

Tenure Rights and Sustainable Livelihoods: Implications for Land Policy

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Abstract: Current development understanding in both policy and academic circles espouses that secure tenure has a significant contribution to poverty alleviation for small-scale farmers. It is under these auspices that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) was implemented in Zimbabwe. The main aim of this paper was to examine the effect of the tenure system to small scale farmers' livelihoods under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe. Although literature has been written on land reform, there is a dearth of rigour and political will on pursuing land reform in Southern Africa despite the racially skewed agrarian systems. Key informants who were selected for in-depth interviews are leaders of farmers, government officials, and small scale farmers. The study made use of semi-structured questionnaires as instruments for holding in-depth interviews with key informants. In addition, document review was used to gather secondary data from published literature sourced from the government and other credible publishers. With regards to the livelihoods of small-scale farmers, results indicate that there is potential for the FTLRP to improve their livelihoods. Positive benefits have been noted in a few cases where farmers had their own capital because land was not bankable without legally binding tenure rights. Therefore, farmers face challenges like lack of financial capital, which limits their productive capacity. In addition, farmers reported cases where arbitrary acquisition when political loyalty to the ruling party was suspected. With lack of capital, productivity among small scale farmers was reported to be waning as farmers rely on rain-fed agriculture. Resultantly, value for beef and other small livestock plummeted, thereby affecting the income of farmers. This demonstrates that secure land tenure and poverty alleviation of small-scale farmers are closely linked. By exploring the policy prescriptions of the FTLRP and livelihoods of farmers, this study highlights the salient matters that are critical in land reform policy implementation and research. The main argument of this study is that land reform can positively change the livelihoods of poor small-scale farmers, provided policy guarantees secure, and bankable title.

Keywords: Land reform, Livelihoods, Small-scale farmers, Tenure

1. Introduction

Throughout the world, land reform policies have tremendously shaped the agrarian structure of countries that implemented them (O'Laughlin, Bernstein, Cousins & Peters, 2013). Land redistribution policies which give secure tenure rights aimed at supporting small scale farmers are often implemented to ameliorate the state of those alienated by an agrarian system (El Ghonemy, 2002). It is the key to improving livelihoods, creating equality in accessing land resources between the poor and the rich. In China, when land was concentrated in the hands of few landlords, small-scale farmers were pestered with poverty, illiteracy (80% among women), only 16% of the cultivated land was under irrigation, and the infant mortality rate was 200 per 1000 live births (El Ghonemy, 2002:191). In addition, taxation was too harsh in the agricultural sector and small-scale farmers suffered. The middlemen took advantage of the plight of poor farmers by

buying their products at an unprofitable price. In South Korea, before the 1948 reforms, 49% of its farmers were tenants and rentals were exorbitant and unfair tenure arrangements forced farmers to only get 25% of the harvest (El Ghonemy, 2002:192). Land redistribution, therefore, leverages the upper hand of landholders and gives land and rights to the poor and landless

Lipton (2010) establishes a strong correlation between enhanced livelihoods and land redistribution. This is more relevant in agrarian arrangements that are characterised by racially skewed land ownership patterns. In particular, Namibia and South Africa, and formerly Zimbabwe are characterised by large scale commercial farms in the hands of few, and land poor black populations who form the majority of the population (Moyo, 2008). While redistribution of land addresses equity issues and potentially changes livelihoods, it is not a magic bullet. Greater efficacy and poverty reduction

opportunities have been noted in agrarian arrangements where secure, land rights were transferred to family run, small scale farms (Kariuki, 2009; Aliber, 2012). Despite the fact that economists argue that secure tenure rights are key to creating investment opportunities for rural farmers, land reform initiatives are lethargic and met with contentions in parts of Southern Africa (Deininger, 2003; Aliber, 2012). Masvingo province in Zimbabwe is one place where customary tenure arrangements and racially skewed land ownership patterns forced the majority of Black farmers to live in poverty (Moyo, 2008). The implementation of the infamous Fast Track Land Reform Programme ushered a reconfigured agrarian sector that espoused equity and better access to the poor. It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to answer the following research question:

- What is the state of tenure security for small-scale farmers in Masvingo Province after the FTLRP?

