


LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ELECTIONS,
POLITICS &
ADMINISTRATION



Editor: MP Sebola

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, POLITICS & ADMINISTRATION

Editor: MP Sebola



BATALEA
PUBLISHERS

Local Government Elections, Politics & Administration

First Published in 2017

First Edition 2017

Batalea Publishers (Pty) Ltd, 4 Hartbees Street, Polokwane, 0700, South Africa.

E-mail: bataleapublishers@gmail.com

Editing, Graphics and Typesetting: www.betaproducts.co.za

E-mail: info@betaproducts.co.za

ISBN: 978-0-620-74208-5 (print)

ISBN: 978-0-620-74209-2 (e-book)

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

EDITOR'S SHORT BIOGRAPHY

Mokoko Sebola is a professor of Public Administration and a Director of the School of Economics and Management at the University of Limpopo. He holds a Masters degree in Development Studies from the University of Limpopo and a Doctoral degree in Public Management from the Tshwane University of Technology. His research interest includes local government, public policy, education and governance, migration, emigration and immigration, ethics, ecotourism and local economic development. Professor Sebola has published widely in national and international journals, accredited conference proceedings and book chapters, presented papers at national and international conferences, and has successfully supervised a substantial number of masters and doctoral degrees. He is also a previous holder of the following awards: *Overall Best Established Researcher*, University of Limpopo (2011), *Distinguished Academic Award*, SAAPAM (2014) and *Overall Best Established Researcher*, University of Limpopo (2015). He is a progressive academic leader who founded and chaired a regionally growing academic conference called the *International Conference on Public Administration and Development Alternatives (IPADA)* and is an Editor of the *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives*.

AUTHORS' SHORT BIOGRAPHIES

Tinashe Chimedza holds a Master's degree in Social Inquiry from the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. He has published on citizenship rights and democracy in Zimbabwe, on civil society and elections in Zimbabwe, and has written papers for conferences on corruption and governance in Zimbabwe and also economic development and democratic developmental states in Africa. He also regularly writes opinion columns for the independent media in Zimbabwe. His areas of research and interest are generally political economy and development in Africa, public policy, democratisation and governance. He is currently an Associate Director of the Institute for Public Affairs in Zimbabwe (IPAZ).

Tamuka Chirimambowa is a D. Litt Et Phil Fellow in the Department of Anthropology and Development at the University of Johannesburg. He studied International Relations at the University of Zimbabwe, Economic History at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Political Science at the University of South Africa. His research interests include civil society, elections, governance and democratisation, political parties, public policy, human rights, migration and rural economies, public and economic policy, indigenisation and empowerment, and broader development themes on Zimbabwe and Sub-Saharan Africa. He has published in several academic and civil society platforms.

Sandra Makwembere is a Senior Lecturer in the Human Resource Programme at the University of Limpopo. She holds a Doctorate in Industrial and Economic Sociology from Rhodes University. Her research interests include public policy and development, the effects of public reforms on society, organisational change and industrial and labour relations. She has book chapter and journal publications.

Angelina Mamabolo is a Lecturer in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Limpopo. She holds a Master of Administration (Public Administration) from the University of Limpopo, South Africa. Her area of expertise includes Politics and Administration, Public Administration, Political Economy, Disaster Management and Governance. She is an emerging researcher who has published articles in different journals and also presented different papers at national as well as international conferences.

Ntwanano Mathebula is a Lecturer in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Limpopo. He holds a Master of Administration (Public Administration) from the University of Limpopo. His research interest areas are Local Government and Public Policy. His publications include various local and international journal publications and conference proceedings.

Sipho Mokoena is a Senior Lecturer at the Turfloop Graduate School of Leadership at the University of Limpopo. He holds a Doctoral degree (Public Management) from the Tshwane University of Technology, South Africa. His area of expertise includes Local Government Management, Local Economic Development, Community Participation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Policy Studies, Human Resource Management, Strategic Management Techniques and Research Methodology in the Public Sector. He has published several articles in DHET accredited journals and has also presented papers at several national and international conferences.

Themba Mzangwa is the Regional Manager at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in the Eastern Cape's East London Hub. He holds a Master of Public Administration and Master of Social Sciences in Industrial Sociology and Labour Studies (University of Pretoria). His areas of expertise include Public Management and Governance, Policy Analysis, Labour Relations and Sociology of Work and Organisation. He has published in various accredited journals and has presented papers in a number of national conferences.

Siphiwe Ndou is a Lecturer in the Department of Public Administration at the University of Limpopo. He holds a Master of Administration (Public Administration) from the University of Limpopo. His area of expertise includes Public Administration Education and Training, Capacity Building, Local Government, Civil Society, Political Economy and Governance. He is an emerging researcher who has published in different journal articles as well as presented at international and national conferences.

Mmapitsi Grateful Raphala is an Intern at the Department of Science and Technology, South Africa. He is currently completing a Master of Arts degree (International Politics) at the University of Limpopo, South Africa. He also did his Masters Student Exchange Programme at the University of Groningen, Netherlands. His area of expertise includes Foreign Policy Analysis, International Law and Post-Colonial Studies. He is an emerging researcher with a fair number of conference contributions.

Bernard Karabo Sebake is a Manager of Student Governance and Development at the University of Mpumalanga. He holds a Master's degree in Public Management from the Tshwane University of Technology (TUT) and is currently busy with a Doctoral degree at the same institution. The area of interest in the scholarship of Public Administration relates to governance, politics and governance, corruption, local government administration and electoral matters. He is an emerging researcher who has published in various journals and conference proceedings that are accredited nationally. He also has expertise in the area of Student Governance in Higher Education institutions, with extensive network in the space of student governance nationally.

Kgothatso Shai is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Limpopo, South Africa. He holds a Doctor of Philosophy (International Politics) from the same university. His area of expertise includes African Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis. He is an esteemed political analyst and Afrocentric researcher who has published in a variety of high impact journals and other referred publications, and has presented papers at international and national conferences.

Ndwakhulu Tshishonga is a Lecturer in the Department of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. He holds an Honours degree in Development Studies, a Master's degree in Public Administration and in Public and Development Management. His area of expertise is in Development Administration and Local Government. He has publications in different journals and has presented at international and national conferences.

Sethuthuthu Vuma is a Lecturer in the Department of Political and Cultural Studies at the University of Limpopo. He is currently completing a Master of Arts degree (History) at the same university. His area of expertise includes student movements, South African politics and liberation history.

DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to my lovely parents, my siblings and all African academics pursuing sustainable knowledge generation for a sustainable African continent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: **1**

REFLECTING ON THE 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA:
THE ANC AND EFF'S DIRE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE DA'S POWERHOLD ON
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS FOR "DIE WIT GEVAAR" MP Sebola

1.1	Introduction	1
1.2	The Theory of "Die Wit Gevaar"	2
1.3	The African National Congress' Ascension to Power and the First Five Years	3
1.4	The Changing Voting Patterns of South Africans After 1994	5
1.5	The ANC's Self Inflicted Pains Through Self-Created Opposition Parties . . .	6
1.5.1	United Democratic Movement (UDM)	7
1.5.2	Congress of the People (COPE)	7
1.5.3	Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).	8
1.6	The Emergence of the Democratic Alliance and the Posing Political Threat	9
1.7	Is There a Need for South Africans to Fear for "Die Wit Gevaar"?	11
1.8	Conclusion	12

CHAPTER 2: **15**

SOUTH AFRICA'S 2016 MUNICIPAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN: AN AFROCENTRIC
CRITICAL ANALYSIS SL Vuma, MG Raphala and KB Shai

2.1	Introduction	15
2.2	Conceptualising and Contextualising Afrocentricity	16
2.3	Historical and Contemporaneous Location of Local Government in South Africa	16
2.4	The Nexus Between Traditional Leadership and Local Government	19
2.5	The Political Effects of the 2016 Municipal Election Campaigns on Party Politics.	20
2.6	Deconstructing Myths From the Veracities of Campaigning.	22
2.7	Unmasking the Realities of Political Party Funding in South Africa	23
2.8	The Specific Usages of Funding by Political Parties During Elections	24
2.9	Conclusion	24

CHAPTER 3: 28

POLITICAL POWER AND DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTION PERSPECTIVE MA Mamabolo

3.1 Introduction 28
3.2 Conceptualisation and Contextualisation of Political Power 30
3.3 Democratic Representation and Power Usage in South Africa 31
3.4 Election Campaigns in South Africa 32
3.5 The Manifestos of Political Parties and Power in Municipalities 33
3.6 Reflections of Service Delivery Protests & Political Power in Municipalities 34
3.7 Political Interference in Local Municipalities 36
3.8 Conclusion 37

CHAPTER 4: 40

RANDOM CRIMINAL ACTS OR DEMOCRATIC ASSASSINATIONS: DISQUIETING
FEATURES OF SOUTH AFRICA'S LOCAL GOVERNANCE S Makwembere

4.1 Introduction 40
4.2 Assassinations in a Global Context 41
4.3 Defining Assassinations 43
4.4 Political Assassinations 45
4.5 Democratic Assassinations 47
4.6 Local Government Leader Assassinations in South Africa 47
4.7 Democratic Assassination as a Feature of Local Governance 50
4.8 Conclusion 52

CHAPTER 5: 54

THE AFTERMATH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: SIGNS
OF A MATURING DEMOCRACY? BK Sebake and NE Mathebula

5.1 Introduction 54
5.2 Methodology and Approach 55
5.3 Elections as One of the Components of Democracy 55
5.4 Elections in the African Context: A Synopsis 56
5.5 Contemporary Issues of Local Government in South Africa 57
5.6 Political Accountability and Democracy 59
5.7 Political Choice and Matured Democracy 60
5.8 Formation of Coalitions 61
5.9 Transition to the New Administrative Regime 62
5.10 Conclusion 64

THE SPIRAL DOWNFALL OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS VOTER TURNOUT DURING THE 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS: EFFECTS OF INCONSIDERATE LEADERSHIP ST Mzangwa

- 6.1 Introduction 66
- 6.2 The Sinking ANC's Promises 67
- 6.3 Democratic Principles and Selfless Leadership in Governance 68
- 6.4 The Values of the Constitution and Effective Governance 71
 - 6.4.1 Human Dignity, the Achievement of Equality and the Advancement of Human Rights and Freedoms 71
 - 6.4.2 Non-Racialism and Non-Sexism 72
 - 6.4.3 Supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law 73
- 6.5 Good Governance and the Delivery of the Basic Services to Citizens 74
- 6.6 The Local Government Elections and its Significance to the Voters 75
- 6.7 The Voter Turnout and Downfall of the ANC's Voter Support 77
- 6.8 The Inconsiderate Leadership of the ANC 78
- 6.9 Conclusion 79

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINING SUPPORT FOR THE ANC DURING THE 2016 SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS SK Mokoena

- 7.1 Introduction 83
- 7.2 Provisions for Municipal Governance in South Africa 83
 - 7.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 83
 - 7.2.2 Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998) 84
 - 7.2.3 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) 84
- 7.3 Overview of Electoral Performance 85
- 7.4 ANC's Electoral Strategies Prior to the 2016 Local Government Elections 86
 - 7.4.1 The ANC's Election Manifesto 86
 - 7.4.2 The 'Zuma Factor' 87
 - 7.4.3 Playing on the Race Issue 87
 - 7.4.4 The Arrogance Claim 88
 - 7.4.5 The Use of Nelson Mandela's Legacy 89
 - 7.4.6 The Elections Machinery, Marketing and Communication 89
 - 7.4.7 Election Party List 90

7.5	The Views of the Public on 'Why the ANC Lost Support'	90
7.5.1	Gauteng	90
7.5.2	Free State	91
7.5.3	Mpumalanga	92
7.5.4	KwaZulu-Natal	92
7.5.5	Limpopo	93
7.5.6	Western Cape	93
7.6	Lessons to be Learnt From the 2016 Local Government Elections	94
7.7	Conclusion	95

CHAPTER 8:

97

THE ROLE OF INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION, PLANNING AND DELIVERY AS VEHICLES TO TURN ELECTORAL ASPIRATIONS INTO REALITIES NE Mathebula

