

Factors Inhibiting the Reduction of Policeable Crime in Gauteng Province

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Abstract: Zinn (2010) points out that despite emphasis and police effort to deal with and contain business robberies, house robberies and car hijacking, these crimes increased nationally by 22 per cent in the 2008/09 financial year. Between 2015/16 and 2016/17 financial years, aggravated robberies went up by 8 per cent (SAPS Annual Report, 2016/17). The question is, 'what inhibits the reduction of policeable crime in Gauteng?' To answer this question, we developed an interpretive and conceptual framework to be published in a peer reviewed journal, but whose summary we share in this paper. Based on this proposed research framework, this paper shares some empirical evidence on factors that inhibit the reduction of policeable crime in Gauteng Province. The research results and findings show that South African Police Service (SAPS) leadership in Gauteng Province still rely on traditional forms of policing that have failed to adapt to strategies crime perpetrators are using. Hough and others (2008) have argued that for an organisation to be successful, its strategy should be aligned with its environment. Further, the inability to adapt explains why the South African Police Service in Gauteng Province lacks a credible strategy, leading to management inefficiency save for a few police clusters whose commanders have introduced credible strategies limited to their clusters only. Such a status quo is attributable to a lacking Provincial leadership, if not national. As Newham (2015, p.43) sums it up, there is a "serial crisis of top management in the police, which has started to take its toll on the effectiveness and public credibility of the South African Police Service".

Keywords: Crime, Leadership, Policeable, Policing, Reduction

1. Introduction

Policing is a dynamic environment, where criminals employ different and sophisticated strategies in order to commit crime. Leadership in the South African Police Service (SAPS) in the Gauteng province has a role of implementing the national policing policy, the latter which should be implemented through strategies and programmes. For this to happen there is a need for an overarching strategy, as well as efficient organisational arrangements. The police should be able to study the mode of operation of criminals and counteract their acts through effective strategies. In this paper, we outline factors that inhibit the police leadership in Gauteng to reduce policeable crime. Policeable crime is crime whose decrease is dependent on police action for reduction (De Cock, Krieglner & Shaw, 2015). These authors point out that with crime such as robbery, burglary and carjacking, there is a large scope for policing tools to be used to reduce them, which make them more policeable than other crimes such as assault, commercial crime and sexual offences. The write-up begins with a discussion on the challenge of leadership within the police service, within the context of the South African Police Service as

an organisation. Thereafter, we review methods of data collection for the study carried out, as well as the findings. The findings are discussed within the theoretical frameworks that have facilitated the interpretation of empirical findings. In particular, these are the strategic leadership theory, in as far as it explains the importance of vision casting, as well as the contingency theory of organisations, which explains the importance of adapting to the external situation by leaders through developing strategies and aligning systems.

2. The South African Police Service as an Organisation

In this section, we undertake a research setting or context analysis to understand the South African Police Service as an organisation. To do this, we outline the mandate, structure and certain systems that are found in the South African Police Service. The SAPS, established in terms of sections 199 and 205 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, is structured to function in the national, provincial and local spheres of government. It is managed administratively by a National Commissioner, and also has provincial leadership in the form of Provincial

Commissioners, who could develop province-specific strategies (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). The next layer of leadership is that of cluster commanders, who are at an executive management level, known as Major Generals, a level that comes after that of a provincial commissioner. Cluster commanders are also able to come up with strategies to deal with crime, where there is a capability to do so. Finally, there are station commanders, most of which are at a senior management level, referred to as Brigadiers, which is equivalent to the level of a director in government. The station commanders report to the cluster commanders, and the cluster commanders in turn report to the Provincial Commissioner. However, the instruction to implement a certain policing policy normally comes from the National Commissioner, and this gets filtered straight to the stations. Sometimes the Provincial Commissioner also issues out a blanket instruction to cluster commanders in dealing with crime, especially in areas that are ridden with high criminal incidents.