2. Literature Review on Tenure Rights and Sustainable Livelihoods

Land administration in Sub-Saharan Africa is centred on capital extraction without meaningful development in rural areas. As such, livelihoods in rural areas are fraught with landlessness, and persistent hunger. Tenure rights in Southern Africa are profoundly shaped by their former colonial governments and their mandate were serving those particular needs. The infrastructure was biased towards urban areas and was aimed at supporting the operation of land markets, the use and creation of capital, land use planning, land taxation systems and urban infrastructure (Williamson, 2001). Its main aim was to advance privatisation through modernisation of tenure. Moyo (2008) reiterates that former Southern Africa experienced the longest and most perverse colonial acquisition. Its land question has been emotive among the discontented given that poverty and landlessness stems from that. It is however confounding to note that the process to reverse land inequality especially in Namibia and South Africa has not gained foothold.

Although land reform in Zimbabwe has received international backlash for violating the rights of white farmers, and contributing to the economic downturn, redistribution was necessary. Maintaining skewed land distribution in the face of poverty is counterintuitive to the livelihood needs of small scale farmers in rural areas. The

need to address unfair policies is stressed by the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) that has tools that identify policies as important in sustaining the livelihoods of the poor. The SLA proffers for the strengthening of tenure organisation to achieve enhanced livelihoods from agriculture (DFID, 2003). It does so by governing individual and collective behaviour. Formal legal systems like property rights, and enforcement mechanisms or informal in the form of customs and traditions are supposed to speak to the needs of the poor (DFID, 2003). The SLA strongly suggests that tenure regimes should establish tenure arrangements that support sustainable livelihoods among small-scale farmers by strengthening land ownership. When farmers are empowered to take charge of resources they own, in this instance land, issues of the arbitrary acquisition will be curtailed. The SLA further supports this standpoint by stating that small-scale farmers, through reform of policies should have inalienable rights that are immune to acquisition to the resources that they own.

With skewed tenure system, there is need to reconfigure them. Tenure rights therefore need to entail regulation that reflects the contemporary land imperatives. Shivji (1998:86) stresses it as "the sum of rules recognized in law underlying land ownership, allocation of land rights, and their protection in law, their disposal and or their regulation". In addition, land administration includes a range of issues such as governance, recognising informal land administration systems, ownership and occupancy rights, pro-poor issues as well as decentralisation. Land administration when applied to the African context, should not seek to replace the traditional land administration systems, but devise means of enhancing the arrangements (Arko-Adjei, 2011). Williamson (2001) reiterates that the role of land administration in post-colonial Africa is to address injustices from colonialism, such as in Southern Africa.

Sachikonye (2004:5) further stresses that land reform should entail "substantial changes in ownership, control, and use of land in order to lessen land-based inequalities". It often takes the form of redistribution of land rights for the benefit of the landless and poor such as tenants and farm workers and small communal farmers whose tenure and livelihoods are insecure". Tenure security for small-scale farmers lies among other things, in the ability of institutions to filter and guide the land

reform process (McGill, 1995). However, the fact that small-scale farmers are still poor is a pointer to misgivings within tenure arrangements (Ellis, 2000). It goes without saying that processes within institutions lend investigation. The SLA also suggests that in cases of persistent poverty, there lie the barriers to opportunities for sustainable livelihoods in institutional arrangements. These range from unfair tenure regimes, labour sharing systems to market networks or credit arrangements. It points out that unclear property rights contribute to poverty and uncertainty to livelihoods security.

3. Data Collection Methods, Procedures and Processes

In operationalising the research question as stated earlier, a case study design was used for this study for the purpose of analysing the effect of tenure rights as provided under the FTLRP on small-scale farmers in Masvingo Province. In-depth interviews with key informants and document analysis were used to get data. The researcher initially gathered data from published reports, government online publications, and publications on the linkages between tenure security, and livelihoods and small-scale farmers. Results from secondary data formed part of the basis for preparation of the interview guide questions. In-depth interviews were carried out with key informants as well as a selected number of small scale farmers. These were information-rich persons who could provide the study with detailed data on the FTLRP and small-scale farmers. Key informants were drawn from organisations that worked with small scale farmers in Masvingo; the War Veterans Association (a pressure group that was involved in the appropriation of land), the Ministry of Lands (the ministry responsible for land allocation), as well as ward leaders. In order to protect the identity of key informants and farmers, key informants were referred to as K while farmers were coded as F with a numerical value to avoid confusion.

