INVESTIGATING SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE SADC REGION: THE CASE STUDY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, 2009-2018.

by

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Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Politics

in the

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

(School of Social Sciences)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF LIMPOPO

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2020

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Declaration

I, **Nduduzo Langa**, declare that the dissertation hereby submitted to the University of Limpopo (Turfloop Campus) for the degree of Master of Arts in International Politics has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university; that it is my work in design and in execution, and that all material contained herein has been duly acknowledged.

Langa N (Mr)   15 April 2020

Acknowledgments

Dedication

I dedicate this to my mother, my only grandmother, and every African child who still has hope for a better world.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFDL	Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo [Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo]
ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARF	African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund
AU	African Union
BLNE	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Eswatini
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BTI	Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CENI	Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante [Independent National Electoral Commission]
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple [National Congress for for the Defence of the People]
CRP	Common Revenue Pool
CUA	Customs Union Agreement
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Cooperation
DMRE	Department of Mineral Resources and Energy
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo

DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EU	European Union
FAC	Forces Armees Congolaises [Congolese Armed Forces]
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises [Rwandan Armed Forces]
FARDC	Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo]
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda]
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
G7	Group of Seven
G77	Group of 77
G8	Group of Eight
G20	Group of Twenty
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
IBSA	India, Brazil and South Africa
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission

IEPA	Interim Economic Partnership Agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
IRP	Integrated Resource Plan
JOMIC	Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
M23	March 23 Movement
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (United Nations Mission in the DRC)
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo [United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo]
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PALAMA	Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
PAP	Pan-African Parliament
PAWO	Pan-African Women's Organisation
PPA	Power Purchasing Agreement
PPRD	People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy

RCD	Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie [Congolese Rally for Democracy]
RCD-ML	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/ Mouvement de Libération
RCD-N	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/National
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSF	Revenue Sharing Formula
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC FTA	SADC Free Trade Area
SADPA	South African Development Partnership Agency
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SAPS	South African Police Service
SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
TFTA	Tripartite Free Trade Area
TNCs	Transnational Corporation
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Abstract

South Africa's foreign policy towards the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, particularly during Thabo Mbeki's tenure, has received substantial scholarly attention. Similarly, South Africa's domestic political arena has been a subject of significant scholarly inquiry during Jacob Zuma's tenure. Understandably, when one considers the domestic scandals that clouded Zuma's presidency, the foreign policy of the Zuma administration, specifically towards the SADC region, has received underwhelming scholarly attention. Therefore, the present study is a contribution to the limited available studies on the Zuma administration's foreign policy towards the SADC region. Noting the importance of the DRC in SADC region international relations, the DRC is used as a case study. The DRC's experience of a seemingly ceaseless or recurrent conflict makes it a suitable case for the assessment of the Zuma administration's foreign policy. This is because it would be difficult for a South Africa that is largely viewed as the SADC region's regional leader to remain indifferent while a fellow SADC member state experiences continuous instability. To achieve its objectives, the study employed document review as a data collection method. The study found that South Africa under Zuma prioritised economic diplomacy. As such, it actively participated in the neutralisation, through military means, of rebel groups in the DRC. It would not be farfetched to submit that this was an attempt to create an environment that is more conducive to economic activity in the DRC so as to improve economic relations between the two countries.

Keywords: South Africa, SADC, Foreign Policy, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zuma, Afrocentricity, Southern Africa.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

In the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa often assumes leadership on numerous matters of importance to the Community and the Southern African region. The assumption of leadership largely stems from the country's *de facto* regional power status. This status, which mainly draws from South Africa's economic superiority in the SADC region, has contributed to the expectation of the international community that South Africa should play a leading role in important regional activities such as conflict mediation, management and resolution. In concurrence with the foregoing argument, Burgess (2012: 207) posits that South Africa has played an important role in multilateral settings, advocated African progress, and urged other countries to embrace democracy, good governance and market liberalisation.

A near perfect example of the conception of South Africa's role in the SADC region that is held by many was provided by Habib (2003: 3) when he argued that "South Africa's role should be one of a hegemon. Simply being a pivotal state…means that we have rejected the role of leadership…and that is not in our [South Africa's], nor the region's interest." With a mixture of results, South Africa has provided leadership in addressing important issues in the SADC region on number of occasions. Examples include the political and socioeconomic situation that has been volatile for most parts of the 21st century in Zimbabwe (Mhango, 2012: 15) as well as recurrent political instability in Lesotho that has become one of the defining features of that country's political scene (Chapanyi, 2015: 1).

It must be highlighted that the argument that South Africa is a leader in the SADC region is contested. Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017: 428) bluntly state that "the South African state…lacks the influence expected of a regional hegemon." In addition, Taylor (2011: 1237) holds that "confusing Pretoria's economic supremacy with political dominion and the ability to project a coherent regional vision means that claims that South Africa is [in a] position to successfully advance a regional agenda are overstated." Taylor (2011: 1237) further posits that "South African diplomacy in the region has in fact been weak and its ability to project power is inhibited." While the argument advanced by Ogunnubi and

Akinola (2017: 428) is largely rooted in matters of terminology, Taylor (2011: 1237) rejects South Africa's supposed leadership position altogether. It must be noted that while terms such as hegemon, regional power and middle power have distinct meanings, they are all applicable to the present study. This is because the focus of the study is not on terminology or characterisation. However, in order to maintain consistency, the study conceives South Africa as a regional power.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one SADC member that has experienced recurrent political and economic instability since the years leading up to the 21st century. In correspondence with the above assertion, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2018: 174) notes that the First Congo War broke out in October 1996, with Rwanda invading Hutu refugee camps in the North and South Kivu regions of the DRC in what he terms "a regionally conceived drive to overthrow" the Mobutu Sese Seko, former President of the Zaire (now DRC), government. Additionally, Rufanges and Aspa (2016: 6) note that since the 20th century, the DRC has repeatedly found itself in a state of tyranny as well as absence and fragmentation of the state, coupled with the exploitation of its natural resources. Further testimony to the DRC's battle with political instability is the fact that Laurent Kabila took power through military conquest over the country's then president, Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997 (Ngolet, 2000: 66).

It must be highlighted that although it is a SADC member, the DRC is not geographically located within Southern Africa. Rather, it owes its SADC membership to then South African president, Nelson Mandela and then Congolese president, Laurent Kabila's mutual view that in order for South Africa and the rest of Southern African states to assist the country to improve its governance, it had to join the Community. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2018: 174) adds that, with economic interests acting as motivation, South Africa played an instrumental role in the DRC joining SADC (September 1997, just under four months after Mobutu Sese Seko was toppled by Laurent Kabila) as it successfully convinced other SADC members to admit the DRC into the regional body.

While the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, other external actors, and internal actors made considerable strides towards finding lasting peace, instability in the DRC continued into the era of the Jacob Zuma administration (2009-2018). In concurrence with the above

assertion, Rufanges and Aspa (2016: 4) posit that although the armed conflict that has plagued the DRC since 1996 has gradually subsided over time, violence and instability have continued to be prominent features of life in the DRC, particularly in the eastern part of the country. Therefore, an enquiry into the foreign policy of the Zuma administration towards the DRC is a worthy exercise. Such an exercise, among other things, is bound to demonstrate whether the Zuma government devoted attention to ensuring the restoration of peace in the DRC as the governments of Mandela and Mbeki did. This is particularly important when one considers the protests that engulfed the DRC towards and after the end of Joseph Kabila's official second term as the president of the country. Kabila's second and final term was due to end in December 2016. The protests centred on Kabila's 'refusal' to step down at the end of his term due to the 'impossibility', which stemmed from "logistical and financial problems", of holding elections before the expiration of his term (Burke, 2016).

1.2 Research Problem

South Africa is largely viewed by various observers as the SADC region's *de facto* regional leader (Ogunnubi, 2019: 193; Rizzi & Schütz, 2014: 191; Van der Westhuizen: 2017). However, the country has been reluctant to assert its leadership in the region and the African continent in its entirety (Qobo, 2012: 4). This is mainly due to the resentment that the country's dominance in the political and especially economic spheres has generated in some African countries (Ogunnubi, 2015: 16). This reality has sparked a conundrum with regards to what is and/or what ought to be South Africa's role in SADC member states, such as the DRC, which have been plagued by ceaseless or recurrent conflict. Logically, South Africa's role in such countries should be dictated or informed by Pretoria's foreign policy towards the SADC region generally and towards specific countries such as the DRC in the context of the present study. Studying South Africa's role in a country such as the DRC thus provides a better understanding of Pretoria's foreign policy towards the DRC in particular and the SADC region in generally.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

This section briefly reflects on two conventional International Relations (IR) theories, Realism and Liberalism, before detailing the study's chosen theory. This is done in order

to provide the reader with an understanding of the theories that would typically underpin an IR study.

1.3.1 Realism

Realism is one of the most prominent theories in IR. It constitutes a well-developed explanation of how states behave and why they behave as they do in the international arena. Realism holds that states are primary and unitary actors in international relations (Antunes & Camisão, 2017: 15). The theory also holds that states are led by rational decision-makers who act in pursuit of national interest (Antunes & Camisão, 2017: 15). A central tenet of realism is the concept of anarchy (Waltz. 2000: 5). This is the argument that the international system, due to lack of an authority, is anarchic. This means that the absence of a government governing the entire international community means that states are left to act in pursuit of their own national interest using their power without the need to account to any authority.

In a fitting summation of realism, Vasquez (1997: 899) described it as "…a set of theories associated with a group of thinkers who emerged just before World War II and who distinguished themselves from idealists (i.e., Wilsonians) on the basis of their belief in the centrality of power for shaping politics, the prevalence of the practices of power politics, and the danger of basing foreign policy on morality or reason rather than interest and power."

1.3.2 Liberalism

Slaughter (1995: 727) described liberalism as "…a family of positive theories about how states do behave rather than how they should behave." Since liberalism considers the protection of individuals' rights to liberty, life and property as the main objective of government, liberals view the wellbeing of individuals as the cornerstone of an equitable and fair political system (Meiser, 2017: 22). Given the interconnectedness of international relations and domestic politics, liberals hold reservations about militaristic approaches to international relations because these compel the state to maximise its military strength (Meiser, 2017: 22). This strength can be used to further a militaristic approach to international relations but can also be used to oppress the given states' own citizens

(Meiser, 2017: 22). In as far as actors are concerned, liberals consider individuals and groups operating in both domestic and transnational civil society as the primary actors in the international system (Slaughter, 1995: 728).

1.3.3 Afrocentricity

The study adopts Afrocentricity as its theoretical framework. As Zulu (2008: 79) correctly posits, Molefi Kete Asante is the founder of the theory of Afrocentricity. The most elaborate account of Afrocentricity was given by Asante (2003: 2) himself when he stated that, "Afrocentricity is a mode of thought and action in which the centrality of African interests, values and perspectives predominate. In regards to theory, it is the placing of African people in the centre of any analysis of African phenomena." Put differently, Afrocentricity is the interrogation of ideas and events from the standpoint of African people as key players rather than peripherals (Mazama, 2001: 388).

Concepts such as centredness, location, orientation, and grounding form an integral part of Afrocentricity (Chawane, 2016: 85). Afrocentricity aims to relocate and centre African people as agents and/or subjects rather than objects in human history; the motivation behind this aim is that Africans have been dislocated and decentred and as a result, largely apprehend the world from a European perspective (Chawane, 2016: 85). As Mazama (2001: 397-8) notes, being centred results in the apprehension of oneself and the world in a manner that is in sync with one's history, culture, and biology. Afrocentric enquiry acknowledges that the African experience must determine all inquiry and that "not everything is measurable because not everything that is significant is material" (Mazama, 2001: 399-400)

Kumah-Abiwu (2016: 9) states that the centrality of the African people is equivalent to what he calls the heartbeat of Afrocentricity. Afrocentricity's emphasis on the centrality of Africans in the analysis of African phenomena makes it an attractive and suitable option for this study because the subject matter involves African countries and thus constitutes an African phenomenon. Dei (1994: 4-5) cited by Kumah-Abiwu (2016: 9) remarks that the Afrocentric paradigm also provides a "critique of the continued exclusion and marginalisation of African knowledge systems from educational texts, mainstream academic knowledge, and scholarship." It is therefore imperative for this study to employ

an Africa-centred theory as a tool of analysis in order to avoid contributing to the said exclusion and marginalisation.

The theory of Afrocentricity implores us to actualise the reassertion of African agency (Monteiro-Ferreira, 2009: 334). In addition, Asante (2002: 104) reminds us that "we must be engaged in the contemporary world, must examine the social and economic plight of African people today, and must question all forms of oppression. But we must do this on the terms of our own agency." The importance of the reclamation of African agency cannot be overemphasised. This is precisely because we exist in a world whose history is a reminder of the robbing of Africans of their agency through systems and acts such as slave trade and colonialism.

Studies that have been carried out on the subject matter of this study mainly employ the conventional IR theories such as Realism, Idealism, and Marxism. The utilisation of Afrocentricity thus enables the study to provide an alternative and non-Western perspective on the subject matter. Additionally, when one studies African phenomena, logic should dictate the application of Africa-centred theories. This is because, although they suppose universal usability, the conventional and West-centred IR theories may not provide a suitable tool of analysis. However, due to their dominance in the academic environment, and possibly limited availability of alternatives, these theories have found themselves being used to analyse African phenomena, with the context differences being ignored. Therefore, Afrocentricity, with its insistence on the importance of the 'African experience' in the analysis of African phenomena, provides the present study with an Africa-centred tool in the analysis of an African phenomenon.

1.4 Purpose of the Study and the Research Questions

The study uses the DRC as a case study to analyse South Africa's foreign policy towards its fellow SADC member states during the period 2009-2018. To achieve this aim, the study poses the following questions:

- If any, what are the drivers of, and principles underpinning, Pretoria's foreign policy towards the SADC region?
- Did the Zuma administration introduce significant changes to South Africa's approach towards the DRC?

- Is South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC reflective of its approach towards the rest of the SADC region?
- What influence does SADC have on South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC and the rest of the SADC region?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The significance of the study mainly lies in its timeframe. Although the subject matter has been tackled on a number of occasions, most of the available literature has not focused on Zuma's term in its entirety. This is mainly because Zuma only vacated his position in February 2018. The study will therefore contribute to the post-Zuma literature which gives an account of South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region and the DRC in particular, during Zuma's tenure. This will contribute to the credibility and dependability of the findings as it is no longer possible for any changes to the phenomenon under study to occur. Given that much of the literature on the Zuma administration focused on the domestic performance of the administration, the current study contributes to the foreign policy aspect of the literature on the administration. Moreover, the use of Afrocentricity also enables the study to provide an alternative and Africa-centred perspective on the subject matter.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

The study relied on textual data. This means that it is deprived of data which may have been sourced from knowledgeable individuals through methods such as interviews should such individuals have been willing to participate in the study.

1.7 Definitional Clarity

1.7.1 Foreign Policy

Bojang (2018: 2) describes foreign policy as "...a vision of a desired outcome or set of interests in interacting with another state/actor, the strategies and ideas used in achieving these goals, and the available resources at a state's disposable, in guiding her interaction with other states." The study adopts this definition as it accommodates important factors such as interests, strategies and resources, which play an integral role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

1.7.2 SADC Region

In this study, this term refers to the region of the African continent that encompasses all SADC member states. SADC is a regional organisation that aims to tackle a number of issues pertaining to Southern African countries including security, poverty, and regional integration. It consists of 16 member countries.

1.7.3 Southern Africa

This term is used to refer to even those SADC member states that are not geographically located within Southern Africa. This means that the terms 'SADC region' and 'Southern Africa' in this study can be used interchangeably. It is important to note that Southern Africa or SADC are referred to as a region rather than a sub-region.

1.8 Chapter Breakdown

In addition to this chapter (chapter one), there are six other chapters which are arranged as follows.

Chapter Two

This chapter reviews literature relevant to the present study. As such, the chapter delves into some of the available literature on the subject matter of the present study in an effort to solicit the views of some of the scholars who have taken their time to write about the subject matter of this study.

Chapter Three

This chapter details how the research was operationalised. It informs the reader of the processes followed in order to get to the conclusion. In other words, this chapter outlines the numerous scientific techniques and methods that the researcher utilised in order to address the research problem. In addition, the chapter performs the role of a guide that informs the reader of the thinking behind the adoption of certain methods and techniques in the operationalisation of the study.

Chapter Four

Chapter four lists and analyses the pillars upon which South Africa's foreign policy rests.

Chapter Five

Chapter five concerns itself with unpacking South Africa's general SADC region policy. It thus, among other things, delves into South Africa's relations with two of the biggest organisations in Southern Africa, SADC (the organisation) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).

Chapter Six

This chapter provides an analysis of the Jacob Zuma administration's foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, in an effort to contextualise the Zuma administration's foreign policy towards the DRC, the chapter firsts provides an outline of the Congolese conflict. This is done in a manner that uncovers the historical and root causes of the Congolese conflict.

Chapter Seven

This chapter rounds off the study by summarising its findings and providing some recommendations.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter has given an overview of the motivation behind the undertaking of the study, as well as the problem that the study sought to tackle. The chapter has also provided the theoretical underpinnings of the study and highlighted certain aspects of the operationalisation of the study. Lastly, the chapter has provided an outline of the rest of the study with the aim of ensuring that the reader understands what each chapter henceforth is dedicated to.

The next chapter reviews some of the literature that is relevant to the present study.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews literature that is relevant to the present study. The review will first focus on literature relating to democratic South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region and the DRC in particular, prior to Jacob Zuma's tenure. This is done in order to provide a background to the Zuma administration's foreign policy. The review then shifts its focus to South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region, with special emphasis on the DRC, during Zuma's tenure. The review aims to uncover what other scholars have made of South Africa's position within the African continent, Pretoria's intervention in the Congolese conflict, as well as how economic considerations impact on South Africa-SADC region and South Africa-DRC relations. These are some of the elements that one can use to pinpoint a country's foreign policy direction.

2.2 South Africa's Pre-Zuma Foreign Policy

2.2.1 Locating South Africa in Africa

In an article entitled "South Africa: BRICS member and Development Partner in Africa", Grimm (2013) provides a detailed account of South Africa's role on the African continent. Although this article focuses on South Africa's engagement with the broader African continent, it contains elements that are relevant to the SADC region hence its inclusion in this review. From the onset, Grimm (2013: 38) posits that engagement for the development of the African continent has become an integral part of South Africa's foreign policy since the demise of apartheid, hence the country claims be the 'mouthpiece' of the continent in multilateral forums such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the Group of 20 (G20). With the above, the author provides South Africa's perception of its role and position in the continent.

Grimm (2013: 39) further highlights that this perception is not shared by the African continent in its entirety as the country has been previously denounced as "not representing Africa" by, among others, the African Union (AU) Commission. Grimm (2013: 39) adds that Pretoria has demonstrated an appetite for and preference of multilateral processes. While this may appear to be contradictory to Grimm's argument in the preceding paragraph, it illuminates an important aspect of South Africa's foreign policy. That is the holding of two identities by the country. The first is that of a representative and voice of Africa, largely held by non-African states hence it finds expression in settings that

are multilateral in nature, such as the G20. The second is that of an advocate of multilateral approaches to international phenomena, which largely finds expression within the African continent. Grimm thus makes a substantial contribution to the understanding of South Africa's foreign policy as he considers both the broader international community and the African continent in his conceptualisation of South Africa's role in the continent. In support of Grimm's view, Alden and Le Pere (2009: 145) posit that "it is clear that the ability of the South African government to act decisively in the name of African interests is more accepted in global settings like the G8 [now G7] or WTO [World Trade Organization] than is always the case within Africa."

2.2.2 South Africa's Intervention in the Congolese Conflict

Hansen (2012: 71) states that by 1997 South Africa was already taking steps to mediate in the conflict in the DRC as then South African president, Nelson Mandela, tried to facilitate a peace deal between then Congolese president, Mobuto Sese Seko, and then rebel leader, Laurent Kabila. Similar to the Mandela administration, the Thabo Mbeki administration was heavily involved in attempts to restore peace and stability in the DRC. Miti (2012: 32) submits that through the Pretoria Accord of 2002, Mbeki contributed to the process which saw Rwandan troops being withdrawn from the DRC. The withdrawal of Rwandan troops must be understood within the context that some countries found in the Great Lakes region of Africa were intimately involved in the conflict in the DRC. In a move that led to Western donors making financial contributions, South Africa offered to pay fifty per cent of the costs of the meetings of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), held in Sun City, South Africa, which ended in December 2002 with the adoption of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, commonly known as the Pretoria Agreement (Miti, 2012: 32).

Having overseen the agreement between parties to the Congolese conflict to form a transitional government, Pretoria had to provide support to ensure the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement (Miti, 2012: 32). Therefore, together with France, Belgium, Angola, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), the United States of America (USA), hereinafter the US, and the European Union (EU), South Africa formed part of a follow up committee that assisted parties to the conflict to reach an Agreement

on Military Integration and the Transitional Government Agreement in 2003 (Miti, 2012: 33). Moreover, South Africa contributed $50 million and through its Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), provided technical support including its personnel during the 2006 elections in the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2018: 177).

Makgetlaneng (2018) looks at factors which motivated the Mandela administration's preference for a negotiated or political settlement to the Congolese conflict over a military one. Additionally, Makgetlaneng briefly reflects on the importance of the DRC to the African continent. By so doing, the author gives reasons why the continent as a whole and South Africa in particular had to intervene in the DRC in order to restore normalcy hence the article is beneficial to the current study. A notable feature of Makgetlaneng's article is the criticism he levels against the West, particularly the US and its supposed allies in the Great Lakes region, notably Rwanda, as well as against Laurent Kabila for their roles in the Congolese conflict. Makgetlaneng (2018) is therefore unequivocally in support of the Mandela administration's call for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in the DRC. Although his article may appear to be biased in favour of the Mandela government's approach to the conflict, Makgetlaneng does a good job in substantiating his argument, especially by tackling the arguments advanced by those who criticised the Mandela administration's approach to the DRC conflict. However, Makgetlaneng (2018: 199) does acknowledge that "his [Mandela's] call for a negotiated settlement of the Congolese conflict was basically rejected."

Makgetlaneng's (2018) anti-Western sentiments are coupled with a belief in the principle of "African solutions to African problems". Despite this, Makgetlaneng (2018: 203) is evidently against Laurent Kabila's supposed solution to the DRC conflict hence he argues that "one of the key reasons why Mandela called for a negotiated settlement of the Congolese conflict and the establishment of a government of national unity was because Laurent Kabila was not a free leader independent from those who put [him] in power." In concluding his contribution to the subject, Makgetlaneng posits that the Mbeki administration did not stray from its predecessor's approach to the DRC conflict. He credits this approach with achieving a transitional government of national unity, which ceased to exist after the 2006 general elections in the DRC. With this, Makgetlaneng

(2018: 211) maintains that South Africa's approach to the Congolese conflict triumphed over that which was advocated by its critics. Although it is not explicitly stated, Makgetlaneng's article is essentially anti-colonial in approach and analyses the subject matter from an Africa-centred perspective. The present study has thus benefited greatly from the article, particularly because it utilises an Afrocentric lens in tackling the subject matter.

In a doctoral thesis titled *From Freetown to Kinshasa: Reassessing Nigeria and South Africa's Foreign Policy Behaviour and Conflict Intervention Roles in Africa*, Amao (2018), among other things, extensively assesses South Africa's intervention in the DRC, mainly during the First and Second Congolese Wars. Amao (2018) also assesses whether there is correspondence or disjunction between Pretoria's conflict intervention behaviour and its stated foreign policy. Amao (2018) highlights that the Mandela administration (1994-1999) diplomatically intervened in the war in the DRC/Zaire in 1997, and subsequently committed itself to becoming an advocate of stability in the SADC region, hence South Africa led SADC's conflict intervention team from 1997 to 2005. This highlights South Africa's tendency to favour multilateral approaches to international phenomena.

