

**A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS IN
MALAMULELE AND VUWANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE**

by

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THESIS

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis hereby submitted to the University of Limpopo, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university; that it is my work in design and in execution, and that all material contained herein has been dully acknowledged.

Chabalala Olinda Ruth (Ms)

Date

Dedication

This study is dedicated to **my mother** Gertrude Chabalala, you are the best, thank you for all the support, guidance, and motivation.

My children Katlego and Vangama; **my siblings** Witnes, Kulani and Rixongile, may you continue to shine and excel.

TO MY FATHER AND HUSBAND IN HEAVEN:

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ANC	African National Congress
BBCC	Bushbuckridge Border Crisis Committee
CDWs	Community Development Workers
DA	Democratic Alliance
DPASA	Department of Public Service and Administration
HIV	Human immunodeficiency virus
ICD	Independent Complaints Directorate
IDP	Integrated Development Planning
KZN	Kwazulu-Natal
LGMD	Local Government Municipal Demarcation
MDB	Municipal Demarcation Board
MEC	Member of the Executive Council
MLFM	Munghana Lonene FM
MPAEC	Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign
NGOs	Non-Government Organisations
NP	National Party
PPMs	Pre-Paid water Meters
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RGA	Regulations of Gatherings Act
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SALGA	South African Local Government Association.
SAPS	South African Police Service
TCA	Thematic Content Analysis

Abstract

The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [RSA], allows people to protest, demonstrate, picket, and assemble when they believe their constitutional rights have been violated. There are legislations that have been put in place to ensure that while people are showing their dissatisfaction, they do not infringe on the rights of others by engaging in riotous behaviour. The Regulation of Gatherings Act [RGA] (Act 205 of 1993) is one of such acts. This study explored the motivations of violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani in the Limpopo Province. A qualitative research methodology was utilised and in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were used to collect data. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used to sample the people who participated in the protests that occurred in the areas of this study. Thematic Content Analysis was used to analyse the findings from the in-depth interviews and the focus group discussions.

The study found that the Malamulele residents were concerned about being in the Thulamela Municipality, and some of their concerns included but were not limited to employment and service delivery. This study found that in Vuwani, the violent protests were influenced by the government's inability to effectively consult residents in the merger between Vuwani and Malamulele which was done with the intention of quenching the violent protests that had erupted in the Malamulele area. Violence is said to have occurred because the government was unresponsive, and it had failed to provide adequate services and had also made unfulfilled promises.

Moreover, this study also found that people engaged in collective violence because of anger and frustration. There were also people who promoted collective violence to gain access to free grocery through looting. The destroying of government properties was seen as punishment to both the community and the government. Some protestors were emotionally disturbed when they saw buildings burning, while some children also learnt to respond with violence when in conflicting situations. The government lost money as they had to refurbish or replace things that they had already provided for. However, in comparison, the participants indicated that it is easy for the government to recover, because they only lose money while the community has to live with the scar of collective violence and its aftermath for a long time.

The participants regard the inclusion of community members in government projects as a measure that can prohibit their engagement in collective violence as they will identify community buildings as their own. Participatory governance should be promoted in communities and the government should address problems as soon as they are identified. The findings of this study and the literature review guided this research to develop a model that can be used to reduce the motivations of people to become violent. Various role players were identified in this model, and they include but are not limited to: The national, provincial, and local leadership, government officials, the police, ward committees as well as the public.

Key words: Violent, protest, violent protest, collective violence, Malamulele, Vuwani

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Protests are considered as essential elements of societies that practise democracy (Mooijman, Hoover, Lin, Ji & Dehghani, 2018). The members of the society are able to voice their grievances and thereby foster change that agrees with their principles during protests. However, protests can rapidly turn into violence (Mooijman *et al.*, 2018). Furthermore, Carrim (2010) states that there are various forms of violent activities that are considered to be reasonable during protests. Similarly, members of the society do not recognise these acts as violence, but as legitimate, useful, and effective means of achieving their desired goals (Carrim, 2010; Collins, 2013; Muller, 2013). Thus, violence is justifiable when people see no other means that they can use to achieve their desires (Muller, 2013). In addition, Collins (2013) states that protests are seen as effective by demonstrators only when there is an element of violence that is added to it. Thus, violence becomes a weapon in political mobilisation (Collins, 2013).

Petrus and Isaacs-Martin (2011) point out that protestors acknowledge that they have vandalised state property, but they fail to take responsibility for their actions. They defend their deeds by blaming the government structures for having pushed them to act beyond acceptable behaviour. Similarly, Booysen (2018) regards violent protests as weapons that are utilised by disgruntled South African communities as an indication of their anger. Furthermore, protestors wish to make their demonstrations visible by protesting on major roads. The use of these roads is also beneficial as it provides food as well as goods through looting (Booyesen, 2018).

Malamulele is an area near Giyani Township, before it was granted its own municipality, it was under the Thulamela Municipality and its offices were located in Thohoyandou within the Vhembe District. The Malamulele residents engaged in violent protests in response to the Municipal Demarcation Board's refusal to heed their plea to have their stand-alone municipality, separate from the Thulamela Municipality

(Tiva, 2013). The demarcation process was guided by The Local Government Municipal Demarcation [LGMD] Act (Act 27 of 1998), Chapter 2, Section 21 (a) and (b) that gave the MDB the duty to determine and also re-determine the municipal boundaries in South Africa.

The protests in Malamulele also stemmed from poor service delivery from the Thulamela Municipality. The residents alleged that good service delivery was only found in the areas around Thohoyandou, where the Thulamela Municipality is located (Tiva, 2013; Tiva, 2015; Mokgopo, 2017). They claimed that more money was spent to develop areas around Thohoyandou, while areas around Malamulele were neglected (Tiva, 2013; Tiva, 2015; Mokgopo, 2017). Furthermore, the protestors alleged that the municipality based their criteria for employment on the language spoken by the job applicant; therefore, only Venda-speaking people were hired in the municipal offices (Mokgopo, 2017). The Malamulele residents envisioned that the solution to their problem would be to create their own municipality. The protests were, however, not confined to the Malamulele area only, as violence also erupted in the Vuwani area.

Piven (2012) considers collective protests as deliberate efforts that are aimed at achieving political change. Bosi and Giugni (2012) state that violent acts that are executed for political purposes are performed by people who are excluded from political arenas, and these may include social movements and members of the community. della Porta and Gbikpi (2012) note that for people to express their political discontent, they choose a specific protest that they may easily identify with.

Lekaba (2014:33) regards violent protests to be, “*a recurring phenomenon in South Africa*”. Tau (2014) highlights that some parts of South Africa have been swamped with violent protests, and in some instances, lives have been lost. Violent protests usually occur when members of the community are dissatisfied with but not limited to, service delivery, demarcation, limited opportunities, and an unresponsive government (della Porta & Diani, 2006; Bryant, 2008; Matebesi, 2011; Tapscott, 2011; Platinum Weekly, 2012; Salgado, 2013; Zama, 2013; Twala, 2014; Musitha, 2016; Mokgopo, 2017; Simelane, 2019). Furthermore, Netswera and Kgalane (2014) state that dissatisfaction and the loss of trust in the government, especially in the local

government structures lead to violent street protests that often culminate into the damage of properties, injuries and even the loss of lives. The South African Government News Agency (2009) notes that during public protests, the demonstrators use weapons such as *pangas* as well as insect repellent sprays, and some may also throw stones at police officers.

Roads are barricaded to stop vehicles from moving from one area to another (von Holdt, 2011a; Selebi, 2012). In some instances, the police have been forced to fire rubber bullets to disperse protesting crowds (Pearce, 2008; Chauke, 2013) and to defend themselves. The RGA (Act 205 of 1993) provides for the prevention and prohibition of gatherings. Section 5(1) clearly states that when there is credible information that indicates a possible threat on a proposed gathering to cause serious disruption on vehicle or pedestrian traffic, the responsible officer may consider the prohibition of such a gathering.

Sebungwawo (2012) points out that due to the failure of municipal governments to act regarding community challenges, the members often feel that the state only responds to violent protests that cost the state money. The Vuwani residents demanded the MDB to reverse its decision to place some areas of Vuwani to fall within the boundaries of the new municipality that was established in Malamulele (Paterson & Power, 2016). When the decision of the MDB did not favour both Malamulele and Vuwani, the two areas embarked on violent protests, where schools were set on fire, shops looted and the roads were barricaded with tree branches and stones (Chauke, 2013; Tiva, 2013). These actions contravene the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 8(6) which prohibits people who participate in a demonstration from performing any act which is likely to cause or encourage violent behaviour.

People believe that a violent unrest is a justifiable tool with which to fight unfair practices by those who are in power (Fanon, 1963; della Porta & Diani, 2006; Zeitz, Tan, Grief, Couns & Zeitz, 2009; Crais, 2011, Dlamini, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Collins, 2013; Muller, 2013). Ngwane's (2011) study confirms that the burning of tyres is a cultural practice that was adopted from the apartheid regime. Petrus and Isaacs-Martin (2011) further illustrate that the use of violence such as the destruction of properties, the burning of tyres and the blocking of roads were common practices during the

apartheid period. Furthermore, the previous mentioned author indicates that protestors portray these activities during modern-day strikes and protests.

The nature of protests in this study resembles the demonstrations that happened during the apartheid era. These demonstrations seem to be akin to the opposition and to what is perceived to be an unfair government. This is epitomised by violent actions in the encounters with the government structures. Firstly, this can be seen through the perceived lack of service delivery at the local government level. Secondly, by turning to the MDB with the expectation that it will pass a decision that fits their aspirations, and thirdly, the actions are fuelled by the disappointment of having their requests turned down.

The violent protests that occurred between 2013 and 2016 in Malamulele and Vuwani in the Limpopo Province motivated the researcher to undertake this study. The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa's (2009) report did not mention the Limpopo Province as one that experienced violent protests. Lancaster (2018) confirms that the protests in the Limpopo Province occur at a lesser extent compared to the ones in Gauteng, Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal [KZN] and even in the Eastern Cape. This researcher put forth that the violent behaviour of the protesting communities took the government by surprise as no preventative measures were put in place to prevent the burning of schools and the damage to state properties. This element of surprise stimulated the researcher's interest to conduct a study on the phenomena to gain an understanding of the underlying dynamics that led to the protests.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem for this study is the violent protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani in response to the MDB's refusal to allow Malamulele to become a stand-alone municipality as well as for taking some parts of Vuwani and incorporate them into Malamulele. The first violent protest erupted in Malamulele in 2013 and was extensively reported in the media (Chauke, 2013; Tiva, 2013; Paterson & Power, 2016). The newspaper reports by Tiva (2013) and Chauke (2013) reflect on the violent behaviour of the residents who looted shops, damaged properties, and torched schools. As a result of the protests, shops, filling stations and some government offices

were shut down. The protesters blocked roads with stones and burned tyres to prevent people from going to work. The residents became angry when they learnt that the MDB decided not to grant Malamulele its own stand-alone municipality. Moreover, Piven (2012) states that violence can be used to win the support of other people. People may sympathise with communities that use violence as this may be seen as an indication that these communities have been pushed beyond the limit of their endurance, hence they opt to protest violently.

Moreover, the MDB also refused to reverse its decision to merge parts of the Vuwani community into the new municipality called the Collins Chabane Municipality. The Vuwani residents, opposed the idea to be included in the new municipality, and they insisted on remaining in the Thulamela Municipality. The residents decided to engage in violence that included the malicious damage to properties (Tiva, 2016), similar to previous demonstrations where residents barricaded roads with burning tyres, rocks, and tree branches (Tau, 2016). The tribal administration office, municipal trucks as well as a police trailer were also torched during the protests in Vuwani.

The protests in Vuwani are reported to have followed similar incidents that were reported in Malamulele, on demands that the MDB had to grant them their own municipality, which eventually materialised in 2016 (Tau, 2016). Having achieved the objective of a separate municipality, the Malamulele experience may have influenced the Vuwani residents to act violently as well. However, in their case, the violent protests did not achieve the objective to remain in the Thulamela Municipality. In response to this, the public set schools alight, and there was alarming damage to furniture, school records and the learners' results were also destroyed in the fire (Evans, 2016; Paterson & Power, 2016; Kanyane, Pophiwa, Raseala, Viljoen, Moolman, Adonis, Ramphalile & Rule, 2017). The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [RSA] gives the citizens the right to assemble, demonstrate and also to picket, but it should be done peacefully, and protestors must be unarmed.

The researcher argues that the Malamulele and Vuwani residents engaged in violence and malicious damage to properties to vent their dissatisfaction over the unfavourable decision by the MDB. One can conjecture that the properties that they destroyed represent their disapproval of how the government determined their fate. The

rationalisation of this kind of behaviour where service delivery is protested, yet other services are being destroyed including some government infrastructure is worth an inquiry. During the protests in Malamulele and Vuwani, the residents did not take into considerations the activities that they are not supposed to engage in as stipulated in the RGA (Act 205 of 1993).

Numerous studies were conducted on violent protests, but it appears that most of these studies concluded that economic, local governance and violent service delivery protests are purely issues that are connected to administration (Alexander, 2010; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Managa, 2012; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Petrus & Isaacs-Martin, 2011). Thus, this study intended to investigate the violent protests that occurred at Malamulele and Vuwani from a criminological perspective that views the communal rampage as criminal behaviour rather than as an administrative issue. This study sought to explore the causes of the violent protests at Malamulele and Vuwani. This study also intended to develop a model for pro-active intervention to consider when engaging communities prior to protests turning violent. Netswera and Kgalane (2014) acknowledge that there are a number of studies that have been done on service delivery protests, but the studies on violent protests are limited.

1.3 CONCEPTUALISATION

Conceptualisation is done for the researcher to clarify what they mean by using particular terms (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).

1.3.1 Violent protest

This study considers a protest to be violent when public buildings such as schools and libraries are vandalised, torched, or if there is attempted arson, and when shops are looted. The blockage of an entrance or exit to a township with rocks and burning tyres, a threat on the councillors' homes and the residents. The throwing of stones at passing cars (including at the police cars) and when the police respond to an outbreak of a protest by firing rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse nonviolent protestors may also

be seen as violent (Sinwell, Kirshner, Khumalo, Manda, Pfaffe, Pholela & Runciman, 2009; Breakfast, Bradshaw & Nomarwayi, 2016).

1.4 BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review was done to enable the researcher to know what other researchers have done on this topic as well as to narrow down the topic (Matthews & Ross, 2010; Neuman, 2014b). It also helped the researcher to get more questions to include in the data collection tools (Matthews & Ross, 2010). The literature was obtained from journal articles, books, research reports; dissertations, theses, government documents and policy reports (Matthews & Ross, 2010; Neuman, 2014b). Ramdhani, Ramdhani and Amin (2014:48) point out the importance of the literature review, as being that the researcher shows the readers how the research, "*fits into the larger field of study*".