The constitutional responsibility of the SAPS is to combat, prevent and investigate crime (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). In fulfilling this mandate, the police can either embark on activities geared towards preventing criminal behaviour by addressing some of the causes and through securing convictions – where a judge in a court of law decides that someone is guilty of an offence. The programmes or business units that make the fulfilling of this mandate possible are Visible Policing, Detective Services and Crime Intelligence. Of interest to this study are the visible policing component, which is responsible for proactive and reactive policing, detective services which should detect crime, effect arrest and facilitate successful convictions; as well as the crime intelligence component which gathers intelligence on organised crime in particular (Freeman & McDonald, 2015). Crucial to note is that aggravated robberies form part of organised crime.


3. The Challenge of Leadership in the South African Police Service

Gauteng has the highest level of these crimes when compared with other provinces (SAPS Annual Report, 2017/18). However, the leadership in the South African Police Service in Gauteng seems to be finding it difficult to significantly reduce policeable crime and in this case, aggravated robbery. This is

true even after the police have increased their personnel numbers and budget, with the belief that an increase in personnel, especially in visible policing, would boost their ability to deal with crime. Zinn (2010) points out that despite the special emphasis to deal with business robberies, house robberies and car hijacking in the 2008/09 financial year, as well as police efforts to contain them, these crimes increased nationally by 22 per cent then. Between 2015/16 and 2016/17 financial years, aggravated robberies went up by 8 per cent. Robbery at residential premises as well as car-jacking increased significantly from 2012/13 until 2016/17 in Gauteng. Whereas carjacking went up by 16.9 percent in the same period, robbery at residential premises also increased by 10.6 percent (SAPS Annual Report, 2016/17). Important to note is that Gauteng contributes 50 per cent of the national crime figures (Ngantweni, 2014). Although we acknowledge the existence of a myriad of reasons why crime is not decreasing significantly, including socio-economic reasons, lack of proper leadership seems to be the main reason for an increase in policeable crime in Gauteng. Police leadership tend to instruct officers on the ground to conduct patrols and road blocks to reduce crime, even though these strategies proved not bear fruit (Gould, Burger & Newham, 2010). Leaders are responsible for developing strategies and systems to ensure organisational efficiency, but this has been a challenge in SAPS in Gauteng for quite some time (Altbekker, 2007; Burger, 2007; Cachalia, 2007).

The crime prevention and combatting function can also be attained through detection, which would facilitate that a number of suspects are arrested and have their cases finalised. However, this seems to be a challenge as well. There have been a few arrests for aggravated robberies when compared to other crimes, as well as a low detection rate on aggravated robberies nationally. The detection rate went down from 22.23 per cent in 2012/13 to 17.87 per cent in 2016/2017 financial year (Institute for Security Studies, 2018). In terms of arrests, there is a stark difference between total arrests for other crimes and arrests for aggravated robberies. Arrests for other crimes were above the 500 000 mark in 2016/17, whereas those for aggravated robberies were only above the 60 000 mark in the same financial year. This is against the backdrop of more than 140 000 recorded figures for aggravated robberies in the entire country in 2017 (Institute for Security Studies, 2018). The focus is on aggravated robberies

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Source: Authors

because these crimes can be solved through a strategy that the police can develop, looking at multiple factors that lead to their increase.

This paper seeks to answer the question as to what are the strategic, implementation and management issues that explain the inability to arrest policeable crime in Gauteng? The paper could go on to ask other research questions, but the scope of the paper is to look at the factors that inhibit the reduction of policeable crime in the Gauteng Province. The section that follows illustrates a conceptual framework for this study, which was actually a roadmap which was followed to ultimately get to the findings.