8.1	Introduction	97
8.2	The Integrated Development Plan as a Mechanism for Service Delivery . .	98
8.3	The Rationale for the Development and Implementation of IDP's	99
8.3.1	Effective Use of Scarce Resources.	99
8.3.2	The IDP Enhances and Speeds up Service Delivery	99
8.3.3	The IDP can be Used as a Fund-Raising Instrument.	99
8.3.4	The IDP Helps to Overcome the Legacy of Apartheid	100
8.3.5	Promotes Intergovernmental Relations.	100
8.3.6	The IDP can Strengthen Democracy.	100
8.4	Integrated Development Planning and Public Participation.	100
8.5	Management Planning in Local Government and Municipalities.	102
8.6	The Management Planning Process	103
8.6.1	Needs Analysis.	103
8.6.2	Identifying Resources	103
8.6.3	Prioritising Goals and Tasks.	104
8.6.4	Creating Assignments and Timelines	104
8.6.5	Establishing Evaluation Methods	104
8.7	Involving People in the Management Planning Process	105
8.8	The Benefits of Involving the Electorate in Management Planning	105
8.9	Service Delivery Within the Auspices of the IDP	106
8.10	Service Delivery Protests in Local Government	108
8.11	Alternative Approaches to Service Delivery.	109
8.11.1	Contracting-Out or Outsourcing	110

8.11.2 Leases	110
8.11.3 Concessions	110
8.11.4 Management Contracts	110
8.11.5 Build, Operate and Transfer	110
8.12 Conclusion	111

CHAPTER 9: 114

THE ROLE OF NEW MEDIA IN THE PROMOTION OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN THE 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS OF SOUTH AFRICA FT Maswanganyi

9.1 Introduction	114
9.2 Participatory Democracy	115
9.2.1 Electoral System in South Africa	116
9.2.1.1 Pre-Electoral Period	117
9.2.1.2 Electoral Period	117
9.2.1.3 Post-Electoral Period	118
9.3 The Role of Media in Democracy	118
9.3.1 The Watchdog Role of the Media	118
9.3.2 Agenda Setting Role of the Media	119
9.4 New Media	119
9.5 Social Media and Local Government Elections	122
9.5.1 The ANC's Use of Social Media	122
9.5.2 The DA's Use of Social Networks	123
9.5.3 The EFF's Use of Social Media	124
9.5.4 The IEC's Use of Social Networks	125
9.6 Conclusion	125

CHAPTER 10: 128

HAMSTER IN A WHEEL DEMOCRACY: THE REDUNDANCY OF ELECTIONS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES? S Makwembere, TC Chirimambowa and TL Chimedza

10.1 Introduction	128
10.2 Conceptualisations of Democracy and Elections in Africa	129
10.3 Elections and Democracy in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe	133
10.3.1 South Africa: Post-Apartheid Electoral Contestation	134
10.3.1.1 Shifting Roles and Contributions of Civil Society in Electoral Processes	136

10.3.2	Zambia: Post-Independence Electoral Contestation	138
10.3.2.1	Civil Society, Elections and Democratisation	141
10.3.2.2	Ideological Conflict Between Civil Society, the Ruling Party and Opposition Parties	142
10.3.3	Zimbabwe: Last Man Standing – Elections, Ideological Shifts and Civil Society Contestations in Zimbabwe	145
10.3.3.1	Competitive Authoritarianism: Assessing Zimbabwe's Electoral Cycle and Rituals	146
10.3.3.2	Socialism, Liberalism and Nationalism: The Ideas Re-Making Zimbabwe's Political Economy	146
10.4	Conclusion: Making Sense of Elections in Post-Colonial Southern Africa	148

CHAPTER 11: 154

'DOUBLE DECENTRALISATION' FOR LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE CASE OF FOURTH GENERATION WARD COMMITTEES AT eTHEKWINI MUNICIPALITY N Tshishonga

11.1	Introduction	154
11.2	Conceptualising Decentralisation and Local Government	155
11.3	The Case of Ward Committees at eThekwini Municipality	158
11.4	The Notion of 'Double Decentralisation'	159
11.5	Decentralisation Through Local Government Elections	160
11.6	Decentralisation Through a Ward Committee System	162
11.7	Decentralisation Through Ward Committee Elections	164
11.8	Challenges of Decentralisation: Power, Resources and Decision-Making	167
11.9	'Double Decentralisation': Towards Balancing Supply-Demand Governance	168
11.10	Conclusion	169

CHAPTER 12: 173

RESHAPING SKILLS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A CAPACITY BUILDING APPROACH SD Ndou and MP Sebola

12.1	Introduction	173
12.2	Understanding the Local Government Terrain	174
12.3	South African Local Government Under Apartheid	176
12.4	Local Government in the Post-1994 South Africa	177
12.5	The Objectives and Developmental Role of Local Government in South Africa	179

12.6	The Structure and Systems of Local Government in South Africa	180
12.7	Challenges of Local Government in South Africa	180
12.8	The Concept of Capacity Building	181
12.9	Defining Capacity	182
	12.9.1 Individual Capacity	182
	12.9.2 Institutional Capacity	183
	12.9.3 Environmental Capacity	183
12.10	Defining Capacity Building	183
12.11	Legislative Framework on Capacity Building in Local Government	185
	12.11.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996	185
	12.11.2 The Skills Development Act, 1998	186
	12.11.3 The White Paper on Local Government, 1998	186
	12.11.4 Local Government Municipal Structures Act (117 of 1998)	187
	12.11.5 Local Government Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000)	187
	12.11.6 The Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003	188
12.12	Local Government Capacity Building	188
12.13	Stakeholders and their Role in Strengthening Local Government Capacity	190
	12.13.1 National Departments	190
	12.13.2 Provincial Departments	190
	12.13.3 Municipalities	191
	12.13.4 South African Local Government Association (SALGA)	191
12.14	Linking Capacity Building with the Functions of Local Government	191
12.15	Conclusion	192

CHAPTER 13: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA **198**

LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA SD Ndou and MP Sebola

13.1	Introduction	198
13.2	Understanding Local Government	198
	13.2.1 What is Local Government?	199
13.3	Local Government in South Africa	200
	13.3.1 The Idea of a Developmental Local Government	200
	13.3.1.1 What is Development?	201
	13.3.1.2 Developmental Local Government	202
	13.3.2 Local Economic Development Administration and Management	202
	13.3.3 Social Development	203

13.4	Administration and Management of Local Government.	204
13.4.1	Differentiating Between Administration and Management	205
13.4.2	Local Government Administration	208
13.4.3	Managing Local Government	210
13.5	Conclusion	210

CHAPTER 14:	215
--------------------	------------

COMPETENCY-BASED TRAINING IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
A SKILLS PROBLEM SOLUTION SD Ndou and MP Sebola

14.1	Introduction	215
14.2	Competency-Based Training (CBT)	216
14.3	The Learning Process and Environment	217
14.4	The Context of Workplace Training as a Means to Capacity Building	218
14.5	Typologies of Workplace Learning	218
14.6	Defining Competency in the South African Local Government	219
14.6.1	Defining Competency-Based Training (CBT)	220
14.6.2	Experiences Learned from Other Countries on Competency- Based Training.	221
14.7	Competency-Based Training as a Skills Problem Solution in South Africa	222
14.8	Conclusion	224

INDEX	229
--------------	------------

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	232
------------------------------	------------

PREFACE

The local government sphere in South Africa has, since the dawn of democracy in 1994, been assigned with the key role of delivering critical and societal welfare services to local communities. The rendering of such a wide range of services, in essence, requires the effective coordination of a variety of functional areas that are necessary to deliver such services. In recent years, the electoral landscape, political face and administrative nature has displayed changes that are of consequence to the Public Administration discourse.

This book is written for academics, postgraduate students and Local Government practitioners to provide them with the theoretical and practical narratives of Local Government elections and administration in post-apartheid South Africa. The Local Government Administration faces different challenges at the coalface of government's delivery of services, but most of the Local Government discourses have mainly ignored the role of the Local Government elections in the administration of Local Government. The historical significance of the 2016 Local Government elections in South Africa, which, according to some authors in this collection, was an eye-opener and a sign of a maturing democracy in South Africa, necessitated the publication of this book. To avoid a complete localisation of the book to a South African audience, notwithstanding the fact that the loss of the African National Congress' (ANC) grip on the South African metropolitan municipalities, such as the City of Johannesburg, Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan and the City of Tshwane, attracted international media attention, the book took a different turn by including a chapter that addresses election problems in African countries. It is the view of the editor that this book addresses contemporary Local Government Administration issues, which will add value to students, practitioners and academics in the discipline of Public Administration and Local Government Administration.

REFLECTING ON THE 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ANC AND EFF'S DIRE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE DA'S POWERHOLD ON SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS FOR "DIE WIT GEVAAR"

MP Sebola

1

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the author argues that the political comfort enjoyed by the African National Congress (ANC), in the last two decades of democracy, is resulting in self-political and historical suicide caused by self-political interests, which may translate into what we may call in the future "die Wit gevaar" or "White threat". The 2016 Local Government Elections in South Africa signalled the first warning that even the most popular parties, such as the African National Congress, can lose a political power base if it shifts from being a party of morals to a party of less self-respect. The 2016 Local Government Election results demonstrated that the ruling party is on its way to losing its two decades of political monopoly in South African politics and, this is leading to the opposition, the Democratic Alliance, emerging in a manner that unsettles their last two decades of democratic victory against apartheid. On its way to losing the political monopoly, the ANC seems to be unconsciously using the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as its own poison of self-destruction. This is evidenced by the ANC's careless mistakes, which lead to the EFF disrespecting the ruling party through disruptions in Parliament. Although the EFF appears in South African politics as the ANC's self-poisoning mechanism, on the contrary, the EFF, is unconsciously, a healing mechanism that is boosting the immune system of the Democratic Alliance (DA) to recover from an unknown chronic political disease. This chapter adopts a conceptual approach and uses literature to argue that the current South African political situation stands to compromise the liberation that the South African stalwarts fought for, because of the African National Congress politicians who have completely lost the mandate of the party as they push for self-political interests, rather than national political interests. This chapter concludes that if the ANC continues on its journey of self-poisoning, by creating more self-opposition parties, it creates the notion of "Wit gevaar" or "White threat" to Africans and will, ultimately and slowly, wake up to realise that they have handed over political power to the minority White class, from whom they took it from through the ballot paper in 1994.

The ANC took political power in South Africa through the ballot box, in 1994, with an overwhelming majority of 62.6% of the votes (Knoesen, 2007:1). This essentially qualified the ANC to occupy a total of 252 of the 400 national assembly seats (Letsholo, 2005) of the South African parliament. This power, attained by the ANC, gave South Africans hope for a democratic country, which they were privileged to have participated in, while many

others failed to see and realise this as they were consumed by the fire of martyrdom. The Mandela and Mbeki regimes seem to have created hope for South African citizens, while the Zuma administration seems to have had many challenges, which have threatened the more than century old culture of being a politically trusted organisation by the majority of South Africans. Gardner (2012:37), however, argues that the ANC's culture has been changing drastically after each decade, which in some instances, creates divisions among its members and sympathisers. According to Suttner (2007:1), the ANC's overwhelming win over the South African electorate has caused them to continue viewing themselves as a liberation movement rather than a political party. That has always been an Achilles heel for most African political parties that have not transformed themselves from being liberation movements to political parties, even after attaining a democratic win through electoral boxes. Unlike normal political parties that accept losses when the time arrives, liberation political parties subject citizens to a permanent debt of slavery which implies that, because we liberated you, you owe us for life and you cannot tell us that we are doing anything wrong in our political administration.

The ANC has not lost its character of, politically, identifying itself more as a liberation movement, which must act to liberate, than a political party, which must bring about good political transformation. They perceive South Africans as people who owe them, because they liberated them from the anarchy of apartheid which was perpetuated by the then White minority government. That makes the political elite conclude that the citizens will vote for them as a form of permanent debt owed for being liberated. Such perception is indeed political suicide, because people vote for the party that promises to provide services with integrity. Letsholo (2005) argues that elections are a powerful tool for democracy, where people make an individual choice as to who should govern them or not. Only political parties, rather than liberation movements, realise the objective of the elections. In this chapter, I argue that if the ANC continues to instil self-inflicted poisoning, through the Economic Freedom Fighters, they will boost the deteriorating immune system of the DA and, ultimately, hand over political power to the minority White class, whom they took it from through the ballot paper in 1994, while South Africans remain fearful of "die Wit gevaar" or "White threat". In addressing the concerns raised in this chapter, the chapter will keep its relevance to conceptualising "die Wit gevaar" theory, analysing the ANC's ascension to power since 1994, the changing voting patterns of South Africans after 1994, the ANC's self-created opposition parties, the emergence of the Democratic Alliance and the EFF as a cure for the ailing minority DA party.