1.4.1 Introduction

Wakefield (2011) states that the literature review provides a discussion of the main published work that relates to the field under study. It suggests to the reader that the researcher has read extensively on the selected topic and acknowledged the work that has been done by others. The review also sets this study in the context of the existing body of literature to bring to light the gaps in the research. It also enables the research to identify relevant questions to ask and the methodologies to be used in the study. Furthermore, Sarantakos (2005) puts forth that the literature review involves a secondary analysis of information that already exists in publications. The aim of doing a literature review is to collect information on how the current research can be structured, as well as processed and how relationships can be formed to help the researcher to familiarise themselves with the research object.

Seferiades and Johnson (2012) state that violent protests are unique from all other forms of contentious politics as they arouse conflicting responses. The above-mentioned authors regard violence as the most visible and extraordinary variable of collective action and also as the most difficult to sustain. Instead of the public choosing to negotiate or to present petitions, they choose to engage in brawls and vindictive

attacks. Bosi and Giugni (2012) regard contentious politics to include amongst others, forms of violence such as rioting, attacks on property, hunger strikes and assaults.

Cronje (2014) notes the difficulty of knowing the exact number of protests that occur or are occurring in South Africa. The author alleges that poor communities resort to protests to express their anger and frustration on how the government performs. Managa (2012) argues that the major problem that is faced by the Limpopo Province is corruption and the mismanagement of the funds that are allocated to render services to poor communities. The Local Government Municipal Systems [LGMS] Act (Act 32 of 2000) Section 4(2) (f) states that the council of municipalities have the duty to give members of the community proper access to services, which are offered by the municipality and to which they are entitled to.

1.4.2 Reasons for engaging in violent protests

There are many reasons for engaging in violent protests. As the literature review will demonstrate, violent protests take place all over South Africa. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Managa (2012), Banjo and Jili (2013), the Parliament of the RSA (2009) and Thomas (2018) allege that corruption, nepotism, maladministration, and financial mismanagement are seen as some of the factors that motivate the public to be violent. Akinboade, Mokwena and Kinck (2013) note that the primary reason for engaging in riotous protests is because of the dissatisfaction with the delivery of basic municipal services. This study observed that there could be deeper underlying causes when schools are burnt and property is destroyed during protests, therefore these issues are worth an investigation. During these protests, it seems that the protestors do not adhere to the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), which prohibits them from engaging in riotous behaviour, but allows them to protest peacefully.

Platinum Weekly's (2012) report argues that violent public protests are caused by but are not limited to unemployment, high levels of poverty, poor infrastructure, and the lack of houses in poor communities. Protests are often caused by political promises of excellence on service delivery during election campaigns. Protesters believe that by following proper channels, their dissatisfaction will not be attended to. To make a serious impact, they embark on illegal protests through marches where they burn

tyres, barricade roads, and destroy community properties as well as businesses (Platinum Weekly, 2012).

Meanwhile, Akinboade *et al.* (2013) state that the allegations of rampant corruption and nepotism within the local government structures are some of the causes of riotous protests. The findings by Akinboade *et al.* (2013) reflect that 97 percent of the participants from Midvaal, 90 percent from Lesedi and 75 percent from Emfuleni agree to having engaged in violent protests due to corruption within the municipalities. Anger may force residents to engage in violent protests. The communities engaged in violent protests as a way of demonstrating their anger because they perceived those that represent the government to have improved their own lifestyles but failed to address the issues that plague communities (Petrus & Isaacs-Martin, 2011).

Banjo and Jili (2013) found that the majority of participants (90%) in Wesselton engaged in violent protests because of the lack of service delivery and unemployment. The 1996 Constitution of the RSA Chapter 7, Section 152(b) commands the local government to offer services to the communities in a sustainable manner. The participants in Banjo and Jili's (2013) study indicated that only those people who were members of the ruling party, their friends and families or the councillors were able to get employment. Bribery was also mentioned to be a factor that pushed them to engage in violent protests (Jili, 2012). In Siyathemba Township, 70 percent of the people protested because of unemployment and 30 percent due to job bribery (Banjo & Jili, 2013). Akinboade *et al.* (2013) and the Parliament of the RSA (2009) also found that violent protests were also caused by unemployment and poverty.

The Lesedi, Emfuleni and Midvaal residents indicated that the riotous protests were the only language that the government understood, and the only way in which their pleas could be heard (Akinboade *et al.*, 2013). Ngwane (2011) and Nembabula (2014) confirm the findings of the study by Akinboade *et al.* (2013), that the only way to attract the attention of the state is by being disruptive and militant. Moreover, Banjo and Jili (2013) put forth that some participants in their research indicated that they were trying to speed up service provision because the government did not understand the language of negotiation. As a result, violent protests were seen as productive negotiating tools.

Tau (2013) claims that the protesters in Protea South informal settlement in Soweto engaged in violent protests to make their voices heard and to demand action from officials. Banjo and Jili (2013) found that 78 percent of the participants were tired of empty promises, therefore, they were expressing their anger and frustration, while four percent claimed that the police were the cause of the violent aspects of the protests. In Siyathemba, the residents indicated that the government was not responding to their demands, yet at the same time, the councillors were putting their interests first (Banjo & Jili, 2013).

Bryant (2008) highlights that frustrations may spill into anger when not resolved. An example is the frustrations of the Kennedy Road settlers who were promised a land to occupy. When the promise was broken, they became frustrated and demonstrated their anger by protesting violently when the land they had been promised was given to a company. The Malamulele and Vuwani residents were also motivated to engage in violent protests when the government failed to respond favourably to their request.

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole (2013:13) regard a theory to be, "*a set of ideas or statements that explain a particular social phenomenon*" while Neuman (2014a) sees the purpose of a theory as explaining why certain things in the world or events are the way they are. The Collective Violence Theory is applied to this study of violent protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani, in response to the MDB's refusal to demerge them from areas which they did not want to form part of (Chauke, 2013; Tiva, 2013; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi and Lozano (2002:215) define collective violence as, "*the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group against another group or against a set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives*". In this study, the term "collective violence" is used to refer to protest actions in Malamulele and Vuwani that were violent.

According to Chauke (2013) and Tiva (2013), the Malamulele and Vuwani residents looted shops, damaged properties, torched schools, blocked roads with rocks as well burned tyres to prevent mobility. The children were prevented from going to school,

while the adults were prevented from going to work. Preventing adults from going to work and the children from going to school was also evident in Benoni in violent protests that were related to service delivery (The Citizen, 2012). This research calls these acts forms of collective violence. The Collective Violence Theory is used in this study to explain violence that is done as a teamwork.

della Porta and Diani (2006:19) state that, "*collective action broadly refers to individuals sharing resources in pursuit of collective goals*". This refers to goals that cannot be given to an individual as they are awarded based on the collective action that has taken place. della Porta and Diani (2006) argue that for protests to emerge, protesters must believe that an opportunity exists and that they have the power to influence change. At the same time, the activists should blame the system for the problem. The Malamulele and Vuwani residents protested because they believed that the MDB's decision was unfair and that by demonstrating violently, they could influence the MDB to reverse its decision.

Lau, Seedat and Suffla (2010) argue that people are more willing to act collectively when they believe that their actions will yield the desired outcomes. Furthermore, Lau *et al.* (2010:1) regard, "*collective violence as a form of participatory citizenship*". In this regard, members of the community collectively participate in activities such as demonstrating and picketing to achieve common goals. The above authors observe that collective action may begin as a peaceful protest, but during the process, it may turn to be an uncontrollable form of mob violence (Lau *et al.*, 2010).

Netswera and Kgalane (2014:266) put forth that, "*community frustration and anger has retained the status quo in political leadership at municipal levels*". Dissatisfaction and loss of trust in leadership can result in violent street protests, where in some instances, there is the loss of lives and damage to properties. Violent protests are prohibited by Section 8(6) of the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) as well as Section 17 of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996. These Acts prohibit people from assembling and presenting petitions while armed. They are allowed to assemble, demonstrate, picket or present petitions in a peaceful manner while unarmed. The participants are required not to utter words that may incite violence. Moreover, Sebola (2014) puts forth that The South African

1996 Constitution, Section 36 limits the rights of people to protest by considering certain factors such as equality, freedom, and the dignity of others.

Fanon (1963) argues that collective violence may emerge when politicians have summoned people to a meeting. By being invited, the people may assume that it is time to fight, while the leader does not want any force, but intended to threaten to use it. The speech, the police presence as well as the crowds might give people the excitement that they have to act collectively. People who are oppressed believe that for them to be liberated, they can only achieve it through the use of force (Fanon, 1963). Reicher (1984) states that a participant in ST. Paul riots said that when a person is oppressed, there is a need to fight the oppressors. In this regard, the participant was referring to the police officers who arrested a café owner and another man in their neighbourhood. The people view this form of behaviour as oppressive, hence they saw the need to fight the police to liberate themselves from the oppression.

Tilly (2003:6) states that, "*Ideas about proper and improper uses of violent means, about differences among social categories, and about justice or injustice undoubtedly shape people's participation or nonparticipation in collective violence*". Sometimes the protest leaders do not wish for violence to occur during the protests, but the crowds who are the supporters are the ones who might assume that it will benefit the group by producing the desired outcome. Ngwane (2011) concurs with Tilly (2003) in that the protests leaders argue that they do not wish for violence to occur, but they use it to get the government to respond. Therefore, violence is necessary to achieve a goal.

Herbolzheimer (2009) states that the Africans gained independence after fighting wars with their colonisers. This is not confined to Africa as even the Americans gained their independence through fighting wars. There are other countries such as Northern Ireland, Southern Sudan and Nepal who fought wars to gain their freedom. As such, Herbolzheimer (2009) argues that there is enough evidence that violence can work as it can be used successfully to achieve goals.

According to Fanon (1963), German militarism resolved its border problems through the application of force, while the Angolan people and Algerians rejected any method that did not include violence to achieve the desired goals. Fanon (1963) states that

they were in slavery, as such they lost their patience with peaceful resolutions to grievances. They knew that the only way for them to be delivered from colonial oppression was through violence. Fanon (1963) argues that violence can be understood as a perfect mediation that the oppressed can use to liberate themselves. The colonised people could therefore achieve victory through violence.

Fanon (1963) argues that violence can be understood as a perfect mediation that the oppressed can use to liberate themselves. This theory is used to demonstrate how the collective action by a group of cohesive people, who are feeling disappointed with the government's performance and service delivery turns violent to achieve their objectives. This is reflected in a kind of liberating violence which forces the government to concede to the groups' demands.

1.6 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1.6.1 Aim of the study

The aim of this study is to explore the motivational factors of the violent protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani, in the Limpopo Province.

1.6.2 Research objectives

The research answered the following study objectives that were intended to explore the motivational factors on the violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani:

- To determine the causes of the violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani;
- To find out if the protesters are exploding at the government when they destroy government properties during protests;
- To ascertain if collective violence can be used as a productive tool to achieve desired goals;
- To propose models that can be used to address the motives behind violent protests.

1.6.3 Research questions

The research questions for this study are as follows:

- What were the causes of the violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani?
- Are protesters exploding at the government when they destroy government properties during protests?
- Can collective violence be used as a productive tool to achieve desired goals?
- Which mechanisms can be used to channel residents to peaceful protesting?

1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study collected qualitative data. The researcher collected data through interviews and focus groups discussion to increase the validity of this study and its usefulness in other settings. Mason (2002) states that qualitative methodology is rewarding as it offers the researcher an opportunity to explore an extensive proportion of the world in which the participants live in. The researcher can also be able to explore amongst others, the participants' experiences and understanding about a particular phenomenon. Moreover, this research was based on narrative studies, as the researcher collected stories that describe the lives of the participants. The researcher in this report is retelling the stories as described or explained by the participants (Bless *et al.*, 2013; Patton, 2015; Niewenhuis, 2016a).

1.7.1 Research design

The phenomenological research design was opted for in this study (Fouché & Schurink, 2011). The objective was to explore the violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani. The researcher gained insight into the violent protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani (Fouché & de Vos, 2011). Exploratory research is done when there is a new area of interest (Fouché & de Vos, 2011), which in this case were violent protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani. The themes that emerged from the interviews were used to develop concepts that through operationalisation were used to formulate the variables for the focus group discussions (Neuman, 2014a). As a

result of the sensitivity of the perceived underlined factors in community protests, the researcher opted for using interviews and focus group discussions to increase the validity and reliability aspects of the data and the credibility of this study.

1.7.2 Sampling method

The population for this study were residents from Malamulele and Vuwani. Data was collected only from residents who were above the age of 18. Both male and female participants were included in this study. This study began by purposive sampling, where the researcher chose participants who seemed knowledgeable (Morrow, 2005; Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Laher & Botha, 2012; Niewenhuis, 2016a; Waller, Farquharson & Demsey, 2016) about the protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani. Sampling was done with a specific purpose, as only people who participated in the protests were sampled (Niewenhuis, 2016a).

Thereafter, the snowball sampling technique was used to get more participants for the collection of data. According to Strydom (2011b), snowballing involves approaching a single participant that is involved in the phenomena being studied and requesting the participant to recruit more participants. It was difficult to know about the people who participated in the protests, hence the purposive and snowballing sampling procedures were used (Niewenhuis, 2016a). The researcher purposively identified a few people who participated in the protests from both Malamulele and Vuwani. These participants were asked to refer the researcher to more participants, who were part of the protests after the data was collected from them (Niewenhuis, 2016a).

The interviewees were conducted before the focus group discussions were held. Nine participants were interviewed from both Malamulele and Vuwani, while 12 participants formed part of the focus group discussions. Six of the participants were from Malamulele and the other six from Vuwani. The first participants that were interviewed were asked to refer the researcher to more participants, who were part of the protests after their data was collected from them [snowballing sampling] (Niewenhuis, 2016a). During the second focus group discussion that was held in Malamulele, there was no new information that emerged as the participants were repeating the information that had already been said by previous interviewees in Vuwani (Niewenhuis, 2016a). The

researcher, therefore, concluded that data saturation has been reached. The researcher created a friendly environment that encouraged the participants to freely share their experiences, views, thoughts, and concerns. The researcher asked clear and short questions, while leading questions were avoided (Greef, 2011).

1.7.3 Data collection methods

The researcher collected data by conducting semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. Two methods of collecting data were chosen because Mouton (1996) regards the use of multiple methods when collecting data to be beneficial in that they are likely to increase the reliability of the study. The interviews gave the researcher an opportunity to be in direct contact with the participants, and the participants were asked to respond to the questions about the protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani (Bless *et al.*, 2013). An interview schedule was used to guide the interview process as well as the focus group discussions. The semi-structured in-depth interviews allowed the researcher an opportunity to make a follow up on interesting responses that the participants gave (Greef, 2011).

With semi-structured interviews, the researcher wrote down a predetermined set of questions to guide the process. The questions were aligned to the aim, objectives, and the research questions of this study. The benefit of using semi-structured interviews is that the participants have an opportunity to introduce the issues that had not crossed the researcher's mind and they can also closely share information when doing face-to-face interviews (Greef, 2011). The interview schedule was used to guide the interview and not to dictate how the process should unfold.

