

# Pre and Post-Settlement Support Systems and the Failure of Some Land Reform Projects in South Africa: Implications for Planning of Land Reform in the Future

**D Phasha**

Independent, South Africa

**T Moyo**

University of Limpopo, South Africa

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**Abstract:** The purpose of land reform in South Africa was to correct the injustices of the apartheid era where millions of blacks were dispossessed of their land. A major challenge has been the failure of many projects on land reform projects. Some scholars attribute the failure largely to the provision of inadequate pre and post-settlement support. The paper therefore aims to analyse that support and its contribution to failure of some land reform projects. The objectives are to examine the machineries for the delivery of settlement support, the nature of support and also to analyse its performance. The methodology was a qualitative desk study. Findings pointed to weak institutional capacities in planning and implementation and poor inter-governmental collaboration as key factors for failure. The paper recommends that as the country considers how it will implement the 'Land Expropriation Without Compensation' policy, the government should significantly invest in an effective, comprehensive and integrated support system of support to beneficiaries to guarantee the success of land reform.

**Keywords:** Land reform, Land Expropriation, Pre and post settlement support, Sustainable development

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## 1. Introduction

Land reform has generally been justified as a redistributive, restorative tool for justice and fairness. One of the most pervasive legacies of colonisation and imperialism in Africa was the racial inequality and imbalances in the ownership and control of land which was biased in favour of a minority white population. Millions of black Africans were dispossessed of their land. According to Moyo (2007), the response of a number of Southern African countries to colonial land dispossession was to expropriate land from the white settlers. Most of the region embarked on some form of land reforms when colonial settlers left after attainment of independence. However, evidence shows limited success of such reforms. In Zimbabwe, for example, land invasions and the lack of capacity by the government to finance the reforms contributed to failure. In Tanzania, the market-based approach to land reform that was adapted had the undesirable result where land ownership became concentration in the hands of a few large-scale commercial farmers and foreign investors, leaving many poor Tanzanian households without land. In Namibia, land reform has also been slowed down by the market-based model that the government followed. After attaining democracy in

1994, the South African government moved swiftly to correct racial historical injustices and unfairness in the pattern of ownership of land. The Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 had dispossessed millions of black people from their land, resulting in a highly skewed pattern of land ownership in which 87 per cent of the land came under ownership of the white population. The new Constitution of the Republic, under Sections 25(7) made provision for restitution of land to those who had lost it or their entitlement to equitable redress (Kloppers & Pienaar, 2014).

Land reform is rooted in a strong legislative and regulatory framework. Even if the Land Expropriation Bill is not passed, the government has committed to continue with the reform process, albeit in the context of the 'willing seller' 'willing buyer' basis. The implication is that there will be new land owners, and for historical reasons, a good number will require support to be viable. A well-functioning and effective pre and post-settlement support system is therefore important to support such land owners. The government introduced the Land for Agriculture Development (LRAD) Grant to support land development of new farmers. A fundamental challenge has been the slow implementation of land reform and its failure in some instances. In his

study on land reform, Terblanche (2008) observed that 50 per cent of land reform projects had failed. Other authors also concur on this point (Kloppers & Piennars, 2014; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014; Hall & Kepe, 2017). By 2018, out of an estimated 82 million hectares, the government had only managed to transfer 10 per cent to 800,000 black farmers instead of the target of 30 per cent which it had set.

Sebola (2018) argues that a number of land reform projects targeting emerging black farmers failed despite their being given various forms of support.

According to Sibisi (2015:18) post settlement was delivered through the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program (CASP). Its purpose was to support land and agrarian reform farmers. The program had six priority areas and these were: provision of advisory and technical services, training and capacity building, business management, marketing, provision of farm infrastructure, production inputs and finance (Sibisi, 2015). Support has also been delivered through the Recapitalisation and Development Program (RECAP). The paper was motivated by the failure of some land reform projects, an outcome that is quite a paradox in view of the intense interest around land reform. The objectives were to examine the machineries for the delivery of such support, to analyse the performance of the interventions and to recommend strategies for improvement.

## **2. Methodological Approach**

A qualitative research design was applied because the purpose was to obtain in-depth understanding of how pre and post settlement support could have led to failure where it was expected to succeed. Data was collected from reports from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) and Department of Agriculture (DoA) since they are primarily mandated to deliver such support. Thematic analysis was used given the qualitative nature of the study. A number of case studies from the literature on experiences of land reform beneficiaries were also reviewed and analysed based on published sources. The thematic approach to data analysis was applied in the processing of the secondary data.

