military intervention was motivated by SA's fear that the deteriorating political situation in Lesotho would impact on the supply of fresh water to the Gauteng province. Realists argue that anarchy forces states to act in certain ways because they can rely on no-one but themselves (Donnelly, 2000: 11). Therefore, anarchy forces them to act in such ways, to defend their own self-interest. However, it is important to state that Pretoria's decisions are influenced by

many factors. Notably,

LHWP is one. However, it should be stressed that Pretoria was still in the process of transforming SA's identity from a pariah state to a respected international player at the time when it led a SADC mediation team in Lesotho (Landsberg, 2010:30). On the other hand, individuals and other non-state actors guide and direct the interactions of the states. Moreover, it is important to state that during the year 1998, SA was a young democracy trying to position itself continentally and internationally as well as compete with other nation states such as Zimbabwe for leadership in the Southern African region.

It is against this backdrop that the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho should be seen as a desperate measure by Pretoria to promote democracy, peace, security and stability in Lesotho as a way to demonstrate its willingness and ability to lead in the Southern African region.

5. THE 2014 ATTEMPTED COUP IN MAS-ERU AND SADC-SA'S MEDIATION EFFORTS

The events in August and early September 2014 in Lesotho come against the backdrop of increasing internal strife within the governing coalition, which consists of the All Basotho Convention (ABC), LCD and BNP. The fallout between Prime Minister Thabane and his deputy, Mothetjoa Metsing led to fears that the coalition would collapse. Thabane feared that Metsing would insti-

tute a vote of no confidence against him with a view of ousting him from his position as Prime Minister. As a result, in early June 2014, Thabane responded to this situation by abrogating Parliament for nine months. The abrogation was accepted by King Letsie III, who is a non-executive monarch and has been largely silent throughout the current crisis. Notwithstanding all of the above, the LCD, after its fall-out with Thabane's ABC, had signed an alliance agreement with the Democratic Congress (DC) in July 2014 with the eye on forming a new government (Motsamai, 2014). Nonetheless, this could only happen once the Parliament suspension is lifted. It is important to note that the DC won 48 seats in the 120 seat Parliament following the May 2012 elections. It was thought that Mosisili could regain power with Metsing as his deputy if Thabane were ousted by Parliament.

Fabricius (2014) highlights that tensions in Lesotho mounted following the announcement of Lieutenant-General Tladi Kamoli's dismissal as chief of the army and Lieutenant-General Maaparankoe Mahao as a replacement. These tensions mounted despite attempts by SADC to intervene. Kamoli's dismissal seems to have triggered the violence of 30 August 2014. Motsamai (2014) states that division and political infighting between the different factions not only created a constitutional crisis paralysing government but also persists despite the earlier regional mediation efforts. Most troubling is the fact that the security forces are involved in the unfolding power struggle

in the coalition government (Powell, 2014). Apart from the visible division within the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), it also seems as though the LDF and the Lesotho police stand on different sides of the political divide. It is worth noting that clearly, there is a major security sector problem in Lesotho.

Prior to the appointment of Cyril Ramaphosa as the facilitator for the SADC mediation team, the mediation process for the conflict under review was led by Namibia. The intervention was influenced by Lesotho's Prime Minister's claims that a *coup d'état* was under way in his country. SADC assisted Lesotho by sending an observer team and a facilitator. It was clear that SADC was not going to send troops to placate the army, as was requested by Prime Minister Thabane (Louw-Vaudran, 2014). SADC clearly favoured a political solution apparently echoing statement of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) Ban Ki-moon. Ban Ki-moon voiced a concern of a military takeover in Lesotho. In this regard, he urged all parties to resolve their differences peacefully for a lasting resolution (United Nations News Centre, 2014). Apparently, Lesotho's Prime Minister Thabane called on SA and SADC to send peacekeeping troops to his country, after claiming that the army had seized power in a coup (South African Press Association, 2014). It is worth noting that Pretoria responded with a statement. The statement reaffirmed that the South African government fully support the African Union's (AU) position on the unconstitutional change of governments on

the continent. In this context, the South African government and SADC will not tolerate any unconstitutional change of government in the region and continent (Fabricius, 2014).