Data collected from in-depth interviews and secondary data was used to draw conclusions of the study. Analysis entailed the rigorous process of coding. Coding is a process whereby data is organised into groups that share a commonality that is essential for analysis. Themes emerged from data collected from respondents was grouped. Additional cleaning of data into more concise groups led to the development of concepts emerging from data. At this point data in codes are organised into a more structured

analysis. In the deductive analysis framework used, codes that emerged from data were used to draw conclusions. The analysis of secondary data was done through observation of trends from existing data which informed identification of key research areas that were supposed to be given attention. For instance, reports show longitudinal trends in agriculture that formed a basis for in-depth interviews. It helped minimise instances of repeated probing during the process of interviewing.

4. Results and Discussion

From data collection, it was noted that Zimbabwean land policy is confronted with the task of unifying land administration that is highly fragmented. The process of land allocation involved a multiplicity of fragmented bodies with traversing interests. The existence of a multiplicity of actors complicates the FTLRP process. It is lamentable that addressing this matter in the FTLRP was a tall order for the government. The land allocation was not vested in one body of authority. The office of the District Administrator allocated A1 farms to some farmers while others were through violent occupation also referred to as *jambanja*. The District Administrator did not have the sole authority in allocation, the District Lands Committee which consisted of representatives from the president's office, war veterans and the ruling party was also involved (Matondi & Dekker, 2011:23). Politics also permeated the process of tenure security. One key informant added that, K2, "*Land ownership, its use, and control is politically charged, even access to inputs, partisan politics play a major role and being politically connected war-rants access to these rare resources.*"

As a result, threats of evictions were noted among A1 farmers thereby creating a state of tenure insecurity. Key informant 2 stressed that, '*People are subjected to dispossession because there is no documentation, giving documentation to farmers is empowering them*'. Being politically aligned to the opposition parties also warranted eviction and this spawned fear among farmers. In addition to that, it made farmers who are loyal to the ruling party feel secure about their tenure.

F4 "*Our tenure is secure though the government is still working on more secure documents of ownership. We are fencing, building homes, and drilling boreholes. What we only need is money for further development since land is already ours.*"

F3, *"Many farmers pretend to be affiliated to the ruling party to retain their farms, the War Veterans used to challenge land allocations but with the inclusion of Joint Operation Committee it is not happening here but I hear that it is happening in other areas"*

Although the opinions of farmers indicate minimal presence of threats, the lack of secure tenure still poses challenges. The minimal worry over possible dispossession by politically powerful farmers also intensifies the state of insecurity. This trend goes against the elements of 'good practice' in land reform processes. It follows that reforms were implemented to eliminate inequalities inherent in the Zimbabwean agrarian society and the continued existence of tenure insecurity is counterproductive. Additionally, Sikor and Müller (2009) also discovered that one of the tenets of land reform during the feudalism era was to eliminate the power base of exploitative feudalists. The FTLRP in Zimbabwe is still faced with the major challenge of addressing the land question if power-wielding politicians continue to arbitrarily influence land issues.

Moyo (2016) also emphasises that countries like Zimbabwe experienced dispossession at a greater magnitude. Therefore, there is a heightened need to address inequality among farmers. Having epochs of politically affiliated individuals countervails the success of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. Borrass (2009) also found that incidences of power wielding individuals were common in countries like Brazil, Columbia, Philippines, and South Africa. What is common in these countries' reform processes is the fact that powerful landholders remain, who have sustainably foiled any reform process that attempts to introduce land redistribution. In the same vein, the Political Economy theory criticizes the existence of certain enclaves in agrarian societies who advance their interests through state apparatus. Oftentimes, rent-seeking vested interests are hidden behind protectionist policies (Friddel, 1991:115). In noting that political affiliation plays a key role, given that ZANU-PF became the incumbent of land allocation, any relationship to the ruling party was more legitimate. During the reform process, ZANU-PF was tantamount to the legitimate government platform for redistribution. Friddel (1991) adds that sometimes the adoption of these platforms is camouflage for nefarious forces. The object of political economy, therefore, is to bring to light the perverseness of protectionism which continues to be adopted despite its anti-nationalistic interests.

It is these power dynamics that the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) fails to capture in its analysis that has the ability to negatively impact on small-scale farmers. As reiterated by Scoones *et al.* (2012), the SLA should add political power as one of its capitals that influences livelihood outcomes of small-scale farmers. Another dimension of tenure insecurity raised by key informants was that the absence of titling for farmers had a number of implications for small-scale farmers. Tenure insecurity has been raised by the World Development Report (2008) and Chimhowu (2018) as integral for sustainable small scale farmers.