### **2.1 Conceptual Framework**

The study was guided by the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) as well as the sustainable land use management approach. The SLA is grounded on

the notion that access to productive assets and resources can reduce vulnerability to poverty. The approach is considered to be both developmentalist (in terms of its long-term perspective of livelihoods) and also with respect to its welfarist orientation (in the short-term). The approach puts emphasis on the potential of people in terms of their capacity to harness and utilise physical and financial resources, social networks and skills to enhance their livelihoods (Serrat, 2017). In the context of land reform, when a government provides pre and post settlement support to beneficiaries of a land reform program, expected outcomes are that the support will be relevant to the needs of the farmers and that it will be managed in a manner that enables the farmers to achieve the goals of the program particularly in terms of improving production and also their livelihoods. The support has to enable recipients to access the capital, inputs, skills, knowledge and expertise they need to be successful farmers.

In this regard, land reform thus for it to be a success need support from the environment spearheaded by the state which encompasses finance, skills training, extension support as well as funding from the state and non-governmental organizations. In support, Ncube (2017) emphasizes the importance of stakeholders such as agricultural extension services because these serve as a link between the farmers and authorities such as the DoA and also with other stakeholders. They also assist with resources, information and capacity development needed to improve their productivity. Thus, the quantity and quality of agricultural support programmes reduces vulnerability to poverty and consequently improves and sustain people's livelihoods. The support also has to ensure that the farmers are able to protect the environment, which is the essence of sustainable development. A functional and balanced eco-system is sustained through an integrated interaction of the constituent elements where natural, human and technological factors are mobilised and used efficiently used to achieve social and economic development.

The SLF was chosen as the framework of analysis to study settlement support and its impact on land reform projects because it guides the analyst to evaluate how institutional, material and other support provided by key agencies in land reform, affected land reform outcomes in terms of the utilisation of land and benefits to the beneficiaries.

### 3. Literature Review

The review is a synthesis of a number of studies that link land reform and support and also it reviews available evidence on the contribution of inadequate or poor support to land reform outcomes.

#### 3.1 Pre and Post-Settlement Support as Integral Elements of Land Reform

Kirsten, Machethe, Ndlovu and Lubambo (2016) argue that land reform alone is not enough to transform the livelihoods of beneficiaries. In addition to land, they need infrastructure such as good roads, water and electricity, access to finance to cover the costs of their farming activities. They also have to acquire and practice new knowledge and technical and other skills in agriculture.

#### 3.2 Beneficiary Selection

Sebola (2018) brings out the question of the targeting of land reform beneficiaries. He argues that one of the reasons for failure of some land reform initiatives was that the farmers were largely inexperienced or in some cases, not interested in farming.

#### 3.3 Needs Assessments During the pre-Settlement Phase

Some authors point to the failure of the responsible agencies to carry out needs assessments prior to transferring land to beneficiaries. For example, Sekoto and Oladele (2012) emphasize the importance of the pre-settlement phase because it provides the opportunity for an extensive evaluation of the farm to be transferred and also of the potential of prospective beneficiaries to farm. They view pre-settlement support as involving evaluation of the agricultural potential of the farm to be bought and in some instance development of business plans whereas post settlement support should include extension support, training and assistance with infrastructure development and advice on marketing of the produce.

#### 3.4 Inappropriate Design of Projects

Inappropriate design of post-restitution projects has been cited as an issue. For example, Hall (2003) cites lack of role clarity among the various actors involved in land reform as to who should provide post-settlement support. She argues that when land reforms started, there appears to have been

no consensus on the role of the Commission on Restitution and Land Reform (CRLR) after the transfer process had been completed. The role of local government in post-settlement was also not clear. Atuahene (2014) argues that failure of pre and post-settlement support was also partly caused by the limited role played by municipalities, who are the ideal agencies of local level development. Xaba and Roodt (2016) also attribute failure to design issues. They note that the design of land reform projects generally tended to promote capital-intensive commercial farming. They are of the view that such support appears to be designed for more successful and more commercial-oriented farmers rather than the largely unskilled and undercapitalized emerging farmers, mostly beneficiaries of land reform.