Consequently, SADC mediation efforts led by Ramaphosa culminated into the signing of Maseru Facilitation Declaration Agreement (MFDA) (SAPA, 2014). The MFDA made a provision that Parliament must be dissolved at the beginning of December 2014 to prepare for the national general elections which were held at the end of February 2015 (Baloyi, 2014). Furthermore, Ramaphosa and SADC observer team efforts in solving Lesotho's political crisis has also resulted in the signing of the Maseru Security Accord (MSA). The MSA was signed by Lieutenant-General Tladi Kamoli, Lieutenant-General Maaparankoe Mahao and Commissioner Khotatso Tsooana. The MSA aimed to promote harmonious relations between the leadership, officers and members of both the LDF and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) (Baloyi, 2014).

According to Ramaphosa the security accord further provides the leaders to do everything in their power to actively prevent, discourage and ensure that no further confrontations or hostilities are caused and occur between members and units of the LDF and the LMPS (SAPA, 2014). As agreed in the MFDA, the reconvening of Lesotho's Parliament by His Majesty, King Letsie III took place on Friday, 17th October 2014 (Jordan, 2014). During the reconvening of Parliament in Lesotho, three

South African Police Service (SAPS) armoured vehicles were parked outside the Parliament building during the ceremony (Motsamai, 2014). Therefore, this can be seen as a sign of the strategic role that Pretoria has played in restoring law and order in Lesotho.

It is important to note that, SADC has yet demonstrated its confidence in Pretoria by choosing Ramaphosa as the facilitator in Lesotho and re-election of President Zuma to chair the SADC organ for politics and defence Troika (DIRCO, 2014). SA's dominance and peace keeping efforts are further demonstrated by the deployment of 140 members of the SAPS to Lesotho to ensure long term political and security stability (SA news, 2014). It is worth noting that this should not be seen as a desperate measure to protect the LHWP.

In fact, it should also be seen as a commitment by SA to bring peace and security in Lesotho as envisaged by DIRCO. There is no gainsaying that stability in Lesotho is of strategic importance to Pretoria. Looking at this from a personal level, the deployment of the SAPS can be seen as Zuma's silent response to Thabane's demands but at the same time ensuring that the LHWP is secured. This can be dubbed as a well-calculated strategic move by Pretoria. SA's mediation success so far demonstrates its maturity in terms of dealing with conflicts in the SADC region as opposed to the unpredictable 1998 military intervention.

6. CONCLUSION

The empirical study of this article has established that in the context of the relationship between SA and Lesotho, the agency is moved from Maseru to Pretoria. This means that the relations between SA and Lesotho are largely dictated by the strategic interests of the former. In other words, the relationship between SA and Lesotho can best be understood when located in the context of SA's foreign policy in the SADC region and Africa as whole. Based on the foregoing, it is not far-fetched to state that Lesotho does not have a clear and solid foreign policy that defines how it relates to SA. In the final analysis, it is observed that Lesotho and SA have cordial bilateral relations. Their bilateral relations are also completed through close collaboration within existing regional cooperation frameworks such as SADC and SACU.

It has been clearly shown that Pretoria-Maseru relations are more grounded on economic and political grounds. Historically, the Pretoria-Maseru relations demonstrate that Lesotho was supposed to be another province of SA. In economic terms, Lesotho depends entirely on SA considering its over dependence on SACU and that its borders are completely surrounded by SA. On the other hand, SA relies on Lesotho for the supply of water to the water strained Gauteng Province.

Lesotho and SA commonalities do not end only with language, geography and culture, but their political history is inextricably intertwined. Thus, Leso-

tho and SA relations can best be described as immemorial. In addition to this, it has been illustrated that even after Lesotho and SA have strengthened ties, border control still remains a sore point between the two countries. Looking at Lesotho's over dependence on SA, incorporating Lesotho for political reasons is not feasible but could be considered in future.