1.2 THE THEORY OF "DIE WIT GEVAAR"

The theory of "die Wit gevaar" is the opposite of the well-known South African apartheid theory of "die Swart gevaar or Rooi gevaar" which simply means "the Black threat or the Black danger or Red danger" which was insinuated by the White South African community in the 1920s, who view the South African Blacks as communists and a potential threat to their cultural and economic comfort zones (van Heerden, 2010; Turner, Hewstone, Swart, Tam Myers & Tausch, 2010:300; Alberts, 2013). The African political threat also

became obvious as most nationalist media in the country conscientised the White minority class to believe that, should the Africans take the South African government over from them, they should anticipate chaos and victimisation. This was political propaganda and a scaremongering tactic used by the nationalist government to keep the Whites and Blacks in South Africa as sworn political enemies (Diakanyo, 2011:1-2; Stemmet & Senekal, 2013:99-100). It was intentionally planned to retain apartheid as the sole political ideology where Blacks (dubbed communist) were like the old British who were seen as people who want to grab the Afrikaner land from its genuine owners, who owned it, through the fatherland claim. Kaufmann (2012:25) revealed that the 1990 polls showed that 49% of White South Africans feared for their and their families' safety in case the new government of Black South Africans took over.

Both the Nationalist Party and the DA have always perceived the ANC's success in elections as a sign of a threat to democracy, reconciliation and nation building in South Africa (Motlanthe, 1998:4), which they, themselves, claim to be capable of maintaining. This view was made popular in their public political discussions, despite the Black membership they had in their political parties, and Black people in their parties were often delegated to continue such a gospel against the party that liberated them from apartheid. Adhikari (2006), however, noted that the influence of the National Party and its *Swart gevaar* theory faded with the new South African community being acclimatised to the new political order that was achieved by the ANC ruling party. The fading away of "die Swart gevaar" has, recently, brought about a new fear among the South African Black community about the likelihood of the emergence of "die Wit gevaar" or "White threat". "Die Wit gevaar", unlike "die Swart gevaar", is a fear among the Black South Africans of losing political power to the White minority ruling class again, through the political errors currently being committed by the ruling ANC elite. The ANC has been the political hope of the South African community, and it is believed to have played a major role in liberating ordinary South Africans from the hardship of poverty and apartheid. It is known, however, that many South African political parties oppose the notion that it is only the ANC that liberated the people of South Africa. The ANC's impact on South African liberation is, however, not comparable to other minority liberation parties, such as the PAC and AZAPO, which were aligned to the Black Consciousness Movement of Steve Biko. The ANC's performance in the recent 2016 elections strengthened the Black peoples fear about what will happen if political power is reversed back to the White minority class through the DA. Thus far, arguments existed that the ANC has, since its ascension to power in South Africa, managed to create more political opposition from itself than maintaining its growth. Its power grip is not only crippled by the White opposition parties such as the DA, FF Plus and others, but, worse, by Black opposition parties.

1.3 THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS' ASCENSION TO POWER AND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS

The first democratic elections, in 1994, which were won by the ANC, created hope for the majority of the South African populace. The victory did, however, create fear of the

unknown among the minority class who were not quite sure how the new government would treat them. After coming into power, Mandela's government proved them wrong and alleviated their fears by extending a hand for reconciliation through the rainbow nation concept. It is, however, acknowledged that the character of political dominance by the ANC could not be ignored (Choudhry, 2009:5). The character of political dominance that characterised the party, before and after the democratic elections, could not guarantee any minority class that such would change. The victory by the ANC was viewed as the end of 300 years of colonialism and the end of four decades of apartheid rule in South Africa (Reynolds, 1999:67). Mandela's term, which could only be dubbed as a "reconciliatory public administration", was performed with distinction until he handed over the reins to Thabo Mbeki in 1999 (Sebola, 2014). Mandela's era was not a simple era of public administration for the ANC. He was, indeed, the first to prove to both the nation and the global community that Africans can govern and achieve peaceful political solutions on their own.

His challenges were many and included both political and economic problems that were not easy to solve. From a political perspective there were, among others, the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), which criticised the ANC for compromising more in order to work with the White minority class, The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which wanted to campaign for the federal state of KwaZulu-Natal, the Boers who wanted the Orania state for the Whites, and the Nationalist party politicians, who still hoped that their 40 years of lost power would be regained if the ANC failed in their first term of political administration. From an economic perspective, the country owed international bankers around R294 billion in 1994 (Goodson, 2013:2), which later soared to R1.4 trillion. There was also a general decline in moral standards, uncontrolled corruption, a high crime rate, and the collapse of municipal services. All the aforementioned political and economic troubles provide evidence to the effect that Mandela's era was not a simple one of comfortable political administration in South Africa. Mandela's era in government is, however, to date, viewed as an era that set a positive foundation for future incumbents of the South African presidential post. No wonder even Mmusi Maimane, in the DA, used the Mandela legacy to campaign against the ANC. His tactic of using Mandela's credibility to campaign against the ANC was viewed, by the ANC, as the DA's weakness. It showed that the party did not have people of political credibility in their party.

Knoesen (2007:2) noted that every election from Mandela's era served to strengthen the political power of the ANC in South Africa. He is believed to be a leader who set a platform for good governance in his administration in which corruption scandals, although experienced, were not at such an alarming rate as they later became after he had left. He retired, voluntarily, from politics and government administration and has remained a political figure of reconciliation and forgiveness (Maanga, 2013) in the eyes of the global community. The character, which he displayed as a political figure of the country, earned him respect from the global village and the nation as a whole. To that extent, the ANC, through him, was viewed in a positive light even by those who were not

party members. Ordinary South African citizens voted for the ANC, because of his love for the ANC, though they were not formally members of it. Such opportunity was also experienced throughout the Thabo Mbeki era. Thabo Mbeki took over from Mandela, but although he served with dignity, there were rumours of divisions at the top, which caused him to be recalled from the mandate of the party by the ANC, in 2007, after the Polokwane Conference.

1.4 THE CHANGING VOTING PATTERNS OF SOUTH AFRICANS AFTER 1994

The election growth pattern for the ANC had been positive until 2004. The third general elections, under the Thabo Mbeki administration, showed that the voting margin increased from 62.66% to 69.69% (Russon, 2011). It is not known, and is difficult to assume, whether this victory was achieved through the foundation of peace and reconciliation that Mandela had built or through political brutality, as mentioned in Sebola (2014), with regard to his ability to have crushed to death all minor political parties through the Floor Crossing Bill. The performance, which outsmarted the opposition, may have also contributed to the National Party exiting the South African political stage forever.

In 2009, when Jacob Zuma took over the political leadership of the ANC, the election performance curved slightly down. Jacob Zuma, who can be held liable for the poor electoral performance of the ANC, entered the 2009 general elections with a possible split of leadership that created the Congress of the People (COPE), which was a breakaway of former ANC supporters who were aligned to former president, Thabo Mbeki (Ndletyana, 2010). The split created a new political challenge and dynamics (Nelana, 2010), which showed that the ANC had not learned from the UDM formation before the 1994 elections. COPE is referred to as the party that was created by the lions of the ANC, which gave it hope for survival and being a bigger ANC electoral challenger. The Congress of the People (COPE) split also signalled a voter decline of the ANC from 65.9%, in 2009, to 62.15%, in 2014, in the South African national elections (Bruce, 2014). The changing voting pattern, in this regard, did not only affect the African National Congress. Smaller parties also experienced a major decline for unknown reasons. The Inkatha Freedom Party slid from 11%-5%, between the periods 1994-2009, and lost the provincial leadership of KwaZulu-Natal to the African National Congress. The voter turnout behaviour seems to have changed drastically in some metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. The United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Independent Democrats (ID) and the Freedom Front Plus (FFP) declined, respectively, from 3%-1%. Other minority opposition political parties, such as the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), performed below 1% (Booyesen, 2009). It is argued that the minority opposition political parties are unlikely to make it on the future South African political stage, because sooner or later the electorates may realise that they have nothing different to offer other than what the ruling party offers. In South Africa, with the politically dominant character shown by the ANC, it becomes difficult for minority political parties to survive for half a decade. Their slow death starts at national level and, finally, ends at the local level.

The South African electorate often finds it difficult to choose between an organisation that liberated them from the hardship of apartheid and a political newcomer promising them an unknown paradise. It has, indeed, happened that the opposition status has been changing in South Africa since 1994. Mandela's opposition was the National Party, which performed fairly well, in 1994, to lead as an opposition. However, since then, this opposition could not be found from any of the South African political parties such as the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), the Black Conscious Movement of Azania, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). It is argued that the exiting of the National Party from the South African political stage provided White minority South Africans with an opportunity to find a new political home. Their political home became none other than the DA and other white minority parties, because racism plays a critical role in choosing political homes in South African politics. The South African change in voting behaviour has recently continued to put the ANC at the helm, with the DA as an opposition, while the EFF seems to be making a good enroot into the electorates (Melber, 2014). The emergence of both the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters cannot be ignored in the current political landscape of the country. While the ANC's future political dominance in South Africa appears bleak, the EFF's political future is as uncertain as all other minority parties in South Africa.

1.5 THE ANC'S SELF-INFLICTED PAINS THROUGH SELF-CREATED OPPOSITION PARTIES

Since the ANC came into power, in 1994, to date, it has self-inflicted major pains to itself by creating at least three opposition parties in two decades from its own loins. All this happened to serve the self-interests of party leaders who preferred to remove their own, out of a political home, rather than amicably attempt to solve the problem of contestations of a political space. The organisation, itself, has not been able to solve problems when confronted with them. In order of occurrence, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) was created by Major-General Bantu Holomisa, because the ANC expelled him for ill-discipline, which was a severe sanction when many thought he only needed to be reprimanded for his differences with Stella Sicqau, a fellow ANC colleague, who died on 7 May 2006. Holomisa deposed Stella Sicqau in a bloodless coup on 30 December 1987. Holomisa, a commander of the then Transkei Defence Force, ousted Sicqau from power because of corruption. The Polokwane conference created a split of leadership, which caused the creation of COPE simply because the Thabo Mbeki camp could not get a political space within the ANC after the victory of the Zuma camp at the Polokwane Conference. Indeed, the Mbeki-aligned individuals, such as Bulelani Nquka, were bullied in the Zuma administration. Jackie Selebi was followed until the gate of prison opened to him. A so-called disciplinary hearing led to Julius Malema being expelled from the ANC. Julius Malema, who initially assisted with the ousting and discrediting of former President, Thabo Mbeki, became a loose cannon within the ANC. His differences to the ANC's standpoint on the nationalisation of mines became his Achilles' heel. Sebola (2014) recorded that incident as a political

contradiction to the ANC's ideology, especially because it claims to be the author of the Freedom Charter. His character was, therefore, viewed in the light of a political liability that could only be dealt with in terms of the ANC's disciplinary procedures. He accepted the verdict and left politics to engage in small farming cabbage projects ten kilometres outside the city of Polokwane. The political vengeance followed him through tax scandals and money laundering allegations, which caused him to finally retaliate by creating the EFF, so that he could defend himself from a particular political home. The creation of these small parties from the ANC has, indeed, become a self-inflicted pain and the impact of the voters, who left with each of these parties, on the national elections cannot be ignored.

1.5.1 United Democratic Movement (UDM)

The United Democratic Movement was the first party to cause a split of votes from the African National Congress in the 1994 national elections. The party performed exceptionally well in splitting the ANC vote, because, at the time, the South Africans were not sure of how the ANC would behave in their first government administration. The party, which was formed and headed by General Bantu Holomisa, who was a military ruler of the Transkei, convinced the Xhosa electorates that it would survive and it then extensively contested the heavyweight ANC. Roelf Meyer, a former influential National Party politician is listed with Holomisa as one of the founders of the party. Meyer, however, did not last long in the party before he chose to resign from politics and the public life. The UDM is currently in coalition governance against the ANC in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. Being a former ANC member, Holomisa does not have a problem with the party per se, but with its president, Jacob Zuma.

1.5.2 Congress of the People (COPE)

COPE is the second party to be created from a split of leadership within the African National Congress' ranks. The founders of COPE were Mosioua Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa and Mluleki George. The formation of the party came from the perception that the ANC, led by Jacob Zuma, is not the real one and so the COPE leaders will retain the real ANC through the formation of COPE (Ndletyana, 2010). The party contested its first national election in 2009 and achieved an outstanding victory of 7.42% in voter results and attained 30 seats in the national assembly. On the whole, it was assumed that 62.21% of COPE votes came from the ANC (Maserumule, 2015). The other percentages are assumed to be coming from parties other than the ANC, such as the DA, IFP, Independent Democrats (ID), the New National Party (NNP), and the United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) (Kotze, 2011:176).