Amao (2018: 176) summarises South Africa's approach to the DRC conflict as follows:

> *(1) negotiating peaceful agreements between the belligerents/warring-parties; (2) supporting the formation of inclusive transitional governments; (3) deploying peacekeepers to crisis zones; (4) providing logistic support for the DRC's attempt towards multi-party elections after a specified period; and (5) ensuring the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction/peace-building programmes that concentrate on rebuilding state institutions and infrastructure.*

Amao's study covers a range of issues, including South Africa's foreign policy, determinants of this foreign policy and the country's intervention in the Congolese conflict, which are of significant relevance to the present study. Although Amao's study is quite comprehensive in scope, apart from South Africa's supposed leadership ambitions and solidarity with the rest of the African continent, it does not attempt to provide possible motivations for South Africa's intervention in the DRC. This is particularly important when one appraises relations between a SADC economic powerhouse (South Africa), which

has been expanding into its neighbours' economies at a rapid pace, and a country which possesses as much mineral wealth as the DRC does. However, it must be noted that Amao does touch on the DRC's economic potential but does not touch on South Africa's possible interests in this economic potential.

In trying to uncover discrepancies and/or similarities in South Africa's foreign policy and its conflict intervention behaviour in the DRC, Amao's study relies mainly on the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy as well as a number of official documents which detail how South Africa ought to conduct itself during interventions in conflicts. While these sources provide one with a good grasp of South Africa's foreign policy, their scope is general in nature. There is therefore a need to use them together with documents which focus solely on South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC. By so doing, one would be able to provide an assessment that compares South Africa's conflict intervention behaviour in the DRC specifically with South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC.

2.2.3   Economic Considerations

In "Socio-economic implications of South Africa's foreign direct investment in Southern African development", Umezurike, Iwu and Asuelime (2016) dissect the impact that South Africa's investment has had on the economies of SADC member states. This appraisal of South Africa's economic relations with the SADC region covers different South African democratic administrations. It is situated within this section of the literature review because its starting point is the Mandela administration, which was the first democratic administration in South Africa. Furthermore, the contribution does not differentiate between different administrations largely because it finds a continuation in South Africa's approach to economic relations with the SADC region, from the Mandela administration to the Zuma administration (albeit only considered up to 2016, which is the year in which the article was published).   `

Umezurike et al. (2016) first highlight the magnitude of South Africa's investment in the SADC region since the dawn of democracy. This is done in order to substantiate the argument that "…SA's [South Africa's] presence has been felt through its domination in trade and investment over other African states" (Umezurike et al., 2016: 364). Evidently, Umezurike et al. (2016) are critical of South Africa's approach to economic relations with

the rest of the SADC region. The three authors even go as far as characterising South Africa as "…a country with neo-imperial ambitions…" To support this characterisation, the authors cite South Africa's increment of tariffs on Zimbabwean textiles and clothing. Their central argument is that this move "was a grand betrayal of a friendly state that supported SA's struggle against apartheid with everything within its diplomatic arsenal" since it was made when the Zimbabwean economy began declining (Umezurike et al., 2016: 364).

Umezurike et al. (2016) further submit that although common knowledge suggests that private companies are at the forefront of South African investment in Africa as a whole, these companies have the support and protection of the government. They add that this approach is "imperialist in nature", and that "it appears there is a clear political undertone to the business initiatives of SA [South African] companies especially in Africa where it has used projects such as African renaissance, NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa's Development], and its peer review mechanism to penetrate African markets at advantageous positions" (Umezurike et al., 2016: 364). In concluding their article, Umezurike et al. (2016) at best jettison, and at worst contradict, the overarching theme of the article, which is the depiction of economic relations between South Africa and the rest of the SADC region as characteristically imperial. The three authors achieve this through conceding that economic relations between South Africa and other Southern African countries are simultaneously cooperative and dominative because South Africa's continued dominance of the regional economy is largely a product of Pretoria's tactful use of cooperation with sovereign Southern African states (Umezurike et al., 2016: 369).

The casual tagging of South Africa's economic relations with the SADC region, and to a smaller extent, the rest of the African continent as 'imperialist in nature' by Umezurike et al. (2016: 367) is also dismissed by their own admission that the operation of South African companies (or what they term the 'South Africanisation' of the African economy) in many other African countries has not produced the desired changes in the socio-economic conditions of the countries in question. In order to justifiably argue that South Africa's economic relations with the rest of the SADC region amount to a form of imperialism, one would need to demonstrate that Pretoria's economic edge translates to actual influence and power in other aspects of South Africa-SADC region relations.

Perhaps to express further disapproval of the dramatised characterisation of economic relations between South Africa and the rest of the SADC region, one needs to invoke Taylor (2011: 1237) who submits that "confusing Pretoria's economic supremacy with political dominion and the ability to project a coherent regional vision means that claims that South Africa is [in a] position to successfully advance a regional agenda are overstated." Taylor further posits that "South African diplomacy in the region [SADC] has in fact been weak and its ability to project power is inhibited."

Alden and Le Pere (2009) provide a comprehensive analysis of South Africa's role on the African continent prior to the takeover of the Zuma administration from which the present study has greatly benefited. In as far as the DRC is concerned, the two authors submit that South Africa has not recorded clear successes in resolving conflicts within the SADC region due to the resistance it has faced from some SADC members involved in conflicts, with the DRC (prior to the death of Laurent Kabila) and Angola serving as examples. Alden and Le Pere (2009: 148) also cite Pretoria's non-participation in the Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia-led 'SADC' military intervention in the DRC in 1998 as one of the dents to South Africa's leadership ambitions in the continent. However, the failure to participate in this intervention could be explained by invoking Braga (2015: 96) who argued that during the Mandela administration, "the moral authority of Mandela became the main mechanism for negotiating with African regimes that violate human rights. Instead of adopting sanctions, Mandela sought to mediate conflicts directly with the leaders involved."

Alden and Le Pere (2009) also observe a convergence in the Mbeki administration's attempts to resolve the conflict in the DRC, which encompassed financial and personal engagement to help resume stalled talks, and South Africa's state-owned electricity utility Eskom's broader aims. These aims according to the two authors included, at least at the time, "ambitions to dominate the electricity supply market in Africa"(Alden & Le Pere, 2009: 157). Alden and Le Pere (2009: 153) add that in the year 2001, South African investment in the SADC region totaled R14.8 billion, with Eskom investing US$6 billion in the Inga Dam project between 2001 and 2002.The Inga Dam project on the Congo River

would generate enough electricity to relieve South Africa of its power shortfall, and to supply West African states as well as Egypt and Morocco (Alden & Le Pere, 2009).

Although Alden and Le Pere (2009) touch on South Africa's participation in conflict resolution within Africa and the SADC region in particular, there is an over-emphasis of the economic component of South Africa's relations with the continent and region. The conflict resolution component is of great importance when one considers that, as already stated in the current study, scholars tend to agree that South Africa's economic strength has not translated to political power and unchallenged leadership in Africa and the SADC region. Therefore, extensively assessing South Africa's performance in conflict resolution would give an indication of South Africa's political standing in the eyes of some of its neighbours. However, Alden and Le Pere's (2009) work provides insight into the challenges that South Africa has to contend with as it supposedly tries to assert its leadership in Africa.

2.3 The Zuma Administration's Foreign Policy

2.3.1 Locating South Africa in Africa

Through an article entitled "The Concentric Circles of South Africa's Foreign Policy under Jacob Zuma", Landsberg (2014) makes a useful contribution to the literature on the Zuma administration's foreign policy. He notes that at least at a rhetorical level, Zuma's administration put emphasis on issues such as national interest, the African agenda, cooperation with the global South, and strengthening relations between the global North and South. An interesting deduction from Landsberg's article is the non-realist conceptualisation of national interests. Instead of a dominative or hegemonic posture, in its description of national interests, according to Landsberg (2014), South Africa identified mutually beneficial cooperation and collaboration with other states as instruments of attaining its national interests.

Landsberg further highlights that 'African advancement' formed part of the key tenets of the Zuma administration's foreign policy. The centrality of Africa, particularly the SADC region, in the country's foreign policy corresponds with the emphasis on cooperation. This is because a posture of domination would not be conducive to cooperative behaviour as it has the potential to lead to the isolation of the country from the rest of the continent.

The strength of Landsberg's article lies mainly in its detailed description of the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy. The description is backed by a brief look at case studies such as the DRC, thus the article manages to strike a balance between theory and practical examples. Through a close examination of cases such as that of the DRC, Landsberg manages to demonstrate a high degree of continuity in the Zuma administration's approach to conflict resolution with that of the Mbeki administration. However, it is important to note that the article was published in 2014, and after this period there was plenty of action in the DRC especially as Joseph Kabila neared the end of his term. Therefore, the findings of this article may not give a conclusive reflection of the Zuma administration's approach to conflict resolution, particularly as it relates to the DRC.

Prinsloo (2019) interrogates and explains how Pretoria has projected influence and power on the African continent. Although Prinsloo's contribution covers different democratic South African administrations, its inclusion in this section of the literature review stems from the considerable amount of space, focus and attention it dedicates to the Zuma administration. Prinsloo (2019) notes that under the Zuma administration, South Africa adopted 'a more rationalist approach' to influence projection in Africa. He attributes this change in approach to new policy decisions taken by the administration. Prinsloo's submission may be understood within the context of Alden and Le Pere's (2006) assertion that South Africa's foreign policy in the Mandela era was a combination of idealist and aspirational principles whose implementation ultimately proved to be harder than expected.

Prinsloo (2019) further submits that the Zuma administration's projection of influence centred on two approaches, with the first being the provision of development funding and the second being the utilisation of multilateral agreements and institutions, most notably the United Nations (UN), BRICS, and the AU. With regards to the BRICS grouping, Prinsloo (2019: 29) opines that "…formal association with an elite cohort of emerging powers increased SA's [South Africa's] international profile and potentially enhanced its role in global decision-making (including the UN Security Council and the Group of 20 (G-20)), while reinforcing its leadership claims on the continent." The foregoing submission highlights an important element of South Africa's foreign policy. As already stated in this

literature review, South Africa holds dual identities in the international system. The holding of two identities underlines the failure of the high regard with which South Africa is held by many non-African countries and multilateral forums to translate into undisputed leadership for Pretoria on the African continent. Prinsloo's claim that South Africa's BRICS membership has reinforced its leadership claims in Africa thus demonstrates the country's persistent use of non-African settings to consolidate its leadership ambitions/position in Africa, despite the apparent shortcomings of this strategy.

Prinsloo (2019) also discusses South Africa's intervention in numerous conflicts on the African continent, including the Congolese conflict. While Prinsloo (2019: 46) argues that Pretoria demonstrated "better leadership and involvement in the DRC", his resounding conclusion is that "…South Africa failed to provide the numbers of troops and/or the footprint in multiple countries." He further asserts that an interrogation of Pretoria's foreign policy indicates that South Africa did not have a policy problem and the problem may rest with the country's army (Prinsloo 2019: 48). While Prinsloo's quantitative approach to the analysis of South Africa's (military) involvement in conflicts in Africa demonstrates a relatively and comparatively poor showing, it is imperative for one to properly assess and locate the role of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the country's arsenal of foreign policy implementation instruments. Although Prinsloo's contribution does highlight the general utility of the military in the implementation of foreign policy, it does not specifically outline the role of the military in the implementation of South Africa's foreign policy. This renders the contribution's discussion of Pretoria's military contributions to conflicts in Africa uncontextualised. However, the foregoing submission should not be confused with the depiction of Prinsloo's contribution as unbeneficial to the present study.

2.3.2 South Africa's Intervention in the Congolese Conflict

Hendricks (2015) contends that the approach adopted by South Africa (from the Mandela era to Zuma's tenure) to conflict management in the DRC narrowly focused on halting the fighting and getting the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table in order to establish a transitional government to be succeeded by a democratically elected one. She argues that this approach has failed to improve human security in the DRC but has given warlords

the benefits of being part of a transitional government. Hendricks (2015: 26) thus maintains that "South Africa has concentrated on state-building, rather than peacebuilding and consequently neglects working on issues of national cohesion, truth and justice and strengthening civil society organisations."

Hendricks (2015: 15) adds that since March 2013, South Africa, together with Malawi and Tanzania, has been part of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which is tasked with "neutralising armed forces". Although noting the relative success of this brigade, Hendricks argues that solutions to complex economic, security and political issues that have bedeviled the DRC do not lie within this approach. The presence of armed forces in the DRC during Zuma's presidency points to the failure of the previous administrations' efforts to establish sustainable peace. Hendricks (2015) makes a significant contribution to the literature available to the present researcher. However, her study does not distinguish between the different South African administrations. This is particularly important because the different administrations had to contend with different challenges both in the DRC and at home. Periodisation also helps in keeping track of changes and continuities in the approach.

Makanda and Naidu (2019) conducted in-depth interviews with 120 Congolese refugees living in the South African cities of Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town in order to elicit their views (refugees') on South Africa's peace-building activities in the DRC. This contribution adds an invaluable and different dimension to literature on South Africa-DRC relations as it also underlines the role that Congolese refugees (could) play in Pretoria's peace-building activities in the DRC. The authors first highlight the role (mainly positive) that refugees from different countries have played in attempts to bring sustainable development in their countries of origin. By so doing, the authors manage to demonstrate the importance of refugees in establishing long-term peace to their countries of origin.

To underscore the need for Congolese refugees to play a role in strengthening South Africa's peace-building efforts in the DRC, Makanda and Naidu (2019: 73) cite, among other events, the 2012 demonstration by Congolese refugees in expression of their disapproval of the "Zuma administration's support of the illegitimate re-election of President [Joseph] Kabila." In reinforcement of their support for the inclusion of

Congolese refugees in Pretoria's peace-building efforts in the DRC, the authors assert that the refugees possess knowledge of the primary causes and dynamics of the conflict that may be beneficial to Pretoria's peace-building efforts. Additionally, the South African-based Congolese refugees are also well acquainted with the projects that Pretoria is/was financing as part of its efforts to ignite or accelerate development and establish peace in the DRC, including the (re)construction of roads, the Inga Dam Project and airport, as well as the funding of the Congolese electoral commission (Makanda & Naidu, 2019).

While acknowledging that the presence of the SANDF in the DRC is supposedly meant to neutralise rebel groups in order to establish enabling conditions for dialogue, Makanda and Naidu (2019) note that some Congolese refugees were critical of South Africa's involvement in the training of the DRC police force which was used by the Joseph Kabila government to stifle demonstrations against it (the Kabila government). Moreover, 70 of the interviewed refugees questioned Pretoria's growing investments in the DRC given the ongoing conflict, while 100 of them argued that South Africa supported the Kabila government in exchange for business investments in the DRC (Makanda & Naidu, 2019). Perhaps, this could be explained more clearly by invoking Curtis (2018: 71) who argues that under the Zuma administration, "South Africa's peacemaking efforts have increasingly been linked to its more mercantilist economic interests, and the moral vision and optimism that influenced South Africa's earlier post-apartheid peacemaking efforts are at risk of dissipating."

Importantly, Makanda and Naidu (2019) submit that despite the reservations that some Congolese have with regards to Pretoria's peace-building activities in the DRC, South Africa is better positioned than any country to help establish long-term peace in the DRC. These reservations included the country's supposed support of a president (Kabila) who in 2011 was 'illegitimately re-elected' (Makanda & Naidu, 2019). Given the AU and SADC's principle of rejecting unconstitutional removals of governments (Mbofana, 2018), one should wonder if Pretoria had any pragmatic options apart from 'supporting' Kabila. This submission draws from the fact that the re-election of Kabila (regardless of its contested nature) meant that the only other forces which could remove Kabila were the

armed rebels. Their means of removal would definitely be unconstitutional and South Africa would have no reason to support such a move.

Makanda and Naidu's (2019) work provides a fresh perspective and angle on South Africa-DRC relations. However, the suggestion that refugees could be involved in South African peace-building efforts in the DRC means that the refugees would first have to organise themselves. Although, foreign nationals in different countries organise themselves for different reasons, this could be difficult in the case in discussion given that some individuals (bearing their refugee status in mind) may not have the necessary resources to travel to certain parts of South Africa to meet with their peers in order to formulate uniform views to present to the South African government. This submission should be understood within the context that such an arrangement would need not to be turned into an elitist club. Additionally, having an input on how South Africa approaches the conflict in the DRC may be seen as interference by foreign nationals in Pretoria's formulation and implementation of its foreign policy.

2.3.3 Economic Considerations

Gbaya (2015) highlights South Africa's wide-ranging economic interests in the DRC in a variety of sectors including mining and telecommunications. To drive his point home, Gbaya (2015) recalls that in 2010 Joseph Kabila ignited a legal dispute between a European oil company and Khulubuse Zuma, Jacob Zuma's nephew, when he (Kabila) awarded two exploration blocks to companies linked to Khulubuse Zuma, which he had previously awarded to South Africa's Divine Inspiration Group and Ireland's Tullow Oil. While Gbaya (2015) uses this case to highlight the extent to which Jacob Zuma was personally involved in the DRC's economy (through a relative), he does not acknowledge that there is a possibility that this case has no relation to South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC at all.

Gbaya (2015) adds that on 24 February 2013, South Africa, ten other African countries, the AU, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), SADC and the UN, signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the region. He further notes that South Africa is still involved in the DRC peace process and is determined to help the DRC in its post-conflict reconstruction as at least five South African

Infantry Battalions were assisting Congolese troops in driving away the rebels during Zuma's presidency. This illuminates the continuation of the DRC conflict as well as South Africa's unending desire to assist in 'restoring' peace in that country.

2.4 Conclusion

As this review has demonstrated, previous studies on the subject matter of the present study provide a multidimensional and, to some extent, rich basis from which the current study draws and proceeds. What is evident from the review is that scholars have grappled with explaining the role of Pretoria in the SADC region. This has compounded the complexity of characterising Pretoria's approach to relations with conflict-plagued SADC members such as the DRC. However, the study has benefited greatly from the fruitful efforts of different scholars to lift the veil covering the various factors motivating South Africa's engagements with the DRC and the SADC region in its entirety. While most of the works reviewed in this study are reluctant to give a tag to South Africa's role in the SADC region and the DRC in particular, what is not disputed is Pretoria's activity in the region and the DRC. Literature unambiguously indicates that the country is an active member of SADC. The present study thus has to interrogate the role of South Africa in the DRC in order to get an improved understanding of Pretoria's foreign policy towards Kinshasa and potentially other SADC members who share certain critical traits with the DRC. The next chapter outlines the study's methodological approach.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Kothari (2004: 8) succinctly captured the purpose of this chapter when he advanced that research methodology concerns itself with "…the various steps that are generally adopted by a researcher in studying his research problem along with the logic behind them." In essence, this chapter outlines the numerous scientific techniques and methods that the researcher utilised in order to address the research problem. In addition, the chapter performs the role of a guide that informs the reader of the thinking behind the adoption of certain methods and techniques in the operationalisation of the study.

Noting the availability of the choice to opt for either the quantitative or qualitative approach, this study is qualitative in approach. The choice is informed by the approach's

compatibility with the purpose of the study, which is to provide an analysis of South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region between 2009 and 2018, with the DRC being used as a case study. In other words, South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC will be under study.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopts the case study research design. Zainal (2007: 1-2) states that "case studies, in their true essence, explore and investigate contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships." Case studies are particularly useful when the researcher seeks to undertake a holistic and in-depth inquiry (Zainal, 2007: 1). This research design is in sync with the primary purpose of the study, which is not to unpack half-truths about South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region for the purpose of generating generalisable findings on South Africa's SADC region policy. An extensive analysis of South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC has helped the study to generate contextual findings on South Africa's foreign policy towards one of the members of SADC. It must be noted that parts of this study are dedicated to the unpacking of South Africa's general approach to relations with its fellow SADC countries. Furthermore, an analysis of South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC has led to the emergence of some generalisable findings. However, this is not the primary purpose of the study hence the suitability of the case study research design. Summarily, the choice of the case study research design partly draws from the fact that the existence of differences does not imply the non-existence of similarities. Conversely, the existence of similarities does not imply the non-existence of differences.

3.3 Sampling

Although the data used in the study is primarily textual, there was still a need for sampling as exhausting the relevant literature was impractical. It is for this reason that the study relied on purposeful sampling. This method of sampling enables a researcher to select the most informative sample to address the research problem (Marshall, 1996). This is because "qualitative researchers recognize that some informants are 'richer' than others and that these people are more likely to provide insight and understanding for the

researcher" (Marshall, 1996: 523). In textual data, the foregoing submission implies that data should be sourced from 'richer' texts. In the present study, the richness of data was determined by its origins. Data was thus sourced from various scholars, authors, publications, institutions and publishers that have contributed to the topic under study. Additionally, as determining the sample size is infeasible for the present study, like many qualitative studies, the study was operationalised until data saturation (Gentles, Charles, Ploeg & McKibbon, 2015).

3.4 Data Collection

This study primarily relied on textual data. As such, scholarly books, journal and newspaper articles, speeches made by the relevant figures, policy documents and other forms of textual data were extensively engaged. These sources were only used in as far as they contained data relating to South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC and the SADC region in general. It is for this reason that the study adopted document review as its data collection method. Document review refers to a systematic procedure used to review or evaluate printed and electronic documents (Bowen, 2009: 27). Mogalakwe (2006: 221) posits that document review has the same usability and is at times more cost effective than other common data collection methods such as in-depth interviews, social surveys, and participant observation. It is important to note that it is possible for document review to contain purely primary data. For this reason, the present study intentionally devoted specific attention to the use of secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis allows for the sourcing of data from experienced and reputable experts in the field and thereby reduces the prospect of bias which may stem from the researcher's own interpretation of primary data.

3.5 Data Analysis

The study employed thematic content analysis. Thematic content analysis is a common qualitative data analysis method and its goal is to identify themes in data. These themes are then used to reach conclusions about the research problem (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). In analysing data, the study employed the guide provided by Braun and Clarke (2006). The guide comprises of six phases.

The first phase entails the researcher familiarising him/herself with the collected data through reading the data repeatedly and searching for patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The second phase entails producing initial codes from the data, which is done through the identification of aspects of the data that the researcher finds interesting (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The third phase entails sorting the generated codes "into potential themes, and collating all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes. Essentially, you are starting to analyse your codes, and consider how different codes may combine to form an overarching theme" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 19). The fourth phase involves reviewing the themes and may result in some 'potential' themes being discarded and others being combined (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In the fifth phase the researcher defines and names the themes; that is "identifying the 'essence' of what each theme is about and determining what aspect of the data each theme captures" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 22). The last phase involves the researcher writing-up a report on the data. "Its aim is to tell the complicated story of your data in a way which convinces the reader of the merit and validity of your analysis" (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 23). This is the process that the present study went through, and the themes generated were converted into sections and sub-sections and headings and sub-headings.

3.6 Quality Criteria

Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson and Spiers (2002) state that according to the criteria developed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), qualitative studies derive their trustworthiness from credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

3.6.1 Credibility

Credibility refers to the accurate reflection of the multiple realities of the phenomenon under study by the collected data; it can be ensured through prolonged engagement with informants, triangulation of data or diversification of sources, member checks, peer debriefing, and more (Sikolia, Biros, Mason & Weiser, 2013: 2). In order to ensure credibility, the present study employed data triangulation and peer debriefing. In addition

to this, the study made use of diverse sources in order for the findings to reflect multiple perspectives.

3.6.2 Transferability

Transferability refers to whether the findings of a study can be applicable in another context (Anney, 2014). Shenton (2004) suggests that qualitative researchers should provide a description of the context in which the study was undertaken in order for readers to be able to establish the applicability of the findings to different contexts. This can be done through the provision of thick descriptions as well as the utilisation of purposive sampling (Anney, 2014). This means that the researcher should detail the data collection, analysis and sampling methods, interpretation of the results and context of the study. The methodology chapter of this study is particularly useful in the elicitation of this information. Importantly, since this is a case study, its findings are unlikely to be generalisable. Moreover, purposive sampling was used in order to narrow the contexts to which the study will be applicable.

