AN ASSESSMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATION IN THE COMBATING OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT IN THOHOYANDOU CLUSTER

by

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Research thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the subject

CRIMINOLOGY

at the

UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO

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JUNE 2015

DECLARATION

I, Hlengani Phanuel Bila, hereby declare that the thesis submitted for the degree PhD: Criminology at the University of Limpopo, is my original work in both style and execution and that I have acknowledged all sources by means of a list of references.



HLENGANI PHANUEL BILA

18 June 2015

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my two daughters, namely: Amukelani, Khubani and Gongomela of Makutsule clan – Mhlahla-ndhlela. I always expect nothing from them, other than hard work. I pray that God protects them from this contaminated society.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to honour God for giving me strength and courage for continuing under grave circumstances.

I also wish to thank and acknowledge the following members for their contribution in this research project:

- Prof C.N. Roelofse, for his promotion, constant support, guidance and experience. It was always easy to work with him, and the knowledge and understanding he has of the criminal justice field made me ride smoothly. Him, I salute.
- Mrs Marlette van der Merwe, for the language editing this thesis
- Mrs Jenny Sergreen, for technical layout
- My Mother, Khubani Bila and wife, Rhulani Mabunda-Bila, for their continuous support
- SAPS top management, for their approval that I go ahead analysing case dockets and interviewing the crime intelligence commander, Border Police commander, police investigators and VIS detectives
- The pilot study group involved in this study
- The samples from the SAPS, for participating in the research

ABSTRACT

The research concerned with the aim of this study, was to assess the application of intelligence-driven investigation in combating organised motor vehicle theft.

The strategic intelligence plan, information sharing and understanding of organised vehicle theft, are some of approaches which will assist in dealing with the challenge of the illegal sale of vehicles and vehicle parts. There is indeed a need to address police corruption, if the battle against vehicle theft is to be realised.

The objectives of this study were the following: to explain the **strategic intelligence plan** for investigating motor vehicle theft; to evaluate whether investigations of organised **motor vehicle theft** in Thohoyandou cluster are **intelligence-driven**; to assess if the cluster uses intelligence **offender profiling** in investigations; to explore how intelligence-driven investigation assists in **information sharing**; and, to make recommendations for the improvement of intelligence-driven vehicle theft investigation.

The researcher wanted to apply new research knowledge, in order to develop good practice in the field. This has been done by recommending new procedures to enhance performance and to improve the ways and means of combating organised vehicle theft.

KEY TERMS

Intelligence-driven investigation; strategic intelligence; intelligence cycle; crime investigations; *modus operandi*; offender profiling; organised crime; systems theory; motor vehicle theft; information sharing.

LANGUAGE EDITOR

12 June 2015

I, Marlette van der Merwe, 4802060118085, hereby certify that the text and references of the doctoral thesis, "An assessment of the application of intelligence-driven investigation in the combating of organised vehicle theft in Thohoyandou cluster", by Hlengani Phanuel Bila, have been edited by me, according to the Harvard reference method as used by the University of Limpopo.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AST-SMV	AUTOMATED SEARCH FACILITY-STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE
ATM	AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE
BACSA	BUSINESS AGAINST CRIME SOUTH AFRICA
CAS	CRIME ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM
CIS	CRIME INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CISNS	CRIME INTELLIGENCE SERVICE NOVA SCOTIA
CJS	CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
CPA	CRIME PATTERN ANALYSIS
CPU	CRIME PREVENTION UNIT
DHA	DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
DLP	DETECTIVES LEARNING PROGRAMME
DoT	DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
FICA	FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTRE ACT
INTERPOL	INTERNATIONAL POLICE
ISE	INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT
MO	METHOD OF OPERATION – *MODUS OPERANDI*
NaTIS	NATIONAL TRAFFIC INFORMATION SYSTEM
OC	ORGANISED CRIME
OMVTS	ORGANISED MOTOT VEHICLE THEFT SYNDICATES
SAICB	SOUTH AFRICAN INSURANCE CRIME BUREAU
SANDF	SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE
SAPS	SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
SMV	STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE
UL	UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO
UNODC	UNITED NATION OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
VIN	VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
VIS	VEHICLE INVESTIGATION SECTION
VUT	VAAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL ORIENTATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

This study is about the application of crime intelligence in the combating of organised vehicle theft in the Thohoyandou cluster. This refers to both proactive and reactive applications. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa, 1996) clearly stipulates the objectives of the South African Police Service (SAPS), which includes the protection and securing of the inhabitants of the Republic and their property. The Constitution is also supported by the South African Police Service Act No. 68 of 1995 (South Africa, 1995), which states that one of the functions of the SAPS is to ensure the safety and security of all persons and property in the national territory of South Africa.

In spite of these obligations inferred on the SAPS by these statutes, theft of vehicles continues to take place – which burdens the victims financially and otherwise. According to Longman (2006:1), vehicle theft and its related criminal activities are rife throughout the world. They account for significant economic loss, and affect the overall quality of life in the affected communities. Vehicle theft is more than merely a nuisance crime, or about a piece of property. A vehicle is no longer considered a luxury, but a necessity for many people. Personal vehicles have become an integral component of everyday life and economic survival.

The 2013–2014 annual report of the SAPS (SAPS, 2014) indicates that theft of motor vehicles has decreased systematically by an overall figure of 18% since 2003–2004 (from 1706 cases in 2003–2004 to 1026 cases in 2013–2014). According to the report, the more motor vehicles are stolen, the more the victims enhance protection measures by installing additional and increasingly sophisticated security or anti-theft devices and systems. The report further projects that, although at first only associated with the more expensive and luxury models, the security technology has since become a feature of the less expensive vehicles as well. Short-term insurance companies also play a role in

this development, by constantly increasing the security requirements pertaining to less expensive models.

Table1.1: Crime in Limpopo (provincial total) for April to March 2003–2004/2013–2014

Period	Apr 2003 – Mar 2004	Apr 2004 – Mar 2005	Apr 2005 – Mar 2006	Apr 2006 – Mar 2007	Apr 2007 – Mar 2008	Apr 2008 – Mar 2009	Apr 2009 – Mar 2010	Apr 2010 – Mar 2011	Apr 2011 – Mar 2012	Apr 2012 – Mar 2013	Apr 2013 – Mar 2014
Number of stolen vehicles	1 706	1 645	1 464	1 567	1 215	1 084	1 090	891	1 024	987	1 026

(**Source:** SAPS, 2014)

The above statistics indicate that between April 2003 and March 2004, 1706 motor vehicles were stolen from owners in Limpopo, compared with 1026 between April 2013 and March 2014. This represents a year-on-year reduction of 40%; however, the figure remains high.

The researcher also observed that 19% of these motor vehicles were stolen within the jurisdiction of the Thohoyandou cluster. The indication in motor vehicles statistics by the SAPS (above) could be a sign that anti-theft devices contribute immensely to the reduction of motor vehicle theft. This could mean that people are paying a great deal of money for such anti-theft devices, as well as insurance premiums, due to the risk factor involved in vehicle ownership in the country. The above statement is substantiated by Businesstech (2015:1), which indicates that South African insurance premiums have reached R110 billion over the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. Based on the above statistics of vehicle theft, the researcher's interest is in conducting a study which seeks to address organised vehicle theft. In this study, the focus will be on combating organised vehicle theft through the application of intelligence, as well as seeking ways of successful investigation which could eventually improve conviction rates within Thohoyandou cluster.

1.2 DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS

The researcher has adopted the following definitions for the purpose of this study:

1.2.1 Cluster

The concept ‘cluster’ refers to a geographical area with a number of police stations clustered together, for the purpose of centralisation of managerial and leadership responsibility within a specific region or sub-region. The Thohoyandou cluster consists of the following eight police stations: Thohoyandou, Vuwani, Saselamani, Tshaulu, Siloam, Levubu, Mutale and Makua.

1.2.2 Profiling

Profiling consists of a description of a person (or persons), an organisation or a specific target. It entails an informal list of characteristics gained from experience and intelligence, believed to be typical of persons and/or organisations involved in illegal activities. The gathering of intelligence is a prerequisite for the compilation of profiles (Van Rooyen, 2008:238).

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

As indicated in Table 1, above, vehicle theft in Limpopo remains relatively high, and worthy of in-depth research. The researcher, a former police investigator, has observed that 89% of cases reported in the Thohoyandou cluster lack information identifying the suspects, exhibits – or, indeed, any information which could be crucial in the investigation of such cases. This means that only 11% of such reported cases go to court. The reason that such a low number of cases is court ready, may be as a result of the non-application of intelligence-driven investigation on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of crime investigation.

According to Burgers, Wright and Nel (2009:1), approximately 30% of vehicles stolen in South Africa (SA) are “exported” to other countries. These authors maintain that approximately 50% of such vehicles are sold within SA, whereas approximately 20% are directed to second-hand parts markets such as chop shops or separated parts.

Burgers *et al.* (2009:98) state further that SA is one of the countries with the highest rate of motor vehicle theft in the world, and that it impacts negatively on the safety and security of the inhabitants of the country and on its economy.

These authors observe that motor vehicle theft has decreased, due to the partnership between the business sector and the government, but that it remains one of the national priority crimes. In order to deal with this priority, the researcher favours intelligence-driven investigations.

Lyman (2008:168) regards an intelligence-driven approach as an important model of the criminal investigation process, which can assist with the combating of many other serious crimes. Anderson (1994:06) concurs with Lyman, but he becomes specific by illustrating that intelligence will enable police officials to be well informed of any actual threat posed by existing and emerging criminal groups, and then be able to develop effective responses to that threat.

The above is supported by Horne (2009:21), who also projects intelligence-driven investigation as a force to be reckoned with in combating all criminal activities, particularly organised crime. She further indicates that attempts to dismantle criminal networks will never be effective until all available information is developed and transformed into intelligence for use by law enforcement personnel. In this study, it should be noted that the proactive and reactive application of crime intelligence refers to intelligence-driven investigation.

1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study focuses on the following aim and objectives:

1.4.1 Aim of the study

The aim of this study is to assess the application of intelligence-driven investigation in combating organised motor vehicle theft.

1.4.2 Objectives of the study

The researcher will focus on the following objectives:

- **Primary objectives**
    - To explain the **strategic intelligence plan** for investigating motor vehicle theft

- To evaluate whether investigations of organised **motor vehicle theft** in Thohoyandou cluster are **intelligence-driven**
- To assess if the cluster uses intelligence **offender profiling** in investigations
- To explore how intelligence-driven investigation assist in **information sharing**

- **Secondary objective**
  - To make recommendation for the improvement of intelligence-driven vehicle theft investigations

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Leedy and Ormrod (2005:54) contend that research questions provide guidance for the kinds of data the researcher should collect, and suggest how the researcher should analyse and interpret the data. They also mention that it is usual for the researcher to ask questions related to a research problem. This study attempts to answer the following questions:

- Is there a strategic intelligence plan for investigating motor vehicle theft?
- How are intelligence-driven investigations of organised motor vehicle theft conducted internationally?
- How are intelligence-driven investigations of organised motor vehicle theft conducted in Thohoyandou cluster?
- Do intelligence-driven investigations assist in the profiling of organised motor vehicle theft offenders?
- What value do intelligence-driven investigations have in combating organised motor vehicle theft?

1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN

This study is evaluative in nature, because the researcher wishes to evaluate the application of intelligence-driven investigation in the identification of suspects, exhibits and any other information which can be instrumental in solving organised motor vehicle theft. In addition, the researcher wants to establish the

value of intelligence-driven investigations, with the intention of determining its strengths and weaknesses, and considering how the application can be improved.

1.7 RESEARCH APPROACH

The study employed a triangulation approach, which is evaluative in nature. According to Todd (1979:1), there is a distinct tradition in the literature on social science research methods, that advocates the use of multiple methods. These various notions share the concept that qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than rival camps. He further underscores the desirability of mixing methods, given the strengths and weaknesses found in single method designs. In Olsen's view (2004:3), triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints can cast light upon a topic. He further highlights that the mixing of data types, also known as triangulation, is often thought to help in validating the claims that might arise from an initial pilot study. The researcher used interviews with the selected sample of respondents. He also studied motor vehicle theft case dockets, and reviewed literature dealing with the topic (Mouton, 2001:13). The collection of data through interviews enabled the researcher to gain insight into the respondents' understanding and use of intelligence-driven motor vehicle theft investigation. This was verified through data extracted from the case dockets, and served as a triangular mechanism for the trustworthiness of the study, and was therefore considered as an effective approach for the study.

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH

The academic community, and the University of Limpopo (UL) in general, will gain from this study, as it will add knowledge to the understanding of the value of intelligence-driven investigation in combating organised theft of motor vehicles. The findings of this study will be made available in the library, to afford some other researchers an opportunity to view it.

Police investigators will be presented with scientific evidence of the value of intelligence-driven investigation in prevention and detection of organised motor vehicle theft, and it will also assist them in obtaining information which will lead to the identification of suspects, exhibits and other information which can be vital in combating organised motor vehicle theft.

Lastly, the combating of motor vehicle theft could enhance community trust in the police in general, and in investigators in particular, and such trust may lead to a strong partnership between the SAPS and the community. The media, also as part of the community, could project the image of the SAPS positively, and that will generate willingness from various stakeholders to give information to the police.

1.9 CHAPTER LAYOUT

The research study includes the following chapters:

1.9.1 Chapter 1: General orientation

The aim of Chapter 1 will provide an overview of the research study, by introducing, among other important topics, an introduction and background to the study, the problem statement, the objectives of the research, as well as its significance.

1.9.2 Chapter 2: Strategic intelligence plan in the investigation of vehicle theft

This chapter will probe both national and international literature, in order to understand the value of intelligence-driven investigation in the combating of organised motor vehicle theft. The concepts covered will include the following: strategic intelligence plan, intelligence-driven investigation, and organised vehicle theft.

1.9.3 Chapter 3: Understanding organised vehicle theft

This chapter will review both national and international literature dealing with organised crime, as a concept, as well as motor vehicles theft, as a second variable.

1.9.4 Chapter 4: Systems theory and its implications in organised vehicle theft

The essence of this chapter is in developing systems theory within the context of intelligence-driven investigation, which, in turn, is aimed at addressing organised motor vehicles theft. The researcher intends, in this chapter, to develop a systems theory model.

1.9.5 Chapter 5: Research methodology

This chapter will describe the research methodology, and justify why such research methodology was employed.

1.9.6 Chapter 6: Data presentation, analysis and interpretation

This chapter describes the processes undertaken in conducting the research, by covering the results of the semi-structured interviews employed in information gathering, and further unfolds an analysis of the research findings. Lastly, the research findings are discussed and interpreted.

1.9.7 Chapter 7: Case docket analysis and interpretation

This chapter is intended to present, analyse and interpret 30 case dockets from the following police stations: Saselamani, Thohoyandou and Vuwani.

1.9.8 Chapter 8: Findings, recommendations and conclusions

The final chapter will outline the empirical research findings gleaned from the research results and key findings. Based on the above, the researcher will make recommendations to the SAPS, future researchers, and any other individuals or institutions interested in contributing toward combating organised vehicle theft.

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN IN THE INVESTIGATION OF VEHICLE THEFT

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Mouton (2001:86) asserts that when one embarks on a study, the most important thing to do is to find out what research has already been done in that particular field of study. He further states that a researcher should begin with a review of the existing scholarship, or available body of knowledge, to see how other scholars have investigated the problem. In this chapter, national and international literature dealing with strategic intelligence and the intelligence cycle will be presented.

2.2 UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY

According to Nickols (2012:8), strategy is about means. It is about the attainment of ends, not their specification. He further pointed out that the specification of ends is a matter of stating those future conditions and circumstances toward which effort is to be directed, until such time as those ends are obtained. In this case, it should be clear that the SAPS' "ends", or intended outcome, is to restore law and order.

Knipe, Van der Waldt, Van Niekerk, Burger and Nell (2002:41) argue that there are four aspects of a strategy that can be identified:

2.2.1 The mission or overall aim of an organisation

Nickols (2012:8) points out that strategy is concerned with how one will achieve one's aims, not with what those aims are; or ought to be, or how they are established. He maintains that the strategy is only in relation to some aim or intended outcomes of the organisation.

According to the 2010/14 SAPS strategic plan (SAPS, 2010b), the mission of the SAPS is to do the following:

- Prevent and combat anything that may threaten the safety and security of any community
- Investigate any crimes that threaten the safety and security of any community
- Ensure offenders are brought to justice
- Participate in efforts to address the causes of crime

It is assumed that accurate intelligence is needed, in order for the police to fulfil their mission.

2.2.2 Transformation technology used

The 2010/14 strategic plan further identifies technology as a critical success factor in the successful performing of the SAPS' core and support functions, and is an integral part of the Criminal Justice System (CJS). It is also reflected in the strategic plan that the SAPS' transformational strategy focuses on the following areas: Visible Policing, Detective Services, Crime Intelligence and the Criminal Record and Forensic Science Services, and it takes into consideration the technological requirements of the CJS. These focus areas of goal achievement for the SAPS, in the context of this thesis, all play some role in intelligence.

2.2.3 The strategic and operational plan

According to the Enterprise Foundation (1999:1), strategic planning is an essential process in preparing to carry out an organisation's mission. An effective strategic planning process provides a framework to make decisions on how to allocate organisational resources, address challenges, and take advantage of opportunities that arise along the way.

2.2.4 Strategic control

Pearce and Robinson (1991:364) outline that strategic control is concerned with following a strategy during its implementation, detecting problems or changes in its underlying premises, and making adjustments. They further posit that, in contrast to post-action control, strategic control is concerned with guiding action on behalf of the strategy while that action is taking place and before the end result is reached. Strategic control is also asserted in the management of

intelligence. According to Knipe *et al.* (2002:42), to understand the strategy of a particular organisation one needs to understand what factors have made that organisation what it is presently. They argue that this involves asking questions such as the following:

- How did the organisation reach its present state?
- Why is it producing its particular range of services and products?
- What kinds of services or products does it intend to deliver in the future: same or different, and, if different, how different?
- If the organisation is thinking of altering its current range, what are the reasons for this?
- How are decisions made in the organisation?
- What is its management style: top-down or bottom-up, autocratic or democratic?
- Why is the organisation structured in a particular way?
- What is the link between strategy and structure?

The SAPS is charged with the responsibilities of prevention and investigation of crime, among others. For these responsibilities to be achieved, the SAPS have to develop a proper strategy which is also linked to the structure. Two other important aspects will be to ensure that the structure is both staffed and skilled. In order to deliver one of the SAPS's products, namely intelligence to support investigations, a comprehensive intelligence strategy and management process is needed.

Decision Lens (2010:01) is of the view that one goal of strategy is to drive change. Change has always been difficult, and organisational inertia is a formidable opponent. Whether proactive or reactive, the ability to rapidly coordinate and redirect resources to advance a response to emerging threats and opportunities is critical to creating competitive advantage and realising strategy (Decision Lens, 2010:01). It is logical to assume that policing strategy can hardly be developed without intelligence.

2.3 THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Ratcliffe (2009:166) outlines objectives for strategic intelligence as follows:

- Provide a strategic context within which to understand emerging threats
- Provide a foresight capacity to allow the development of targeted strategies (provide warning of the need for new or different policies, responses, priorities, powers, and so on)
- Narrow the range of uncertainty
- Ensure that this understanding is provided in an appropriate form to the appropriate policy-makers at the right time

According to Ratcliffe (2009:166), strategic intelligence is required by the senior executive and policy-makers for the formulation of strategy, policy and long-term planning. According to the SAPS 2010/2014 strategic plan (SAPS, 2010b), there is a long-term need for capacitating crime intelligence as an approach to ensuring improved service delivery. The specifics are prioritised as follows:

- Improve skills of the personnel at all levels as well as their retention
- Improve network collection by increasing ground coverage
- Utilise visible policing personnel for the gathering of information and the provision of intelligence
- Increase support for collectors by enforcing more effective management of sources
- Improve targeted undercover operations through advanced covert methodology
- Focus on interaction with other role players, e.g. other departments, Vehicle Identification Services Unit and Border Police
- Improve intelligence database capabilities, as well as access to remote systems for the purposes of integrating information management

According to Ratcliffe (2009:166), strategic intelligence addresses current or explanatory components by its nature, but given the requirements to service forward-looking decisions, it must have strong emphases on the future. Gilbert (2010:439) argues that strategic intelligence may provide local police investi-

gators with the means to understand the structure and movement of organised crime elements within their jurisdictions.

Ratcliffe (2009:166) is of the view that the relevance of strategic intelligence is in, among others, government ministers, senior law enforcement executives and policy-makers, and a comprehensive service will need to include a mix of national current intelligence, forward-looking assessments, open source reports, and strategic warning.

2.4 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

According to Becker (2009:435), information about organised crime groups is referred to as intelligence. He further indicates that intelligence data is collected for both strategic and tactical purposes. Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1998:345) reflect that strategic information refers to information designed to support the strategy of the institution and is concerned with decisions affecting the long-term objectives of that institution. Gilbert (2010:439) contends that information which is collected from police informers, community members, criminal informants, electronic surveillance and other means, constitutes the raw data from which intelligence is to be produced.

According to Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1998:345), strategic decision-making information can be distinguished from tactical and operational decision-making by certain characteristics. The characteristics of strategic decision-making information are outlined as follows:

- The information needs are seldom explicitly defined and specified
- Existing formal channels of communication of the institution are not suitable for strategic information
- The timing and phasing of gathering, transmitting, storing and retrieving information, are critical
- The information comes mostly from the external environment
- The time horizon of the future rather than the past (Van der Waldt & Du Toit, 1998:345)

Strategic intelligence provides the law enforcement organisation with an overview of criminal capabilities, vulnerabilities, trends and intentions. It identifies classes of threats and risks to public safety and order, so that organisations can properly formulate effective policies, programmes and plans to combat criminal activities (McDowell, 1997:8). According to Gilbert (2010:439), if intelligence is properly compiled and understood, it may enable the police to predict organised crime activities, and, as such, they can be prevented.

According to Santos (2009:346), strategic intelligence addresses crime analysis – which is the study of crime problems and other police-related issues to determine long-term patterns of activity, as well as to evaluate police responses and organisational procedures. Carter and Carter (2009:318) give a broader perspective of discussions which need to be handled by the strategists. They argue that plans may be developed to either prevent a threat from maturing – or mitigate the threat, should it emerge. In their view, it is epitomised by the following two questions:

- What future plans and resources must be developed?
- How must they be configured, to meet threats defined in the strategic intelligence plan?

As intelligence includes both strategic and tactical intelligence, the latter is unpacked hereunder.

Tactical intelligence is information that contributes directly to the achievement of an immediate law enforcement objective (Becker, 2009:435). According to Lyman, (2008:172–173), tactical intelligence targets criminal activity considered to be of immediate importance to the investigator. Specifically, tactical intelligence furnishes the police agency with specifics about individuals, organisations, and different types of criminal activity. Santos (2009:346) becomes more specific by stating that tactical intelligence addresses recent criminal incidents and potential criminal activity, through the examination of characteristics such as “how”, “when” and “where” the activity has occurred, in order to assist in pattern development, investigative leads and suspect identification, and case clearance. Strategic and tactical intelligence forms part of an intelligence cycle.

2.5 THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Given the importance of the intelligence process as both a concept and an organising principle, it is worth thinking about how the process works, and how best to conceptualise it (Lowenthal, 2012:67). Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information, important to criminal activities, are processed:

- Requested
- Collected
- Analysed
- Provided to policy-makers

From the definition of the term 'intelligence', it becomes clear that information needs to be processed in order to become intelligence end-products. Metscher and Gilbride (2005:3) present the intelligence cycle (Figure 2.1). The cycle indicates planning which has to be done by policy-makers; after that, the intelligence community collects information, which is collated, evaluated and analysed, and disseminated. According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31), the value of the intelligence effort cannot be realised unless the intelligence product is disseminated to the right people at the right time. It implies proper understanding of how the organisation functions, who needs to be informed, and timeous distribution of the intelligence.

Figure 2.1: The intelligence cycle
(**Source:** Lowenthal, 2012:67)

Intelligence not delivered at the right time, or intelligence delivered to persons unable to utilise it – not to mention if the intelligence fell into the hands of an adversary – not only does no good but could result in injury or loss of life. Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31) conclude by indicating that quality intelligence reports should be known for their timeliness, accuracy and clarity. The different components of the intelligence cycle are deliberated hereunder.

2.5.1 Strategic intelligence planning

Peterson (2005:6) indicates that planning of how data will be collected is important to the entire intelligence process. He further indicates that effective planning assesses and verifies existing data, and ensures that additional or new data collected will fill any gaps in the information already available. Intelligence collection should also be planned, and its methods coordinated, and its guidelines should prohibit illegal methods of obtaining information. Inaccurate collection efforts can result in a flawed result, regardless of the analytical skills employed.

Planning and collection are a joint effort that requires a close working relationship between crime analysts – who understand how to manage, compile and analyse information, and intelligence collectors – who know the best ways of collecting information (Peterson, 2005:6).

According to Peterson (2005:6), planning requires an agency to identify the outcomes it wants to achieve from its collection efforts. This identification directs the scope of the officers' and agents' investigations – for example, a straightforward inquiry to identify crime groups operating in a jurisdiction, or a more complex inquiry to determine the likelihood that criminal groups will steal vehicle(s), as well as where and how.

According to Knipe *et al.* (2002:47), some form of strategic planning is at all levels in an organisation. Strategic planning at organisational level results in a set of organisational strategic objectives. These authors continue to indicate that the strategic objectives are then converted into business strategies by business managers. Business strategies are then carried out through programmes and projects whose strategy is the project approach or plan. Intelligence for policing organised crime does not essentially differ from this concept. Intelligence

should be the basis of planning and programmes (investigations) to be conducted.

McDowell (1997:15) contends that an essential requirement of the planning activity in any strategic intelligence project, is to develop a wide-ranging awareness of the total environment surrounding (and describing) the task. This involves the intelligence staff in focusing broadly on the complete problem, rather than, perhaps more comfortably, zeroing in on particular and specific matters (McDowell, 1997:15).

In strategic intelligence planning, it is also important to define the problem correctly, and McDowell (1997:15) outlines two reasons for doing so:

- The planning phase of any intelligence project assumes, as its starting point, that intelligence staff fully understand the task set for them. However, strategic problems often lend themselves to being stated in vague or imprecise language, appearing to be open ended – or perhaps merely inadequately articulated. It is essential that the intelligence consumer's needs be clearly understood, both to provide satisfaction and avoid waste of intelligence effort and resources.

- Defining the problem afresh not only illuminates all possible aspects of the issues involved, but also, through ingeniously redefining and restating of the intelligence task, guides the further planning for later activities – especially collection of information.

Section 205 of the Constitution mandates the police to take action to protect the property of citizens as well. Such action requires planning, and it is conjectured that an intelligence plan should form an integral part of general police planning. In the view of Burgers *et al.* (2007:98), the core strategic imperatives necessary for a sustainable reduction in vehicle crime, have been based on the known market and other enabling drivers of vehicle crime.

2.5.2 Strategic intelligence collection

McDowell (1997:15) puts it correctly by saying that information collection must be a disciplined component of the intelligence cycle or process, as any other

(and the intelligence officer's) role in this phase is to identify what type of information and sources will be best to meet the requirements of the intelligence task.

According to Carter (2004:84), collection is the gathering of raw information, based on the requirements. He further indicates that activities such as interviews, technical and physical surveillances, human source operations, searches, and liaison relationships, result in the collection of intelligence.

Information collection is rarely just a start-and-stop activity; rather, it tends to be a continuum that is subject to modification as the whole intelligence cycle proceeds, responsive to changing perceptions, driven by incoming data, of ways to address the problem (McDowell, 1997:15). The following discussions focus on two types of information collection, namely overt and covert:

2.5.2.1 Strategic intelligence provision for overt gathering

According to Lyman (2008:170), there are two methods of intelligence collecting, namely overt and covert means. Overt information collection includes personal interaction with people, many of whom are witnesses to crimes, victims of crimes, or the suspects themselves. The sources of overt collection are:

(a) Crime statistics

Crime statistics, when properly analysed, are a valuable source of information for intelligence generation. According to Santos (2009:44), computer statistics, also known as "compstat" has been one of the significant influences surrounding the adoption of crime analysis and crime mapping by the police departments, dating back to the 1990s. Crime analysts use quantitative data and methods in conducting statistical analyses of numerical or categorical data. Methods such as frequencies and percentages, means and rates, are primarily used (Santos, 2013:03).

(b) *Modus operandi*

Modus operandi, also known as method of operation (MO), addresses how the crime occurred – for instance, the point entry, method of entry, weapon used, and the suspect's actions (Santos, 2009:72). According to Gilbert (2010:185),

MO revolves around the understanding that human behaviour tends to repeat itself. He argues that human methods of operation/behaviour are consistently improved and reinforced if they bring results, for a particular perpetrator.

Turvey (2011:153) is more specific, stating that MO consists of the perpetrator's habits, techniques and peculiarities of behaviour. A practical example is that of a particular perpetrator who uses a particular method to steal vehicles; if such a method works, the person concerned is more likely to use the same method in future.

(c) Crime scene

Gilbert (2010:80) defines a "crime scene" as a location at which an alleged criminal offence has occurred. In the context of this thesis, such a location can be an individual address at which there are concentrated thefts of vehicles (Santos, 2009:47). According to Gilbert (2010:80), processing a crime scene is one of the most important phases of investigation. He further indicates that, at the location of the crime, if physical evidence which consists of objects and materials, is found and secured, it can assist in the process of discovering facts.