#### 3.5 Adequacy of Support

A number of studies point to the limited inadequate post-settlement support, limited provision of skills, lack of planning and infighting in communities. Lahiff (2012), a scholar who has extensively studied land reform in South Africa, makes the conclusion that the lack of post settlement support is one of the factors that has led to the failure of many land reform projects. Using Limpopo Province as an example, he argues that although the then DoA was the lead agency in the implementation of land reform in the province, it did not take responsibility for post-settlement (or post-transfer) support of beneficiaries. This fell largely on the provincial DoA and, more recently, to the post-settlement unit (PSU) established by the Limpopo RLCC (Ramutsindela, Davis & Sinthumule, 2016). These observations are supported by Xaba and Roodt (2016) whose study concludes that land reform in the country has been marked by some failures, with little or no improvements in the livelihoods of the beneficiaries. Their findings revealed that about 70 to 90 per cent of the projects (including land restitution projects) have failed. They attribute this to inadequate attention to beneficiary needs paid by the public, academics, politicians and other stakeholders involved in the land acquisition or restitution phases of the process. Sekoto and Oladele (2012) also argue that the support had no impact on the productive capacity of beneficiaries. Clearly, the shortage of qualified extension officers made it impossible for production to take place. Ncube also points out that provision of extension services to smallholder farmers were problematic due to 'lack of meaningful contact with farmers, outdated extension methods, low numbers of staff and low aptitudes of extension staff' (Ncube, 2017:3).

Land reform farmers have tended to depend on informal markets to sell their produce. The challenge with such markets is that they are not predictable. Sekoto and Oladele (2012) observe that lack of market support is a major constraint to the success of new farmers under the land reform in the North West province. Marketing strategies are very weak and traditional. Consequently, they have been an obstacle to growth in farm production.

### **3.6 Weaknesses in Institutional Capacity**

Binswanger-Mkhize (2014) cites capacity challenges faced by the DRDLR, the Restitution Commission (RCO, the Provincial Agricultural Departments (PAD). The author argues that these capacity limitations reflect poor performance on the part of the Comprehensive Agriculture Support Program (CASP) and the Recapitalisation and Agricultural Support Program (RECAP). It is also worth pointing out that even the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR), the department at the centre of land reform and pre and post-settlement support, in its Strategic Plan 2015-2020, admits that very little attention has been paid to land development and post-settlement support to ensure that redistributed land is used to its best potential. The Department explains that most of the attention has instead tended to focus on transferring land to previously disadvantaged groups who acquire land through the land reform programme (DRDLR, 2015b). More recent studies, for example, Hall (2017), argues that in a number of instances, although government departments budgeted for support for land reform, only a few projects actually received that support. The challenge could have been limited capacity on the part of the DRDLA in terms of human and other resources. But these challenges should have been identified and redressed to ensure successful outcomes from the reform process. Hall's research also finds that poor beneficiary participation at all stages of the land reform process (project identification, design and implementation), was a major challenge. It meant that they were simply at the 'receiving end' of any support that was provided, without having the opportunity to make an input into its suitability, adequacy or relevance.

### **3.7 Partnerships**

The DoA and DRDLR always encouraged land reform beneficiaries to enter into partnerships

with commercial farmers (who, for historical reasons, happened to be mostly white) in order to get technical and advisory services. Mentors have been appointed as well to assist the new farmers. The challenge is that partnerships have not always worked to the advantage of the black farmer, with reports indicating that some of the partners have not done much to transfer skills even though they receive consulting fees from the DRDLR for their services (Mabuntana, pers. comm. and Contact Trust, 2003). The poor performance of partnerships is a reflection of poor monitoring on the part of the departments that contracted the partners because if problems had been picked up earlier, they could have been resolved through termination of the contracts to the partner and appointing new ones. It could also reflect poor communication with the beneficiaries because if consulted, they would have raised these issues with the department. In more recent land reform cases, Hall and Kepe (2017) attribute failure to the government's change in approach to land reform. They explain that in the last four years, the government's approach has shifted from focusing on tenure security towards holding land on a lease basis. One of the conditions in the leasehold model is that for a prospective beneficiary to be awarded a lease, they must have a strategic partner (typically a large commercial farmer or agribusiness venture). In their research, Hall and Kepe conclude that it appeared as though 'elite capture' had occurred because their study had reports of cases where the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform had signed leases not with beneficiaries but with the strategic partner and that more support was directed to the partner rather than beneficiaries. The authors, however, did not find much evidence in the literature about the issue of elite capture. Although this finding cannot be generalized, it however gives insights into why some land reform projects have failed. Furthermore, the possibility of 'elite capture' in land reform is not a matter to be ignored. As the government continues with land reform in the future, it needs to find mechanisms to guard against such practices because they will defeat the noble cause for redistributive justice through land reform.