3.6.3 Dependability

Dependability refers to the stability or consistency of results across time. It aims to demonstrate that the repetition of the study, in the same context, with the same methods and participants would yield similar results (Shenton, 2004: 71). To enable the determination of the dependability of the findings, the researcher must detail the research processes or audit trail (Sikolia et al., 2013). Summarily, a reader's engagement with a study should inform the reader of the steps and processes undertaken by the researcher in order to arrive at the overall conclusion. The reader's possession of this information adequately equips him/her with the necessary tools for the repetition of the study should he/she find the need to repeat it. As such, the study openly provides such details, particularly in the methodology chapter. Furthermore, data triangulation was used in order to improve the dependability of the study.

3.6.4 Confirmability

Confirmability refers to the extent to which the findings of a study are shaped by data and not researcher bias, motivation, or interest (Pandey & Patnaik, 2014). Confirmability can be catered for through an audit trail, triangulation and reflexivity (Houghton, Casey, Shaw

& Murphy, 2013). Once again, triangulation played an integral role in ensuring the confirmability of the present study. Moreover, special attention was devoted to the diversification of sources. Additionally, a non-South African perspective has been accommodated through the use of data produced by non-South Africans and/or from outside South Africa. Conclusions are thus drawn from a variety of sources and are a reflection of different perspectives.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

3.7.1 Permission to Conduct the Study

Permission, in the form of an ethical clearance certificate, to carry out the study was sought from the Turfloop Research and Ethics Committee (TREC). This action was prompted by the necessity to seek protection as the researcher conducted the research under the umbrella of the University of Limpopo (UL). Resultantly, TREC issued the researcher with an ethical clearance certificate which is attached in appendix 1.

3.7.2 Avoidance of Academic Fraud

All the materials collected and cited in this research report which has been submitted as part of the researcher's studies have been solely used for academic purposes. Additionally, an effort was made to ensure that, unless explicitly stated, all the material cited in this research report has been duly acknowledged. Quotations used have also been interpreted appropriately in order to ensure that the integrity of the original writers is protected.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter constitutes a deliberate and informative exposition of the methods, techniques and processes employed by the researcher in the conduction of the study. Its central goal is to inform the reader of the logic behind the choice to utilise certain methods and techniques in order to arrive at the overall conclusion. The ultimate aim of the chapter is to eliminate any sense of arbitrariness in the readers' minds by ensuring that the readers are aware of the steps, and the reasons behind them, taken by the researcher in the conduction of research.

The next chapter unpacks the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PILLARS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

4.1 Introduction

There is a multiplicity of views among scholars regarding the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy. Since it is impractical to accommodate all these views, this chapter relies predominantly on two sources. The first is the journal article written by South Africa's first democratically elected president, Nelson Mandela, in 1993. The article, entitled "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy", outlines in detail, the factors which would guide democratic South Africa's foreign policy. The interrogation of the factors that guided the Jacob Zuma administration's foreign policy will indicate whether this article is still relevant to South Africa's foreign policy. The second is the 2011 White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy.

The use of the two sources emanates from three considerations. First, the 1993 article outlined the principles that would guide not only the foreign policy of a Mandela-led South Africa but any democratic South African administration. Second, the 2011 White Paper provided a detailed outline of Pretoria's foreign policy for the period May 2011 onwards. The tenure of the Zuma administration falls within this period. Lastly, the use of the two sources enables the chapter to provide a historically informed appraisal of the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy under the Zuma administration. This is the main purpose of the chapter. It is worth mentioning that the existence of pillars which underpin the country's foreign policy does not imply the existence of a single South African foreign policy towards all countries.

4.2 Human Rights

Human rights have become a virtually permanent feature of discourse pertaining to South Africa's foreign policy. This is however not surprising when one considers that the apartheid system was characterised by gross human rights violation. In corroboration of this assertion, Mandela (1993: 87-88) states that "the anti-apartheid campaign was the most important human rights crusade in the post-World War II era." Mandela (1993: 88) adds that "…South Africa will not be indifferent to the rights of others. Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs."

Rhetoric and actions are two different things. The difference is particularly evident in the case of South Africa and human rights. Fritz (2018) opines that South Africa's support for human rights has been underwhelming, and this has been a result of two scenarios: the first is when the country has opted to embrace continental or regional positions even when these are not in sync with its own policy; the second is when the country has taken a position which in its view would contribute to the creation of an international governance architecture that is more representative and equitable. In support of the above view, van der Westhuizen and Smith (2015) argue that over the years, South Africa's preoccupation with human rights has had to come second to the country's interests of being a champion of the interests of the global South, and asserting its African identity. It is thus not farfetched to argue that South Africa's membership of India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) was partly informed by the desire to position the country as an advocate of the interests of the global South. Additionally, events such as Mandela's unsuccessful call for the imposition of sanctions against Nigeria in 1995, and South Africa voting in favour of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973 in 2011, which led to the killing of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, surely made the assertion of an African identity an imperative for the country.

In October 2016, South Africa voiced out its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Kemp, 2017). The ICC is tasked with prosecuting perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Fehl, 2004). The ICC relies on States Parties to arrest individuals and surrender them to the Court (Oosterveld, Perry & McManus, 2001). Fritz (2018) states that South Africa's official reason for withdrawing from the ICC was that the Rome Statute hinders the country's ability to efficiently play its peacemaking role in the African continent. However, Fritz (2018) also contends that the decision was informed partly by the enmity felt by a number of African countries towards the ICC, and the notion that the court is selective in its prosecutions. Worthy of noting is that the attempt to withdraw from the ICC was however ruled to be invalid and unconstitutional by South Africa's High Court in 2017 and thus halted.

It must be remembered that South Africa's bid to withdraw from the ICC followed the country's failure to arrest the then President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, who is wanted by the ICC for war crimes. As a result, Maru (2015) points out that South Africa had to choose one of its two obligations: that of supporting a fellow African Union (AU) member state (Sudan); or that of arresting Bashir as its ICC membership dictates. Arresting Bashir would have constituted non-adherence to the AU's decision of non-cooperation with the ICC on matters relating to the Sudanese leader (Tladi, 2009). Al-Bashir's case thus represents a classic case of the country opting to embrace regional or continental positions. The case can also be interpreted as a symbol of South Africa's attempt to assert an African identity and to substantiate the country's supposed pro-Africa foreign policy stance.

Another important case relating to human rights is the suspension and subsequent curtailing of the mandate of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal. SADC (2012) posits that "after several judgements ruling against the Zimbabwean government, the Tribunal was *de facto* suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit." The fall of the Tribunal followed its 2008 ruling which found the Zimbabwean government's seizure of white-owned farms to be in violation of the SADC Treaty (Nathan, 2013b). In August 2012, the SADC Summit concluded that the mandate of the Tribunal should be restricted to "interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States" (SADC, 2012).

Initially, in cases in which domestic legal systems were unwilling or unable to protect individuals' human rights, the Tribunal served as an alternative and last resort (Cowell, 2013). The suspension and subsequent curtailing of the Tribunal's mandate thus marked an end of its role as a human rights tribunal (Cowell, 2013). Fritz (2018) notes that a spokesperson of South Africa's Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) stated that, in relation to the Tribunal, the country had an obligation to respect the collective decision of the SADC Summit. Again, this is symbolic of the influence that SADC has on the positions that the country takes in relation to a variety of matters. Fritz (2018) adds that for South Africa, the issue of the Tribunal is not of much importance hence the country is unwilling to use its power as SADC's primary member state funder

to get the Tribunal to be fully restored. Interestingly, the former Chief Justice of the Tribunal, Ariranga Pillay, argued that Zuma "selfishly" stood back and allowed Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe to destroy the Tribunal (Fabricius, 2013). However, it must be noted that on 11 December 2018 Zuma's role in the emasculation of the Tribunal was declared "unconstitutional, unlawful and irrational" by the South African Constitutional Court, in a ruling which corresponded with a similar earlier ruling by the North Gauteng High Court (Nicolson, 2018). As per instruction of the Constitutional Court, Zuma's successor, Cyril Ramaphosa, officially withdrew South Africa's signature from the SADC protocol which restricted the powers of the SADC Tribunal at the 39th Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of SADC which was held in Tanzania in August 2019 (Ngatane, 2019).

The case of the SADC Tribunal as well as the attempt to withdraw from the ICC highlight the relegation of human rights from their envisaged position of being the light that would guide South Africa's foreign affairs (Mandela, 1993) to just being one of the pillars of the country's foreign policy. Importantly, Alden and Le Pere (2006) assert that South Africa's foreign policy in the Mandela era was a combination of idealist and aspirational principles whose implementation ultimately proved to be harder than expected. One can thus locate the relegation of human rights from their envisaged and/or initial position in South Africa's foreign policy, as evidenced by the two aforementioned cases, within this context.

4.3 Democracy

Mandela (1993) held that the only system capable of guaranteeing human rights is democracy. As such, he envisaged that South Africa would play an integral role in the promotion of democracy throughout the world, especially in Africa (Mandela, 1993). Landsberg and Kondlo (2007) observe that South Africa's African Agenda involves the promotion of "democratic peace": that is the view that democracies do not go to war with one another, and democracy is thus more peaceful than other systems of government. Landsberg (2018) adds that, at least rhetorically, the promotion of human rights and democracy have become prominent features of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. What is discernable from the above submissions is the view, among South Africa's foreign policy-makers, that democracy and human rights are intrinsically a couple. Once

again, the motivating factor is the deprivation of black South Africans of their basic human rights during the apartheid era (Geldenhuys, 2012).

In addition, South Africa firmly believes in the peaceful resolution of conflict (Curtis, 2018: 73). This firm belief can be linked to the country's promotion of democratic principles. Partly due to this belief, the country is usually willing to participate in extensive peacekeeping operations, particularly in the African continent (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007). In fact, the New Partnership for Africa's Development's (NEPAD) plan of action, of which South Africa is a big proponent (or at least was during Thabo Mbeki's era), encompasses democracy, governance, and peace and security (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007).

In unpacking South Africa's commitment to the promotion of democracy in other countries, it is important to remain cognizant of reality. As such, one needs to be mindful of the fact that promotion does not amount to dictatorship. Given the above, it would be unrealistic for one to expect South Africa's attempts to promote democracy in other countries to yield positive results at all times. This is because the decision to embrace democracy and to adopt and adhere to democratic principles rests on the shoulders of individual countries. The above assertion is of course mindful of the non-dictatorial nature of promotion. Summarily, the factors upon which the adoption of and adherence to democratic norms is dependent, make the appraisal of South Africa's performance in this space a complex exercise, regardless of the administration under consideration.

Noting the non-dictatorial nature of promotion, one is left to wonder how South Africa's promotion of democracy in other countries may lead to the actual adoption of democracy and adherence to its norms by those countries. The promotion of democracy is further complicated by the fact that although there are principles which many democracies tend to embrace, democracies are typically different (Masango & Mfene, 2017). Perhaps the solution to this conundrum lies in Afrocentricity's call for the reclamation of African agency (Monteiro-Ferreira, 2009). In line with this call, one would expect South Africa to afford other countries the opportunity to craft and configure their own democracies should they wish to adopt democracy. Although it may by some miracle work, the exportation of the South African version of democracy to other countries would rob those countries of the

opportunity to establish their own governance path and thus their agency. What may be deduced from the above assertion is that there is a need for South Africa to clearly unpack what 'promoting' democracy entails. This would enable the country to identify strategies through which democracy could be promoted. Lastly, it would provide the country with an even more structured approach to peacebuilding and eliminate occurrences of arbitrariness.

4.4 The Centrality of Africa

As far as Africa is concerned, the first contention is that post-apartheid South Africa has advanced an Afrocentric foreign policy, characterised by the quest for African renewal, national liberation, and efforts to overcome the legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism (DIRCO, 2011a). As such, the White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy details that the country's national interest include the realisation of a prosperous South Africa, Southern Africa and Africa (DIRCO, 2011a). Moreover, Landsberg (2012) notes that the 2009 *Medium-term Strategic Framework to Guide Government's Programme for the Electoral mandate Period 2009-2014* proclaimed that the Zuma administration would pursue its foreign policy under the theme "Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced Cooperation".

Southern Africa unsurprisingly occupies a more special position than any other African region in South Africa's foreign policy. Testimony to this is Mandela's (1993) assertion that South Africa's destiny is linked to that of Southern Africa. Importantly, Mandela (1993) opines that colonialism established a regional economy that was characterised by South African domination, and subordination and dependence of other countries; post-apartheid South Africa would thus seek to avoid the pursuance of its national interest at the expense of the region. This has indeed largely been the case. As Qobo (2012) notes, South Africa lacks the eagerness to openly pursue commercial opportunities, not only in Southern Africa, but in the whole African continent. This may be due to the fact that "the ANC government is aware of…the negative role played by the apartheid government in Southern Africa. It therefore feels that it owes a huge debt to the continent. As such it views South Africa as having no right to explicitly express leadership intentions or speak against wrongs committed by other governments" (Qobo, 2012: 2).

The primacy of Africa encompasses the African agenda. According to Geldenhuys (2012: 33), in 2010, the former Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ebrahim Ebrahim stated that the African agenda "seeks to promote peace and security on the continent, strengthen the pursuit of good governance and democracy, deepen regional integration, develop skills and build capacity within the organs of the AU, and advance Africa's development agenda." In furtherance of the objectives it set for itself and in embracement of the special place given to Africa in Pretoria's foreign policy by previous administrations, the Zuma administration introduced the presidential focus on infrastructure and the deployment of South African personnel in AU and SADC structures to Pretoria's Africa policy (Maloka, 2018). The latter led to the election of South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the chairperson of the AU Commission in July 2012 (Ujara & Ibietan, 2017), a position she held until February 2017. Importantly, the success of Dlamini-Zuma's candidature was largely a result of the support she received from most SADC member states, signifying an important role played by the Zuma administration in campaigning for her (Soko, 2016). Citing the appointment of Dlamini-Zuma as AU Commission chair to support his argument, Adebajo (2018) maintains that by securing strong support at the regional level, Zuma amplified South Africa's influence at the continental level.

Since the country is reluctant to take a hegemonic posture, its role in Southern Africa and Africa as a whole centres on providing support in the form of developmental assistance and peace-building, as well as using its position as a recognised global actor to advance Africa's economic interests, particularly in institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Group of 20 (G20) (Qobo, 2012). DIRCO (2011) is of the view that countries can maximise their influence within their regions through taking the policy initiative, building institutions and originating solutions. DIRCO further states that South Africa has played this role in the continent and the result has been increased South African influence internationally. Examples in this regard would be the key role the country played in the establishment of the AU and NEPAD (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007). Notably, South Africa's posture of non-domination is in sync with what Mandela envisaged prior to the demise of apartheid in the country.

An equally important element in as far as the centrality of Africa is concerned is the notion of "African solutions to African problems". The notion resonates highly with most AU members, including South Africa and it applies to a variety of issues including health, development, education but it is mostly used in reference to issues relating to peace and security (Nathan, 2013a). During the 2011 Libyan crisis, President Zuma criticised the West for deviating from the purpose of UNSC resolution 1973. He accused the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its allies of using the resolution to enforce regime change in Libya, and reiterated the AU's support for "African solutions to African problems" (Nathan, 2013). The idea of 'African solutions to African problems' may be interpreted as an indication that Africa does not need a 'babysitter'. This is in sync with Afrocentricity because it removes the risk of external powers using African problems to advance their own interests and ensures that African problems are resolved in a manner that is constructive and beneficial to Africans. Moreover, it ensures that African agency is not overridden by overzealous and ill-intentioned non-African states.

4.5 Economic Development

Mandela (1993) asserted that the African National Congress' (ANC) foreign economic policies would seek to stimulate rapid economic growth in South Africa. He added that this would be done through strategies such as attracting foreign investment, introducing trade-policy reforms that promote competitiveness of domestic sectors and lower the country's import bill, and coming up with a variety of initiatives to encourage private sector investment. This assertion is an indication that from the beginning, South Africa's own economic development has been, expectedly, at the centre of the country's foreign policy. Exemplified by the search for economic and market opportunities abroad, the Zuma administration also placed South Africa's domestic economic interests at the centre of foreign policy-making, adoption and implementation (Landsberg, 2018).

In affirmation of South Africa's commitment to regional integration, DIRCO (2011) opined that SADC integration remains an important element in enhancing South Africa's global competitiveness and for the economic development of Southern Africa. Alden and Soko (2005) argue that promoting regional integration has been at the centre of South African efforts to grow the country's economy. As a result, South African companies have

considerable interests in Southern Africa, as the region provides a market for some internationally uncompetitive South African products, as well as significant investment opportunities in a number of sectors (Taylor, 2011). Needless to say, South African economic interests reach beyond the SADC region. For the promotion and protection of these interests, the country can now rely on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA), which was officially launched in 2015. Worthy of noting is that the TFTA is not yet operational as it has not received the required number of ratifications in order to come into effect.

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has invested greatly in Africa. Its presence in the African market has influenced the decisions of numerous international companies to use it as a 'gateway' into the continent (Alden & Soko, 2005). However, Vickers and Cawood (2018) argue that there is uncertainty regarding South Africa's status as a 'gateway' into the rest of the continent, and it stems partly from policy uncertainty during Zama's tenure and may have influenced the decisions of Coca-Cola, General Electric and Heineken to base their Sub-Saharan Africa regional headquarters in Nairobi. This demonstrates the impact that a country's domestic governance issues may have on its international standing.

South African companies dominate the trade and investment sphere in Africa (Vickers & Cawood, 2018). Moreover, South African media and telecommunications companies, MTN, SABC's Africa division (Alden & Schoeman, 2015) and MultiChoice are highly competitive in the continent. In 2016, the country's total goods trade with Africa was over R437 billion, which is about 20 per cent of South Africa's merchandise trade with the international community; while 30 per cent (R317 billion) of the country's goods exports were destined for Africa, the continent's import to South Africa only amounted to 11 per cent (120 billion) (Vickers & Cawood, 2018).

Expectedly, South Africa trades more with members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC, hence in 2016, Botswana was South Africa's number one trading partner in Africa (Vickers & Cawood, 2018:). Using data from South African National Treasury, Vickers and Cawood show that outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by South African firms to SADC countries sat at 26 per cent in 2014 (the highest of

any region in the world), and it amounted to 11 per cent for the rest of Africa, that is 37 per cent in total for Africa.

The South African economy remains the most industrialised on the continent, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is the largest in Africa (Alden & Schoeman, 2015). The result is that South Africa's imports from other African countries consist mainly of raw materials, mineral fuels and other commodities, while its exports to the continent consist mainly of value-added manufactured goods including plastic and rubber goods, mechanical appliances and electrical equipment, and machinery (Vickers & Cawood, 2018). Partly due to the above imbalances, South Africa continues to run a trade surplus (R197 billion in 2016) with its African trading partners (Vickers & Cawood, 2018). Qobo succinctly captured Pretoria's stance on the trade surplus:

> There is a great deal of sensitivity in South Africa about continuing to run trade surpluses with its African counterparts as if this were harmful. It is as if South Africa would rather prefer African countries to purchase goods and services from Europe, China and India than from South Africa, for fear of being perceived as recolonising Africa (Qobo, 2012: 4).

However, this sensitivity may be justified. Ogunnubi (2015) notes that South Africa's political and economic dominance on the continent has sparked resentment and suspicion in some African countries. This is in addition to perceptions that South African companies could potentially cripple local infant industries (Marthoz 2012 as cited in Ogunnubi, 2015). In response to these negative perceptions, in July 2016, Pretoria issued *Guidelines for Good Business Practice by South African Companies Operating in the Rest of Africa*, a voluntary set of codes largely informed by international best practices (Vickers & Cawood, 2018).

The issuance of the abovementioned voluntary set of codes highlights a degree of continuity in South Africa's approach to economic relations with other African countries. As already stated, Mandela (1993) acknowledged that colonialism established and entrenched asymmetrical economic relations between Pretoria and its neighbours, and vowed that democratic South Africa would seek to disengage from the perpetration of this flawed structure of the regional economy. Mandela's acknowledgement reflects an act of

self-assessment on South Africa's part. The Zuma administration's issuance of the set of codes highlights the importance that the country affords the views and perceptions of other African countries. Together, these two cases demonstrate the importance with which South Africa views its economic relations with the rest of the African continent.

4.6 Multilateralism

Spies (2009) asserts that in the year 2009, South Africa continuously reiterated its preference for a multilateral approach to diplomacy. South Africa's commitment to multilateralism has remained resolute as DIRCO's 2013-2018 Strategic Plan indicates that the country "is committed to multilateralism and a rules-based international order and to this end promotes global security, sustainable development, human rights and international law through its participation in international fora, notably the UN system and its specialised agencies, funds and programmes" (DIRCO, 2013: 3).

Explaining South Africa's commitment to multilateralism, Qobo and Dube (2015) submit that Pretoria's awareness of its economic inferiority in relation to other globally influential states informs its preference for collaborative approaches to international phenomena. The relevance of Pretoria's economic status is drawn from two considerations. Firstly, economic capability is regarded by various scholars, including Ray S. Cline, as one of the determinants of power in International Relations (Baldwin, 1979). Secondly, South Africa's economic inferiority in relation to globally influential powers would hinder any attempt to pursue a unilateral approach to global matters of importance as the country would be unable to mobilise adequate financial resources in order to exercise influence in a number of spaces across the globe at a given time. Multilateralism therefore ensures that Pretoria exercises influence even in spaces in which its relative power in the international system would not permit it. This could explain the country's support for efforts targeted at strengthening the United Nations (UN) system and its role in multilateralism (DIRCO, 2013).

The Thabo Mbeki administration continuously sought multilateral solutions to African conflicts (Adebajo, 2018). This approach was seemingly retained by the Zuma administration. As Zondi (2012, p. 11) notes, this approach "…enables [South Africa] to lead from the front and from behind, depending on the issue at hand." This approach also

applies to Southern Africa. South Africa has focused on strengthening SADC, forging regional consensus and unity, and finding multilateral solutions to Southern African conflicts (Alden & Le Pere, 2009). The country's commitment to multilateralism is partly a product of lessons that the ANC took from the support it received from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the frontline states (Zondi, 2012). Moreover, South Africa is 'committed' to using its relative strength in the continent and region for the benefit of all rather than for bullying its African counterparts, hence it seeks to cultivate strategic partnership with African countries for the purpose of promoting peace, stability and development (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007).

4.7 South-South Cooperation

Anthony, Tembe and Gull (2015) argue that Zuma came into power in 2009 when South Africa was evidently intensifying its embracement of South-South cooperation, with BRICS membership, which the country gained in December 2010, being a symbol of this embracement. Mpungose (2018) submits that the country's admission into the BRICS grouping enabled the country to substantiate its commitment to the agenda of the global South. Mpungose also notes that the then outgoing chairman of the Manufactures Association of Nigeria, John Aluya, argued that South Africa's improved relations with China under Zuma were instrumental in the former being admitted to BRICS, since Nigeria was also keen to join the grouping. South Africa's former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane succinctly captured the importance of BRICS when she stated that BRICS is the anchor of South Africa's South-South cooperation strategy (Nqakula, 2013).

The Zuma administration maintained that the current global governance architecture is outdated and therefore unable to efficiently tackle challenges that the contemporary world is facing (DIRCO, 2011a). South Africa has thus argued that there is a need to transform the Bretton Woods institutions, and especially, the UN (Sidiropoulos, 2008) in order for the global governance system to be rules-based rather than power-based (DIRCO, 2011a). The roots of the current global governance system can be traced back to the Second World War. The UNSC, in particular, is a product of the post-World War II alliance in 1945 (Bradford, 2005).

South Africa's commitment to South-South cooperation partly stems from its experience of colonialism and apartheid, hence its understanding of multilateralism has anti-imperial and anti-Western undertones (Qobo, 2012). South Africa's call for reform of multilateral institutions is thus partly motivated by the desire to overcome Western domination. In addition, one cannot be faulted for submitting that there is a link between the Zuma administration's refusal to arrest the former President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, and the administration's global South orientation. While Pretoria's ICC membership dictates that the country should have arrested Bashir, the arrest of Bashir was likely to earn the country as much criticism from its African counterparts as Mandela's 1995 call for the imposition of sanctions against Nigeria did. This submission is made with the knowledge that Africa is largely considered as part of the global South.