Tenure insecurity in Africa can be traced to the state of land administration that is fraught with a multiplicity of land tenure arrangements. According to the Land Equity Report (2006) and Place (2009), African countries battle with a multiplicity of land administration systems. These are tradition customary systems as well as the imported systems used by the colonial government. A land administration which includes control of use, land use and zoning is often confronted by the dual land administration systems. Customary tenure systems are often subservient to private landholding tenure, which is a deliberation of the colonialism process. Be that as it may, rural small-scale farmers have been negatively affected by these tenure arrangements. The FTLRP as a land policy, has not aided farmers in coming up with a comprehensive tenure system that is secure and beneficial to farmers. By making itself the custodian of land, the government has not solved the challenges of the previously existing customary tenure. In this regards, key informant K2 emphasised that, *"As long as the state retains the right to land, security of tenure will not be guaranteed, "It is not secure at all, as long as the government is the legal owner, definitely you are not the owner"*, and further reiterated that, *'People are subjected to dispossession because there is no documentation, giving documentation to farmers is empowering them'*. The SLA, stresses the importance of institutional arrangements as critical for the livelihoods of the poor. As reiterated by DFID, institutional arrangements in the form of formal tenure rules profoundly affects the livelihood outcomes of farmers, therefore, having fragmented tenure is inimical to sustainable livelihoods.

Land under customary arrangements is often regarded as of less economic value in the majority of African countries. According to the Land Equity Report (2006), a few African countries like Uganda

and Mozambique have a unified legal system whereby both customary and private land is legally recognised. This protects landholders from both landholdings while failing to recognize customary tenure can have a deleterious impact on farmers. It also regards legitimate native owners of land as illegal settlers, like the Masai who were forcefully removed from Serengeti. In terms of the correlation between tenure security and investment among small-scale farmers, it can be noted that there is no direct causality between the two. Place (2009) asserts that there is inconclusive evidence to link tenure security and investment among small-scale farmers. The author gives an example of Ethiopian farmers who invested in their land despite insecure tenure. In the same manner, results from Malawi and Uganda discovered that there were uniform results across plots under different tenure arrangements (Place, 2009). This was also evidenced by responses from farmers who stated that:

F4 "Our tenure is secure though the government is still working on more secure documents of ownership. We are fencing, building homes, and drilling boreholes. What we only need is money for further development since land is already ours".

It follows that in Masvingo, farmers did not mention tenure as a factor in investment on their farms. Evidence shows that some farmers made long-term investments on their farms even though they did not have secure tenure. Lack of affordable credit is the only factor that hindered small-scale farmers from investing.

K3 emphasised that, 'The government should address the issue of land and its economic value, as of now we are working with its semi-productive value'. In addition, farmers also stated how their lack of collateral has denied them loans from banks.

Inversely, customary tenure (tenure arrangements found among farmers in rural areas) is widely accepted as able to provide sufficient tenure security to stimulate investment and growth (Place, 2009). This brings us to another important issue about tenure security. Place (2009) through empirical evidence noted that tenure insecurity is relatively high in regions where colonial land dispossession was extensive. It, therefore, can be justifiably concluded that tenure insecurity in some instances exists due to heightened competition spawned by skewed land ownership. Moreover, customary tenure systems

can be exonerated from being inherently unjust and promoting inequality. This is especially relevant when it comes to women accessing land rights in the majority of African countries.