COPE came with more hope for South Africans than the UDM did, because it was a formation of individuals with high moral standards who rejected to being in the ANC of Jacob Zuma, which was highly tainted with political corruption. Moreover, it was also suspected to be a party that was formed with Thabo Mbeki's blessing. Thabo Mbeki has,

indeed, distanced himself from such speculations, irrespective of the pressure put on him. Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema, while in alliance, tested his loyalty by asking him to campaign for the ANC. When he refused this request, they publicly criticised him for being a member of COPE. It can be argued that even though COPE is not performing as well as before, it has managed to paralyse the voter capacity of the African National Congress. If the ANC had managed the situation differently by resolving the political differences between individuals, they could still be counting on the votes that COPE has taken. COPE still has seats in the national, provincial and local municipalities of South Africa to ensure its existence and the retention of votes, which they took from the ANC and other South African political parties more than a decade ago.

1.5.3 Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)

The EFF was launched in 2013 and competed in the first national election in 2014. Like COPE, in its first national election, it attained 6.35% of the national votes gaining only 25 seats in the South African National Parliament. Its performance is much less than what COPE achieved in 2009, when it gained a share of 7.4% and 30 seats in the national assembly. Mbete (2014), however, argues that COPE had resources and sympathisers from the Polokwane Conference. Julius Malema's fate, after being expelled from the African National Congress, is comparable to that of Bantu Holomisa. Although viewed as such, Malema had influence over the ANC Youth League and most of his followers left with him to go to the EFF. Like it or not, Malema is a populist and that makes him the favourite of the youth and the poor. His populism tactics are well calculated, from a legal perspective, to the extent that, where he and his party have sought legal recourse, they have emerged victorious against the government (Hurt & Kuisma, 2016). Such victories, which the ANC ignores, increase the EFF's populism status, which threatens the voter confidence of the public regarding the African National Congress. The ANC has shown a lack of provision of leadership on numerous occasions when it has thrown its children out of the organisation, rather than spanking them.

Currently the EFF's influence regarding the political agenda of the South African citizen cannot be ignored. In its first local government election political manifesto, the EFF made no reference of recognition of any South African political hero. Unlike other South African political parties, who prefix their manifesto with late South African political heroes such as Tambo, Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, Steve Biko and Chris Hani, to say the least, in their political manifesto the EFF only make reference to a great African American hero, Dr Martin-Luther Jnr (EFF Election Manifesto, 2014:4). There are three important aspects that should be noted about the EFF's anti-ANC criticism. Firstly, the EFF's main goal of existence is to provide criticism on how badly the ANC, under Jacob Zuma, is governing. Secondly, the EFF's attack is much more focused on the ANC than it is on the DA or any other white minority parties in South Africa and thirdly, the EFF's attitude towards the ANC is highly personal and serves the interests of the DA more than it serves the EFF. Many political analysts view the future of the EFF as very promising in the future political direction and discourses of South Africa.

1.6 THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE AND THE POSING POLITICAL THREAT

The DA has since occupied the official opposition status against the ANC in parliament and is steadily growing. Having taken this position from the National Party, which had slowly died since being led by Martinus van Schalkwyk, the DA became sure of shifting membership from the National Party to its base. Its growth was evidenced by its ability to take over the Western Cape Province from the ANC, as well as becoming the official opposition party in KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape Province, Mpumalanga, Northern Cape, the Free State Province and the South African parliament as a whole (Mottiar, 2015). This significant growth by the DA is what the ANC should have viewed as "die Wit gevaar" or "White threat". The two tables below show the growth pattern of the DA in the South African electorate.

From Table 1.1, it can be deduced that the Democratic Alliance has been increasing its voter base by an alarming percentage. Having moved from seven seats in parliament, in 1994, to 89 seats, in the 2014 national elections, it shows that the DA's political ambition to take control of the entire South African government cannot be ignored. Although there are no studies that have confirmed where the Democratic Alliance is attaining this political strength to woo votes from South Africans, arguments are that it was strengthened by the death of the National Party, under Martinus van Schalkwyk. Most nationalists of the apartheid era do not see the future in minority conservative Afrikaner parties such as the Freedom Front Plus. The DA, with its history of criticising apartheid is the only political party dominated by the white minority class that can woo Africans (Blacks) into their camps. The Democratic Alliance always had its roots in liberal South African politics, which opposed apartheid, and changed its name from the Progressive Party (PP) to the Democratic Party (DP) in 1989, and ultimately, the DA in 2000, when it forged a failed alliance with the New National Party (NNP). The party has always been led by politicians with unquestionable moral backgrounds who opposed both the National Party's apartheid model and the ANC's corruption systems through the Cadre Deployment strategy.

Russon (2011) mentioned that "the Democratic Party is the only South African Party that has shown exponential growth trends over the four elections". It can, therefore, be concluded that its strengths lie in its ability to question the current South African

Table 1.1: DA National Election Results, 1994-2014

Year	Number of votes	% of votes	Seats in parliament
1994	338 426	1.73	7
1999	1 527 337	9.56	38
2004	1 931 201	12.37	50
2009	2 945 829	16.66	67
2014	4 091 584	22.23	89

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (www.iec.org.za)

Table 1.2: DA and ANC Election Results, Western Cape, 1994-2014

Year	DA%	ANC%
1994	6.64	33.10
1999	11.91	42.07
2004	27.11	45.25
2009	51.46	31.55
2014	59.38	32.89

Source: Mottiar (2015)

government's administration on moral grounds, as they have not been a part of this before, unlike the EFF which questions what they had not questioned while being part of the system. The role of both the EFF and the DA is convincing the South African electorate that a better life is derived from a different political history. The DA has a history of questioning political leaders from moral grounds as it did with the National Party. But, the EFF politicians only question after they are no longer part of the system. That is seen as politically unethical.

Table 1.2 demonstrates the electoral progression of the DA against the ANC in the Western Cape. In the last two national elections, the DA seems to have overtaken the African National Congress by almost 50% of the electoral vote. The two periods of elections, being 2009 and 2014, in the Western Cape show that the people of the Western Cape have developed some form of political trust in the administration of the DA. Taking into account that, in their first victory in 2009, the DA was hit by the open toilet scandal, one would have expected their victory over the ANC to have declined a bit, but instead it increased by 7.92%, while the ANC increased the electoral margin by a mere 1.34% from the 2009 national elections. This simply implies that the ANC's strategy to campaign through the open toilet scandal did not make a good political impact in the province.

Table 1.3: Metropolitan Election Results, 2006-2016

City of Cape Town			
POLITICAL PARTY	2006	2011	2016
ANC	37.91%	32.98%	24.36%
DA	41.85%	60.92%	66.61%
Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality			
ANC	66.53%	51.91%	40.90%
DA	24.39%	40.13%	46.71%
City of Tshwane			
ANC	56.35%	55.32%	41.50%
DA	30.69%	38.65%	43.00%
City of Johannesburg			
ANC			44.60%
DA			38.70%

Source: Author's compilation (2016)

Table 1.3 shows how the DA has performed in the Local Government Elections from 2006-2016. The Table only shows the enroots that the Democratic Alliance have made into the South African Metropolitans. The Western Cape Province is a stronghold of the Democratic Alliance, therefore, automatically making the Cape Town Metropolitan a white man's homeland in South Africa. In the 2016 Local Government Elections, the Democratic Alliance achieved victory over, at least, three Metropolitan municipalities. These include Cape Town, Nelson Mandela Bay and the Tshwane Metropolitan. Although it won the metropolitan municipalities, only Cape Town was won by over a 50% margin. In all other metropolitans, it had to form a coalition with other minority parties in order to govern. Although the ANC won the Johannesburg metro, the coalition of the DA and other minorities made it impossible for the ANC to govern this municipality. The DA governs the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality through coalition votes with political parties that are opposed to the ANC.

1.7 IS THERE A NEED FOR SOUTH AFRICANS TO FEAR "DIE WIT GEVAAR"?

Whether or not South Africans should fear "die Wit gevaar", the political future for the ANC as a majority party looks uncertain. There are no clear future guarantees. The party has had three presidents in two decades and, in the first three terms (15 years), only one opposition party emerged from the party itself. In this case, it was the United Democratic Movement of General Bantu Holomisa. In the fourth term, during which President Jacob Zuma took power, two opposition parties emerged from the party itself, namely the Congress of the People (2009) and the Economic Freedom Fighters in 2014. Thabo Mbeki, during his tenure as President of South Africa, managed to abort all minor political parties through the Floor Crossing Bill. That ultimately led to many people crossing from their political parties to join the ANC. Sebola (2014) noted that during the Thabo Mbeki regime, the ANC gained 27 seats through floor crossing when a further 87% of the National Party councillors crossed to the ANC (Wikipedia, 2010:2), which is a move that increased the political authority of the ANC in the South African parliament. While Mbeki seems to have put aside political difficulties with minor political parties, such as the PAC, ACDP, UDM, AZAPO, APC, NADECO and IFP, the 2009 victory by Jacob Zuma created two opposition parties, which could possibly lead to the creation of the "die Wit gevaar". COPE and EFF emerged strongly as critics of their own mother body, namely the ANC. South Africans view, with suspicion, how vocal Mosiuoa Lekota and Julius Malema can be against the party that was once their political home.

The emergence of these two in political circles assists the DA in executing its strategy, through them, to nail Jacob Zuma and ultimately the ANC, without getting any blood on their hands. While the EFF makes too much noise against Jacob Zuma in parliament, the noise seems to have increased more confidence, among South African voters, in the Democratic Alliance than in any other political party. It could be assumed that, with its anarchic, radical, immature and ill-disciplined approach to political issues against opponents, South Africans may not have faith in voting for the EFF even if they were angry with the ANC. Its majority of votes could be coming from the youth who regard

politics as more of a comedy than a real issue that affects people. Zille (2014:3-7), in the Democratic Alliance political manifesto, campaigns against the personality of Zuma, rather than the ANC as a failing party. It has never happened before, in the history of the ANC leadership that an individual is campaigned against instead of the party itself. When the ANC put the National Party (called the New National Party) into political retirement through an alliance, little was done to realise how a party, which was once an official opposition in the first democratic South Africa, could have disappeared. The harsh truth is that it could be reappearing through the current DA, which only suggests that Africans should be worried about the oncoming "die Wit gevaar". In his acceptance speech as Mayor of Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, the new Mayor Athol Trollip said, "Cadre deployment is a 'thing of the past'" (Koyana, 2016:1), which White South Africans believe the ANC used to officially deny the White citizens an equal opportunity in the public service. Trollip himself, however, formed a 14-member Mayoral committee composed of nine Whites and only five Blacks which, according to the ANC, is a White-male dominated Mayoral Committee (Spies, 2016:1). Trollip's perception of the Black government is of corruption and abuses of state resources; hence, his first project is to ensure the end of cadre deployment. The ANC, on the other hand, continues to experience declining respect from both the national and the international community on allegations of the political recklessness of the Zuma administration. The sacking of the Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan, through a cabinet reshuffle, threatens not only the economic status of the country, but also instils a sense of a confused future for ANC voters. Surprisingly, the ANC leadership, just like at the Polokwane Conference, publicly criticised their own President Zuma in the same way as they did with Thabo Mbeki. As of now, the future of the ANC, as a majority ruling party in South Africa, is bleak and nothing can be confirmed.