Saunders and Nagar (2018) submit that Zuma devoted more attention to cementing relations with other Southern African former liberation movements that have become governing parties than Mbeki. This could explain the strengthening of relations between South Africa and Angola during Zama's presidency. As Sachikonye (2018) notes, by 2013 there had been a significant improvement in South Africa-Angola relations, and this was largely due to the personal chemistry between the former Presidents of the two countries, Jacob Zuma and Eduardo Dos Santos, which was missing during Mbeki's tenure. Zuma demonstrated his intention to renew South Africa-Angola relations when he made Angola the first country he visited as President, accompanied by a large ministerial and business delegation (Adebajo, 2018). The case of Angola can be located within the Zuma administration's intensified embracement of the agenda of the global South.

Interestingly, DIRCO (2013: 3) states that "South Africa will utilise bilateral and multilateral engagements to consolidate and strengthen relations with organisations of the North to advance and support national priorities, the African Agenda and the Developmental Agenda of the South." This indicates that South Africa's anti-Western and anti-imperialism stance does not signify the weakening of ties with the North but rather the use of the North to meet the ends of the country, Africa and the South. As Qobo (2010: 14) notes, South Africa has on numerous occasions "acted as a bridge builder between the global North and South." Furthermore, the supposed strengthening of ties with organisations of the

global North for the reasons stated above is demonstrative of South Africa's purposeful approach to relations with the North. The purposeful approach or at least its consideration by Pretoria's foreign policymakers is a notable disruption to the conventional North-Africa relations which are characterised by the paternalistic tendencies of the North.

4.8 Conclusion

The pillars of South Africa's foreign policy have remained largely consistent throughout the different administrations. The main changes have been on prioritisation. The focus of the Zuma administration was mainly on multilateralism and South-South cooperation. In addition to this, economic diplomacy, aimed mainly at assisting the country in addressing its domestic challenges such as unemployment, inequality and poverty, also took precedence over a number of other objectives such as promoting democracy and human rights. This contributed to the increase in investments of South African companies in Africa. It further illuminated the need to carefully (re)consider the practicality of promoting democracy in other countries. The restructuring of the global governance system continued to be a key interest for South Africa. The country is particularly interested in the reform of the UNSC, of which it aims to be a permanent member. It is thus no surprise that Africa, particularly Southern Africa, continues to occupy an important position in South Africa's foreign policy. Without the support of the AU, it would be nearly impossible for the country to become a permanent member of the UNSC.

The following chapter interrogates South Africa's general foreign policy towards the SADC region.

CHAPTER FIVE: SOUTH AFRICA IN THE SADC REGION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter interrogates the manner in which South Africa has approached and handled relations with the SADC region. In other words, it unpacks the general aspects of South Africa's Southern Africa policy. First, the chapter briefly reflects on some of the changes

that the Zuma government made to, and aspects that it embraced from, the Thabo Mbeki administration's Southern Africa policy. Second, the chapter reflects on South Africa's relations with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (the organisation) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Third, the chapter dissects the impact that xenophobic attacks that have occurred repeatedly in South Africa have had on the country's relations with Southern Africa and the African continent as a whole. The chapter inevitably makes reference to key events involving numerous countries. Although the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of these countries, its relations with South Africa are not interrogated extensively because the succeeding chapter is dedicated entirely to that country. Lastly, in order to assess the longevity of the Zuma administration's foreign policy, this chapter briefly unpacks the Cyril Ramaphosa administration's SADC region policy.

5.2 Changes and Continuities

5.2.1 Changes

Monyae (2012: 149) argues that the Zuma government focused on moving towards an economic diplomacy and away from the conflict resolution preoccupation of the Mbeki administration. This was exemplified by the Zuma administration's infrastructure development advocacy through institutions such as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) (Monyae, 2012: 149). However, this does not imply the total neglect of conflict resolution by South Africa. Testimony to the foregoing assertion is the fact that following the March 2009 military coup which resulted in the deposition of Madagascan president, Marc Ravalomanana, and the installation of Andry Rajoelina as the president of a High Transitional Authority (Curtis, 2018: 80), Zuma played an important role in getting both Ravalomanana and Rajoelina not to contest the first post-coup election, which took place in December 2013 (Saunders & Nagar, 2018: 264-265). It must, however, be noted that Mozambique's Joaquim Chissano was appointed as SADC's mediator in the Madagascan conflict (Zounmenou, 2009: 73). An additional point worthy of noting is that after contesting one another in a run-off election in December 2018, Rajoelina came out victorious, a result that was upheld by Madagascar's High Constitutional Court after it had been challenged

by Ravalomanana (Al Jazeera, 2019). The 2018 electoral contestation between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina points to the temporality of the solution provided by SADC to the 2009 coup and conflict.

Saunders and Nagar (2018: 265) submit that Zuma devoted more attention to cementing relations with other Southern African former liberation movements that have become governing parties than Mbeki. This could explain the strengthening of relations between South Africa and Angola during Zuma's presidency. As Sachikonye (2018: 156-157) notes, by 2013 there had been a significant improvement in South Africa-Angola relations, and this was largely due to the personal chemistry between the former presidents of the two countries, Jacob Zuma and Eduardo Dos Santos, which was missing during Mbeki's tenure. Zuma demonstrated his intention to renew South Africa-Angola relations when he made Angola the first country he visited as president, accompanied by a large ministerial and business delegation (Adebajo, 2018: 17).

The lukewarm relations between Angola and South Africa that existed prior to the Zuma administration's taking of office can be traced back to the apartheid era. In an effort to protect and sustain the apartheid system, apartheid South Africa's destructive actions cost Southern Africa approximately 1.5 million lives and $60 billion between 1980 and 1988, as the country was directly or indirectly involved in civil wars in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Ogunnubi & Amao, 2016: 305). In the particular case of Angola, Sachikonye (2018: 154) cites the 1988 Battle of Cuito Cuanavale as an event which acts as a reminder of the apartheid government's destabilisation of that country. Additionally, African countries such as Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria do not appreciate being lectured by South Africa as they regard the country as a new entrant on the African stage (Ogunnubi & Amao, 2016: 307). The foregoing argument is symbolic of the multiplicity of dynamics that take centre stage in relations between African countries in general and SADC member states in particular. While one would expect South Africa's relative economic strength, a highly regarded determinant of power in the international system (Baldwin, 1979), to afford it a commanding voice in African international relations, the argument by Ogunnubi and Amao (2016: 307) is contrary to that expectation. The

argument also partly explains the rationale behind Pretoria's possession of two identities which were discussed in chapter four.

Sachikonye (2018: 157) states that in Angola, South Africa was associated with the 'misdemeanors' of its commercial and mining interests. In 2012, South African imports from Angola amounted to R23-billion while exports amounted to approximately R8.7-billion (Chibba, 2014). Saurombe (2010: 127) adds that South Africa's Shoprite supermarkets can be found in countries such as Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, but the "products sold in these stores are exclusively South African." Not sourcing from local suppliers could be one of the factors contributing to the resentment of South Africa's commercial interest in some African countries. In response to these sentiments, South African companies doing business in other African countries need to establish close ties with local businesses in those countries. This would enable these South African companies to source products from local companies. It would also contribute to the growth of those local companies and thereby improve their capacity to supply their South African counterparts. Resultantly, the need to source products from South Africa by South African companies operating in other African countries would be significantly reduced. To actualise this suggestion, Pretoria could convert the 2016 *Guidelines for Good Business Practice by South African Companies Operating in the Rest of Africa* into a mandatory set of codes and turn the suggestion into one of the codes.

The Zuma administration also introduced the presidential focus on infrastructure, as already stated, and the deployment of South African personnel in African Union (AU) and SADC structures to Pretoria's Africa policy (Maloka, 2018: 302). The latter led to the election of South Africa's Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the chairperson of the AU Commission in July 2012 (Ujara & Ibietan, 2017: 136), a position she held until February 2017. Importantly, the success of Dlamini-Zuma's candidature was largely a result of the support she received from most SADC member states, signifying an important role played by the Zuma administration in campaigning for her (Soko, 2016). Citing the appointment of Dlamini-Zuma as AU Commission chair to support his argument, Adebajo (2018: 13) maintains that by securing strong support at the regional level, Zuma increased South Africa's influence at the continental level. This argument signifies the importance of

securing a strong support base at the immediate regional level as a means that can be used to secure and advance interests at the continental and global levels.

The creation of the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) signalled the Zuma administration's intention to become an aid donor (Adebajo, 2018: 13). SADPA, according to DIRCO (2011: 35) "…will facilitate and manage development assistance in support of South Africa's foreign policy objectives." The creation of SADPA was announced in 2009 by Zuma in his inaugural State of the Nation Address, and the formal, legal, and technical frameworks were supposedly completed by 2013 (Naidu, 2017: 153). Despite several years having passed since its creation, SADPA is evidently struggling to take-off and thus "remains only on paper" (Cilliers, 2017: 9). The underwhelming progress made towards the functionality of SADPA is deleterious to the country's efforts to become a significant development assistance provider. The significant provision of development assistance would add another dimension to the country's power within the international system. However, in criticising the slow progress made towards the realisation of the full functionality of SADPA, one needs to take into consideration that South Africa operates within a context of constrained financial resources.

Nganje (2014: 1) holds that in contrast to immediate post-apartheid administrations which displayed embracement of South Africa's 'leadership role' in Southern Africa, the country has over the years neglected this role. In corroboration of this view, Schönwälder (2014, 18) cited in Breitegger (2017: 11) asserts that under the Zuma administration, South Africa's role as a promoter of democracy in Southern Africa became less prominent due to the internal problems that the country faced. This could explain why Smith (2012: 76) is of the view that under the Zuma government, South Africa's soft power currency declined. This highlights the impact that internal issues can have on a country's foreign policy, and therefore, global standing. Perhaps in addition to the internal problems that the Zuma administration faced, one should consider the changes to the pillars of South Africa's foreign policy and thus the relegation of human rights and democracy advocacy (discussed in chapter four) as a contributing factor to the diminished prominence of Pretoria's role as a democracy promoter.

Adebajo (2018: 13) recalls that in May 2013, the then vice-president of Zambia, Guy Scott, controversially and undiplomatically stated that "the South Africans are backward in terms of historical development. They really think they're the bees' knees and actually they've been the cause of so much trouble in this part of the world. I have a suspicion that the blacks model themselves on the whites now that they're in power". The comparison of the democratic government to the apartheid regime indicates, at least, that some African leaders still hold on to deeply entrenched memories of the overwhelmingly negative role that apartheid South Africa played in Africa. This, combined with the resentment of the country's economic dominance (which was mentioned in chapter four) on the continent that exists in some African countries, only fuels negative perceptions about the country. However, these perceptions may be justified. As Taylor (2011: 1236) notes, South Africa's elite aspires to create an environment that is conducive to the unhindered functioning of capitalism in Southern Africa.

5.2.2 Continuities

An interesting aspect of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy is the influence that the apartheid government's actions have had in shaping it. As Smith (2012: 75) observes, the South African government has conducted itself carefully in order to avoid awakening memories of the apartheid government's aggressive engagement with Southern Africa and Africa as a whole. Close ties between the African National Congress (ANC) and most SADC members, many of whom had given the party refuge or other forms of support during the apartheid era, acted as a catalyst for democratic South Africa's engagement with the rest of Southern Africa (Saunders & Nagar, 2018: 263). It is very much likely that these ties motivated democratic South Africa's 'non-aggressive' approach to relations with its neighbours.

The priorities of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation's (DIRCO) 2009-2012 strategic plan included "consolidating the African Agenda", a priority that was one of the main tenets of Pretoria's foreign policy during the Mbeki era (Maloka, 2018: 301). Although the consolidation of the African Agenda was renamed the "continued prioritisation of the African continent" in the 2010-2013 strategic plan, its retention by the Zuma administration meant continuity in foreign policy, particularly because the core

actions under it largely remained the same (Maloka, 2018: 301-302). In corroboration of the above view, Landsberg (2012: 81) notes that the Zuma administration's foreign policy was influenced heavily by the Mbeki government's notion of the "African Agenda".

At this point it would be wise to zoom into Zimbabwe-South Africa relations briefly. In response to Zimbabwe's multiplying internal political and socioeconomic problems, the Mbeki-led South African government employed a strategy which was dubbed by the media as "quiet diplomacy" (Landsberg & Kondlo, 2007: 9). Mhango (2012: 16) submits that quiet diplomacy refers to "a combination of soft diplomatic approaches, mostly behind-the-scenes engagements, aimed at facilitating pacific settlement". Importantly, Mlambo (2016: 26) argues that quiet diplomacy was a reaction to vocal and public Western criticism of the Robert Mugabe regime. Quiet diplomacy can thus be interpreted as the Mbeki government's response and alternative to Western megaphone diplomacy, which had proven to be ineffective in changing the situation in Zimbabwe. Nathan (2013a: 53) observes that the Mbeki administration's quiet diplomacy in the face of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe was viewed by human rights activists as demonstration of Mbeki's protection of the Mugabe administration. This view was reinforced when Mbeki joined Mugabe in criticising the sanctions that were imposed by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) on Zimbabwe (Nathan, 2013a: 53). Moreover, in July 2008, while serving as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), South Africa voted against the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe, and with the help of vetoes from Russia and China, the resolution was defeated (Anthony et al., 2015: 7).

The Mbeki administration is also guilty of endorsing flawed Zimbabwean elections as free and fair despite wide spread violence being reported during election seasons (Mlambo, 2016: 27). With regards to the 2002 elections, the South African government reported that the elections were legitimate but not necessarily free and fair, while SADC endorsed the elections as free and fair (Graham, 2006: 122). Despite noting that the 2002 elections were not free and fair, and Zimbabwean military leaders stating prior to the elections that they would not recognise the opposition leader as president if he were to win, South Africa endorsed them and went on to endorse the clearly flawed 2005 elections as well (Mlambo, 2016: 27-28).

Given the evidently pro-Mugabe stance of the Mbeki administration it is unsurprising that Moyo (2013: 75) contends that one of the contributing factors to the survival of the Mugabe regime was the support that the governing Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) received from South Africa's governing party, the ANC. Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004: 390) add that after a period of hesitation, towards the end of 2002, Mbeki and the ANC had moved from quiet diplomacy to openly endorsing Zimbabwe's land reform policies. To support their argument, the two authors cite Mbeki's argument, expressed in the *ANC Today* that "the economic crisis currently affecting Zimbabwe did not originate from the desperate actions of a reckless political leadership, or from corruption. It arose from a genuine concern to meet the needs of the black poor, without taking into account the harsh economic reality that we must pay for what we consume".

The Mbeki administration's quiet diplomacy and lack of stern action towards the Mugabe administration are worthy of thorough dissection. Noting that South Africa could have employed instruments such as sanctions to assist in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis, van Nieuwkerk (2012: 91) states that principles such as human rights promotion have had to come second to solidarity among Southern African (former) liberation movements in South Africa's foreign policy. In concurrence with van Nieuwkerk (2012: 91), Ngubentombi (2004: 155) argues that punitive measures against Harare would have led to the isolation of Pretoria in the region and possibly in the AU, which would have resulted in substantial political and economic damage. Lodge (2004: 2) adds that South Africa's foreign policy is characterised by the principle of South-South solidarity. Therefore, while Pretoria desires to differentiate or distance itself from the West and assume a more 'African identity', it is caught in an awkward position of balancing between the West and the South (Lipton, 2009: 333). The awkwardness is created by the role that the West expects South Africa to play in Africa, which at times clashes with South Africa's desire to sing from the same hymn book as its neighbours in an attempt to gain acceptance of its 'leadership position' in the continent.

In March 2011, at a SADC meeting held in Zambia, the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, requested permission to send three members to work with the Joint Monitoring

and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) in order to improve its oversight role over the global political agreement (GPA), but the officers (only two) were sent a year later, and the ZANU-PF argued that this amounted to interference in Zimbabwe's internal affairs (International Crisis Group, 2012: 17). Mugabe's insistence on non-interference in Zimbabwe's domestic affairs stemmed from SADC's resolute commitment to the protection of national sovereignty and against its transference to the regional body (Nathan, 2006: 606). At the same meeting, Zuma, in his report as SADC's mediator accused Mugabe and the ZANU-PF of intentionally defaulting on the implementation of the reforms stipulated in the GPA, leading to Mugabe stating that his party had the right to reject Zuma's mediation should the 'interference' persist (International Crisis Group, 2012: 17). This represented one of the few times that the South African government criticised Mugabe, and could be interpreted as an attempt by Zuma to assume a neutral position between the members of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in order to avoid the criticism that Mbeki was subjected to.

Zuma's confrontational approach towards Mugabe was short-lived. Moore (2014a: 110) submits that in the build up to the 2013 Zimbabwean elections, Lindiwe Zulu, who was serving as the leader of the South African facilitation team, took a more pro-democracy stance in questioning the preparations to the extent that Mugabe "told Jacob Zuma to shut his 'street woman' (Zulu) up". Still expressing concern over the preparations and the date chosen for the poll, Zulu revealed that Zuma had called Mugabe to register his dissatisfaction with the build up to the elections; to this Mugabe responded with, "an ordinary woman says 'no you can't have elections on July 31'. Really, did such a person think we, as a country, would take heed of this street woman's utterances?" and threatened to withdraw from SADC if it "decides to do stupid things" (Raftopoulos, 2013: 8). Subsequently, the South African Presidency denied that Zuma had called Mugabe and distanced itself from Zulu's utterances (Raftopoulos, 2013: 8). This was a clear demonstration of the Zuma administration succumbing to Mugabe's bully tactics. It also underscored the end of Zuma's confrontational approach towards Mugabe.

The ZANU-PF convincingly won the 2013 Zimbabwean elections. The Mugabe-led party won 61 per cent of the presidential votes and 197 parliamentary seats while the

opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T), could only manage to get 34 per cent of the presidential vote and 70 seats in parliament (Moore, 2014a: 102; Moore, 2014b: 47). This was an impressive comeback by the ZANU-PF from the GNU. However, as in most Zimbabwean elections in the 21st century, reports of irregularities soon surfaced. The Research and Advocacy Unit (2016: 8) advances that "all empirical analysis reported multiple sources of possible rigging; manipulations of the voters' roll, assisted voting, huge numbers of voters being turned away, unknown number of voters using 'voters slips', and enormous numbers of security personnel voting in unmonitored ways". The AU and SADC observer groups, although divulging that they had their reservations, proclaimed the elections as fair and credible, while Zuma congratulated Mugabe and stated that the result was a reflection of the 'will of the people' of Zimbabwe (Southall, 2013: 136).

The Zuma administration's reaction to Mugabe's scathing remarks about Zulu and the ZANU-PF's victory in the 2013 elections cemented the end of Zuma's confrontational attitude towards Mugabe and marked the reincarnation of Mbeki's quiet diplomacy. These changes can be partly attributed to an improved understanding of Southern African politics, as well as South Africa's various ambitions, including the UNSC permanent seat and uncontested leadership in Africa. The Zuma administration's experience on the Southern African terrain and recognition of the influence that Mugabe had in the region clearly demonstrated the disadvantages of engaging in a face-off with a Mugabe-led Zimbabwe. His seniority and the ZANU-PF's seniority and position among Southern African former liberation movements put the ANC-led South Africa at a disadvantageous position for a face-off. The case of Zimbabwe thus represents a useful tool in the assessment of the aspects of the Mbeki administration's foreign policy that the Zuma administration adopted or maintained.

5.3 Regional Organisations

The centrality of Africa and SADC member states in particular in South Africa's foreign policy dates back to the Mandela administration, particularly in as far as expanding economic linkages and regional peacekeeping are concerned (Siko, 2014: 74). It is thus unsurprising that DIRCO's 2010-2013 strategic plan included the 'continued prioritisation

of the African continent', which encompasses, among other key priorities, focus on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the AU, and SADC (Maloka, 2018: 302). Given the above, this section briefly reflects on South Africa's relations with two of the main Southern African regional organisations.

5.3.1 Southern African Customs Union

The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is made up of Botswana, Eswatini (formerly Swaziland), Lesotho, South Africa and Namibia. The customs union can be traced back to the signing of the customs union agreement (CUA) of 1910 on 29 June by Swaziland, South Africa, Bechuanaland and Basutoland (Ramalepe & Shai, 2016: 97). Namibia joined the customs union when it gained independence from South Africa in 1990 (Hartzenberg, 2011: 7). According to Breitegger (2017: 10), South African can lay claim to leadership in both SACU and SADC. It is within this context that Vickers (2012: 123) maintains that as the SACU chair, from 2010 to 2011, South Africa played a central role in the rationalisation of SACU's working programme into five key areas: establishing common institutions; regional industrial policy; unified engagement in external trade negotiations; review of the revenue sharing formula; and development of a trade facilitation programme to improve border efficiency.

Inequalities between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Eswatini (the BLNE states, formerly BLNS states) have resulted in Pretoria being an unparalleled hegemonic power within SACU, and can be credited with stifling progress in the implementation of democratic reforms as stipulated in the 2002 SACU agreement (Gibb, 2018: 275-281). The consequence of the combination of historical factors, asymmetric power relations between SACU members, and lack of implementation of the 2002 SACU agreement has been the continuation of South African management of the customs union's affairs relating to the implementation of the common external tariff, despite the fact that this, according to the 2002 SACU agreement, should be done by the SACU Tariff Board and national bodies (Hartzenberg, 2011: 7). The SACU Tariff Board and national bodies are yet to come into being.

Saunders and Nagar (2013: 35) opine that in signing a trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union (EU) in1998, South Africa showed little regard for SACU and

SADC, a trend which has continued in recent times in as far as South Africa-EU relations are concerned. The two authors further observe that South Africa's conduct in Southern Africa gives an impression that bilateral relations outrank multilateral relations with the region. This observation is in direct contrast with South Africa's stated belief in multilateralism. Worthy of noting is that Eswatini, Botswana and Lesotho signed an interim economic partnership agreement (IEPA) with the EU, which according to Ramalepe and Shai (2016: 98-99) can interpreted as the three countries' exercise of sovereignty and illumination of their resentment of South Africa's dominance within SACU. The foregoing argument highlights the negative side of South Africa's undisputed dominance within the customs union. It further highlights that despite the benefits that SACU members derive from the customs union, the inequalities between them will continue to play a significant role in shaping the state of relations between them.

Despite South African 'dominance' in SACU, Gibb (2018: 281) questions whether it is 'democratic' for a South Africa that is responsible for more than 80 per cent of SACU's gross domestic product (GDP), merchandise exports, population, electricity generation and manufacturing output to possess equal power as a Lesotho that contributes just 0.7 per cent of SACU's GDP, or an Eswatini that accounts for only 2 per cent of SACU's population. Democracy must be understood within the context that one of the main aims of renegotiating the SACU agreement, which resulted in the new (2002) SACU agreement, was to democratise the customs union (McCarthy, 2003: 30). While the abovementioned figures undoubtedly paint an undemocratic picture, it is important to note that leadership or leadership ambitions bring with them responsibilities which at times require the leader or aspirant leader to sacrifice themselves in demonstration of their leadership capabilities.

SACU's current revenue sharing formula (RSF) enables the BLNE states to receive nearly half of the revenue in the common revenue pool (CRP) despite the fact that collectively they account for less than 10 per cent of SACU's GDP (Ngalawa, 2014: 145). Through the RSF, for 2011/2012, Lesotho received R3.1 billion, Eswatini received R3.3 billion, South Africa received R4.5 billion, Namibia received R8.1 billion and Botswana received R9.7 billion (Gibb, 2018: 286). Given the above figures, it is unsurprising that Flatters and

Stern (2006: 2) are of the view that Lesotho, Eswatini, and Namibia (to a lesser extent) are highly dependent on SACU for their national budgets. Draper (2010) bluntly states that through the CRP, Pretoria subsidises the national budgets of BLNE sates, and a hasty withdrawal of revenue would result in two failed states, namely Lesotho and Eswatini.