On another note, it was noted that some farmers voiced the need to have an established legal framework where farmers could register their land and be able to change ownership in instances of inheritance or other reasons, as well as access loan from banks. Matondi and Dekker (2011) on their study of the FTLRP in Masvingo also noted results that indicated that small scale farmers were not protected from arbitrary dispossession; neither was there an existing supportive legal framework. Correspondingly, Ding (2003) discovered that the Chinese land policy prioritized the establishment of a policy where tenure security of farmers was vested. The legal framework lubricated land titling as well as land transfer. Therefore, the establishment of land administration that provides legally binding land registration is critical under the FTLRP. In addition to that, land titling has the potential to unlock the latent potential in farmers by proving access to cheap capital that can be obtained from banks. One of the major challenges encountered by farmers was lack of capital due to the absence of formal land titling. Financial capital is named as one of the essential elements needed for sustainable livelihoods. Its absence therefore spells poor livelihoods among small scale farmers. Moreover, land allocated to farmers in Masvingo was sourced from ranches hence extensive infrastructural investment was needed. Farmers expressed the need for infrastructural development. The FTLRP itself had committed to providing basic infrastructure but dip tanks, and most farms were inaccessible while some had dust paths. In addition to that, farmers constructed small dams fencing, and soil conservation structures on their own. Land reform, as reiterated earlier should work in concert with the land administration in order to achieve optimum use. Williamson (2010), is of the opinion that land administration helps in having the infrastructure in place during the process of land reform execution. Contrary to the tenets of land administration, land allocation in Masvingo was under-resourced as well as ill-planned. In this regard, Byamugisha (2014) stresses that Africa is plagued by a lack of investment in land administration. It is the role of land administration through land use to properly plan and demarcate land parcels before it is distributed to prospective landowners. Furthermore,

Pinstrup-Anderson and Shimokawa (2014) add that land planning provides a roadmap on where supportive infrastructure like electricity, irrigation systems should be placed in its spatial geodetic mapping. Hence land administration is no longer an activity divorced from the land reform process.

Williamson (2010) further adds that when a country has a fragmented land administration, it is likely to frustrate land reform efforts. As evidenced above, most farmers had to erect structures on their own. Under such circumstances, boundary disputes are likely to crop up among farmers. The Political economy theory further adds that the provision of infrastructure for farmers is the prerogative of the government. It is under these auspices that land administration can foster sustainability as stressed earlier (Williamson, 2010). The author emphasizes that contemporary land administration should ensure sustainable development by working in support of the FTLRP. Sustainability can only be reached by small-scale farmers when proper infrastructure is provided for small-scale farmers. In the same vein, Zhong (2014) also found that the Chinese government under Mao managed to foster sustainability in small-scale farming by providing infrastructure for poor small-scale farmers; post-settlement in China entailed institutional as well as infrastructure reconfiguration. Decentralisation of institutions and administrative functions for land were introduced. Irrigation and land drainage with a mix of traditional and modern technology was established with the aim of boosting production. Moreover, entrusting farmers with infrastructure ensures the longevity of natural resources. For instance, the German Constitution has a provision insisting on the land owner's social role to natural resources (Williamson *et al.*, 2008).

Williamson (2010) further stresses the role of land administration as that of addressing injustices from colonialism, such as in Southern Africa. On the contrary, in Sub-Saharan Africa, land administration mainly centred on capital extraction without meaningful development in rural areas (Williamson, 2010). Therefore, correcting colonial injustices should entail substantial investment in land administration. This would include the establishment of sound infrastructure like clear irrigation, roads as well as railway networks. Giving less priority to investment in public infrastructure is likely to be counteractive to the FTLRP land reform aims. It is lamentable that governments and development organizations

seem to give less priority despite the role it plays in enhancing productivity among farmers in rural areas (Pinstrup-Anderson & Shimokawa, 2014). The majority of developing countries have been investing less in infrastructure and maintenance of existing roads and electricity supplies and telecommunications in rural areas substantially lack. Land planning in the Fast Track Land Reform Programme made use of the 1930s planning models that alienated people from sources of water. As a result, access to water is difficult among A1 farmers. Moyo and Matondi (2013) assert that land administration institutions are wrought with red tape. They often employ outdated approaches to land use and land use issues span various ministries which render the government inefficient in land use matters. According to Byamugisha (2014), African governments sit with a degenerated surveying infrastructure like geodetic networks and they also rely on outdated large-scale base maps. This is contrary to the notion raised by Williamson (2010) where the author emphasized the need for the land administration to correct unfair colonial injustices as well as the promotion of sustainability through capacitating farmers. Colonial land administration alienated the rural areas from infrastructural development and heavily taxed them as it was preoccupied with capital extraction. Therefore, farmers in rural areas have been neglected and driven from important resources like water as well as important road and railway networks. It is lamentable that African small-scale agriculture is distinctively characterized by remotely isolated farmers located in inaccessible and infertile places (Chimhowu, 2018). However, the implementation of the FTLRP was supposed to reverse these colonially instituted ploys of isolation by strategically placing small scale farmers and prioritizing infrastructure for them.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Most of the farmers that were interviewed indicated that only those farmers with immovable property managed to get loans from banks. Key informants added that lack of an established legal framework for ownership tenure security remains insecure and farmers are also not benefiting from the economic value of their land and cannot easily change ownership of land. Challenges faced by farmers in accessing financial capital include lack of collateral since the majority of farmers do not own fixed property like houses. Those who accessed loans had collateral while others were farmers who formed cooperatives and applied for loans as a group.