The researcher got an opportunity to probe and follow up on the interesting ideas that the participants gave (Greef, 2011; Niewenhuis, 2016a). The participants were able to give more information as they were in close personal contact with the researcher (Greef, 2011). Probing was achieved through the contacts. The findings from the interviewees were used to guide the design of the focus group schedule that was used to direct the focus group discussions. An audio recorder was used to record the interview conversations, with the permission of the participants. The interview guide was written in English, Xitsonga, and Tshivenda.

According to Bless *et al.* (2013), focus groups consist of six to ten participants. Unlike the in-depth semi-structured interviews where the participants are interviewed separately, these participants discussed their views with each other. The participants learned from each other. From each area, six participants formed part of the focus group discussion. The researcher did her level best to ensure that there was no domination of certain individuals in the group discussions and that everyone got the chance to contribute (Bless *et al.*, 2013). Before the group discussion started, the researcher explained the rules to be followed, which were that all the views should be respected, and everyone should get an opportunity to contribute.

1.7.4 Data analysis methods

The data was analysed through Thematic Content Analysis [TCA]. This involved breaking and interpreting the data into themes taking into consideration Braun and Clarke's (2006) TCA which is discussed in detail in Chapter Seven of this research: Familiarising with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining, and naming themes and producing the report. Maguire and Delahunt (2017) consider Braun and Clarke's (2006) TCA as offering a clear and a useful framework for qualitative researchers in the social sciences.

The data was firstly analysed in the field and secondly it was analysed away from the field. The researcher read the data and listened to the recorder time and again to get immersed in the details. The memo writing started immediately at the beginning of data collection and continued throughout the completion of the report. The data was broken down into parts, then closely examined to do comparisons for similarities. The data was reduced to small, manageable set of themes that were written in the final narrative (Schurink, Fouché & de Vos, 2011). The words and phrases that were used by the participants themselves, especially the catchy ones that draw attention, are used in this report (Schurink *et al.*, 2011).

1.7.5 Quality criteria

Quality criteria in this study was maintained through credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

1.7.5.1 Credibility

Schurink *et al.* (2011) state that credibility can be maintained by ensuring that subjects are accurately identified and described. The researcher also determined whether there was a match between the views expressed by the participants and the researcher's reconstruction and representation of these views. Moreover, credibility was increased in this study by prolonged engagement and persistent observation while conducting interviews as well as in focus group discussions (Lincoln & Gumba, 1999 cited in Schurink *et al.*, 2011; Kawulich & Holland, 2012).

1.7.5.2 Transferability

To ensure the applicability of the findings of this study to other areas that are also facing the same problem of violent protests, Schurink *et al.* (2011) recommend the use of data from different sources, so as to increase the generalisability of the study. The chances of transferability were increased through the collection of data, by utilising in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Moreover, the data was presented in its original form (Bryman, 2004; Geertz, 1973, cited by Kawulich & Holland, 2012;).

1.7.5.3 Dependability

For the research to be dependable, the researcher followed the research process by adopting a logical procedure that ensures that all the steps in the study can be easily audited (Schurink *et al.*, 2011). Moreover, the readers are provided with evidence that if the study can be repeated with similar participants, following the same steps, similar findings will be produced (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The researcher accounted for the changing conditions in the problem that was studied, "*as well as for the changes in the design created by an increasing refined understanding of the setting*" (Schurink *et al.*, 2011:397). Moreover, a complete record of how this study was carried out, *inter alia*

the formulation of the problem statement, literature review, data collection methods, data analysis and ethical adherence is provided (Bryman, 2004).

1.7.5.4 Confirmability

Lincoln and Guba (1999) cited in Schurink *et al.* (2011) state that the researcher has to ask whether the findings of the study can be confirmed by another researcher. The researcher provides evidence that corroborates the findings and interpretations by means of keeping an auditable trail of how the research process unfolded (Schurink, *et al.*, 2011). Moreover, the researcher did not allow personal values to influence the way in which this study was carried out (Bryman, 2004).

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of this study is based on the production of a model to deal with underlying motives to engage in violent protests. This should enable proactive engagements to deal with frustrations that may lead to violence. The model includes conflict handling mechanisms between the government and the communities. Not many criminological studies have been undertaken on violent protests; therefore, this study will make a significant contribution to the discipline. It will add on the literature that is already available on violent protests. This study may also serve as a guideline for further studies that can be done in criminology and other disciplines on violent protests.

1.9 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The data was only collected in Malamulele and in the Vuwani Townships, the surrounding villages were not included in this study. Data was only collected from the people who participated in the protests. The views of the people who did not participate in the protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani were excluded from the in-depth interviews and also from the focus group discussions. This study was intended to be a mixed methodology study, because of the threats to boycott elections in Vuwani by residents (Nengovhela, 2018; E-tv News, 08 April 2019; Ramothwala, 2019), the quantitative methodology was changed because the safety of the researcher and the

assistants could not be guaranteed when information had to be collected from a large sample by using the Independent Election Commission [IEC] 2015 election list to select respondents.

Nengovhela (2018) reports that the IEC officials were heavily guarded by the police when they registered the voters, but only a few people went to register. Some people said that they were afraid to register because something bad might happen to them when they register to vote (Nengovhela, 2018). The focus group discussions were then considered as a replacement of the quantitative data collection, through the use of questionnaires.

1.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethics are meant to guide researchers to conduct themselves in an acceptable manner when they are conducting research even if the people who partake in the study do not know anything about ethics. When they are gathering knowledge, the researchers have a moral and professional obligation to adhere to ethics (Neuman, 2014a). The following ethical issues were adhered to in this study:

1.10.1 Permission to carry out the study

The researcher requested for ethical clearance from the Turfloop Research Ethics Committee [TREC] of the University of Limpopo. Permission to record the interviews was also requested from the participants.

1.10.2 Potential harm and benefits

The potential risk that this study posed is that the participants might have recalled events which made them sad. The benefit is that this study assisted in developing a model for conflict handling mechanisms between the government and the communities to reduce the motivation of violent confrontation.

1.10.3 Informed consent

The participants were informed about the harm and also the benefits that are associated with taking part in this study. They were given consent forms to sign as an indication that they have not been forced to take part in this study.

1.10.4 Physical and psychological harm

This research was not associated with any physical harm, and it tried as much as possible not to cause psychological harm to the participants. Strydom (2011a) expresses the difficulty of predicting the possibility of the research to cause emotional harm to participants but offers an alternative way which is to thoroughly inform the participants before they partake in a study about the potential impact of the investigation. If the participants are well informed beforehand, they have an opportunity to withdraw from the study if they realise that the risk of participating outweighs the benefits (Strydom, 2011a). The researcher thoroughly explained the benefits and the risks of participating in this study, to enable the participants to choose whether to participate or not.

1.10.5 Voluntary participation

The participants were not forced to taking part. They consented and participated freely without being manipulated to take part in this study (Matthews & Ross, 2010; Davies & Francis, 2011; Bachman & Schutt, 2015). They were allowed to withdraw at any time without giving an explanation if they did not wish to continue with the interview. The participants were also informed that there was no penalty for withdrawing.

1.10.6 Privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality

The right to privacy, anonymity and the confidentiality of the participants were respected. The participants' identities are not revealed in the report, they remain anonymous. The researcher gave assurance that the information provided by the participants will be written in a way that does not reveal their identities (Bryman, 2004; Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012; Neuman, 2014a). The participants' names were not written

anywhere during the collection of the data to give them the assurance that they will remain anonymous. The participants were not asked to report their own criminal behaviour during the protests. They were asked to talk about violent protests done collectively. The information that may lead to the positive identification of the participants has been refined in the narratives.

The participants' right to privacy was protected by not being forced to reveal the information that they think was embarrassing or demeaning (Sarantakos, 2005). The information that was provided was used for research purposes only. The information that the participants shared with the researcher was treated with confidentiality. The researcher did not make raw data accessible to unauthorised people.

1.11 STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

This research consists of ten chapters structured as follows:

Chapter Two

Legislative Framework: This chapter deals with the legislation that governs the **protests**, which is the 1996 Constitution of the RSA, and the RGA (Act. 205 of 1993). The chapter also looks into the legislation that governs the demarcation process, which is through the application of the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) and The Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1999). The legislation governing the delivery of services is also included in this chapter, which is governed by The Constitution of the RSA, 1996, the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000), The White Paper on Local Government 1998 and the *Batho Pele* Principles.

Chapter Three

Literature Review: This chapter looks at the actions that are regarded as violent protests in other parts of the world, and in African countries as well as in the history of protests in South Africa during the apartheid era and during democratic governance.

Chapter Four

Literature Review: This chapter is based on the literature review on the **motivational factors that encourage people to become or act violently during protests**. The

motives for protests to turn violent include *inter alia* unresponsive governance, dissatisfaction with service delivery, demarcation grievances, violence being used as a communication tool between the government and communities, unfulfilled promises, the police, and the media's role in inciting violence. This chapter also looks at who the protestors are punishing by destroying government properties.

Chapter Five

Literature Review: The negative consequences of violent protests are covered in this chapter. The negative effects of violent protests include economical loss, loss of lives and injury of bystanders and protestors, arrests of the protestors, disruptions on community lives, destruction of infrastructure, educational loss and also that violence may fuel more violence. The chapter also dwells on how violent protests may lead to xenophobic attacks on foreign owned shops, where they are attacked, and their shops looted.

Chapter Six

Theoretical Framework: The Collective Violence Theory is used to explain the reasons peaceful protests tend to be violent. Forms of violent protests, key actors in collective violence as well as how social movements play a role in collective violence are discussed in this chapter.

Chapter Seven

Research Methodology: This chapter describes the research methodology that includes the research design, the sampling method, the data collection methods, data analysis methods, quality criteria and the ethical adherence that this study adhered to.

Chapter Eight

Data presentation, analysis, and interpretation of findings: The findings from the in-depth interviews and the focus group discussions are presented in this chapter using themes and sub-themes.

Chapter Nine

A model of resolving motives of engaging in violent protests: This chapter is about the model of resolving conflicts from escalating into violence. This research designed a model of resolving conflicts guided by the findings of this study as well as by the literature review.

Chapter Ten

Summary of the findings, recommendations, and conclusions: This chapter summarises the findings, as well as makes recommendations and conclusions based on the findings.

1.12 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter has presented the background of this study, the study's aim as well as the research methodology that has been discussed briefly. This chapter consists of the introduction; statement of the problem; conceptualisation; brief literature review; the Collective Violence Theory; the purpose of the study; as well as the aim of the study; and the research questions. The research methodology includes the research design, sampling method, data collection methods, as well as the data analysis methods. The significance of this study, its limitation and the ethical considerations are also discussed.

This chapter also looked into the causes of the violent protests that Managa (2012), Banjo and Jili (2013) and The Parliament of the RSA (2009) indicated that they emanate from corruption, nepotism, maladministration, and the financial mismanagement that was committed by the government officials. Moreover, Akinboade *et al.* (2013), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013) found dissatisfaction with the delivery of basic municipal services and unemployment. Therefore, the protestors use a disruptive and militant style to attract the attention of the state, as they respond effectively to violent protests than to peaceful protests (Ngwane, 2011; Banjo & Jili, 2013). The next chapter discusses the legislative framework that governs protests, the demarcation of areas and service delivery.

CHAPTER TWO

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the legislative framework that relates to violent protests. The laws governing protests in South Africa include The South African 1996 Constitution, and the RGA (Act 205 of 1993). The laws governing the demarcation process include The Constitution of the RSA, Section 155; and the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill 2005; the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) and The Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). Moreover, there are other laws governing the delivery of services, these include but are not limited to the Constitution of the RSA, 1996; the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000), The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 and The *Batho Pele* Principles.

Some protests occur because the government as well as the members of the community fail to adhere to legislative mandates (Bruce, 2014). There are protests that have turned violent because of the failure to adhere to these policies. Bruce (2014) and Manala (2010) report that protesters have barricaded roads, destroyed buildings and there are people who have been killed during the outbreak of violence. The legislation governing the demarcation process has been included in this study because in the areas of study, violent protests are said to have resulted from demarcation grievances (Chauke, 2013; News24, 2015; IOL News, 2015). Moreover, the legislation governing the delivery of services has been included because some protests that become violent emanate from the government's failure to provide services (van Vuuren, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Salgado, 2013; Musitha, 2016; Mokgopo, 2017).

2.2 LEGISLATION GOVERNING PROTESTS

The legislation that governs protests include the South African Constitution, 1996 and the RGA (Act 205 of 1993). Tait and Marks (2011) put forth that the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) was drafted to direct how people can protest and the role of the police in protests.

2.2.1 The South African Constitution, 1996

The right for citizens to peacefully demonstrate is enshrined in The South African Constitution, 1996, Section 17. The constitution allows members of the public to protest when they are dissatisfied with decisions, or the policies as implemented by the government amongst others. Mpehle (2012) as well as Sebola (2014) also state that the above-mentioned section of the constitution gives people the right to peacefully demonstrate, picket, and present petitions when they feel their rights have been violated as well as when their needs are not met. However, there is limitation in their protest. They are not allowed to protest while they are armed with weapons as they may cause injury to other people.

2.2.2 Regulation of Gatherings Act (Act 205 of 1993)

The South African Local Government Association [SALGA] (2015) states that that the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) clarifies the conditions under which a public gathering can be held, in any public road or space. Moreover, it acknowledges that the citizens have the rights to protest in public, to express their views (SALGA, 2015). However, the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) also sets limitations by requesting protestors to respect the rights of others when they are protesting (Tait & Marks, 2011; SALGA, 2015). The notice to gather should be given seven days before the proposed date of the protest (SALGA, 2015), to allow the authorities to make the necessary arrangements.

The purpose of this Act is to explain the processes that need to be followed during a gathering that is attended by more than 15 people. Section 3(3) (a-h) of the Act requires the person who is in charge (or the leader/ convener) of a gathering to give

notice in the form of writing for such gathering. The notice is expected to have the following information:

- Details of the convener (their names, addresses and contact details);
- The name of the organisation seeking to hold a gathering;
- The purpose, the time, duration as well as the date of the gathering;
- The expected number of participants as well as the details regarding the people who shall serve as marshals during the gathering;
- The complete and exact route in which the procession will take; the assemble time and place; the place where participants are to disperse and end time;
- The mode of transportation to the assemble point and from the point of dispersal as well as the number and types of vehicles to form part of the procession;
- If a petition will be handed to a person, the place where it will be handed over; and
- The person to receive should be indicated in the notice.

The law prescribes the procedures to be followed to hold peaceful protests. Arguably, this is a legal way to give air to dissatisfaction. Section 5(1) of the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) gives the responsible officer the power to prohibit a proposed gathering based on the following:

- If there will be a serious disruption of vehicular or pedestrian traffic;
- Injury to the protesters and other persons;
- Extensive damage to property;
- Inability of the police and traffic officers to contain the threat that the gathering poses;
- Time is not favourable; and
- There are other people that have to be consulted.