### **3.8 Quality of Extension Services**

Extension services are a key pillar for success in agriculture because they provide the knowledge and impart the technical skills that farmers need to be efficient and productive. The challenge in a

number of land reform projects was that extension officers did not have the requisite educational qualifications and knowledge that was necessary to support the new farmers effectively. According to Greenberg (2013) there were fewer and less educated extension officers that were available for the new small-scale farmers. Furthermore, in terms of educational qualifications, they possessed diplomas or certificates, contrary to the government standard of a bachelor degree or higher.

### 3.9 Lack of Access to Markets

Another challenge in government's support to the new farmers was the limited scope of that assistance. Greenberg (2013) argues that the package of support did not include some vital services such as market access. His study observed that most support was mainly in the form of material and financial support. This excluded marketing support, an important factor in successful farming. Even if farmers are enabled to increase production, they cannot succeed if they do not have access to markets. Greenberg argues that new farmers are failing to break the barriers of markets which are controlled by white commercial farmers who have well versed marketing strategies and resources for both the local and international markets. It is therefore important to address the issue of markets in post settlement support.

### 3.10 Review of Case Studies on Pre and Post-Settlement Support

A review of a number of government reports and published sources revealed some concrete examples of how poorly implemented or designed pre and post-settlement support contributed to the failure of some land reform projects. The section below presents some of those cases. They were selected based on the criteria that they were all fell within the categories of land redistribution, land restitution and land tenure reform. The other criterion was that they are known to have been failing or had collapsed. Finally, cases were selected depending on availability of information to enable the authors to relate pre and post-settlement support to their performance.

#### **Case 1: Limpopo Province – Bjatladi Community Property Association (CPA)**

The experience of the Bjatladi Community Property Association (CPA) is documented in a

study by Mantsho (2018) on land restitution in the Waterberg District of Limpopo Province. In that study, Mantsho explains that in 2007 Zebediela Citrus farm was transferred to the rightful owners in terms of the legislation on restitution. The new owners were registered under the Bjatladi CPA (Mantsho, 2018). Prior to settlement, the DRDLA provided support in the form of registration of the CPA. This involved signing of a restitution settlement agreement in which 35 percent of the land would be transferred within a period of 15 years as from 2007. The agreement also established a citrus fruit company that was to produce for local and export markets and also create jobs for the community around the area (Mashamaite, 2014). The DRDLR provided the CPA with extension support. However, according to Mantsho (2018), in reality, little support was actually delivered. This is supported by Mashamaite (2014) who explains that basically, the Department was overwhelmed and short staffed and so, it was unable to arrange delivery of extension services on the required scale. Mantsho (2018) also explains that whereas the financial demands of running a large citrus venture are high, the amount provided by the department was much smaller than what the new company required. The farmers thus had no choice but to borrow from financial institutions. Unfortunately, these institutions were reluctant to finance them because they did not have a track record in farming and also, they did not have the required collateral as individual farmers (Mashamaite, 2014). According to research by Mantsho (2018), after failing to get support from the financial institutions, the farmers resorted to using their social grants to finance their agricultural activities. But these were not adequate. In fact, the diversion of resources meant for the upkeep of the farmers and their families ultimately had a negative impact on their welfare.

Another challenge faced by the CPA was limited or poor access to markets. The majority had to travel on average, 90 kilometres to reach markets to sell their produce. The Department was unable to assist them on this score. Consequently, most of the farmers had to utilise local informal markets. They resorted to selling from the back of their bakkies, at local shopping centres and stalls in the area. The big challenge was that they had no choice but to sell at much lower prices than they could have obtained from larger or more established farm produce markets.

### **Case 2: The Makgoba Tea Estate in Limpopo Province**

The Makgoba Tea Estate (previously known as Sapekoe Tea Estate), is located near Tzaneen in the Limpopo Province. The rightful owners of the land on which the estate was established, lodged a claim and won it. Although the victory of the owners was widely celebrated, the Makgoba Tea Estate would become one of the sad stories of failed land reform in the province (Matlala, 2017). The Estate used to employ about 3 000 workers when it was flourishing. The government spent R104 million to purchase the farm and transfer it to the new owners. This benefited 600 families (Matlala, 2017). Lack of support to the new owners led to the virtual collapse of the farm.