Unavailability of long term tenure arrangements is detrimental to livelihoods of small scale farmers. Given that the majority of farmers cannot use offer letters as proof of collateral, the land is a dead asset to its beneficiaries. Its economic value is not useful to farmers. This means that farmers cannot derive sustainable livelihoods from farming because they struggle to get capital without collateral. The majority of A1 farmers are poor people who were given land in order to decongest the communal areas. Nevertheless, the policy misses the mark by not providing permanent tenure arrangements to A1 farmers eighteen years after the implementation of the programme. Moreover, the fact that the government has overarching control and ownership of land is detrimental to development. Farmers need to have control and ownership of land in order to maximise the optimum land value and it also empowers them.

The presence of multiple agencies that dealt with the land administration in Masvingo also leads to a fragmented administration. The involvement of War veterans, local leadership and the Ministry of Lands brings uncertainty of how land administration should be handled. Moreover, farmers feel insecure when various organisations get involved without clear-cut roles that they play. It also increases exposure of farmers to arbitrary dispossession of land by those in power. Political actors with close links with the ruling party ZANU-PF like War Veterans had the power to take the land. Political motives in this case negatively affect perceptions of farmers regarding tenure security which resultantly counteract production. Although farmers are investing regardless of tenure security, the state of farmers remains uncertain. Farmers remain vulnerable to dispossession if political imperatives prevail. Moreover, the FTLRP still lack an operational legal framework that enables farmers to bequeath land when the need arises.

Although redistribution took place, lack of land planning and land use had some drawbacks. The land planning process did not place people closer to sources of water. The use of old land administration colonial planners that used to drive black farmers from sources of water was inimical to crop farming as well as animal husbandry. Although redistribution undoubtedly took place, poor planning on the part of the government threatens to lock farmers in a state of disequilibrium. Land planning also failed to provide road and railway networks for

small scale farmers. As a result, the lack of transportation negatively affected farmers in accessing inputs. Inputs became difficult to access, and the government also took long to deliver. The result of the lack of transport networks includes imperfect markets, fraught with price hikes and a shortage of products. Functional irrigation only covers a negligible fraction of small scale farmers. As a result, A1 farmers heavily rely on rain-fed farming. Therefore, one can note that the African land question was not adequately addressed given that the land process should meet the needs of small scale farmers that ensures sustainability. Lack of sufficient capitals like irrigation for small scale farmers exposes farmers to rain-fed agriculture vagaries.

Despite the farmers having expressed the absence of security, the fact that they cannot use their land as collateral security is inimical to growth. Successful land reform processes in China and other places indicate that giving farmers more secure ownership renders land policies successful. Farmers will be able to use their land as collateral and also ease the process inheritance. Therefore, the study recommends that the government should establish a formal land ownership legal system that gives farmers rights to their land. Key informants also reiterated that providing secure rights for small scale farmers is instrumental to growth. Land administration in Zimbabwe needs to be reconfigured to meet the needs of small-scale farmers. The existence of conflicting tenure systems (customary and imported English tenure systems) is inimical to addressing the African land question.

Addressing the African land questions entails reversing inequalities inherent in agrarian systems that suffered massive colonial land dispossession. The SLA emphasise that institutions must be regulated to address the needs of small scale farmers. Indonesia as a former British colony managed to unify its indigenous tenure system and the inherited colonial tenure to combat irregularities. Similarly, Uganda and Mozambique legally recognised land under customary tenure. Moreover, addressing tenure arrangements should be able to eliminate unlawful dispossession in cases where a multiplicity of authorities get involved and partisan politics interfere with land distribution. The Political Economy states that the government should guard against the advancement of vested interests in tenure arrangements. In China, the privatisation of land rights managed to eliminate predatory tendencies

of landlords in its agrarian system. In terms of the provision of tenure security, the Zimbabwean land administration is fraught with political interference. Results indicate how partisan politics interfere with the process of land allocation. The involvement of multiple political figures like War Veterans and government is inimical to the process of land reform. Policy implementation in development is a public endeavour that is not supposed to be permeated by politics in democracy.

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