(d) Witnesses to crimes

Gilbert (2010:106) defines a witness as a person who sees or knows by personal presence and perception. He further outlines three general requirements for a witness to be deemed a reliable witness:

(i) That the witness was conscious during the event;
(ii) That the witness was physically present during the event; and
(iii) That the witness was psychologically and mentally attentive.

Witnesses should be separated from one another as soon as possible, and interviewed separately with as much privacy as possible (Dempsey, 2003:201). The reason for separating witnesses is that individuals (witnesses) have a tendency to influence others to a surprising degree (Gilbert, 2010:105). Gilbert (2010:105) further opines that witnesses are absolutely essential to the investigative process, and they provide descriptions that result in an arrest. He

further indicates that witnesses are vital in giving evidence which ensure the conviction of the perpetrator.

(e) Victims of crimes

Victims are invaluable sources of information. Dempsey (2003:201) considers the victims of a crime as the initial sources of information as to the "when, where, who, what, how", and sometimes "why" of a crime. He further maintains that the victim should be interviewed as soon as possible after the crime. Gilbert (2010:102) argues that the victim interview may be relatively simple, or a prolonged and difficult experience demanding the maximum skills of a police investigator. The emotional state of the victim will determine the level of difficulty. Victim interviews involve people who have lost their property, e.g. a vehicle (Gilbert, 2010:102).

The investigator should also conduct follow-up interviews, to ensure that any new information the victim recalls is obtained. Even if the victim cannot provide the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, they might be able to provide new leads for the investigator (Dempsey, 2003:201).

Despite the central place a victim occupies in an alleged crime, Dempsey (2003:201) cautions investigators to be careful when using information from the victim to develop new leads, particularly in relation to the identity of the suspect. He contends that the victim may be entirely inaccurate in describing the suspect. Furthermore, eyewitness identification of suspects is notoriously inaccurate (Dempsey, 2003:201).

(f) The suspect

According to Dempsey (2003:164), suspects may give valuable information regarding the investigation of motor vehicle theft. Interviewing a suspect will always test the questioning skills of the investigator (Gilbert, 2010:111). Dempsey (2003:164) contends that for an investigator to obtain relevant information, interviewing skills are needed.

Gilbert (2010:111) is of the view that the time and place of the interview must be selected or considered. He further maintains that conducting suspect interviews

at the police agency will give the police investigator an advantage. The formal setting of the police facility will remind the suspect of the seriousness of the situation, and tend to dispel the notion that the police investigator can be deceived (Gilbert, 2010:111).

The Constitution introduces the rights of the arrested person (suspect). In terms of section 35 (1) of the above Act,

"Everyone who is arrested (suspected) for allegedly committing an offence has the right

a. to remain silent;
b. to be informed promptly
    i. of the right to remain silent; and
    ii. of the consequences of not remaining silent;
c. not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence against that person;"

The above implies that under no circumstances shall the police investigator compel the suspect or the arrested person to give information. This is because, in terms of Section 35(5) of the Constitution, “Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detriment to the administration of justice”

(g) Ordinary citizens

It is incumbent on investigators to interview relevant persons in their quest to obtain information. According to Dempsey (2003:165), these interviews may be in person or by telephone. The subjects may be public or private officials having information the investigator needs, or friends or associates of victims, witnesses or suspects. Gilbert (2010:200) is of the opinion that police agencies must improve the relationship between themselves and the communities, as a way accessing information about criminal activities within such communities. The police agency/investigator must ensure that courtesy, as well as measures of ensuring voluntary compliance from the community, are adhered to (Dempsey, 2003:165).

Furthermore, Dempsey (2003:165) opines that overt information is collected from ordinary citizens, and to best facilitate the overt collection process, agency administrators should require officers from all divisions to document any information on suspected criminal activity, and to pass such information on to intelligence officers. Visible policing can be especially instrumental in the overt intelligence collection process, by noting any activity around residences or businesses operated by major criminals in the area. Findings should be reported on a special intelligence report form, and forwarded to the proper investigators (Lyman, 2008:170).

2.5.2.2 Strategic intelligence provision for covert gathering

Covert information collection is the most common method, and includes a process known as intelligence gathering. This is a process of data collection on planned criminal acts that have not yet occurred, but for which the investigator must prepare. Covert intelligence collection methods employ the use of physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, informants and undercover officers (Lyman, 2008:171).

(a) Physical surveillance

According to Van Rooyen (2005:247), [physical] surveillance is the careful and continuous surveillance of something or someone, carried on in a secretive or discreet manner, in order to obtain information with regard to the identities or activities of a subject or subjects. Surveillance can be broken down into two general categories (Van Rooyen, 2005:247):

- The first is whereby the investigator must move, either by foot, vehicle or helicopter, in order to follow a subject or subjects. This type of surveillance is called "*mobile*" or "*tailing*" (Van Rooyen, 2005:247; Gilbert, 2010:396).
- The second is whereby the investigator remains in a fixed position to observe a subject or subjects, and is called "*stakeout*" or "*static*" surveillance.

Gilbert (2010:396) argues that fixed surveillances are generally conducted for one or more of these reasons:

- To gather evidence by observing the activities within a premises
- To obtain information that can be used to secure a search warrant
- To identify, locate, and control and arrest suspects or wanted persons
- To observe, protect, and control an informant's activities, or to protect material witnesses
- To analyse the physical structure of a dwelling for a subsequent raid or material witnesses
- To protect and document the movements of an undercover officer

Van Rooyen (2005:248) lists specific reasons why it is imperative that certain places and persons be observed:

To follow up the movements, habits, activities, visiting places, contact points or associations of individuals for various reasons, e.g. personal profile, pre-employment investigation;

- Verify information supplied by informers or obtained by other means
- To analyse the physical structure of premises for possible mopping-up actions
- To confirm or rebut allegations of illegal activities
- To obtain sufficient information for the issuing of a search warrant
- To monitor and safeguard the activities and behaviour of a police trap
- To identify and trace suspected persons
- To collect information of individuals in, e.g. organised crime

Physical surveillance is therefore for specific reasons and in a specific operational context. Intelligence collectors should be trained in being obtrusive and attentive, and properly briefed as to what the expected outcomes of the surveillance should be.

(b) Electronic surveillance

As electronic information becomes more sophisticated, it will have a major effect on case investigations, assisting investigators with a quantity of data, and providing information, making it possible to prepare reports quickly, and assemble evidence for presentation in court. Present technology allows for the transfer

of photographs, fingerprints and other forms of visual information, through networks (Van Rooyen, 2005:225).

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:19), electronic collection offers greater personal distance from the targets, along with the most reliable raw data. This raw data is collected directly from the target as they interact with their employees, agents, comrades, friends and vendors. They go further to reflect that electronic collection may include the following:

Telephone eavesdropping – often referred to as “tapping the line”. This method may provide considerable information concerning the plans, capabilities and co-conspirators of the target. This involves intercepting the signal from one or more telephone units or service points, and either monitoring it as it happens (live), or recording it for later review and presentation (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:19).

Van Rooyen (2005:231) mentions that from telephone tapping or interception it is possible to see who phones whom, how often and for how long; even SMS activity is shown, and can be useful information. Van Rooyen further maintains that all listed phone numbers, including facsimile and cellular, can be traced using Telkom’s ‘Cybertrade’ service. This is available to anyone who buys Telkom’s software. It is a nationwide, online directory that allows a person to search names, addresses and numbers, and is an essential data intelligence investigation tool.

According to Section 5 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act No. 70 of 2003, an interception direction may only be issued if the designated judge concerned is satisfied with the facts alleged in the application concerned, that –

(i) There are reasonable grounds to believe that –

- A serious offence has been, or is being, or will probably be committed
- The gathering of information concerning an actual threat to public health or safety, national security or compelling national economic interests of the Republic, is necessary

- The making of a request for the provision, or the provision to the competent authorities of a country or territory outside the Republic, of any assistance in connection with, or in the form of, the interception of communications relating to organised crime, or any offence relating to terrorism, or the gathering of information relating to organised crime or terrorism, is in accordance with an international mutual assistance agreement, or the interest of the Republic's international obligations
- The gathering of information concerning property (vehicle) which is or could probably be an instrument of a serious offence, or is, or could probably be, the proceeds of unlawful activities, is necessary

(ii) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the interception of particular communications concerning the relevant grounds referred to above will be obtained by means of such an interception direction, and that the facilities from which, or the place at which, the communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the relevant grounds referred to herein above, are commonly used by the person or customer in respect of whom the application for the issuing of an interception direction is made. Within this context, emails and social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, among others, can be intercepted.

(c) Informants

Dempsey (2003:164–65) defines the word 'informant' as someone who has special knowledge of a crime or incident or an ongoing criminal enterprise. The informant is a person who provides an investigator with confidential information on a past or future crime, and does not wish to be known as the source of the information.

Recruiting and developing the skills of informants and information sources within organisations can be an exceptional means of acquiring valuable information. Information obtained in this way should be treated very carefully, since, in some cases, acting on it indiscriminately could compromise or "burn" the informant – which could put them at risk, or simply ruin their access to information. It may be prudent to use their information to develop a creative means of achieving one's goal (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:22).

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:22) further contend that informants are motivated by various reasons to give information, some of which are the following:

- Vanity
- Civic-mindedness
- Fear
- Repentance
- Avoidance of punishment
- Gratitude or gain
- Competition
- Revenge
- Jealousy
- Remuneration

When one analyses the reasons why the informant gives information, it is clear that if they stand to benefit, they may even lie. Gilbert (2010:141) indicates that the reliability of the informant is determined by their previous track record of giving reliable information to the police. He further opines that if the informant has previously aided the police investigator by identifying criminal suspects or locating wanted suspects, or has generally supplied information that has proved to be accurate, reliability can be established.

(d) Undercover officers

"Undercover" is an investigative technique that is often used to obtain information when other efforts have proved impractical or have failed (United States, 2005:27). This United States (U.S). field manual further indicates that a police investigator goes undercover when he leaves his official identity, and takes on a role to gain needed information. He associates with a person, or becomes part of a group, believed to have critical information that the police want. Joh (2009:165) asserts that undercover officers participate in authorised crime for a number of different reasons. Two of the most important are the following: (1) to provide opportunities for the suspects to engage in the target crime; and (2) to maintain a false identity, or to facilitate access to the suspect. Joh further argues that these needs are at their greatest in facilitative operations, when police must

both maintain their covert identities, as well as encourage the commission of crime, so long as the conduct furthers legitimate objectives. Undercover activities are commonly used by the police for gaining access to organised crime groups (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:21).

Section 25(2) A (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977 reads as follows:

"Any law enforcement officer, official of the State or any other person authorized thereto for such purpose (hereinafter referred to in this section as an official or his or her agent) may make use of a trap or engage in an undercover operation in order to detect, investigate or uncover the commission of an offence, or to prevent the commission of any offence, and the evidence so obtained shall be admissible if that conduct does not go beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence: Provided that where the conduct goes beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence a court may admit evidence so obtained subject to subsection (3)." In *S v Pule* 1996 (2) SACR 604 (O), the Judge ruled that undercover operations is an indispensable tool to gather evidence against perpetrators during and after the undercover operation, since criminals are sly and they operate sophisticatedly.

2.5.3 Strategic intelligence collating

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2011:13), collation is the transfer of collected information and/or intelligence into a storage system (be it a filing cabinet or a computerised database), in a structured (indexed, cross-referenced) format that permits rapid and accurate access. According to Peterson (2005:6) collation involves sifting through available data, with the view of eliminating information which is useless, irrelevant, or incorrect, and putting the data into a logical order.

This organisation of data makes it easier to identify relationships among entities, and uncover relevant information. Peterson (2005:7) indicates that in today's world, collation is performed using sophisticated databases with text-mining capabilities (Peterson, 2005:6). Peterson (2005:7) further advocates that data-base design is critical for retrieving and comparing data. He remarks that many

computer software companies offer database products, but most require fine-tuning to make them suitable to law enforcement agencies' needs. In Peterson's view (2005:7), collation also involves evaluating the data being entered. Information placed into an intelligence file is evaluated for two reasons, namely –

- the validity of the information; and
- the reliability of its source.

Each collection plan is unique in terms of the breadth, type and form of data to be collected, and the characteristics of the sources – so too must be the approach to determining the most appropriate protocols for recording, collating and evaluating the data (McDowell, 1997:16). The author further indicates that this requirement for flexibility is a constant feature of all intelligence collection, regardless of whether or not it involves strategic intelligence. At its simplest, data evaluation in operational intelligence requires each and every piece of information to be evaluated for reliability and credibility, and so recorded (McDowell, 1997:16).

In strategic intelligence, often involving the collection of masses of intricate data, it is the recording aspect that is likely to suffer, due solely to the workload involved in doing so. Instead, the strategic intelligence specialist will tend to carry out the evaluation, note the result mentally (rather than physically on files), and "feed" these perceptions into the analytical and interpretation processing that follows (McDowell, 1997:16).

2.5.4 Strategic intelligence analysis

The analysis stage of the intelligence cycle is a key one. Analysis can be described as in-depth examination of the meaning and essential features of available information. Analysis highlights information gaps, strengths and weaknesses, and suggests ways forward (UNODC, 2011:13). According to McDowell (1997:17), analysis is the process of selecting, integrating and interpreting data to focus upon a given issue. He further indicates that in the intelligence context, analysis takes on two additional, special overtones that set it aside from other fields of analysis:

- Firstly, the environment within which intelligence activity takes place rarely involves the collection and subsequent processing of information that is entirely quantifiable or controllable; instead, the nature of intelligence work (regardless of its focus) is that much of the information involves judgements about the activity of people, with all the uncertainties thereby involved.

- Secondly, intelligence analysis must result in an outcome that is, at the very least, both descriptive and explanatory of any given set of circumstances, and, at best, provides forecasts of future events.

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:27) take the argument further by indicating that intelligence analysis occurs both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitative analysis, also referred to as “number crunching,” utilises objective information based on distinctly measurable criteria such as the number of crimes in a census tract, or the number of port scans on a network firewall.

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:27) qualitative analysis, on the contrary, processes information that is subjective in nature. This may include whether a place is clean or safe. The judgement is ultimately based on an individual’s perspective. They further indicate that quality, being a subjective measurement, will typically differ somewhat between persons, and quantity, being finite and measurable, will be replicable between persons.

2.5.4.1 Crime Analyses in vehicle theft

There are many types of crime analysis, but for the purpose of this study, the following will be discussed. The choice is informed by the intended outcome of this study.

(a) Tactical crime analysis

Santos (2005:63) indicates that tactical crime analysis involves analysing data to develop information on the "where, when and how" of crimes, in order to assist officers and investigators in identifying and understanding specific and immediate crime problems. According to the ESRI report (2012:3) tactical analysis is aimed at the following:

- Analysing crime data to identify crime patterns and series
- Linking *modus operandi* and suspect information to specific crime locations
- Providing investigative leads by aggregating data from multiple sources
- Forecasting potential crime locations through special tools and techniques
- Supporting operations plans and clarifying ideal deployment locations
- Cleaning cases by linking suspects to specific crimes after arrest
- Continuous active monitoring of high-risk and convicted offenders

Tactical crime analysis units focus on, and will work closely with, law enforcement officials and investigators. The goal of tactical analysis is to promote a rapid response to a crime problem happening right now. One of the roles of a tactical crime analyst is to detect current patterns of criminal activity, to predict possible future crime events (Santos, 2004:63).

(b) Strategic crime analysis

Santos (2004:63) is of the view that strategic crime analysis is concerned with long-range problems and planning for long-term projects. Strategic analysts examine information collected by the police, agents, and also long-term increases or decreases in crime, known as “crime trends or pattern.” A crime trend is the direction of movement of crime, and reflects either no change or increases/ decreases in crime frequencies within a specific jurisdiction or area (Santos, 2004:63).

An example of this could be what happened in South Africa in the recent past – cash heists went down, and organised criminal groups shifted their target by blowing up banking automated teller machines (ATM). According to Santos (2013:240), for one to understand the frequency of the problem, it is important to firstly understand the long-term trends of such a problem, both before and after a response is implemented – that is, determining, as the author further argues, whether the problem has increased, decreased or remained the same. Santos (2013:61) adds that the primary purposes of strategic crime analysis are:

- to assist in the identification and examination of long-term crime problems; and

- to evaluate police responses to problems, and the organisational procedures of police agencies.

Examining problems within the “problem-solving” process may include the analysis of “vehicle theft” rates, repeat victimisation, hot spots, and environmental characteristics that affect opportunities and incidents of crime. Strategic crime analysis will also assist the police agencies in assessing their strengths and weaknesses in the combating of crime (Santos, 2013:62).

(c) Administrative crime analysis

According to Santos (2004:63), administrative crime analysis focuses on providing summary data, statistics, and general trend information, to managers. This type of analysis involves providing descriptive information about crime to departmental administrators, command staff and officers, as well as to other city government personnel and the public (Santos, 2004:63). Such reports provide support to administrators as they determine and allocate resources, or help citizens to gain a better understanding of community crime and disorder problems. Quantitative data provides measurable terms for crime and disorder problems, and administrative analysis utilises basic descriptive statistics to measure crime, and call for service from local law enforcement (Santos, 2004:63).

(d) Investigative crime analysis

Investigative crime analysis involves profiling suspects and victims, for investigators, based on analysis of available information. It is sometimes called “criminal investigative analysis.” Generally, as conducted by crime analysts at the local law enforcement level, this is not the same type of intensive profiling by SAPS Provincial and National Office, but rather a more general hypothesising about what type of person is committing a particular crime series (Santos, 2004:64).

(e) Intelligence analysis

Carter and Carter (2009:321) argue that intelligence analysis should address the following four broad questions:

(i) Who poses threats?

This response identifies and describes behaviours of people in movements or ideologies who pose criminal threats to community safety.

(ii) Who is doing what with whom?

This includes the identification, description and characteristics of conspirators or people who provide logistics in support of terrorism and criminal enterprises;

(iii) What is the *modus operandi* of the threat?

Intelligence analysis seeks to identify how criminal enterprises operate. It also seeks to determine what criminals typically target, and the common methods of attacking those targets.

(iv) What is needed to catch offenders and prevent crime incidents or trends?

Intelligence requirements seek specific types of information that are needed to fully understand the threat environment.

Santos (2004:64) takes the argument further, by indicating that crime analysis differs from intelligence analysis in another key area. Intelligence analysis usually starts with an identified problem statement or identified problem subject (such as theft of vehicles), and information specific to the topic is then identified, gathered, analysed, and disseminated. On the other hand, crime analysis often involves the discovery of crime problems, and the identification of the nature of crime problems, by filtering through large quantities of data.

(f) Operations analysis

Santos (2004:65) expounds that operations analysis examines how a law enforcement agency is using its resources. It focuses on such topics as deployment, use of grant funds, redistricting assignments, and budget issues. In many agencies crime analysts are asked to assist on special projects for the department that fall into the category of operations analysis.

2.5.4.2 Crime analysis methods

There are six analysis methods as described by Mestcher and Gilbride (2005:27), as follows: Crime Pattern Analysis (CPA), Association/network analysis, Tele-

phone record/communication analysis, flow analysis, spatial/geographical analysis, strategic analysis and financial analysis.

(a) Crime-pattern analysis (CPA)

According to Santos (2009:153), the term 'crime pattern' refers to a combination of attributes of particular crimes that distinguishes that collection of activity from other activities. It is a process that looks for links between crimes and other incidents, to reveal similarities and differences that could be used to help predict and prevent future criminal activity (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:27).

For Gottschalk (2008:96), crime pattern analysis is the examination of the nature and distribution of crime within an area, to identify the emerging and current trends and patterns – unlike crimes or incidents and hot spots. He further indicates that crime pattern analysis includes the following:

- Crime trend identification
- Crime series identification
- General profile analysis
- Hot spots analysis
- Examination of the nature and scale of crime within an area
- Time frame

(b) Association/network analysis

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:27) describe network analysis as the collection and analysis of information that shows relationships among different individuals suspected of being involved in the activities together. This, as they continue, may provide insight into organisational structure, capability, and which investigative methods could be most effective in combating vehicle theft. Chene (2008:8) contends that the growth of organised crime in the post-apartheid era is a serious concern in South Africa. He further indicates that domestic groups are increasingly linked to transnational criminal networks originating from Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Russia.

As in other African countries, organised criminals are involved in various criminal activities, including vehicle theft, drug trafficking, gold and diamond smuggling,

dealing in endangered species, arms trade, human trafficking and money laundering (Chene, 2008:8).

According to Peterson *et al.* (1996:3), network analysis can also be used for, among others:

- to uncover new conspirators;
- to show the geographical breadth of the criminal activity; and
- to provide a basis for criminal organisation and asset forfeiture charges.

The UNODC (2011:46) outlines critical linkage issues in association analysis, as follows:

(i) Leadership

- Who is central in this organisation?
- Who is the initiator of the interactions?

(ii) Structure

- Who are the people who can take over the roles of the key personalities if they are removed?
- What is the hierarchy of the organisation?
- How is the criminal activity organised?

(iii) Communication/network

- The removal or incapacitation of which three individuals would sever a supply network?
- Which communication links are most worth monitoring?
- What patterns of interaction can be seen, and how do these patterns allow one to understand and predict behaviour?
- Can this model of linkages be applied to other criminal organisations?

(iv) Financial links

- What do the organisation's financial links tell us about its operations?
- What business links does it have?

(v) Memberships

- Are there criteria for membership of the organisation?
- What group pressures or unwritten rules govern the activities of its members?
- What is the organisation's propensity towards the use of violence?

(vi) Strategy

- What role(s) do a specific individual appear to be playing within a criminal organisation?
- Who are the people who can take over the roles of the key personalities, if they are removed?

By understanding leadership, structure and membership, communication means, strategy and financial means of organised crime group, with emphases on the issues indicated above, the police officials will be able to make necessary arrests. As can be seen from the discussions, association analysis can be of value in the combating of organised crime groups dealing in vehicle theft. There is a need that police officials be trained in order to understand the various types of association analysis, and also how they can be applied.

(c) Telephone record/communication analysis

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:27), communication analysis is concerned with the review of records reflecting communications (telephone, email, pager, text messaging, etc.) among entities that may be reflective of criminal associations or activity. The UNODC (2011:59) maintains that telephone record analysis represents one of the most widespread techniques that can produce illustrative and useful results. It can be subdivided into quantitative (or statistical) analysis and association analysis. Quantitative analysis aims to establish patterns in data on the basis of numeric parameters of a phone call – day, time and duration. Association analysis uses the results of the statistical analysis and link diagrams to produce hypotheses about the purpose and content of the calls, i.e. relationships and purpose of contacts of the targeted individuals (UNODC, 2011:59).

According to the UNODC (2011:60), telephone record analysis add value to the crime analyst and the police investigator in the following ways:

- Identifying telephone numbers dialed by a suspect's telephone, which may open other lines of enquiry
- Identifying patterns and common numbers that are called
- The indication of frequency of calls
- Identifying associates or connections
- The identification of location of caller (mobile phones)

The UNODC (2011:60) contends that, in general, the analyst can expect to obtain information on a particular telephone/subscriber in a specific area, as follows:

- Subscriber's name/address
- Subscriber's connection number(s)
- Subscriber's account details
- Payment details (bank/branch/account references)
- Contemporaneous record of connections made (over a particular time period), with details of:
    - other numbers called;
    - time, date, duration, etc. of each call; and
    - mast locations of mobile phone calls.

(d) Flow analysis

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:27) posit that the three most common categories of flow analysis include event flow analysis, commodity-flow analysis, and activity flow analysis.

(i) Event flow analysis

Event flow analysis is the compilation and analysis of data relating to events as they have occurred over time, to allow the analyst to draw conclusions and/or make recommendations. They are used most frequently in relation to specific criminal violations, where the events leading up to, and away from, the violation, need to be viewed in context (UNODC, 2011:56).

(ii) Commodity flow analysis

According to the UNODC (2011:54), commodity flow analysis looks at the flow of goods or services among people, businesses and locations, to determine the meaning of such. It may give insight into the nature of a conspiracy, the hierarchy of a group or the workings of a distribution network. It can show the final beneficiary of the criminal act, or the final location of assets purchased on his/her behalf. There are three commodity flow analysis questions, such as:

- Who ends up with the largest amount of the commodity (stolen vehicle) in question?
- Are there locations and individuals shown, to which (whom) the commodity (stolen vehicle) is siphoned?
- If a criminal hierarchy is involved, what does the flow of the commodity (stolen vehicle) indicate about the relationships within that group?

(iii) Activity flow analysis

In terms of the UNODC's understanding (2011:56), activity flow analysis is used to provide a generic view of a set of criminal actions, or operational modalities, to determine what the key actions were, and provide an overview of a crime.

(e) Spatial/geographical analysis

Santos (2009:4) posits that visual analysis displays of crime locations in the form of a map, and their relationship to other events and geographical features, are essential to understanding the nature of crime and disorder. A look at the locations of criminal activity or criminals, will help to determine whether future criminal activity can be deterred or interdicted through forecasting activity based on historical raw data (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:26–27).

(f) Financial analysis

According to Van Rooyen (2004:241), descriptions of the financial status and detailed descriptions of all assets belonging to the subject, must be determined.

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:27) suggest that financial analysis is a review and analysis of financial data, to ascertain the presence of criminal activity.

They further list what it can include:

- Band record analysis
- Net worth analysis
- Financial profiles
- Sources and application of funds
- Financial statement analysis
- Bank secrecy record analysis

The above information can assist in indicating financial inflow and outflow of an alleged vehicle theft perpetrator, thereby confirming an availability of money which cannot be accounted for.

(g) Strategic analysis

This is most often related to the structure and movement of organised criminal elements, patterns of criminal activity, criminal trend projections, or projective planning. They further indicate that valuable strategies which could be used include, among others, physical surveillance, enquiries from relatives, friends, and colleagues – all of which/whom could provide worthwhile information.

2.5.5 Strategic intelligence dissemination

The UNODC (2011:15) explains that an intelligence analyst has the responsibility to disseminate analytical products to targeted audiences, as appropriate. They also contend that much of the routine dissemination may be conducted by way of short notes. They are also quick to indicate that the analysts should be able to give oral briefings on larger investigations, and write structured reports detailing the currently available information.

According to Carter (2004:85), the heart of information sharing is dissemination of the information. Critical to appropriate dissemination of information, is understanding which persons have the “right to know” and the “need to know”, both within the agency and externally (Carter, 2004:85).

Carter (2004:85) further suggests that in some cases there may need to be multiple versions of one product. For example:

- An unclassified public version of a report may be created to advise citizens of possible threats.
- A second version may be “law enforcement sensitive”, and provide more detailed information about potential suspects, that would be inappropriate to publicise.

According to McDowell (1997:18), it is, of course, an obvious requirement that the results of the intelligence process have to be reported by the analyst to those who have tasked the project and who manage the intelligence activity. Most strategic issues require deep and comprehensive examination and consideration, and it is only appropriate that the means of reporting the assessment findings will almost always be in writing, although often preceded by and summarised in a verbal briefing to clients and managers (McDowell, 1997:18).

The team of analysts must use the available information to perform an assessment. This may be the validity of a threat, the level of vulnerability, or some similar concern. An assessment may be focused on a particular suspect or person, organisation, venue or event, or it may forecast the possibility of a future event (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:31).

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31), forecasts based on intelligence are essentially the best possible guess of what a person, organisation, movement, or other human entity, may do in the future, based on current information. The authors further argue that even though some day machines may act autonomously, today, at the root of every threat, excluding accidents and natural disasters, is human intention.

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31) contend that it is the role of intelligence to accurately report what that intent is, will be, how it may react in different environments, and why? It is this combination of assessments and forecasting that ultimately define the value of the intelligence product.

Lowenthal (2012:66) recommends that the intelligence community consider the following questions in the dissemination of information:

- Among the large mass of material being collected and analysed each day, what is important enough to report?
- To which policy-makers should it be reported: the most senior or lower ranking ones, to many or just a few?
- How quickly should it be reported? Is it urgent enough to require immediate delivery, or can it waiting for one of the reports that senior policy-makers receive the next morning?
- How much detail should be reported to the various intelligence consumers?
- How long should the report be?
- What is the best vehicle for reporting it – one of the items in the product line, a memo, a briefing? Are different vehicles needed for different policy-makers, based on their preferences for consuming intelligence, their own depth on the issue, and so on?

From the above discussion, it is clear that an intelligence product should serve both a tactical and a strategic purpose. Within the context of using intelligence for a specific purpose, there is, therefore, a need to train collectors and analysts to differentiate between intelligence aimed at tactical purposes and the one intended for strategic purposes.

2.6 MOTOR VEHICLE STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN

According to BACSA (2010:2–3), a strategic intelligence plan against vehicle theft should focus on the following areas:

- Disrupting the separated parts or chop shops markets by:
    - building on the intelligence collected on illegal distribution channels for separated parts; and
    - the continued pursuit of better inventory management, environment controls, and repair standards within the mainstream industry.

- Disrupting vehicle laundering markets by:

- continuing to pursue the reform of written-off vehicle management practices in line with the current work programme, tighten damage assessment criteria, and improve the rigour and consistency of vehicle inspection regimes; and
- continuing to promote better access to vehicle status information for consumers, reviewing advertising standards and seller disclosure requirements.