4. Towards Assessing the Challenge of Leadership in the South African Police Service

The area of focus for this paper is leadership, as leaders should be able to both formulate and implement strategy so as to achieve organisational goals (Grant, 1991; Cronje, 2004). We started this paper by outlining briefly, the structure and mandate of the South African Police Service, as an organisation in which the research problem has been identified. The police service is a national competency, whose

strategies and operations are normally initiated at the national level and cascaded to the nine provinces. The core mandate of the SAPS is to ensure that the inhabitants of South Africa are safe from crime (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). Among others, the responsibilities of the police have been documented in section 205 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, as being to prevent, combat and investigate crime (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). However, the research problem as identified in this section is that leadership in the SAPS seems to find it difficult to significantly reduce the incidences of policeable crime. Studies have been undertaken to address the challenge of ineffective police leadership, but little is known about the ability of the South African Police Service leadership in Gauteng to adapt to challenges and fluidity of crime by developing strategies to deal with crime, as well as adjusting its systems.

In part, the SAPS did not significantly reduce crime due to the fact that funding was not really allocated strategically, that is, to units that would play a more meaningful role in addressing crime than others. Other reasons are that strategies were poorly developed and implemented. Strategies formulated to reduce crime were not based on a

thorough analysis of the external environment, thus implying that SAPS could not adequately deal with contingencies in the external environment since the same were not comprehensively identified. This would also create a misalignment of the said challenges with the capabilities and resources of the SAPS as an organisation. Strategy implementation was plagued with systemic challenges and lack of skills (Altbekker, 2007; Burger, 2007). Inability or incompetence in strategic management on the part of the leadership could be cited as a root factor to SAPS' challenge in not being able to arrest policeable crime. In this study, we do not refer to the political economy of the country, which may be one of the contributing factors to this problem. This study therefore seeks to resolve this national police problem, as also highlighted in other studies, (Policy Advisory Council, 2007; O'Regan and Pikoli, 2014) with a specific focus on Gauteng Province as it has more policing resources than other provinces (Estimates of National Expenditure, 2012).

Studies to address the problem of leadership not only in the police across the world but also in the public sector have pointed to similar problems of ineffective leadership and management (Adams, 2010; Chetty, 2011). The police style of leadership was also regarded as contributing to poor leadership in general. Absence of candidates of adequate quality and caliber was also found to be a problem (Doby *et al.*, 2004; Schafer, 2009). The root cause of this problem was poor mentorship and well as inadequate training and development of leaders (Veitch, nd; Booyens, 2005; Naidoo, 2005; Siswana, 2007; Chavalala, 2010). Most of these studies resolved that development of police leaders would resolve the said problem (Schafer, 2009; Veitch, n.d). The public sector was also inundated with problems of poor policy implementation, poor communication of the vision as well as lack of skills and resources in implementing policies, which are problems that have been identified in the police as well (Naidoo, 2005; Siswana, 2007). These studies embarked on both quantitative and qualitative methods. The limitations of the said studies were methodological in nature, where some major conclusions could not be reached in some instances either because only few individuals were interviewed, or there was no empirical evidence to reach some conclusions, while others could not be generalised to a broader population. In order to resolve the problems identified by the researchers in these studies, the bulk of them (Doby *et al.*, 2004; Booyens, 2005, Naidoo,

2005; Chetty, 2011; Masufi, 2012; Veitch, nd) utilised elements of transformational leadership theory.

Leadership has been identified as a field within which this study could be situated. We define leadership as "process of ensuring organisational effectiveness, by articulating a vision, setting goals and providing direction, and not as a position" (Grint, 2005; Hough *et al.*, 2008; Carsten *et al.*, 2010; Pierce & Newstrom, 2011). The leader is able to provide direction by creating a conducive environment for followers, through some attributes. Leadership is also a process that changes with situations (Pierce & Newstrom, 2011).

Although a series of leadership paradigms and theories were identified and studied, the study selected a strategic leadership theory as a primary and suitable theory for analyzing the findings of the study, as it is based on vision as a major determinant of leadership. The selected theory also has the attribute of competence, which has as its sub-components, communication of a vision as well as innovation and decisiveness, and other contextual attributes such as empowerment and organisational capability (Daft, 2005/2008; Kouzes & Posner, 2002). Some of the attributes that were identified were flexibility and adaptability, which entail the ability of a leader to adapt with changes in the external environment through developing a new strategy (Achua & Lussier, 2012). Strategic leadership is also about motivation and inspiration of followers to achieve organisational goals, as well as leading change (Daft, 2005/2008; Rafferty & Griffin, 2011). The attributes in this study are inter-linked and interdependent and when taken together, they complete the leadership process. In addition, we selected the contingency theory of organisations as another theory which would be used to collect and analyse data for this study. Thus, a leader that adapts to contingencies in the external environment is flexible, competent and able to communicate a vision. The external environment here is the meso and micro environment wherein the SAPS operates. These frameworks have assisted in interpreting the research findings.