One positive aspect for South Africa in the SACU arrangement is that a country's share of excise collections is determined by its share of the SACU GDP, and since South Africa's contribution to the SACU GDP is approximately 92 per cent, the country receives about 80 per cent of the excise revenue component of the CRP (Ngalawa, 2014: 145). Despite this, there is consensus in South African official structures that the RSF needs to be renegotiated (Draper, 2010). Perhaps what is evidently a loss for South Africa could yield benefits elsewhere. Smith (2012: 76) notes that according to Flemes, regional powers can pursue acceptance from their neighbours through allowing some degree of free-riding, as well as providing public goods and material incentives. Thus what South Africa loses through SACU could come in handy as the country seeks to cement its place as SADC's and ultimately Africa's undisputed regional/continental power.

5.3.2 Southern African Development Community

Even though DIRCO rhetorically insists that Southern Africa is South Africa's main foreign policy priority, Saunders and Nagar (2018: 270) contend that reality suggests that SADC has often come second to other priorities. While it is not surprising that Pretoria has often prioritised its national interest over those of the region, the lack of coherence in its policies towards SADC, which stems partly from the reality that different components of its bureaucracy (DIRCO, the Presidency and others), interact separately with the community, is a setback (Saunders & Nagar, 2013: 34-35). It is thus important that Pretoria integrates and rationalises its interactions with the regional body in order to ensure that components of its bureaucracy speak with one voice, and therefore portray an image that is expected from a supposed leader.

Nganje (2014: 3) states that South Africa has the most diversified economy in Southern Africa, this may partly explain why the country accounts for approximately 70 per cent of the region's GDP and 60 per cent of SADC's total trade. Adding that South Africa is

arguably the most industrialised and technologically advanced African country, with a population that only comes second to that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the SADC region, Ogunnubi and Amao (2016: 307) submit that South Africa is Southern Africa's hegemon. However, Vickers (2012: 122) points out that Pretoria's economic dominance in the region contributes to the perception that "the country acts selfishly in its own national interest as a regional hegemon (in the negative critical sense, not as a 'benevolent' hegemon)." Negative perceptions of South Africa's role in the Southern Africa may signify that its status as a regional hegemon is not accepted or at least recognised throughout the region.

While South Africa's economic dominance within the SADC region reasonably justifies the argument that the country is the region's hegemon, it would be prudent to take into consideration the multiple factors at play when making this argument. Without the intention to enter the debate on South Africa's hegemonic status, one needs to remain cognizant of the fact that while the determinants of power may be in South Africa's favour, it does not automatically follow that the country would use them in order to assert its hegemony in the region. Therefore, the assertion that South Africa is the SADC region's hegemon should be informed mainly by its behaviour in the region rather than its comparative strength. As already stated in the present study, South Africa has been reluctant to assert its leadership in the region. Furthermore, in its non-hegemonic definition of national interest, the country identified mutually beneficial cooperation and collaboration with other states as instruments of attaining its national interest (Landsberg, 2014). A hegemonic posture would thus be detrimental to the country's cooperation ambitions as it is more aligned with domination, demonstration and exertion of power, and flexing of muscles.

Although noting that the South African market was opened up through the SADC FTA (free trade area), Vanheukelom and Bertelsmann-Scott (2016: 16) argue that within South Africa there are protected industries that are heavily reliant on government support in the form of trade remedies, tariffs, non-tariff barriers and incentives. This perhaps explains why Zimbabwe's former president, Robert Mugabe, according to, Saunders and Nagar (2018: 269), stated that, "we appeal to South Africa, which is highly industrialised, to lead

us in this [industrialisation] and work with us, and cooperate with us and not just regard the whole continent as an open market for products from South Africa. We want a reciprocal relationship where we sell to each other [and] not just receiving products from one source." Contrary to the popular view, Saurombe (2010: 128) asserts that "the underlying philosophy of South Africa's vision is that South Africa's destiny is inextricably linked to that of the region and the rest of Africa. This is shown by South Africa's more developmental rather than narrowly mercantilist approach to the region and Africa more generally." While this argument provides a different perspective, the year in which it was made should be noted. The period 2010 to 2018 presented enough time for the Zuma administration to make substantial changes to its foreign policy approach in this regard. Therefore, the argument by a number of scholars (Curtis, 2018: 71; Landsberg, 2018: 58) that the Zuma administration adopted a more business-friendly or mercantilist approach to foreign policy matters should not be disregarded.

Cilliers (2017: 9) submits that Pretoria has been a major provider of development assistance in the SADC region, especially to conflict-ridden countries such as the DRC, which received over $1 billion between 2001 and 2015. Additionally, through the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF), Zimbabwe received R613 million between 2008 and 2009. These figures add a different dimension to South Africa's foreign policy and may have informed the views expressed by Saurombe (2010) in the preceding paragraph. It is within this context that the importance of the full functionality of SADPA, which was identified by DIRCO as a vehicle through which South Africa's development assistance agenda could be driven, should be understood.

SADC member states, and South Africa in particular, remain solidly committed to the principle of national sovereignty and against its transference to the regional body (Nathan, 2006: 606). Hwang (2007: 77) advises that SADC's commitment to national sovereignty should be understood within the context that the regional body is mostly made up of countries with "weak" state structures, and which do not enjoy strong regime legitimacy. What can be deduced from the foregoing analysis is that the fact that SADC member states face more internal than external security threats is the reason for SADC's commitment to non-interference. This signifies that the appreciation of their own internal

weaknesses has led leaders of SADC member countries into abstaining from interfering in the internal affairs of one another. Furthermore, Hwang's characterisation of Southern African countries implies that if SADC were to jettison its non-interference stance, the organisation would be involved in incessant intervention. As the *de facto* regional leader, South Africa would be expected to provide leadership in these interventions.

5.4 Xenophobia

Xenophobic attacks that have recurrently taken place in South Africa are one stain that continues to taint the country's image in Africa, and possibly, globally. Nathan (2005: 370) opines that "there is widespread xenophobia in South Africa, targeted mainly at people from other African countries", which highly contradicts Pretoria's rhetoric on the importance of Africa. Although noting that the first notable and widely-covered outbreak of xenophobic violence took place under the leadership of Mbeki in 2008, Cilliers (2017: 8) holds that the biggest dent to South Africa's standing in Africa under the Zuma administration was xenophobic violence. Incidents of xenophobic attacks were observed in some parts of Durban and Johannesburg in April 2015, as well as in the township of Katlehong in the east of Johannesburg in 2016 (Hengari, 2016: 2-3). In February 2017, incidents of xenophobic violence, targeted mainly at undocumented Zimbabweans, Pakistanis and Nigerians, were reported around Pretoria and Johannesburg (Le Pere, 2017: 108).

Misago (2016: 447) argues that xenophobic violence has become a persistent feature in democratic South Africa. In concurrence with the above argument, Madue (2015: 60) observes that there is a widely held mythical view among South Africans that there are floods of illegal immigrants entering South Africa, which, together with the social and economic challenges faced by South Africans, fuels xenophobic attacks. Additionally, Tella (2017: 12) observes that apart from xenophobic violence, there exists "deep attitudinal xenophobia", which is evident in the manner in which South African government agencies, particularly the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the Department of Home Affairs treat foreign nationals, as well as in speeches by South African politicians. One such speech could be Jacob Zuma's statement to the National Assembly on 19 April 2015, in which he stated that "while we strongly condemn the attacks, we are aware of,

and are sympathetic to some of the issues that have been raised by affected South African citizens" (Hengari, 2016: 3). Zuma's utterances were largely informed by the factors that have been raised by some South Africans as reasons behind xenophobic attacks. These include crimes such as the alleged drug and human trafficking in which some foreign nationals are said to be involved.

Xenophobic violence in South Africa has resulted in calls in countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria, for the boycott or expulsion of South African businesses and goods; and also earned South Africa a spot on the AU's Security Council agenda (Cilliers, 2017: 8). Moreover, in retaliation to xenophobic violence which occurred in September 2019 in some parts of the Gauteng province of South Africa, South African companies such as Shoprite and MTN were physically attacked in Nigeria (Ohuocha & Dludla, 2019). What can be deduced from the above is that xenophobic violence does not only make South Africa unattractive to foreign nationals, but also contributes to the creation of an environment that is hostile to, and unreceptive of, South African commercial interests and most likely, citizens.

Le Pere (2017: 108) notes that xenophobia has had a serious impact on South Africa's continental leadership ambitions. Xenophobia has also had a negative impact on South Africa's image globally. Testimony to this are the difficulties that the country faced in getting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma elected as the AU Commission Chairperson (Tella & Ogunnubi, 2014: 157-158). Misago (2016: 451) adds that the South African government's overall response to xenophobic violence has been denialist in character. Denialism only dents South Africa's leadership credentials as it creates an impression that the government is allergic to accountability, and passively encourages xenophobic violence.

5.5 The Ramaphosa Administration

After being the deputy president during Zuma's second term, Cyril Ramaphosa took over from Zuma when the latter (Zuma) resigned as the president of South Africa in February 2018. These events followed Ramaphosa's election as the president of the ruling ANC in December 2017, a position in which he also replaced Zuma. Subsequently, following the ANC's electoral victory in the May 2019 national and provincial elections, Ramaphosa retained his presidency. As a result, this chapter's analysis of the Ramaphosa

administration's foreign policy will only be limited to the period February 2018 to the time of writing. Therefore, considering that the ANC's electoral victory in 2019 marked the beginning of a five year Ramaphosa reign (should he finish his term), the analysis in this chapter will not provide a conclusive dissection of the Ramaphisa administration's foreign policy. This section's intention is thus to provide an early detection of signs of continuity or discontinuity in the Ramaphosa administration's foreign policy vis-à-vis that of the Zuma administration.

5.5.1 Continuity or Discontinuity

In his first Cabinet reshuffle, Ramaphosa appointed Lindiwe Sisulu as the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. Sisulu went on to establish a Ministerial Review Panel which was tasked with the responsibility of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the country's then prevailing foreign policy direction, as well as recommending interventions needed in order for the country to contribute meaningfully in the global stage (DIRCO, 2019a: 1-2). It must be noted that Sisulu was replaced by Naledi Pandor in Ramaphosa's first post-2019 elections Cabinet. The establishment of the Ministerial Review Panel signified the Ramaphosa administration's intention to pave a new path for itself and distance itself from the Zuma administration. The establishment of the panel can also be interpreted as the Ramaphosa administration's conveyance of the message that there were fundamental concerns that the administration had with the trajectory of the Zuma administration's foreign policy. Considering that domestically, Ramaphosa's overarching message during his campaign for the 2019 elections centred on the need to root out corruption and to lead the country towards a new clean path characterised by economic growth, it is unsurprising that his administration would seek ways to differentiate its foreign policy from that of the Zuma administration.

Domiro (2019) notes that Ramaphosa proclaimed a 'renewed' focus on the rhetorically well-established notion of the importance of Africa in South Africa's foreign policy. The emphasis on the centrality of Africa is unsurprising because the continent in general and the SADC region in particular constitute the country's immediate terrain for foreign policy implementation. The centrality of the African continent is one pillar of South Africa's foreign policy that has been retained, at least rhetorically, by different democratic

administrations, including the Zuma administration. The Ramaphosa administration's embracement of the notion of the centrality of Africa is closely linked to its resurrection of the Mbeki administration's idea of an African Renaissance (Domiro, 2019).

In its assumption of its role as the chair of the AU in 2020, the Ramaphosa-led South Africa has an opportunity to demonstrate its resurrection of the African Renaissance at the continental level (DIRCO, 2019a: 8-9). The actualisation of the African Renaissance during South Africa's stint as the chair of the AU, will according to the Foreign Policy Review Report, require the strengthening of regional economic communities (RECs) and particular prioritisation of institutions such as Pan-African Women's Organisation (PAWO), the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and programmes such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and NEPAD (DIRCO, 2019a: 9). These recommendations of the Review Panel are profoundly reminiscent of the factors that formed an integral part of the Mbeki administration's foreign policy. The explanation for the reincarnation of the ideas of the Mbeki administration perhaps lies in Fabricius' (2019) conviction that the"…nostalgia for the Thabo Mbeki years isn't [is not] surprising, given the composition of the panel that wrote the report. The chairperson was former deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad and the panel includes other close Mbeki allies." Given that Pahad served under Mbeki, one cannot be faulted for submitting that he played a role in the formulation and implementation of the country's foreign policy during Mbeki's tenure and therefore believed in the core underpinnings of that administration's foreign policy. However, it must be noted that these recommendations do not conclusively constitute the path that the Ramaphosa administration will follow. Conversely, it is unlikely that the administration would commission a review of foreign policy with no intention of utilising the recommendations that would emerge from the review.

The Review Panel recalls South Africa's integral role in the pursuit of 'well-crafted' African Renaissance programmes, including the APRM, NEPAD and other important tasks in the AU (DIRCO, 2019a: 9). It is particularly eager for realisation of the reincarnation of the cooperative spirit that drove the country into the establishment of close relationships with other African states including Algeria, Senegal, Egypt and Nigeria in the pursuit of African Renaissance initiatives (Fabricius, 2019). The panel thus submitted that the country

should forge strategic alliances with certain African countries (Domiro, 2019). The recommendations of the panel are resoundingly a call for the reincarnation and revitalisation of the Mbeki administration's foreign policy. There are signs that the call for the forging of alliances with specific African countries could have been heeded by Ramaphosa already. These signs include Ramaphosa's sending of special envoys to convey a message of South Africa's commitment to pan-African unity to the DRC, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Niger and Senegal (South African Government, 2019b). The sending of these envoys was a reaction to the xenophobic attacks that took place in the country in September 2019. The envoys were coupled with an apology from Ramaphosa to Zimbabweans who met him with a hostile reception when he delivered a speech at the state funeral of the late former president of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe (Nkanjeni, 2019). The crowd, which disrupted Ramaphosa's speech through jeers in demonstration of its condemnation of xenophobic attacks, cheered Ramaphosa soon after he apologised for the attacks (Nkanjeni, 2019).

Ebrahim (2018b) advanced that Ramaphosa will seek to pursue his domestic priorities such as attracting (international) investors, increasing business confidence and thereby expanding trade, through economic diplomacy. In concurrence with this assertion, Payi (2019), who formed part of the Foreign Policy Review Panel, opines that there is a need for a concerted effort aimed at attracting foreign investment in order for the country to overcome some of the challenges it faces. In affirmation of the need to prioritise the utilisation of the international arena for the pursuance of South Africa's domestic economic interests, the Foreign Policy Review Panel defined economic diplomacy as "a nation's promotion of its economic fortunes, interests and needs in the global environment" (DIRCO, 2019a: 11). Economic diplomacy is another focus area that the Ramaphosa administration's has embraced from the Zuma administration's foreign policy. This is unsurprising when one considers the urgent need for South Africa to grow its economy in order to overcome challenges such as unemployment and poverty.

The Foreign Policy Review Panel counseled the Ramaphosa administration to take a cautious approach to relations with other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) members, and encouraged the administration to avoid neglecting relations with

the global North (Fabricius, 2019). Should the panel's advice be heeded, it would result in a notable shift from the Zuma administration's South-South preoccupation, which centred on BRICS relations. This is one aspect of South Africa's foreign policy that the Ramaphosa administration needs to consider carefully. This aspect has the potential to define South Africa's standing and image internationally during the remainder of Ramaphosa's presidency. A concerted effort at consolidating relations with the North may result in the loss of important allies in the form of UNSC permanent members in Russia and China, who may interpret this effort as a shift in loyalty. The Ramaphosa administration thus has the difficult task of balancing between the North and the South. However, Domiro (2019) is of the view that the panel's advice stems from the rapid growth in the influence of China and Russia in Africa. Therefore, South Africa needs to ensure that its relations with other BRICS members do not serve as a vehicle for the penetration of what is supposed to be its own sphere of influence (considering its leadership ambitions in the continent) by other BRICS members.

Payi (2019) submits that "…South Africa has gone through a period in which we lost our international stature, and saw our economic relations with many of our international partners weaken." In what Payi sees as a path towards the reclamation of South Africa's good-standing in the international system, in June 2018 the country was elected to serve as a non-permanent member in the UNCS for the period 2019-2020 (DIRCO, 2019b). In addition, Pretoria was elected to Chair the AU in 2020 (South African Government, 2019a). The Ramaphosa administration welcomed these two roles as opportunities to contribute to the pursuance of the AU's goal to Silence the Guns by 2020 (AU, 2019; DIRCO, 2019b). Payi's contention that under the Zuma administration South Africa's international standing took a dent is also discernible in the report of the Review Panel. Should the Ramaphosa administration's foreign policy move from this premise, then major changes in the trajectory of the country's foreign policy are to be expected. Considering Ramaphosa's characterisation of the Zuma administration at the domestic level as 'nine wasted years' the introduction of changes to the country's foreign policy would not be a startling occurrence.

5.6 Conclusion

The Zuma administration played a central role in strengthening relations with Southern Africa's former liberation movements. It also paid substantial attention to ensuring the appointment of South Africans to key positions in continental and regional organisations. Despite this, there are signs that the administration was reluctant to openly play a leadership role in the region. However, this might have been due to fear of negative perceptions or simply reduced capacity due to South Africa's own internal problems. Although enjoying dominance within SACU, the country is growing increasingly uncomfortable with 'subsidising' the BLNE states, while its approach within SADC appears to be motivated by commercial interests more than anything else. Lastly, the country has to effectively deal with xenophobic attacks and respond to them carefully in order not to further compromise its image in Africa and beyond.

While it is observable that the Zuma administration sought to cement relations with the SADC region primarily, the Ramaphosa administration is seemingly following the path that Mbeki took. The path focused largely on the African continent rather than narrowly focusing on improving relations with SADC member state. The Ramaphosa approach has the potential to cement a leadership position for the country at the continental level within a short period of time. However, it also poses a risk of alienating SADC members who may prove to be important allies when the country needs backing in order to have its way at the continental level. While there is a degree of continuity between the Ramaphosa and Zuma administration's foreign policy, there is an evident effort on the part of the Ramaphosa administration to establish a new path for itself or to reinvent the Mbeki administration's path. This is unsurprising when one considers that domestically, the Zuma administration's reign was once characterised by Ramaphosa as 'nine wasted years'. The Ramaphosa administration's response to xenophobic attacks also marked a departure from both those of the Mbeki and Zuma administrations which many characterised as a denialist or indifferent.

The next chapter specifically zooms into South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC.

CHAPTER SIX: SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

6.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the Jacob Zuma administration's foreign policy towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, in an effort to contextualise the Zuma administration's foreign policy towards the DRC, the chapter firsts provides an outline of the Congolese conflict. This is done in a manner that uncovers the historical and root causes of the Congolese conflict. The importance of the Congolese conflict emanates from the consideration that ceaseless or recurrent political and socioeconomic instability in the DRC has overtime become a defining feature of the country. As such, it (instability) is bound to have a significant impact on relations between the country and other countries. South Africa is no exception as its foreign policy towards the DRC is bound to be partly influenced by considerations of the recurrent instability. South Africa's approach to the Congolese conflict thus provides useful insight in the analysis of Pretoria's foreign policy towards the DRC. The chapter then shifts its attention to South Africa's reaction to the Congolese conflict. This is followed by a brief reflection on the

political and socioeconomic conditions in the DRC between 2009 and 2018. The chapter then provides an extensive dissection of the Zuma administration's foreign policy towards the DRC before providing concluding remarks.

6.2 The Congolese Conflict

Noting that the country has been plagued by apparently ceaseless conflicts since the 1990s which have resulted in gross human rights abuses, peacekeeping failures and a humanitarian calamity, Shepherd (2014: 3) contends that the DRC has become synonymous with violence and corruption in the eyes of many observers. The above observation is indicative of the conditions that many Congolese citizens have to contend with. It further unveils the seriousness with which members of the international community including members of the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) such as South Africa ought to approach relations with the DRC. Although the DRC has a relatively well-documented history of conflict (dating back to the pre-colonial period), the current chapter begins its reflection on the Congolese conflict with the start of the First Congo War. Although the literature which considers the history of conflict in the DRC prior to the First Congo War provides valuable insights on the DRC's turbulent past, it is not the primary focus of the present chapter. This stems from the consideration that the First Congo War occurred at a time when South Africa had already transitioned to democracy. Its (the First Congo War) use as the starting point of analysis thus enables the current study to stick to its intention of focusing primarily on democratic South Africa's foreign policy and therefore devoting minimal attention to apartheid South Africa's relations with the SADC region.

6.2.1 The First Congo War

Williams (2013: 81) succinctly captures the complexity of the conflict in the DRC when he opines that the conflict has seen the involvement of multiple actors including Congolese rebel groups, neighboring countries, and rebels from these neighboring states. His observation that the conflict in the DRC has a multitude of causes including among others "local disputes over land and resources, the acquisitive goals of rebel groups and predatory neighboring states, and ethnic and political grievances all help explain the outbreak and continuation of war in the DRC" (Williams, 2013: 81) is reflective of the

complexity of the situation under study. Nonetheless, the First Congo War broke out in 1996 and culminated in the removal of Mobutu Sese Seko as the President of the DRC (then Zaire) in 1997.

An important factor in the removal of the DRC's then President Mobutu Sese Seko and thereby the outbreak of the First Congo War was the Rwandan Genocide. This is demonstrative of the regional dimension of the conflict in the DRC as well as the apparent tendency of conflicts occurring in one of the countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa to affect neighbouring states substantially. As Williams (2013: 86) notes, the Rwandan Genocide began in 1994 when Rwandan Hutu leaders initiated the extermination of the Tutsis, leading to the killing of about 800 000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus before the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) stepped-in and halted the killings with the aid of Uganda. However, it is important to recall that the one event that sparked the killing of the Tutsi was the assassination of Rwanda's then President, Juvénal Habyarimana, when his plane was shot down while travelling with Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira in Kigali (Magnarella, 2005: 815). The Hutu accused the RPF of being responsible for the assassination, while certain foreign observers accused Hutu extremists in the Rwandan Armed Forces which stood to lose significantly if Habyarimana had went on to implement the Arusha agreements as it was widely believed after a regional meeting with Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Tanzania's Ali Hassan Mwinyi (Magnarella, 2005: 813-815). The Arusha Accords were signed by the Rwanda and the RPF in August 1993 in order to break the stand-off between the two parties (Nikuze, 2014:1093). Consequent to the success of the RPF and the Genocide overall was the fleeing of approximately one million refugees into the neighbouring DRC including thirty thousand Forces Armées Rwandaises [Rwandan Armed Forces] (FAR) members (the perpetrators of the genocide) and other militiamen (Stearns, 2012: 31; Williams, 2013: 86).

The arrival of Rwandan 'refugees' in the DRC, particularly in the North and South Kivu provinces was to be a source of problems for the DRC. As Alusala (2014: 96) states, upon their arrival in the eastern parts of the DRC, the Interahamwe (Hutu militia) and the ex-FAR were still heavily armed. The Rwandan refugees settled in an area which was largely populated by the ethnic Tutsis, known as Banyamulenge (Warren, 2011: 5-6). The

Banyamulenge and the Banyarwanda were formally stripped of Congolese citizenship by the Mobutu government in 1995 and had been on the receiving end of ethnic violence perpetrated by government forces (UNECA, 2015: 14; Venugopalan, 2016: 3; Warren, 2011: 5-6). The arrival of the Hutus from Rwanda thus exacerbated already existing ethnic tensions in the DRC (Alusala, 2014: 6). Testimony to the foregoing statement is that the Congolese Hutus soon collaborated with the ex-FAR, resulting in the fleeing of nearly 200 000 Tutsi into Goma or Rwanda at times due to persecution carried out violently (Stearns, 2012: 29). Furthermore, the still heavily armed ex-FAR (Rwandan Hutus) carried out incursions into Rwanda from the DRC, and in combination with the attacks on Congolese Tutsis carried out by the Congolese Hutus in collaboration with the ex-FAR, these incursions triggered a reaction from Rwanda (Williams, 2013: 87).