1.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter captured and analysed the pattern of how the ANC has, since 1994 to 2016, been electorally underperforming in a manner that could ultimately lead to it losing political power over the South African populace. It has been argued, in this chapter, that the people have been slowly losing political trust in the ruling party, because of the moral degradation of its political elite. Corruption has been topping their system of public administration which, ultimately, robbed the citizens of their right of access to quality services. This weakness is currently very open to the extent that although the South African public acknowledged its role in liberating them from the draconian laws of apartheid, they cannot withstand the manner that its elites rob the citizens of their right to public services. The decline in electoral votes, in favour of the opposition, is the first step to showing that Africans can only trust a party that is not characterised by corruption, but by adherence to moral standards. Unfortunately, a party that claims this is a racially founded party by the name of the Democratic Alliance. The focus of the African Blacks to change their votes from the ANC to the Democratic Alliance only suggests one fearful political solution: "die Wit gevaar or White threat" or the return of the White minority class to governing South Africa with the potential of bringing back what South Africans fear the most; the monster called apartheid.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Adhikari, M. 2006. 'God made the White man, God made the Black man' Popular Racial Stereotyping of Coloured People in Apartheid South Africa. *South African Historical Journal*, 55:142-164.
- Alberts, C. 2013. *Afrikaner Adolescents Identity Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa*. Available at: http://www.rjr.ru.ac.za/rjrpdf/rjr_no33/Afrikaner_adolescents. Accessed on 19 September 2016.
- Booyesen, S. 2009. Party opposition perpetually on the verge of Promise –South Africa's election. *Journal of African Elections*, 9(1):80-109.
- Bruce, D. 2014. *Control, discipline and punish? Addressing corruption in South Africa*. Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria
- Choudhry, S. 2009. He had a mandate; the South African constitutional court and the African National Congress in a dominant party democracy. *Constitutional Court Review*, 2:1-28.
- Diakanyo, S. 2011. *The imagined threat of 'die Swart gevaar'*. Available at: <http://thoughtleader.co.za/sentletsediakanyo/2011/01/06/of-the-imagined-threat-of-die-swart-gevaar/> Accessed on 3 March 2017.
- Economic Freedom Fighters, 2014. *Now is the time for economic freedom! EFF 2014 Elections Manifesto*. Available at: <http://docplayer.net/21509059-Eff-elections-manifesto-now-is-the-time-for-economic-freedom.html>. Accessed on 15 September 2016.
- Gardner, C. 2012. *How liberal is the current ANC*. Available at: http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/focus/focus-65/06.%20C_Gardner%20-%20How%20Liberal%20is%20the%20Current%20ANC. Accessed on 19 September 2016.
- Goodson, S. 2013. *The ANC – A liberation movement or a tool of the Bankers?* Jeffrey's Bay: South Africa. Available at: <http://www.southafricaproject.info/ANC-pp95-96-hope%20final.pdf>. Accessed on 24 September 2016.
- Hurt, S.R. & Kuisma, M. 2016. *Undermining the "Rainbow Nation"? The economic freedom fighters and left-wing population in South Africa*. Paper presented at the 66th Political Studies Association annual International Conference, Hilton Brighton Metropole, Brighton 21-23 March 2016.
- Kaufman, S.J. 2012. *The end of apartheid: rethinking South Africa's 'Peaceful' Transition*. University of Delaware: Delaware.
- Knoesen, S.G. 2007. *Public services provision in South Africa*. The Variation in Access to Electricity, Water, and Sewerage at the Municipal Ward Level between 1996 and 2001. Centre for the Study of Democracy: UC Irvine.
- Konyana, X. 2016. *Cadre deployment a 'thing of the past' –Trollip*. Eye Witness News: Cape Town.
- Kotze, D. 2011. General analysis of the local government election 2011. *Unisa: Department of Political Science*.
- Letsholo, S. 2005. How the ANC won the 2004 elections: Perspective on voting behaviour in South Africa. *The Democracy Encyclopaedia*, 31:45-67.
- Maanga, G.S. 2013. The relevance and legacy of Nelson Mandela in the twenty-first century Africa: an historical and theological perspective. *African Journal of History and Culture*, 5(5): 96-113.
- Maserumule, M.H. 2015. Decrypting the congress of the peoples diminishing electoral prospects. *Politeia*, 34(1):45-65.
- Mbete, S. 2014. The Economic Freedom Fighters South Africa's Turn towards Populism? South Africa Election Update. *Journal of African Elections*, 14(1):35-59.
- Melber, H. 2014. South Africa's Elections 2014: and the winner is? *German Institute of Global Area studies*, 4:1-8.
- Motlanthe, K. 1998. ANC Today. Mobilise and Organise for a Decision ANC Victory. *Online Voice of the African National Congress*, 9(15):1-4.
- Mottiar, S. 2015. The democratic alliance and the role of opposition parties in South Africa. *Journal of African Elections*, 14(1):106-123.
- Ndletyana, M. 2010. Congress of the people: a promise betrayed. *Journal of African Elections*, 9(2): 32-55.
- Nelana, B. 2010. The ANC Polokwane Conference and its Aftermath. *African Institute of South Africa*, 11:1-9.

- Reynolds, A. 1999. South Africa: Electoral system design and conflict management in Africa. *Elections and Conflict Management in Africa*, 31: 67-76.
- Russon, R.D. 2011. Ten years of democratic local government elections in South Africa, is the tide turning? *Journal of African Elections*, 10(1):74-98.
- Sebola, M.P. 2014. The Politicisation of Government Administration: The Limited Brutal Options of the South African Government Administration. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science*, 5(7): 208-216.
- Senekal, A.B. & Stemmet, J. 2013. Threats of communist expansion in apartheid South Africa: NP Claims Versus CIA Intelligence Perspectives in the Years 1960 to 1990. *New Contree*, 68:99-119.
- Spies, D. 2016. *Nelson Mandela Bay mayoral committee White, male dominated – ANC*. Available at: <https://polotiki.com/2016/08/24/nelson-mandela-bay-mayoral-committee-white-male-dominated-anc/>. Accessed on 3 March 2017.
- Suttner, R. 2007. African National Congress (ANC): Attainment of power, post liberation phase and current crisis. *Historia*, 52(1):1-46.
- Suttner, R. 2007. Cultures of the African National Congress of South Africa: imprint of exile experiences. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21(2)303-320.
- Turner, R.N., Hewstone, M., Swart, H., Tam, T., Myers, E. & Tausch, N. 2010. *Promoting intergroup trust among adolescents and young adults*. Western Cape: Stellenbosch University.
- van Heerden, C.H. 2010. Newspaper Cartoons as a Reflection of Political Change during the First Democratic Elections in South Africa. *Journal for Communication Sciences*, 13,103-120.
- Wikipedia, 2010. eTV. redirected from eTV in South Africa. Available at: <http://en.wikipedia.org>. Accessed on 28 February 2011.
- Zille, H. 2014. *Together for Change Together for Jobs*. DA 2014 election Manifesto. Available at: <http://www.da.org.za>. Accessed on 28 September 2016.

THE SPIRAL DOWNFALL OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS VOTER TURNOUT DURING THE 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS: EFFECTS OF INCONSIDERATE LEADERSHIP

ST Mzangwa

6

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) ensures that South Africa is a sovereign, democratic state, which is founded on the values of human dignity, the advancement of human rights, non-racialism and non-sexism with its citizens abiding to the rule of law. If it had paid heed to these values, promulgated in the Constitution, the current leadership of the African National Congress (ANC) could have done better in the 2016 Local Government Elections. Local government is primarily about service delivery, which should be the point at which government connects with citizens. Service delivery is a fundamental human right, which the government should embrace to ensure that it renders effective services to its people. The recent, highly contested 2016 Local Government Elections are embedded in a history where democratic principles, which liberation movements, such as the ANC and many others, fought for through leaders who demanded a change of regime for the betterment of the nation, were a primary concern. Central to the ANC's values and principles, as a liberation movement, are the principles which underpin a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory society. These principles serve as sufficient evidence that the ANC was formed not only to overthrow the apartheid regime, but also to create equality and a better life for all citizens, irrespective of their social background. Of deep concern is the perception that the current ANC leadership, under President Zuma, seems to have ignored the values contained in the constitution of the ANC, and is failing to respect the Constitution of the country. This chapter argues that, owing to the ongoing scandals revolving, primarily, around President Zuma, it has become difficult for the ANC to maintain its loyal voter supporters and to salvage what it stood for. It is suggested that if the leadership of the ruling party would adhere to both the values of the Constitution and the founding principles of the ANC, the party will not only regain its dignity, but could also obtain its objectives of bringing about change towards a better life for the citizens of South Africa.

A number of scholars have contributed to conversations on the issues of local government, service delivery and good governance, effective leadership, democracy and liberation movements in Africa and South Africa, in particular, Mafunisa, 2008; Nengwekhulu, 2009; Suttner, 2009; Mpehle, 2012; Southall, 2014; Prah, 2015 and Schwella, 2015. This chapter does not add to the views of these and other scholars, nor does it aim to analyse the 2016 South African local government political party 'electioneering' stance. Rather,

it aims to take a closer look at the ANC's current leadership, under President Zuma, in relation to the recent Local Government Election's outcomes. This chapter argues that with the ongoing scandals, revolving mostly around the President (Zuma), it became difficult for the ANC to be seen by South African society as a liberation movement, which aims to maintain what it proclaims. Ignorance and negligent leadership have obscured the ANC's values and principles, as a movement, and have contributed to a lack of good governance. Good governance portrayed by leadership, if appropriately implemented, will reinstate the values and principles underpinning the ANC as a liberation movement (Mashele, 2016). If these fundamental principles could be invigorated and exercised within the movement, itself, by its ordinary members, such attributes and principles could easily be transferred and utilised more effectively in the government's leadership structures. This would guarantee the ANC's objective stance as a liberation movement, which aims to bring a 'better life for all'. In this regard, the ANC, as a ruling party, could maintain its platform from which to make South Africa prosper under a caring and exemplary leadership. Among other lessons, which could be learned after the recent Local Government Elections, is that mediocre and ignorant leadership in a multiparty and constitutional democracy failed the good intentions of the ANC as a liberation movement (Suttner, 2009).

In an attempt to address the arguments drawn from the literature in this chapter, this introduction has outlined the purpose and the structure of this chapter. The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows: views on the sinking ANC's promises, a presentation of democratic principles and selfless leadership in governance, details on the values of the Constitution and effective governance, an analysis of good governance and delivery of basic services to citizens, a discussion on the Local Government Elections and their significance to voters, a review of voter turnout and the downfall of the ANC's voter support and, finally, a summary and concluding remarks.

6.2 THE SINKING ANC'S PROMISES

"The people have spoken. The people have said unequivocally: The ANC leads!" (Mbeki, 1999). These were the sentiments uttered, with confidence, by the former President of the African National Congress (ANC), Mr Thabo Mbeki, after the ANC's overwhelming (66%) win of the national elections in 1999. The ANC continued to win National and Local Government Elections in the following years, despite decreasing support for the ANC. The recent (2016) Local Government Elections were the worst ever in the history of the ANC's election results, which draws attention to the statistical indication of the past (World Bank 2011; Independent Electoral Commission, 2016). Certainly, no one can deny that the 2016 Local Government Elections were highly contested, as compared to the previous Local Government Elections, which took place after 1994 (Independent Electoral Commission, 2016). Over 26 million South African citizens registered to vote and the voter turnout was above 15 million, which symbolises citizens exercising their democratic right to make a choice as to how they would like to be governed, as is enshrined in Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights Section 20(2)(a) in the Constitution of

South Africa (1996) (hereafter referred to as the Constitution). Undoubtedly, South Africans have, once again, spoken to make the point that they take local government more seriously than ever before. Local government is the point at which government connects with its citizens, and this is primarily about service delivery. Service delivery, in its nature, is a fundamental human right, which ensures that government renders services to its people to the best of its ability (Nengwekhulu, 2009:347). The highly contested 2016 Local Government Elections were the beneficiaries of democratic principles, which liberation movements, such as the ANC and others, have fought for through leaders who demanded a change of regime for the betterment of the nation (Prah, 2015:4).

At the centre of the ANC's values and principles, as a liberation movement, are the principles which create a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory society whilst promoting equality in society (Rule 2.2 of the ANC Constitution, 1997). On its own, this is sufficient evidence that the ANC was built not only to overthrow the apartheid regime, but to eradicate apartheid, in all its forms, by giving all people the dignity they deserve irrespective of their social background. This "better life for all" has been espoused in the ANC's election manifesto since 1994. Indeed, some elements and promulgations of the South African Constitution, such as the ones mentioned above, are, in fact, drawn from the constitution of the ANC as a liberation movement. It is disturbing, therefore, to note that the current ANC leaders seem to have ignored the very constitution of the movement they belong to, and they subsequently care less about admiring and respecting the Constitution of the country (Suttner, 2009:234), which provides that "the Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedom, (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism, (c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law" as is enshrined under Section 1 of the founding provisions of the Constitution. By virtue of these values, which are promulgated in the Constitution, the ANC could and should have done better in the Local Government Elections, had it not been for the promotion of their 'own goals', which was mainly committed by its current leadership, as was analysed by various political and independent analysts such as Maluleke (2016), Mashele (2016) and Matshiqi (2016).