Should an application be turned down for whatever reason, the applicants may turn to the courts to have it overturned. Should the court also turn down the application, the applicants should abide by the decision of the court.

2.3 LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE DEMARCATION PROCESS

The following acts were found to be guiding the demarcation of boundaries: The Constitution of the RSA, 1996; the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) and the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998).

2.3.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

According to Cameroon (2006) and Mokgopo (2017), municipal boundaries are demarcated as per the guideline of The South African Constitution, 1996, that provides for an independent board to be responsible for the demarcation of areas.

2.3.2 The Local Government Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998)

The MDB demarcates municipalities with the aim of ensuring that the municipality has a number of citizens to enable it to supply services to the people. The LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) Section 21(1) (a & b) gives the MDB the power to determine and also re-determine the municipal boundaries in South Africa. Violent protests erupt because the government has failed to adequately engage communities to a point of consensus as to the exact boundaries of the new demarcations (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Manala, 2010; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Matebesi, 2011).

Furthermore, violent protests seem to achieve results as government often accedes to the demands of the protestors (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Ngwane, 2011; Banjo & Jili 2013; van der Merwe, 2013). The government waits for the destruction of properties, as it is the case in Khutsong, where the government granted the request of incorporating their municipality (Merafong City Local Municipality) into Gauteng Province instead of Northwest Province after members of the community had engaged in violent protests (Matebesi & Botes, 2011). Mavungu (2011) states that the violence that accompanied the Khutsong provincial boundary dispute is considered the most violent in the history of protests. The high violence that was displayed enabled the protests to be known nationally and internationally.

Section 21(4) of the the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) provides for the members of the public who are not satisfied about the determination of a municipal boundary to write to the board within 30 days after the publication of the notice to object to the decision. Section 21(5)(a) and (b) states that the board can either confirm or opt to withdraw the determination of a municipal boundary. It is worth noting that the objections are considered because of the eruption of violent protests (Limpopo Mirror, 2013; Langa, 2011a; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). Moreover, the community should consider the objectives of the board in the demarcation process specified in Section 24 of the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998). The objectives which are set out with considerations of the municipality to be able to fulfil its constitutional obligations, are:

- *The provision of a democratic and accountable government for the local communities;*
- *The provision of services to the communities in an equitable and sustainable manner;*
- *The promotion of social and economic development; and*
- *The promotion of a safe and healthy environment [that will enable the municipality to govern effectively, as well as enable an Integrated Development Plan [IDP] in the municipality. There should also be a tax base that includes all the possible users of services within the jurisdiction of the municipality].*

According to Section 24(d) of the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998); the MDB has to take into consideration whether the municipality that has to be established has a viable economic base. Furthermore, the Act mandates the MDB to inform the community about their findings of whether a viable economic base can be achieved. The affected communities are afforded an opportunity to object to the recommendations of the MDB. Section 26(1) and (2) indicates that the board should publish a notice in a newspaper that should circulate in the affected area to inform the community about the matter and also convey the message on the radio. Section 25(a) mandates the Board to take into consideration that the people in the demarcate municipal boundaries are interdependent together with their economies. As such the following should be considered:

- Human settlement and migration;

- Employment of the people living in the areas where demarcation is conducted;
- The transport that they use for travelling;
- Spending;
- The use of recreational facilities and infrastructures by the people in the area to be demarcated.

Furthermore, the following should also be considered in the demarcation of areas according to Section 25:

(b) The need for cohesive, integrated and unfragmented areas, including metropolitan areas;

(c) The financial viability and administrative capacity of the municipality to perform municipal functions efficiently and effectively;

(d) The need to share and redistribute financial and administrative resources;

(e) Provincial and municipal boundaries; and

(f) Areas of traditional rural communities.

Cameroon (2006) also stresses on the provision made in Section 24 and 25 of the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) that measures should be taken to ensure that the size of the area to be demarcated is manageable. The author states that there should be capacity development and geographic continuity. Moreover, Kanyane *et al.* (2017) put forth that concerning the incorporation of Vuwani to Malamulele, the MDB acted under the instruction of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs [COGTA] after the financial viability of these areas had been determined. The MDB has been entrusted with the power to make final decisions in the demarcation processes (Cameroon, 2006). The Act is clear on the mandate that both the community and the MDB should follow in the demarcation process. However, the protests that occur because of demarcation grievances as reported in Langa (2011a), Ngwane (2011), and Bernstein and Johnston (2007) may suggest that the Act was not adhered to by either party or both.

Mokgopo (2017) puts forth that in the demarcation process, the municipalities have to play a role because it is their areas that are demarcated, as such their functionality as a municipality is affected by the process. For example, the demarcation may result in the municipalities having a larger area to provide services for. When they play an active role, they will be able to indicate how the demarcation may affect their ability to provide services.

2.3.3 Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998)

Section 12(1) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) allows the Member of the Executive Council [MEC] for the local government to establish a municipality to be demarcated by giving notice in the *Provincial Gazette*. After the MEC has established the municipality to be demarcated, the Demarcation Board is then given the mandate to demarcate in accordance with the Demarcation Act. Section 12(3) (c) and (d) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) indicate that the notice in the *Provincial Gazette* to establish the municipality should indicate the boundaries and the name of the municipality to be established.

2.4 THE LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES

Tsheola (2012) indicates that The Constitution of the RSA, 1996, the White Paper on Transformation Service delivery of 1997, the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) and the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000) mandate the local government to provide services to the citizens of South Africa.

2.4.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996

There are various clauses within the constitution that clarify how the services should be provided to citizens. The Constitution of the RSA, 1996, Section 152(1) (b) mandates the local government to guarantee the provision of services to the people as they have to use all the available resources to meet the service that are needed by the community. Furthermore, Section 26(1) and (2) mandates the government to use its available resources to ensure that the South African citizens are provided with

adequate housing. According to Mbecke (2014), Section 152 of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa specifies that the members of the community, organisations and the local government should be involved in government matters and local authorities such as councillors have a role to play to encourage their involvement. The participation by the members of the community will ensure that the effective and much needed services are thus provided to the people.

Miraftab (2006) points out that the constitution recognises that the people of South Africa have the right to access housing and basic services as provided in Section 26 and 27. Moreover, Section 155(4) of the Constitution mandates the municipality to provide services in an equitable and sustainable manner. SALGA (2015) states that the responsibility of ensuring that there is consultation and engagement in developmental matters with local communities has been placed in the hands of the local government, according to the constitution, as in Section 156.

2.4.2 The Local Government Municipal Systems Act (32 of 2000)

Section 4(2) (d) of the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000) commands the municipalities council to ensure that there is provision for the local community with municipal services in a “...*financially and environmentally sustainable manner*”. The community members should be consulted with regard to “*the level, quality, range and impact of the services*” that the municipality should provide them with or else it should appoint another service provider. They should also be informed about the various options for service delivery that they can choose from [Section 4(2) (e) (i-ii)].

Furthermore, in Section (5), a provision is made for the community to be given a chance to be involved in but not limited to the local government activities, that include the decision-making process, access to council information and attending the council meetings (Mathoho, 2011). Section 6(2) (a) compels the municipal administrators to be “*responsive to the needs of the local community*”. Mofolo and Smith (2009), as well as Jili (2012) notes that Section 73(1) (a & c) of the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000) gives a mandate to the municipalities to prioritise the needs of the local communities and also to ensure accessibility of basic services.

Skenjana and Kimemia (2011) and SALGA (2015) put forth that the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000) advises the municipalities not only to encourage public participation in government matters, but also to create conducive conditions for the members of the community to participate. According to Barichievy, Piper and Parker (2005), the above-mentioned Act mandates the municipalities to publish a by-law in a newspaper, so that the citizens can be given an opportunity to respond. This is done to ensure that the citizens participate in governance matters. Furthermore, Barichievy *et al.* (2005) indicates that the publication has to include an invitation to those who cannot read, to visit municipal offices, so that the municipal workers could help them by writing down their inputs.

2.4.3 The White Paper on Local Government, 1998

The White Paper on Local Government (1998) mandates the municipal councillors to promote the citizens and community groups' participation in the designing as well as in the delivery of municipal programmes (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). When citizens are part of the programme's implementation, they will benefit by being provided with the services that meet their needs and affordability. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) also seeks to promote the participation of marginalised groups such as women who may wish to participate, but because of certain constraints, such as social values and norms, safety issues and transport are unable to do so. The White Paper mandates the municipal councils to do their level best in taking care of these constraints. On the other hand, the local government has to prioritise the delivery of basic services to communities who are currently having minimal access to these services (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

The municipalities are also tasked with overseeing the implementation of the IDP. This IDP seeks to assist the municipalities to establish a developmental plan for short, medium, and even for the long term; as it recognises the relationship between development, delivery, and democracy (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). Moreover, for the IDP to be useful and practical, the municipalities have to develop objectives on how the services will be provided, as well as show the standards and level at which these services will be pitched. Furthermore, the communities should be involved in the development of some of the municipalities' key performance

indicators to increase the municipal's accountability towards its citizens (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

2.4.4 The Batho Pele Principles

The *Batho Pele* Principles were put in place to mandate the government officials in the manner in which they should forge their relationship with the public. In addition, the *Batho Pele* Principles guide the members of the public on the service that they should expect from the government. It also ensures that the members of the public are aware of when their constitutional rights have been contravened. Mbecke (2014) indicates that *Batho Pele* was established to develop the relationship between the public servants and the communities, to improve service delivery, while Mpehle (2012) puts forth that the purpose of the principles was that the people should be put first.

2.4.4.1 Consultation

The *Batho Pele* Principles oblige the government to inform its citizens on the level and quality of public services they are to receive, and, where possible, the citizens are the ones who must choose the service that best meets their standards, while considering their economic capabilities (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). According to the Department of Public Service and Administration [DPSA] (1998), the *Batho Pele* Principle indicates that all the stakeholders should be consulted concerning the nature of service that will be provided. In addition, Mofolo and Smith (2009) put forth that when municipalities consult the community representatives under their jurisdiction, they will help in highlighting the preferred services, the quality and level of the service rendered and whether they can afford the services to be provided.

2.4.4.2 Service standards

The citizens should know the standard of the service that they should expect from the government. The departments of the national and provincial government are required to publish service standards that communities should expect to receive from them (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). In addition, Mofolo and Smith (2009) indicate that the publication can reach many people if the information is published in

the local newspapers and also when the local library is used to leave copies of the IDPs for residents.

Moreover, the national and provincial government are mandated to ensure that the standard of services is not lowered. Hence, the national and provincial government departments are compelled to evaluate their service standards at least once a year. This will allow them to put measures in place to ensure the improvements of service standards for the following year (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). Moreover, for the public to be able to access those newly introduced services, they should have knowledge of such services (Mofolo & Smith, 2009).

2.4.4.3 Access

The citizens should have an equal access to the services which they are entitled to (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998), irrespective of whether they are in the townships or in the rural areas. Access to services could be made possible when payment options are also provided in the residential areas and in the shopping complex (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). For example, currently, members of the public are able to buy electricity from the local *spaza* shops or pay water services in shops such as Shoprite and Pick n Pay. The *Batho Pele* Principles thus recommend an equal access to basic services such as clean water and housing to communities in urban as well as in rural communities (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

2.4.3.2 Value for money

This principle highlights that the South Africa citizens have the right to demand that the government must spend money wisely as they contribute to the government's revenues through the payment of income tax as well as VAT (DPSA, 1998). The constitutional mandate in Section 195(1) on basic values and principles governing public administration indicates that, "*Public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, including the following principles*": The promotion of professional ethics, economic and effective use of available resources. "*Public administration must be development-oriented*"; and the services are to be rendered fairly and equally to all the people irrespective of their

asocial background, gender, race, and religion. With regards to the promotion of the citizens' participation in policy-making decisions as well as in responding to their needs; public administration has to account to the people; and ensure that they are up to date and have accessible and accurate information to promote transparency.

Draai (2010) states that Section 195(1) of South Africa's Constitution, makes a request to the public servants, that in their administration of public services, they must be accountable to the communities that they serve. When members of the community feel that the objectives of the White Paper, that include participatory governance, the implementation of the IDP and adherence to the *Bathopele* Principles are not followed, they may take the government to task and thereby protest violently (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Ngwane, 2011). Meanwhile, Mofolo and Smith (2009) state that people should see the value for their money, by getting improved services that are accessible in a cost-effective manner.

2.5 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter was able to highlight the legislation that governs protests, which is governed by The Constitution of the RSA, 1996 and the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) that affords South Africans an opportunity to exercise their democratic right of peaceful protests when they are dissatisfied with service delivery or by the policies implemented by the government. The chapter also dwelt on the legislation that governs the demarcation process through the application of the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) and The Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). The Act mentioned above gives the mandate to demarcate to the MDB after consultation with the community members. Some of the issues that are taken into consideration in the demarcation process are whether the municipality to be demarcated will have a viable economic base by being able to pay for its municipal services as well as the effects that the demarcation will have on the traditional authority in the community.

The legislation governing the delivery of services is highlighted in the following acts: The Constitution of the RSA, 1996, the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000), The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 and the *Bathopele Principles*. These acts mandate the local government to provide equal services such as health care, clean water, and

sanitation, as well as housing for the communities. Moreover, the people need to know the level at which the services will be provided to them and if there are delays in the services, consultation should be done (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

In addition, the provided services should meet the service standards and they have to be monitored on a yearly basis to ensure compliance. The services should also offer the citizens value for money (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). According to Mofolo and Smith (2009), the following Acts, namely, the South African Constitution, 1996; and The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 also mandate the state to consult and allow members of the community to participate in governance matters. This is possible by allowing the public to make inputs in governmental matters, so that the state can be accountable. The next chapter discusses the actions that are considered as violent protests. The history of protests in South Africa and also the protests that occurred in other countries are also looked at in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

THE INTERNATIONAL, AFRICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES OF PROTESTS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter discussed the legislation framework that was applied in South Africa to govern protests, demarcate areas, and ensure service delivery. Violent protests are experienced across many countries worldwide, as will be highlighted from the literature in this chapter. Even though the chapter intends to discuss the history of protests in South Africa as well as in other countries, the researcher saw it necessary to first discuss the actions that can be regarded as violent protests. Mathoho (2013) indicates that even though peaceful protests are provided for in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa; the communities choose to reject these provisions and opt for violent protests.

3.2 ACTIONS REGARDED AS PROTESTING VIOLENTLY

There are many incidences that this research considers to be a form of protesting violently. For example, Mbazira (2013) highlights an incident that occurred in 2009 in Uganda, where a district chairperson from a village was lured to a dusty road. The road had been described as having many potholes. The protestors sprayed the district chairperson with dust, while pouring some sand in his car. This was done while protestors were shouting that he should have a first-hand experience of feeling the dust. Karamoko (2011) defines violent protests as protest activities where some of the participants engage in physical acts that can either cause immediate injury to persons or are likely to result in substantial harm.