- Diverting (organised crime) offenders

  Gilbert (2010:405) describes the young offenders or gang as a group with the following characteristics:

  - A gang name and recognised symbols
  - A defined geographical territory
  - A regular meeting pattern
  - An organised, continuous course of criminality

  According to BACSA (2010:5) there is a need for diverting young offenders by:

  - encouraging innovative means of delivering young offender programmes; and
  - developing new educational resources to engage and inform young people of potential risks, consequences, and the long-term impact of becoming involved in vehicle crime.

- Building stakeholder/community capacity

- Encouraging innovation via a discreet range of communications and public education projects (BACSA, 2010:5)

2.7 SUMMARY

In this chapter, the strategic intelligence plan in the investigation of vehicle theft has been discussed. The first issue was to understand the strategic intelligence cycle. Secondly, the chapter also covered how strategic analyses are conducted. Analyses are considered to be the crux of strategic intelligence. From the above

discussions, it becomes clearer that a strategic analysis plan is vital in the combating of organised vehicle theft. A strategic analysis plan can give guidance to the police investigator or intelligence collector on where, how and why vehicle thefts, among others, take place. Through analysis, it also assists in the identification of possible suspects of vehicle theft. The following chapter will focus on organised vehicle theft, and also how, why and where vehicle theft takes place.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1 of the study, a problem statement was outlined concerning organised vehicle theft. Criminals have organised themselves to form what is known as “organised groups or syndicates”. In the quest to understand national and international organised vehicle theft, the researcher reviewed literature dealing with the relevant variables, and was guided by the following research questions:

- How are intelligence-driven investigations of organised motor vehicle theft conducted in Thohoyandou cluster?
- Do intelligence-driven investigations assist in profiling organised motor vehicle theft offenders?
- How are intelligence-driven investigations of organised motor vehicle theft conducted internationally?, and
- What value do intelligence-driven investigations have in the combating of organised motor vehicles theft?

The above research questions also guided this chapter.

3.2 MEANING OF ORGANISED CRIME

As indicated earlier, Chene (2008:8) contends that the growth of organised crime in the post-apartheid era is a serious concern in South Africa. He further indicates that domestic groups are increasingly linked to transnational criminal networks originating from Nigeria, China, Pakistan and Russia.

As in other African countries, organised criminals are involved in various criminal activities, including vehicle theft, drug trafficking, gold and diamond smuggling, dealing in endangered species, arms trade, human trafficking and money laundering. (Chene, 2008:8).

According to Irish and Qhobosheane (2003:72), for crimes to be deemed “organised”, the following criteria were regarded as necessary. For the purposes of this study, these criteria were also adopted:

- The offences should be serious.
- The offences should be for profit or power.
- The group committing the crimes should operate for a prolonged or indefinite period.
- The group should have a clear structure.
- There should be division of labour or tasks within the group.
- The ground should have some form of discipline or control.
- Money laundering should be a component of the group’s activities.
- The group should be able to exert influence through corruption, violence or intimidation.

Section 11 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 1998, as amended by the Prevention of Organised Crime Amendment Act No. 24 of 1999, interprets what a member of organised crime is, namely: “In considering whether a person is a member of a criminal gang for the purposes of this chapter, the court may have regard to the following factors, namely that such person:

- admits to criminal gang membership;
- is identified as a member of a criminal gang by a parent or guardian;
- resides in or frequents a particular criminal gang’s area and adopts their style of dress, their use of hand signs, language or their tattoos, and associates with known members of a criminal gang;
- has been arrested more than once in the company of identified members of a criminal gang for offences which are consistent with usual criminal gang activities; and
- is identified as a member of a criminal gang by physical evidence such as photographs or other documentation."

An organised crime group is in the business of committing criminal activities, and as such, it operates like any other organised business enterprise.

3.3 ORGANISED CRIME AND CORRUPTION

According to Roelofse (2015:15), where governments fail to act, it should serve as one of the indicators of corruption and/or coercion. The normal organised crime MO is to bribe key officials, or to actually lure them into the structure, which allows them to share profits. Such key officials can also be blackmailed, once they have accepted a bribe, the main targeted groups being the customs and police officials (Roelofse, 2015:15).

Roelofse (2015:16) portrays how organised crime elements gradually encroach on a target government, where they may eventually become *de facto* participants in government policy and decisions. Figure 3.1 below presents this author's theoretical model, labelled as 'encroachment', reflecting how organised crime groups infiltrate the government.

Structure / **Strategy**	**State**	**Business**	**Structure** / **Relationship**	**Result**
Evasion	Initial phase of establishing OC within a state. OC group(s) avoid state/ law enforcement through clandestine operations and secrecy	Ghettoised criminal markets for contraband goods and services and fronting	OC – **Subordinate** to state	State control
Corruption	Enticing and penetrating state agencies first at lower levels, e.g. border and customs officials, and then increasingly into upper echelons.	OC – Using legal business for its "business" Exploiting weak controls, often paying for bribes	OC – **Encroaching** state structures through individuals	
Collusion	Increasing association of individuals in powerful positions in state and OC groups State uses OC groups for covert operations and activities Cronyism	Business uses OC groups for profitable illegal activities such as racketeering	OC and state structures engaging – more individuals draw structures into OC	Losing control Hybrid system
Assimilation	State officials are shifting loyalty and serve OC objectives. Influences policy and laws. OC activities and operatives are protected. Defeating the cause of justice/shielding criminal activities	Business is done via criminalised tenders. Tax evasion	OC takes increasing role – assimilating with state structures	

De Facto-isation	Takes on legal political authority. Uses state resources as vehicles for OC. Funds are embezzled and fraud is evident.	Illegal and legal business merged. Tax funds are used for illicit and criminal activities.	OC and state integrating, and illegal activities become "legitimate"	OC State
Replacement	OC becomes government	Criminal business has become the norm	OC takes over the state	

Figure 3.1: Encroachment model
(**Source:** Roelofse, 2015:16)

Chene (2008:5) concurs with Roelofse, above, but mentions five levels of (organised) criminal infiltration or encroachment of the public sector that have been identified as follows:

(a) Sporadic acts of bribery

At the first level, a bribe is offered in exchange for a single favour: to obtain a passport, a licence, or information that facilitates criminal activity or helps to avoid punishment (Chene, 2008:5).

(b) Regular acts of bribery

This level consists in continually paying bribes to public officials, with a view to securing continuous protection from police investigation, and facilitating illegal activities at international borders, for example. In such schemes, low-ranking public officials are on the organised crime "payroll" in exchange for their services and continuous dedication to the criminal cause (Chene, 2008:5).

(c) Infiltration into government agencies

At this level, criminal networks may infiltrate the mid-rank of public agencies, and gain employment in law enforcement agencies by various means, with the view to easing criminal operations. (Chene, 2008:5).

(d) Infiltration into higher levels of government

This level of infiltration targets higher-ranking officers in sensitive government offices, who can provide long-term benefits and protection to criminal groups. Criminal groups gain systematic and broader access to confidential information, and enjoy increased protection (Chene, 2008:5).

(e) Infiltration into the political arena

This level of infiltration involves high officials such as senators, ministers, and sometimes even the presidency of the country, with the view to capturing the state's policies, and influencing the law making and enforcement, as well as judicial decisions. This level of infiltration is especially prevalent in the Russian Federation (Chene, 2008:5).

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that for organised criminal groups to function well, state employees such as police officers and immigration officers are recruited and placed on the payroll of these syndicates. The involvement of police officials in organised crime was seen most recently when three police members attached to the Pafuri Port were arrested following intensive investigations, after information was received that they were assisting suspects in smuggling stolen motor vehicles across the border, in return for payment (Otto, 2015:01).

3.4 INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATION OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT

3.4.1 Intelligence driven investigations

Carter and Carter (2009:317) define intelligence-driven investigations as the collection and analysis of information relating to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats, and/or strategic planning relating to emerging or changing threats.

From the interpretation of this definition, which covers the collection and analysis of information, it becomes apparent that the intelligence cycle and intelligence-driven investigation are inseparable concepts. The researcher views organised vehicle crime as a serious threat which needs to be rooted out, and that intelligence-driven investigation could aid police investigators in responding to the threat.

Lyman (2008:460) indicates that as a way of wanting profit, the offender would steal for reselling the motor vehicle as it is, or strip it for parts. He further men-

tions that understanding the motive for stealing will assist the police investigators in prevention and detection of such criminal activities.

The high cost of vehicles, insurance and deductibles, and the potential waiting periods for insurance settlements, create a significant financial hardship for many victims. In some places, insurance is not mandatory or only liability coverage is required. These victims suffer a total loss if their vehicle is not recovered – or is recovered but with severe damage. Thus, vehicle theft leaves countless victims without transportation, financially burdened, and feeling violated (Longman, 2006:1).

Established organised crime groups involved in organised vehicle theft are motivated by using profit to fund further criminal activities. Longman (2006:1) again indicates that these organised crime groups are involved in exporting of such stolen motor vehicles. They also place orders for specific makes/models/years, commit theft in counterfeiting the identity of the cars and accompanying paperwork, transporting the motor vehicle outside the province, and arranging for their illegal export out of the country (Wallace, 2004:12).

Intelligence-driven investigation can be used to address issues of what data and information are currently available, and what the analyst will need to collect before proceeding further. Intelligence-driven investigations are structured approaches to gathering and collating information about a particular issue or person (Ratcliffe, 2008:128).

According to Carter and Carter (2009:317) intelligence-driven investigations focus on threats, and it becomes essential to identify variables within a community and the surrounding region that support the generation and maturation of crime. These can be wide ranging from the following:

- The emergence of organised criminal elements within the region, who steal vehicles
- The emergence of an extremist group – e.g. to use in terrorism – car bombs that articulate hate violence

- A variety of unique characteristics that are idiosyncratic of a certain community, such as proximity to an international border that contributes to criminal threats.

The sudy area, bordering Mozambique and Zimbabwe obviously falls predominantly within the category

3.4.2 The 3i model

Ratcliffe (2006:439) introduces the 3i model (see Figure 3.2) as an intelligence-driven investigation process which can be applied in the reduction of organised vehicle theft.



Figure 3.2: The 3i model
(**Source:** Ratcliffe, 2006:439)

According to Ratcliffe (2006:439), in the 3i model (interpret, influence, impact), the crime intelligence analysis interprets the criminal environment, in order to determine who the main players are, and what significant and emerging threats exist. He further reflects that, in this model, the arrow runs from the intelligence analysis unit to the criminal environment.

The second arrow runs from the intelligence function to the decision-maker. The 3i model does not make a determination as to who is the best decision-maker: this is for the individual analyst to figure out (Influencing decision-makers is a tricky area for many analysts).

Ratcliffe (2006:11) states that analysts with a traditional intelligence background often feel that their role is simply one of investigative case support, providing output and descriptive analyses of wire taps, intelligence gleaned from individual investigations, and grading information that detectives receive from confidential informants. The notion of providing commanders with recommendations as to targets and action can seem quite alien, and many analysts feel that this is outside of their ambit (Ratcliffe, 2006:11).

A successful intelligence-driven investigation is therefore one that is able to interpret the criminal environment, convey that intelligence to decision-makers, and influence their thinking so that decision-makers in turn design creative crime reduction policies that have an impact on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2006:440).

Intelligence-driven investigations do not take place if interpretation and influence are the only components of the 3i model. For crime reduction to happen, decision-makers must make an impact on the crime environment (Ratcliffe, 2006:440). For organised vehicle theft to decrease, all components of the 3i model must occur: the crime intelligence analysts must interpret the crime environment, the analysts must then use that intelligence to influence decision-makers, and decision-makers, in turn, must direct resources effectively, in order to have a positive impact on the criminal environment.

The interpretation of the crime environment will assist intelligence collectors in the identification of organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft. Intelligence collectors will then strategically and tactically influence the police management (decision-makers) in knowing and understanding the crime environment. The impact could be in the form of staffing, or making physical resources available.

As can be seen from the above discussion, combating organised crime will definitely need an understanding of intelligence driven vehicle theft investigations. The following discussion is aimed at addressing three areas which the researcher views as critical in the combating of organised vehicle theft. The discussion is aimed at addressing three issues, namely: controlling vehicles on the borders, regulating resale of vehicles, and the selling of vehicle parts.

3.4.3 Controlling vehicles on the borders

Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA) (2009:5) makes it clear that some vehicles are stolen for a specific market. Stolen vehicles find their way into countries where registration procedures are often lax (Gilbert, 2010:325). BACSA (2009:5) argues that vehicles such as four-wheel drives and pick-ups are stolen specifically for the export market to African countries. BACSA (2010:5) further indicates that mini-buses are stolen for the internal taxi market and second-hand parts market.

Irish and Qhobosheane (2003:75) indicate that the SAPS first identified the smuggling of cars across Southern African borders as a problem in the 1980s. They contend that, since then, there were significant increases in the number of stolen vehicles between 1980 and 2003. Irish and Qhobosheane further state that stolen vehicles have also become an important form of currency, and are regularly used to pay for other criminal activities such as gold and diamond smuggling, or else sold for hard cash.

According to Wallace (2004:9), vehicles that are stolen for export overseas are often loaded into shipping containers and accompanied by false documentation claiming the container holds a different type of cargo. In some cases, the organised crime groups may have a link to a port of entry (border) in the form of individuals in key positions, who are influential in the movement of commercial cargo off a vessel and within the border environment.

Besides false documentation, one popular method is Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) switching, or “re-vinning”. This is done when organised crime groups purchase a vehicle that has been in an accident, and written off as salvage, in order to obtain its VIN. They will then steal a vehicle of the same make, model and year, and replace its VIN with that of the wreck wherever it appears on the vehicle (Wallace, 2004:9).

It is difficult for border law enforcement officials and customs officers to detect such vehicles as stolen, when they are taken across the border.

Organised criminal groups dealing in vehicle theft recruit police officials, who are attached to the border, as a way of effectively ensuring proper smuggling. The case of the three police officers at Pafuri, referred to above, is an example of collusion between police and organised crime groups. The report highlighted that these police officers were arrested, following intensive investigations, after information was received that they were assisting suspects in smuggling stolen motor vehicles across the border, in return for payment (Otto, 2015:1).

3.4.4 Regulation of resale of vehicles

According to BACSA (2009:4), the high demand for second-hand parts to repair damaged vehicles, or to upgrade vehicles, also plays an important role in the demand for vehicles. They further indicate that newly released or lesser-known models typically have low theft numbers and low risk profiles. This is mainly due to the fact that an illegal market for such vehicles does not exist.

Stolen vehicles have two sorts of impact on the market. First, persons whose cars are stolen commonly replace them with new or used vehicles, while stolen vehicles (which are not exported, written off through damage, or chopped for their valuable parts) re-enter the legitimate market as second-hand vehicles (Field, 2011:78).

Police investigators are expected to gather intelligence about second-hand dealership. Operators of second-hand dealership or motor salvage yards are required to pass a “fit and proper” test, register with their local authority and maintain records of the vehicles they have obtained and from whom they have obtained them (Brown *et al.*, 2004:8). According to Field (2011:78), the increased supply of older vehicles will also tend to decrease the price of new vehicles to bring supply and demand into equilibrium. Furthermore, he contends that one effect of vehicle theft on the vehicle market will therefore be to redistribute wealth, reducing the resale value of new cars, and reducing the prices that purchasers of second-hand vehicles will have to pay.

According to the Second-hand Goods Act No. 6 of 2009, ‘‘second-hand goods’’ means goods which have been in use by a person other than the manufacturer or producer thereof or a person dealing therewith for such manufacturer or

producer in the course of business, but does not include goods with a value of less than R100. For the purpose of this Act, a vehicle falls within the ambit of goods. The following discussions are centred on the Second-hand Goods Act, and subsequently outline sections relevant to the control of second-hand vehicles as part of the prevention of theft.

3.4.4.1 Records by dealers

According to the Second-hand Goods Act No. 6 of 2009, section 21:

"(1) Unless otherwise provided in this Act, a dealer must keep a register in the prescribed form and record in the register the prescribed particulars regarding every acquisition or disposal of second-hand goods.

(2) The particulars must at least include —

(a) particulars in respect of the identity of the person from whom the second-hand goods are acquired, including —
  (i) the person's full names, contact address and contact telephone number;
  (ii) the manner in which the person's identity was verified; and
  (iii) the person's identity number.
(b) a description of the second-hand goods and serial number or distinguishing mark or feature of the second-hand goods;
(c) the purchase price paid by the dealer;
(d) the number assigned to the second-hand goods by the dealer;
(e) the name and signature of the person who conducted the transaction on behalf of the dealer; and
(f) the date and time of the transaction, the date on which the second-hand goods were sold or an account of how and when the second-hand goods were otherwise disposed of.

(3) If the certificate of registration in question is issued with a condition which requires separate registers, such separate registers must be kept in respect of the acquisition and disposal of different classes of second-hand goods.

(4) A person acquiring second-hand goods from, or disposing of goods to, a dealer, must furnish such dealer with his or her full name, physical address and an original identity document or passport as proof of his or her identity.

(5) A dealer must obtain and keep a copy of the identity document or passport contemplated in subsection.

(6) A dealer must retain a register contemplated in subsection (1) and copies of the documents contemplated in subsection (4) for a period of not less than five years, calculated from the date of the relevant transaction.

(7) Every entry in a register in respect of an acquisition or disposal of second-hand goods must be made contemporaneously with the acquisition or disposal in question."

The availability of records in the form of entry in a register will assist the police investigator in the process of verifying the records of the previous owner of the second hand vehicle or vehicle parts in question.

3.4.4.2 Restrictions on dealers and pawnbrokers

The Act also puts restrictions on dealers and pawnbrokers in section 23:

"(1) No dealer may—

(a) acquire or accept in pawn goods from any person under the age of 18;
(b) store goods elsewhere than on the premises for which a certificate has been issued in terms of this Act;
(c) take into his or her possession goods unless he or she is convinced on reasonable grounds that the seller of the goods is the owner or titleholder thereof or is duly authorised to dispose thereof;
(d) deliver goods acquired by him or her to a person or change the form or alter the appearance thereof until after the expiration date of a period of seven days from the date of acquisition thereof; or
(e) accept in pawn any firearms or ammunition as defined in section 1 of the Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act No. 60 of 2000).

(2) During the period contemplated in subsection (1) (d) or during any period that any pawned goods are subject to a pledge, the articles must be kept separate from all other goods of the same or similar kind and description."

The identification of second-hand parts that are pawned, jacks, spare wheels, batteries, etc. will always be difficult, since they are generally not marked by the manufacturers.

Morgan (2009:9) views the importance of disrupting the vehicle-laundering markets via:

- the better management of written-off vehicles, including improving damage assessment criteria, repair standards and vehicle inspection regimes; and
- developing better access to vehicle status information for consumers, reviewing advertising standards and seller disclosure requirements etc.

3.4.4.3 Motor vehicle records

The issue of motor vehicle records is addressed by section 21 of the Act:

"(1) Subject to section 21, a dealer dealing in second-hand motor vehicles must also record in the prescribed register the particulars regarding every acquisition or disposal of a motor vehicle contemplated in subsection (2).

(2) The particulars contemplated in subsection (1) are—

(a) the VIN, and the chassis and engine number;
(b) the odometer reading;
(c) the exterior and trim colour; and
(d) any distinguishing mark or feature, such as microdot particulars.

(3) A person acquiring or disposing of a motor vehicle from or to a dealer must furnish such dealer with—

(a) his or her full name;
(b) his or her physical address;
(c) his or her original identity document or passport as proof of his or her identity; and
(d) proof of registration or deregistration of the motor vehicle.

(4) A dealer must obtain and keep a copy of the identity document or passport contemplated in subsection (3) and must obtain and keep proof of registration or deregistration, as the case may be, contemplated in that subsection.

(5) A dealer must retain the copies contemplated in subsection (4) for a period of not less than five years, calculated from the date of the relevant transaction."

The above information show that particulars of the person acquiring or disposing motor vehicle from the dealer, if provided in the form of copies of identity documents, will be vital in tracing suspicious transactions which were done long before.

3.4.4.4 Routine inspections

According to section 28 of the Act:

"(1) A police official may, during times when business activity in respect of second-hand goods is taking place, enter the premises of any registered dealer in order to investigate compliance with this Act and require the dealer, owner, an employee or the person in control of the premises to—

(a) produce the certificate of registration relating to that premises for inspection;
(b) produce any register, record, book or other document relating to the goods in or on the premises for inspection or for the purposes of obtaining copies thereof or extracts there from;
(c) produce any goods found in or on such premises for examination; or
(d) explain any entry or absence of any entry in any register, book, record or document found therein or thereon.

(2) If, upon any inspection, a police official discovers that any method of dealing, recording of transactions in registers or storage that is being used is in contravention of this Act, the police official may—

(a) demand immediate discontinuation of the method; and
(b) afford the dealer a period of no more than seven days to rectify such method in order to ensure compliance with the Act.

(3) The dealer, owner, employee or person in charge of premises contemplated in subsection (1) must assist the police official in the performance of his or her functions under this Act.

(4) (a) A police official must conduct at least one comprehensive annual inspection of each registered premises, during which the records contemplated in section 21(1) must be examined.

(b) On each occasion when a police official inspects a register in terms of subsection (1)(b), such police official must—

(i) sign his or her name immediately after the last entry in that register, and append his or her number and rank and the date on which the inspection was conducted; or

(ii) certify in the manner that the National Commissioner may from time to time direct, that the records were inspected."

Regular police officials' visits in the second hand goods dealers are vital; however, there is a need to recruit informers from within, as a way of improving accessibility of information.

3.4.5 Selling of vehicle parts

Another measure that can help to discourage vehicle theft is marking of parts. This will enable police officers to identify stolen vehicles, as well as arrest and prosecute the people involved (Wallace, 2004:12). According to the South African Insurance Crime Bureau (SAICB, 2010:5), vehicles are stolen for their component parts and these parts are often used to repair other vehicles. Professional vehicle theft operations of this nature are commonly called chopshop operations. Gilbert (2010:323) maintains that the majority of vehicle stripping happens in concealed locations such as rented garages. The SAICB (2010:5) posits that this is one of the most difficult types of offences to investigate, because it is difficult to identify individual parts and ascertain whether they have been stolen or not. The Bureau further concludes by indicating that most vehicle components do not have any identification numbers on them, and once a part is removed, it cannot be identified with certainty to the standard required in criminal hearings, unless those parts have been microdotted with a unique number.

When vehicles are stolen and chopped for their parts, the legitimate market for vehicle parts supplied by the manufacturers will lose sales, as a result. These lost sales may be set against the increased sales of parts that occur as a result

of vehicle damage from vehicles that have been stolen for joyriding purpose. The overall effect of vehicle theft on the sale of parts is therefore indeterminate (Field, 2011:78).

According to Wallace (2004:12), vehicle theft for parts is attractive to organised groups, since in many cases a vehicle's stripped parts are worth two to three times the value of the vehicle itself. She further mentions that vehicles thieves may first steal a vehicle and then look for a buyer for its parts, or may receive an order for certain parts and then steal a particular vehicle in order to fill the order. Organised crime groups may receive orders for specific parts directly from body shops or rebuilders. Brokers receive orders from the body shop, and arrange to hire thieves as necessary to acquire the vehicles that contain the required parts. The thieves steal and then deliver the vehicle to a "chopshop" where it is dismantled and the requisite parts obtained (Wallace, 2004:12).

Wallace (2001:8) contends that vehicle parts marking are a measure that can help to discourage vehicle theft. VIN are engraved on very few body parts (fender, hood and doors), making it difficult to track stolen parts. The author indicates that increasing the number of vehicle parts that are marked with a VIN, can discourage theft of vehicles for the resale of parts.

Organised vehicle groups are also involved in money laundering. This is substantiated by Roelofse (2007:19), who asserts that money laundering is a specialisation field in organised crime, where individuals and groups specialising in money laundering, market their services to other organised crime groups. He further indicates that reporting suspicious financial transactions is vital in the combating of money laundering, and that the Financial Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 of 2001 was established for that purpose. This Act provides that any person who knows, or ought reasonably to have known, that property – including a motor vehicle – is or forms part of the proceeds of unlawful activities and –

"(a) enters into any agreement or engages in any arrangement or transaction with anyone in connection with that property, whether such agreement, arrangement or transaction is legally enforceable or not, or

(b) Performs any other act in connection with such property, whether it is performed independently or in concert with any person, which has or is likely to have the effect—

(i) of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of the said property or its ownership or any interest which anyone may have in respect thereof, or

(ii) of enabling or assisting any person who has committed or commits an offence, whether in the Republic or elsewhere –

(aa) to avoid prosecution, or

(bb) to remove or diminish any property acquired directly, or indirectly, of the as a result commission of an offence, shall be guilty of an offence."

Organised crime group dealing who are based in South Africa, resell stolen vehicle inside the country inside or outside South Africa whereas some of them sell the vehicles in parts. Organised crime group activities can be curbed through, amongst other methods, the application of FICA. The crux of the FICA is, indeed, aims at combating illicit activities such as vehicle theft.

3.5 INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATIONS IN THE PROFILING OF ORGANISED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT

In the quest to understand the value of intelligence-driven investigation in the profiling of organised motor vehicle theft, the following will be discussed, namely: the meaning of offender profiling, the profile of a typical vehicle theft offender, organised vehicle theft, and crime analysis of vehicle theft.

3.5.1 Offender profiling

According to Van Rooyen (2004:238), profiling is the description of a person(s), organisation or a specific target. It entails an informal list of characteristics gained from experience and intelligence, believed to be typical of persons involved in illegal activities. The gathering of intelligence is a prerequisite for the compilation of profiles.

There are five objectives to the profiling of offenders, as outlined by Van Rooyen (2004:238):

- To get a better understanding of structures, activities and movements of groups of people, individuals or organisations
- To decide the best possible strategy to implement, in order to prevent or minimise the threats
- To follow the most effective ways in investigating against the offender
- To trace the subject or suspect
- To determine the movements, activities and associates of the subjects

Brown, Cannings and Sherriff (2004:7) argue that offender profiling takes the form of examining the *modus operandi* of each individual offence, and identifying known offenders who have used a similar approach. They further indicate that in the above way, offences would be linked with offenders on an ongoing basis. Turvey (2008:324) argues that property-oriented behaviour, such as theft of vehicles, results in material gain.

3.5.2 Profile of a typical vehicle theft offender

Wallace (2004:9) is of the opinion that the majority of vehicle theft crimes are associated with, or committed by, youth offenders. Organised vehicle theft groups recruit youths to steal cars for two specific reasons:

- To protect the upper levels of the organised crime leaders
- Because the justice system is lenient towards youth offenders, and the organised crime operatives assure them (youth offenders) that they have little to fear if they are apprehended

According to the SAICB (2010:3), those involved in stealing vehicles range from groups of petty criminals to highly sophisticate organised criminal groups with extensive local and transnational links. They further indicate that the latter often operate in terms of orders for specific makes or models of vehicles from buyers, both within South Africa and outside its borders. The above indicates that for theft of vehicles to happen, there should be a market or buyer.

3.5.3 Reasons for theft

BACSA (2009:7) reflects that most of the vehicles which are stolen in South Africa are sold inside the country. They further show that to be able to sell the stolen vehicles in South Africa, the original identity of the vehicles needs to be changed or concealed. Criminals prefer vehicles of which the identity can be removed or concealed very easily.

As indicated earlier, some vehicles are taken across the borders of neighbouring states. Becker (2009) further indicates that, occasionally, a vehicle is stolen for the purpose of resale. The VIN is altered, a new title and licence are obtained, and the vehicle is put on the block for sale. He is quick to point out that vehicles can be stolen to order, or they can be stolen by an organised crime group specialising in appropriating late model luxury vehicles, and altering, transporting and selling them, both inside and outside the country.

To support the above, research indicates that in almost all vehicle-related crimes, the primary and secondary identifiers such as licence, VIN and engine number are altered or removed, to conceal the identity of a vehicle (BACSA, 2009:7).

According to Crime Intelligence Service Nova Scotia's (CISNS) annual report (2006:17) criminals who steal vehicles look for the following:

- Vehicles not protected
- Particular makes and models
- High volume parking area with easy entry and exit
- Keys in the vehicle ignition or in plain view inside the vehicle
- Vehicles left unlocked and/or windows open
- Valuables left in plain view inside a vehicle
- Vehicles left running

Becker (2009:330) argues that thieves who chop a vehicle have in mind the same objective as do those who strip a vehicle: the reduction of the vehicle to its parts. He further indicates that the focus is on the major body components, including doors, fenders, hood, bumpers, and windows, the frame as well as the engine block. According to Santos (2009:147), three categories of information are col-

lected on vehicles: the official information, the physical description, and the nature of the vehicles at the time of incident.

3.5.4 Vehicle profiling

3.5.4.1 Official information on the vehicle

This consists of the VIN, number plate, and state (province, in the case of South Africa) of issue. Becker (2009:330) sensitises one on a very important issue, by mentioning that a vehicle's VIN consists of 17 letters and numbers. Altered or false VINs can be recognised by someone who understands what the letters and numbers represent. The VIN letters and numbers have the following meaning, as explained by Becker (2009:330):

- The 1st symbol, which is a number, indicates the nation in which the vehicle was manufactured.
- The 2nd symbol, a letter, indicates the manufacturer (e.g. G for General Motors).
- The 3rd, a number, indicates the make of the vehicle (e.g. Toyota).
- The 4th symbol indicates the type of restraints used in the vehicle (e.g. C for seatbelts).
- The next three numbers, 5, 6 and 7, constitute the manufacturer's code for the position of the vehicle in the production line, and the body type of the vehicle (e.g. a van).
- The 8th symbol, a letter, indicates the type of engine.
- The 9th symbol, a number, is a check digit and is used to validate the VIN.
- The 10th symbol, a letter, tells the year the vehicle was made.
- The 11th symbol, a letter, reflects the city in which the auto plant is located.
- The remaining six numbers, which are 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, constitute the production number of the vehicle.