6.3 DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND SELFLESS LEADERSHIP IN GOVERNANCE

In a democratic state, the multiparty system functions, primarily, within a relative and representational procedure unlike direct majoritarian rule, which is arranged in a form of a "winner-takes-all" setup (Prah, 2015:1). Historically, it would appear that under the paradigm of African leadership or governance, African leaders seem to favour the "winner-takes-all" arrangement as opposed to a multiparty system, where different political parties have a space (representational) not only to raise their ideologies, but to function in an enabling environment and take part in governance without being undermined or unwanted by the ruling party (Kanjere, 2015:327).

Public governance is primarily the responsibility of politics, although politics must not be confused with administration in the public service (Sebola, 2014:209). Public governance remains a function and product of politics. The public expects politicians, as leaders, to show remorse when they have done wrong and to take responsibility for their actions. Instead, we have a parade of blatant ignorance and empty rhetoric, which has taken the place of proper political discourse (Fakir, 2009:9). The key aspect in compromising state or government functions is the failure to implement policies, which aim to enforce political responsiveness to senior state appointments, so as to avoid patronage and nepotism in state administration (Matheson *et al.*, 2007:10). According to Matheson *et al.* (2007:11), patronage and nepotism tend to occur in countries where the governance system appears to be weak due to the politicisation of civil service and senior government officials who lack competency to do their duties, and little, or nothing, is done to remove them.

Various countries, such as the United States of America (USA), Japan, Israel and Germany, all practice different forms of constitutional democracy. The main, common principle of a constitutional democracy is that the rights of the citizens are protected by the Constitution, including the rights of the minorities. Moreover, the government is fully bound to the Constitution and the citizens' voice is acknowledged and taken seriously in the political rule and power (Government and Politics, 2016). In its arrangement, democracy should not be what transpired in countries such as the United States of America (USA) during the 19th century when African-Americans were kept marginalised in the southern parts of America. Instead of being divisive, democracy should be about the people's will and should be understood as being relatively evolutionary as opposed to being regressive. This was only seen after the civil war and after the 1960s and the civil rise of leaders such as Martin Luther King in the USA. From this viewpoint, the features of democracy, and how it is being applied in an African context, are not supposed to be worse than what it was in the western countries, if one considers the historical background of African-Americans (Prah, 2015:7). However, the opposite seems to be taking place in African countries and among the leadership.

Despite evidence of undemocratic elements in countries across the world, which announce themselves as democracies, such discrepancies gain more attention in the African political sphere where it appears that some political leaders are in favour of a political philosophy, which is kept in short supply (Prah, 2015:3). Thus, in Africa, it is not important who the followers of the leaders are and what they are capable of, as long as they take orders from the leaders at all costs (Kanjere, 2015:326). Examples of countries where liberation movements ended up serving the leaders, but not the citizens, include Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria and Angola among others (Mafukata, 2015). Democracy, it seems, is rhetorically acclaimed but difficult to practice.

In South Africa, the current leaders of the ANC are surrounded by scandals of corruption, nepotism, the mismanagement of funds and high levels of arrogance, particularly, towards anyone who opposes the current leadership's conduct. A culture of patronage has held

the party hostage. The perception is that one may not oppose ill-disciplined behaviour and all instances of patronage for fear of being deemed disloyal to the current ANC, and facing the accusation that you deserve no place in the movement (Southall, 2014; 2016). Certainly, statements of arrogance and ignorance uttered by the ANC leadership make it difficult for the party to prosper, as Secretary-General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe, keeps referring members to their constituencies or branches (Mathebula, 2016). If the ANC leaders were to strongly safeguard, monitor and ensure that the majority of the party's proposed policies and regulations are implemented, such a move would (a) make it easier for the ANC to appeal to people's expectations and (b) it would be difficult for the major opposition political parties to break the wall of hope and trust established by the ANC, through its principles, to the majority of South African citizens (Skweyiya, 2016). However, currently the opposition political parties, such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), appear to be a 'threat' to the current ruling ANC, simply because of poor leadership and ongoing weaknesses inside and outside of the ANC structures. It appears that the current leadership of the ANC has forgotten that, in democracy, people have a right to vote a political party out of governance should it fail to live up to its promises and fail to deliver services to the citizens (Mpehle, 2012).

Rule 2.3 of the ANC's constitution (1997) provides that the ANC and/or any member of the ANC should "defend the democratic gains of the people and advance towards a society in which the government is freely chosen by the people according to the principles of universal suffrage on a common voters' roll". Therefore, historically, the ANC is a political liberation movement which recognises the importance of democracy, and where its leaders, in particular, the executive and the President, are not supposed to be seen to be reprimanded, reminded and, more often, found to be performing wrong actions, which violate the principles of democracy (Rule 2.3 of the ANC constitution, 1997).

Advice from some prominent ANC leaders, who aimed to help President Zuma refrain from departing from the principle and policy of the ANC, was ignored and shut down. This resulted in a negative response from President Zuma and some executive members of the ANC, such as Jessie Duarte, who lashed out at such leaders for being 'politically bankrupt', instead of taking the advice and moving forward (Letsoalo, 2015). President Zuma's behaviour portrays him not only as an ignorant and arrogant leader of the 'people's movement' but as a destroyer of the good principles of the movement itself (Mashele, 2016). Also, President Zuma's actions, as well as those of other executive leaders of the ANC, portray him as a bearer of bad tenets who is seemingly immune to criticism. Given this state of affairs, it is difficult for the ANC to 'simply maintain', let alone claim Mandela's¹ legacy and the legacy of other, prominent, South African liberation movement leaders (Manusamy, 2016). Indeed, claiming such legacy is left to the oppositions, which leaves the ANC with no option but to oppose the opposition parties when they, rightly, claim or quote that leaders such as Mandela have done good work and their legacy to make South Africa a rainbow nation is worth fighting for. The ANC leadership, such as

¹The former president of the African National Congress and the former president of a democratic South Africa from 1994-1999, Nelson Mandela is also well known by his clan name of Madiba.

Zweli Mkhize, cry foul that opposition parties, in particular the DA, must not campaign using Mandela's name as that 'belittles' Nelson Mandela (Mkhize, 2016).

A better strategy for the ANC leadership would be to agree with the opposition and endorse that they are the true adherents of Mandela's values; to allow the public to speak freely, recognise their concerns and respond as a responsive leadership through disciplined and principled actions. The emergence of 'absolute power', seemingly practiced and defended by the current leadership of the ANC, does not help the liberation movement in any way except to drag the name of the ANC down, as predicted by Callinicos in the early 1990s (Callinicos, 1991). The 'culture' of patronage has caused internal tensions and factionalism within the ANC and it's deteriorating under President Zuma, who mainly appoints ministries who are personally loyal to him and not to the ANC (Southall, 2016:81). The questions, therefore, are: what went wrong with the good leadership that the ANC had? Where is the ANC leadership, which aimed to 'govern without boundaries or discrimination'?

6.4 THE VALUES OF THE CONSTITUTION AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE

In a democratic state, such as South Africa, which still enjoys global recognition as an African country that transitioned to democracy, without violence, after 1994, tolerance is still a key signifier towards and between governing officials, in particular the leaders of the ruling party (Prah, 2015:9). In an attempt to maintain attributes of good governance in a multiparty governed system, tolerance is not only a key feature, but will help to keep society and voters of the ruling party keen to achieve its initially intended objective of making South Africa a functioning country and the ANC as the movement aiming to offer 'a better life for all'. This requires a ruling party with a leadership which honours the Constitution and respects its citizens.

6.4.1 Human Dignity, the Achievement of Equality and the Advancement of Human Rights and Freedoms

According to Mandela (1993), the people of South Africa and leaders with good intentions towards the country should seek democracy that builds the nation, and leaders should aim to deepen and broaden the rights of all citizens. Most people agree that life in South Africa, under multiparty and constitutional democracy, is better than it was more than two decades ago, because of the democratic government system we have had since 1994 (Leibbrandt, *et al.*, 2010).

Nengwekhulu (2009:347) and Fakir (2009:7) argue that high levels of income inequality and poverty have been exacerbated in South Africa since 1994. Resources are still not shared equally. For example, there are still considerable numbers of people without housing; unemployment rates are rising; and poverty levels remain alarmingly high. Certainly, government should be about the authoritative and fair allocation of resources to the public, since this is what human dignity and human rights mean, as promulgated in the

Constitution. In this regard, Dlamini-Zuma (2016) strongly contends that the important task of presiding over the country is primarily about the allocation of resources to the citizens. The government leaders, or those presiding over the country's resources, have to make sure that they invest in society and in the talent of human beings (society), educate, develop skills and ensure that people are healthy and safe, particularly the youth. In a South African context, considering a history of colonisation and apartheid, investing in young citizens helps to ensure that the nation aims to transform the economy and move appropriately with the times (Chiumbu, 2016). Associating these sentiments with the principles of the African Union (AU) from its foundation year, in 1963 until now, the AU, according to Dlamini-Zuma (2016), has stood for the eradication of colonialism, the abolition of apartheid as well as freedom of association and a right to live as contained in the Constitution of democratic countries like South Africa. Furthermore, Nengwekhulu (2009:347) maintains that political power is linked to service delivery, since that has to do with taking care of the citizens, which is the important task and responsibility of local government. The removal or negligence of service to people is not just a symbol of ignorant and irresponsible leadership, but more so, it is an indication of arrogance, oppression and the exploitation of people. An African leader, and indeed, a South African leader, must not fall into such a trap.

6.4.2 Non-Racialism and Non-Sexism

Elements and utterances of race and ethnic discrimination will always emerge from within society. However, since members of society are also associated with political parties, such utterances and elements are associated with the political party that they belong to. It is, however, worse when political leaders are the bearers and deliverers of racial utterances. This implies that such leaders advocate discord and aim to gain not fame, but power from the "vulnerable and disadvantaged" society when relying on racial division to score political points. In the culture and Constitution of both the country and that of the ANC, racial discrimination or the promotion thereof is neither tolerable nor accommodated in any form (Rule 3.1 of the ANC constitution, 1997).

The current ANC leadership, including President Zuma, as was seen during the campaigns of the 2016 Local Government Elections, has attacked the political parties led by young Black leaders such as the DA and the EFF leaders, respectively, on the basis of their skin colour and social background, as if it is wrong of them [young Black opposition leaders] to be on the leading front, which opposes the failing leadership of the ANC. Elements of hate speech belittle the leaders of the ANC and send a message of disunity to South Africans. Such speeches relate to hate speech, which the Constitution condemns based on race, ethnicity and freedom of choice (SA Parliament Business Publications, 2016). In contrast, the young Black leaders are the ones who proclaim Mandela's legacy. They convey messages of fighting for a non-racial society and the ideology of building a rainbow nation in a better manner than the current leaders of the ANC. Yet again, this is a failure of the leadership, since this is distinct from the ANC as a movement, together with its manifesto, as is evident by the majority of the former leaders of the

ANC who strongly condemn racial discrimination and who avoid being drawn into 'shameful' divisive behaviour (Callinicos, 1991:2). Certainly, progressive democratic government under the ANC, as the ruling party, has borne fruit and the movement must be proud to have once had leadership, which was selfless and remained focused on a just society.

6.4.3 Supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law

According to Booyens (2016), the ANC's leadership recently, under President Zuma's reign, lost their votes with ease to the opposition parties. For example, the leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), Mmusi Maimane's message was clear and unambiguous during a campaign, saying "Honour Madiba – Vote for change". The DA was reminding South Africans that democracy is all about the choices made by people in a free society (Manusamy, 2016). The DA supported such statements by saying that Madiba once said, "If the ANC does to you what the apartheid government did to you, then you must do to the ANC what you did to the apartheid government" (Mandela, 1993).

For ordinary South Africans, some of whom are poverty stricken, unemployed, hungry and without shelter, their choices were to vote against the ANC and vote for change or abstain from voting as some did (Plaut, 2014). In as much as the DA's postulation of Madiba's (Nelson Mandela's) honour was aimed at garnering votes, it was very difficult for the ANC, under President Zuma, to make the same claim, so they countered, defensively, that Madiba could not be brought into local political issues, as this would 'belittle' what Madiba stood for (Mkhize, 2016). The truth is that there is no belittling of Madiba when it comes to people's lives.