Over 2 000 jobs were lost. A study by Matlala (2017) reveals how poor management and negligence led to failure of the farm in his description of the state of the Estate post restitution:

*...Tea bushes that had been left to grow up to 3 metres high; the agricultural infrastructure had been stripped and removed from the property and opportunities to create employment looked bleak as planned projects had come to nothing. A forensic report marked 'for internal use only' confirmed that the estate was stripped of assets in excess of R121 million and subsequently, in 2011 the Department became the caretaker of the estate.*

It is not surprising that the farm has not been successful.

### **Case 3: Dikgolo Trust in Limpopo Province**

Dikgolo Trust came into being in 1998 after the community won a land claim. The Trust is made up of a group of people from the Dikgale tribal area in the former homeland of Lebowa. The people came together to purchase land through the Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) offered by the Department of Land Affairs (Lahiff, Davis & Manenzhe, 2012). The group had settled in the villages of Dikgale and Ga-Mokgopo during the period of forced removals of the apartheid era.

The DLA provided them with a total grant of R1 040 000, most of which was spent on the purchase of the land (Lahiff *et al.*, 2012). The DoA provided support in the form of procurement of consulting services to develop a business plan for the Trust. The business plan proposed an elaborate project structure, comprising small plots for

cultivation by individual members and a range of other enterprises to be operated collectively by the group (Atuahene, 2014).

In spite of the initial support, the Trust experienced some challenges. One was that the post settlement support was erratic in terms of provision of skills development and financial resources. The other was that most farmers were overwhelmed by the drastic shift from subsistence and small-scale farming that they were accustomed to and the commercial farming that they were about to embark upon. They felt that their skills did not match what commercial farming entailed. Another challenge was that support in the form of extension services from the DoA (Mankweng satellite offices) was very erratic (Ramutsindela, Davis & Sinthumule, 2016:41). After the initial grant was used for the purchase of land, financial resources dried up and commercial lenders or the land bank could not finance the agricultural production. This resulted in limited growth in terms of crop production. The result, as documented by Lahiff, Davis and Manenzhe (2012) were poor yields. The authors claim that the amount of maize produced by farmers at Dikgolo Trust simply did not match the land area they had. The farmers harvested less than 500 kg, which was even below the amount of maize required for consumption by one household in a given the year.

Clearly, even though the Dikgolo Trust represented success in terms of the transfer of land to its rightful owners, became an unsuccessful farming venture due to the failures related to pre and post-settlement support.

### **Case 4: Monyamane Communal Property Association**

A study by Lahiff *et al.* (2012) describes the case of the Monyamane Communal Property Association (CPA) which was formed by residents of Sekgopje village in 1998. It was for the purpose of acquiring land under the land redistribution programme in Limpopo Province. Pre-settlement support was made available by the provincial DLA which assisted the residents to form a CPA. The model was deemed to be appropriate because it would make it easier to deliver support services such as financial and material support. One business plan would be drawn up for the CPA instead of developing several plans for each individual farmer. Ramutsindela, Davis and Sinthumule (2016) indicate that the CPA was granted a Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) of

R2.5 million to purchase land and R500 000 for infrastructure. Each member was given a start-up financial grant of R15 000. The Monyamane Farmers Association (MFA) was registered as a CPA with 201 members through the assistance of the Provincial Department of Land Affairs (Matlala, 2014). Post settlement support mainly consisted of agricultural support services. The Provincial Department provided extension officers to support and educate the newly resettled farmers in agricultural production (Matlala 2014).

The CPA faced a number of challenges. The first was that post-settlement support was ineffective. Lahiff *et al.* (2012) highlights the unavailability of extension officers during crucial crop production times. This challenge negatively affected yields. He also points out that animal husbandry production was limited due to lack of personnel within the DoA who were the experts in this field. A second challenge was that the Trust received limited financial support through DoA. It was not adequate to finance all the needs of the farmers (Sihlobo & Kapuya 2018). The third challenge included the lack of co-ordination and communication between key departments such as DoA, DLA, Housing and Water Affairs and Forestry and local government structures (Department of Land Affairs, 244).

In essence, given the multidimensional nature of the requirements of land beneficiaries, no one department could deliver on its own. It was therefore important for the different stakeholders (Departments of Education, Finance, Agriculture and Environment Affairs, Housing) to adopt a more integrated approach and also to engage the farmers on their different needs. Once again, the failure of this land redistribution program can clearly be attributed to, among other factors, the shortcomings in the nature and delivery of pre and post-settlement support. The DRDLA (2013) reached similar conclusions in its 3-year review of the Recapitalisation and Development Programme. By its own admission, the Department concluded that most land reform projects were not successful and were in distress. The Review explained that failure was due to a lack of adequate and appropriate post-settlement support. It admitted that some projects had actually collapsed to a point where the farms had to be auctioned.