Subsequently, the 1998 coup and the 2014 attempted coup share a similar pattern of a division between the security forces. Pretoria has been hugely criticised for its military intervention during the 1998 Lesotho constitutional crisis. However, the 2014 attempted coup has seen Pretoria using a different approach and successfully mediating and stabilising the Lesotho crisis. Pretoria opted for a political resolution rather than a militant resolution. Therefore, a clear demonstration of her maturity in her policy approaches with regard to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Southern African region.

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COMMUNICATION FACTORS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT HANDLING STRATEGIES IN STATE OWNED UNIVERSITIES IN THE SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the influence of communication tools on industrial conflict management handling styles with particular reference to state owned universities in south west Nigeria. The study adopted the descriptive research survey design of the ex post facto type. Human behaviour is interpreted in modern times through theories particularly when such behaviour falls within the parameter of social activities directly or indirectly influencing groups of people. Human activities in organisations are influenced by personal convictions which run contrary at times leading to disagreement between parties concerned.

Keywords: Communication Tools, Industrial Conflict Management Handling Strategies, Theories.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian University system has been consistently facing disagreement over issues bordering on working conditions of workers, social welfare, beliefs and ideologies. Agbonna, Yusuf and Onifade (2009) state that like every other organisation, the work force of Universities in Nigeria persistently show concern on distribution of power, resources, non-implementation of previous agreements, poor university funding and disparity in salary, retirement age and non-implementation of government support for the sector. These incessant disagreements however have resulted in protracted disharmony in management staff interpersonal rela-

tionship, increased indiscipline among students, disarmed school authorities, distrusted academic calendar, unfavourable learning environment and shortfall in human capital development (Agbonna, 2009; Alabi 2002; Oguntuase 1999; Olugbile, 2005).

According to Ndum, Etim and Okey (2013) the incessant occurrence of these disruptions and the attendant consequences are indicators of ineffectiveness of the strategies adopted to deal with the recurring challenge of industrial conflict. Odiagbe (2011) notes that these disagreements exist because there is lack of understanding of the issues as well as the mechanisms to respond to them. As a result, the la-

bour has consistently view the several contentions over issues as brutal oppression by the authorities because their approaches have always lacked shared feelings, ideas, information and openness. Although, past studies have been conducted on industrial conflict in the Nigerian Universities like the studies by Agbonna, Yusuf and Onifade (2009) on communication and conflict manager's personality in school security and conflict management, Odiagbe (2011) on industrial conflict in Nigerian Universities focussing on disputes between the academic staff union of Universities (ASUU) and the federal government of Nigeria; and Ndum and Okey (2013) on conflict management in the Nigerian University system not much research have focussed on the influence of communication factors on industrial conflict management handling strategies in the Nigeria University system. Therefore, this study focuses on communication factors and industrial conflict management handling strategies in state owned universities in the south-west Nigeria. In achieving the objectives of this article, the study poses the following research questions:

- what are the communication factors influencing conflict management in state owned Universities in south-western Nigeria?
- is there any relationship between communication factors and industrial conflict management strategies in state owned Universities in south-western Nigeria?

The study also hypothesises that: There is no significant relationship between organisational communication factors (communication openness, information adequacy and regularity, information quality and reliability, pattern of information flow, participative management) and industrial conflict management styles adopted in state-owned Universities in south-western Nigeria.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Organisational information theory by Weick (1969) explains the main activity of organisation as the process of making sense of equivocal information. Members of organisations accomplish this sense making process through enactments, selection and retention of information. Organisational members are successful to the extent that they are able to reduce equivocality through understanding (West and Turner, 2000). This theory is quite relevant to this research work in the sense that organisations particularly universities operate through information dissemination and flow which have great influence on the relationship of the workers and management in the course of their daily assignments. Such information determine the execution of organisational goal(s) or otherwise. The in-ambiguity of communication within and across the organisation will create a communication climate where members will perceive purposes clearly and thus reduce friction.