The migration of Rwandans, particularly the so-called génocidaires, into the DRC (then Zaire) in large numbers enabled neighboring states to participate in the toppling of Mobutu (Trautman, 2013: 39). It is worth noting that "Rwanda provided training as well as organizational and logistical support to Congolese Tutsis in the provinces of North and South Kivu" (Williams, 2013: 87). In fear of ethnic cleansing and under the inspiration of the support received from Rwanda, the Banyamulenge (Tutsi) confronted the Mobutu government and launched strikes targeted at Hutu refugee camps and the Congolese army in September 1996 (Venugopalan, 2016: 3). The beginning of these strikes was followed by the timeous and immediate entrance of the Rwandan army into the DRC, which meant that the war against the Mobutu government was in motion (Weiss, 2000: 3). Rwanda was joined immediately by Uganda which was motivated by the desire to overcome anti-Yoweri Museveni (President of Uganda) forces such as the Lord's Resistance Army, the West Nile Bank Front, and the Allied Democratic Forces which used the DRC as a base to coordinate and launch attacks on Uganda (Venugopalan, 2016: 3).

In the midst of this instability emerged the Laurent-Désiré Kabila-led Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, AFDL) which, in addition to the Banyamulenge, was made up of different ethnic groups which were anti-Mobutu's regime (UNECA, 2015: 14). Williams (2013: 87) argues that the AFDL was used by the countries which marched into the DRC

to gain a degree of legitimacy for their invasion as they (Rwanda particularly) had nurtured this rebel group. The AFDL successfully overthrew the Mobutu government with the help of the Rwanda (Check, 2011: 2) in May 1997. With Mobutu having fled the country, Laurent Kabila declared himself the president of the country on the 17th of May 1997 (Stearns, 2012: 31). This signified the end of the First Congo War. McKnight (2015: 30) correctly observes that Rwanda saw the "Banyamulenge rebellion" as an opportunity to squash the génocidaires. He further argues that in taking this opportunity, Rwanda committed atrocities and practically avenged the killing of the Tutsi. Mobutu's 'hosting' of the génocidaires and his government's connivance with them in the persecution of the Congolese Tutsis thus contributed immensely to his downfall.

A discernable feature of conflict in most of the countries in the Great Lakes region is the ethnic solidarity that transcends borders. This ethnic solidarity plays a significant role in the perpetuation and spilling over of (violent) conflict from one sovereign state into another. Ethnic solidarity also contributes substantially to the compounding of actors in conflicts in the region. This leads to greater complexity of the conflicts and thus makes their resolution a laborious and difficult task hence parts of the DRC still find themselves in a continuous state of instability and conflict despite measures that have been taken by the international community to bring an end to fighting altogether in the country. If ethnicity matters so much, one is left with no choice but to wonder whether the 'unification' of different ethnic groups into a single state is/was a wise idea. One also has to question whether the 'separation' of ethnic groups into different countries is/was a wise idea. This line of thinking takes us back to the Berlin Conference of 1884-5and even to pre-colonial times which is a subject beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice to say, from a Pan-Africanist perspective, one would of course desire an Africa where the retention of ethnic identities does not hamper unity among Africans in general. However, from an Afrocentric perspective one cannot help but argue that although African unity is a desirable that many Africans continue to strive for, the people of the Great Lakes region and many other parts of Africa were stripped off their agency. This argument is made with the consideration of how most contemporary African countries and their borders were constructed.

It is important to note that ethnicity is just one of the factors that contribute to the regionalisation of the conflict in the DRC and other conflicts in the Great Lakes region. Another significant factor is the use of the DRC by rebel groups that are intent of overthrowing the governments of their countries of origin to attack the territories of these countries. This compounds the multiplicity of interests in Congolese conflicts. A case in point would be the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] (MPLA)-led Angola which was another notable participant in the toppling of Mobutu motivated by the fact that the Mobutu government had provided the 'rebel group' União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] (UNITA) with supply lines and bases across the Congo-Zaire border (McKnight, 2015: 31). The Congolese territory has thus been used to fight numerous battles which logically should have been fought elsewhere. This has largely been a result of foreign rebel groups using the DRC as a safe haven, as well as the complicity of the Congolese government in this act, particularly during the era of Mobutu.

6.2.2 The Second Congo War

Laurent Kabila's rise into the Congolese Presidency did not produce the results that Kigali (Capital city of Rwanda) had hoped for when it participated in the First Congo War. Instead, the génocidaires, whom Rwanda had hoped to defeat decisively, continued with their incursions into the Tutsi-led Rwanda much more rapidly than prior to the First Congo War (Williams, 2013: 90). Domestically, instead of introducing positive economic and social changes as the Congolese people had hoped, the Kabila government become synonymous with human rights abuses and autocracy, leading to a decline in Kabila's popularity (Warren, 2011: 6). Additionally, Kabila's failure to distance himself from his backers (Rwanda and Uganda) upon assumption of power in Kinshasa (Capital city of the DRC) contributed to the growth in his unpopularity as the Congolese people soon viewed him as a puppet of Rwanda and Uganda, and Rwandan troops stationed in Kinshasa as "a force of occupation" rather than liberators (Williams, 2013: 88).

In light of the above perceptions, Kabila soon began establishing his own path in an effort to distance himself from Rwanda and Uganda. To make matters worse, as Venugopalan

(2016: 4) argues, Kabila did not act against rebel groups that were using the DRC to launch attacks against Rwanda and Uganda as the two countries had expected; instead, certain Congolese militias, among them the Mai-Mai and the Bembe, as well as the new Congolese army, the Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC), supported the insurgents and even escorted them to the Rwandan borders. Weiss (2000: 13) submits that "already during the spring of 1998 it became increasingly clear that the leaders who had been most responsible for putting Kabila into power were dissatisfied with his performance. In a sense, this was a failed condominium; Kabila acted too independently and is reported again and again to have ignored the advice given to him by his foreign sponsors." In light of deteriorating relations between him and his foreign backers, Kabila made a move that extremely soured relations between himself and Rwanda and Uganda when he established close and warm relations with a known Ugandan enemy in the form of Sudan and when he began recruiting the génocidaires (Interahamwe and ex-FAR) in June 1998 (Ogunnoiki, 2019: 20; Weiss, 2000: 13; Williams, 2013: 88).

The final trigger for the outbreak of the Second Congo War was Kabila's July 1998 call for Rwandan troops to leave the DRC (McKnight, 2015: 35; Stearns, 2012: 32). On August 2, 1998, the Commander of one of the largest and best units in the new Congolese army, the Armee nationale congolaise's (Congolese National Army) 10th brigade declared the end of the unit's recognition of Laurent Kabila as the leader; this declaration was followed by a similar one from the 12th brigade (Weiss, 2000: 13). This was followed, on the same day, by the entrance of Rwandan army units into the DRC, marking the beginning of the Second Congo War (Williams, 2013: 89). On the 20th of August 1998, the Rwanda-backed Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie [Congolese Rally for Democracy] (RCD), which acted largely as a legitimising force of Rwandan invasion of the DRC, was formed and consisted largely of AFDL former members and people who had formed part of the Mobutu regime (Venugopalan, 2016: 5).

Laurent Kabila's fall was suspended when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened on the side of his government, leading to the Rwandan and Ugandan invaders settling for the occupation and plundering the eastern part of the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 14). This was after Kabila had requested assistance from SADC (Nathan 2006: 613). The

Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervention demonstrated a degree of disunity and inability to speak with one voice within SADC as South Africa (the Chair of SADC at the time), with the support of Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana called for a negotiated settlement (Kapinga, 2015: 6). However, the Mugabe-led Zimbabwe (the chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation at the time) claimed that SADC had unanimously decided to defend Kabila's government (Kapinga, 2015: 6). With that 'phase' of the war ending in a stalemate, the Lusaka Agreement of July 10, 1999, which served as a ceasefire agreement and a road map for the political transition in the DRC was signed by parties to the conflict (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 18).

Following Laurent Kabila's assassination in January 2001 by one of his bodyguards, the country's presidency was assumed by his son, Joseph Kabila (Reid, 2006: 75). This paved the way for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) to take place as per the directive of the Lusaka Agreement, which Laurent Kabila, despite having signed, was against (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2006: 140). After numerous challenges, including the October 2001 aborted attempt in Addis Ababa, the ICD finally commenced on 25 February 2002 with participation from Congolese groupings such as the government of President Joseph Kabila, Mai-Mai fighters, representatives of civil society organisations, and the two factions of the RCD breakaway group, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/National (RCD-N), Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/ Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML) (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 19). With substantial support from the United Nations (UN) and South Africa, the ICD took place in Sun City and Pretoria, South Africa (Fuamba, Yonekawa & Seegers, 2013: 327; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 19). The ICD and the peace process in its entirety resulted in a number of agreements, including agreements for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC (Rufanges & Aspa, 2016: 4). In December 2002, the Congolese parties to the conflict signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC in Pretoria (the Pretoria Agreement), which retained Joseph Kabila as president and apportioned other key government positions among the parties to the conflict for the duration of the transition period (Rogier, 2004: 35). The final act of the agreement was signed in April 2003 (Fuamba et al., 2013: 328). This was coupled by the adoption of an interim constitution (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004: 19; Rogier, 2004: 35). This officially marked the end

of the Second Congo War. Subsequently, elections were held in 2006 and Joseph Kabila emerged victorious.

6.3 South Africa's Reaction to the Congo Wars

The First Congo War occurred at a time when South Africa had just transitioned from apartheid to democracy. One can thus argue that the war presented a monumental challenge to the democratic government which was arguably still finding its feet at both the domestic and international levels. As stated in Chapter One, the DRC joined SADC in September 1997, and according to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2018: 174), South Africa, motivated by the DRC's economic potential, successfully convinced other SADC members to approve the admission of the DRC into the regional community. The forgoing submission implies that the admission of the DRC into SADC was influenced by democratic South Africa's economic ambitions, stemming from the DRC's economic potential. The argument thus sharply contradicts the well-established argument that South Africa's foreign policy under the leadership of Mandela was largely centred on the promotion of human rights and democracy.

It is important to note that the DRC's formal admission into SADC took place after the ousting of Mobutu. Therefore, democratic South Africa's engagement with the DRC did not begin with the admission of Kinshasa into the regional body. It is with this knowledge that Hendricks (2015: 22) states that "South Africa was first called on to mediate the conflict between Mobutu and [Laurent] Kabila in 1997, but no agreement could be reached because Kabila had in essence achieved a military victory." Given the reality that Laurent Kabila assumed power upon his military ousting of Mobutu, it is safe to aver that South Africa's intervention in the First Congolese War did not amount to much. This is unsurprising when one considers that the war was largely centred in the Great Lakes region with minimal participation from Southern Africa in the form of Angola.

With the DRC having joined SADC, there was greater Southern African involvement in the Second Congo War in the form of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola with their military interventions. In the mediation front, Botswana's Sir Ketumile Masire was appointed as the facilitator of the ICD, while South Africa largely served as a venue for the talks (Rogier, 2004: 27). While noting that South Africa's influence in the ICD was initially restricted by

the parties to the conflict, Kabemba (2006: 152) advances that the signing of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Accord took place under the mediation and supervision of South Africa. The first phase of the ICD ended in April 2002 following the signing of a power sharing agreement between the Congolese government and a Ugandan backed rebel movement; this exclusion of the Rwandan backed rebel movements led the ICD into a stalemate (Khadiagala 2007: 60).Khadiagala (2007: 60-61) notes that the stalemate led to greater involvement of South Africa in the ICD as the country led a number of talks aimed at restarting the peace talks. In correspondence with this view, Rogier (2004: 30-31) states that disagreements over the structure and command of the future Congolese army saw the assumption of a more central role by Pretoria in the talks as the facilitator, Masire, asked the then President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to negotiate a deal between the parties.

Hendricks (2015: 22) reminds us that South Africa invested significant financial resources towards hosting the ICD, and further played a notable role in getting the talks to recommence, despite not being the official facilitator or mediator. Rogier (2004: 30-31) adds that South Africa was particularly keen on the success of the ICD as this was bound to contribute positively to its reputation as a peacemaker. He adds that the country also had its eyes on the business opportunities that would arise from the stabilisation of the DRC. Having overseen the agreement between the parties to the Congolese conflict to form a transitional government, Pretoria had to provide support to ensure the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement (Miti, 2012: 32). Therefore, together with France, Belgium, Angola, the UK, the US, and the European Union (EU), South Africa formed part of a follow up committee that assisted parties to the conflict to reach an Agreement on Military Integration and the Transitional Government Agreement in 2003 (Miti, 2012: 33). Moreover, South Africa contributed $50 million and through its Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), provided technical support including its personnel during the 2006 elections in the DRC (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2018: 177).

At this point it is befitting to revert to the events that occurred within the SADC grouping during and after the Second Congo War. Nathan (2006: 613) notes that in response to Mugabe's proclamation that SADC had unanimously agreed to help Laurent Kabila,

Mandela's spokesperson at the time stated that "there is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of the SADC." In response to Mandela's questioning of his authority to intervene in the DRC militarily on behalf of SADC, Mugabe remarked that, "No one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out, fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help" (Nathan, 2006: 613). Subsequently, an emergency SADC Summit meeting which was called by Mandela, disapproved of military action (from any actor in the Second Congolese War) and appealed for a cease-fire, in the absence of Mugabe who sighted divisions within SADC over the Congolese issue as the reason for his absence (Nathan, 2006: 613; SADC, 1998). Nathan (2006: 614) argues in an effort to demonstrate some degree of unity, the meeting endorsed both the positions advocated by South Africa and Zimbabwe (Nathan, 2006: 614).

Castellano da Silva (2016: 579) submits that Mandela was opposed to Mugabe's intention to become *primus inter pares* in the politics of the region. This submission leads one into questioning whether the crisis in the DRC was used by the two statesmen to fight their own narrow battles and to demonstrate how much influence they had in the SADC region. While the answer to this question is not readily available, the disagreements between Mugabe and Mandela over the appropriate response to the Second Congo War does highlight that the importance of personalities in the politics of the SADC region. The disagreements also highlight the potential of personalities and egos to become destructive if they remain unabated. Without dismissing the progress that SADC has made in relation to the present subject since the occurrence of the 1998 verbal 'confrontation' between Mandela and Mugabe, the importance of transcending personality politics and entering a phase in which interventions in crises occurring in SADC member states are rooted in nothing except principles, values and guidelines of SADC cannot be overemphasised.

In essence, both Mugabe and Mandela had their ways in the resolution of the Congolese crisis albeit at different times. However, considering the fact that the Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia military intervention in the DRC produced no military victor, one cannot be

faulted for arguing that Mandela's preferred solution prevailed when the end of the war was officially declared in 2003 after lengthy negotiations. Given the above, the shortcomings of the negotiated settlement are worthy of attention. Amao (2018: 144-145) asserts that South Africa's approach to conflict resolution centres on a model which has been employed in different countries including the DRC and it involves: "(1) a broad-based national unity government involving the warring parties, and confidence-building measures and the reform of security forces, (2) provisions to address justice issues and a timetable for the drafting of a new permanent constitution, and (3) the holding of democratic elections."

Hendricks (2015: 24) levels sharp criticism at Pretoria's approach to the Congolese crisis, she laments that "then we see South Africa strengthening what was fast becoming an international practice of small rebel groups attaining access to national political power or integration into military establishments through terrorising peasants in far-flung rural areas. It remains quintessentially the 'politics of the belly' rather than any ideologically driven social movements accessing power to bring about social change: hence the fractious nature of the post-conflict political environment." The end result of the ICD, in which South Africa was a significant role player is succinctly captured by Kabemba, 2006: 156) who argues that the ICD's focus was mainly on the warring parties, who were only interested in the securing of their own interests, and the consequence of this has been the trapping of the DRC in a vicious circle of instability. In affirmation of this argument, Rogier (2004: 32) submits that Mbeki's intervention in the ICD, at a time when the parties were unable to reach certain agreements, did not have much impact on the talks. While the model employed by South Africa in an effort to find a solution to the Second Congo War was undoubtedly meant to ensure that the parties to the conflict are treated impartially, it creates an impression among civilians in different countries that an armed attempt at overthrowing a government is likely to gain them some degree of political power upon its resolution through negotiation. This is obviously a negative impression, as it can lead to numerous armed attempts at government toppling by any unsatisfied section of a given society.

Perhaps, South Africa's economic interests in the DRC and the African continent in its entirety could explain South Africa's approach to the Congolese Conflict. In this regard, Umezurike and Ogunnubi (2016: 268) observe that South Africa has the ability to expand its investments and capital base in war torn and politically unstable countries, and this ability has been demonstrated in countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Angola where South African companies have engaged in both clandestine and transparent operations. The two authors further argue that the rhetoric of African Renaissance that Pretoria has preached, particularly during the Mbeki era, has enabled the penetration of African markets by South African companies as it masked the country's goal of expanding trade and investment in Africa. This could partly explain the country's preference for a negotiated solution to both Congo Wars because a military solution would have likely led to further destruction of infrastructure and prolongation of the absence of peace. These conditions are unconducive to economic prosperity. From this angle, the interest of Pretoria would thus have been the establishment or restoration of peace in the DRC, without much attention to the personnel that would make up the transitional government. This undoubtedly poses a threat of rebel groups using their newly acquired access to political power for their own benefit and to the detriment of the majority of the Congolese people.

6.4 The State of Affairs in the DRC between 2009 and 2018

6.4.1 Insecurity and Rebel Movements

Kolk and Lenfant (2012: 480) state that violence in the DRC, most notably in the eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, Ituri, and the former Katanga, has continued to be a regular occurrence notwithstanding the peace agreements signed in 2006 and 2008. The assertion points to the failure of multiple peace agreements to translate into long-lasting and sustainable peace. The failure of these peace agreements can be partly attributed to the shortcomings of the military integration attempts that the Congolese government and rebel movements embarked on. Yonekawa (2014: 166) asserts that Laurent Nkunda who was appointed general of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in 2004 regardless of his known record of committing crimes against humanity, refused to be deployed anywhere beyond the Kivu provinces due to discrimination against the Tutsi (he is Tutsi as well). Previously, Nkunda was a general of the RCD. Nkunda

defected from FARDC and eventually formed the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) in December 2006 (Yonekawa, 2014: 166).

The CNDP's said purpose is to protect the Banyarwanda (particularly the Congolese Tutsi), ensure their representation in Congolese institutions, promote federalism in the DRC, and to defend itself from the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), one of the factions of the Rwandan génocidaires active in eastern DRC (Rufanges & Aspa, 2016: 8). In the post-2004 period, the CNDP has battled the FARDC, the FDLR has launched attacks against civilians, while the Mai Mai militias which were excluded from the transition process and left armed have played a role in the maintenance of instability in the DRC (Usanov, de Ridder, Auping, Lingemann, Espinoza, Ericsson, Farooki, Sievers & Liedtke, 2013: 39). It is thus clear that the peace process in the DRC had begun faltering and fracturing even before the commencement of Zuma's term as the president of South Africa.

Yonekawa (2014: 166) states that in January 2009 the CNDP'sChief of Staff Bosco Ntaganda ousted Nkunda and assumed the leadership of the group and subsequently signed a declaration of cessation of hostilities. She adds that these events were followed by the 23 March 2009 peace agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP, which contained the following stipulations among others: the reconfiguration of the CNDP into a political party, its absorption into the FARDC, and the CNDP's proposed "model for the delimitation of administrative boundaries", which she characterised as "a *de facto* surrender of territory [in the Kivus] to Rwanda and Uganda through the CNDP (Yonekawa, 2014: 167). The foregoing submission must be understood within the context that in 2009 Kabila agreed with Rwanda to permit the entrance Rwandan troops into the DRC in order for them (Rwandan troops) to pursue FDLR in exchange for the arrest of Nkunda by the Rwandans (Stearns, 2011). Nkunda was indeed arrested in January 2009 (prior to the signing of the March 23 agreement) by Rwandan officials and reportedly remains under house arrest (Venugopalan, 2016: 7). However, his whereabouts are difficult to confirm.

Rufanges and Aspa (2016: 8) opine that in 2006 and 2012, the CNDP was absorbed by the FARDC but defected repeatedly until it (CNDP) established the M23 (Mouvement du

23 Mars/March 23 Movement) and proceeded to militarily battle the FARDC. The various failed attempts at integrating rebel groups into the FARDC point to the failure of the agreements signed by the Congolese government and these groups. The failure illuminates the need for the questioning of the assumption that rebels would simply switch loyalties from their groups to the FARDC. It is evident that rebel groups operating in the DRC generally have very narrow and specific interests. Their integration into the Congolese army should thus take into consideration the practicality of reconciling these narrow group interests with the objectives of the FARDC. Taking into consideration the shortcomings of the integration process, one can submit that reconciling the interests of numerous rebel groups with those of FARDC has proven a difficult exercise hence some of them have defected. Furthermore, it is unimaginable that groups which have identified the Congolese government and by extension the FARDC as the enemy would suddenly desert their agendas and fight on the side of the FARDC. The training that these groups may receive upon integration is clearly not enough to cement them as part of FARDC. There is therefore a need for the repurposing of the individual members of rebel groups which will change their views on the Congolese government, the FARDC, and the Congolese society as a whole.

In April 2012, the M23 was established and largely consisted of former CNDP troops that defected from the FARDC citing the failure of the Congolese government to fully honour the 23 March 2009 peace agreement, as well as bad treatment within the army, as reasons for the mutiny (Nangini, Jas, Fernandes, & Muggah, 2014: 3-4). The M23 was named after the 23 March peace agreement. The M23 rebellion did not last very long as the FARDC, with the support of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo, MONUSCO), defeated the group in late 2013 (UNSC, 2014: 3).

The UN Group of Experts on the DRC maintained that Rwanda provided the M23 with multiple forms of support including ammunition deliveries, recruitment, fire support and troop reinforcement, while post-defeat, leaders of the group moved freely in Uganda and continued with recruitment in Rwanda (UNSC, 2014: 3). Since many of the M23 troops

fled to Rwanda and Uganda where they are refugees, their reactivation can take place at any point (Rufanges & Aspa, 2016: 8). In correspondence with the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, Gil (2012: 1) notes that Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of supporting M23. While this accusation has obviously been denied by both countries, particularly Rwanda, the possibility of it being true cannot be dismissed. The two countries' involvement in Congolese conflicts is well documented. In this regard, Van Reybrouck (2014) opines that Nkunda's destructive activities in the east of the DRC turned him into Rwanda's new golden boy. Musila (2014: 3) adds that the rebellions by the Nkunda-led CNDP (2007-2009), as well as those of the M23 (2012-2013) were supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Rwanda in particular has been prominently involved in Congolese conflicts. Its intention and attempts to annihilate the génocidaires in their numerous incarnations will always earn it accusations of meddling in Congolese affairs, even when this may not be the case.

6.4.2 The Economy of the DRC

On the economic front, Lalbahadur (2019) posits that while the DRC is Africa's richest country in terms of mineral wealth, it remains economically underdeveloped with a largely impoverished population due to mainly the violent conflicts that have plagued the country. In concurrence with the above argument, Herderschee, Kaiser and Samba (2012: 2) detail that "less than a quarter of the population has access to safe drinking water, and less than a tenth of the population has access to electricity." Given the DRC's well-documented economic potential, these indicators symbolise a country that is in a conflict-induced state of impoverishment and instability. It is this instability that has partly contributed to the government's incapacity and/or unwillingness to deliver services to all parts of the country (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011: 27). Despite being described as a water rich country, in 2011 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) noted that only 26 per cent of the Congolese population had access to safe drinking water (UNEP, 2011: 27). This is under the Sub-Saharan Africa 60 per cent average, and is largely a result of the country's debilitated water infrastructure (UNEP, 2011: 27). Mercy Corps (2018) remarks that "lack of access to clean water, sanitation facilities and hygiene practices are the main causes of diarrhea, which is the second most common cause of mortality for young children there [in the DRC]."