It is highly advisable for police investigators to use the following checklist in vehicle cases, as recommended by Becker (2009:331):

- Make, mode, licence number, and VIN of the vehicle? (Names of all known operators of the vehicle)

- Where was the vehicle recovered?
- How was entry made? (Break-in, keyed)
- Who witnessed the theft?
- When was the theft discovered? (By whom?)
- Where was the vehicle last legitimately used? (Who used it? – For what purpose?)
- Where was the operator at the time of the theft? (Witnesses to the operator's location and activities?)
- Where was the owner at the time of the theft?
- Witnesses to the owners' location and activities?
- Who has possession of keys to the vehicle? (Account for each set of keys)
- Payment history?
- Repair history?
- Owner's financial circumstances?

3.5.4.2 Physical description

According to Santos (2009:147), the physical description of a vehicle includes the following:

- Make – e.g. Toyota, Audi, Ford, BMW or Mercedes Benz
- Model – e.g. C180 Blue efficiencies, AMG line, Elegance, etc.
- Style – e.g. four-door, two-door, hatchback or sedan)

3.5.4.3 Time of incident

Santos (2009:147) further states that information on the nature of the vehicles at the time of incident includes the following:

- Status – e.g. stolen, recovered, abandoned
- Qualitative details – e.g. any dent in the vehicle

3.5.5 Organised vehicle theft

The SAICB (2010:2) reported that vehicle theft is a greater criminal enterprise than anyone can imagine, since it is organised crime, masterminded by well-organised criminal groups. The Bureau report further highlights that South

Africa experiences high rate of vehicle thefts – which has a negative impact on the safety and security of citizens and their property. Organised criminal groups in South Africa are involved in the stealing of vehicles, and they are not scared off by locked doors and security systems, and their MO is developed and changed according to circumstances (SAICB, 2010:2).

According to Irish *et al.* (2010:75), South Africa has a strong network of organised crime groups, which linked up with both foreigners in South Africa and criminal networks from other African countries. The authors further indicate that these groups were later to develop into more sophisticated organised crime networks. More recently, Nigerian networks have become involved in the lucrative vehicle-smuggling trade, and those who do the actual stealing of such vehicles, are predominately South Africans.

It is believed that the organised criminal groups involved in vehicle crime operate in well-developed structures, and once a vehicle has been stolen by a foot soldier or runner, the following will happen:

- Other gang members who specialise in falsification and production of vehicle registration and identity papers will start doing the job.
- Others will follow to falsify or change the chassis number, production number, etc.
- Thereafter, the couriers are hired to take the vehicles from one country to the next.
- The receivers who organise the sale of the vehicles are at the end of the chain.

Organised crime groups have both short- and long-term strategies. It is clear that, in the process, they develop intelligence data to counter the SAPS strategy. Their MO is also to recruit police officers. The police are actually in the business of combating crime, and as they try to achieve their mandate, organised crime groups counter all such efforts.

3.6 SHARING OF INFORMATION BETWEEN POLICE STATIONS, UNITS AND INTER-AGENCY

3.6.1 Lack of trust

The lack of management and sharing of information in vehicle theft investigations, clearly illustrate one of the main problems facing a combating strategy. According to Phillips, Ting and Demurjianis (2002:88), the information must be securely shared in an easy, efficient, scalable and reliable way, in order to facilitate the tasks of the dynamic coalition without compromise and loss of confidentiality. Jones (2007:384) contends that "[t]oday's rapidly evolving threats, by contrast, call for quick, imaginative and agile responses". In his view, to develop this capability information must include sharing it more widely.

Information sharing is regarded as a key element of the strategy for intelligence reform. It is conceived as a central means of adapting to contemporary security challenges, in particular from transnational actors involved in criminal activities (Jones, 2007:384).

Liu and Chetal (2005:286) argue that the primary reason that spurs the hesitation and reluctance for agencies to share their sensitive information with one another is because they do not have trust amongst themselves. They go further to reflect that 'lack of trust' is caused by conflicts of interest and if agency A, as they continue, is to share information with agency B, the question of compromising the interests of A comes to the fore. Liu and Chetal (2005:286) argue that information-sharing "schemes" must be based on trust.

3.6.2 Trust model

The trust model should be built in such a way that win-win information sharing will always increase mutual understanding. They contend that an information sharing procedure between two agencies is a win-win procedure if the interests or payoffs of both agencies will be increased to a similar degree when the procedure ends. The trust model should be built in such a way that win-lose information sharing will always decrease the trust of the loser in the winner. An information sharing procedure is a win-lose procedure if the interests of at least

one agency will be decreased when the procedure ends (Liu & Chetal, 2005:287):

- **Requirement A and B:** Indicates that interests must be part of the trust model. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2006:395), "interest", within this context, refers to a person's advantage or benefit. Liu & Chetal (2005:287) introduce a "trust model", and also maintain that the reason why there is a lack of trust among agencies implies that the trust model for effective cross-agency information sharing needs to satisfy requirements A, B and C.

- **Requirement C:** Indicates that information validity and utility must be part of the trust model. A piece of information need to be valid, or of higher integrity, to be used (Liu and Chetal, 2005:287). Phillips and Demurjian (2002:93) take the argument further, and indicate that information has integrity if it is consistent, accurate and reliable. They reiterate that an error in information coordination, a missed time window, or a loss of information, could render a serious threat.

Information sharing is vital in improving intelligence analysis. The more information the analyst has, the better he can interpret the criminal environment, and also influence decision-makers (Jones, 2007:387). Jones (2007:389) further argues that a need-to-know standard for information sharing must not be employed blindly, and a need-to-share approach of integration must take its place.

Liu and Chetal (2005:290) contend that information sharing must be based on the following:

- Centralised trust
- Secure communication channels
- Intra-agency information sharing in place

3.6.3 International liaison

There is a hierarchy of agencies, ranging from international, through regional and national, to local. As a way of improving information sharing, International Police (INTERPOL) General Secretariat developed the Automated Search Facility-Stolen Motor Vehicle (ASF-SMV) database to support police in member

countries in the fight against international vehicle theft and trafficking (INTERPOL, 2015:7). INTERPOL further reports that in 2014, more than 132 000 vehicles, worldwide, were identified as stolen, thanks to the SMV database. By the end of 2014, the number of database records had risen to more than 6.8 million. This indicates that vehicle theft is indeed an international problem, and that there is a need for information sharing at international level.

In the Southern African region, SARPCCO (2011:10) serves as the coordinating body, and raises the following issues which make it difficult for the law enforcers to combat, among other crimes, vehicles theft:

- Police are reactive rather than preventative.
- There is limited intelligence gathering, in-depth investigation and information sharing.
- There is a lack of clear mandates – it is not clear as to who is responsible for organised crime investigation (Crime Investigation Division versus Specialised Units versus Organised Crime Units versus Intelligence Bodies?).
- There is a lack of cooperation between different law enforcement authorities.

As can be seen from the above discussions, intelligence-driven investigation requires proactive and reactive approaches, effective collection of information, a clear mandate on all stakeholders involved, as well as cooperation between law enforcement agencies.

At the national, provincial and cluster level, there are various units within the SAPS that are carrying the mandate of crime prevention, detection, as well as investigation, as outlined in section 205 of the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 1996).

Burgers *et al.* (2007:109) contend that there is a need for stakeholders share information in the combating and prevention of vehicle crimes. This will enable all role players, in both the private and public sectors, to contribute towards combating vehicle theft. This includes access to information about stolen vehicles, statistics regarding vehicle crime and motor vehicles on the National Traffic Information System (NaTIS).

Intra-agency information sharing is emphasised section 73 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Amendment Act No. 24 of 1999, which reads that –

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962), and with regards to any other secrecy provision in similar legislation, whenever any investigation is instituted in terms of this act, including an investigation into any offence referred to in Schedule 1, and an investigation into the property, financial activities, affairs or business of any person, the Commissioner of the South Africa Revenue Services or any official designated by him or her for this purpose, shall be notified of such investigation with a view to cooperation and sharing of information."

3.6.4 Standardised information-sharing policy

The 2011–2018 strategic plan of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2011:13), shows that there is a need for standardised information-sharing policies across the agency, and it has to be guided by the following objectives:

- Ensuring that information-sharing agreements comply with the available policy
- Developing standardised policies, processes and procedures for information sharing, that provide partners with a clear understanding of how and with whom they can share information
- Working with the Crime Intelligence cluster commander of the department, to develop and implement an Information Sharing Segment Architecture (which documents the SAPS's communications activities, and describes the necessary policies, processes, architecture and governance needed to improve information sharing), that defines how the SAPS will participate in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and that fully addresses Crime Intelligence requirements, including Crime Intelligence Architecture Methodology
- Demonstrating the existence of a clear governance structure for information sharing and assigning accountability for establishing, implementing and overseeing information-sharing policies, processes and technologies linked to the police force;

- Formalising information-sharing relationships among partners that currently rely on existing information networks, developing an information-sharing framework
- Increasing understanding of the roles and missions within the force stakeholder community by providing information-sharing best practice materials and guidebooks with information about the various stakeholders.

As can be seen from the above discussions, information sharing appears to be the crux of intelligence. It also becomes clear that each and every stakeholder's role and mission should be known and understood. To ensure effective sharing of intelligence trust is vital. The trust model of Liu and Chetal (2005:287) seems to be extremely important in developing trust within the intelligence country.

3.6.5 Information sharing categories

At national level, there are four information-sharing categories which are imperative for sharing, as outlined by Burgers *et al.* (2007:109), as follows:

3.6.5.1 NaTIS Information

The online NaTIS queries to insurance companies and banks have been implemented by the Department of Transport (DoT). Some of the banks and insurance companies have very successfully implemented the online queries. According to Burgers *et al.* (2007:109), the challenge is that the availability of information regarding vehicle registration and licensing, ownership details, vehicles status and roadworthy status, is still very limited to other organisations and the public.

3.6.5.2 SAPS information of stolen and hijacked vehicles

Burgers *et al.* (2007:110) contend that the private sector, individuals that intend buying a vehicle, and the SAPS, are benefiting from the partnership in the battle against motor vehicle related crimes, including fraud. They further remark that BACSA is playing an important role in representing the industry and the public in making this information available to vetted users.

3.6.5.3 Information on vehicles in-transit

According to Burgers *et al.* (2007:110), the majority of South Africa's neighbours rely on passage through South Africa for their imports – which include second-hand vehicles, hereinafter referred to as "in-transit vehicles". It should be noted that a large number of these vehicles do not reach their destination, and are ultimately registered in South Africa. They mention that these registered vehicles are then sold to unsuspecting buyers.

3.6.5.4 Vehicle crime statistical analysis

The statistics regarding vehicle crime are important for the industry and the SAPS. Statistics on vehicle crime is a source of information to determine current trends of criminal activity (Burgers *et al.*, 2007:110). The continuous high theft of vehicles (see Chapter 1) could mean that the information-sharing approach has to be revisited.

3.7 SUMMARY

The research reviewed international and national literature, in order to understand organised crime within the context of vehicle theft. The discussions were limited to literature on identified areas. From this chapter, it became clear that for organised crime to operate effectively, public sector or government officials are bribed and blackmailed in the process. The critical issue of trust (inter-agency and even amongst individuals) was highlighted as a vital altitude that should exist in intelligence cycles. The chapter also emphasised the importance of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in the combating of organised criminal activities such as vehicle theft. In this chapter, offender profiling was also analysed, with the main purpose of understanding how organised crime groups can best be defused. The following chapter will address the question of research theories, and it involves the processes undertaken in conducting this study.

CHAPTER 4

SYSTEMS THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Organised crime adds to an increase in public spending on security and policing, and again undermines the very human rights standards that many countries strive to preserve. In the view of Cordner, Cordner and Das (2010:134), organised crime is usually professional crime, and in a broad sense, the entire underworld may be said to be organised. Blunkett (2004:2) is of the view that organised crime reaches into every community, ruining lives, driving other crime, and instilling fear. He further maintains that many communities are vulnerable, and to that effect, innocent residents and legitimate businesses are taken advantage of in the process.

Blunkett (2004:2) further opines that organised crime influences corrupt government officers and law enforcement agencies in many states, worldwide, which desperately need good and honest government as a foundation for economic prosperity, order, security and political liberty. From the above statement, it is clear that organised crime is an

international problem. The researcher believes that for one to know and understand organised crime, in order to develop proactive and reactive means and ways of combating the scourge, the systems theory provides a sound foundation for analysis.

4.2 MEANING OF SYSTEMS THEORY

Before one can understand the systems theory, it is logical to first understand 'systems' as a term. According to Langlois (1982:585), a system is just the set of parts, plus a set of relations among the parts. von Bertalanffy (1955:14), also known as the 'father of the systems theory', points out that thinking from the direction of economics and the social sciences, rather from biology, there is a body of what he calls "general empirical theory" or “general system theory” which

he claims is widely applicable to many different disciplines. In Skyttner's view (1996:20), the following points represent the "hallmark" of the general systems theory.

4.2.1 Interrelationships and interdependence of objects and their attributes

Skyttner (1996) maintains that unrelated and independent elements can never constitute a system.

4.2.2 Holism

Strauss (2008:188) states that the history of theoretical reflection upon the nature of human society diverges into two mutually exclusive modes of explanation: atomistic and holistic. In Langlois's view (1982:582), there is a need to study the total system, in order to see the bigger picture. He further contends that holistic properties, impossible to detect by analysis, should be possible to define in the system. Jackson (2003:3) makes it clear that holism considers systems to be more than the sum of their parts. In terms of Jackson's (2003) assertion, holism puts the study of the whole before that of the parts.

Jackson is supported by Langlois (1982:582), who maintains that this view is to be contrasted with methodological holism properties that cannot be derived from the properties of constituent parts. He contends that it does not try to break down organisations into parts, in order to understand them and intervene in them. It concentrates its attention, instead, at the organisational level, and on ensuring that the parts are functioning and are related properly together, so that they serve the purposes of the whole (Langlois, 1982:582).

Being holistic also means approaching problems, ready to employ the systems language – for instance, looking at organisations, their parts, and their environments, as systems, sub-systems and supra-systems (Jackson, 2003:582).

4.2.3 Goal seeking

Systemic interaction must result in some goal or final state to be reached, or some equilibrium point being approached. Jackson (2003:25) postulates that a goal-seeking category ranges from optimising approaches, single-mindedly

concerned with reaching predefined goals, to approaches where much more attention is given to capacity building in those areas of organisational behaviour and design perceived as necessary if viability is to be ensured; and so, goal seeking is made possible.

A causal system is an instance of what one might call a “mechanical” structure. The movements of the parts are causally related to one another within the dictates of a fixed structure (Langlois, 1982:596). On the other hand, Langlois (1982:596) pronounces that a goal-directed system, which is also known as a cybernetic system, has a fixed structure, but points out that the system has variables which can be manipulated, and that can also be altered by information generated within the system itself. He further reasons that the system possesses a goal, and, by means of an information feedback loop, it is able to compare its situation with that goal, and make appropriate adjustments towards it.

The success of the goal-seeking category can, in terms of Jackson (2003:25), be measured by efficiency and efficacy:

- **Efficiency:** The minimum resources used in goal seeking
- **Efficacy:** The means employed to enable one to realise one's goals

4.2.4 Transformation process

According to Murzek and Kramler (2004:3), the transformation process definition describes the process itself. It provides header-information for the transformation process, e.g. the name of the process, description, author, etc. A process definition consists of transformation flow objects.

The flow object sub-transform represents the invocation of a transformation sub-process. Beside its attribute name, it also has a relation “refer to”, which points to the sub-process. It is used to structure the whole transformation process in logical parts (Murzek & Kramler, 2004:4).

4.2.5 Inputs and outputs

In a closed system, the inputs are determined once and for all; in an open system, additional inputs are admitted from its environment. According to Jackson

(2003:6), an open system, such as an organism, has to interact for open system existence, and adapt in reaction to changes in the environment. Open systems take inputs from their environments, transform them, and then return them as some sort of product back to the environment. Roelofse (2007:59) becomes more specific, by indicating that inputs are material and information processed through command structures in operational and support outputs, to prevent crime and maintain social stability. He further “schematically” describes the above as follows:

Figure 4.1: Illustration of a general systems theory
(**Source:** Skyttner, 1996:20)

The researcher agrees with Roelofse (above), and as such he favours intelligence-driven investigations (input) in resolving of vehicle theft (output). The model will be described in more detail in a later chapter.

4.2.6 Entropy

This is the amount of disorder or randomness present in any system. When this permanent stage is reached, and no events occur, maximum entropy is attained. All systems tend to "run down," and to progress to a stage of reduced coherence, and, eventually, a completely random order (Tamas, 2000:1).

4.2.7 Regulation

The interrelated objects constituting the system must be regulated in some fashion, so that its goals can be realised.

4.2.8 Hierarchy

Systems are generally complex wholes made up of smaller sub-systems. This nesting of systems within other systems is what is implied by 'hierarchy'.

4.2.9 Differentiation

In complex systems, specialised units perform specialised functions. This is a characteristic of all complex systems, and may also be called specialisation or division of labour.

4.2.10 Equifinality and multifinality

A profound difference between most inanimate and living systems can be expressed by the concept of equifinality. In most physical systems, the final state is determined by the initial conditions. Open systems have equally valid alternative ways of attaining the same objectives (divergence) or, from a given initial state, obtain different and mutually exclusive objectives (convergence). In the SAPS the interconnectedness of intelligence with investigations and reliance on specialised units fit well into the theory. Furthermore the interaction of SAPS and its sub units with the external environment is a further indicator of the relevance of the systems theory.

According to Jackson (2003:6), the system (see Figure 4.2, below) is a complex whole, the functioning of which depends on its parts and the interactions between those parts. There can be smaller systems or sub-systems within other, larger systems; a clear example of this would be a single household in a village (Tamas, 2000:1). Roelofse (2007:58) posits that the system has a preferred state. He further points out that in the case of the police; the preferred state is social order. The parts of the system may, in turn, be systems themselves. Laszlo and Krippner (1998:7) correctly views the advantage of the systems theory as having a potential to provide a trans-disciplinary framework for critical and normative exploration of the relationship between one's perceptions and conceptions and the worlds they purport to represent. The authors further add that studies of cognitive development and human perception are beginning to rely more and more on the systems approach.

According to Patton and MacMahon (2006:6), the systems theory emphasises interconnectedness and the importance of the whole rather than the parts. Thus, an individual cannot be separated from their context, and behaviour cannot be accounted for in a linear way.



Figure 4.2: The police organisation as an open social system
(**Source:** Whisenand, 1976:110)

Laszlo and Krippner (1998:13) contend that observers in the context of systems science have a clear conception of their mission as an integral part the social system with which they work. In performing a systems analysis of a problem or situation, they start from the problem, not from a preconceived model. Once the manifestation of the problem has been identified and described, they can proceed inwards to the sub-systems, and outwards to the environment (Laszlo & Krippner, 1998:13). In this study, the problem is organised vehicle theft, and, to that effect, the researcher favours intelligence-driven investigations.

4.3 SYSTEMS ENVIRONMENT

According to Laszlo and Krippner (1998:13), in systems theory the term 'environment' is defined as the set of all objects, a change in whose attributes affects the system, as well as those objects whose attributes are changed by the behaviour of the system. The environment affects the system's inputs, which, in turn, affects the behaviour of the system in a strictly pre-programmed fashion (Langlois, 1982:587). Roelofse (2007:62) states that the environment within which the system operates is so complex, that the system as a whole may not be able to cope with these complexities in order to reach its preferred state. He further outlines that the system therefore subdivides itself into sub-systems that specialise in dealing with various variables emanating from the environment.

Roelofse (2007) outlines the most prominent sub-systems as follows:

4 Commercial – concerning itself primarily with procurement of equipment, uniforms, stores, etc.

5 Technical – its primary function being the procurement, operation and maintenance of computers, vehicles, weapons, etc.

6 Operational – functional police work such as patrolling, investigation of crime, etc.

7 Personnel – interacting primarily with the socio-cultural and psychographic systems, and being involved in recruitment, development, remuneration, manpower care, etc.

8 Controller – or management information system, concentrating on information flow within the firm; also interacting with the politico-legal system.

9 Support – may include laboratories, research personnel, etc.

4.4 THE SYSTEMS APPROACH AS ANALYTICAL TOOL

Roelofse (2007:60) describes the system approach as an analytical tool, and he also identifies the procedure that should be followed to analyse a system as follows:

4.4.1 Define a conceptual boundary

The boundary of the system is defined to reduce the scope of the problem, and to ensure that the correct focus is attained in the analysis. The definition of the boundary is discretionary. If it is defined too broadly, the analysis will become too cumbersome to handle. On the other hand, if it is defined too narrowly, it will result in a localised and ineffective analysis.

Roelofse (2007:60) cites that the definition of the boundary is often guided by the scope of the problem. He further exemplifies in this way: "*NASA will define its physical boundaries somewhere in outer space, and a cafe owner in a small town could include the wholesaler, baker and fresh produce supplier as part of his boundary*".

4.4.2 Identify the parts of the system

The parts of the system inside the boundary must now be identified. The parts of the system are entities or elements of the system, and their definition depends on the level of detail required for the analysis (Roelofse, 2007:60).

Taking the human being as an example, one can define the human being as a system. One can define its boundaries within the framework of its economic and social responsibilities, or only in the family environment. In turn, one can define the digestive or nervous system. Similarly, one can identify divisions, departments, sections, etc.

4.4.3 Identify the parts of the environment

It is seldom sufficient to treat the environment as an undifferentiated amorphous entity with which the system interacts.

Generally, certain parts of the system will have more specific interactions with specific parts of the environment, than with others. Whenever this occurs, it may make the analysis more realistic to consider such an external part as a subsystem in the environment.

4.4.4 Determine the interaction between the parts of the system, themselves, and between parts of the system and the environment

The interaction between the parts of the system, themselves, and the environment, can be identified in terms of flow of goods, materials, men, machines, information, communication, etc.

The researcher favours application of the systems theory in the combating of organised vehicle theft crime. Within the context of systems, raw data will be collected by the police officials from the crime environment (input environment), in line with intelligence cycle requirements, collect, evaluate and analyse (processes), and out of the processing, there will be intelligence (output environment) which will be used, among others, to arrest organised crime groups, prevent further crime from happening through patrols, development of short and long term strategy, etc.

Systems typically have inputs, process and output components. Contextualised within law enforcement and organised crime, the police and organised crime groups are opposed entities in battle for information and ultimately intelligence on which they develop short, medium and long term strategies.



Figure 4.3: Dual organised crime strategies



Figure 4.4: Systems theory in strategy development

The researcher considers the Joint Intelligence Forum as a structure vital for information processing (collection and analysis) aimed at intelligence sharing. Information which is collected is then analysed for the development of intelligence strategy. The strategy is then reviewed periodically as a way of closing new gaps emanating from counter-strategy by the Organised Motor Vehicle Theft Syndicates (OMVTS). As could be seen from the above model, OMVTS also recruit the lower-ranking police officers who are stationed in various operational areas such as ports of entry, vehicle registration offices, and vehicle investigation services/units.

4.5 SUMMARY

For the police to solve crimes effectively, considering that they are in the business of combating crime, the employment of the systems theory becomes pertinent, since it allows them to concentrate on *input* (collection of raw information from the community), *process* (processing of raw information) and *output* (actual reduction of crime through intelligence driven investigations and crime prevention). The following chapter will focus on research theories which guided the whole study.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Method, along with a thesis statement, is vital to the success of a dissertation. It must be because a result can only be accepted, rejected, checked, replicated, or even understood, in the context of how the researcher got there (Hofstee, 2011:107). Considering that the previous chapter outlined national and international literature, the reviewing of literature was conducted within the context of concepts which guided the whole study, addressing the research methodology aspects, with specific reference to the following:

- Research design and approach
- Target population
- Sampling

The chapter gives a detailed description of the data collection and analysis process. The reliability and validity of the study, insofar as population, sample procedures, collected data, and analysis processes, are concerned, will again be discussed.

5.2 DEFINITION OF RESEARCH

According to Welman and Kruger (2002:2), research involves the application of various methods and techniques, in order to create scientifically obtained knowledge by using objective methods and procedures. Research can also be defined as a "*systematic process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting information in order to increase our understanding on the phenomenon about which we are interested or concerned*" (Leedy & Omrod, 2005:2).

5.3 METHODOLOGY

With regard to methodology, the following is addressed in this chapter: research design and approach, target population, sampling, data collection, data analysis, and the reliability and validity of the study.

5.3.1 Research design

The researcher employed an empirical research design, as he was concerned with exploring the value of intelligence-driven investigation in combating vehicle theft. Empirical research design is about factual discoveries, or confirmation of existence of previously hypothesised phenomena. The rationale of using this design was for the researcher to obtain factual information from the participants by having face-to-face interviews with them (Mouton, 2001:13). According to Denscombe (2002:6), this involves the idea of getting out of the office and purposefully seeking the necessary information in the field. The researcher also studied motor vehicle theft case dockets, and reviewed literature dealing with the topic (Mouton, 2001:13).

5.3.2 Research approach

The researcher employed a triangulation approach, which is evaluative in nature. The reason for choosing this approach was because the problem under investigation was practical. The researcher wanted to ask the participants various questions, and analyse case dockets, with the aim of exploring the application and value of intelligence-driven investigation. According to Todd (1979:1), there is a distinct tradition in the literature on social science research methods that advocates the use of multiple methods. These various notions share the concept that qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than rival camps. He further underscores the desirability of mixing methods, given the strengths and weaknesses found in single method designs. In Olsen's view (2004:3), triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods, so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints can cast light upon a topic. He is further highlights that the mixing of data types, also known as triangulation, is often thought to help in validating the claims that might arise from an initial pilot study. To support the triangulation approach, the researcher interviewed the sample using semi-structured questions, and also analysed vehicle theft case dockets (Mouton, 2001:13).

5.3.3 Target population

Welman and Kruger (2002:119) indicate that the target population is the population to which the researcher would ideally like to generalise results. The researcher did not have the means to study South Africa as a whole, so the Thohoyandou cluster was specifically selected for a number of reasons: firstly, the cluster shares borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and many stolen vehicles are taken across the borders of these two countries; secondly, the researcher focused on the Thohoyandou cluster because he resides there, and it was also economically viable, as he was not being sponsored by anyone to conduct the research.

Thohoyandou cluster is located in Vhembe district in the province of Limpopo. In addition, within Thohoyandou cluster, one finds the SAPS Vehicle Investigation Section (VIS) known as Thohoyandou VIS, the SAPS Crime Intelligence Services, as well as eight police stations, namely Thohoyandou, Vuwani, Levubu, Siloam, Saselamani, Tshaulu, Mutale and Makua. This means that data could be collected from a number of role players involved in motor vehicle theft investigation, within a reasonably small geographic area, yet having all the necessary components one would, for instance, find at provincial level. The first three entities are the only ones in the cluster, so they were all included in the study. Participants from each entity were included in the study.

In simple random sampling, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2001:201), each member of the population has the same chance of being chosen. The researcher wrote the names of all eight police stations on pieces of paper, then separated each of the eight names using name tags, put them in a small container, closed his eyes, shook the container, and randomly chose three name tags. Each time a number was drawn, it was put back into the container, so that the total probability always remained at 0,125 (one out of eight possible outcomes for being selected). When a number was drawn for a second time, the process was simply repeated until the following three stations were selected: Thohoyandou, Vuwani and Saselamani. The researcher opted to include the Beit Bridge land border control point in this study. He considered that within Thohoyandou

cluster there is no land border (port of entry); however, within the Vhembe district there is the Beit Bridge land border.

5.3.4 Sampling

The participants consisted of police investigators, VIS detectives, the Intelligence commander, the Customs manager, and the Border Police manager. The reason for choosing the above sample was because all were, in one way or another, involved in the control of motor vehicle theft. The researcher used various sampling methods in selecting participants.

5.3.4.1 Police investigators

As a way of ensuring representation of Thohoyandou, Vuwani and Saselamani police stations, the researcher selected 25% police investigators from each station, and employed systematic probability sampling. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:199), in systematic probability sampling, the researcher can specify in advance that each segment of the population is represented in the sample. They again indicate that systematic sampling involves selecting individuals (or perhaps clusters) according to a predetermined sequence. The researcher did not consider heterogeneous elements such as gender and race: all the police investigators were given an equal chance of being selected as participants (Welman & Kruger, 2001:60).

Thohoyandou police station has 48 police investigators, while Vuwani and Saselamani have 22 each. The researcher compiled three alphabetical name lists of police investigators from the aforementioned police stations. The researcher wanted to draw a sample of 12 police investigators from Thohoyandou; he divided 48 by 4 and obtained a sampling interval of 4. The numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 were written on the paper, cut into four pieces in accordance with the four numbers, and placed in the container. The researcher drew one number to get the starting point on the list, and drew number 1. Every fourth investigator was then selected.

The researcher wanted to draw a sample of five (5) police investigators from Vuwani police station, which had 22 police investigators, so he divided 22 by 4, obtaining a sampling interval of 5. He then wrote the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

on the piece of paper, cut four pieces in accordance with the five numbers, put them in the container, drew one number to get the starting point on the list, and drew number 3. Thus, the numbers do not matter in the end. The same procedure was applied for Saselamani police station, in order to draw five (5) participants.