In addition to the more observable acts of violent protests such as the deliberate injury of police, immigrants, government officials, the burning down of houses or other structures, the looting of shops, occasions where rocks are thrown at passing motorists, tyres burnt to block roads and other similar acts are included in the definition of violent protests (Karamoko, 2011). Peaceful protests include election boycotts,

consumer boycotts, drafting of memoranda, *toy-toying*; mass meetings, marches, presentation of petitions and stay always (Berkhout & Handmaker, 2010; Montsho, 2010; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013).

Freeman (1966:231) regards stay aways and boycotts as, “*mere abstentions*” that are non-coercive. Protests can be regarded as violent when protesters block roads and barricade the entrance and exit to an area with stones and they are burning tyres on the public roads (Bryant, 2008; Pearce, 2008; George Herald, 2017). Burning government buildings and shops, looting from foreign-owned shops, as well as looting from street vendors, are also included in the description of violent protests (Dlamini, Langa & von Holdt, 2011; von Holdt, 2011b; The Citizen, 2012; Lekaba, 2014; Magubane, 2014). Furthermore, damaging the houses belonging to community leaders (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; von Holdt, 2011b; The Citizen, 2012; Magubane, 2014) and the forced resignation of elected officials are also considered to be violent forms of protests (Botes, Lenka, Marais, Matebesi & Sigenu, 2007b; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013). The death of people that result from protests is also regarded as violence in this research (Higson-Smith, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Simiti, 2012; Ngubeni, 2014; Eye Witness News [EWN], 2017a).

Vandalising cars and shops, confrontations with the police (such as hurling stones or throwing petrol bombs at police who are trying to disperse a crowd) (von Holdt, 2011b; Goldstone, 2012; The Citizen, 2012; City Press, 2018), and the use of force to prohibit learners from going to school (The Citizen, 2012; Lekaba, 2014; Musitha, 2016) are described as violent acts. von Holdt and Alexander (2011) during a debate on collective violence amongst others argued that the protesters erect barricades as a mechanism of defending themselves from the police. The shutting down of government offices by the protesters is also regarded as violence (Ndamase, 2013).

Forcing people to attend a protest is also considered as violence. Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) found that in Gladysville, the taxis were stopped and the people who were inside were told aggressively that they are not supposed to go to work, as everyone was expected to be part of the march. This is in contravention of the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 8(10) which indicates that people should not be forced to attend a gathering or demonstration. Even an attempt to use force to compel people to attend

a gathering is prohibited. The prohibition of people from going to work by the protesters also contravenes the rights of the people as stated in the 1996 South African Constitution. The 1996 Constitution of the RSA gives all the citizens the freedom to move within the boundaries of the Republic. By application of this act, whether there is a protest or not, people should attend willingly without being forced. On the other hand, their dignity as provided by the Constitution in Chapter 2, Section (10) is also to be respected. It is degrading for a person to have to be commanded to get out of a taxi, while they are prepared and willing to go to work, it also does not show respect.

The use of molotov cocktails is also regarded as a violent form of protesting. The use of this mechanism has been seen in Hamburg, where a group of protesters masked themselves and threw molotov cocktails on police vehicles as well as on their helicopter (Oltermann, 2017). Johnston and Seferiades (2012) also report on the use of molotov cocktails during an outbreak of protests. The use of these cocktails is very dangerous as it leads to serious injury of the people and damage to property in a short space of time.

For Malamulele, Musitha (2016) states that there was a “total shutdown”, which included preventing children from going to school. The children missed out on learning for almost two months. The schools were burnt to ensure compliance, while at the same time there was a monitoring group that was put in place to ensure that people do not enter or leave the area. This was done to demand a separate municipality (Musitha, 2016).

The researcher therefore argues that enforcing compliance by prohibiting children from going to school as well as denying people mobility can be regarded as a violent form of protesting. Section 21 of the South African Constitution, 1996, Subsection (1) and (3) provides all the people with the freedom of movement within the Republic, as well as to reside in any place that they choose. When people are denied the right to move freely, their constitutional rights have been violated as the Constitution makes provision for such. In Thembaletu, there is a report of people being denied the freedom of movement, by preventing them as well as cars to travel to and from the area (EWN, 2017b).

The Saulspoort Village residents near Rustenburg blocked roads with tree branches, rocks and burning tyres (Selebi, 2012). von Holdt (2011a) reports that in Voortrekker, the residents barricaded roads with burning tyres. They also burnt municipal buildings including the clinic, library, community hall as well as some offices. Three houses belonging to the councillors, including the mayor were set alight in the process of protesting (von Holdt, 2011a). The throwing of stones at their leaders and the police, as what happened in Zwelihle, near Hermanus in the Western Cape (Molyneaux, 2018) and in Voortrekker (von Holdt, 2011a), is also considered in this study as violent protestation. Other acts of violent protests include the torching of buses as was the case during a taxi strike in Cape Town (Evans, 2017). The burning of tyres and emptying buckets of excreta as well as rubbish in the street are also considered to be violent forms of protesting (Atkinson, 2007).

3.3 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON VIOLENT PROTESTS

Literature is provided in this section about the violent protests that occurred internationally. The countries that have been selected for examination were based on the availability of literature on international countries that also experienced the eruption of violent protests.

3.3.1 Athens protest

Goldstone (2012) states that in Paris and Athens, violent protests occurred after the death of a youth. The death is reported to have resulted from police action. The communities are reported to have experienced a history of confrontations and violence by the police in their communities. These communities violently protested against what they perceived as years of neglect and deprivation by the authorities.

3.3.2 Bristol: ST. Paul's riots

Reicher (1984) states that while the police went to investigate the allegations pertaining to the illegal consumption of alcohol on a premise that had lost its liquor license years ago, the owner of the premises and another man whose relationship with the owner is not stated were arrested by the police. The arrest led to riots, wherein the

eye witnesses who were inside the premises during the arrest indicated that the police harassed the people that they found inside. This resulted in running battles between the police and the people (Reicher, 1984). The police officers who were accompanying the officers who made the arrest but did not enter the premises; had to flee the scene on foot, because their cars were blocked, stoned, and even burnt (Reicher, 1984).

Reicher (1984) explains that the driver of another police car was hit when bricks were thrown to smash the windscreen. Camera operators and photographers were also targeted for intentional damage (Reicher, 1984). The reason for them being targeted was because the videos and photographs could have resulted in their identification, which in turn may have led to prosecution. Some vehicles were damaged while other people were injured.

3.3.3 French protests

Waddington and King (2012) state that the 2005 French urban riots which occurred from October to November 2005 took another turn, instead of lasting for two to three days as was the norm in previous protests, they continued to reoccur and proliferate for three weeks. The protesters were angry about the death of adolescents who were chased by a group of police officers when they were coming from a rugby football match. The death occurred when they hid from the police in an electricity substation (Waddington & King, 2012 cites Body-Gendrot, 2007). In these riots, Simiti (2012) states that the protestors had violent confrontations with the police. They threw petrol bombs at the police, and they also attacked private properties where they burnt cars, however, looting is reported to have been minimal.

3.3.4 Greece protests

della Porta and Gbikpi (2012) report that in Greece, protestors engaged in peaceful demonstrations by marching to the police station, striking, and also making sit ins. However, the protests became violent when a young student was killed by the police. The above-mentioned authors further state that the interactions between the various actors in the streets such as police, youths and football hooligans amongst others may lead to the eruption of violence.

Johnston and Seferiades (2012) state that the death of an adolescent sparked a cycle of violent protests in Greece in 2008. Furthermore, the above-mentioned authors allege that during a police patrol, an officer shot an unarmed youth who died instantly. Community members protested violently in response to the death of the child. Furthermore, Kanellopoulos (2012) as well as Johnston and Seferiades (2012) allege that the news of the killing spread like a wildfire through the use of text messages, emails, and word of mouth. The community came in full force to attack the police. The roads were barricaded, and some government buildings were set on fire. Collective violence may be committed when people are angry (Reicher, 1984; Leonard, Moons, Mackie & Smith, 2011).

3.3.5 Iran protests

The protests that occurred when people were disputing the outcome of election results that occurred in Zimbabwe on the 1st of August 2018 as shown on television (E-tv news, 01/08/2018, 20:00), also occurred in Iran. The opposition candidate requested for new elections and this request stirred violent protests (Johnston, 2012). Just like Zimbabwe, the Iran government responded with violent suppression where people were shot (Johnston, 2012; Ngo, 2018). In Iran, the protests became violent when the government instructed security personnel to use brutality and lethal force on suspected protest leaders (Goldstone, 2012).

The protestors were also publicly denounced as state enemies for demanding fairness in elections. The elections were held, but they could not be accepted as free and fair elections because, the government is reported to have announced a candidate that was favoured by the government to have won the elections (Goldstone, 2012). This announcement was made before sufficient time had passed for the people to have been convinced that the ballots were counted. The results showed the unfavoured candidate to have lost badly, even in his own home province. This raised suspicions as the citizens protested to demand the recount of the election votes. Instead of being listened to, they were dealt with harshly (Goldstone, 2012).

3.6.6 Iraq protests

Robin-D'Cruz (2018) reports that the killing of a protestor as well as the injury of other protestors resulted in violence. The protestors attacked and burnt the offices belonging to the political parties and the militia. The demonstrations before they erupted into violence were about the dominance of the post-2003 Iraqi state. The dominators claimed that they represented the interest of the previously marginalised Shi'i south. As the group to which those who had been indicated to be dominating was in opposition of such, they protested peacefully, but the killing of a protestor, together with the injury of other protestors caused by the military prompted them to act violently (Robin-D'Cruz, 2018).

3.3.7 Los Angeles protests

Goldstone (2012) states that violent protests are also witnessed in democratic societies, as they have been witnessed in the United States, Athens, France and also in Rodney King. The riots in Rodney King in Los Angeles erupted after the court ruled that the white police officers who torched a black suspect were found not guilty (Goldstone, 2012; Simiti, 2012). According to Simiti (2012), a black motorist was engaged in a high-speed chase with four white police officers from Los Angeles Police Department. The police officers were video recorded by a nearby resident when they were brutally beating the victim, while he was lying down on the ground (Simiti, 2012). In response to police brutality, people started to engage in riots where the following actions were witnessed: Violent attacks on civilians, destruction of private as well as public properties, and looting (Simiti, 2012).

According to Goldstone (2012), black communities used public protests as an opportunity to vent their frustration on what they regarded as victimisation by the police, which they had experienced for several years. The victimisation was fuelled by being limited to economic opportunities by Koreans who were controlling many businesses downtown. Simiti (2012) reports that the riots resulted in the death of 53 people, while thousands were injured.

3.3.8 Thailand protests

Goldstone (2012) gives an account of the Red-Shirt protests in Thailand. The red-shirt protests are said to have been instrumentally designed to show the government that the people were not happy and that they favoured democracy. They were not happy with the decision taken by the government of removing a prime minister. In response to that, the government acted democratically by giving them another leader who would cooperate with the interests of the group.

However, Goldstone (2012) further informs that the group was not convinced about the new prime minister's policies and promises. They demanded the resignation of this leader who they did not want to be seen associating themselves with. Unlike the reaction they got in the initial protests, this time around, the government responded not democratically but authoritatively. They were attacked and some were shot when they hurled stones and threw petrol bombs at the security forces. The violence by the state did not contain the protest but it fuelled more violence that resulted in massive arson and attacks on properties. The protests ended with massive military violence (Goldstone, 2012).

3.4 PROTESTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

On the 1st of August 2018 at 20:00, the E-tv channel showed news of protestors in Zimbabwe's Harare city fighting running battles with the soldiers and the police. In the news, it was reported that the violent clashes were in response to the election result where ZANU-PF was announced to have won the majority of the parliamentary seats. Not only were protestors injured, but innocent people who were passing by were caught in the cross-fire and were seriously injured. A man was shown bleeding from the mouth with broken teeth. During an interview with the reporters, he explained that he was not protesting violently, but that he was surprised to have been attacked by the law enforcers. Another person who was also injured, stated that he was just passing by when he was attacked by the law enforcers. What was worrying in these protests is that live ammunitions were fired (E-tv news, 01/08/2018 20:00; Mavhunga, Masters & McLaughlin, 2018; Ngo, 2018).

On the 2nd of August 2018 on E-tv news, an officer from Zimbabwe reported that 22 shops and three cars were damaged. Extensive damage to properties was also reported. The rioters were said to have been armed with knobkerries, iron bars and even stones, while they were holding plank cards. Some people who were not protesting were attacked by the protestors. They also overturned bins and set them on fire. It was confirmed that six people were killed when live ammunition was fired. Moreover, the protestors who were interviewed indicated that their rights had been infringed on when protestors were killed through the firing of live ammunitions (E-tv news, 02/08/2018, 20:00). Goldstone (2012) argues that the street violence was committed in response to the police's violence as was seen in Athens through the breaking of shops, overturning cars, setting fires as well as throwing stones at the police. In this regard, the protestors in Zimbabwe displayed similar behaviours.

Greene (1974) argues that people are more likely to be provoked to take direct action when their immediate economic circumstances are not favourable. They are more likely to be motivated to protest against poverty, unemployment and even rising food prices. *“Protests could be extended not to be only about economic grievance, but also to include political and social change”* (Greene, 1974:109). For example, in Zimbabwe, 12 people are reported to have been killed by security forces when they protested against a harsh rise of fuel in January 2019 (BBC News, 2019). To demonstrate their anger towards the price increase, the protestors used rocks to block roads. These people acted violently because they were not impressed by the price hike, while they were also experiencing economic hardship that they had been experiencing for years (BBC News, 2019).

3.5 HISTORY OF PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.5.1 Violent protests in the apartheid era

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) as well as van der Merwe (2013) place the history of protests in South Africa on the apartheid period, when people used violent mechanisms to fight the apartheid government that was seen as being oppressive. Petrus and Isaacs-Martin (2011) point out that the strikes and protests are not emerging activities in South Africa. They emerged a long time ago with the most

historically significant example of the violent protests being the 1976 Soweto uprising during the struggle against apartheid. The nature of the 1976 violent protest thus has an influence on the current protests. Equally, Bruce (2014) alleges that President Zuma highlighted that the origin of protests was from the apartheid era where the protest started as a peaceful one on June 16 in 1976. The 1976 student uprising is highlighted as a first incidence of protests that encouraged the current protests that have turned violent.

It is also alleged that during the 1980s, the African National Congress [ANC] and its allies engaged in protests as a technique of violent resistance to authority to make the country ungovernable (Bruce, 2014). During apartheid, the protesters were seen burning government buildings. It would have not been possible to burn people who were representing the state, but it was easier to destroy the buildings that the state had built to hurt the state. The state had to incur financial losses to repair the buildings that had been destroyed. Moreover, Simons (1997) indicates that on 16 June 1976, the Soweto senior students chanted slogans of freedom and carried placards to show their anger that was aroused when the then Minister of Bantu Education informed them that Afrikaans would be used as a medium of instruction for certain subjects. The protests turned violent when police started shooting and killing school children who were unarmed (Simons, 1997 cites Brooks & Brickhill, 1980).