Media richness theory proposes that communication media have vary-

ing capacities for resolving ambiguity, negotiating varying intentions and facilitating understanding. Two main assumptions of this theory are: people want to overcome equivocality and uncertainty in organisations and a variety of media commonly used in organisations work better for certain tasks than others. Daft, Lengel, and Trevino cited in Hodge, Anthony and Gales (1996) presented a media richness hierarchy, arranged to illustrate the capacity and richness of media types to process communication in organisations. They were listed as; the availability of instant feedback; the capacity of the channel to transmit multiple cues such as body language, voice tone and reflection; the use of natural language; and the personal focus of the channel. Face to face communication is the richest communication in the hierarchy followed by telephone, electronic mail, letter, memo, and bulletin. From a management perspective, the media richness theory suggests that rational choices are with particular communication channels to specific objective or task. This is significant as it expresses the value of negotiation in facial contacts over all other forms of discussion which remains the major means of interaction on issues of conflict.

3. TREND OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN NIGERIAN UNIVERSITIES

According to Anekwe (2013) conflicts in the Nigerian universities are linked to several factors. These include wages and related issues; conditions of service; discipline, interpretation or viola-

tion of agreement; non-recognition of unions and anti-union activities. Porter, Bingham and Simmonds (2008) posited that communication failure is also a cause of conflict in employer-employee relations. And non-clarity of communication in Nigerian universities poses a great threat to industrial harmony and smooth running of academic programmes. In the opinion of Ejiogu in Ndum, Victor Etim and Stella-Maris Okey (2013), the incessant industrial conflicts in the Nigerian universities do not only occur periodically, it has assumed a particular trend. These are conflicts due to hierarchy of positions, conflicts based on the relationship between the objective state of affairs and the perceived state of affairs by conflicting parties and conflicts based on antagonistic source. The first trend occurs in form of subordinate, super-ordinate or lateral conflicts. In these cases, conflicts arise from friction between boss and subordinate, between the administrator and an authority over him or between an administrator and his peer.

4. CONCEPT OF COMMUNICATION

Communication is sharing our feelings, ideas and opinions with others. This can be intellectual, personal, spoken or written in nature. According to Awo-tua-Efebo (2001) communication connotes the conveyance of information or knowledge from one person to another. Communication is interactive by nature. The importance and meaning of communication pertain to the fact that receivers and senders of messages are connected through space and

time. Communication as a process has two participants – the sender of the message and the receiver of the message. When these messages are transmitted, they activate the person and this response is the purpose of communication. Communication motivates, informs, suggests, warns, orders, changes behaviour, and establishes better relationships, to make interaction meaningful and make oneself understood.

The etymological source mentions that 'communication' is derived from the Latin term 'communicare', which means to impart or participate. Communication is a process that allows us to exchange information by several methods. Communication is the process by which individuals promote meaning in the minds of others by means of verbal or nonverbal messages (McCroskey & Richmond, 1996).

The most uncomplicated conceptualisation of communication can be found within the Encoder/Decoder paradigm, in which communication is described as the transfer of information by means of a code (Ivancevich, 2002), where communicators understand each other based on shared social and communicative cues. However, where this is in short supply, conflict ensues. Communication requires that all parties understand a common language that is exchanged. There are auditory means, such as speaking or singing, and nonverbal, physical means, such as body language, sign language, paralanguage, touch, eye contact, or the use of writing.

5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNICATION AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

In every human interaction that involves two or more people, communication is important. Imobigbe (1993) observes that in all human societies, communities, organisations and interpersonal relationships where regular interaction takes place, conflict happens. Further, McNamara (2007) identifies that issues of information usage as sources of conflict in workplace are employees not informed of new decisions and programmes and employees are not involved in decision making. As a result, such inadequate or ineffective information may be good ground for conflict to erupt.

Conflict Research Consortium (2008) states that even in ordinary circumstances, people often say things that are not interpreted in the way the statement was intended. When people are angry with each other, the likelihood of misinterpreting information is greatly increased to the point where conflict is almost inevitable.