The total number of police investigators selected was 22, and they are referred to, in this study, as participants 1 to 22.

5.3.4.2 VIS detectives

Thohoyandou cluster has one VIS, with only ten (10) detectives, and, as such, the researcher decided to include all of them in the sample. The VIS detectives were referred to as participants 23 to 32.

5.3.4.3 Intelligence commander

Silverman (2000:104) states that sampling allows the researcher to choose the case because it illustrates some features, or process, in which he is interested. The researcher included the commander of Thohoyandou Crime Intelligence Branch. He used purposive sampling to select the Intelligence commander. The reason for including the branch commander only, is because intelligence collectors are not readily available due to the nature of their duties which require them to be covert. In this study, the Intelligence commander was referred to as participant 33.

5.3.4.4 Border police commander

The researcher included one border police commander (Beit Bridge) in this study. This is an official who commands, manages and supervises Border Police officials practising policing at the border. Before a motor vehicle exits or enters the country, Border Police officials ensure that all its documentation is verified, for validation purposes. The researcher decided to include the Border Police commander from Beit Bridge border gate. The Border Police commander is referred to as Participant 34.

5.3.4.5 Case docket analysis

A sample was chosen by simple random selection, whereby every member of the population had an equal chance of being selected (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001:201). The researcher decided to work on 30 motor vehicle theft case dockets: ten (10) from each police station. In the sample, 50 motor vehicle theft case dockets from each police station, dating backwards from 19 July 2012, were selected. The researcher took the sample of 50 case dockets from Thohoyandou, starting from 19 July 2012, backwards to 14 February 2008. In addition, he took 50 case dockets from Vuwani, starting from 19 July 2012 backwards to 20 May 2005, and also 50 case dockets from Saselamani, starting from 19 July 2012 backwards to 16 June 2005. Out of each 50 dockets he listed Crime Administration System (CAS) numbers on the paper, then split them per CAS number, putting each fifty CAS numbers in a small container (three different containers), and employing simple random sampling to select ten (10) from each container.

It appeared that Thohoyandou police station generated the most case dockets, followed by Vuwani and Saselamani, respectively. The researcher noted that Thohoyandou police station had generated more case dockets within a short period, and that it had more police investigators, when compared with Vuwani and Saselamani stations which generated far fewer case dockets, and also fewer police investigators.

5.3.5 Data collection

In this study, the triangulation process in data collection was used. Powell and Connaway (2004:124) contend that triangulation is the use of a variety of methods and techniques for data collection in a single study. The researcher therefore employed multiple sources of data collection, notably from literature, case dockets and participant interviews, in order to answer the research questions.

Leedy and Ormrod (2005:99) state that multiple sources of data are collected with the hope that they will all converge to answer a specific research question. They further reflect that this approach is especially common in qualitative research; for example, a researcher might engage in many informal observations

in the field, conduct in-depth interviews, and then look for common themes that appear in the data, gleaned from both methods.

5.3.5.1 Literature review

According to Goddard and Melville (2001:19), a literature study allows the researcher to get the feeling for the topic and issues involved, and understand how the proposed research would fit into them. The researcher reviewed both national and international literature, in order to address the objectives of the study. The researcher used the research objectives as a guide to collect information from literature.

5.3.5.2 Interviews

In this study, data has been collected by means of semi-structured interviews. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001:184), in a semi-structured interview the researcher may follow the standard questions, with one or more individually tailored questions, to obtain clarification or probe a person's reasoning. They further reflect that in a qualitative study an interview tends to be informal and friendly, and participants may feel as if they are simply engaging in a friendly chat with the researcher. It also enables the researcher to probe issues by asking more questions, in order to delve deeper into an issue.

The researcher created one interview schedule emanating from the research objectives. The researcher conducted face-to-face interviews with the participants, taking notes during the interviews. He posed the same set of questions to the police investigators from the three police stations and the VIS investigators (participants 1 to 32), the Intelligence commander (participant 43) and the Border Police commander (participant 44). They were also asked questions emanating from the aforesaid interview schedules.

The researcher sent interview schedules to his promoter and his editor, to check whether it was understandable and clear. The first interview schedule was first handed out to ten (10) police investigators, five (5) VIS investigators, one (1) intelligence commander, one (1) Border Police commander and one (1) customs commander. The researcher then rectified questions where it appeared that the pilot study did not understand such questions. In the pilot study, the researcher

used VIS investigators from outside the cluster, due to the shortage within the cluster. Interviews were conducted with each individual in turn, in order to avoid participants influencing each other.

In this study, the researcher followed the suggestions for conducting a productive interview, as proposed by Leedy and Ormrod (2005:147):

- Identify some questions in advance: The researcher had a set of questions in the form of an interview schedule. The questions were related to the research problem, and were based on the research questions.

- Make sure the interviews are representative of the group: The researcher justified his sample by using the simple random sampling technique to choose his participants. In a random sample, each person in the universe has an equal probability of being chosen as a participant, and each collection of persons of the same size has an equal probability of becoming the actual participant, as long as they are all members of the same universe. The researcher conducted random sampling, after an adequate sampling frame was constructed. He selected persons without showing bias for any personal characteristics (Bailey, 1987:87).

- Find a suitable location: All participants were interviewed in quiet offices conducive to interviewing, and as such, the researcher used offices made available by the SAPS.

- Obtain permission: The researcher requested permission from the Office of the SAPS National Commissioner, and thereafter followed suit with each respective police station, as well as the VIS. He also requested permission from each respective sample participant, police investigator, VIS investigator, intelligence commander, as well as the Border Police commander (see appendices).

- Establish and maintain interest: During the interviews the researcher showed genuine interest in what the participants were revealing, in order to encourage them to “open up”.

- Focus on the actual, rather than on the abstract or hypothetical: The researcher posed questions which were practical, linking and engaging the participants in a real situation – for example, “How can offender profiling assist you in your investigation of motor vehicle theft?” This kind of question helped to determine whether or not the participants understood the importance of offender profiling in motor vehicle theft investigation.

- Avoiding putting words in people’s mouths: The researcher gave the participants the chance to express their understanding, without interruption. This was exercised by applying listening skills, in order to allow the flow of information.

- Record responses verbatim: The researcher used shorthand to capture everything the participants revealed.

- Keeping your reactions to yourself: The researcher did not show any surprise at, or disapproval of, anything mentioned by participants.

- Remember that you are not necessarily getting the facts: Regardless of how experienced, educated, confident and convincing some of the participants were, the researcher always treated their responses as perceptions, not facts.

5.3.5.3 Case docket analysis

Welman and Kruger (2002:182) state that the term 'case docket analysis means that a limited number of units of analysis, such as individuals, groups or institutions, are studied intensively. 'Case study' does not refer to some or other technique that is applied. They again allude to that uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of a particular case studied in all its complexity. In combination with the literature review and interviews, the researcher conducted case docket analysis of motor vehicle theft from Thohoyandou, Vuwani and Saselamani police stations. In collecting data from case dockets, the researcher was guided by the following structured questions:

- Did the case docket indicate the day of the week in which a vehicle was stolen?
- Did the case docket indicate the race and gender of the victims?
- Did the case docket indicate the type of instrument used to steal the vehicle?
- Did the case docket indicate from which policing precinct the vehicle was stolen?
- Did the case docket indicate whether the stolen vehicle was insured?
- Did the case docket indicate whether the stolen vehicle was fitted with a tracker system?
- Did the case docket describe the type of stolen vehicle?
- Did the case docket indicate the value of the stolen vehicle?
- Did the case docket indicate the age of the vehicle stolen?
- Did the case docket indicate whether there are any witnesses?
- Did the case docket indicate whether the stolen vehicle has been circulated?
- Did the case docket indicate whether informants were tasked?
- Did the case docket indicate whether agents were tasked?
- Did the case docket indicate an arrest and/or possible prosecution suspect(s)?
- Did the case docket indicate the court outcome?

The researcher understands that if an intelligence-driven investigation is employed, it could be of value in the combating of organised motor vehicle theft. By conducting case docket analysis, the researcher wanted to establish the value of intelligence-driven investigation in identifying suspects, exhibits and any other information which can assist in the investigation of organised motor vehicle theft.

5.3.5.4 Experience

The researcher was employed by the SAPS from 2000 to 2010. From 2002 to 2004 he worked in the Detective Branch, Tzaneen, as a police investigator, during which time he also investigated motor vehicle theft cases. From 2004 to 2009, he was stationed at Limpopo Provincial Training Section (Mopani district), and was charged with the responsibility of presenting courses to police investigators. Among other courses, the researcher presented a course on investigation

of crime – which also includes motor vehicle theft. From 2009 to 2010 he worked at the Giyani Crime Intelligence Service as a crime intelligence collector. From January to September, 2011, the researcher worked as an Investigation of Crime lecturer at the Vaal University of Technology (VUT). He also worked at the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Currently, he is the Chief Risk Officer in the Limpopo Department of Health.

During his time as a police investigator, presenter (facilitator) of courses, crime intelligence collector, and lecturer in Investigation of Crime, the researcher gathered knowledge and understanding of motor vehicle theft investigation as well as intelligence-driven investigation.

The researcher attended the Detectives Learning Programme (DLP) at Hammanskraal SAPS Detectives' College, and also holds a Master of Technology degree in Forensic investigation from the University of South Africa, and he assisted with developing two curricula at degree level, namely BA Police Science and BA Criminalistics, at VUT.

5.3.6 Data analysis

The researcher used “spiral analysis” as a method of data analysis. Leedy and Ormrod (2005:150), quoting Creswell (1998), describes spiral analysis steps, which are crucial in analysing data. The researcher applied these steps in analysing this data.

- The researcher organised data, which he obtained in the form of literature, interviews, case docket analysis, and experience, and he broke down large bodies of text into smaller units in the form of sentences and individual words. The researcher worked through all the data to decide which one is relevant for this study.

- He perused the entire data set several times to get a sense of what it contained as a whole. The researcher also critically evaluated the entire set of data, in order to establish both relevancy and irrelevancy.

- He identified and argued general themes and sub-themes, and then classified each piece of data accordingly. This allowed him to get a general sense of patterns – a sense of what the data meant.

- He finally integrated and summarised the data. This step included offering hypotheses that described relationships among the themes. He broke down specific data into themes, in order to answer the research questions under discussion, in each chapter.

5.3.7 Reliability and trustworthiness

Given that the study employed triangulation reliability and (quantitative data) and trustworthiness (qualitative data) apply. The following section addresses the reliability and validity of this study.

5.3.7.1 Method taken to ensure reliability

Reliability is concerned with the question of stability and consistency. Do repeated applications of the operational definition under similar conditions yield consistent results (Singleton & Straits, 1999:114)?. Will the same methods used by different researchers, and/or at different times, produce the same results? This is the requirement: that the application of a valid measuring instrument to different groups, under different sets of circumstances, should lead to the same observation (Mouton & Marais, 1990:79).

The researcher used reliable sampling techniques in obtaining participants and case dockets, to ensure reliability. He undertook to ensure that the data collected was analysed accordingly, as reflected above. The researcher also described the Thohoyandou cluster as his target population. He again applied the simple random sampling technique, in obtaining the three police stations as samples.

All participants are familiar with the concepts of “intelligence-driven investigation” and “motor vehicle theft”. The researcher asked all of them valid questions, and he avoided ambiguous or vague wording, to ensure that participants would “read” the questions consistently on different occasions (Greenfield, 2002:174). He perused case dockets which were filed in archives, and included the dockets

which were undetected, as well as those which concluded with “guilty” or “not guilty”.

5.3.7.2 Methods taken to ensure validity

According to Leedy and Ormrod (2005:28), the validity of the measuring instrument is the extent to which the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure.

A researcher thinks about how to demonstrate the validity of his method and analysis in at least two ways (Mason, 1996:147–148):

- **Validity of data generation methods**

  This involves asking what it is that the researcher thinks his data source and generation methods could potentially tell him, and how well they can do this. Broadly, he asks how well matched the logic of the method is to the kind of research questions he is asking, and the kind of social explanation he intends to develop. In ensuring validity of the sampling, the researcher employed simple random sampling, in order to have all segments of the population represented in the sample.

  The researcher sought the opinion of police investigators, VIS investigators, the Intelligence commander and the Border Police commander, who were asked the same questions based on the one interview schedule. He reviewed national and international literature limited to the research questions, in order to explore the field, and also drew valid motor vehicle theft case dockets from the aforementioned police stations.

- **Validity of interpretation**

  This involves asking how valid data analysis is, and the interpretation on which it is based (Mason, 1996:148–149). Validity of interpretation in any form of qualitative research is contingent upon the end product, including a demonstration of how that interpretation was reached. The researcher wanted to understand what his data could reveal, and also how well it could do so. He broke up the data into manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships.

The researcher wanted to understand the various constitutive elements of the data through an inspection of the relationships between concepts and constructs, and to see whether there were any patterns or trends that could be identified or isolated, or to establish themes in the data (Mouton, 2001: 108).

5.3.7.3 Ensuring trustworthiness

To ensure trustworthiness, the researcher used three criteria adopted by Guba and Lincoln (1981:14), namely credibility, dependability and conformability.

Credibility was ensured by means of professional conduct during the research, and engaging in a respectful manner with participants, to allow them to express the lived truth of their work. The results should be trustworthy for the participants, by applying sound methods, and ensuring accuracy, so that they will find the results credible. Dependability was ensured through theoretical conceptualisations and the foundation of the study (from the selected theories), and cross-referencing to the literature. Trustworthiness was further enhanced by checking and rechecking the data collected, to verify that the data had been accurately captured.

5.3.8 Ethical considerations

Leedy and Ormrod (2005:101–102) reflect that ethical issues in research need to be adhered to. The focus of this study was on the following categories, as outlined by these authors:

- The researcher asked for permission from the SAPS to interview the police investigators, VIS detectives, intelligence commander and Border Police commander (hereafter referred to as the participants) (Annexure B).

- The researcher ensured that the research participants were not exposed to physical or psychological harm, and they were not subjected to unusual stress, embarrassment or loss of self-esteem.

- The participants in this study were told the nature of the study to be conducted, and given the choice of either participating or not participating. Again,

they were told that if they agreed to participate, they had the right to withdraw from the study at any time.

- In reinforcing the right to privacy, the researcher informed all the participants that the information they gave would be kept available for use by interested parties. However, he also mentioned that their names would not be revealed. The researcher referred to all those who participated in this study as participants 1 to 32. The justification of privacy is, inter alia, to let the participants open up, without any reservations in answering.

- The researcher reported his findings in a complete and honest manner, without distortion of the truth or misrepresentation thereof. He did not fabricate data to support his conclusions, and he acknowledged all his sources, to avoid plagiarism and documentary theft.

- Leedy and Ormrod (2005:102) take it further by saying that in the United States, any college, university or research institution has an internal review board (IRB) which scrutinises all proposals for conducting human research under the auspices of the institution. This board, which is made up of scholars and researchers across a broad range of disciplines, checks proposed research studies, to ensure that the procedures are not unduly harmful to participants, that appropriate procedures are followed to obtain participants' informed consent, and that participants' privacy and anonymity are assured. The researcher submitted his research proposal to the Turfloop Research Ethics Committee (TREC), and the proposal was scrutinised by committee members, who also issued an Ethical Clearance (Annexure D).

5.4 SUMMARY

This chapter focused on describing the research methodology employed in the study. The concept 'research' was defined, and, under the research methodology context, the researcher addressed the research design, and the approach. The discussion included a description of the target population, the sampling technique, the data collection and the analysis methods. Lastly, reliability and validity, as well as the ethical considerations of the study, were described.

The following chapter describes the process undertaken in conducting the research, and the key areas to be addressed will be the results of the semi-structured interviews, and the case dockets analysed; furthermore, the chapter will describe how the data was analysed. Lastly, the chapter discusses and interprets the research findings emanating from international and national literature, the semi-structured interviews, and also the case dockets.

CHAPTER 6

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter addressed the research methodology applied in the study. The specific aspects covered were the target population, sampling, data collection and data analysis.

This chapter presents the data collected from the police investigators and VIS detectives, and both the CIS and Border Police commanders. Twenty-two (22) police investigators from the Vuwani, Saselamani and Thohoyandou police stations, and the two Border Police and CIS commanders from Beitbridge land border and Thohoyandou cluster, respectively, were interviewed. The researcher also interviewed ten (10) VIS detectives from Thohoyandou cluster.

6.2 BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

The crux of this discussion is to present the biographical and background information of the participants. The focus of this sub-heading is on their organisation/section, their rank or position, the responsibilities in their current employment, establishing whether they attended any intelligence courses/seminars related to crime investigation, and also their academic qualifications. The above information is vital for indicating aspects which could influence their capabilities to discharge their duties.

6.2.1 Rank/position composition in the organisation

The results, in terms of police officials'/officers' ranks are presented in table form, as follows:

Table 6.1: Results of police officials'/officers' ranks

RANK	VIS DETECTIVES	BORDER POLICE COMMANDER	CIS COMMANDER	POLICE INVESTIGATOR	TOTAL PER RANK
Colonel	None	01	None	None	**01**
LT Colonel	None	None	01	None	**01**
Major	None	None	None	None	**None**
Captain	01	None	None	01	**02**
LT	01	None	None	01	**02**
Warrant Officer	08	None	None	17	**25**
Sergeant	None	None	None	03	**03**
Constable	None	None	None	None	**None**
TOTAL	**10**	**01**	**01**	**22**	**34**

When comparing the number of participants, in terms of rank, the researcher noted that there was one (1) colonel, one (1) lieutenant-colonel, two (2) captains and 25 warrant officers. Only three sergeants were part of the sample, whereas constables were not represented at all. The rank distribution is entirely due to the deployment of staff by SAPS to these units.

6.2.1.1 Current deployment of participants



Figure 6.1: Current deployment of participants

6.2.1.2 Responsibility of participants

The participants were questioned on their responsibilities within the units in which they serve:

- All twenty-two (22) police investigators stated that they are responsible for investigating various criminal activities, and only conduct preliminary investigations on vehicle theft cases. After the reporting of a vehicle theft case, they conduct preliminary investigations, and then the docket is handed over to VIS. Three participants also indicated that one of their respective key performance areas (KPA) is to conduct supervision of case dockets which are investigated by other police investigators.

- All ten (10) VIS detectives indicated that they are responsible for investigating vehicle theft.

- The CIS Commander stated that his responsibility is to manage the Crime Intelligence Services (CIS) in the Thohoyandou cluster. He further indicated that the CIS has two core components, namely the Crime Analysis Section and the Collection Section.

- The researcher also interviewed the Border Police Commander, who indicated that her responsibility is to manage the police officials, and ensure that they discharge their constitutional responsibilities in terms of section 205 of the Constitution. Her area of focus, as she explained further, is to ensure that the land border is safe, and that criminals entering and exiting the country are legally dealt with, after being identified. She added that all properties entering and exiting the country should be checked – and this includes vehicles (see Chapter 1).



Figure 6.2: Number of police investigators per police station

The researcher checked the responsibilities of the participants, and he established that out of 34 participants, there are 22 police investigators responsible for conducting investigation of cases. He learned that when it comes to the investigation of vehicle theft cases, the police investigators in question do preliminary investigations, since there is a Vehicle Investigation Services (VIS) responsible for vehicle theft investigation.

Deductions

It was established that ten (10) VIS detectives receive case dockets from the police investigators, and conduct further investigations. The CIS Commander ensures that the collected information is analysed; however, it is not clear whether he is responsible for effective dissemination of information. No respondent indicated that they are responsible for collecting information for processing, and also did not indicate that they share information among each other, or within the unit, or among units. This is an obvious problem in the investigation process as, for instance, pointed out in the literature review, Phillips and Demurjian (2002:93), that information has integrity if it is consistent, accurate and reliable. The Border Police commander is responsible for managing the police officials, and ensuring that they work according to the stipulations of the Constitution. From the above discussions, there is a clear indication that the

police investigators and VIS detectives work hand in hand, but, generally, there is no indication that the responsibilities of the police officials are linked, in so far as sharing of intelligence information is concerned.

6.2.2 Experience of participants in terms of number of years in current employment



Figure 6.3: Number of years' experience of participants

- Five (5) police investigators have between five (5) and 10 years' experience in the investigation of case dockets.
- Nine (9) police investigators have between ten (10) and 15 years' experience in the investigation of crime.
- Six (6) police investigators have between 15 and 20 years' experience of crime investigation.
- Two (2) police investigators and the CIS commander have between 20 and 25 years' experience in the investigation of crime.
- One (1) Border Police commander and the CIS commander have between 25 and 30 years' experience as a police commander at a border.

Deductions

According to the presented data, there is an indication that 15% of the participants have between one (1) and five (5) years' experience, whereas 26% of the participants have between five (5) and ten (10) years' experience. There is a

further indication that 18% of the participants have between ten (10) and 15 years' experience. The researcher also established that 6% participants have above 15 years of service. From the above data, it is clear that the participants have many years of experience. It is therefore surprising that in spite of this, vehicle theft crime remains very high and also undetected. This could be due to experience – which is not based on a strong theoretical foundation, the absence of skilled mentors, and a lack of quality training, which undermines the achievement of the police mandate. This mandate, in terms of section 205 of the Constitution, includes, among others, the prevention and investigation of crime.

6.2.3 Academic qualifications

Table 6.2: Qualifications of the sample per specialisation or section

Qualifications	VIS detectives	Border police commander	CIS commander	Police investigator	Total per qualification
Matric	08	None	None	18	**26**
Three-diploma/ degree	02	None	None	03	**05**
Four-year degree	None	01	01	01	**03**
Total	**10**	**01**	**01**	**22**	**34**

According to the presented data –

- 76% of the participants' highest qualifications are Standard 10 (or Matric).
- 15% of the participants have at least a three-year degree or diploma as their highest qualifications.
- 9% have a four-year degree recorded as their highest qualifications.
- There is no participant with a Master's degree or higher.

Deductions

Generally, there is a clear indication that all participants have passed Standard 10 or matric, and that only 24% have gone beyond Standard 10. This could mean that there is a dearth of tertiary education, which could lead to poor understanding of strategic plans of dealing with organised vehicle thefts.

6.2.4 Organisation/department

- All twenty-two (22) police investigators work for the SAPS CIS, and are divided among the three police stations as follows: twelve (12) are at Thohoyandou, five (5) at Vuwani, and five (5) at Saselamani.
- Ten (10) VIS detectives are employed by the SAPS and attached to Sibasa VIS unit.
- The CIS Commander works for the SAPS CIS.
- The Border Police Commander works under the Border Control Unit of the SAPS.



Figure 6.4: Institution or organisation in which the participants are employed

The researcher established that –

- 65% of the participants are police investigators attached the SAPS.
- 29% of the participants are VIS detectives attached to the SAPS-VIS.
- 3% apiece of the participants are with the Border Police and CIS, respectively.

Deductions

The above data is based on the purposive sample drawn for the study. The sample ensured participation of all units involved in the investigations of organised vehicle theft as well as the relevant commanders.

6.2.5 Courses attended in intelligence or related to crime investigation

The participants were asked whether they had attended courses in intelligence or related to crime investigation. They answered as follows:

- Twenty-two (22) police investigators maintained that they had not attended intelligence courses or seminars.
- Fourteen (14) of the above police investigators had attended a 3-month Detective Learning Programme.
- Two (2) of the above police investigators had attended a 2-week crime investigation course.
- Six (6) police investigators stated that they had not attended any crime investigation courses or programmes.
- The Border Police Commander had not attended any investigation or intelligence courses or seminars.
- The CIS Commander had attended a 2-week crime investigation course, a basic informant handlers' course, an intelligence course, and also an intelligence commander's course.

Deductions

In terms of data presented, only one (1) participant (3%) had attended an intelligence course, whereas 97% of the participants had not. 41% of the participants had attended a 3-month crime investigation course. The researcher observed that although the majority of participants had attended a crime investigation course which encompasses intelligence as a module, they had not attended a stand-alone intelligence course.

6.3 STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN

In the quest to determine the knowledge and understanding of the participants on the issues of a strategic intelligence plan, the researcher posed the following questions:

6.3.1 Is there a strategic intelligence plan for investigating motor vehicle theft at your unit/police station?

The researcher asked the sample this question: Is there a strategic intelligence plan for investigating motor vehicle theft at your unit/police station?

- Ten (10) police investigators and six VIS detectives commented that they do not have knowledge of a strategic intelligence plan. Participant number 1, 4, 5 and 7 indicated that they were never trained on intelligence matters.

- Twelve (12) police investigators and four (4) VIS detectives indicated that there is a strategic intelligence plan aimed at combating various criminal activities. Participants' number 2, 3, 8, and 17 indicated that even though they know that the strategic intelligence exists, they do not have full understanding since it was never communicated to them.

- Four (4) police investigators and three (3) VIS detectives further indicated that the reason why they are not familiar with the strategic intelligence plan, is because they are at operational level, and as such, they execute with operational plans.

- Two (2) police investigators and one (1) VIS detective further maintained that their commanders are the ones responsible for a strategic intelligence plan.

- The Border Police Commander argued that in terms of their strategic intelligence plan, each and every vehicle exiting or entering South Africa has to be checked. She further explained within tactical intelligence perspective in that the vehicle is checked physically (engine and chassis numbers), and circulated on the police system to check the ownership status against the driver. She further indicated that the authenticity of documents is also verified.

- The CIS Commander indicated that a cluster strategic intelligence plan is a plan which assists in the identification of threats, and that it is derived from a provincial strategic intelligence plan. This plan will normally indicate

measures to be taken to defuse a threat. The threat could be any criminal activities happening within the Thohoyandou cluster.

According to the Enterprise Foundation (1999:1), strategic ‘intelligence’ planning is essential in preparing to carry out the mission of the organisation. They further indicate that an effective strategic intelligence planning process provides a framework for making decisions on how to address challenges (organised vehicle theft), and take advantage of opportunities that arise along the way.

Deductions

When comparing the responses from the participants and the literature, it is clear that some participants (47%) do not understand the meaning of 'strategic intelligence plan'. Lack of a clear understanding of 'strategic intelligence plan' on the part of the participants, could undermine how they are expected to respond to the combating of crime. This is because to deal effectively with crime, one has to have higher-level planning (strategic intelligence plan), followed by lower-level planning (tactical intelligence plan). The above discussions also highlighted that the CIS and Border Police commanders know about a strategic intelligence plan, and this could mean that the VIS, police investigators and commanders also know about a plan, but that its content is not known on the ground. Further, this indicates that those at investigation level are not involved in compiling the plan. There is, indeed, a need for a strategic intelligence plan to be shared with all law enforcement officials. Their knowledge of the strategic intelligence plan can improve how they approach each and every case (input) they investigate, since they will be viewing it from a broader perspective (output).

6.3.2 What is the objective of a strategic intelligence plan?

The researcher asked the participants what the objective of a strategic intelligence plan is, and their responses were as follows:

- Ten (10) police investigators and six VIS detectives revealed that they do not know what the objective of a strategic intelligence plan is since they are involved in executing operational plans.

- Four (4) police investigators and three VIS detectives from the above participants further indicated that the reason they are not familiar with the strategic intelligence plan is because they are at operational level, and as such, they execute with operational plans. One police investigator (participant number 2), further indicated that although he was trained on basic intelligence management, the course did not cover strategic intelligence.

- Two (2) police investigators and one (1) VIS detective from the above participants further maintained that their commanders are the ones responsible for the strategic intelligence plan.

- The comment from twelve (12) police investigators, four (4) VIS detectives, the CIS Commander, and the Border Police Commander, was that the objective of a strategic intelligence plan is to indicate ways of combating various criminal activities.

- The Border Police Commander further opined that the strategic intelligence plan guides both the police management and officers at operational level, on a better way of combating crime.

- The CIS Commander commented that the cluster's strategic intelligence plan's objective is to assist in the identification of threats. The threat could be any criminal activities, organised or not organised, which are happening within the Thohoyandou cluster. The CIS Commander further illustrated that the strategic intelligence plan is used as a guide for the process which needs to achieve the results (crime reduction). This plan explains what each police unit (e.g. the crime prevention, crime investigation or crime intelligence) should do in the combating of, for instance, organised vehicle theft. The objective of this plan is, among others, to determine and clarify the roles and responsibilities of each section. The plan also indicated the target to be achieved within a particular period of time.

According to the SAPS 2010/14 strategic plan (SAPS, 2010b), there is a long-term need for capacitating crime intelligence as an approach of ensuring improved service delivery. The specifics are prioritised in the following:

- Improve skills of the personnel at all levels, as well as their retention
- Improve network collection by increasing ground coverage
- Utilise visible policing personnel for the gathering and provision of intelligence
- Increase support for collectors by enforcing more effective management of resources
- Improve targeted undercover operations through advanced covert methodology
- Focus on interaction with other role players – e.g. other departments, VIS unit and Border Police
- Improve intelligence database capabilities, as well as access to remote systems for the purpose of integrating information management

Deductions

The researcher compared the literature, and the participants' viewpoints, and established that there is a dearth of knowledge and understanding on the part of the participants in so far as the objective of a strategic intelligence plan is concerned. The SAPS 2010/14 strategic plan (SAPS, 2010b) clearly reveals that the objectives of a strategic plan are, among others, to ensure that the employees are well skilled, and that there is retention strategy, improved information sharing, and improved intelligence focusing on collection, analysis, data management, and also covert management. No participant referred, for instance, to data collection, analysis and management. No one indicated the need to share information in the course of planning and investigation. The difference between what the participants said and what was stated in the literature, suggests that they (participants) need to be trained in the issue of a strategic intelligence plan. This indicates that the national plan to strengthen intelligence has not filtered down to the units in the study area.