Herderschee et al., (2012: 13) state that the DRC's arable land is in the region of 80 million hectares. They further submit that the country has historically been among the main producers of gold, copper, and cobalt, but this contribution has been hampered by lack of exploration and neglect, which has resulted in known reserves being moderate in comparison to the country's potential. In 2013, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) reported that agriculture is responsible for approximately 40 per cent of the DRC's gross domestic product (GDP) and employs 70 per cent of the population (CAADP, 2013: 7). Adebayo (2018) takes the argument a step further and contends that the amount of arable land that DRC possesses gives the country the potential to feed the whole of Africa. Noting that the DRC's infrastructure is in a state of debilitation, Galletta, Jametti & Redonda (2012: 2) advance that the construction sector has an important role in stimulating economic growth in the DRC as it does not only contribute to the country's GDP but to the growth of other sectors of the economy. One such sector is the agricultural sector whose growth is at times constrained by the difficulty of transporting products to the urban areas (Galletta et al., 2012: 2).

Matthysen and Montejano (2013: 6) observe that although the DRC's mineral wealth is not the root cause of the conflict that has plagued the DRC since the 1990s, it has contributed significantly to the perpetuation of the conflict in the east as the control of mines and trading routes has financed armed groups. Other central players in this plundering are numerous transnational corporations (TNCs) and multinational corporations (MNCs) which negotiate access to the DRC's minerals with warlords (Mullins & Rothe, 2008: 81). In corroboration of the foregoing statement, Carpenter (2012: 10) posits that MNCs that take part in the exploitation of Congolese mineral resources have a vested financial interest in the continuation of conflict in the DRC hence their fueling of the fighting as a means to maintain their relatively 'trouble-free' access to these resources. Apart from TNCs, some of the DRC's neighbours have taken advantage of the instability in the country to illegally acquire its natural resources (Mullins & Rothe, 2008: 81). A prime example is Rwanda. As Bleischwitz, Dittrich and Pierdicca (2012) observe, Rwanda is largely seen as the favoured route for the movement of illegally traded minerals for various reasons including: that the country does not tax exports of tantalum concentrates while the DRC taxes official mineral exports; and that Rwandan law provides

for the declaration or labelling of imported minerals as Rwandan provided that they undergo additional processing in Rwanda and have their value augmented by 30 per cent. This is why Congolese coltan can be exported from Rwanda to other countries as a Rwandan product without regard to whether it was imported into Rwanda through illegal or legal means (Bleischwitz et al., 2012). Coltan is the DRC's most lucrative natural resource at present (Carpenter, 2012: 6).

The commercial interests of MNCs and neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda, in the plundering of Congolese mineral resources compound the factors that have made the path towards sustainable and long-lasting peace in the DRC elusive. It is therefore clear that the 'restoration' of peace in the DRC cannot be located in the possibility of the warring parties running out of funds to continue with their destructive pursuance of their goals for as long as there are external parties that are intent on realising their commercial interests through the maintenance of financial relations with warlords and rebel militias. The inability of the Congolese government to exercise authority throughout the country is obviously a significant enabler of this problem. This demonstrates the complexity and interconnectedness of the issues contributing to the continuity of conflict in parts of the DRC. For instance, the possession of mineral resources is not the cause of conflict but has over the years contributed immensely to the sustenance of the conflict. Moreover, the inability of the Congolese government to exercise authority throughout Congolese territory is not the primary cause of conflict in the DRC but has contributed to the perpetuation of violent conflict in the country. It is also important to note that from an Afrocentric point of view the actions of some MNCs operating in the DRC and some neighboring states are tantamount to denying the Congolese people their agency as they rob them of the opportunity to determine whether the continuation of conflict is in their best interest or not.

6.4.3 Elections in the DRC

In 2011, the DRC held presidential and parliamentary elections. The elections, which took place on 28 November were organised by the Independent National Electoral Commission (Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante or CENI) which had only been officially installed in early 2011 (Carter Center, 2011: 4-5). This obviously marked a

challenge for the new organisation, which was further compounded by the contraction of the role played by international actors in the elections when compared to the 2006 elections (Carter Center, 2011: 4). The results for the presidential elections were released on the 9th of December 2011 and were met with protests as well as a petition from the opposition challenging them; on the 16th of December 2011, the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court thus enabling the inauguration of Joseph Kabila as the president of the country on December 20, 2011(Githaiga, 2012: 1). On the parliamentary front, the results of the National Assembly elections were released on February 1, 2012, with the Alliance of the Presidential Majority led by Joseph Kabila's People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) leading the pack (Githaiga, 2012: 1).

The elections, which were devised to take place on the 28th of November, had to be extended to the 29th and even 30th in some areas due to delays in the arrival of electoral material, particularly ballot papers which had to be flown in from South Africa (Carter Center, 2011: 5). On election day a number of undemocratic occurrences were reported, including the intimidation of voters by security forces, undelivered ballot papers, the turning away of voters, ballot stuffing, destruction of electoral materials in Lubumbashi due to suspected fraud, the burning down of a number of polling stations in Kananga, and shooting at a polling station resulting in the death of three people (Githaiga, 2012: 6; Reid, 2013: 43-44). These incidents are inconsistent with democratic conventions and definitely contributed to the characterisation of the elections as controversial and the questioning of the credibility of the results.

Given events surrounding the elections, Etienne Tshisekedi who came second in the race for presidency rejected the results, proclaimed himself president and held his swearing-in ceremony at his residence, before he was put under unofficial house arrest for his actions (Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index [BTI], 2014: 10; Mangu, 2013: 13). It is after consideration of these factors, among others, that Mangu (2013: 26) concludes that "…the 2011 elections in the DRC were neither credible nor democratic…Not only did the elections not comply with regional and sub-regional principles, norms, standards and guidelines, they also failed to comply fully with domestic electoral norms, principles, and guidelines." The credibility of the elections was questioned mainly due to suspected

collusion between Kabila, his party and its alliance, and institutions such as the Supreme Court and the CENI. However, it is important to acknowledge that some of the irregularities may have been purely a result of ill-preparedness particularly on the side of the CENI, given its limited experience.

The next national elections were supposed to have been held in 2016. Given the controversy that surrounded the 2011 elections, the 2016 elections were supposed to serve as an indicator of whether the DRC had progressed towards fully functional democracy or not. However, the elections did not take place. This created a constitutional and political conundrum. Constitutionally, Kabila's second and final term as the president of the country came to an end in December 2016 but the country failed to hold elections in 2016 as per constitutional prescript (US Department of State, 2017: 1). The country's electoral commission cited logistical and financial troubles as the reason behind the failure to organise elections in 2016; this failure resulted in protests which led to the death of several people after clashes between protesters and security forces in places such as Kinshasa (BBC, 2016). The Kabila-led government and the opposition reached an agreement stipulating that Kabila would vacate office upon the completion of the presidential and parliamentary elections set for a date towards the end of 2017 but these elections never took place (Ogunnoiki, 2019: 30). The deal which was reached under the mediation of the Catholic Church also facilitated the formation of a transitional government (Al Jazeera, 2017).

The elections finally took place on 30 December 2018 without Kabila contesting. Instead, the country's governing coalition forwarded Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary as its candidate (The Sentry, 2018: 1). Félix Tshisekedi was named the winner of the presidential elections and was inaugurated on 24 January 2019 (Berwouts & Reyntjens, 2019: 1). However, Berwouts and Reyntjens (2019: 3) argue that during election day, upon realisation that Shadary was too far behind in the race, and in fear of Martin Fayulu obtaining an absolute majority, the Congolese "…regime approached the Tshisekedi camp and offered their candidate the presidency to avoid power falling into the hands of Fayulu, and more importantly, those of his powerful backers Bemba and Katumbi." The two authors further advance that as a result of this arrangement and an overwhelming

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victory in the parliamentary and provincial elections "which were held under the same fraudulent conditions as the presidential poll", the country's ruling coalition remained in power. These allegations once again put in doubt the credibility of Congolese elections and put into question the country's seriousness with regards to achieving electoral transparency.

Allegations of electoral fraud are however not surprising as The Sentry (2018: 1) notes that allegations of corruption and lack of transparency characterised the build-up to the 2018 Congolese elections. The failure to hold elections in 2016 was largely viewed as Kabila's attempt to stay in power. It is within this context that Lalbahadur and Sidiropoulos (2018: 7) argue that the country's electoral commission's postponement of elections led to it being viewed as complicit in Kabila's attempt to stay in power. These views point to a government which had lost the confidence of the people, at least that of those who share these views. Furthermore, when one considers the 2011 elections, the scepticism regarding the relationship between the Kabila government and the CENI, as well as the organisation and handling of the elections is justified.

6.5 South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards the DRC during Zuma's Tenure
6.5.1 Contribution to the DRC's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Efforts

Nganje (2012: 2) argues that the dominant political culture of the Mobutu era, characterised by the pursuit of self-aggrandisement and personal enrichment, remains entrenched in the politics of the DRC. He further argues that this coupled with the atmosphere of political gloom, among other factors, acts as a hindrance to the democratisation of the country. To remedy the situation, Nganje (2012: 4) advises that there's a need for the DRC's partners as well as global and regional powers to restructure the manner in which they engage with the DRC insofar as important measures such as investments, development assistance and trade relations are concerned. This suggestion is made with the knowledge that the support given by other countries is at times wrongfully used by the ruling elite to sustain undemocratic practices as it has been the case with the Congolese police force trained by South Africa and Angola which is said to have been one of the tools used by Kabila to suppress protests by the opposition (Nganje, 2012: 4).

Nganje (2012: 5) is of the view that "as a leading member of SADC and a contributor to post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the DRC, South Africa should spearhead diplomatic efforts to engage the Congolese political leadership in order to assist it to build consensus around a democratic political future for the country." This view is demonstrative of the role that South Africa has played and can continue to play in the DRC's post-conflict reconstruction endeavours. Nganje (2012: 5) adds that countries aiding the DRC's post-conflict reconstruction endeavours such as South Africa, the US, China, France and Belgium should condition their support on the Congolese government's devotion to democratisation and political reform. While this suggestion is noble as it seeks to ensure that citizens of the DRC get to live in a fully democratic society, from an Afrocentric viewpoint it is problematic. Conditionality is typically associated with 'assistance' from Western countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which are typically Western-controlled. The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that these institutions ordinarily impose upon countries that seek their assistance are tantamount to interfering with the governing and thus 'independence' of these countries. While the need to democratise and politically reform the DRC is apparent and urgent, it should not come at the expense of the 'independence' of the country. In Afrocentric terms, the reform and democratisation of the DRC should not come at the expense of the agency of the Congolese people as this would amount to the substitution of one problem with another. Furthermore, the Zuma administration made South-South cooperation one of its foreign policy priorities. It would thus be unthinkable that a government that advocates South-South cooperation would offer conditional support that is anchored on principles which are likely to produce dependency and interference in the DRC's domestic governance.

The preceding paragraph reflects the difficulties that (donor) countries that support other countries' post-conflict reconstruction initiatives with 'pure' initiatives face. The foregoing assertion is made with the knowledge that in its engagement with other African countries, South Africa has been wary of projecting itself as a country intentioned on subverting the governments of these sovereign states. Considering that multilateralism has been a key pillar of South Africa's foreign policy since the demise of apartheid, it would be prudent for South Africa and other Southern African countries to use SADC as a means to hold

Kinshasa accountable for its (ab)use of the support provided by these countries. This would prevent these countries from earning themselves the backlash that may follow from their adoption of 'Western ways' of holding a fellow SADC member to account. These Western ways, as evidenced by some SAPs, can at times have dire consequences for the general population and the ability of the government to carry out the mandate given to it by the general population.

Mutisi (2016: 5) notes that in supporting the DRC's post-conflict reconstruction efforts, Pretoria seeks to realise the birth of an efficient and responsive Congolese state, as well as to contribute to efforts aimed at developing a social contract relationship between this state and Congolese citizens. Noting that South Africa is part of the Tripartite Mechanism on Dialogue and Cooperation in the DRC, which includes Angola and of course the DRC, Mutisi (2016: 5) adds that through providing support in areas such as security sector reform (by training military personnel and up grading Congolese military training centres), Pretoria continues to play a significant role in the DRC. In concurrence with the above assertion, Defence Web (2015) reports that the DRC requested South Africa's support in the training of FARDC recruits, which is something not unheard of as South African army instructors had been training Congolese soldiers at least since the early the early 2010s. It is important to note that the Tripartite Mechanism, whose memorandum of understanding was signed on 23 August 2013, has a mandate which includes among other responsibilities, increasing cooperation in areas such as security and defence, politics and diplomacy, humanitarian and social sectors, as well as the economy, finance and infrastructure development (Angop, 2016). It is thus unsurprising that Besharati and Rawhani (2016: 6-7) find that when Southern African Customs Union (SACU) transfers are excluded, the DRC receives the biggest chunk of South Africa's development assistance.

Cilliers (2017: 9) submits that Pretoria has been a major provider of development assistance in the SADC region, especially to conflict-ridden countries such as the DRC, which received over $1 billion (R45 8.5 billion) between 2001 and 2015. This money has been used to finance a number of projects that South Africa has been implementing in the DRC. Among these is the R20 million project of training public service officials by the

Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) (Vickers, 2013: 540). Another important project has been the training of the DRC's diplomats by DIRCO (DIRCO, 2016). While noting staff members at the DRC's Diplomatic Academy which DIRCO helped establish, Hendricks and Lucey (2013: 5) submit that there is a concern on the side of South Africa that the diplomats who were trained by DIRCO were not being posted. These projects and funds highlight the extent to which South Africa has been involved in the DRC's efforts aimed at post-conflict reconstruction and development. However, credit for these project cannot be solely given to the Zuma administration as some of them were initiated by previous administrations.

6.5.2 Contributions to Congolese Elections and Alleged Support for Kabila

Makanda (2016: 101) posits that during the build-up to the 2011 Congolese elections, the West was reluctant to finance the elections due to the DRC's proximity to China. This was in contrast with the substantial financial support that the West channeled towards the holding of the 2006 elections. As a result, the Zuma-led South Africa provided R126 million to the DRC to ensure the holding of elections, with some of these funds being used by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to "transport 1 863 tons of electoral material, such as ballot papers printed in South Africa, to 13 transit points in the DRC, on 39 flights" (Gbaya, 2015: 58). It is worth noting that in 2010 through a presidential decree the Congolese government awarded two oil blocks located in Lake Albert to two companies, Caprikat and Foxwhelp, linked to Jacob Zuma's nephew, Khulubuse Zuma (Independent Online, 2010). Moreover, in December 2011, South Africa and the DRC signed a memorandum of understanding with regards to the building of the Grand Inga Dam on the Congo River (African Business, 2012). These deals intensified speculation that South Africa's engagement with the DRC centred on the fulfilment of South Africa's interests, and in the case of the Jacob Zuma administration, personal interests, as his nephew had business interests in the DRC. The Inga Dam is touched on in more detail on the later parts of this chapter.

Congolese citizens who reside in South Africa have expressed their dissatisfaction with South Africa's relations with the DRC. Patel (2011) notes that the protesters who also happened to be supporters of Etienne Tshisekedi, one of the candidates in the 2011

presidential elections, accused Zuma of being complicit in the alleged electoral fraud which saw Kabila retaining the presidency. Smillie and Serrao (2011) add that in December 2011, approximately 200 Congolese protesters, who carried placards and handed out cards with a photograph of Tshisekedi, accused Jacob Zuma of supporting Kabila, since his family had business interests in the central African country. The protesters submitted a memorandum of demands at the ANC's headquarters, Luthuli House, and also demanded that South African companies involved in fraudulent activities in the DRC should face consequences in South Africa (Smillie & Serrao, 2011). Clayson Monyela, DIRCO's spokesperson, rejected the accusations that South Africa had a preferred candidate for the 2011 Congolese elections and stated that "It is incorrect to say South Africa prefers one candidate over another. South Africa does not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign country" (Patel, 2011).

Once the DRC's Supreme Court confirmed Kabila as the winner of the 2011 presidential elections, South Africa congratulated him and further stated that "…the South African Government wishes to reaffirm its desire to further enhance its strong relations with the DRC. Furthermore, the South African Government and its citizens reiterate its commitment to continue working with the Government and the people of the DRC with a strong emphasis on devising mechanisms and processes to ensure rapid development in existing and new bilateral projects, for the mutual benefit of the two countries" (DIRCO, 2011b). Mavungu (2013: 40) notes that in his congratulatory message to the DRC for 'successfully' holding the elections, Zuma stated that "elections in the DRC were conducted in accordance with the DRC Electoral Law, the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the July 2002 Durban OAU Declaration on The Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in Africa."

It is very clear that South Africa's engagement with the DRC prior to and post the 2011 elections strengthened the view held by many that South Africa's involvement in Congolese affairs is largely meant to boost the prospects of South African businesses in accessing and successfully competing in the Congolese terrain. The deals involving Khulubuse Zuma further fueled these views and perceptions. It is therefore important that these views are not dismissed at face value as there is some substance in them. The

DRC's economic potential provides reason enough for the exploration of these views. It makes economic sense that South Africa would seek to extract economic returns from its involvement in Congolese affairs. However, the deals involving Khulubuse Zuma do not provide sufficient and conclusive evidence that South Africa's involvement in the DRC is motivated by the desire to extract economic returns.

Makanda (2016: 101) asserts that the support that Pretoria showed Kabila as he stood for re-election strengthened South Africa-DRC relations but led to a deterioration in relations between South Africa and Rwanda. The deterioration of relations between South Africa and Rwanda is also partly a result of South Africa's granting of asylum to Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa who is a former chief of staff of the Rwandan army and former head of Rwandan intelligence (Tonheim & Swart, 2015: 4). After falling out with President Paul Kagame, Nyamwasa left Rwanda for South Africa in 2010 where he faced an assassination attempt which his wife blamed on the Kagame government (Mail & Guardian, 2010). Since then, Nyamwasa has survived more assassination attempts including one he faced in 2014 at his Johannesburg home, with the assailants being believed to have been operating from the Rwandan embassy in South Africa; this resulted in the expulsion of three Rwandan diplomats from South Africa, with Rwanda retaliating by expelling six South African diplomats from Rwanda (Ebrahim, 2018a).

The 2014 attempt on Nyamwasa's life followed the 2013 assassination of Patrick Karegeya, the former Rwandan Intelligence Head, in Sandton allegedly by Rwanda's agents (Ebrahim, 2018a). Prior his death, Karegeya had held several meetings with both South African and Tanzanian intelligence officials at an important time as the two "…countries were sending troops to the DRC as part of a UN force to neutralise the M23 rebel group, largely considered a Rwanda proxy rebel force" (Ebrahim, 2018a). The latest assassination of Rwandan dissidents residing in South Africa allegedly masterminded by Kigali is that of Camir Nkurunziza, a former bodyguard of Kagame who had turned to a critic of the Rwandan president (Du Plessis, 2019). Nkurinzinza died under unclear circumstances in Cape Town after an apparent hijacking-gone-wrong which took place after a few days following Kagame's attendance of President Cyril Ramaphosa's inauguration in Pretoria (Du Plessis, 2019). New Vision (2019) reports that in an interview

with the media, Kagame apportioned blame for the poor relations with Uganda to dissidents in South Africa. It is very clear that allegations of Kagame attacking his dissidents on South African territory and other factors continue to strain the relationship between South Africa and Rwanda even though current South African President, Ramaphosa, had pronounced his intentions to renew relations with Rwanda.

Tonheim and Swart (2015: 5) aver that relations between South Africa and the DRC were strengthened partly because the relationship between Zuma and Kabila involved more trust and common interests. Besharati and Rawhani (2016: 26) add that prior to his vacation of the presidency, Kabila had become more isolated but Zuma was one of the few external actors who had his audience, with their two countries cooperating in multilateral forums such as the UN, AU, G77, SADC, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). In correspondence with the above assertions, Tonheim and Swart (2015: 4) note that South Africa's participation in the Addis Ababa negotiations was pivotal as Kabila was deemed as lacking the political weight to negotiate with leaders such as Kagame and Museveni from a position of equality. The Addis Ababa negotiations, which led to the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC, were necessitated by continued instability and violence in eastern DRC which were mainly a result of the M23's destructive activities (Kok & Zounmenou, 2013). The agreement was signed by the DRC, South Africa, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, theRepublic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. The guarantors of the agreement are the UN, the AU, ICGLR and SADC.

The apparently close relationship between Zuma and Kabila could be rooted in Kabila's lack of allies in the Great Lakes region. The rise and fall of some of Kabila's predecessors has been heavily influenced by the DRC's neighbouring countries, particularly Rwanda and Uganda. Given the instability of the DRC, without the solid support of these countries, Kabila was vulnerable. Maintaining sound relations with a country like South Africa thus acted as a buffer against the onslaught that these countries might have masterminded in the absence of a respected partner on Kabila's side. Aligning with South Africa also made sense for the DRC because the country has been continuously involved in the resolution of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC since the era of Mandela. For South

Africa, involvement in the DRC contributes significantly to its quest to consolidate its place as an undisputed leader of the SADC region and the African continent as a whole. Aligning with Kabila also meant a greater possibility of securing South African business interests in the DRC.

6.5.3 South African Efforts in the Fight Against the M23 and other Rebel Groups

In 2013, through resolution 2098 of the UNSC, the UN authorised the deployment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), within MONUSCO, which is tasked with neutralising armed groups in an effort to offset the threat posed by these groups to civilians and state authority in eastern DRC (UNSC, 2013: 6). Tonheim and Swart (2015:4-5) opine that although the establishment of a brigade is an idea that came from the ICGLR, it was advocated strongly by South Africa once SADC had begun viewing it as a viable solution. South Africa's 5 Infantry Battalion in the DRC was replaced by the country's 121 Infantry Battalion as part of the FIB which is credited with defeating the M23 rebels (Amao, 2018: 175). The FIB is made up of over 3 000 (3 069 soldiers to be precise) troops, at least at its inception, from Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa (Benson, 2016: 4). Noting that its troop contribution sits at 1 345, Mataboge (2013) characterises South Africa as the 'the backbone' of the FIB. As already stated in this chapter, the M23 was indeed defeated and it surrendered on 05 November 2013, with the ICGLR-facilitated peace deal between the rebel group and the Congolese government being signed on the 21st of December 2013 (Gbaya, 2015: 51).

Besharati and Rawhani (2016: 13) state that since the 'conversion' of the MONUC to MONUSCO in 2010, Pretoria has been the largest contributor among African countries, with its troops ranging between 1 200 and 1500. Gbaya (2015: 62) notes that even after the defeat of the M23 rebels, five South African Infantry Battalions were supporting the FARDC in its efforts to drive remaining Mai-Mai rebels into a cordon in the mountains north of Masisi in preparation for a final ground and air assault. These actions highlight that South Africa, at the time, was not considering complete withdrawal of its armed forces from the DRC. This can only mean that the Zuma administrations viewed the country's military involvement in the DRC as strategically important.

Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has repeatedly sought peaceful and negotiated resolution of conflicts in many African countries. As already stated in this study, in the 1990s, South Africa advocated a negotiated settlement in the DRC and even got into a 'quarrel' with Zimbabwe over the latter's military intervention alongside Angola and Namibia on the side of Laurent Kabila during the Second Congo War. However, during Zuma's presidency this approached changed as the country adopted a mixture of "dialogue and hard power" (albeit in a multilateral setting) which could be attributed to the realisation by South Africa and the rest of the international community that the use of military force was necessary in dealing with the M23 (Gbaya, 2015: 69). Furthermore, the change in approach may be attributed to the country's experience in the Congolese terrain. The country has been involved in Congolese affairs since Mandela's tenure. As such, the Zuma administration may have had a better understanding of Congolese affairs than previous administrations as it would have studied the shortcomings of the previous administrations and therefore had a better idea of what to do and what not to do. Lastly, South Africa's involvement in the FIB offensive may have been influenced by the desire to demonstrate its military capabilities to fellow African countries, particularly those that continue to be involved in the destabilisation of the DRC, such as Rwanda.