5. Methodology and Data Collection Procedure

In order to understand issues of organisational arrangements and how they enable or disable strategy implementation in the SAPS in Gauteng,

our research took the form of qualitative research, with a focus on semi structured interviews and focus group interviews. The research design was a case study – that of Gauteng – which would provide detailed and extensive data on the issue being studied. Gauteng was selected as it has a high rate of aggravated robberies when compared with other provinces, and has also been provided with the bulk of resources to deal with the said crime. However, the police in Gauteng have not been able to significantly reduce those crimes. In order to collect data, semi-structured interviews were held with various respondents. With the semi structured interviews, were able to ask further questions that were not on the interview schedule, based on the replies of the participant. The benefit with focus groups in turn is that "participants are able to build on one another's ideas and comments to provide an in-depth view that is not obtainable from individual or group interviews" (Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012:135).

For the research sample, we embarked on non-probability sampling, with both purposive and snowball sampling used. Snowball sampling was used to get additional respondents among academics in particular. The entire sample consisted of respondents both within and outside the police service. From the police side, interviews were held with two former provincial commissioners of Gauteng, ten cluster commanders, each of whom had up to 42 years of experience in the SAPS, nine station commanders, with between 28 and 30 years' experience in policing as well as former senior police managers. Interviews were also held with academics and researchers in the area of policing, some members of the national and Gauteng Secretariat of police at both junior and senior management levels, one business expert in policing, and a leader in the South African Police Union. In total, 35 respondents were interviewed, apart from the focus group interviews. Finally, we also conducted five focus groups with police officers on the ground between the ranks of a constable and lieutenant colonel. Interviews were transcribed and a thematic data analysis carried out.

In terms of ethical considerations, we obtained approval for the study through the University of the Witwatersrand's Human Research Ethics Committee. Ethical issues such as voluntary participation, informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity were pointed out in the application for ethical clearance. Permission to interview police officers was also obtained from the South African

Police Service office in Gauteng. Respondents were assured of the confidentiality of the responses that they gave, in that the information they gave was not ascribed to them.

One of the main limitations of the study was that we were unable to interview the Provincial Commissioner of SAPS in Gauteng in 2017, as well as the Acting National Police Commissioner of SAPS in 2016 and 2017, including the former National Police Commissioners of Police from 2009 to 2015. However, these would not have affected the findings of the study as officers from both the national office and provincial offices were interviewed. Another administrative limitation is that some of the low ranking officers were afraid of being put on record, with the fear that what they would have said would be revealed to their managers. This was despite having explained the purpose of the study and having assured them of confidentiality of the information and that they would remain anonymous. This limitation was addressed through a triangulation of data sources in the main, as well as data collection techniques (Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 2011; Nieuwenhuis & Smit, 2012). The methodology for the study was however, strong in terms of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Bryman, 2012).

6. Results and Discussion

6.1 Traditional Policing Versus Intelligence Led Policing

The findings reveal that instead of adapting to the mode of operation of criminals by developing strategies, station commanders and some cluster commanders tend to rely on traditional methods of policing to deal with policeable crime. Most station commanders revealed that visible policing approach, road blocks and crime prevention operations were used as tactics to prevent aggravated robberies. These kind of operations do not bear fruit because they either displace crime to another area, or lead to a situation where criminals wait for the police to finish their operations and then go and carry out their activities. This explains why one of the senior police managers said the following, "the police are known to make fire out of cardboard and paper, meaning quick approach in terms of operations, flooding the area with police." In other words, these operations are not sustainable. Those who advocate for police visibility as a