6.3.3 What is the difference between information and intelligence?

The following became evident from the responses of participants:

- The CIS Commander conceded that information is something in the public knowledge, whereas intelligence is the product of the intelligence cycle. He

added that the intelligence cycle starts from the identification of threats (based on information), collecting information, collating the information from various sources, and analysing the collated information to turn it into an intelligence product.

- The Border Police Commander indicated that information is unconfirmed data, whereas intelligence is analysed data.

- Five (5) VIS detectives and nine (9) police investigators indicated that information is just rumour, and two (2) of them reflected further that intelligence is evidence based.

- Six (6) VIS detectives and thirteen (13) police investigators did not know the difference between information and intelligence. Two police investigator (participant number 10) further alluded that the reason he does not know is because he was never trained on intelligence matters.

According to Lowenthal (2012:67), intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to criminal activities, are requested, collected, analysed, and provided to policy-makers. The researcher also learned that while some of the participants concur with the literature, the majority do not have knowledge thereof.

Deductions

It is disturbing to find that the majority of the participants fail to differentiate between information and intelligence. It is very possible that a police official, who does not know the difference, may end up affecting an arrest based on information, as opposed to on intelligence.

6.3.4 What is the difference between 'strategic intelligence plan' and 'tactical intelligence plan'?

The researcher asked the sample this question: What is the difference between 'strategic intelligence plan' and 'tactical intelligence plan'?

- Twelve (12) police investigators and six (6) VIS detectives indicated that their knowledge is that both strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence are aimed at the combating of crime, but how so? They do not know.

- Five (5) police investigators and three (3) VIS detectives indicated that strategic intelligence is concerned with high-level plans for combating crime, whereas a tactical intelligence plan deals with operational matters. Two (2) police investigators and one (1) VIS detective further commented that tactical intelligence will address issues such as the 'who, where, when, what, why and how' of the crime. This means, as one police investigator explains further, that tactical intelligence is concerned with an immediate solution to crime, since it addresses who the suspect is, why he committed the crime, what instrument was used to commit the crime, how the crime was committed, and so forth.

- The CIS Commander indicated that a strategic intelligence plan is a broader plan, which addresses the intended outcomes. The outcomes could be to reduce theft of vehicles by a particular percentage within a 2-year period. This plan will address the issues of staffing, training, and physical resources such as cars, buildings and finances. Tactical intelligence addresses specific activities to be carried out to ensure that the intended outcome is achieved. Practically, he further argued, the activities include arresting individual suspects, seizing vehicles, and taking these suspects to court (litigation process).

According to Santos (2009:346), strategic intelligence addresses crime analysis – which is the study of crime problems and other police-related issues, in order to determine long-term patterns of activity, as well as to evaluate police responses and organisational procedures. Tactical intelligence is information that contributes directly to the achievement of an immediate law enforcement objective (Becker, 2009:435).

Deductions

The researcher compared the reviewed literature and the participants' views on the difference between strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence, and estab-

lished that only two (2) participants could differentiate between the two types of intelligence. It is a worrisome situation if and when the participants, who, in terms of their KPAs, are expected to know and understand the difference between strategic and tactical intelligence, do not have a clue on this issue.

From the above, it is clear that strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence approaches are slightly different. Strategic intelligence is concerned with a long-term plan, whereas tactical intelligence focuses on short-term plans for combating crime. The researcher also learned that these approaches are also common, in that they are both concerned with crime problems, and the collection and analysis of information.

6.3.5 Who in the cluster is responsible for drafting the strategic intelligence plan?

The researcher asked the sample this question: Who in the cluster is responsible for drafting the strategic intelligence plan?

- Twelve (12) police investigators, six (6) VIS detectives, as well as the Border Police Commander, indicated that it is the responsibility of the CIS to draft the strategic intelligence plan.

- Ten (10) police investigators and four (4) VIS detectives stated that they do not have any knowledge as to who is responsible for drafting the strategic intelligence plan. Three (3) police investigators (participants number 11 and 16) and two (2) VIS detectives (participants number 24 and 27) further commented that they only know that their immediate commanders are responsible for drafting operational plans.

- One CIS commander indicated that it is the responsibility of his management team, including himself, to draw up a strategic intelligence plan. He further mentioned that out of the strategic intelligence plan, a cluster operational plan is drafted. A cluster operational plan assists in the identification of problematic areas where higher crime statistics are projected.

Deductions

When comparing the literature and the participants' responses, the researcher learned that the majority of the participants do not have knowledge on who is responsible for drafting a strategic intelligence plan. One CIS commander indicated that the strategic intelligence plan is done by his management team; however, In the view of Knipe *et al.* (2002:47), the plan should be done at all levels of the SAPS – i.e. at national, provincial, cluster and station levels. It is clear that the cluster management, under the leadership of the cluster commander, not the crime intelligence commander alone, is charged with the responsibility of drafting or developing a strategic intelligence plan. The researcher is of the view that a collective approach, in the form of allowing the cluster commander to lead the process, could add value, in so far as ensuring that all police units within a particular cluster allow of such plan.

6.3.6 Does the strategic plan make provision for overt intelligence gathering?

The researcher asked the sample the above question, and their answers were as follows:

- Twenty-two (22) police investigators and VIS detectives indicated that, from time to time, they obtain information through interviews with the witnesses and suspects, as well as the community.

- Ten (10) police investigators and seven (7) VIS detectives stated that they also collect information from the community.

- Four (4) police investigators and five (5) VIS detectives stated that they also collect information from the Criminal Record Centre (CRC) about the previous convictions of the suspect.

- Participants number 23 and 26 (VIS detectives) and participant number 9 (police investigator) indicated that crime statistics from the Crime Information office can greatly assist in indicating relevant information.

- Two (2) police investigators stated that information gathered from the crime scene can be vital. One (1) of these two (2) police investigators elaborated

that the MO identified at the crime scene assists police investigators and intelligence collectors to obtain further leads.

- The Border Police Commander stated that information from crime statistics represents vital overt intelligence to be used in the combating of crime, since it gives the police the picture of what the problem is, and also how to follow leads.
- According to the CIS Commander, overt intelligence gathering is done mostly by the police investigators and VIS detectives, when they take statements from witnesses and make enquiries within the community.

According to Lyman (2008:170), there are two methods of intelligence collecting: overt and covert means. Overt information collection includes personal interaction with people, many of whom are witnesses to crimes, victims of crimes, or even the suspects themselves. Covert information includes crime statistics, *modus operandi*, crime scene, witnesses to crimes, and victim of crimes, suspect and ordinary citizen.

In Gilbert's view (2010:105) witnesses are vital to the investigative process, since they provide descriptions that result in an arrest, and also necessary in giving needed evidence.

Deductions

From the above discussions, it becomes clear that although the participants are knowledgeable, no single participant gave a response equal to the literature. It is clear that if the police can collect information about *modus operandi*, crime scene, victims of crime, suspects and also ordinary citizens, they will be able to generate strategic and tactical intelligence which can be used in the combating of organised vehicle theft. The researcher also learned that out of 30 case dockets reviewed, there was no single case docket which mentioned the availability of a witness or victims.

6.3.7 Does the strategic plan make provision for covert intelligence gathering?

The researcher asked the sample the above question, and they answered as follows:

- According to the CIS Commander, covert gathering is conducted by CIS collectors from the informers, as well as by police agents from counter-intelligence. They do so by using covert informants or informers who are registered. He went on to reflect that CIS is mandated to collect semi-covert information – i.e. they collect information both overtly and covertly. The CIS commander further clarified that an informant is a person who gives information to the police for reward, or any other reason. Such reason, he continued, could be revenge, limiting competition from another organised crime group, or for crime reduction.

- The Border Police Commander maintained that it is the duty of the CIS commander to handle or address intelligence functions, including the strategic plan.

- All the VIS detectives and police investigators indicated that the strategic plan makes provision for covert gathering, since it allows the use of informers.

- Participants 6, 7 and 12 (police investigators) and participant 28 (VIS detective) further indicated that informers are not always reliable, since they may mislead the police for ulterior motives.

- Participant 19 (police investigators) continued by indicating that an informer who is involved in vehicle theft will, under normal circumstances, not be reliable, unless he is to be remunerated by the SAPS.

According to Lyman (2008:171), covert information collection is the most common, and includes a process known as intelligence gathering. This is a process of data collection on criminal acts that have not yet occurred, but for which the investigator must prepare. Covert intelligence collection methods employ the use of physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, informants and undercover officers.

Deductions

Generally, the researcher established that the participants are aware of the value of the informants in the investigation of crime; however, they did not

mention covert intelligence collection methods such as physical surveillance, electronic surveillance and undercover officers. The ignorance of the usage of covert intelligence collection methods could be reflected in the results of 30 case dockets reviewed, wherein informants were used only in 57% cases, whereas 100% of cases indicated that undercover officers (agents) were not used.

6.3.8 In what type of managerial structure is intelligence interpreted?

The researcher asked participants in what type of managerial structure intelligence is interpreted.

- The CIS Commander expounded that intelligence is interpreted at cluster meetings. He further highlighted that the interpretation emanates from reported cases wherein areas with more criminal activities are identified. The identification of such areas or places is aimed at channeling both physical and human resources, according to need.

- The Border Police Commander argued that it is the duty of the CIS Commander to interpret intelligence.

- All the VIS detectives and 18 police investigators indicated that the CIS is charged with the responsibility of interpreting intelligence.

- Participants 2, 7, 11, 17 and 18 (police investigators) responded by saying that they did not know. Participant number 7 further indicated that he never received any training on the issues of intelligence and as such, he would not know where the interpretation takes is done.

Knipe *et al.* (2002:47) are very clear that some form of strategic 'intelligence' planning is done at all levels in organisations; however, they is very silent about at which level it should be interpreted.

Deductions

The participants are of the view that intelligence should be interpreted at cluster level. The researcher is of the view that, as with intelligence planning, intelligence

interpretation should be carried out at all levels of the organisation (SAPS) – in this case, at the cluster (strategic intelligence), whereas the police station would deal with tactical intelligence.

6.3.9 How does the intelligence direct investigations?

The researcher asked the sample the above question, and received the following replies:

- The CIS Commander indicated that within the CIS there are two components: Crime Analysis Section and Collection Section. Crime Analysis Section indicates crime statistics, and also hotspots in terms of geographic areas. This type of intelligence directs the deployment of the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU).

- The Border Police Commander remarked that in theory, intelligence can direct investigations; however, CIS collectors come to the police station whenever there is an arrest. She further indicated that CIS collectors usually interview such arrested suspect.

- All the VIS detectives and police investigators stated that they do not see or know how intelligence directs investigations. Participant 18 further stated that he has never been trained on intelligence issues.

- Four (4) VIS detectives and six (6) police investigators further indicated that they hardly communicate with CIS collectors, since these collectors are very secretive.

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31), forecasts based on intelligence are essentially the best possible guess of what a person, organisation, movement or other human entity, may do in the future, based on current information. Carter and Carter (2009:317) define intelligence-driven investigation as the collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats, and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats.

Deductions

A comparison of the viewpoints of the participants and the literature, together with reviewed case dockets results, revealed that only the Crime Intelligence commander understands how intelligence directs investigations. He stated that proper collection, analysis and dissemination of information results in actionable intelligence.

The researcher, on comparing the viewpoints of the participants and the results of case dockets analysed, established that there is a dearth of knowledge and understanding on the part of the participants, and as a result, case dockets do not reflect the usage of intelligence. From the above responses, it becomes more evident that case docket inspections do not direct intelligence usage. There is again clear evidence of no communication between VIS and other agencies directed by investigations to coordinate investigations at, specifically, directing intelligence in investigations.

6.3.10 Have you had any successes in investigations, due to an intelligence-driven approach?

- The CIS Commander indicated that there are no successes which can be attributed to intelligence-driven investigations. He cited that there is a need for proper training of the CIS collectors and analysts, on how collection and analysis is an issue of top priority.

- Five (5) VIS detectives, seven (7) police investigators and the Border Police commander do not know or remember any success emanating from an intelligence-driven approach.

- Five (5) VIS detectives and fourteen (14) police investigators indicated that they had successes emanating from intelligence driven approach. They were all quick to point out that these successes are not from the CIS, but rather their own information gathering.

Successful intelligence-driven investigations is therefore one that is able to interpret the criminal environment, convey that intelligence to decision-makers, and influence their thinking so that decision-makers, in turn, design creative

crime reduction policies that have an impact on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2006:440).

Deductions

From the 30 case dockets reviewed, it is clear that there are no successes emanating from intelligence-driven investigations or any other method of policing. Evidence of unsuccessfulness could be seen in a 90% lack of arrests, as well as 100% lack of conviction on all 30 reviewed case dockets. Furthermore, five (5) VIS detectives and fourteen (14) police investigators reported that they had some success based on intelligence, but that this intelligence did not emanate from the office of the CIS. This undoubtedly indicates a lack of communication between sections within the SAPS. This is detrimental both to cooperation and to fighting crime.

6.4 SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF THE VEHICLE THEFT STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN

6.4.1 What is the purpose of a strategic intelligence plan focusing on vehicle theft?

The participants were questioned on the purpose of the strategic intelligence plan focusing on vehicle theft, and they responded in this way:

- Ten (10) police investigators and six (6) VIS detectives indicated that they do not have knowledge of a strategic intelligence plan dealing with vehicle theft.

- Four (4) police investigators and three (3) VIS detectives further indicated that it is not possible for them to know, since they deal with operations, as opposed to strategic matters. One police investigator further indicated that he understands the operational intelligence plan, since that is the plan which he is expected to execute.

- Twelve (12) police investigators and four (4) VIS detectives indicated that the purpose of a strategic intelligence plan dealing with vehicle theft, is to guide how the SAPS should combat vehicle theft.

- Participants number 14 and 17 (police investigators) and participant number 29 (VIS detective) further maintained that their commanders are the ones responsible for developing a strategic intelligence plan focusing on vehicle theft.

- The Border Police Commander posits that a strategic intelligence plan outlines how, among other things, every vehicle status (stolen or not) exiting or entering South Africa has to be checked, as well as doing verification of the vehicle, and the ownership of such vehicles.

- The CIS Commander indicated that a cluster strategic intelligence plan is a plan which assists in the identification of threats (organised vehicle theft), and that it is derived from the provincial strategic intelligence plan.

The Enterprise Foundation (1999:1) contends that an effective strategic intelligence planning process provides a framework for making decisions on how to address challenges (organised vehicle theft), and take advantage of opportunities that arise along the way.

Deductions

When comparing the responses from the participants and the literature such as the Enterprise Foundation (1999:1), it is clear that some participants (47%) do not understand the meaning of 'strategic intelligence plan'. The above discussions also highlighted that the CIS and Border Police commanders know about the strategic intelligence plan, and this could mean that the VIS and police investigator commanders also know about the plan, but that its content is not known on the ground. Furthermore, this could mean that those at the investigation or collection level are not involved in compiling the plan. The researcher is of the view that although the police investigators, VIS detectives and CIS collectors deal with the operational plan, there is a need for them to be oriented on the strategic intelligence plan, since this will improve their efficiency through a better understanding of how to deal with vehicle theft.

6.4.2 Does a strategic intelligence plan exist on controlling of vehicles on the borders?

The researcher asked the participants whether they have known of any existing strategic intelligence plan focusing on controlling vehicles on the borders, and they responded as follows:

- Ten (10) police investigators and six (6) VIS detectives indicated that they do not have knowledge of any strategic intelligence plan aimed at controlling vehicles on the border.

- Twelve (12) police investigators and four (4) VIS detectives indicated that the purpose of a strategic intelligence plan dealing with controlling vehicles on the border is intended to guide how the SAPS should combat vehicle theft at the borders.

- The Border Police Commander posited, as she also stated above, that a strategic intelligence plan outlines how, among other things, every vehicle status (stolen or not) exiting or entering South Africa, has to be checked, as well as verification done of the vehicles, and the ownership of such vehicles.

- The CIS Commander indicated that a strategic intelligence plan on the controlling of the borders should exist in such a way that suspects are identified locally (within South Africa) and their movements monitored, and then be infiltrated, with the aim of defusing the organisational structure of the organised crime group.

A system is a collection of interrelated element of which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. According to Langlois (1982:582), there is a need to study the total system, in order to see the bigger picture. Holistic properties, impossible to detect by analysis, should be possible to be defined in the system. In Jackson's view (2003:3), holism considers systems to be more than the sum of their parts. In terms of Jackson's (2003) assertion, holism puts the study of wholes before that of the parts. The SAPS is in the business of ensuring social order in the community (output). To achieve it business, there is a need that input and process be taken into cognisance since they are part of whole.

Jackson is supported by Langlois (1982:582) who maintains that this view is to be contrasted with methodological holism properties that cannot be derived from the properties of constituent parts. He contends that holism does not try to break down organisations into parts in order to understand them and intervene in them. Holism concentrates its attention instead at the organisational level, and on ensuring that the parts are functioning and are related properly together, so that they serve the purposes of the whole (Langlois, 1982:582).

Being holistic also means approaching problems, being ready to employ the systems language; for instance, looking at organisations, their parts and their environments, as systems, sub-systems and supra-systems (Jackson, 2003:582). The study concentrates on an open system – which is relevant to the SAPS. According to Jackson (2003:6), open systems take inputs (plans and collected data) from their environment, transform them (processes in the form of information collation, evaluation and analysis) and then return them as some sort of product (output in the form of refined data or intelligence) back to the environment. To explain this process, the researcher devised the following figure:



Figure 6.5: The police organisation as an open social system

The SAPS has a duty to collect information from the input environment. Peterson (2005:6) states that intelligence collection must be planned and its methods must be coordinated, and its guidelines must prohibit illegal methods of obtaining information. According to McDowell (1997:15), an essential requirement of the planning activity in any strategic intelligence project is to develop a wide-ranging awareness of the total environment surrounding (and describing) the task. The SAPS has to process collected information. The processing of information is

done within the context of intelligence cycle. According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31) planning this has to be done by policy makers and thereafter, the intelligence community collects information, which is collated, evaluated and analysed, and disseminated.

Deductions

The researcher observed that a managerial appreciation of the intelligence cycle integrated with the systems theory where inputs and outputs of different sub-systems (police units) is not evident. This leads to uncoordinated efforts in combating vehicle theft. The multi-lateral flow of intelligence is not evident.

6.4.3 How does the strategic intelligence plan regulate the resale of vehicles?

- The CIS Commander illustrated that for the strategic intelligence plan to be well regulated on the resale of vehicles, database of second-hands goods dealers have to be monitored constantly.

- The Border Police Commander referred the question to CIS.

- Eight (8) VIS detectives and ten (10) police investigators do not know any strategic intelligence plan for regulating the resale of vehicles.

- Two VIS detectives and 12 Police investigators stated that the strategic intelligence plan is intended at regulating the resale of used vehicles. One police investigator further indicated that records of documents pertaining to previous ownership of vehicles are sought for the purpose in order to ensure that no stolen vehicles are sold. One VIS detective also indicated that it is important to have full description of the vehicle in question in the form of, amongst other descriptive aspects like chasses, engine numbers, year model, VIN, colour of vehicle etc.

From the literature reviewed, it becomes apparent that the Second-Hand Goods Act (South Africa, 2009) regulates the resale of motor vehicles, in the form of the guidelines set hereunder.

(1) Subject to section 21, a dealer dealing in second-hand motor vehicles must record, in the prescribed register, the particulars regarding every acquisition or disposal of a motor vehicle contemplated in subsection (2).
(2) The particulars contemplated in subsection (1) are –
(a) the VIN and the chassis and engine number; (b) the odometer reading; (c) the exterior and trim colour; and (d) any distinguishing mark or feature, such as microdot particulars.

The literature further highlighted that a person acquiring or disposing of a motor vehicle from or to a dealer must furnish such dealer with – (a) their full name; (b) their physical address; (c) their original identity document or passport as proof of identity; and (d) proof of registration or deregistration of the motor vehicle.

(4) A dealer must obtain and keep a copy of the identity document or passport contemplated in subsection (3), and must obtain and keep proof of registration or deregistration, as the case may be, contemplated in that subsection.
(5) A dealer must retain the copies contemplated in subsection (4) for a period of not less than five years, calculated from the date of the relevant transaction

Deductions

On comparing the literature and the viewpoints of the participants, the researcher established that there is a knowledge gap on the part of the participants, in that the majority of them do not mention the Second-Hand Goods Act. From the above discussions, it becomes clear that this Act is the most relevant Act according to which a strategic intelligence plan dealing with the resale of motor vehicles should be drafted. The discussion is also relevant for how vehicle parts sales should, through a strategic intelligence plan, be controlled or managed. When one realises that the Border Police Commander does not know the relevant Act, the inference could be that she will not enforce the Act without knowledge thereof. The CIS Commander indicated that the second-hand goods database should be monitored. The question is whether the monitoring part is done, and who is doing it. This question arises from the realisation that the majority of the participants are not knowledgeable.

6.4.4 Does the strategic intelligence plan establish how illegal vehicle parts selling should be combated?

- According to the CIS Commander, the Border Police Commander, two (2) police investigators and one (1) VIS detective, the sale of vehicle parts is regulated by the Second-Hand Goods Act. The Act, as they argued, makes provision for how second-hand goods, including vehicle parts, should be sold. According to the CIS Commander, chopshops (scrap yards) within Thohoyandou cluster are identified, and contact persons or informers from the chopshop, or from outside, are recruited and tasked to gather any information on illegal activities.

- Twenty (20) police investigators and nine (9) VIS detectives did not know to what extent a strategic intelligence plan establishes how the selling of illegal vehicle parts should be combated.

According to the reviewed literature, the particulars of the second-hand goods, on resale, must at least include –

(a) Particulars in respect of the identity of the person from whom the second-hand goods are acquired, including – (i) the person's full names, contact address and contact telephone number; (ii) the manner in which the person's identity was verified; and (iii) the person's identity number.
(b) a description of the second-hand goods and serial number or distinguishing mark or feature of the second-hand goods;
(c) the purchase price paid by the dealer;
(d) the number assigned to the second-hand goods by the dealer;
(e) the name and signature of the person who conducted the transaction on behalf of the dealer; and
(f) the date and time of the transaction, the date on which the second-hand goods were sold, or an account of how and when the second-hand goods were otherwise disposed of. Wallace (2001:8) contends that vehicle parts marking is a measure that can help discourage vehicle theft. VIN are engraved on very few body parts (fender, hood and doors), making it difficult to track stolen parts.

Deductions

The researcher compared the viewpoints of the participants with the literature, and he deduced that the majority of the participants do not have any knowledge of the Second-Hand Goods Act. It is surprising how the police (investigators, VIS detectives, Border police and crime intelligence collectors) may reduce vehicle theft without implementing the Second-hand Goods Act, in terms of parts resale management methods. The researcher also observed that not all motor vehicles parts are microdotted, and this make it impossible to fully operationalise the Act in that such goods do not have serial number as dictated by the Act.

6.4.5 To what extent does a strategic intelligence plan allow sharing of information between police stations, units and inter-agency?

- The CIS Commander stated that there is no information sharing within the units, due to lack of trust. Liu and Chetal (2005:286) concur, and state further that the primary reason which spurs the hesitation and reluctance on the part of agencies to share their sensitive information with one another. is because they do not have trust among themselves. They further maintains that 'lack of trust' is caused by conflicts of interest and if agency A, as they give an example, is to share information with agency B, the question of compromising the interests of A comes to the fore. The CIS Commander added a practical example in that Police investigators or VIS detectives who are corrupt will normally avoid CIS collectors, because they may be exposed. The CIS Commander also indicated that the sharing of information by units/sections could add more value towards the combating of various criminal activities. He further remarked that police investigators will, from time to time, accuse CIS collectors of interfering in their duties – more especially, when collectors go to the police station to interview the arrested suspect(s). The most disturbing issue, as he admitted, is that even the Crime Investigation Unit (CIU) commanders sometimes fail to understand the mandate of CIS, and eventually, there are unrealistic expectations from these commanders.

- All VIS detectives, police investigators and a Border Police Commander, indicated that although some units/sections share crime information, the CIS does not share information with them. Twenty-two (22) police investigators indicated that they frequently share information with the CIU. Ten (10) VIS detectives further indicated that they share information with the Police investigators. The Border Police Commander stated that her unit (Border Police unit) shares information with Crime Prevention and police investigators, but not CIS.
- The Border Police Commander further indicated that the CIS only receives information from the other police units, but it does not give out information. She further argued that lack of information sharing undermines the effort to combat vehicle theft since she cannot plan properly due to lack of sufficient information.

Carter (2004:11) identified the reasons which make it difficult for law enforcers to combat organised vehicle theft, as, among others, the following:

- Police are reactive rather than preventative.
- There is limited intelligence gathering, in-depth investigation and information sharing.
- There is a lack of clear mandates – it is not clear as to who is responsible for organised crime investigation (CIU on versus Specialised Units versus Organised Crime Units versus Intelligence Bodies)?
- There is a lack of cooperation between the different law enforcement authorities.

Deductions

When comparing the literature and the participants, it becomes clear that there is sharing of information among police stations and units, but CIS does not share information. The researcher is therefore of the opinion that a lack of information sharing between the CIS and other police units compromises the whole effort channelled at combating motor vehicles thefts.

6.5 INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATION OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT IN THE THOHOYANDOU CLUSTER

6.5.1 What is your understanding of organised vehicle theft?

The participants were asked what organised crime is, and answered as follows:

- The CIS Commander commented that organised crime refers to more than two people who continuously commit crime. He opined that there is a structure wherein someone is a ringleader and others being runners. Practically, he added that in the case of organised vehicle offenders, there will be a person who identifies vehicles which are targeted, and the one who steals, as well as the market for such vehicles.

- The Border Police Commander remarked that organised crime refers to criminal activities that are committed by organised groups. She further indicated that the group normally has a structure, with the organised crime leader being the one in control, followed by runners or those who do the actual stealing.

  She further argued that the ringleader is the one who is the overall controller of the organised crime group, and this is the person who drives a well-registered vehicle, and he does not get involved in the actual stealing. The coordinator receives instructions from the ringleader, and communicates the message downwards to the runners. Runners have different activities, ranging from identifying specific vehicles, stealing vehicles and arrangement of fake vehicle papers. Runners do not know each other and they all report to the coordinator.



Figure 6.6: The structure of organised crime, as illustrated by the Border Police Commander

- Five (5) VIS detectives and fifteen (15) police investigators indicated that organised crime happens when at least two or more people commit criminal activities together.

- Five (5) VIS detectives and four (4) police investigators asserted that organised crime is when at least three offenders work together in the commission of criminal activities.

- Participants number 1, 11, and 20 (police investigators) indicated that they do not know what organised crime is, since they do not deal with such cases. Two police investigators justified their lack of knowledge in that there is a task-team dealing with organised crime offences.

Section 11 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 1998, as amended by the Prevention of Organised Crime Amendment Act No. 24 of 1999, interprets what a member of organised crime is, namely: “In considering whether a person is a member of a criminal gang for the purposes of this chapter the court may have regards to the following factors, namely that such person:

- Admits to criminal gang membership,
- Is identified as a member of a criminal gang by a parent or guardian,

- Resides in or frequents a particular criminal gang's area and adopts their style of dress, their use of hand signs, language or their tattoos, and associates with known members of a criminal gang,
- Has been arrested more than once in the company of identified members of a criminal gang for offences which are consistent with usual criminal gang activities
- Is identified as a member of a criminal gang by physical evidence such as photographs or other documentation."

Organised crime groups are in the business of committing criminal activities, and as such, they operate in the same way as any other organised business enterprise.

Deductions

From the above discussions, it becomes clear that once criminals (perpetrators) organise themselves to committing crime, there is a need that police officials, also, organise themselves in developing both strategic and tactical intelligence plans. The researcher compared the responses of the participants with the literature, and he identified that, generally, there are commonalities. Organised crime is crime which is committed by a number of perpetrators (at least two) over a period of time. Although some of the police officers did not explain in a detailed context, their interpretations are correct, in terms of the Act. The Border Police commander also explained explicitly in the form of the diagram.

6.5.2 What is the meaning of 'intelligence-driven investigation'?

- Twenty-two (22) police investigators, ten (10) VIS detectives and the Border Police commander did not know the meaning of 'intelligence-driven investigation'. Eight (8) police investigators and three (3) VIS detectives from the above, further indicated that they are knowledgeable on the concept 'intelligence', as opposed to 'intelligence-driven investigation'. Participant number 7 and 21 (police investigators) and participant number 1 (VIS detective) went further by indicating that they were never introduced to 'intelligence-driven investigation' in their whole career.

- The CIS commander argued that it is intelligence that leads investigations. He further indicated that police investigators are directed by intelligence whenever they investigate criminal activities. Intelligence will assist in the identification of suspects, exhibits, or any other information or evidence which assists in the solving of crime.

Literature defines intelligence-driven investigation as the collection and analysis of information relating to crime, and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats, and/or strategic planning relating to emerging or changing threats (Carter & Carter, 2009:317).

Deductions

When comparing the literature such as Carter and Carter (above) and the participants, it becomes clear that the participants do not have any knowledge in so far as the meaning of intelligence in concerned. Lack of knowledge on the part of the participants is a serious concern, considering that intelligence-driven investigation is intended to aid law enforcement in developing strategies for combating crime.