#### **Case 5: Richtershoek Farm, Mpumalanga**

Not all pre and post-settlement support resulted in failure, however. For example, Richtershoek

Farm in Mpumalanga is one of the successful farms which was assisted by the DRDLR in 2009. The farm is situated outside Malelane in Mpumalanga. Thabethe, Mungatana and Labuschange (2014) cite the project as a classic example of pre-settlement support in which the beneficiary received agricultural training first to capacitate them with skills and knowledge on agricultural production. This was followed by a R14 million recapitalisation grant that the department offered. Kgosiemang and Oladele (2012) note that the grant assisted the beneficiaries to purchase agricultural implements such as equipment and machinery. The department also facilitated the provision of water and electricity services. Clearly, it can be said that the Richtershoek Farm land reform project was a successful case of pre support to beneficiaries of land reform. But it is also worth noting that it may have been adequately supported because it was a large enterprise, probably earmarked for commercial agriculture. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that a farming enterprise can succeed when the right kind of support is adequately provided.

#### **4. Conclusion and Recommendations**

Agricultural extension has proved to be a big issue in the land reform case studies discussed. Limited support was provided to the new farmers and yet such support was very central for their success. These observations are supported in the work of Greenberg (2013), Ncube (2017) and Sekoto and Oladele (2012). The failure to deliver adequate pre and post-settlement support in the cases that were highlighted contributed to the failure of the projects. In terms of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), even though the beneficiary communities had acquired a valuable asset that could transform their lives through improving livelihoods, this was constrained by the poor support received. The failures point to the need to reconceptualise and improve delivery of such services in the future. The paper makes a few key recommendations. In thinking about the future of settlement support, the words of Xaba & Roodt in their call for government to provide more effective support for post-settlement, should be borne in mind: If land reform is to continue in its current fashion, its prospects are doomed. It is the government's duty to see to it that they create self-sufficient farmers through the provision of post-settlement support (Xaba & Roodt, 2016:21).

While acknowledging that a small study of this nature cannot be generalized, there are important issues that can be considered in future policy designs and implementation. The paper recommends that as the country deliberates on the proposed Land Expropriation Without Compensation policy, the government should significantly invest in an effective, comprehensive and integrated support system to guarantee the success of land reform. Government should consider strengthening the institutional structures and mechanisms responsible for providing support to land reform beneficiaries, institutions such as the DRDLR, DoA, Department of Public Works and other departments at provincial government level that can provide support, agencies such as the National Development Agency (NDA), to improve collaboration in terms of more effective inter-governmental coordination in the design and implementation of support programmes.

The capacities of the departments responsible for post-settlement support should be strengthened through filling any vacant posts, creation and/or enhancing capacity of specialised units that are devoted to pre and post-settlement support. From a review of the case studies, it would appear that pre-settlement support was very limited and yet, it is so vital for the success of the new farms. It is therefore recommended that the government should consider institutionalising pre-settlement support and training prospective land reform beneficiaries prior to transferring land to them. Extensive needs assessments of the beneficiaries should be carried out before land transfers. The studies should, among other things, prepare a socio-economic profile of the beneficiaries and identify their needs for capacity development; information which would then inform training interventions. Profiling should also eliminate "fly by the night farmers" who take chances when they hear of possible financial benefits from the government.

As suggested by Hall (2004), local government should be empowered to play a greater role in assisting beneficiaries of land reform through within the framework of integrated development planning. The case of Kalkfontein, Mpumalanga, demonstrates that it is feasible for local government to contribute towards this effort. In Kalkfontein, a community moved towards establishing a township on the land they got restituted and the local municipality committed to providing water services. The lesson from the cases of provision of pre and

post-settlement support presented in the paper is that while acknowledging the importance of land reform from the perspective of redistributive justice, without adequate support prior to and after land is acquired, will not achieve the transformative change that is expected in the lives of beneficiaries. The paper therefore recommends that the government departments that are responsible for providing such support, should consider a developing a more comprehensive and integrated framework and plan on pre and post-settlement support. This should be done in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including the prospective new farmers who know best what kind of support they require.

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