mechanism of addressing crime have mentioned that aggravated robberies have gone up because of poor police visibility. One downside of visibility is that due to stop and searches, suspects that are supposed to be arrested get to escape and relocate to other areas in order to evade arrests. The study gathered that visibility is only useful if it is informed by a crime pattern analysis, rather than it being haphazard. Intelligence led policing enables the police to focus on identified problematic areas. The challenge with this is that there are those police managers at station level that underestimate the importance of intelligence in dealing with crime. Therefore, visible policing can only serve as a deterrence where it is strategic, that is, directed by intelligence. Use of intelligence would mean that the police position themselves strategically in order to deal with crime by following the patterns provided by the information at the disposal of the police and developing a strategy.

The challenge with crime intelligence however, is that there is a fund, also known as "paggeld", which is supposed to be used by the police in recruiting and paying informers, but is not used adequately. There is therefore a challenge with the recruitment of informers, which explains why there is weak intelligence capability at SAPS. There is also not enough personnel in crime intelligence as the police service has lost these to the private sector due to the lucrative salaries that are offered in the private sector. Notwithstanding this grim situation, there are few stations that deploy police vehicles and personnel to hotspots, as informed by crime threat analysis and the modus operandi of criminals.

6.2 Absence of a Contemporary Strategy to Deal with Crime

The findings reveal that SAPS in Gauteng has no strategy to deal with aggravated robberies. Several respondents believe that the problem of aggravated robberies in Gauteng is not a problem of police officers on the ground, but rather a strategy issue. When the police in Gauteng implemented an Aggravated Robbery Strategy in 2008, there was a decline in some of the crimes that fall under the aggravated robbery category. For instance, house robberies were reduced by 20 per cent, business robberies by 19 per cent and hijackings by 32 per cent between 2009 and 2011 (Newham, 2017). To the lack of strategy in the province, one respondent remarked as follows, "so at the moment what

we are doing with aggravated robbery is hit and miss." Another respondent referred to the manner in which SAPS in Gauteng is dealing with aggravated robberies as fire brigade policing, which amounts to crisis management. The police do not have a strategy which puts together crime prevention or visible policing, detective services, crime intelligence, supply chain management and human resources management unit so that they all work in tandem. One of the contributory factors to lack of strategy is the fact that SAPS is a national competency and therefore, provinces tend to wait for a strategy from the national office, rather than developing their own. The province should be able to define its own problems, but this is not the case. This is a structural and legislative problem, which has compromised policing. Some senior managers in the police in Gauteng mentioned the fact that they did not develop strategies because it is not expected of them to do so.

This finding is not unique to Gauteng but Khayelitsha in the Western Cape, where there was no strategy to deal with high levels of crime (O'Regan & Pikoli, 2014). This system has weakened the effectiveness of the SAPS as an institution that is mandated to see to the safety and security of the inhabitants of the country. A lack of strategy leads to the police adopting reactive approaches to crime prevention, rather than dealing with the causes. The reactive approaches displace crime rather than rooting it out. Instead of having a strategy in place and monitoring its implementation, SAPS in the Gauteng province and nationally use a performance chart system to determine police stations that are performing badly as well as those performing well. The performance chart partly relies on information recorded on the Crime Administration System, which could easily be manipulated by stations, as revealed by respondents. Between 2008 and 2010, as pointed out by Bruce (2011), there have been concerns over allegations of manipulation of crime statistics by some police stations in Gauteng and the Western Cape. What the police leaders fail to recognise with this approach is that crime figures do not say anything about the dynamics of crime, and can therefore not be used to determine if stations are performing well or not (Kriegler & Shaw, 2016).