6.5.3 Who has the mandate to investigate vehicle theft?

- Ten (10) VIS detectives, twenty-two (22) police investigators and the Border Police Commander stated that it is the duty or responsibility of the VIS detectives to investigate vehicle theft. Participants number 3, 5, 9, 16 and 21 further indicated that police investigators conduct preliminary investigations, then send the case docket to the Vehicle Investigation Section.

- The CIS Commander pronounced that in terms of section 205 of the South African Constitution, the SAPS is charged with the responsibility of investigating crime, as well as crime prevention. This means, he further argues, that any person appointed in terms of the South African Police Act, as a police official, is mandated to investigate any criminal offence – and that includes theft of motor vehicles.

The literature indicates that the SAPS is mandated to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain public order, protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic, and their property, and uphold and enforce the law (Section 205 (3) of the Constitution). It is a worrisome situation that the majority of the participants who, by virtue of the Constitution, are expected to investigate vehicle theft cases, are not aware of their object or mandate.

6.5.4 How are intelligence-driven investigations of organised vehicle theft done in Thohoyandou cluster?

The researcher asked the participants the above question, and they responded in this way:

- Twenty-one (21) police investigators and ten (10) VIS detectives did not answer this question, due to lack of knowledge and understanding. Eleven (11) police investigators further indicated that they would not know, since their responsibility is the investigation of crime. Three (3) VIS detectives also stated that their responsibility is limited to vehicle theft investigation. Two (2) police investigators and two (2) VIS detectives further outlined that the question can be answered appropriately by CIS collectors.

- One (1) police investigator mentioned that management identifies investigators who are experienced in the investigation of organised crime; they then form a task team consisting of such investigators.

- The CIS Commander explained that a threat is identified (vehicle theft, for example), and planning is then done to ensure that proper mechanisms of dealing with a threat are employed. He further indicated that information about such threat or vehicle theft will be collected by CIS collectors, and such information will be analysed and evaluated. Then, there will be a refined intelligence, which will be disseminated to the relevant SAPS section or unit. In this case, the relevant sections or units could be the Crime Investigation Unit (CIU) or VIS. He concluded by stating that this approach is called the “intelligence cycle”.

- The Border Police Commander argued that the controlling of movement of vehicles at the border is aimed at crime prevention, as opposed to crime

investigation. She further indicated that within this context, the role and responsibilities of the police officials at the border is to establish both whether the vehicles are well documented, and the ownership of such vehicles.

Deductions

When comparing the literature and the participants' responses, it becomes clear that the majority of the participants (91%) are not sure about the role of intelligence-driven investigators in the investigation of motor vehicle theft. The literature outlines that for intelligence-driven investigation to succeed, the police officials should be able to collect and analyse information related to vehicle theft (Carter & Carter, 2009:317).

6.5.5 How are vehicles crossing South African Borders checked?

- Ten (10) VIS detectives, twenty-two (22) police investigators and the CIS Commander stated that vehicles crossing the South African border are checked by the Border Police officials who work at various border posts of the country.

- According to the Border Police Commander, the driver of the vehicle has to provide proof of ownership of such vehicle, or any other proof which authorises them of such possession.

In Wallace's view (2004:9), vehicles that are stolen for export overseas are often accompanied by false documentation. In some cases, the organised crime groups may have a link to a port of entry (border), in the form of individuals in key positions, who are influential in the movement of vehicles and within the border environment. The involvement of those in authority in corrupt activities makes it more difficult to deal with the illegal export of vehicles. Otto (2015:1) reported that three police members attached to the Pafuri port of entrance appeared in court on Thursday, 2 February 2015, after they were arrested on a charge of corruption. The members were arrested following intensive investigations, after information was received that they were assisting suspects in smuggling stolen motor vehicles across the border, in return for payment.

Deductions

The involvement of police members in organised crime groups undermines all efforts towards combating organised vehicle theft. This implies that intelligence (and counter-intelligence) should also involve members working in the SAPS.

6.5.6 Is there any method or mechanism of reducing the illegal re-registration of stolen vehicles?

- The CIS Commander, Border Police Commander, two (2) police investigators and one (1) VIS detective, indicated that the Second-Hand Goods Act exists to ensure that there is no illegal re-registration of stolen vehicles. The Act, they argued, makes provision for the way in which second-hand goods, including second-hand vehicles, should be sold. According to the CIS Commander, the re-registration of a vehicle falls within the ambit of traffic officials, and before they re-register the vehicle they should ensure that all necessary documents are available.

- Twenty (20) police investigators and nine (9) VIS detectives did not know any method or mechanism of reducing the illegal re-registration of stolen vehicles.

According to Brown *et al.* (2004:8), police investigators are expected to gather intelligence about second-hand dealership. They also maintain that operators of second-hand dealerships or motor salvage yards are required to pass a “fit and proper” test, register with their local authority, and maintain records of the vehicles they have obtained and from whom they have obtained them.

Deductions

The literature makes it very clear that police officers are expected to collect intelligence on second-hand dealerships. It further puts a requirement on the part of second-hand dealerships and vehicle scrapyards. The researcher observed that the majority of the participants (85%) are not knowledgeable when it comes to what they are expected to do, e.g. collection of intelligence about second-hand dealerships. There is therefore a need that these participants be trained in their role and responsibilities in so far as ensuring compliance with Second-Hands Goods Act is concerned.

6.5.7 How could information on organised crime be analysed?

- All Twenty-two (22) police investigators, ten (10) VIS detectives and the Border Police Commander, did not have an idea on how information on organised crime could be analysed.

- According to the CIS Commander, information on organised crime is analysed in the intelligence cycle. He stated that the intelligence cycle starts with tasking, planning, collection and collation, before analysis. After analysis, the information is evaluated and disseminated.

Deductions

When comparing the literature and the participants' responses, it is clear that the majority (97%) of the participants do not have any knowledge and understanding. The literature is very precise that there are seven methods of crime analysis, namely Crime-pattern analysis (CPA), Association/Network analysis, Telephone record/communication analysis Flow analysis, Spatial/geographical analysis, Strategic analysis and Financial analysis. None of these was mentioned by any of the respondents, indicating a superficial knowledge of these kinds of analysis.

6.6 DOES INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATION ASSIST IN THE PROFILING OF ORGANISED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT?

6.6.1 The meaning of offender profiling

To the question, What is the meaning of offender profiling?, the respondents answered in this way:

- In terms of the Border Police Commander's assertion, African males from Malawi and Mozambique are mostly the ones involved in the stealing of vehicles. She also alluded to the fact that the culprits are normally of low financial status, who work for rich organised group leaders. She further stated that the role of these culprits is to ensure that stolen vehicles reach the organised crime leaders who are outside South Africa.

- According to the CIS Commander, offender profiling refers to the studying of an individual offender in order to understand such an offender. The studying could be centered on their previous convictions, age, gender, race, financial status, associates or friends, educational level, movements, properties, or any other information which will assist in the description of such individual. The rationale for profiling, he continues, could be to establish whether the offender in question can or cannot be linked with the crime under investigation – or with any other criminal activities. Another reason could be to link the offender with other offenders.

- All VIS detectives and police investigators stated that they do not know the meaning of 'offender profiling'.

Brown *et al.* (2004:7) argue that offender profiling takes the form of examining the MO of each individual offence, and identifying known offenders who have used a similar approach. They further indicate that in the above way, offences would be linked with offenders on an ongoing basis. Turvey (2008:324) argues that property-oriented behaviour, such as theft of vehicles, result in material gain.

There are five objectives to the profiling of offenders, as outlined by Van Rooyen (2004:238), as follows:

- To get a better understanding of structures, activities and movements of groups of people, individuals or organisations
- To decide on the best possible strategy to implement, in order to prevent or minimise the threats
- To follow the most effective ways in investigating of crime
- To trace the subject or suspect, and to determine the movements, activities, and associates of the subjects

Deductions

The researcher learned that literature is available on the meaning of 'offender profiling', the majority of the participants elaborate are not *au fait* with the concept. Lack of knowledge on the part of the participants can also impact on how they conduct their investigations. It simply means that profiling cannot be used in investigations if participants are not aware of what it entails.

6.6.2 What is the profile of a vehicle theft offender?

- According to the CIS Commander vehicle theft offenders within Thohoyandou cluster are African males, who range between 16 and 45 years of age. They do not have matric or standard ten certificates. The offenders speak either Xisonga or Tshivenda, and they are more likely to be staying in Limpopo.

- The Border Police Commander stated that the offenders are African males from either Malawi or Mozambique, and that they are of poor status, in terms of financial wealth. They do not steal for themselves, but rather for well-known organised crime leaders. She further stated that these organised crime leaders do not steal vehicles by themselves, since they use “runners” or “foot solders”.

- Ten (10) VIS detectives and twenty-two (22) police investigators indicated that African/ black males are the ones stealing vehicles.

- Two (2) police investigators further indicated that these African males speak Tshivenda or Xitsonga languages.

Irish and Qhobosheane (2003:75), indicated that South Africa has strong net-works of organised criminal organised groups which are linked up both with foreigners in South Africa and criminal networks from other African countries. It is also indicated that the groups later develops into more sophisticated organised crime networks. Nigerian networks are also involved in the lucrative vehicle within South Africans

It is believed that the organised criminal groups involved in vehicle crime oper-ate in well-developed structures, and once a vehicle has been stolen by a foot soldier or runner, the following will happen:

- Other gang members who specialise in falsification and production of vehi-cle registration and identity papers, will start doing the job.
- Others will follow to falsify or change the chassis number, production number, etc.
- Thereafter, the couriers are hired to take the vehicles from one country to the next.

- The receivers who organise the sale of the vehicles are at the end of the chain.

Deductions

The majority of the participants indicated that they do not understand the meaning of 'offender profiling' – which could also imply that they do not know the objectives thereof. The Border Police commander, and the rest of the respondents, differs in giving the nationality of offenders. The CIS commander refers to Xitsonga or Tshivenda offenders, and the Border Police commander refers to offenders from Malawi or Mozambique. This is an indication that there is no joint profiling between those involved combating vehicle theft.

6.6.3 What kind of information could be useful in the profiling of an offender?

- The CIS Commander stated that information such as race, gender and previous convictions can be used for profiling the offender. He further maintained that the place where a vehicle has been stolen, and also the type of vehicle, can assist the CIS collectors in profiling the offender. Once an offender succeeds in stealing a vehicle from a specific place or area, he is more likely to steal from the same or similar area. It also applies to the model of a vehicle, in that the easier it is for the offender to steal that particular model, the more he is more likely to target such model again.

- The Border Police Commander argued that the language accent of the offender can assist in the establishment of the nationality of the offender.

- All VIS detectives and police investigators do not know what information can be used in the profiling of the offenders.

Mokros and Alison (2015:28) state that the information on the offenders' background characteristics extracted from the police files, for the purpose of profiling, comprises the following features:

- Age at the time of the offence
- Ethnicity

- Employment situation (i.e. whether employed or unemployed)
- Labour type (i.e. whether skilled or unskilled)
- Education level
- Qualifications
- Whether the offender lives with someone or alone
- Marital status
- Criminal records

Deductions

When comparing the participants' responses and the literature, it becomes apparent that the majority of the participants do not have knowledge of the information which can be used to profile offenders. Based on the above, the researcher is of the view that information extracted from the police files will assist the investigator in identifying vehicles most targeted by the offender, and as a result, indicate the MO.

6.6.4 What is the purpose of stealing vehicles?

The researcher asked the participants what the purpose of stealing vehicles is, and received the following responses:

- Six (6) VIS detectives, fifteen (15) police investigators and the Border Police Commander indicated that the purpose of stealing vehicles is to get parts. One (1) VIS detective mentioned that parts such as an engine, gearbox and chassis are particularly in demand.

- Four (4) VIS detectives and three (3) police investigators, who were substantiated by the CIS Commander, stated that vehicles are stolen for resale. One (1) VIS detective further indicated that before the vehicle is resold, the offenders change the colour, engine number, chassis number and identification papers of the vehicle.

- One (1) VIS detective, supported by the Border Police Commander and the CIS commander, indicated that some vehicles are stolen and taken to countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe for resale.

Deductions

When comparing the literature and the participants, there is a clear indication that stolen vehicles are exported, written off through damage, chopped for their valuable parts, or re-enter the legitimate market as second-hand vehicles.

6.6.4 What types of crime analysis could be used in vehicle theft?

- Fifteen (15) police investigators, nine (9) VIS detectives, one CIS Commander, as well as the Border Police Commander, identified crime statistics as a good crime analysis method that can be used in the combating of vehicle theft.

- Four (4) police investigators, two (2) VIS detectives and the CIS Commander went further to expound that crime statistics provide information such as the date, the time the vehicle was stolen, and the model of the stolen vehicle. Participant 4 further indicated that this information will help the investigator in understanding the suspect who might have stolen the vehicle, through MO analysis – meaning that if a perpetrator steals on Friday night and is not arrested, he is more likely to continue stealing on the same day of the week. Two VIS detectives also indicated that the above information will assist the investigator or detective in identifying the suspect, since various offenders operate differently, in terms of date, time and place of theft, and the model of the vehicle they target.

- One (1) VIS detective also indicated that if, for instance, a diesel vehicle will be the one stolen, and this could mean that the market is Mozambique. This was substantiated by the Border Police Commander, who indicated that double-cab vehicles are normally taken to Zimbabwe and Malawi, since there are no proper roads in these countries.

- Seven (7) police investigators and one (1) VIS detective do not have knowledge and understanding of the crime analysis which can be used in vehicle theft.

6.6.4.1 Crime analysis in vehicle theft

There are many types of crime analysis, but for the purpose of this study, the following will be discussed, the choice being informed by the intended outcome of this study (Santos, 2004:63): tactical crime analysis, strategic crime analysis, administrative crime analysis, investigative crime analysis, intelligence analysis and operations analysis.

6.6.4.2 Crime analysis methods

There are six **analysis methods** as described by Metscher and Gilbride (2005: 27), namely crime-pattern analysis (CPA), association/network analysis, telephone record/communication analysis, flow analysis, spatial/geographical analysis, strategic analysis, statistical analysis and financial analysis.

Deductions

Referring to literature and participants, it becomes clear that the participants are more familiar with Crime statistics analysis, whereas literature covers six types of vehicle crime analysis. The literature further addresses the methods which can be used in analysis. Participants were silent on these six types of analysis – which supports the notion that in-depth analysis cannot be performed, as the participants are not aware of their existence.

6.6.6 Why are specific people targeted, if any, as victims?

The participants indicated that there are no specific people targeted as victims, but rather, specific vehicles are targeted.

Deductions

According to case dockets analysed, the higher numbers of vehicles which are stolen are owned by African males, at 73%, followed by 23% African females, with 3% being stolen from white males (see next chapter). The data also indicated that no white females were victims of crime. This is a natural outcome of the demographics of Vhembe district that has a black population of over 98% (South Africa Census, 2011:1). The reason that the majority of victims are African males, as opposed to other genders and races, could be that in rural areas males are likely to be the financial providers, and relatively few females possess cars.

The possibility exists that this could be because of their (African males) being the majority of vehicle owners within Thohoyandou cluster.

6.6.7 Which geographical areas are more favourable for vehicle theft offenders?

- The sample stated that is always hard to specify where vehicles are more likely to be stolen, since some are stolen at private residences, and some from various other places outside residential areas.

- One (1) police investigator further indicated that, be it as it may, a lot of vehicles are stolen at night at victims' residential places, as opposed to any other places.

Deductions

According to analysed case dockets, 83% of vehicles are stolen from residential areas, as opposed to 17% being stolen from business areas (see next chapter). The reflection of higher numbers of vehicles being stolen from residential areas is probably due to better security at business premises.

6.6.8 Does intelligence-driven investigation assist in profiling organised motor vehicle theft offenders?

- The researcher asked the sample this question: Does intelligence-driven investigation assist in profiling organised motor vehicle theft offenders?

- Twenty-two (22) police investigators and ten (10) VIS detectives do not have knowledge of how intelligence-driven investigations can assist in the profiling of motor vehicle theft offenders.

- The CIS commander indicated that intelligence-driven investigations assist in the profiling of organised vehicle offenders. He argued that the most commonly used profiling method is called notebook analysis. This method, he continued, will tell the analyst or the crime intelligence collector whether a suspect has previous convictions, and also the names of his co-accused. According to this participant, notebook analysis is applied by identifying the offender, and linking the offender with other offenders or criminal activities.



Figure 6.7: Illustration of an example of notebook analysis, as unfolded by the participants

The CIS Commander further expounded that, suppose offender A is a member of an organised vehicle theft being profiled, it can be possible to link the offender with other offenders. He alludes to the fact that linkages can be done through, among other methods, checking previous convictions, or doing cellular phone interception. The participant is quick to point out that it is possible that offenders B, C, D and E do not necessarily know each other, but are all working with offender A.

Van Rooyen (2004:238) mentions five objectives of profiling offenders, as follows:

- To get a better understanding of structures, activities and movements of groups of people, individuals or organisations
- To decide on the best possible strategy to implement, in order to prevent or minimise the threats
- To follow the most effective ways of investigating crime
- To trace the subject or suspect
- To determine the movements, activities and associates of the subjects

Deductions

It is clear from the above discussions, that the majority of the participants do not have any knowledge and understanding of how intelligence-driven investigations

can assist in profiling a perpetrator (or perpetrators) involved in organised vehicle theft. To some extent, these participants do not know the objectives of offender profiling in a general context. The result is that this valuable investigative tool is not used.

6.7 SUMMARY

The crux of this chapter was to present data as collected from the participants, and also comparing their insight with the literature. Understanding the level of knowledge on the part of the participants is vital, because, by virtue of them being charged with the responsibility of combating organised vehicle theft, they expected to have the capability to combat such crimes.

It was established that according to the SAPS 2010/14 strategic plan (SAPS, 2010a), there is a long-term need for capacitating crime intelligence as an approach of ensuring improved service delivery. These are some identified priorities:

- Improve skills of the personnel at all levels, as well as their retention
- Improve network collection by increasing ground coverage
- Utilise visible policing personnel for the gathering and provision of intelligence
- Increase support for collectors by enforcing more effective management of sources
- Improve intelligence database capabilities, as well as access to remote systems for purposes of integrating information management

The researcher established that the majority of the participants are less informed on the issues of strategic intelligence.

In this chapter, it also became clear that more participants still require training, in order for them to have an understanding of intelligence-driven investigations. Carter and Carter (2009:317) outline that intelligence-driven investigation focuses on the collection and analysis of information related to crime (vehicle theft) and conditions that contribute to crime (vehicle theft). This results in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical

responses to threats (vehicle theft), and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats (vehicle theft).

Carter (2004:11) also identifies challenges which make it difficult for law enforcers to combat organised vehicle theft, as, among others, the police are being reactive, as opposed to being preventative; there is limited intelligence gathering, in-depth investigation and information sharing; there is a lack of clear mandates – it is not clear as to who is responsible for organised crime investigations (Crime Investigation Division versus Specialised Units versus Organised Crime Units versus Intelligence Bodies); and lastly, and very importantly, there is a lack of information sharing between different law enforcement authorities. The researcher observed that there is, indeed, less information sharing among the SAPS units within the Thohoyandou cluster and possibly, within the entire SAPS.

The importance of profiling was highlighted by Van Rooyen (2004:238), and, to that effect, its objectives are the following: to get a better understanding of structures, activities and movements of groups of people, individuals or organisations; to decide on the best possible strategy to implement, in order to prevent or minimise the threats; to follow the most effective ways in investigating crime; to trace the subject or suspect; and, to determine the movements, activities, and associates of the subjects. The following chapter, Chapter 7, will focus on presenting an analysis and interpretation of the data collected from case dockets.

CHAPTER 7

CASE DOCKET ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

According to Hofstee (2011:117), once data is available, the researcher should do something to turn it into the evidence – this takes place through the analysis of data. The previous chapter focused on presenting, analysing and interpreting data collected from 34 participants; this chapter is concerned with data presentation, analysis and interpretation. Data was collected from 30 motor vehicle case dockets from Thohoyandou, Vuwani and Saselamani police stations. The imperative of this chapter is to establish, among others, whether case dockets are investigated accordingly, and this has been done by analysing case dockets.

7.2 RESPONSES ON THE DAY OF VEHICLE THEFT



Figure 7.1: Vehicles stolen by day of week

The researcher analysed 30 vehicle theft cases, as can be seen from the above table, and he observed the following:

- Ten (10) out of 30 case dockets indicated that the vehicles were stolen between Saturday and Sunday. The overlapping is due to the manner in which

victims report their cases; for instance, parking the vehicle on Saturday and only realising on Sunday that it has been stolen.

- Eight (8) out of 30 case dockets indicated that vehicles were stolen between Friday and Saturday. The explanation of the overlapping observed herein, does not differ from the description in the previous bullet.
- Six (6) case dockets indicated Thursday night as the date and time of the theft.
- Three (3) case dockets indicated the thefts taking place on a Monday – no indication of time, other than that it was during daylight.
- Two (2) case dockets indicated that the vehicle was stolen on a Wednesday night.
- One (1) case docket indicated that a vehicle was stolen on a Thursday, but no information on whether it was during the day or at night.

Deductions

From the data presented above, it is clear that motor vehicles are mostly stolen from Friday to Sunday (60% – over the period of three days), compared with Monday to Thursday (40% – over the period of four days).

7.3 RACE AND GENDER OF THE VICTIMS

The researcher analysed 30 vehicle theft cases, and observed the following:

- Twenty-two (22) out 30 vehicle theft cases indicated African males as victims;
- Seven (7) out of 30 vehicle theft cases indicated African females as victims.
- One (1) out of 30 vehicle theft cases indicated a white male as a victim.

Deductions

The above data indicates that higher numbers of vehicles stolen were owned by African males (73%), followed by African females (23%), with a lesser number of white males (3%). It is unclear why the majority of victims are African males, as opposed to other genders and races. The possibility exists that this could be because of their (African males) being the majority of vehicle owners within Thohoyandou cluster.

7.4 TYPE OF INSTRUMENT USED

The participants were questioned about the types of instrument used in vehicle theft.



Figure 7.2: Type of instrument used to steal a vehicle

The researcher analysed 30 vehicle theft case dockets, with the following results:

All case dockets indicated unknown instruments. This could mean that perpetrators do not leave traces at the crime scene, thereby making it difficult for police investigators to understand the method of operation employed by such perpetrators. On 9 March 2015, the Sowetan (2015:9) reported that a vehicle theft suspect was found in possession of a signal-jammer device. The police investigator told the court that only big communications companies and the SA National Defence Force [SANDF] are allowed to have signal-jamming devices. He further indicated that a signal-jammer device, if activated, stops incoming and outgoing phones.

Deductions

Lack of an indication of the instrument used could be because whenever the vehicle theft takes place, the perpetrators do not leave vehicle theft implements. It is again clear that organised criminal groups use technological devices such

as signal-jammers, to ensure that, if caught stealing, the victim does not manage to telephonically contact the police for assistance. This is an indication of the sophistication of organised crime groups and the resources they have at their disposal.

7.5 PREMISES WHICH ARE TARGETS OF VEHICLE THEFT

Considering that the researcher extracted ten (10) case dockets in the three police stations sampled, he then deemed it necessary to analyse the type of premises which are targeted by vehicle thieves.



Figure 7.3: Type of premises which a vehicle was stolen

The researcher categorised geographical areas into two, namely residential and business areas, and these are the issues determined:

- Twenty-five (25) out of 30 vehicles were stolen from residential areas (home). The indication is that only two of them were in the garage, whereas the other 23 were not garaged. He further observed that 18 out of 23 vehicles were in a physically secured yard; the remaining five (5) were in an open yard.
- Five (5) out of 30 case dockets analysed indicated that vehicles were stolen from business areas. Three (3) out of five (50 vehicles were stolen from shopping areas, whereas two (2) were stolen from work areas (government building).

Deductions

The above data indicates that 83% of vehicles are stolen from residential areas, as opposed to 17% being stolen from business areas.

7.6 INDICATION OF VEHICLE INSURANCE STATUS



Figure 7.4: Insurance status of stolen vehicle

The researcher analysed 30 stolen vehicles, and observed the following:

- Eighteen (18) stolen vehicles were insured;
- Five (5) stolen vehicles were not insured;
- The insurance status of seven (7) vehicles was not reflected.

Deductions

From the above data, it is clear that a higher number (60%) of stolen vehicles is insured, compared to a lesser number (17%) of uninsured vehicles. The lack of records, in terms of 23% of stolen vehicles, is of serious concern, since it does not give a clear picture regarding the actual number of insured and uninsured stolen vehicles. This information is available from each victim, and could have been recorded.

7.7 TRACKER SYSTEM



Figure 7.5: Availability of tracker by vehicle stolen

The researcher perused 30 vehicle theft case dockets, to establish whether they (vehicles) had trackers, and observed the following:

- 8 (27%) stolen vehicles were fitted with a tracker device.
- 12 (40%) vehicles were not fitted with a tracker device.
- 10 (33%) vehicle theft case dockets did not indicate tracker status.

Deductions

From the above data, it is clear that a higher number of stolen vehicles did not indicate tracker device status. Lack of proper data capturing by police officials undermines the effort of effectively analysing data.

7.8 TYPE OF STOLEN VEHICLE



Figure 7.6: Type of stolen vehicle

The researcher analysed 30 vehicle theft case dockets, with the following results:

- 50% of 30 stolen vehicles were Toyota Hilux (single cabs).
- 23% of 30 stolen vehicles were Nissan 1400s.
- 17% of 30 stolen vehicles were VW Golfs.
- 7% of 30 stolen vehicles were Toyota Conquests.
- 3% of 30 stolen vehicles were Nissan Double Cab bakkies.

Deductions

From the data presented, it is clear that a higher number of stolen vehicles were Toyota Hilux (single cabs) as well as Nissan 1400s. Considering that 77% of stolen vehicles were bakkies, the purpose of stealing could be linked to transporting (probably stolen or contraband goods) within or outside the Republic of South Africa.

7.8 VALUE OF A STOLEN VEHICLE



Figure 7.6: Value of stolen vehicles

The following are the results:

- Fifteen (15) vehicles were valued at below R100 000.
- Six (6) vehicles were valued at between R100 000 and R150 000.
- Five (5) vehicles were valued at between R150 000 and R200 000.
- Three (3) vehicles were valued at between R200 000 and R250 000.
- One (1) vehicle was valued at between R250 000 and R300 000.

Deductions

The data indicates that 50% of stolen vehicles were priced below R100 000, whereas 50% are actually above R100 000. Although 50% of the stolen vehicles were priced below R100 000, an equal number of vehicles ranging from R100 000 and above, were stolen. The value of a stolen vehicle does not assist much in determining the most targeted vehicles. The above data could suggest that the perpetrators do not look at the value of a vehicle, but rather at other factors. Second-hand vehicles that are older are normally used for their parts, as owners of older models need to do repairs. Such stolen vehicles are likely to end up in chopshops.

7.9 INDICATION OF AGE OF VEHICLES STOLEN



Figure 7.7: Age of vehicles stolen

The researcher learned the following:

- Eight (8) vehicles stolen were from the 1994 to 2000 period;
- Eight (8) vehicles stolen were from the 2001 to 2006 period.
- Ten (10) vehicles stolen were from the 2007 to 2010 period; and
- Four (4) vehicles stolen were from 2013.

Deductions

The above data suggest that old vehicles (six (6) years and above – 70%), when compared with new vehicles (five (5) years and below – 30%), are more targeted. This could be due to a lack of sophisticated tools such as tracker systems, and their value as second-hand parts.

7.10 WITNESSES

In all 30 case dockets analysed, there was no mention of an eyewitness, other than the complainant or victim of crime.

Deductions

The absence of eyewitnesses is not surprising, considering that in the case of theft in general, perpetrators ensure that nobody sees them. The above implies that there is nothing uncommon about the unavailability of witnesses.

7.11 CIRCULATING VEHICLE AS A STOLEN VEHICLE

All (100%) stolen vehicles were circulated as 'stolen'. It is surprising that although stolen vehicles are circulated immediately on reporting, the recovery of stolen vehicles remain very low. The low success on the recovery of vehicles strongly suggests that a more radical approach should be preferred in dealing with vehicle theft.

Deductions

When one considers that 100% of stolen vehicles were circulated, and only three (9%) recovered, it becomes apparent that investigations cannot rely solely on circulation. Other methods outside circulation, and reactive procedures, are required, and for the purposes of this study, the researcher favoured an intelligence-driven approach.

7.12 TASKING OF INFORMANTS



Figure 7.8: Informant tasking

The results of the case dockets analysed are as follows:

- Seventeen (17) out of 30 vehicle theft case dockets (SAPS 5 – Investigation Diary) indicated that informers were tasked to gather information. Out of the

above 17 case dockets, not a single one indicated a follow-up of informer tasking.

- Thirteen (13) out 30 case dockets did not indicate that informers were tasked.

Deductions

There will always be the question why informers are not tasked in a vehicle theft investigation process. This could be due to a lack of knowledge and understanding from some of the participants, as can be gathered from their biographical background. Furthermore, the fact that investigators did not even make follow-ups on tasked informers, is indicative of poor management of informers, and of case docket management in general.

7.13 TASKING OF AN AGENT



Figure 7.9: Tasking of agent

The researcher analysed 30 vehicle theft case dockets, to establish whether there was any tasking of an agent, with the following results:

All 30 vehicle theft cases did not indicate the tasking of an agent.