6. TREND OF COMMUNICATION IN ORGANISATIONS

6.1. Downward communication:

In this type of communication, superiors communicate with their sub-ordinates and it is directive in nature. Orders, commands, comments, memos, rules and regulations, etc., come in to this category.

6.1. Upward communication:

This communication is processed from sub-ordinates to their superiors. This gives feedback to the employer or management. Sometimes this feedback or upward communication helps the superiors to carry out downward communication.


6.3. Lateral communication:

It is also termed as horizontal communication. This includes interaction and communication between the sub-ordinates of same cadre. To interlink activities of different branches, lateral communication is very helpful. It always avoids the

small delays caused by downward communication (Ashalatha,).

The foregoing demonstrates that communication is complex and requires a good measure of dexterity, relationship building and participation to build trust otherwise there will be conflict (Putnam, 2006). Severin and Tankard (1992) state that a theory is a representation of the real world which serves as basis for research. Organisational information theory, as a communication theory, explains the causes of conflict in organisations while media richness theory gives insight to why the choices of means of communication have definite reactions over one another.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of organisational communication factors and industrial conflict management




Source: Akinsanya (2010)

7. INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT HANDLING STYLES

Conflict in organisations come in different forms and thus require several approaches in addressing it. Kuhn and Poole (2000) define conflict handling style as a general and consistent orientation toward the other party and the conflict issues, manifest in observable behaviours that form a pattern and share common characteristics over time. They classify the conflict handling styles as avoidance, distributive and integrative approaches as the most replicated and understood. The distributive style is a confrontational approach with a party conceding to the other. Putnam and Wilson (1982) state that other commonly used tactics in this style include; directive communication about the issue; persistent argument for one's own position; and

attempt to take control of the interaction. The integrative style is one in which the parties employ cooperative behaviours to pursue mutually favourable resolutions. This implies arriving at a position or solution acceptable to all concerned parties. However, conflict is often best understood by examining the consequences of various behaviours at moments in time. The behaviours in reaction to conflict are usually categorised along two basic dimensions: assertiveness that implies the individual concern or interest above others, while cooperativeness connotes the individual interest for others and himself/ herself (Akanji, 2005). These two dimensions can be used to explain the five handling styles. Adler and Elmhorst (2002), and Akanji (2005) enumerate such methods in the following:

Figure 2: Conflict Handling Styles/Methods



Conflict Handling Methods:

There are conflict handling methods, i.e.

Competing, Accommodating, Avoiding, Compromising Collaborating and compromising

7.1 Competing

Competing is a style in which one's own needs are advocated over those of others. This method relies on an aggressive style of communication, low regard for future relationship, and the use of coercive power. It tends to result in responses that increase the level of threat and is a very assertive method.

7.2 Accommodating

Accommodating, sometimes tagged smoothing, is the opposite of competing. This style is used by persons who yield their needs to those of others, being diplomatic. They allow the need of the group to overwhelm their own, though this may not be stated in attempting to preserve relationship perceived as important. This style is effective for short term resolution of conflict and solutions arising from such may be sources of future conflicts. This method seeks the cooperation of others

7.3 Avoiding

Avoiding is a descriptive behaviour that serves to minimise

addressing conflict explicitly, either ignoring it or quickly shifting conversation to a different issue. It can only be effective when the issues at stake are rather trivial, and this method is used to buy time. This is both unassertive and uncooperative. Such attempts get feelings pent up, as views go unexpressed making the conflict flourish until it becomes a burst like unattended tumor resulting in cancer.

7.4 Compromising

Compromising is the approach to conflict in which people grant concessions in a 'give and take' arrangement. This style can be effective when resources can be shared but may not be appropriate when values or principles are the source of conflict. Though it may seem satisfactory it is not usually satisfying to all. This attempt helps shape individual perception without wanting to understand the side very well. It breeds lack of trust avoiding risk.

7.5 Collaborating

Collaborating is pooling individual needs and goals towards common goal. It is called 'win-win problem solving'. Collaboration requires assertive communication and cooperation to achieve better solution than an individual could make alone.