Again, the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC), from Luthuli house, had to be cautious on how to support the President. The NEC eventually made its own nominations extending even to the local councillors who were imposed on communities, such as the call on Thoko Didiza to stand in as the Tshwane mayoral candidate, which sparked violent reactions in the discontented branches. Danny Jordaan was lobbied to rescue the Nelson Mandela Bay constituency, even though this move did not bestow the expected results for the ANC in retaining their governance of this metro. An ANC community elected Ward Councillor from Soshanguve (North of Pretoria in Gauteng), ward 89, won a case against the NEC, which deliberately ignored this and swapped him for someone who was nominated to be a Ward Councillor (Business Day, 26 July 2016) based on the NEC's imposing tactics. There is still infighting and killings among the members of the ANC and these negative incidents are linked to the political positions being fought for within the party in the regions, such as KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, yet the NEC is unable to control this situation. The recent case by the National Prosecuting Authority's (NPA) investigations imposed against the former Minister of Finance (Pravin Gordhan), while the President played 'quiet diplomacy' and claimed there was nothing he could do, shows the low level of party politicking and a lack of leadership (Booyens, 2016; Matshiqi, 2016). These, among others, are some of the spiralling, scandalous and

reckless errors which the ANC leadership, under President Zuma, keeps making with little concern for the integrity of the country. These issues have cost the ANC more votes and will continue to cause more damage if they are unattended to (Merten, 2016; Carolus, 2016).

6.5 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES TO CITIZENS

In its nature, the promotion of good governance is a fight against the ill-conduct of public servants and against corruption, while ensuring the full support of law enforcement and encouraging personnel to render an efficient service (Madonsela, 2010:2). Senior government officials or political leaders need to lead by example, as a firm step to enforce a culture of law-abiding civil service, rather than by empty rhetoric made by politicians. Good governance implies a full acknowledgement of upholding the Constitution and respecting human rights where personalities have no place, but only justice prevails and must always be done (Prah, 2015:4).

When addressing members of the ANC, the former Deputy President of the ANC and former President of South Africa, Kgalema Motlanthe, stated that the ANC must prioritise service delivery to its citizens. He articulated that "complacency, which has been practiced within the movement (ANC), and the results of the past local government election were an embarrassment to the ANC" (Motlanthe, 2016). He went further to say that some members of the ANC have abandoned the principles of the Constitution, which they were responsible for compiling (Motlanthe, 2016). Instead of supporting the Constitution, members of the movement are being dragged into court for contravening the very Constitution they fought for.

The socio-economic development of a country and the country's attraction to investors, globally, lies mainly in how the state is governed (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014:20). Attributes of good and caring leadership are what people want in order to appreciate the good intentions of the ANC (Skweyiya, 2016). However, and in stark contrast to the message of Madiba, President Zuma opted to use divisive messages during The Local Government Election campaigns and rallies and so did the leadership of the ANC, namely the Deputy President, Cyril Ramaphosa, in Vhuwani (Power FM, 2016).

Madonsela (2010:1) emphasises that: "most authorities on the issue of good governance and corruption are adamant that the single most important factor is the human element. In other words, we need to address human values and behaviour". Good governance does not start because a party has been elected into government. It depends on the principles and values of individuals who are guided by the political movement or the organisation to which they belong. It starts before you even get elected. Government is about the authoritative sharing of resources with a deserving public, but a mobster does the opposite, which is to loot from the state for personal gain (Ellis, 2012:624; Southall, 2016:74). It seems difficult for the current leadership of the ANC, provocative

and controversial as it may sound, to uphold the principles of a democratic government, which can only be defended through good governance (Agang SA, 2013). In this regard, errors that are made by leaders of the ANC cannot be defended by people who insist that corruption, nepotism and cronyism are inherited from apartheid. It is for this very reason that the ANC got into power – to eradicate corrupt state officials and to implement justice to serve all. The fight against corruption is what the ANC stood for and this must be conveyed through politically committed leaders who serve justice (Kanjere, 2015).

A failure to honour the constitution of the ANC led to ignorance and a concomitant failure to honour the South African Constitution (Suttner, 2009). The ANC, as the ruling party, could be regarded as being careless about the serious development of the country and, by promoting ill-discipline throughout the ranks, transferring those failures to governance and, thereby, creating space for opposition parties to take over. The intention of the liberation movement has been completely ignored and Madiba's legacy has been left in the hands of the opposition, such as the DA.

President Zuma has been easily drawn into the games of 'cheap politicking' to the extent that he deliberately ignores any criticism, even if it comes from the movement's leaders. In an attempt to rightfully protect the movement, and probably President Zuma himself, prominent leaders such as Cheryl Carolus, Ben Turok, Mavuso Msimanga, Zola Skweyiya and Ronny Kasrils, have requested his resignation (African News Agency, 2016). Some prominent leaders of the ANC, in line with stalwarts such as Frank Chikane, Ahmed Kathrada and Paul Mashatile, submitted advice to Luthuli House for a change in leadership with calls for the resignation of President Zuma (African News Agency, 2016). The President uses public platforms for minor, if not the wrong reasons such as always singing songs instead of tackling serious national matters (Suttner, 2009) and ridiculing members of parliament for raising the Nkandla matter, as if this was just a minor issue. Furthermore, he argues to parliamentarians that the ANC comes first, before the country or the Constitution, and calls the South African Black middle class "the clever Blacks" when they try to voice their concerns. In this regard, the value of the Constitution is, undoubtedly, meaningless to such a leader.

6.6 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE VOTERS

Local Government elections are about the authority given, by the public, to the elected officials to make sure that service delivery is rendered to the citizens (Nengwekhulu, 2009). The local government's primary duty is to deliver services to the public (Dlamini-Zuma, 2016). Elections could then be regarded as the 'voice' of the citizens in a democratic state (World Bank, 2011:26). Observing the results of the 2016 Local Government Elections, the ruling party seems to have taken the people for granted, neglecting to serve citizens with dignity, without discriminating and by constitutionally abiding by the rule of law. People have been loyal and have voted for the ANC, in many instances, even when

they protested against it [ANC] and, even then, in some areas, it failed to deliver on its promises (Collinicos, 1991; Anyangwe, 2012:42).

During the 2016 Local Government Elections, people preferred either not to vote for the ANC or to vote against the ANC in favour of the opposition; thus, some votes could be assumed to not actually be votes for the DA, but rather votes against the ANC (Matshiqi, 2016), for instance, in the Tshwane Metro, which the DA now leads after a coalition was formed with the EFF. Poor governance by the ANC leadership made it easier for oppositions to point out the mismanagement and maladministration involving corruption, patronage, cronyism, nepotism and all the typical failures incurred by the ANC-led government. The ANC's NEC preferred to cover for the leadership's mistakes, instead of outrightly condemning the ill-conduct (Letsoalo, 2016). For instance, President Zuma could have immediately resigned after the Constitutional Court found him acting against the Constitution, particularly, on the issue of Nkandla. This could have restored the dignity of a principled and people-serving ANC (Mafukata, 2015:101).

It may not be surprising that other political parties, particularly, the main opposition to the ANC, although they had very little to say or showcase about their 'uniqueness' and manifestos, emerged victorious enough after the Local Government Elections, due to the weaknesses of the ANC's leadership (Anyangwe, 2012:51; Mashele, 2016). It was not necessarily about what the oppositions stood for, but more about what the ANC and its leadership have done wrong, with proven evidence, in most cases. These sentiments could be shared by many people inside and outside the ANC (Mashele, 2016; Matshiqi, 2016). On its own, the ANC shows another angle of the current leaders, which is in stark contrast to that of the former leaders, who were so well grounded and did sterling work in compiling a powerful, appropriate and well-tabulated constitution for the party (ANC), which is not only appealing to the people, but which is also influential and addresses most of what the South African society needs or deserves, which is to be governed adequately (Callinicos, 1991).

Elements of shifting the blame and not being accountable to address the challenges, and rectify errors, have mushroomed within the structures of the ANC. The first and most significant route of accountability is the visibility of policymakers to citizens, which maintains the relationship between voters and politicians. Elections are, therefore, the most powerful mechanism, which citizens could use to hold policymakers or politicians responsible and also accountable (Dlamini-Zuma, 2016). Leaders of the ANC who raise honest views and suggest 'positive moves' are being 'victimised' or sidelined as if they have done something wrong (Plaut, 2014:635). The Sunday Times (21 August 2016) reported that the Gauteng Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) under Chairperson, Paul Mashatile, is to be disbanded, since they are being implicated as the cause of the ANC's low Local Government Elections voter support turnout in the Province. This comes after the Gauteng PEC's vocal concern of requesting President Zuma to step down as the President of the country and not endorsing his face in campaigns for the 2016 Local Government Elections in the Province.

6.7 THE VOTER TURNOUT AND DOWNFALL OF THE ANC'S VOTER SUPPORT

Since its entry into government, in 1994, the ANC has proven to have a voter loyalty of more than 80% (CSIR, 2006). Most of the supporters or voters of the ANC have shown discontent regarding poor service delivery and protests have been demonstrated by various communities, but voters still returned the ANC to power, overwhelmingly, each term when they voted since and after 1994. A statistical reflection of the Local Government Elections since the year 2000, shows that the ANC votes grew from 59.4% to 66.3% by the year 2006. However, since then, the votes for the ANC declined, each term during elections, including in the very recent 2016 Local Government Elections, which was the lowest at only 53.9%. The pattern of loyal support over the years, each time during elections, remained unchanged even during 2009 (World Bank, 2011:28).

Statistical polls indicate that even though the total voter registration and the voter turnout were higher than during all past Local Government Elections, with above 26 million registered voters and above 15 million voter turnout, the ANC voter support was low, signifying a further decline compared to past Local Government Election votes (Independent Electoral Commission, 2016). In Table 6.1 below, the Local Government Election voter turnout is shown, in sequence, from 2000 until 2016. Clearly the 2016 Local Government Elections had more people voting and it is during this term that the number of votes for the ANC went down, drastically, as reflected by the Independent Electoral Commission's local government outcomes from 2000 to 2016.

The ANC lost the three large metros where it used to govern, and which house most of the Black middle and working class, namely, Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape, Tshwane and the City of Johannesburg in Gauteng, all to the DA which is mainly in coalition with the EFF (Sunday Times, 2016). Among the ANC voter supporters in townships and elsewhere, the Black middle class, according to a survey conducted by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in November 2005, constitutes 56% of a sample size of just slightly above 5 000, which shows that voting helped to improve the running of local government and the delivery of services (World Bank, 2011:28).

Table 6.1: Local Government Elections Results (2000 to 2016)

Political party	2000	2006	2011	2016
African National Congress (ANC)	59.4%	66.3%	62%	53.9%
Democratic Alliance (DA)	22.1%	14.8%	23.9%	26.9%
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	9.1%	8.1%	3.6%	4.3%
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)	*	*	*	8.2%
Other parties (collective figure)	9.4%	10.8%	10.5%	6.7%
Total voter turnout	100%	100%	100%	100%
*During the time of the elections, which took place before 2014, the Economic Freedom Fighters had not yet been formed and, thus, there is no statistical indication supplied for the EFF in the years 2000, 2006 and 2011.				

Source: Independent Electoral Commission (2016) (South Africa)

The crux of a democratic government system has to do with respect for the values of a multiparty system to ensure accountability, transparency and responsiveness.

Certainly, under the leadership of President Zuma, as the President of the ANC and of the country, the opposition parties appear to have attracted voters on a 'silver platter' during the 2016 Local Government Elections. Even though it could be argued that the opposition did not win the elections with an outright majority, their work was made easier on the basis of mediocre and ignorant leadership from the ruling party, as the liberation movement, with the ruling party in chaos and the poor conduct of President Zuma, as a leader, who does not take the country and the movement seriously. Statements from the President, such as "the ANC comes first" and that "the ANC will rule till Jesus comes", make a mockery of democratic principles (Tau & Williams, 2016; Mail & Guardian, 29 July 2016, p.11). This portrays a level of disrespect for the South Africans [voters] as a nation and diminishes the Constitution. Likewise, it destroys the founding principles of the ANC, since it totally opposes what the ANC represents. Needless to say, the country's Constitution seems to be insignificant to President Zuma who, apart from neglecting to protect the Constitution, in defence of the Nkandla matter, delegated various Parliamentary Committees and Cabinet Ministers to justify his expenditure. Where does this put the ANC, itself, under such a leader?

6.8 THE INCONSIDERATE LEADERSHIP OF THE ANC

Against a background of ongoing mistakes perpetrated by the current leadership of the ANC lies a lack of consideration and, more seriously, a display of arrogance and a disregard for human rights and the rule of law. To take one example, the Nkandla saga showed a defiance of Chapter 9 Institutions with contempt for the Public Protector's findings and an attempt to bluntly oppose the Constitution (Mashele, 2016). The ANC leadership had the capacity and the power to prevent this, and other misdemeanours, by those who abuse their power and misuse public money and to defend the defenceless, yet they chose to do nothing.