6.5.4 The Grand Inga Project

The Grand Inga Dam Hydroelectric Project is one in which South Africa has continuously expressed and to some extent demonstrated desire to work with the DRC on. The DRC envisages generating power from its Congo River's flow. The plan, which partly stems from the November 2011 partnership agreement between Pretoria and Kinshasa, is to construct a third dam and power station at the hydroelectric site on the Congo River's Inga Falls (Maupin, 2015: 1-2). As such, the country is intent on actualising the Grand Inga Project with a number dams including Inga III which would initially generate 4 755 megawatts, 2 500 of which South Africa (through the 2013 Grand Inga Dam Project Treaty) has committed to purchasing (Taliotisa, Baziliana, Welsch, Gielen & Howells, 2014).Inga I and Inga II were installed in 1972 and 1982 respectively, and once completed the Grand Inga Project would be the biggest hydroelectric project in the world with the potential to supply one-third of the current electricity demand in Africa (Taliotisa et al., 2014; Warner, Jomantas, Jones, Ansari & de Vries, 2019: 1).

The transmission of electricity from the DRC requires and involves the erection of high-voltage transmission lines from the Inga site through Zambia into South Africa (Besharati & Mthembu-Salter, 2016: 6). In addition to Zambia, the transmission lines will have to pass through Zimbabwe or Botswana, something which South Africa's defence force is uncomfortable with as having such important infrastructure beyond the country's own borders may pose a threat to national security (Kings, 2018). The other option would be for the transmission lines to be connected to the grids of Zambia, Botswana or Zimbabwe, however, as officials from South Africa's Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) informed parliament in November 2019, the two options were under discussion at the SADC level (Congo Research Group & Phuzumoya Consulting, 2020: 8). While South Africa does need additionally power supply considering the recurrent electricity shortages that the country has experienced since 2008, the concerns about national security are valid. While the country generally enjoys cordial relations with most of its neighbours, having some of its electricity supply passing through other countries may prove to not be the wisest decision over time when one considers that relations between countries may deteriorate at any point.

Fabricius (2020) notes that according to International Rivers, building the transmission lines may cost approximately R70 billion ($4 billion), while Eskom estimates that one kilometre of transmission lines may cost around R7 million. Considering the financial difficulties that have plagued Eskom over the past few years (which became more apparent during Zuma's second term), it would be very difficult for Eskom to justify going ahead with this project. Congo Research Group and Phuzumoya Consulting (2020: 10) state that the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) indicates that purchasing power from the Inga project featured in the government's "applied policy adjustments and considerations" and acknowledges that this move, along with other "adjustments and considerations" would lead to approximately 5 per cent higher tariffs by 2030 in comparison to the least cost scenario. Fabricius (2020) reports that an official of the then Department of Energy informed parliament's then Portfolio Committee on Energy that "Inga power would cost two to three cents per kilowatt-hour more than the lowest-cost scenario, increasing the national energy bill by about R175 million a year." In addition the Grand Inga in its entirety

is estimated at $120 billion, with Inga III expected to cost about $14 billion (Besharati & Mthembu-Salter, 2016: 6).

Besharati and Rawhani (2016: 17) point out that South Africa does not have the financial muscle to compete with some of the more powerful countries in financing the Inga Dam project. The two authors, however, add that if the New Development Bank (the BRICS Bank) were to decide to contribute to the project, South Africa may still play an indirect role in the financing of the project. South Africa's evident financial constrains may have a negative impact on the progress of the project since the DRC has limited financing options at its disposal. Firstly, in 2016, the World Bank suspended its$73.1 million grant for complementary studies, capacity building, and institutional strengthening after Kabila assumed direct control of the Inga agency (Kavanagh & Clowes, 2019). The World Bank (2016) stated that its decision stemmed from the "DRC's decision to take the project in a different strategic direction to that agreed between the World Bank and the Government in 2014." Secondly, the Chinese and Spanish consortia that won the tender to construct the dam are reported to have indicated that they would need a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) from South Africa in order to get financing for the project (Congo Research Group & Phuzumoya Consulting, 2020: 9).

Congo Research Group and Phuzumoya Consulting (2020: 2) argue that South Africa's commitment to purchase electricity from the Inga Dam Project makes virtually no energy policy and financial sense as it may cost the country more than the other sources at the country's disposal. This argument is reinforced by Kings' (2018) revelation that the country's commitment to Inga III is used as a politicking tool within SADC, and a means to maintain influence over the DRC, and that the inclusion of Inga III in the country's energy plan stems from the pressure applied by policymakers. In addition, Congo Research Group and Phuzumoya Consulting (2020: 10) state that in response to the draft IRP, the parliament's Committee on Energy urged the government to invest in local power generation which would cost less while being more reliable and creating jobs. Apart from this, the Inga Project faces more challenges. The two consortia tasked with developing the project reportedly could not agree on the percentage of each party's share and project's development (Kavanagh & Clowes, 2019). Moreover, in January 2020

Actividades de Construcción y Servicios, the leader of the Spanish consortium withdrew from the project (Reuters, 2020).

It is evident that the Inga Dam Project faces a number of obstacles. These obstacles diminish its attractiveness and gradually contribute to its discounting in the list of options that may help alleviate South Africa's energy problems. The former presidents of South Africa and the DRC, Zuma and Kabila respectively, made substantial progress in the march towards the realisation of Inga III. With both countries now having new presidents, it remains to be seen whether they will be able to make even more progress in as far as the Inga Dam project is concerned. Regardless of whether he may have reservations about the project, it is very unlikely that President Ramaphosa would pull out of the commitment to purchase 2 500 megawatts of the power that would be generated from Inga III. This is because the country's positioning as the DRC's 'leading' partner in the development of Inga III contributes to the consolidation of its image as the leader of the SADC region and possibly Africa. Moreover, withdrawing from this commitment would result in considerable reputational damage for the country and also dent the country's credibility among its peers in SADC and the AU. It is therefore not surprising that in its defence of the commitment to acquire power from the DRC, the DMRE (2019: 14) is adamant that "in addition to this generation option providing clean energy, the regional development drivers are compelling, especially given that currently there is very little energy trade between these countries, due to the lack of infrastructure. The potential for intra-SADC trade is huge as it could open up economic trade."

6.5.5 Economic Relations between South Africa and the DRC

Vickers (2013: 550) notes that within some government circles, there is a concern that South Africa is not deriving any commercial returns from its involvement in and financing of peace processes in a number of African countries. Besharati (2013: 26) adds that conventionally South Africa invests in the restoration of peace and stability in a number of African countries, however, once a degree of peace has been achieved, the rewards of South African efforts are reaped by companies from other parts of the world, including China, India, Europe and Brazil. To drive his point home, he points out that despite its efforts aimed firstly at restoring peace and thereafter post-conflict reconstruction and

development in the DRC, Pretoria failed to convince Kinshasa to hand it big mining concessions, while China managed to speedily negotiate a deal to access the DRC's cobalt and copper in return for a $6 billion public infrastructure package which would be implemented by Chinese companies. This approach to relations with the DRC is consistent with South Africa's desire to prevent projecting an image of a hegemon in its relations with African countries. The approach is also consistent with the idealism that largely characterised the Mandela administration as it paints a picture that South Africa's involvement in the DRC's peace process was motivated by the desire to help rather than to access the DRC's economy.

It has been observed that, while the Mbeki administration made significant strides, the expansion of South African companies into other African countries heightened more during the Zuma administration's time in office (Gbaya, 2015: 56). As Vickers (2013: 550) correctly observes, the Zuma administration paid significant attention to economic diplomacy and national interest as the White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy testifies. The shift, at least rhetorically, towards ensuring the derivation of profits from the country's relations with other countries, particularly those who need its assistance to stabilise and restore peace, can be seen as a response to concerns and realisations that the country's efforts tend to benefit non-South African companies. Additionally, as South Africa matures as a democracy there is bound to be acts of self-correcting in cases where policy makers find that the country could have done better. The Zuma administration's emphasis on economic diplomacy and national interest may also be understood within that context. Lastly, South Africa's domestic challenges such as unemployment, inequality and poverty, necessitate the use of all available and viable avenues to generate revenue in order to confront these challenges. As years after the end of apartheid pass, there is growing impatience among the population with the pace of redress hence the need for government to explore all possible sources of revenue. It is therefore unsurprising that Besharati (2013: 27) contends that "while ruthlessly avoiding mercantilism, South Africa should not be apologetic about its commercial interest, as held by all the other foreign players on the continent."

While South Africa can still benefit more from its relationship with the DRC, it is important to acknowledge that there are a considerable number of South African companies that operate in the DRC. These companies have invested in varying sectors of the Congolese economy, including mining and construction, telecommunications, logistics and other services, infrastructure and energy, and agriculture and retail (Besharati & Mthembu-Salter, 2016: 4). It is thus unsurprising that South African companies such as Vodacom, G4 Securicor, Standard Bank, Group Five, AngloGold Ashanti, Shoprite, South African Express, African Explosives and Chemical Industries, Ruashi Mining, Bell Equipment and more operate in the DRC (Gbaya, 2015: 57; Hendricks & Lucey, 2013: 6). While noting that bilateral trade between the DRC and South Africa is skewed in favour of the latter due to the former's limited productive capacity, DIRCO (2016) reports that in 2012, South African exports to the DRC reached R12,142 billion while imports from the DRC totaled R67 million. In addition, Independent Online (2017) reports that in 2016 South African exports to the DRC wereR11.5 billion while imports from the DRC reached R1.3 billion. This obviously marked a decrease in South African exports to the DRC and an increase in imports from the DRC, and thereby led to a decrease in the trade deficit.

Gbaya (2015: 57) asserts that South African companies operating in the DRC can be divided in two groups, with the first group operating independent of the government while the other group, largely made up of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) gained entry into the DRC through the government. Grobbelaar (2014: 46) adds that while SOEs have engaged significantly with the rest of Africa, it has been private companies that have been at the forefront of South Africa's investment in Africa. Perhaps this state of affairs could be explained by invoking the argument that has been made on a numerous occasions that South Africa's approach to economic relations and development assistance has over the years lacked coordination (Besharati & Mthembu-Salter, 2016: 8; Grobbelaar, 2014: 13). It therefore makes sense that the Zuma administration made a pronounced effort towards the pursuit of economic diplomacy. As Hendricks & Lucey (2013: 6) recall, through its Trade and Investment initiative (founded in 2009), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) led 75 business executives to the DRC in 2012. According to the DTI (n.d.), this initiative "aims to increase export capacity and support direct investment flows

via the implementation of strategies directed at targeted markets, and effectively manage the DTI's network of foreign trade offices."

One deal which had the potential to strengthen cooperation between South Africa and the DRC was the 2014 agreement between South African company, Africom Commodities and the DRC for the former to manage the Bukanga Lonzo agriculture project in the DRC (Oakland Institute, 2019). However, the excitement about this project, which was meant to solve the country's food shortages, was short-lived as Africom left the DRC in July 2017 due to non-payment from the Congolese government for nearly a year (Ross, 2018). The company proceeded to file for arbitration at the International Court of Arbitration in hope of receiving $19.79 million of outstanding payments (Ross, 2018). On the brighter side, one of South Africa's biggest cement companies, PPC entered into an agreement with the DRC's Barnet Group to construct a cement plant in the DRC which would go on to produce for the DRC and its neighbours (Besharati & Mthembu-Salter, 2016: 5; Petterson, 2014). These two contrasting stories are a perfect depiction of the success and failure that South African companies in the DRC faced during Zuma's tenure.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has, among other things, delved into the state of affairs that prevailed in the DRC during Zuma's time as the president of South Africa. This was done in order highlight the circumstances that may have influenced relations between the DRC and South Africa during this period. An analysis of South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC during the time in question demonstrates some considerable shifts from the approach that previous administrations had adopted to relations with the DRC. Firstly, while the Mandela and Mbeki administrations always advocated a peaceful resolution of the two Congo Wars and avoided sending troops to fight on either side of the warring parties, the Zuma administration although still calling for a peaceful resolution actively participated in the deployment of troops in the DRC to offensively fight rebel groups such as the M23. However, it is important to note that the circumstances under which these contrasting decisions were taken are different. The Mandela and Mbeki administrations had to decide on getting involved in a war involving known sovereign states and choose sides. On the other hand, the Zuma administration only had to contribute troops to the fight against

rebel groups some of which are alleged to have been funded by sovereign states. However, it is important to note that the Mbeki administration did deploy South African troops in the UN's peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC.

Secondly, the Zuma administration adopted a more commercial interest-driven approach to relations with the DRC. This marked the jettisoning of the idealistic approach to international relations that largely characterised the Mandela administration. This change was informed by a number of considerations including the need to grow the South African economy in the context of the post-2008 world economy, as well as the realisation that there are economic benefits that South Africa can derive in countries in which it has invested considerably in peace processes.

The next chapter provides the entire study's concluding remarks and recommendations

CHAPTER SEVEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction.

This chapter details the study's general conclusion. In other words, it succinctly outlines the results that the undertaking of the study has yielded. The chapter also recommends adjustments that could be made in order to improve relations between South Africa and the DRC.

7.2 Summary of Findings

This study has used the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a case study in its endeavour to gain some insights on South Africa's foreign policy towards the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. This submission should not be interpreted as an indication that South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC is applied to every SADC member state. However, it is unthinkable that South Africa would develop a foreign policy towards the DRC without considering various regional factors. Therefore, while the present study has unpacked South Africa's foreign towards the DRC extensively, it has also revealed, to a limited extent, some aspects of how Pretoria approaches relations with other fellow SADC members. The study is a result of the

observation, as indicated in the problem statement, that South Africa's 'dominance' in the African continent has sparked some opposition in some African countries. This, coupled with South Africa's sensitivity to perceptions that it is intent on exercising hegemony on the continent, has generated confusion as to what ought to be the country's approach to relations with Africa and the SADC region, particularly with conflict-plagued countries such as the DRC. Accordingly, some of the key findings of the study are summarised below. This is followed by the recommendations that the study puts forward.

7.2.1 The Principles Underpinning South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards the SADC Region

South Africa's foreign policy towards the rest of the world is guided by a number of pillars. Many of these pillars have remained consistent since the dawn of democracy. However, the prioritisation of these pillars has differed from administration to administration. As such, the Zuma administration which was in power for the duration of the period under study, May 2009 to February 2018, prioritised a number of pillars in its approach to relations with the SADC region. Among these are the centrality of Africa, multilateralism, South-South cooperation and economic diplomacy. Given its geographical location, it is no surprise that the African continent remains an important part of South Africa's foreign policy. The importance of the continent reinforces Pretoria's perception of itself as a mouthpiece of the continent, notably in multilateral forums where it gets the privilege of being the only African country with representation. These would include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and the Group of Twenty (G20).

In addition to the centrality of Africa, adherence to pillars such as South-South cooperation implies that South Africa cannot neglect relations with the rest of Africa and the SADC region in particular. This is because many of the countries found within the continent and the region form part of the global South. Multilateralism further compounds the importance of Africa as it would be unthinkable that a country which advocates multilateralism would leave behind its immediate sphere of influence (SADC region and Africa) to seek the actualisation of this principle further afield. One pillar that began featuring prominently in South African foreign policy discussions during Jacob Zuma's presidency is economic diplomacy. The study found that there was a strong push within

the administration to derive economic gains from South Africa's relations with countries such as the DRC, which Pretoria has assisted substantially with its peace process and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. This marked one of the main changes introduced by the Zuma administration to South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC in particular and the SADC region in general.

7.2.2 Changes Introduced by the Zuma administration to South Africa's Foreign Policy

As already stated, the Zuma administration made economic diplomacy one of the central pillars of South Africa's foreign policy. However, there are other changes that the administration introduced particularly in as far as relations with the DRC are concerned. South Africa's approach to relations with the DRC notably shifted from the call for negotiated settlements to conflict between the government and rebel groups to the call for the offensive use of force to suppress rebels. Once this call was embraced by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the country actively participated in the process to overcome the rebel groups, with the defeat of the M23 being a prime example. Additionally, relations between Joseph Kabila and Zuma were characterised as strong given the then Congolese president's isolation. This may have been a result of personal chemistry between the two leaders as was the case with Angola's Eduardo dos Santos. This argument is reinforced by the rejection of Thabo Mbeki by the DRC as the Cyril Ramaphosa-led South African special envoy in August 2018 on the grounds that special envoys do not respect the DRC's sovereignty (Lalbahadur & Sidiropoulos, 2018: 13). It is important to note that while the changes that the Zuma administration introduced to South Africa's foreign policy are significant, they did not mark the total abandonment of the previous administrations' foreign policy.

7.2.3 South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards the DRC as a Reflection of the Country's Approach Towards the Rest of the SADC Region

South Africa's foreign policy towards the DRC shares many similarities with its foreign policies towards other SADC states. One notes that leaders of SADC member states hardly oppose one another, at least publicly. Former liberation movements within SADC, many of which have become governing parties, tend to support one another. This support

is at times hidden behind the highly entrenched principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. While Kabila is not a conventional liberation fighter, he was the first democratically elected president of the DRC in the post-Mobutu era. As such he may have found a home within the group of leaders of SADC states. Given these 'conventions', it would have been difficult for South Africa not to embrace the DRC and Kabila. It is within this aspect that South Africa's approach to relations with the DRC mirrors the approach to relations with many other SADC member states.

The pillars upon which South Africa's foreign policy rests are largely applied to all countries that Pretoria has relations with. While this does not signify a single foreign policy towards all countries, it does illustrate that the principles that inform the country's foreign policy, at least on paper, remain the same. However, the DRC, at least during Kabila's term, 'was' a conflict-plagued country. As such, foreign policy towards such a country, albeit rooted in the same principles, is unlikely to share a high degree of similarities with foreign policies aimed at peaceful and stable countries. South Africa's economic relations with the DRC is one other aspect in which similarities with Pretoria's approach to economic relations with other SADC member states may be drawn. This is because the objectives of Pretoria's economic diplomacy remain the same regardless of the country towards which this policy is aimed.

South Africa's foreign policies towards SADC members share multiple similarities. However, its relations with the DRC given its unique circumstances do not give a conclusive reflection of its foreign policy towards the rest of the SADC region.

7.2.4 SADC Influence in South Africa's Foreign Policy

SADC as an institution has a degree of influence on South Africa's foreign policy. Firstly, it is expected that SADC members should adhere to the collective decisions of the regional organisation. Expectedly, South Africa hardly deviates from the decisions of the Community in the implementation of its foreign policy. A prime example is South Africa's response that it abides by the collective decisions of SADC when asked why it did not push for the re-installation of the SADC Tribunal. Another example is that in its justification of its recognition of Kabila as the president of the DRC following the 2011 elections which were mired in controversy, the country cited the findings of the SADC observer mission

in the elections in question. Given that South Africa is still going to need SADC in its pursuit of a permanent seat in the UNSC, it would have been imprudent for the Zuma administration to deviate from the decisions of the SADC collective. However, when considering the amount of power (as stipulated by the determinants of power in International Relations) that Pretoria has in relation to other SADC members, it would not be farfetched to argue that within the organisation there are solid possibilities for it to exert influence.

7.3 Recommendations

Going forward, there is a need for the Ramaphosa administration to use the momentum created by the Zuma administration to pursue South African business interests in countries such as the DRC. The further penetration of the Congolese economy would open up the market to more South African products which could help boost the South African economy. Improvements in the South African economy are needed as the country continues to battle poverty, inequality and unemployment. In order to extract more economic returns from its relationship with the DRC, South Africa needs to improve the coordination of its engagements with the DRC. This would require even closer relations among state entities and between them and the private sector. Projects such as Inga III may be used by South Africa in negotiating improved entrance terms to the Congolese economy. However, in committing itself to certain projects with the DRC, South Africa needs to be wary of the volatile 'nature' of the DRC. Therefore, there could even be a need to develop a specific approach to countries with volatile peace such as the DRC.

South Africa plays an active role in resolving numerous issues that plague the SADC region. This undoubtedly paints a picture of the country being a leader in the region. However, the country does not view itself as a leader, at least publicly. Furthermore, the country's leadership is obviously contested. Other SADC members and analysts may also dismiss arguments that the country is a leader in the SADC region. However, it is difficult to find any country in the international community whose leadership in any sphere is not contested. As such, the aforementioned grounds on their own cannot be used to dismiss claims of South Africa's leadership in the region. Rather, the role that the country plays in countries such as the DRC should be used to decide whether the country is indeed a

leader in the region or not. In this regard, South Africa, given its economic superiority, should unashamedly and decisively push for the betterment of the region. This would eliminate the confusion about its role in conflict-plagued countries such as the DRC. This recommendation is made with the awareness of the limited resources that the country has to do with, as well as the deeply entrenched principle of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs that many SADC member states adhere to.

South Africa also needs to deal with the Rwandan factor in its relations with the DRC. While it is encouraging that President Ramaphosa has set his eyes on renewing relations with Rwanda, the alleged actions of Kigali are discouraging. South Africa needs to put a stop to the use of its territory for the killing of Rwandan dissidents allegedly by Rwanda. Given the resources at its disposal, the South African government needs to ascertain whether indeed Rwanda is responsible for the killing of Rwandan dissidents in South Africa. If these allegations are proven, the government needs to consider whether allowing former Paul Kagame loyalists into the country is a wise decision given the apparent fearless pursuit of such individuals by Rwanda. Once this is done and relations between Rwanda and South Africa are normalised, there would be assurance in Pretoria that good relations between itself and the DRC are not premised on the latter's need for alliances but rather on shared interests between the two countries. This submission is made with the consideration that over the years, Rwanda has continuously been accused of aiding rebel groups that pose a threat to Kinshasa.

7.4 Theoretical Implications of the Study

The study has shed some light upon South Africa's SADC policy, with South Africa-DRC relations being considered in particular, under the Zuma administration, which is a topic that has relatively been neglected due to the focus on the administration's performance at the domestic level. This marks a contribution to literature in International Politics in general, and South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region in particular. In addition, the use of the theory of Afrocentricity has equipped the study with the tools to analyse the subject matter from a position that is beyond what the conventional International Relations theories offer. As such, the study can be used as a starting point of many other future studies concerning the subject matter. This is particularly important

as both the DRC and South Africa have moved into new eras under the leadership of Félix Tshisekedi and Cyril Ramaphosa respectively.

While this study is definitely not the first in its field to employ Afrocentricity as its theoretical framework, it contributes to the struggle for the acknowledgement of unconventional theories such as Afrocentricity as applicable and fitting for use in International Relations. The acknowledgment of theories such as Afrocentricity and their predicable subsequent wide use would go a long way in ensuring that Africans in the study of International Relations, foreign policy, South Africa's foreign policy, and South Africa's foreign policy towards the SADC region and the DRC in particular are able to adopt theories that they relate to as and when they please.

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Appendix 1: Ethical Clearance Certificate

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TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

ETHICS CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

MEETING: 05 November 2019

PROJECT NUMBER: TREC/464/2019: PG

PROJECT:

Title: Investigating South Africa's Foreign Policy towards the SADC Region: The Case Study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2009-2018.

Researcher: N Langa
Supervisor: Prof KB Shai
Co-Supervisor/s: Mr JPM Vunza
School: Social Sciences
Degree: MA in International Politics

PROF P MASOKO
CHAIRPERSON: TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

The Turfloop Research Ethics Committee (TREC) is registered with the National Health Research Ethics Council, Registration Number: REC-0310111-031

> **Note:**
> i)   This Ethics Clearance Certificate will be valid for one (1) year, as from the abovementioned date. Application for annual renewal (or annual review) need to be received by TREC one month before lapse of this period.
> ii) Should any departure be contemplated from the research procedure as approved, the researcher(s) must re-submit the protocol to the committee, together with the Application for Amendment form.
> iii) PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES.

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