7.6 Confronting

Confronting: In some conflict situations, parties may decide to slug it out with one another, taking violent dimensions which may lead to both parties losing or the most powerful having the victory.

8. METHODOLOGY

The research design adopted for the study was the descriptive survey research design of the ex post facto type. The reason for adopting the design was because the variables (Organizational Communication factors and Industrial Conflict Management) observed in this study is already in existence and no manipulation was done on the independent variables. A total of 921 participants were selected for this study from a population of four thousand five hundred and twenty-eight (4528) staff of the three selected universities i.e. Lagos State University, Olabisi Onabanjo University and Ladoke Akintola University of

Technology using simple random and proportionate stratified technique, management staff members. Others are the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), the Senior Staff Association of Nigerian Universities (SSANU), the Non Academic Staff Union (NASU) and the National Association of Academic Technologists. Thus, the sample comprised all the 5 management staff (Vice Chancellor, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Registrar, Bursar and Librarian). Thus, the sample comprised all the 5 management staff (Vice Chancellor, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Registrar, Bursar and Librarian). It also comprised 20% of the membership of ASUU (334), SSANU (191), NASU (361), and NAAT (20).

9. DATA ANALYSIS

Descriptive statistics including frequency counts, percentages and Multiple Correlation Matrix were used to analyse the data collected at 0.05 level of significance.

Table 1: Distribution of respondents

S/N	Institution	MGT	ASUU	SSANU	NASU	NAAT	TOTAL
1	LASU	5	120	100	72	8	305
2	LAUTECH	5	106	61	148	6	326
3	OLABISI ON-ABANJO	5	108	30	141	6	290
Total		15	334	191	361	20	921

Table 1 above indicates that from the total of 941 respondents 361 or 39.2% were NASU members, 334 or 36.3% were ASUU members, 191 or 20.7% were SSANU members 20 or 2.2% belong to NAAT while 15 or 1.6% were management staff.

Table 2: Demographic Information

S/N	DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	Frequency	Percentage
	Unions		
1	NASU	361	39.2
2	ASUU	334	36.3
3	SSANU	191	20.7
4	NAAT	20	2.2
5	Management Staff	15	1.6
	Gender		
1	Male	577	62.6
2	Female	344	37.4
	Age		
1	20-29,	81	8.8%,
2	30-39,	307	33.3%,
3	40-49,	356	38.6%,
4	50-59	157	17%
5	60-65	20	2.2%.
	Academic Qualification		
1	O' Level	24	2.6
2	OND/NCE	105	11.4
3	Professional Certificate	123	13.3
4	HND/B.Sc	251	27.2
5	Higher Degree	412	44.7

Table 2 above shows that the respondents' gender was made up of 577 (62.6%) male and 344 (37.4%) female. Respondents within the age bracket of 20-29 were 81 (8.8%), 30-39 were 307 (33.3%), 40-49 were 356 (38.6%), 50-59 were 157 (17%) while 60-65 were 20 (2.2%). The table also show that 686 (74.5%) and 101 (11%) of the respondents were married and single respectively, while the divorced and separated were 55 constituted 6% respectively and 28 (3%) were widowed. The table shows that the category of staff with O/L certificate were 24 (2.6%), OND/ NCE were 105 (11.4%), professional qualification was 123 (13.3%), while those with HND/Bachelor degree were 251 (27.2%), while those with higher degrees were 412 (44.6%) of the respondents.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix of organisational communication factors and industrial conflict management in selected state-owned universities in Nigeria

Variable	Information Adequacy	Participatory Management	Communication Openness	Information Quality	Pattern of Information Flow
Competing p-value	0.72** 0.00	0.48** 0.00	0.68** 0.00	0.56** 0.00	0.53** 0.00