Mbazira (2013:265) states that the protests that occurred in Khutsong in the Free State were followed with by protests that occurred in various areas of the country that “*bust like popcorn*”. Bond (2010) supports this statement by stating that, protests had “*popcorn*” character, popping up in various areas. Mbazira (2013:275) also notes that the protests “*have taken advantage of a history of social mobilisation to be massive, organised and in some cases drawn-out*”. In von Holdt’s (2011a) research, the participants indicated that they burnt the houses of those in authority, as well as for those who collaborated with the apartheid government in the 1980s. They also stated that battling with the police was described as war, just like the anti-apartheid liberation struggle.

Buhlungu (2006) indicates that the Anti-Privatisation Forum [APF] frequently resorted to militant mobilisation. This suggests that the movement had the desire to use militant

mobilisation that was used during the apartheid era. Some of the examples of this militant mobilisation that the APF used include the destruction of Pre-paid water Meters [PPMs] as well as water and electricity connections. They even marched to the mayor's house as well as to the Constitutional Court (Buhlungu, 2006). Langa (2011a) notes that in Azania, some protesters became violent when the police fired rubber bullets without being provoked. As such, they responded with violence by digging holes in the road for traps to be erected. Furthermore, Langa (2011a) regards this sophisticated method of fighting battles with the police as a re-invention of the anti-apartheid tactics that were used to fight the special police units.

Similarly, Buhlungu (2006) highlights that the APF as a social movement had contacts outside the country. These contacts were in the form of discussion groups, document, and information exchange where they learned from other groups to refine their strategies. The movement used a combination of methods that were reported to have been used at different historical moments such as the one used by the Young Union Movement in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the Militant Civic Movement in the 1980s. The movement not only used the struggle methods that were used by the different movements in South Africa, but they also used the methods that were used globally. Some also sought to make an area ungovernable (Buhlungu, 2006).

Tadesse, Ameck, Christensen, Masiko, Matlhakola, Shilaho and Smith (2006) regard violent protests as a 'tried-and-tested' method that has been used previously to fight the apartheid government. During that time, disgruntled citizens destroyed property to express frustrations as they believed that their voice was not heard. While Simpson (2010) indicates that protests against the apartheid government had been demonstrated by schools and rent boycotts, open violence was also witnessed. The resistance was blamed on the ANC which was said to be coordinating the events beyond the borders of South Africa.

According to Hodes (2010), the television Magazine show named Beat It, which was intended for people living with human immunodeficiency virus or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome [HIV/AIDS] as well as the community at large, included amongst others, marches, songs, and protest dances, which shows the connections to the anti-apartheid struggle. Hodes (2010:188) concludes that by the use of "*the*

same discursive strategies and communication forebears”, that had been used during the resistance against the apartheid government, the show added weight and was able to draw attention to television viewers in the struggle against HIV/AIDS.

Rosenthal (2010) points out that protests have been demonstrated by social movements such as the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee [SECC] which resembled the anti-apartheid struggle, where they engaged in marches and demonstrations that were done in the same manner as the anti-apartheid struggle protests. They boycotted service rates; marched, *toyi-toyied* (“*the iconic anti-apartheid dance*”) while singing ‘struggle songs’ which were formerly directed at the National Party [NP] leaders during the apartheid period but now they are directed to the ANC leaders and officials (Rosenthal, 2010:246).

The White Paper on Local Government of 1998 states that in 1984, black people protested against the way in which human settlements were economically distorted. They were not happy with the social and economic conditions in the townships as well as in Bantustans. The weapons that were used included rent boycott, consumer boycott as well as service charges (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998). According to Khumalo (2014), violent protests are a return of the anti-apartheid mantra as they popularly use anti-apartheid slogans “*burn, burn, burn*” in the current struggles. These words were used when destroying the things that were associated with the apartheid government such as police stations and schools. These were burnt into ashes using a molotov cocktail as well as car tyres. A molotov cocktail according to Helmenstine (2017), is also known as a petrol bomb, alcohol bomb, bottle bomb, or a poor man's grenade, and its purpose is to set a target on fire. Khumalo (2014) notes that the protests in South Africa date back to the early 1970s, but they appear to have “degenerated” into serious violence.

3.5.2 Violent protests in the democratic governance

Violent protests in the post-apartheid era refer to the protests that occurred after the first democratic election in the history of South Africa in 1994. Atkinson (2007) observes that in the democratic regime, the members of the community protested violently in 2004 in Diepsloot, demanding the removal of councillors due to the

unsatisfactory provision of services. Other violent protests are reported by the above-mentioned author to have erupted a few months after Diepsloot in Harrismith, in the Free State Province. The grievances in Harrismith slightly differed from those in Diepsloot, in addition to the demand for service provision, they also demanded amongst others, the withdrawal of their town from Maluti-a-Phofung Municipality (Atkinson, 2007). Tyabazayo (2013) states that democracy in South Africa brought with it the restructuring of provincial and municipal boundaries that has been responded to by residents with contestations as well as violence. Hence, people from Harrismith also included demarcation grievance in their protest, as reported by Atkinson (2007).

Violent protests during the apartheid period can be linked to oppressive governance. The current protests relate to the failure of democracy (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). People hoped that the democratic government would be inclusive as they had put it in power through their votes (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Dau, 2010; Manala, 2010; Botes, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Mbazira, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014). Moreover, Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) state that the damage that these protests cause has nothing to do with how long they lasted as that the damage caused in a short period of time may be massive. In support to this, the above-mentioned authors give an account of protests that lasted for a short period of time in Voortrekker but caused three deaths within 48 hours. Tyres were burned to barricade access to roads, and there was the burning of private cars as well as of government buildings. The mayor and the councillors' houses were also burnt.

Kotze and Taylor (2010) state that the social exclusion that was experienced during the apartheid era is currently being witnessed in the poor black communities. As such, it should not be a surprise when the communities in this democratic era engage in struggles that have been witnessed at that time, that are presented in the form of protests. Bryant (2008) points out that the current protests connect with the apartheid culture, as it can be seen through the singing of protest songs that have been adopted from the apartheid era but have been reworked to fit the current struggles.

After the outbreak of violent protests in 2004, Atkinson (2007) reports that more protests occurred all over the country. During the democratic government regime, around 2006 in Khutsong, the South African Communist Party [SACP] is alleged to have played an important role in making the place ungovernable during the re-demarcation of Merafong City Local Municipality. The strategies that were used by the governing party to remove the apartheid government in office are currently being used by other parties to fight the democratically elected government.

3.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This study considered violent protests to include instances where protestors engage in physical acts that can either cause immediate injury to persons (Karamoko, 2011) or cause a leader to be lured to a dusty road and sprayed with dust (Mbazira, 2013). The following acts are also considered as forms of violent protests: The deliberate injury of police, immigrants, government officials, the burning down of houses or other structures, the looting of shops, occasions where stones are thrown at passing motorists as well as tyres burnt to block roads (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Karamoko, 2011; von Holdt, 2011b; Selebi, 2012; The Citizen, 2012; Lekaba, 2014; Magubane, 2014). The use of force to prohibit learners from going to school (The Citizen, 2012; Lekaba, 2014; Musitha, 2016); as well as aggressively prohibiting adults from going to work (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011) are also considered as collective violence.

Currently, the violent protests in South Africa occur because the citizens want inclusive governance, as they have voted (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Dau, 2010; Manala, 2010; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Mbazira, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014). Atkinson (2007), Bond (2010), as well as Mbazira (2013) state that an eruption of violent protest in one area is likely to encourage the outbreak of violent protests in other towns/ cities. Violent protests can occur when people feel the outcome of a court case was not fair (Goldstone, 2012; Simiti, 2012). People can violently protest for the removal of councillors who they consider to be unproductive (Atkinson, 2007; Matebesi & Botes, 2011).

This chapter has shown that violent protests are not only confined to South Africa, as an account of the violent protests that occurred in other countries was given: Athens

(Goldstone, 2012), Greece (della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012; Johnston & Seferiades, 2012); Iraq (Robin-D'Cruz, 2018), and St. Paul (Reicher, 1984). Violent protests in South Africa can be traced to the apartheid regime where people were fighting the government, they considered to be oppressive (Simons, 1997; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bryant, 2008; Rosenthal, 2010; Simpson, 2010; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; van der Merwe, 2013; Khumalo, 2014).

The literature provided in this chapter indicates the similarities and differences pertaining to the causes of protests internationally and in South Africa. The literature reveals that in South Africa, the violent confrontations between the public and the police were sparked by the police's use of lethal force on peaceful protestors (Dawson, 2010; Twala, 2014; Evans & Mngandi, 2017.); this is also evident in Greece (della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012). In some international countries, the protests only emerged and turned violent due to brutal police actions, that is when the police victimised and even killed innocent people (Reicher, 1984; Goldstone, 2012; Simiti, 2012; Johnson & Seferiades, 2012; Waddington & King, 2012). Some violent protests (Goldstone, 2012; Johnston, 2012), such as the ones in Africa's Zimbabwe (Ngo, 2018) stemmed from dissatisfaction in the outcome of the election results. The Collective Violence Theory also indicates that peaceful protests have turned violent because of the police's use of brutal force during peaceful protests (Tilly, 2003).

During public protests, people have been injured and some even died internationally (Goldstone, 2012; Simiti, 2012), and also in South Africa (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Mahlangu & Ndabeni, 2014). In South Africa, the history of violent protests can be traced back to the oppressive apartheid era government (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Bruce, 2014); especially after the shooting of innocent learners who were protesting against the unfair educational system (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). During the democratic era in South Africa, the violent protests have been encouraged by many things that include but are not limited to the unsatisfactory provision of services (Atkinson, 2007), demarcation grievances (Atkinson, 2007), and social exclusion (Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Bruce, 2014).

CHAPTER FOUR

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS FOR ENGAGING IN VIOLENT PROTESTS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Violent protests can be encouraged by a number of factors that when combined, provide people with reasons to engage in riotous behaviour (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Carrim, 2010). For example, della Porta and Diani (2006), Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Marais, Matebesi, Mthombeni, Botes and van Rooyen (2008), Malaquias (2011) as well as Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) found that the residents engage in violent protests for a number of reasons including but not limited to poverty, financial mismanagement, unemployment, inequality and also the failure by the municipality to deliver services. In Malamulele, Mokgopo (2017) states that the protests started as service delivery protests and transformed into demarcation grievances. Smelser (1963) as well as Schneider (1993) state that the presence of a structural strain provides enough reasons for people to engage in collective behaviour that is often violent.

According to von Holdt (2011a), the community protests spread across South Africa around 2004 and seemed to have risen in 2009 and 2010. This was stated based on the report by the Municipal's IQ, which recorded larger and more visible protests. Pearce (2008) and von Holdt (2011b) report on the violent nature of the protests as both private and public property has been destroyed in the process. There have also been confrontations between the crowd and the police where the public hurled stones at the police and their vehicles. Meanwhile, Mahlangu and Ndabeni (2014) as well as Kanyane *et al.* (2017) support von Holdt's (2011b) argument that the protests in South Africa tend to be violent, with the destruction of property also taking place and they are often accompanied by the assault of innocent people.

In certain areas, peaceful protests turned violent and resulted in death. Mahlangu and Ndabeni (2014) report on the death of people who were shot by the police while protesting over water outages. These people were protesting within the RSA's constitutional mandate, Section 27(1) (b) which provides that people should be given

access to water (The RSA Constitution, 1996). Mbazira (2013) makes a comparison of the protests in South Africa as well as Uganda and concludes that the protests in South Africa are bigger in strength and occur more frequently. Furthermore, Mbazira (2013) also considers the protests in Uganda not to be as massive and well organised as the protests in South Africa.

According to Mbazira (2013), the factors that influence protests in South Africa and Uganda reflect failure in local democracy. Meanwhile, Berkhout and Handmaker (2010) argue that the increasing number of public protests are an indication of the rising impatience amongst South Africans who have seen little progress in their communities. The people who were part of the struggle against the abuses by the apartheid government are frustrated by the high levels of state repression, and police violence. The above-mentioned authors share the same sentiments that the public protests reflect the failure in local democracy to provide adequate services to the community.

Tilly (2003) argues that the violent protests threaten the relationship between the state and the people. Likewise, Hough (2008) puts forth that the protests are not only a threat to law and order, but they also pose a threat to the national security. Protests could result in acts that are similar to terrorism that is committed with a political motive (Hough, 2008). Johnston and Bernstein (2007) state that community protests in the democratic governance began in the township of Harrismith in 2004. Further, the previous mentioned authors allege that the Harrismith protest influenced the spread of violent protests in other areas of South Africa, especially on service delivery.

Kotze and Taylor (2010) point out that since 2004, many communities resorted to violent riots that led to the destroying of schools, libraries and also the houses of the councillors who were seen to not be performing according to the public's expectations. The author also states that many municipalities lack or experience the inadequate provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, electricity, refuse removal and other services that the local municipalities is responsible for delivering to communities. Petrus and Isaacs-Martin (2011) further explain that the culture of protests and the violence that occurs during these protests are directed at the government as an

institution. Hence, the councillors' houses, libraries and other municipal buildings are targeted as they are perceived to be all part of the government.

Dawson (2010) points out that the communities especially those living in informal settlements are forced to live under impoverished conditions. To add to their problems, they find themselves with councillors who only serve their own interests and are unapproachable. This makes it difficult for the community to turn to them as a "*first port of call*" for raising concerns, before they consider taking their grievances to the streets and protest (Dawson, 2010:117). When they use protests as what Dawson (2011:117) describes as "*a vehicle for the expression of democratic voice*", the police respond to these protests in a harsh manner. Furthermore, Dawson (2010) as well as Jili (2012) indicate that these peaceful protests turn violent because of the police's use of excessive force. There are various media reports of the police using teargas and/or stun grenades to disperse the crowds that were protesting violently, for example, at Thembalethu (George Herald, 2017; MLFM, 12 July 2017, 14h00); Kimberley (Daniel, 2018); Imizamo Yethu (EWN, 2017b).

Meanwhile, Akinboade *et al.* (2013) argue that the municipalities experience service delivery protests whereby concerns are raised regarding the failure to deliver basic services. These concerns manifest in violent protests. According to the debate by von Holdt and Alexander (2011), the people engage in protests as a fight for material improvement as well as for their voices to be heard.

During the protests, the criminals exploit the situation by looting and hiding behind public protests (Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Burger, 2009). Kanellopoulos (2012) puts forth that before the shops were burnt, they were looted. Properties have also been damaged during protests, where protesters throw stones on vehicles or even burn them as shown on SABC 2, (18 September 2017), wherein a MyCiti bus was burnt, while looting also occurred in the process. If the intention is really to show dissatisfaction, why should looting occur before shops are set alight? The researcher has reasons to believe that the shops are burnt as a way of covering up the looting in case the shops have Closed Circuit Cameras [CCTV] and to avoid identification through the fingerprints that can be taken from the crime scene.