This kind of selfish leadership shows little inclination to monitor, nurture, protect and encourage the good principles of the ANC, as well as the values drafted by the former leaders who aimed to change the regime for the betterment of the country and all who live in it (Fakir, 2009). This type of conduct, therefore, leaves one no choice but to conclude that the current leadership has not only lost direction, but is aiming to change the movement's constitution to suit their ill-doings. The current ANC leadership has not only shown weakness but inconsiderate and intolerable leadership standards. Had they the opportunity, it is arguable that they would have changed the Constitution, not only of the country but of the ANC, itself, for highly questionable motives. More alarmingly, the ANC leadership, or elements within it, are quick to label those who oppose their actions as enemies of the party. Their continued actions suggest that they do as they wish, irrespective of the outcomes.

In this ill-disciplined environment, a productive space has been created for opposition parties to voice their dismay at the apparent failure of the principles of the ANC, as a formerly proud liberation movement. Concomitantly, voters are provoked by such conduct and the outcomes are displayed when election results turn out to be unfavourable to the organisation. When ill-discipline becomes a 'culture' encouraged by poor and inconsiderate leadership, elements of corruption gain momentum (Fakir, 2009). Ultimately, the current context of ill-discipline and inconsiderateness undermines the Constitutional values and effective governance, which the ANC has always claimed to stand for.

6.9 CONCLUSION

It has become a pattern for many African leaders in politics to appear weak and reluctant to acknowledge their mistakes, or to accept a view which differs from theirs. Instead, attributes of being unfit and unwelcoming are revealed in line with most African leaders who get rid of, or alienate, those who voice contrary opinions to theirs (Mafukata, 2015:102; Prah, 2015:3). In their eyes, to take advice, no matter how good the advice may be, is a sign of being undermined. The weaknesses of the ANC leadership could be associated with some of the causes which resulted in poor voter turnout (Booyens, 2016; Dlamini-Zuma, 2016), or with voters who would have voted for the ANC, but chose to vote for the opposition.

Contrary to some opinions, the South African situation cannot be associated with that of Zimbabwe, primarily, because of the Constitution which South Africa adopted along with its principles of the Chapter 9 Institutions (Callinicos, 1991:26). Thus, it is suggested, therefore, that:

- The leadership of the ruling party should admire the values and the principles of the Constitution of the country and those of the constitution of the organisation (that is, the ANC).
- The leadership of the ruling party should review, reflect and prioritise the importance of the citizens, taking into cognisance that they serve as the ruling party (organisation) in governance and the citizens come first as is enshrined in the Constitution's Bill of Rights.
- Consistency, in terms of the treatment of the ANC senior members, who are government officials, will help save the ANC from being seen as biased and failing to apply the rules and principles of its constitution.

This implies that whichever political party comes into power (to govern as a ruling party) must not only have to be in possession of good documented principles which they execute, but there is a need, beyond that, for efficient, accountable and responsive public officials. In this manner, citizens can enjoy the benefits of democracy knowing

that they are governed by responsible officials who care and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the country.

The evidence regarding the 2016 Local Government Elections is that, on the one hand, the decline of the ANC voter support, as seen during the 2016 Local Government Elections, should be a catalyst for the ruling party to dramatically improve its performance. On the other hand, this decline has created space for multiparty democracy to be exercised, since the political parties have had to form coalitions to be able to govern. Multiparty democracy and coalition governance is healthy for democracy, as it promotes unity and encourages co-governance, co-creation and helps unify nation-building in a diverse form of political environment. Importantly, though, it could be concluded that the power and recognition of an institution is based on its policies; hence, the institution is as strong as its policies, provided such policies are being honoured and adhered to by members of the institution. Sadly, it does not appear that the ANC leadership still honours the existing policies or principles and values of their own constitution. It is, consequently, the conclusion of this chapter that the current leadership of the ANC does not honour South Africa's Constitution either.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- African News Agency, 2016. *ANC veterans tell President Zuma to step down*. Available at: <http://mg.co.za/article/2016-04-06-anc-veterans-tell-president-zuma-to-step-down>. Accessed 28 August 2016.
- Agang SA, 2013. *Restoring the promise of freedom: Reforming the public service*. Available at: <http://www.sabreakingnews.co.za/2013/11/07/agangsas-new-logo-restoring-the-promise-of-freedom/>. Accessed 2 June 2015.
- ANC (African National Congress) Constitution, 1997. *African National Congress Constitution: As amended by and adopted at the 50th National Conference*, December 1997. Available at: <http://www.anc.org.za/content/anc-constitution-adopted-december-1997>. Accessed 6 April 2016.
- Anyangwe, C. 2012. Race and ethnicity: Voters' party preference in South African elections. *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies – Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinary*, 7(2):38-58.
- Booyens, S. 2016. *Interview with Ashraf Garda on SAFM*. Radio Talkshow (SABC). Monday 8 August, 9:00-12:00.
- Business Day, 2016. *ANC ignores ward councillor's application in High Court over nomination*. Tuesday 26 July. Available at: <http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2016/07/26/anc-ignores-ward-councillors-application-in-high-court-over-nomination>. Accessed 30 July 2016.
- Callinicos, A. 1991. Marxism and imperialism today. *International Socialism* 2(50):3-48.
- Carolus, C. 2016. *Woman's Day Weekend Line-Up – POWER* 98.7. On air Thursday 11 August 2016, 9:00-12:00.
- Carothers, T. & Brechenmacher, S. 2014. Accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion a New Development Consensus? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, DC.
- Chiumbu, S. 2016. *Media, Race and Capital: A Decolonial Analysis of Representation of Miners' Strikes in South Africa*, *African Studies*. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00020184.2016.1193377>. Accessed 3 July 2016.
- CSIR (Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research). 2006. *Database on Tracking Voting Changes in the South African Electorate*. Pretoria, South Africa.

- Dlamini-Zuma, N. 2016. *Woman's Day Weekend Line-Up* – POWER 98.7. On air Thursday 11 August 2016, 9:00-12:00.
- Ellis, S. 2012. Politics and Crime: Reviewing the ANC's Exile History. *South African Historical Journal*, 64(3):622-636.
- Fakir, E. 2009. *Politics, state and society in South Africa: Between leadership, trust and technocrats*. Development Planning Division Working Paper Series No.1, DBSA: Midrand.
- Government and Politics, 2016. What is a federal republic? Available at: <https://www.reference.com/government-politics/type-government-south-africa-fcd4faff769f145d>. Accessed 10 August 2016.
- Independent Electoral Commission, 2016. Local Government Elections results. Available at: <http://www.elections.org.za/content/default.aspx/>. Accessed 8 September 2016.
- Kanjere, M. 2015. *Assessing the capacity of African leadership in combating corruption*. SAAPAM 4th Annual Conference Proceedings – Limpopo Chapter 2015, pp.318-331.
- Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., Finn, F. & Argent, J. 2010. *Trends in South African Income Distribution and Poverty since the fall of Apartheid, OECD Social, Employment and Migration*. Working Papers, No. 101. OECD, Paris: France.
- Letsoalo, M. 2015. Zuma lambasts Motlanthe for 'alliance is dead' comments. Available at: <http://mg.co.za/article/2015-11-07-zuma-attacks-motlanthe>. Accessed 2 September 2016.
- Madonsela, T.N. 2010. *Corruption and Governance Challenges: The South African Experience Address by the Public Protector of the Republic of South Africa, Advocate Thuli N. Madonsela*, at the National Conference on Corruption and Governance Challenges, in Nigeria on 21 January 2010.
- Mafukata, M.A. 2015. Evolution of Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa – from Nkrumah to Mutharika the 2nd: Case Study of South Africa. *International Journal of Research in Business and Social Science*, 4(1):2147-4478.
- Mafunisa, M.J. 2008. The role of codes of conduct in promoting ethical conduct in the South African public service. *South African Journal of Labour Relations* 32(1):136-148.
- Mail and Guardian. 2016. 'The nature of South African politics' issued Friday 29 July, p.11.
- Maluleke, T. 2016. Institutional racism is enemy. *Sunday Independent* 21 March, p.27.
- Mandela, N.R. 1993. *Mandela's address to the COSATU Congress: Address by President Nelson Mandela at the 5th National Congress of COSATU* –7 September 1994. Available at: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Govern_Political/Cosatu.html. Accessed 9 September 2016.
- Manusamy, R. 2016. *Local government elections 2016: Scrum over Mandela's legacy exposes hollow heart of SA politics*. Available at: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-07-27-lge-2016-scrum-over-mandelas-legacy-exposes-hollow-heart-of-sa-politics/#.V9fXT9GKCuk>. Accessed 2 September 2016.
- Mashele, P. 2016. *SA finally African, all thanks to Zuma*. Available at: <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/05/09/sa-finally-african-all-thanks-to-zuma> Accessed 8 August 2016.
- Mathebula, A. 2016. *The Day the "Clever Blacks" came to the Party*. Available at: <http://voices.news24.com/akani-mathebula/2016/08/the-day-the-clever-blacks-came-to-the-party/>. Accessed 13 September 2016.
- Matheson, A., Boris Weber, B., Manning, N. & Arnould, E. 2007. *Study on the Political Involvement in Senior Staffing and on the Delineation of Responsibilities Between Ministers and Senior Civil Servants*. OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, 2007/6, OECD.
- Matshiqi, A. 2016. *2016 Interview with Iman Rappetti on POWER 98.7 Radio Talkshow (SABC)*. 17 August 9:00-12:00.
- Mbeki, T.M. 1999. *Extracts from a victory speech given by ANC leader Thabo Mbeki from Kempton Park, broadcast live by South African TV*. Available at: <http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk>. Accessed 11 September 2016.
- Merten, M. 2016. *Grim and Grimmer: SA's depressing GDP stats*. Available at: <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-06-09-grim-and-grimmer-sas>

- depressing-gdp-stats/#.V6r0UtGKCUk. Accessed 2 July 2016.
- Mkhize, Z. 2016. *Interview with Iman Rappetti on POWER 98.7 Radio Talkshow (SABC)*. Tuesday 26 July, 09:00:12:00.
- Motlhante, K. 2016, *eNCA NEWS Prime Time*. Saturday 20 August, 22:00-22:30.
- Mpehle, Z. 2012. Are service delivery protests justifiable in the democratic South Africa? *Journal of Public Administration*, 47(1):341-363.
- Nengwekhulu, R.H. 2009. Public service delivery challenges facing the South African Public Service. *Journal of Public Administration*, 44(2):213-227.
- Plaut, M. 2014. South Africa: how the ANC wins elections, *Review of African Political Economy*, 41(142):634-644.
- Power FM. 2016. *POWER BREAKFAST with Lawrence Tlhabane and Ayanda Allie-Paine* on POWER 98.7 Radio Talkshow (SABC). Monday 30 July, 6:00-9:00.
- Prah, K.K. 2015. *Multi-Party Democracy and It's Relevance in Africa* Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society Cape Town. Available at: <https://www.elections.org.za/content/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=1947>. Accessed 4 December 2015.
- Republic of South Africa, 1996. *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996)*. Pretoria: Government Printers.
- SA Parliament Business Publications, 2016. *A People's Government, The People's Voice*. Available at: <https://www.parliament.gov.za/peoples-government-peoples-voice>. Accessed 31 July 2016.
- Schwella, I. 2015. *South African Governance*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa.
- Sebola, M.P. 2014. The Politicisation of Government Administration: The Limited "Brutal" Options of the South African Government Administration. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(7): 208-217.
- Skweyiya, Z. 2016. *eNCA NEWS Prime Time*. Saturday 3 September 22:00-22:30.
- Southall, R. 2014. From liberation movement to party machine? The ANC in South Africa, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 32(3):331-348.
- Southall, R. 2016. The coming crisis of Zuma's ANC: the party state confronts fiscal crisis, *Review of African Political Economy*, 43(147):73-88.
- Sunday Times. 2016. *Local government elections* issued 21 August 2016.
- Suttner, R. 2009. The Jacob Zuma Rape Trial: Power and African National Congress (ANC) Masculinities, *NORA –Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research*, 17(3):222-236.
- Tau, S. & Williams, D. 2016. *ANC will not rule until Jesus comes*. Available at: <http://www.citizen.co.za/1240092/anc-will-not-rule-until-jesus-comes/> The Citizen. Accessed 3 July 2016.
- World Bank, 2011. *Accountability in Public Services in South Africa: Selected Issues*. Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, DC.