6.3 Management Inefficiencies

Management inefficiencies or poor supervision at station level can also explain why the police are not

effective in addressing policeable crime. One of the manifestations of the inefficiencies is the inability of station commanders to use the information provided by the Crime Information and Analysis Centre to develop strategies or interventions to curb crime. What also came out was that there is no good quality management at station level, where officers are not made to account on patrols they claim to have conducted. Some of the station commanders do not use the Automatic Vehicle Location System (AVL) to ascertain if officers have indeed conducted patrols. When the cluster commanders try to verify the officers' reports about patrols through the AVL, they realise that the report coming from the officers and the one generated by the AVL are sometimes in conflict with each other, meaning that there were no patrols taken. Incidents which indicated ill-discipline, such as those of officers coming to work whilst intoxicated, were reported by respondents. This lack of command and control was also identified in a study conducted by the Policy Advisory Council as appointed by the former Police National Commissioner Jackie Selebi.

In terms of detective performance, there is no urgency on the part of the detectives to arrest a suspect that has been identified by a victim. Some of the dockets end up being closed as undetected, meaning that a suspect could not be found or there was not enough evidence at the crime scene to secure an arrest. Research conducted by the Department of Community Safety between 2011 and 2012 reveals that in some of the cases that were closed as undetected, thorough detective work was not carried out. For example, physical evidence was not collected, 24 hour inspections were not conducted, stolen goods list was not circulated, informers were not tasked to assist with the investigations and the investigating officers did not comply with instructions of prosecutors. The quality of the statements was also a concern, especially in relation to the description of the suspects and objects used in the commission of crime (Department of Community Safety 2012). Even in our study, the quality of statements was raised as a concern. This is an indication that the shift commanders, detective team leader, detective commander and station commander are not playing their part. With these challenges, the work of the detectives cannot serve as a deterrent for further crimes as there are few arrests and therefore few convictions. Respondents actually mentioned that there were more cases closed as undetected than those that ended with a guilty conviction.

6.4 Some Exceptions to the Gloomy Picture

Against all odds, there are few pockets of excellence in the SAPS, where some senior managers at cluster level and a few at station level adjust to the external environment through development of strategies and systems to deal with policeable crime. This has been identified from some cluster commanders who either use intelligence to bring about systems to address aggravated robberies, or develop strategies. Some of these have developed partnerships with several role players in the field of safety and security in order to address crime challenges, whilst others used both intelligence and members of the community to deal with crime. These are but few cluster commanders who have been innovative enough to come up with solutions for crime in their own clusters. These cluster commanders have been in the South African Police Service for more than 30 years and had been in senior management either at cluster or station level for 10 years and more. Involvement of other stakeholders in crime prevention included the sharing of resources that certain communities have, such as cellular phones and vehicles.

This study has revealed that despite high levels of crime, especially aggravated robberies, SAPS in Gauteng does not adapt to strategies that criminals employ through developing a counter-strategy. This has been proven by the manner in which a lot of managers at station level prefer to embark upon police visibility in order to deal with aggravated robberies. This problem is neither new nor unique to Gauteng. The Policy Advisory Council, as appointed by the then National Commissioner of Police Jackie Selebi between 2006 and 2007, found that despite the challenges of aggravated robbery and commercial crime at the time, there was no structured plan at national level to empower stations to manage and reduce crime. Rather, crime combatting interventions from the national office were irregular and not sustainable (SAPS, 2007). Stations were tasked by provinces to conduct operations and roadblocks with no consideration to specific needs of the station, and some of these were not intelligence based. At most of the stations visited, crime intelligence was not provided, for purposes of crime combatting.

On the detective services, the findings revealed a poor quality of investigations and low conviction rate. The poor quality of investigations was partly as a result of lack of proper command and control.

Another study by O'Regan and Pikoli (2014) in Khayelitsha, also illustrated inefficiencies in policing in three police stations in Khayelitsha. The study was requested by the Premier of the Western Cape at the time, partly to investigate complaints of allegations of inefficiency at the three Khayelitsha police stations. This study found that many crimes were not investigated properly as cases were often withdrawn or struck off the roll due to incomplete investigations. In terms of investigations, detectives did not comply with instructions of prosecutors, there was poor statement taking where elements of crime were not included in the statements. The main reason for these inefficiencies was poor management at station level, the cluster and provincial level. SAPS in Khayelitsha did not have any strategy in place to deal with vigilante attacks and youth gangs.