Avoiding p-value	0.66** 0.00	0.85** 0.00	0.50** 0.00	0.28** 0.00	0.26** 0.00
Collaborating p-value	0.82** 0.00	0.66** 0.00	0.98** 0.00	0.74** 0.00	0.72** 0.00
Accommodating p-value	0.49** 0.00	0.39** 0.00	0.70** 0.00	0.92** 0.00	0.82** 0.00
Compromising p-value	0.27** 0.00	0.09 0.19	0.48** 0.00	0.62** 0.00	0.73** 0.00

**** Significant p<0.05**

The results presented in table 2 reveal that there is positive correlation between the predictor variable of Information Adequacy (IA) with all the five conflict management handling styles: competing ($r = 0.73^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); avoiding ($r = 0.66^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); collaborating ($r = 0.82^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); accommodating ($r = 0.49^{**}$, $p < 0.05$) and compromising ($r = 0.27^{**}$, $p < 0.05$). Participatory management (PM) also correlated with all the five conflict management handling styles: competing ($r = 0.48^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); avoiding ($r = 0.85^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); collaborating ($r = 0.66^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); accommodating ($r = 0.39^{**}$, $p < 0.05$) and compromising which was not correlated ($r = 0.09$, $p > 0.05$). Communication openness (CO) also correlated with all the five conflict management handling styles: competing ($r = 0.68^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); avoiding ($r = 0.50^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); collaborating ($r = 0.98^{**}$, $p < 0.05$); accommodating ($r = 0.70^{**}$, $p < 0.05$) and compromising ($r = 0.48^{**}$, $p < 0.05$).

10 DISCUSSIONS OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The study revealed that there is relationship between organisational communication factors (such as information quality and regularity, information adequacy and reliability, pattern of information flow) and industrial conflict management. This finding is in consistency with findings of Trombetta and Rogers, (1994); Razali (1996), Zhu, May and Rosenfeld, (2004) who showed that these variables (information adequacy, participatory management, communication openness, information quality, and pattern of information flow) greatly influenced worker's

commitment to their organizations and organizational performance. Their findings are further extended by current findings, although with special focus in university communities, adding that organizational communication factors may reduce to a greater extent industrial bluffs and acrimony.

The study also shows that each of the organisational communication factors positively influenced industrial conflict management. Mohr and Spekman (1994), Larson and Kulchitsky (2000), Moy, Torres, Tanaka and McCluskey (2005), Ayoko and Pekerti, (2008) and Kandlousi, Ali and Abdollahi (2010)

found these variables as intervening in the communication process and foster persuasiveness as the basic ingredient of communication in conflict management from which other properties of constructive communication in conflict resolution stem. (Agbona et al, 2009).

The correlation matrix of the variable was found to be moderately positively correlated ($r=0.44^{**}$) with p- value less than 0.05 ($p<0.05$). This shows that information adequacy and regularity goes a long way in determining effectiveness of conflict management as there is relationship between information adequacy and regularity and conflict management. In consistence with the findings of Ayoko and Pekerti, (2008) communication openness correlated positively with conflict resolution and trust determining the conflict duration trust building in organisations.

Furthermore, the findings of Asekun-Olarinmoye, (2006) and Onifade, (2004) that show correlation between information reliability and conflict resolution, the result in table 3 above shows that information quality and reliability correlated positively with industrial conflict management. These are communication factors with significant composite effect on industrial conflict management in selected state-owned universities in South western Nigeria. The result shows that information ade

quacy, information quality, participatory management and information flow pattern which indicate that it in-

fluenced industrial conflict management. This is supported by the findings of Nordin, Sivapalan, Bhattacharyya, Ahmad and Abdullah (2014) that communication factors in organisations have positive correlation on conflicts resolution and overall communication climate.

11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Industrial conflicts in Nigerian university system take different dimensions and have been persistent and managers of these institutions require dynamic approaches to manage them. This study has shown that organisational communication factors are key to managing conflict and their adoption has positive relationship with conflict management.

This study concludes that increasing adoption and use of these factors have increasing positive influence on success rate of conflict management in state owned universities in south west states. Therefore, the effective and efficient use of these factors by management of universities will promote industrial harmony, employee's welfare and increasing productivity.

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