7.14 ARREST AND POSSIBLE PROSECUTION



Figure 7.10: Comparison of case dockets with and without arrests

The researcher analysed 30 vehicle theft case dockets, with the following results:

- Twenty-seven (27) out of 30 cases dockets did not indicate an arrest;
- Three (3) out of 30 case dockets indicated arrests. Two of the dockets indicated an arrest of three suspects, respectively, whereas the other one indicated the involvement of four suspects, but only two were arrested.

Deductions

From the above data, it is clear that there is a high number (90%) of unsolved cases, with arrests only having been made in 10% of the cases. This shows that the current methods and techniques used by police officials do not assist in addressing the higher number of stolen vehicles.

7.15 THE COURT OUTCOMES

Out of the three case dockets, as indicated above, two (66%) reflected with-drawal due to insufficient evidence, whereas one (33%) indicated an acquittal. Generally, it is a poor scenario, where even in cases in which the police officials managed to effect an arrest, perpetrators are not convicted.

7.16 SUMMARY

The above data reflects that towards, and on, weekends, the number of stolen vehicles increases. It is clear that a higher number of stolen vehicles are Toyota Hilux (single cabs), as well as Nissan 1400s. Considering that 77% of stolen vehicles are bakkies, the purpose of stealing could be linked to transporting (probably stolen or contraband goods) within or outside South Africa. In terms of the vehicles stolen, it was observed that data indicates 50% stolen vehicles being valued below R100 000, whereas 50% are actually above R100 000. Although 50% of the stolen vehicles are below R100 000, an equal number of vehicles ranging from R100 000 and above, have been stolen. Second-hand vehicles that are older are normally used for their parts, as owners of older models need to do repairs. Such stolen vehicles are likely to end up in chop-shops.

Another indicator is the number of unsolved cases without arrests, which is high, at 90%, compared to only 10% of case arrests. This shows that current methods and techniques used by police officials do not assist in addressing the high number of stolen vehicles. The disturbing part of this data is the low usage of informants, as well as non-consideration of other covert means of information, such as the use of agents. Another identified gap (see Chapter 6) is less information sharing between units. The following chapter concentrates on the findings and recommendations of the entire study.

CHAPTER 8

FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The chapter outlines the findings, recommendations and conclusions of the study. Through the study, the researcher aimed at assessing the application of intelligence-driven investigations in combating organised motor vehicle theft in the Thohoyandou cluster. The researcher collected data from national and international literature, vehicle theft case dockets as well as interviews with police investigators, VIS detectives, crime intelligence commander of the cluster, and Beitbridge Border police commander.

In addressing the aim of the study, the researcher employed four research objectives and the whole study was guided by such objectives, namely:

- To explain the strategic intelligence plan for investigating motor vehicle theft;
- To assess if the cluster uses intelligence for offender profiling in investigations;
- To evaluate whether investigations of organised motor vehicle theft in Thohoyandou cluster are intelligence-driven; and
- To explore how intelligence-driven investigation assists in information sharing.

8.2 THEORETICAL ORIENTATION TO FINDINGS

The first finding is incidental, and is not an outcome of the stated objectives. During the preliminary literature review, this theoretical aspect was not uncovered. In the full review, however, it emerged. These are primary findings emanating from the research, which are based on data collected from both national and international literature. In addition, the findings are embedded in the systems theory, where intelligence planning and application are viewed within a strategic process of input, process and output. It is also understood from the *modus operandi* of organised crime groups that use planning strategies to

establish syndicates and perform their criminal operations. Strategically, the police and the organised crime groups are involved in a strategy/counter-strategy implementation process (see Figure 4.4).

As in a typical military battle, strategy and counter-strategy determines the outcome of victors and losers. The combating of organised vehicle theft depends fundamentally on the availability of accurate intelligence. The research has uncovered major shortcomings in the intelligence processes in the study area. The first level of findings is at the theoretical level and this was incidental to the research. Lowenthal (2012:67) refers to the intelligence cycle from a theoretical and practical perspective, and it is clearly a process depending on input, process and output. For example, in the cycle, planning is part of the cycle (Figure 2.1). From a management perspective, this is incorrect, as the cycle itself should be planned and managed in order to ensure that intelligence-driven investigations of vehicle theft are executed in a controlled and coordinated environment.

Intelligence cycle

In terms of the systems theory, it is evident that the intelligence cycle is, rather, an integrated process where one component follows another, and it should be recognised that a fault, omission or defect in one component has a bearing on subsequent components. This process is unpacked hereunder (see Figure 8.5). The process does not take place in isolation, but within broader external and internal environments which must be strategically and tactically managed. The intelligence cycle, according to Figure 8.1, starts with “planning” within the theoretical and management context, and this should be changed to “intelligence needs”. Clearly the needs determine what happens in the rest of the cycle. This unfolding process must be stipulated in a plan that in turn must be managed.

“Management planning is the process of assessing an organization's goals and creating a realistic, detailed plan of action for meeting those goals. Much like writing a business plan, a management plan takes into consideration short- and long-term corporate strategies” (McQuerrey, 2015:1).

Goals are determined by managers according to the intelligence needs. The Intelligence cycle is a process that must be managed through the intelligence

plan this is a management function and not a function within the cycle (see Figure 8.1 below).



Figure 8.1: Intelligence management process

From the systems theory and intelligence planning, there are strategic and tactical needs. In this study, the focus is on intelligence-driven investigation. For intelligence-driven investigation to take place, there is a need that strategic intelligence needs are clearly planned, coordinated and integrated (see Figure 8.5 and 8.6). Another focus is on the way tactical intelligence directs management processes to satisfy strategic and tactical needs. This should emanate from the case dockets via the detectives and management inspection. Figure 8.6 and 8.7 explain the process of tactical intelligence needs.

8.2.1 Findings on research objective 1

To explain the strategic intelligence plan for investigating vehicle theft

In strategic intelligence planning, it is also important to define the problem correctly. McDowell (1997:15) outlines the following two reasons for doing so:

- The planning phase of any intelligence project assumes, as its starting point, that intelligence staff fully understand the task set for them. However, strategic problems often lend themselves to being stated in vague or imprecise language, appearing to be open ended, or perhaps merely inadequately articulated. It is essential that the intelligence consumer's needs be clearly understood, both to provide satisfaction and to avoid waste of intelligence efforts and resources.

- Defining the problem afresh not only illuminates all possible aspects of the issues involved, but also, through re-defining and re-stating the intelligence task, guides further planning for later activities – especially that of collection of information.

The Enterprise Foundation (1999:1), states that strategic ‘intelligence’ planning is essential in preparing to carry out the mission of the organisation. They further indicate that an effective strategic intelligence planning process provides a framework for making decisions on how to address challenges (organised vehicle theft), and take advantage of opportunities that arise along the way.

A comparison of what the Enterprise Foundation (1999:1), and the participants state, it becomes apparent that some participants (47%) do not understand the meaning of 'strategic intelligence plan'. The researcher is of the view that a lack of clear understanding of 'strategic intelligence plan' on the part of the participants, could undermine how they are expected to respond to the combating of crime. This is because in order to deal effectively with crime, one has to have higher-level planning (strategic intelligence plan), followed by lower-level planning (tactical intelligence plan). The above discussions also highlighted that the CIS and Border Police commanders know about the strategic intelligence plan. This could mean that the VIS and police investigators and commanders also know about the plan, but that its content is not known on the ground. Furthermore, this indicates that those at investigation level are not involved in compiling the plan.

The researcher finds that the lack of communicating the strategic intelligence plan to law enforcement officials creates a disadvantage on their part, in that they will not understand the holistic approach of combating organised vehicle theft. Their knowledge of the strategic intelligence plan can improve the way in which they approach each and every case (input) they investigate, since they will be viewing it from a broader perspective (output).

In the literature, the Enterprise Foundation (1999:1) posits that a strategic ‘intelligence’ planning process provides a framework for making decisions on how to allocate organisational resources, address challenges (organised vehicles theft), and take advantage of opportunities that arise along the way.

It stands to reason that if police officers involved in vehicle theft investigations are not *au fait* with intelligence planning, then the planning process, the plan itself, and the application of intelligence-driven investigation in vehicle theft, are inherently flawed. This will be substantiated in subsequent findings deliberated hereunder.

8.2.2 Findings on research objective 2

To evaluate whether investigations of organised vehicle theft in Thohoyandou cluster are intelligence-driven

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:31), posit that forecasts based on intelligence are essentially the best possible guess of what suspects, organised crime groups, organisations or other human entity, may do in the future, based on current information. When comparing literature and the participants' responses, it becomes evident that the majority of the participants (91%) are not optimising the use of intelligence in investigation.

The explanation of the intelligence cycle will be within the context of systems theory, which comprises input, process and output.

INPUT

As already indicated in Chapter 4, this study employed an open system approach. According to Jackson (2003:6), an open system, such as an organism, has to interact for its constant existence, and adapt in reaction to changes in the environment. Open systems take inputs from their environments, transform them, and then return them, as some sort of product, back to the environment. Roelofse (2007:59) becomes more specific by indicating that inputs in open systems are material and information, processed through command structures in operational and support outputs, to prevent crime and maintain social stability. The input environment addresses planning and collection. This command, given that 91% of participants do not know what intelligence-driven investigations are, indicates that police investigators and VIS detectives are not determining intelligence needs.

The intelligence cycle, as depicted in Figure 8.1, consists of a number of sub-sections. These will be discussed separately in Figure 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 as components 1, 2 and 3 of the cycle. In the end, the three components will be depicted in the new proposed intelligence cycle in Figure 8.5.



Figure 8.2: Input environment as part of the system – Component 1

Intelligence needs: Herring (1999:4) maintains that defining an organisation's actual needs, and doing so in a way that results in the production of intelligence that management feels compelled to act on, is one of intelligence's most elusive goals. The use of a systematised or formal "management-needs identification process" is a proven way to accomplish this task. Herring (1999:4) further states that the objective is to create a cooperative environment between intelligence users and crime intelligence professionals (collectors and analysts), that supports the two-way communication necessary for identifying and defining the company's (SAPS) real intelligence needs.

Collection: Collection is the gathering of raw information, based on the intelligence needs or requirements. Before collection takes place, the police officials must interpret the crime or input environment. The researcher is of the view that if the crime environment can be interpreted accordingly, it will be easy to know and understand, among others, who the perpetrators are, what vehicle models

are being targeted, where the market of the targeted vehicles is, and how organised the syndicate is.

There are two methods of intelligence collecting, namely overt and covert means (Lyman, 2008:170). Overt collection refers to means such as crime statistics, MO, the crime scene, witnesses of crimes, victims of crimes, the suspect, and ordinary citizens. Covert collection involves the use of the following methods: physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, informants, email, and telephone interception.

From the collected data, it becomes clear that although the participants are knowledgeable, no single participant gave a response equal to the literature. It is clear that information such as *modus operandi*, the crime scene, victims of crime, suspects, and also ordinary citizens, is critical in this respect. The researcher also learned that out of 30 case dockets reviewed, there is not a single case docket that mentioned the availability of a witness or victims.

PROCESS



Figure 8.3: Intelligence process as part of the system – Component 2

Collation: According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), (2011:13), collation is the transfer of collected information and/or intelligence into a storage system (be it a filing cabinet or a computerised database), in a

structured (indexed, cross-referenced) format that permits rapid and accurate access.

Evaluation: Evaluation involves converting the vast amount of information collected into a form usable by analysts. This is done through a variety of methods, including decryption, language translation and data reduction. Evaluation includes the entering of raw data into databases, where it can be exploited for use in the analysis process (Carter, 2004:74).

Analysis: In the view of Carter (2004:74), analysis is the conversion of raw information into intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating and analysing available data, and preparing intelligence products. The author further states that the reliability, validity and relevance of the information is evaluated and weighed. The information is logically integrated, put into context, and used to produce intelligence. The author is also of the view that this includes both "raw" and "finished" intelligence. Raw intelligence is often referred to as "the dots". "Finished" intelligence reports "connect the dots" by putting information into context, and drawing conclusions about its implications (Carter, 2004:74).

The researcher analysed 30 case dockets, and he observed the following:

- Day of the week: From the data presented in Chapter 6 (Figure 6.1), it is clear that motor vehicles are mostly stolen from Friday to Sunday (60% – over the period of three days), compared with Monday to Thursday (40% – over the period of four days). It is not clear what the reason could be for higher vehicle theft statistics over weekends, as opposed to during the week.

- Ownership of vehicles: Analysed case dockets (Chapter 6, Figure 6.2) indicate that a higher number of vehicles stolen were owned by African males (73%), followed by African females (23%), with a lesser number of white male (3%) victims. The data also indicated the non-existence of white female victims. It is unclear why the majority of victims are African males, as opposed to other genders and races. The possibility exists that this could be because of their (African males) being in the majority of vehicle owners in Thohoyandou cluster.

- Geographical area: Case docket analysis (Chapter 6, Figure 6.4) revealed that many vehicles (83%) are stolen from residential areas, as opposed to vehicles stolen from business areas (17%). The reflection a of higher number of vehicles being stolen from residential areas is disturbing, in that if an owner can find the perpetrators, chances are that they (perpetrators) may even be physically dangerous to such victim.

- Type of vehicles mostly targeted: The higher number of stolen vehicles are Toyota Hilux (single cab), and the Nissan 1400 (Chapter 6, Table 6.8). Considering that 77% of stolen vehicles are bakkies, the purpose of stealing could be linked to doing courier business within or outside South Africa.

As can be seen from the case docket analysis, there is a clear indication that many case dockets do not have enough data to allow crime analysts to conduct proper analysis. The implication of limited information is that the crimes analysts will, during collation, have less data, and, as a result, the evaluation and analysis processes will have less data which will, in turn, impact the entire process.

OUTPUT

Roelofse (2007:59) contends that inputs in open systems are material and information processed through command structures in operational and support outputs to prevent crime.



Figure 8.4: Output environment system – Component 3

Dissemination: Dissemination is the distribution of raw or finished intelligence to the consumers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements (Carter, 2004:74). According to the UNODC (2011:15), an intelligence analyst has the responsibility of disseminating analytical products to targeted audiences, as appropriate. They also contend that much of the routine dissemination may be conducted by way of short notes. They further indicate that the analysts should be able to give oral briefings on larger investigations, and write structured reports detailing the currently available information.

From the case dockets analysed, only 57% indicated that the tasking of informants, all case dockets did not reflect the use of agents. Insufficient use of informants and agents results in a poor detection rate. Based on the analysed case dockets, the detection rate can clearly be evidenced by a lower number (9%) of arrests made.

8.2.3 Findings on research objective 3

*To assess if the cluster uses intelligence **offender profiling** in investigations*

According to the literature, there are five objectives of offender profiling:

- To get a better understanding of structures, activities and movements of groups of people, individuals or organisations
- To decide on the best possible strategy to implement, in order to prevent or minimise the threats
- To follow the most effective ways in investigation
- To trace the subject or suspect
- To determine the movements, activities and associates of the subjects

The researcher found that the majority of participants (94%) do not know and understand the meaning of offender profiling. The implications of the participants not using offender profiling could be costly in the combating of organised vehicle theft, in that there will be a dearth of intelligence. The CIS Commander, however, seemed to have understanding of the concept, as he mentioned that offender profiling refers to the studying of an individual offender, in order to understand such an offender. The study could be centred on their previous convictions, age, gender, race, financial status, associates or friends, educational level, movements, properties, or any other information which would assist in the description of such individual.

The purpose of profiling could be to establish if the offender in question cannot be linked with the crime under investigation, or any other criminal activities. Another reason could be to link the offender with other offenders. The Border Police Commander was more practical, by indicating that African males from Malawi and Mozambique are the ones mostly involved in vehicle theft. She also alluded to the fact that the culprits are normally of low financial status, who works for rich organised group leaders. She further stated that the role of these culprits is to ensure that stolen vehicles reach the organised crime leaders, who are outside South Africa.

Based on this finding, the researcher can safely conclude that the cluster does not use intelligence in offender profiling in the investigation of organised vehicle theft. Lack of knowledge and understanding definitely impacts how the cluster investigates organised vehicle theft cases.

8.2.4 Findings on research objective 4

To explore how intelligence-driven investigation assists in information sharing

The literature revealed both challenges in, and guidelines for, achieving standardised information sharing, as follows:

8.2.4.1 Challenges

- Police are reactive, rather than preventative.
- There is limited intelligence gathering, in-depth investigation and information sharing.
- There is a lack of clear mandates – it is not clear as to who is responsible for organised crime investigation (Crime Investigation Division versus Specialised Units versus Organised Crime Units versus Intelligence Bodies).
- There is a lack of cooperation between the different law enforcement authorities.

8.2.4.2 Guidelines

- Ensuring that information-sharing agreements comply with the available policy, strategy and implementation plan
- Developing standardised policies, strategies, and implementation or procedure manuals for information sharing, that provide partners with a clear understanding of how and with whom they can share information
- Working with the Crime Intelligence cluster commander of the department, to develop and implement an Information Sharing Segment Architecture (it documents the SAPS's communications activities, and describes the necessary policies, strategies, architecture and governance needed to improve information sharing) that defines how the Thohoyandou SAPS cluster will participate in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and that fully addresses Crime Intelligence requirements, including Crime Intelligence Architecture Methodology

- Demonstrating the existence of a clear governance structure for information sharing, and assigning accountability for establishing, implementing and overseeing information-sharing policies, strategies, and technologies linked to the SAPS

- Formalising information-sharing relationships among partners that currently rely on existing information networks

- Developing an information-sharing framework

- Increasing understanding of roles and missions within the Force stakeholder community, by providing information-sharing best practice materials and guidebooks with information about the various stakeholders

8.2.4.3 Categories of information sharing

The literature identified four vital sharing categories, as follows:

- NaTIS information
- SAPS information of stolen and hijacked vehicles
- Information of In-Transit
- Vehicle Crime Statistical Analysis

The participants indicated that there is a need for information sharing; however, there is reluctance on the part of the intelligence unit to share information with other units.

8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made on the basis of the facts which unfolded during the research process. In Chapter 1, the researcher indicated that the aim of this research was to assess the application of intelligence-driven investigations in combating organised motor vehicle theft. The researcher covered the research aim, the objectives and the questions. Some concepts were covered satisfactorily in some of the literature, rather than by the participants.

These recommendations were guided by four objectives.

8.3.1 Strategic Intelligence level

The researcher recommends the model outlined hereunder, for the purpose of an inter-agency intelligence planning committee.



Figure 8.5: Strategic management process – legal and policy mandate – management through an inter-agency intelligence planning committee

8.3.2 Intelligence cycle – Theoretical contribution: intelligence planning process

At the theoretical level, the researcher argues that planning is not within the cycle, but constituting the cycle through a management process. The plan component of the cycle should be replaced by the figure 8.6 below. The crux of this cycle is that it should start with either strategic or tactical intelligence needs. The needs direct the type of information which is collected. As can be seen herein under, the process itself is bidirectional implying that if, for instance, during an analysis stage/step, it is established that more information is needed from the collectors, the collectors may be required to further collect information.



Figure 8.6: Intelligence flow-management process

The intelligence cycle, as the researcher recommends, should be replaced by an intelligence flow-management process, starting from intelligence needs to feedback. The above process, as opposed to the intelligence cycle depicted in Figure 2.1, is bi-directional: it allows the process to go backwards, for whenever there is a need for additional information or further clarification. Planning appears together with coordination and integration at the centre of the cycle, since it influences the entire cycle. During collection there should be planning, coordination and also integration; this is also applicable to collation, evaluation, analysis, dissemination and feedback.

8.3.3 Strategic intelligence plan

The strategic intelligence plan for investigating vehicle theft should be outcome based. This implies that the strategic intelligence plan should focus on achieving the following:

- Disrupting the separated parts or chopshop markets
- Disrupting the vehicle-laundering market
- Diverting (organised crime) offenders
- Building stakeholder/community capacity, and encouraging innovation via a discreet range of communications and public education projects

For the above to take place, there should be effective communication between the head of detectives, detectives and also crime intelligence collectors.



Figure 8.7: Intelligence needs generator model

The police investigators, VIS detectives, Border Police officials and crime intelligence police should be trained in the strategic intelligence planning process. As can be seen from the above model, a case docket is opened by the crime victim, and then the head of detective services, which is at strategic intelligence level, allocates the docket for investigation purposes. The police investigator or VIS detective studies the case docket, and the needs for intelligence are generated. The police investigator or VIS detective communicates with the intelligence collector for tactical intelligence purposes, whereas the head of detectives will communicate with the head of Crime Intelligence to generate strategic intelligence.

An additional recommendation is the following: Considering that police investigators and/or VIS detectives do not include some of the key elements of intelligence considerations in their investigations, it is recommended that the investigation diary (SAPS 5, part of the case docket) be changed, to add a section for intelligence review (Annexure C).

The figure below indicates types of intelligence which should appear in the docket component.



Figure 8.8: Docket intelligence component

8.3.4 Training in crime intelligence

Considering that crime intelligence training encompasses intelligence offender profiling contents, the police officials in the Thohoyandou cluster and in the entire country as a whole, should be trained in crime intelligence. Such training will assist them to better know and understand, amongst other issues, the following:

To understand organised vehicle theft criminal organisation structures, activities and movements;

- To decide on the best possible strategy to implement, in order to prevent or minimise organised vehicle theft
- To follow the most effective ways in investigating against the offenders involved in organised vehicle thefts
- To trace organised vehicle theft suspect
- To determine the movements, activities and organised vehicle theft group(s)

8.3.5 Investigation of organised vehicle theft in Thohoyandou cluster

Investigation of organised vehicle theft in Thohoyandou cluster should be intelligence driven. The following is recommended:

- Thohoyandou cluster should encourage police officials (police investigators, crime intelligence officials, VIS, Border police officials, etc.) to work according to an integrated approach. This will ensure value for money in the use of

information from a well-interpreted crime environment. Such information will be used for proactively and reactively combating crime, and the police officials will better understand as to which information should be conveyed for tactical purposes and strategic consumption.

- Based on information conveyed by the police officials at tactical or operational level, the management is now in a position to strategically impact the crime environment. The impact could be achieved by staffing, skilling, or making resources available within the police units or sections.

8.3.6 Exploring how intelligence-driven investigation assists in information sharing

To explore how intelligence-driven investigation assists in information sharing, the following is recommended:

- That the police officials are trained in information sharing; and
- That the police management is trained on developing strategic information-sharing policies – strategies, as well as implementation plans.

8.4 CONCLUSION

This study was concerned with the assessment of intelligence-driven investigation in the combating of organised vehicle theft. From the discussions, it became clear that there is a plethora of literature addressing concepts such as 'intelligence-driven investigation', 'organised vehicle theft', 'information sharing', 'offender profiling', as well as 'strategic intelligence plan'. The study also showed that there is a clear dearth of knowledge and understanding on the part of the participants when it comes to critical concepts such as strategic intelligence, intelligence-driven investigation, and offender profiling. A lack of knowledge and understanding in those areas can undermine the SAPS in decisively dealing with organised vehicle theft. In this study, it was also revealed that there is a lack of information sharing between the various police units, which also undermines the combating of organised vehicle theft. It was recommended that there should be an inter-agency intelligence planning committee which will assist with, among others, a review of strategic intelligence policies and other prescripts.

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ANNEXURE A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

TITLE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATION IN THE COMBATING OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT IN THOHOYANDOU CLUSTER

A. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. What is your rank/position in the organisation?
2. What are the responsibilities in your current employment?
3. For how many years have you been in your current employment?
4. What are your academic qualifications
5. Which organisation are you working for?
6. Did you attend any intelligence courses courses/seminars related to crime investigation?

B. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN

1. Is there a strategic intelligence plan for investigating motor vehicle theft at your unit/police station?
2. What is the difference between strategic intelligence plan and tactical intelligence plan?
3. Who in the cluster is responsible for drafting the strategic intelligence plan?
4. How are intelligence-driven investigations of organised vehicle theft in Thohoyandou Cluster?
5. Do intelligence-driven investigations assist in profiling organised vehicle theft offenders?.
6. Does the strategic plan make provision for overt intelligence gathering?
7. Does the strategic plan make provision for covert intelligence gathering?
8. In what type of managerial structure is intelligence interpreted?
9. How does the intelligence direct investigations?
10. Have you had any successes in investigations due to an intelligence-driven approach?

C. SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF THE VEHICLE THEFT STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN

1. What is the purpose of the strategic intelligence plan focusing on vehicle theft?
2. What are the objectives of a strategic intelligence plan?
3. Does a strategic intelligence plan exist for the controlling of vehicles at the borders?
4. How does the strategic intelligence plan regulate the resale of vehicles?
5. Does the strategic intelligence plan establish how vehicle parts should be sold?
6. To what extent does a strategic intelligence plan allow sharing of information between police stations, units and inter-agency?

D. HOW ARE INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT INVESTIGATED IN THE THOHOYANDOU CLUSTER?

1. What do you understand in 'organised vehicle theft'?
2. What is the difference between information and intelligence?
3. What is the meaning of 'intelligence-driven investigations'?
4. Who has the mandate to investigate vehicle theft?
5. How are intelligence-driven investigations into vehicle theft conducted?
6. How are vehicles crossing South African borders checked?
7. Is there any method or mechanism for reducing the illegal re-registration of stolen vehicles?
8. How is the sale of vehicles and parts regulated to reduce the selling of stolen ones?
10. How could information on organised crime be analysed?

E. DO INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATIONS ASSIST IN THE PROFILING OF ORGANISED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT?

1. What is the meaning of 'offender profiling'?
2. What is the profile of a vehicle theft offender?
3. What kind of information could be useful in the profiling of an offender?
5. What is the purpose of stealing vehicles?

6. What types of crime analysis could be used in vehicle theft?
7. Why are specific people targeted, if any, as victims?
8. Which geographical areas are more favourable to vehicle theft offenders?
9. Do intelligence-driven investigations assist in the profiling of vehicle theft offenders?

F. HOW ARE INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATIONS OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT INTERNATIONALLY (CROSS-BORDER)?

1. What is the extent of vehicle theft internationally?
2. Which countries are most affected by organised motor vehicle theft?
3. What is the internationally accepted definition of 'organised crime'?
4. What is the common modus operandi of transnational organised crime syndicates to move vehicles across the borders?
5. What is the profile of a motor vehicle theft offender, internationally?
6. How is information collected internationally?
7. How is information analysed internationally?

G. WHAT VALUE DOES INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN INVESTIGATION HAVE IN THE COMBATING OF ORGANISED VEHICLE THEFT?

1. What is the criminological meaning of the word ‘combating’?
2. How could organised motor vehicle theft be understood?
3. What value does the proactive application of intelligence-driven investigation have in the combating of organised theft of motor vehicles?
4. What value does the reactive application of intelligence-driven investigation have in the combating of organised theft of motor vehicles?

ANNEXURE B

SAPS LETTER OF PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

G.P.S. 002-0222

SAP 21

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE **SUID-AFRIKAANSE POLISIEDIENS**

Verwysing Reference	11/3/1
Navrae Enquiries	Colonel Ngum NT Keka V
Telefoon Telephone	(012) 334 3819 (012) 334 3850
Faksnommer Fax number	(012) 334 3563

GENERAL RESEARCH AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

PRIVATE BAG X 177
PRETORIA
0001

MR. HP Bila
PO BOX 3713
MALAMULELE

REQUEST TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON: THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE DRIVEN INVESTIGATION IN THE COMBATING OF ORGANISED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT.

1. It is with pleasure to inform you that the Research Technical Committee situated in the Division: Human Resource Development has granted you permission to conduct research within the South African Police Service.

2. The research to be conducted has to be in line with the topic presented, which is "The value of intelligence driven investigation in the combating of organized motor vehicle theft"

3. Furthermore, the permission for research conducted in the South African Police Service was granted telephonically by the Provincial Commissioner Lieutenant General Mpembe of Limpopo Province.

4. Good luck in the endeavor of your studies.

Yours sincerely

_____ **BRIGADIER**
SECRETARY: RESEARCH COMMITTEE
DIVISION: HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
LL GOSSMANN
DATE: 2012-12-03

ANNEXURE C

DOCKET INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT – INVESTIGATIONS DIARY

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES **Case number** _____

Docket Intelligence Component: Investigations Diary

Date and time	Type of evidence	Signature after actual activities performed (Please indicate if not applicable)
	Overt evidence:	
	Crime scene	
	Crime statistics	
	Witnesses	
	Victims	
	Suspects	
	Covert evidence:	
	Informers	
	Agents	
	Physical surveillance	
	Profiling	
	Telephone eavesdropping	
	Email interception	

ANNEXURE D

TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

University of Limpopo
Research Development and Administration Department
Private Bag X1106, Sovenga, 0727, South Africa
Tel: (015) 268 2212, Fax: (015) 268 2306, Email:noko.monene@ul.ac.za

TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEECLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

MEETING:	**28 January 2015**
PROJECT NUMBER:	**TREC/03/2015: PG**
PROJECT:	
Title:	An assessment of the application of intelligence driven investigations on the combating of organized vehicle theft in Thohoyandou Cluster
Researcher:	Mr HP Bila
Supervisor:	Prof CJ Roelofse – University of Limpopo
Co-Supervisor:	Dr CE Oliver – University of Limpopo
Department:	Criminology
School:	Social Science
Degree:	PhD in Criminology

PROF TAB MASHEGO
CHAIRPERSON: TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

The Turfloop Research Ethics Committee (TREC) is registered with the National Health Research Ethics Council, Registration Number: **REC-0310111-031.**

Note:
i) **Should any departure be contemplated from the research procedure as approved, the researcher(s) must re-submit the protocol to the committee.**
ii) **The budget for the research will be considered separately from the protocol.**
PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES.

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