In line with the contingency theory of organisations, the police are expected to scan the environment through the use of information made available by crime intelligence and determine what the trends are, and develop strategies to counteract the acts of the criminals. As argued by Zhao, Lovrich and Robinson (2001, p.367), "individual organisations must adapt themselves to their external environment when their goal /goals are affected by change in their operating conditions." This action is expected of a strategic leader, upon noticing a change in the external environment. At the core of the contingency theory is that "the performance of an organisation is contingent on how well it fits the context within which it is embedded" (Zhao, Lovrich & Robinson, 2001, p.367; Kuhns III, Maguire & Cox, 2007, p429). The police can therefore not stick to traditional methods of policing even though they have proven not to work. The police managers and leaders in Gauteng have instead focused on visible policing, which amounted to a disjuncture or misalignment between operations and external conditions.

Traditional forms of crime control became increasingly ineffective in the late 1960s and 1970s, as they illustrated a poor fit between the societal environment and the strategic organisation of policing (Zhao, Lovrich & Robinson, 2001). Embarking on road blocks implies that police managers and leaders tend to put more emphasis on outputs than outcomes, resulting in officers becoming pre-occupied with the number of road blocks they must carry out rather than the results of the crime prevention efforts (Bruce, 2011). Ultimately, a misfit

between the organisation and its environment leads to the worsening of organisational performance (Zhao, Lovrich & Robinson, 2001). This has been evident in this study, which revealed that there was an increase in rates of aggravated robbery between 2012/13 and 2016/17 financial years.

Some of the attributes of effective police leadership which emanate from the contingency theory of organisations as well as the strategic leadership theory are vision, adaptability, flexibility and decisiveness, which illustrate the ability of a leader to adapt to the external environment by developing a strategy. Strategic leaders craft a strategy in order to bring about effectiveness as they are "responsible for the relationship of the external environment to choices about vision, mission, strategy and their implementation" (Daft, 2005/2008, p.288). Strategic leadership theory postulates that a strategic leader's principal task is setting a vision for an organization and providing a conducive environment for its implementation (Hitt, Keats & DeMarie, 1998; Ireland & Hitt, 2005; Hitt, Haynes & Serpa, 2010). In the absence of leaders with such calibre, an organisation will remain ineffective. The research reveals that at the time of the research, there were only few cluster commanders in the SAPS in Gauteng who were able to develop a strategy. This explains why most stations relied on traditional forms of policing to deal with aggravated robbery, which did not yield fruit.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

What the findings highlight is that whereas there may be leadership in the SAPS in Gauteng, the leadership is not of a strategic nature. The fact that the police leadership, in the main, does not adapt their strategies to the external environment signals that they are not effective in dealing with crime, let alone policeable crime. Contingency theory purports that organisations will only be effective if they remain dynamic through adapting to changes in technology and the environment (Donaldson, 2001; Gibling, 2005; Maguire & Uchida, 2007). It therefore remains a futile exercise to utilise the same old methods of policing to deal with aggravated robberies, even though they have proven not to yield results. This is said in light of the fact that strategies that criminals employ when committing crime change overtime, and the police need to be able to adjust to strategies that criminals utilise by developing counter strategies. Inability to adapt to strategies used by criminals in addressing

crime therefore indicates poor leadership, which is not able to cast a vision. Therefore, SAPS needs to develop a strategy that will be all-encompassing, that is, factoring in issues of crime prevention, investigations, crime intelligence and resource management. The strategy should be informed by the information that the police have in dockets, through crime intelligence and through incarcerated offenders. Detectives should also be trained to specialise in investigations whilst still at college in order to facilitate good investigation skills. Policing should also be decentralized in order to allow provinces to be creative in developing their own strategies, rather than rely on the national office to issue instructions on how to combat crime or to develop a strategy.

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