Tait and Marks (2011:15) acknowledge that “*the right to freedom of assemble*” is one of the achievements of the democratic government in South Africa. People are permitted to protest when in disagreement about certain things, but when they start to burn buildings such as schools meant to serve them, it becomes an issue of concern. Accordingly, the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 8(6) prohibits people who participate in gatherings from performing acts or uttering words that may encourage violence.

Kotze and Taylor (2010) speculate that the South African political history encompasses the demonstrations and protests that occurred in black communities as a form of political engagement. As such, it is not surprising to see people using them as forms of active engagement to voice their dissatisfaction in matters that affect their lives. For example, when the people are not satisfied with the provision of basic services; or the prevalence of; corruption, nepotism, lack of skills by government employees and many other concerns, they may use protests as a form of political participation (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Kotze & Taylor, 2010).

Moreover, Bernstein and Johnston (2007) allege that many municipalities experience overwhelming problems, and at the same time they manage to survive. However, there are municipalities that seem not to cope with the overwhelming problems, when there is weak management, uncertain or absent leadership, poor communication, political favouritism, and incompetence. When these occur, the members of the community become frustrated and see the solution as violent protests, as was the case in Phumelela and Khutsong (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007).

Violent protests are not only confined to issues that plague communities, as even the transport system has been caught in the crossfire of violent protests, for example, Uber cars were burnt by a rivalry group in September 2017 in Gauteng (SABC 2, 11 September 2017 at 17h30). Some cars have been set alight allegedly by meter taxi drivers to demonstrate their anger (eNCA, 2017), as they had been involved in ongoing conflict (IOL News, 2017; eNCA, 2017), where Uber was accused of stealing business from them (eNCA, 2017). In Cape Town, similar events have been seen when the taxi drivers’ strike turned violent, and they stoned and burnt buses as well as threw stones at police and traffic officers (Evans & Mngandi, 2017).

Not only demarcation grievances or service delivery issues encourage the eruption of violent protests, but the education system has also experienced violent protests (City Press, 2018). For example, some members of the community protested violently against a school in Vereeniging, Gauteng; demanding that the school should admit 55 non-Afrikaans speaking learners following the High Court ruling that the concerned learners should not be enrolled in the above-mentioned school. Some people who are affiliated to political organisations led this protest. The demonstrators burned tyres in front of the entrance to the school while singing freedom songs (City Press, 2018).

In addition, Bernstein, and Johnston (2007) indicate that the dissatisfaction with local governance has its own profile and dynamics. Conditions found within the localities as well as the performance of certain individuals are some of the reasons that lead violent confrontations between the government and the citizens. On the other hand, Atkinson (2007:53) argues that violent protests result from the ineffectiveness of the municipality to deliver services, as well as from poor responses to the citizens' grievances and lastly from "*the conspicuous consumption entailed by a culture of self-enrichment on the part of municipal councillors and staff*".

4.2 FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE PEOPLE TO PROTEST VIOLENTLY

The section that follows will explore some of the factors that encourage the occurrence of public protests in communities.

4.2.1 Influences from the apartheid regime

Even though the apartheid regime has long passed, its influence in the current protests is evident (Kotze & Taylor, 2010). Underhill (2013) states that the strategy of making some areas of South Africa ungovernable is not a new tactic, as during the apartheid system in the 1980s, the ANC and its allies had engaged in a struggle to make it difficult for the apartheid government to rule. Simpson (2010) supports the above statement by indicating that, in January 1984, Oliver Tambo who was the president of the ANC at that time called the masses to act in solidarity to render South Africa ungovernable, while von Holdt (2011a) recognises the acts of making a place 'ungovernable' from the days of anti-apartheid resistance.

Ngwane's (2011) findings are that the protestors are reviving the resistance that they had shown the apartheid government to the post-apartheid government. The participants in the above-mentioned study explained the use of similar tactics that were employed during the apartheid because people still find themselves in the same situation that they were in during the apartheid government. For example, they are still living in shacks or places called "squatter camps", with no access to basic services such as electricity, and water (Ngwane, 2011:89). These people are the ones who are more inclined to resent the government and thereby protest violently as they are reminded of the apartheid government which was not interested in providing services to black people.

4.2.2 Violent protests are an effective tool of enforcing outcomes and to convey a message

Protests can be effective tools to influence outcomes. Booyesen (2007) states that the councillors from different political parties as well as the mayors and municipal managers tend to address meetings of protesting crowds. Their presence in these meetings symbolises that the 'protests work', as such, the communities incorporate protests in their participation in politics (Booyesen, 2007). Moreover, after members of the community participate in protests, the ANC prioritises service delivery during their election campaigns to motivate the South African voters to elect them (Booyesen, 2007).

Furthermore, the protests are considered to convey a direct and clear message to the elected office-bearers and to the councillors. Violence is often chosen as a means whereby the community can communicate with their government (Opp, 2001; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Booyesen, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Dlamini *et al.* 2011; Langa, 2011a; Ngwane, 2011; Mbazira, 2013). In addition, members of the communities have often written memorandums that are not responded to, however, when they engage in violent protests, their leaders visit them and attend to their grievances immediately. The above-mentioned authors allege that the culture of people to demonstrate, often violently is built when the government fails to deliver services, but after violent protestation, the services are provided. The current researcher therefore argues that when members of the community want to force the

government to render services or agree to something, violent protests are the mechanism to achieve the goal. Moreover, visitations from officials who represent a particular sphere of the government serve to confirm that violent protests are an effective mechanism.

Furthermore, Booysen (2007:31) argues that community protests remind the elected officials of the pledge that they have made to serve communities. As such, the protests become “*the language of power-from-below*”. In addition, Kotze and Taylor (2010) put forth that protests serve a strong message to the state that the citizens’ constitutional rights to access basic services should be equal across communities. For example, the SABC 2, 17h30 news (14 August 2017), showed the citizens of Rotterdam in Limpopo Province violently protesting demanding a tarred road. The residents travelled approximately 35 km to block the road between Lomondokop and Giyani. The reason that might have led the community to leave their area and block the road elsewhere is that their place would not have made any impact on their local roads. Their efforts paid off, as within six days, the premier of the province promised the erection of a tar road in the area.

Goldstone (2012) states that when certain groups engage in community protests, they believe that the only way in which they can have an impact is by engaging in violent tactics. According to Somerville (1952:161), “*people possess the inherent right to use forceful means to change their form of government under certain circumstances, namely, when the needs and demands of the majority are not legally and peacefully granted by the existing government*”. The above statement by Somerville (1952) reflects that the scholar supports the use of force only when the government does not listen to the people’s concerns.

4.2.3 Weakness in participatory governance

A weakness in the participatory governance efforts may lead the members of the community to engage in riotous behaviour. Edigheji (2004) regards participatory governance as a means to ensure that there is no information gap between the government and the public; as the members of the public are given the opportunity to contribute towards the formulation of policies for the state to implement without

hiccups, as an agreement would have been reached. It also ensures transparency and accountability of the government towards the people that they serve to ensure the sustainability of programmes (Edigheji, 2004). While Friedman (2006) regards participatory governance as a forum where citizens have an opportunity to make submissions to the government, it can also involve organised discussions between the government and the public.

In Roodt and Stuurman's (2011) research, the young people indicated that they have lost interest to participate in politics as well as in service delivery. This lack of interest was because of the lack of trust in politicians. Their participation could have been beneficial to the whole community as it will be promoting democracy and accountability. The youth were not even bothered to know who their ward councillor was. This proves that they did not care about what happens in their community (Roodt & Stuurman, 2011).

Furthermore, Rowe and Frewer (2004) indicate that in public participation, the members of the community should be consulted as well as be involved in agenda-setting, decision-making and policy development. Matebesi and Botes (2011) regard the demarcation process of Merafong City Local Municipality (Khutsong) as a good example that reflects the weakness of participatory governance. Public participation was a failure in Khutsong as it only allowed the government to go ahead with their plans, instead of involving the community in deciding what was best for them (Matebesi & Botes, 2011). Goldstone (2012) supports the notion that the society that verbally declares itself to be democratic and is representative of its citizens, but in practice tends to ignore certain groups or issues encourages more protests to erupt as a way of attracting the state to recognise these groups or issues.

According to von Lieres (2007), the introduction of democracy in 1994 evoked many expectations in citizens that they will be included to participate in government matters. Moreover, Matebesi and Botes (2011) put forth that in the democratic South Africa, the government should include members of the community in decision-making. When the government fails to engage communities about issues that affect them and implements decisions without their consultation, the members of the community may respond by demonstrating violently (Matebesi & Botes, 2011).

Ngwane (2011) reports that the failure in participatory governance results in members of the community barricading roads, attacking government properties, and burning the councillors' houses. Görgens and van Donk (2011) argue that when the 'invited' spaces of participatory governance are limited, the people tend to use violent protests as a form of meaningful engagement with their government. The South African Constitution, 1996 and the LGMS (Act 32 of 2000) recognise the participation of communities in government matters. The RSA's Constitution, 1996, Section 152(1) (e) mandates the local government to encourage the public to participate in local government matters. The LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000), Section 4(2) (a) advises the council of the municipality to encourage the public in community issues such as the rendering of services.

Matebesi and Botes (2011) conclude that forcing people to use the political or legal route to comply with the plans of the government does not reduce conflicts. The members of the community are less likely to use violent protests when they are included in policy implementation. In addition, Booysen (2009:1) states that the failure of participation and substantive transformation that started around 2005 has led to the citizens regarding protests as a "*self-initiated, bottom-up form of participation*". Bryant (2008) supports the above statement by indicating that the Kennedy Road Movement sustained its existence by consulting its members before making decisions. The leadership consulted as many people as possible in the decision-making processes, which they termed as the 'bottom-up democracy'.

The Constitution of the RSA, 1996, Section 118 provides that the public should have access as well as be afforded an opportunity to form part of the legislative and other processes of the legislatures. The researcher concurs with Matebesi and Botes (2011) that when the government takes a decision without consulting the members of the community, while the constitution provides for their inclusion, the public may engage in violent protests. Moreover, Section 32(a) of the Constitution states that people have the right to access governmental information (RSA Constitution, 1996); but it seems like the government officials are not honouring the constitutional mandate. Dawson's (2010) research found that the community members of Mdantsane in East London boycotted *imbizos* because they did not provide conducive information. The participants also indicated that their contributions were not considered. The officials

held meetings only for the media, so that it could look like consultation took place and the public agreed with the decisions taken (Dawson, 2010). Tyabazayo's (2013) research reports similar findings of the participants showing dissatisfaction with the government for not listening to their views.

Mathekga (2007) alleges that in the apartheid era, many people lacked the opportunity to participate in the issues that affected them. The above-mentioned author regards the citizens of that time to be people who were not allowed to question the services provided to them, they were just recipients and were not part of decision-making process. Thus, the author refers to them as passive citizens as they did not play a role in how they were governed.

Moreover, Booysen (2007:21) argues that the South African government is "both a top-down and a bottom-up institution". While looking at the top-down approach, the state is the one that holds the power to determine the policies and their implementation as well as sets the budget to use for particular projects (Booyesen, 2007). In the bottom-up approach, it is where citizens are striving for the delivery of services (Booyesen, 2007). When members of the communities are not part of the decision-making processes, it becomes difficult for them to raise issues to their municipalities (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Booyesen, 2007; Ramjee & van Donk, 2011; Managa, 2012). As the recipients of services, their voices are not heard on what best fits them or on how services should be rendered to them. Hence, the violent protests continuously occur on a number of issues including anger over the demarcation of areas as well as service delivery.

The current researcher argues that the members of the community may engage in protests because of the lack of understanding on what public participation entails. Maphunye and Mafunisa (2008) acknowledge that to some people, when they hear the phrase 'public participation', what comes to their mind are unruly public protests, instead of the concept suggesting to them to form part of the government processes in decision making and implementation. In addition, Mautjana and Makombe (2014) indicate that protests occur due to the failure in policy implementation as well as its monitoring by the intended beneficiaries. When the government excludes the public from projects, they deny them access to information and this in turn makes them not

to support the government efforts to show their dissatisfaction (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Ramjee & van Donk, 2011; Mautjana & Makombe, 2014).

4.2.4 Unresponsive governance

When residents see the government as being unresponsive to their grievances by not seeing anything happening in terms of the concerns that they have raised, they may engage in protests (Zama, 2013). According to Maphunye, Tshishonga and Mafema (n.d.), the citizens know that they have an option to use their voices to indicate their dissatisfaction with the services that are provided to them. Upon realising that the government does not take the issues that they raise seriously, the citizens engage in violent protests.

Tadesse *et al.* (2006) regard violent protests as an indication of the limitation in representative democracy in acknowledging public concerns and responding effectively to the raised issues. Magubane (2014) notes that the University of Johannesburg did not find any evidence that supported the claim that the protests are politically motivated but concludes that the protests occur when the state is unresponsive to the people's concerns. This is evident when the residents consider strikes or referring matters to courts and boycotting the payment of services as necessary actions to show their disapproval of the government (Netswera & Phago, 2009). In addition, the residents may revolt when the government fails to respond to the memorandums, but respond when violent protests erupt (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Matebesi, 2011; Tapscott, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a). The members of the public, therefore, consider violence to be the only language that the government understands, because they respond to it, than to peaceful demonstrations.

When residents regard the government as unresponsive to their problems, they may see violent unrests as a way that will compel the government to act. Marais *et al.* (2008) state that the protests that occurred in Phumelela were due to the inability of the top management to provide basic services to the community, and they were also due to the lack of financial management. The members of the community mentioned in the study done by the above-mentioned researchers that the government showed

signs of deafness to the complaints of the community (Marais *et al.*, 2008). After four years of complaining, the community members regarded violence and confrontations as the only ways to force the government to act (Marais *et al.*, 2008; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007). In addition, the municipality also made promises of resolving their concerns, but these promises were unfulfilled; instead, the officials were arrogant to the public (Marais *et al.*, 2008).

According to Oldfield and Stokke (2006), the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign [MPAEC] held community weekly meetings, where they discussed the issues affecting the community and took decisions about strategies and activities. In these meetings, communication with banks, councillors and state institutions were reported to the community. The MPAEC invited the Provincial Minister of Housing to attend community meetings about the collective demands that they had raised with regards to the sub-standard quality of the houses and ownership of the land. The relevant state institution that was supposed to address the matter did not handle it in a meaningful way. Instead, they were directed to take their complaints about housing to the developers (Oldfield & Stokke, 2006). The RSA Constitution, 1996, Section 26(1) indicates that people should have access to adequate housing.

Furthermore, Oldfield and Stokke (2006) report that the lack of meaningful political engagements combined with future threats of eviction made the movement to engage in public protests that included amongst others demonstrations and sit ins at banks. In response to evictions, the movement responded by putting back evicted families at their homes. The RSA's Constitution, 1996, Section 26(3) states that a person should not be evicted from his/her home without the court having issued an order to do so. The court order is issued only after considering all relevant circumstances, but in this regard, such a process was not followed, this bred a conducive environment for violent protests to emerge.

Clutterbuck (1986) states that riots can arise from social, industrial, and even political causes, while von Holdt (2011a) highlights that community protests can erupt because of state actions as well as the lack of actions. In Malamulele, the residents are said to have protested violently only when the MDB refused to grant them their own stand-alone municipality (Chauke, 2013; Tiva, 2013; Musitha, 2016) and this can be

regarded as a form of state inaction, as the decision was not pleasant to the residents. On the other hand, in Vuwani, when the MDB tried to address the grievances of Malamulele by incorporating some parts of Vuwani to Malamulele, the residents became angry and burned buildings such as schools; and this could be considered as a form of state action. According to della Porta and Diani (2006), the state's action can produce people who act collectively against it. This is likely to happen when the state sets limits on the people's political action, and also when it fails to encourage the development of a certain group of people.

The government's failure to address grievances does not only make the concerned group to protest violently against it, but they can also engage in violent confrontations with other community members (Tapscott, 2011). Furthermore, Tapscott (2011) states that the community of backyard dwellers from Langa engaged in violent confrontations with other community members (hostel dwellers). This resulted from the failure of the government to address the grievances raised by the Langa backyard dwellers when they showed disapproval of the Joe Slovo camp residents getting 70% of newly built Reconstruction Development Programme [RDP] houses, while they only had a 30% share. The above-mentioned author further reports that the mayor failed to consider their suggestion of an equal share of both the groups to housing allocations (Tapscott, 2011).

4.2.5 Lack of consultation/ communication with communities

Sinwell *et al.* (2009) and the Parliament of the RSA (2009) recognise the State's lack of communication with communities to be amongst the causes of the violent protests. The community engages in protests because the municipalities do not communicate their decisions with the citizens (Parliament of the RSA, 2009). They implement decisions without consultations and sometimes the community views the decisions as unfavourable. Matebesi and Botes' (2011) research found that the members of the community engaged in violent protests because the national government did not consider their request and the decision taken by the government to incorporate Merafong City Local Municipality into Northwest was not satisfactorily communicated to the community.

The politicians and the officials fuel anger in the citizens, and the citizens show their anger through violent protests when the politicians and the officials fail to listen to their complaints (Matebesi, 2011). Tsheola (2012:165) concludes that the service delivery protests should suggest that the decisions that are made with regard to the services to be rendered “*do not reflect the public needs, aspirations, uncertainties and fears*”. The citizens are likely to be frustrated and riot against the government when the government fails to consult them on which services should be a priority.

In Mandela Park in Khayelitsha, the government failed to properly communicate with regards to the housing policies. The residents became frustrated and rioted by destroying public and private properties. In Diepsloot, Gauteng, the protests escalated into violence when a rumour was spread about people living in shacks being moved to Brits in the Northwest Province (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009). Tadesse *et al.* (2006) argues that the lack of clarity, proper information and awareness may make well-intended government policies to be a source of frustration to the people. When people do not have clear information, rumours and speculations arise. To add on, Vider (2004) states that the rumours can result in collective violent behaviour. False news can spread very fast and thus influence people to engage in collective violence.

According to Tiva (2013), the residents of Malamulele also complained about the lack of service delivery, while rioting for demarcation. In contrast, Musitha (2016) disagrees with what residents said about service delivery to Tiva (2013). Musitha (2016) argues that the available data suggests that the government provided services at Malamulele. In addition, Musitha (2016) argues that the ward committees failed to disseminate information adequately about the provided services; as such, the citizens think that service delivery was not taking place. Furthermore, participatory governance might also be lacking from the citizens.

In Bernstein and Johnston’s (2007) research, the participants highlight that there was a breakdown in communication between the municipality and the residents of Phumelela. In support of the above statement, Botes *et al.* (2007b) report that the people in Phumelela were able to protest violently and they were thus able to remove the ward councillor from his position. The protestors were able to capitalise on the broken communication between the councillor and the community and thus achieve

their goal; even though there was no proof that he was guilty of the charges, they were accusing him of. In addition, Botes *et al.* (2007b) highlight that the lack of an effective complaints management system contributed to an outbreak of violent protests, wherein the case studies found that there was no mechanism in place to capture complaints, so that a follow up can be made, and thus enable the leadership to give citizens feedback.

4.2.6 Dysfunctional committees and government officials' attitude

Atkinson (2007), Johnston and Bernstein (2007), and Goldstone (2012) state that arrogance, rudeness, and the shoddy treatment by the government officials may result in anger that may in turn promote violent protests. The members of the community can consider violent protests as an option that can bring them closer to their desires, when they regard their leaders as people who are unapproachable, unwilling to communicate with residents and not willing to listen to the people that they serve.

Johnston and Seferiades (2012) report that in Greece in the year 2008, when the protestors acted violently after a police officer shot and killed a youth during patrol, they did not only demonstrate violently about the killing. The killing provided an avenue where other issues could be avenged upon. The protestors were also angry with the government for the lack of economic opportunities. This led to the burning of shops as well as a luxurious tourist hotel. Goldstone (2012) links both peaceful and violent protests to the progress in democracy. In either way, the protests are meant to challenge dictatorship as well as ensuring that the government exercises democracy by meeting the needs of the people instead of neglecting them.

Desai (2002) states that a Durban march, attended by an estimated number of between 20 000 and 30 000 people broke into violent protests when the then president, Thabo Mbeki in 2001 failed to come and receive their memorandum; instead, he sent a low-ranking official. The protestors expected the president to receive the memorandum himself or send a cabinet member to receive it. The protestors interpreted the failure to attend as a bad attitude (Desai, 2002).

In addition, Desai (2002) gives an account of a peaceful protest that turned violent because of the attitude of the mayor's bodyguard. While the protestors were chanting outside the mayor's gate, the bodyguard threatened them by pointing a firearm at them and firing live ammunition. They responded by pelting stones at him. Some young people ran into the mayor's house and cut the water supply (Desai, 2002). The current researcher concluded that the protestors would not have seen the need to defend themselves if the mayor's bodyguard did not behave in a violent manner.

Maphunye *et al.* (n.d.) allege that when rendering services to the public, the officials often act as if they are doing the public a favour, and they are not doing the job that they have been hired to do. For example, Botes *et al.* (2007b) report that a ward councillor favoured certain members of the community. The councillor was described as not giving the people who were not in his good books a chance to speak in community meetings and never responded to the requests for a meeting so that the residents could be given a peaceful platform to raise their concerns (Botes *et al.*, 2007b).

4.2.7 Lack of government accountability

Tsheola (2012) regards service delivery protests that are violent to be an indication of the lack of public participation in IDP. Furthermore, the author argues that the IDP is designed to ensure public participation and government accountability. When people engage in violent protests, this serves as an indication of the failure by the government to account to citizens as well as their failure to provide them with an avenue to voice out their concerns (Tsheola, 2012). In support of the afore-mentioned author, van Dijk and Croucamp (2007) state that the violent confrontations between the government and the public raise some questions about the accountability of the ruling party. Furthermore, Bernstein and Johnston (2007) report that in Phumelela, the dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the IDP also played a role in the outbreak of the violent protests.

Meanwhile, Langa (2011a) states that the members of the community may feel anger and resentment towards their elected political leaders when they feel excluded and marginalised, and this occurs when they see their political elected leaders driving expensive cars, while the community is not provided with essential services such as water. Langa (2011a) calls this behaviour class apartheid and argues that it was introduced by democracy as it is a replacement of racial apartheid. In class apartheid, the gap between the poor and the rich is seen as widening (Langa, 2011a). The rich are becoming richer, while the poor are drowning in poverty. This may suggest the lack of accountability by the leaders to the people who put them in these offices.

According to Selebi (2012), when members of the community believe that they are not considered for opportunities, they can resort to riots. Furthermore, the author reports about the residents' protest that turned violent, because their complaint that the local administration did not give local citizens preference when mining companies that were operating in their community recruited workers (Selebi, 2012). When the members of the community perceive the local administrations as not being considerate of their needs it can lead to dissatisfaction that can manifest through violent protest.

Sinwell *et al.* (2009) report about a community accusing their municipality of not being accountable, after the disappearance of prize money that was supposed to be used for the Mayoral Championship. The members of the community engaged in a peaceful protest, but after realising that it was not getting the attention it needed, they started to set fires on buildings, as well as barricading roads.

4.2.8 Corruption, Maladministration, and financial mismanagement

Corruption, misappropriation as well as nepotism can lead to violent protests. Drury, Kriekhaus and Lusztig (2006:122) define corruption as, "*the abuse of public office for private gain*". Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Botes *et al.* (2007b), Goldstone (2012), Lodge (2012), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013) found that people are more likely to engage in violent protests when they are convinced that their government is corrupt and mismanages funds. The corrupt activities may include nepotism, bribery, theft and even the embezzlement of public resources (Drury *et al.*, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Mpehle, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013). Drury *et al.* (2006) and

Twala (2014) put forth that corruption might also occur when an individual uses his/her position for personal gain as well as giving favours to relatives and friends. Furthermore, Drury *et al.* (2006) regard corruption as an act that affects the economy of a country.

Corrupt activities can diminish the government officials' and politicians' reputations in the community, where they are often pointed out at, during protests as corrupt people who steal state resources for personal gain (Twala, 2014). Meanwhile, Burger (2009), Dau (2010), Manala (2010), Banjo and Jili (2013), Khotseng and Tucker (2013), as well as Mbazira (2013) blame corruption, and nepotism to be responsible for the failure of service delivery as they reduce the financial resources that were supposed to be allocated for service delivery. In addition, quality service delivery is hindered when unqualified people are hired in municipal positions or given tenders simply because they are members of the ruling party (Burger, 2009; Dau, 2010; Twala, 2014). The communities responded to this failure through violent protests (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Dau, 2010).

Violent demonstrations can also occur when a municipality or government office is not transparent in its operations as the *Bathopele* principles and The Constitution of the RSA, 1996, Section 195 (1) (g) mandates public administration to be transparent to the public, by constantly providing the public with information that is accurate. According to Botes *et al.* (2007b) and Abreu (2014), the residents protested violently against irregular municipal bills. The high municipality bills make services to be unaffordable, as such the frustrated members of the community who cannot access water or electricity protest violently (Atkinson, 2007).

Mbazira (2013) concludes that South Africa is characterised by poor management, maladministration as well as the abuse of finances. A Sowetan report states that during an audit for 2011/2012, the Auditor-General indicated that only a few municipalities in South Africa had clean audits (SAPA, 2012). The current researcher, therefore, states that this kind of behaviour may encourage citizens to engage in violent demonstrations as they expect to see value for their money. The *Batho Pele* principle states that people have the right to demand the government to spend their

money appropriately, as they pay income tax and contribute to VAT to finance the administration of the country.

4.2.9 Pursuing of personal interest and political infights

The political infights between members of a party may influence protests to become violent. Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Matebesi (2011) as well as Piper and von Lieres (2016) found some protests to have been politically driven. In addition, Johnston and Bernstein (2007), Malapo and Ngubeni (2011) as well as Akinboade *et al.* (2013) found that some protests that became violent were influenced by the politicians who did not make it on the ruling party's candidate list, more especially before the local government elections. Some of them became leaders in these protests who mobilised the people to protest violently (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). They used their anger and grievances to mobilise people to join in the fight against the decision taken by the national and provincial government. In addition, Piper and von Lieres (2016) state that people tend to use violent protests to support their favourite candidate against the opposition in the same political party.

Furthermore, the political infights between the different parties can be blamed for the outbreak of violent protests. For example, in Johannesburg's Alexandra, violent protests erupted on 3 April 2019, a month just before the national elections. The ANC and the Democratic Alliance [DA] pointed fingers at each other for the outbreak of violence. The community members closed the main roads by burning fires on the streets and blocking roads (E-tv News, 03 April 2019). The complaints submitted by the residents include the crimes committed by foreign nationals, illegal land invasion resulting in the mushrooming of informal settlements, poor service delivery and corruption in the allocation of RDP houses (E-news 03 April 2019, Simelane, 2019). In addition, Simelane (2019) states that the residents blamed the police for working with criminals, as they failed to investigate reported cases.

The researcher can thus infer that the outbreak of violent protests in Alexandra was political motivated. The problems that the community complained about had been evident for some time. They cried about the lack of service delivery as reported on the news (E-tv News, 10 April 2019). In a television interview, the protestors indicated that

they feel neglected because of the government's failure to deliver services; but the protestors only raised these issues towards elections (E-tv News, 10 April 2019). A protestor also stated in an interview with Simelane (2019) that there are people who are going around telling other people not to vote for a certain political party. Therefore, based on that statement, the current researcher concludes that the political infights played a significant role in the outbreak of violence in Alexandra.

Furthermore, Akinboade *et al.* (2013) reveal that in South Africa, during and after the elections, many issues come forward and they are mostly related to service delivery. Moreover, Mpehle (2012) argues that the political infights in the municipalities shift the focus of councillors from delivering quality services to fighting for job positions. The infights lead to inadequate service delivery, which in turn contributes to the dissatisfaction of the people and that manifests into violent protests (Atkinson, 2007; van Vuuren, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Salgado, 2013; Musitha, 2016; Mokgopo, 2017).

von Holdt (2011a) indicates that there are protest leaders who engage in violent protestation in pursuit of their own agendas. Some participants in the research conducted by the above-mentioned author indicated that some people engage in violent protests because the tenders were no longer awarded to them. They hide their true motives under service delivery umbrella. They seem to be chanting for the inadequate delivery of services, whereas the real fight is on getting tenders (von Holdt, 2011a). Moreover, della Porta and Diani (2006) put forth that people are likely to engage in collective action when there is a political context that makes it favourable to do so. Disputes provide a conducive condition where people who failed to secure posts within their party motivate others to join them in collective action, by claiming to be fighting for the community while they are fighting for their own interests (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013).

Furthermore, von Holdt (2011a) puts forth that the protesters see leaders of the protests as people who are leading the struggle. Meanwhile, during a current affairs discussion on radio, the listeners, including those coming from Vuwani, alleged that the people who refused the incorporation in Malamulele might be benefiting from being

part of Makhado. They have tenders and are not sure, if they will still get them in the new municipality (MLFM, 30 August 2017).

4.2.10 Criminal intentions and opportunity

Burger (2009), Manala (2010), Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), as well as Akinboade *et al.* (2013) put forth that some people participate in protests because they have criminal intentions. Thus, the protests offer them a good opportunity to commit crime. Martin, McPhail, and McCarthy (2009) state that there are people who join protests without even knowing the issues which the protestors are fighting for. Their participation is based on the assessment of an opportunity where they can loot, knowing that blame will be levied on the protests. Tilly (2006) argues that the sudden outbursts of protests offer people an opportunity to loot.

4.2.11 Failure to honour promises made during election campaigns: Constitutional and political mandate

The failure to honour political mandates may result in communities protesting violently. In line with the above statement, Tadesse *et al.* (2006) found that the ward councillor who left the area after being elected, angered the residents in Khayelitsha. The community members view this kind of behaviour as an abuse of people's trust. The researcher argues that moving away from the area where a person is elected to serve may suggest to the members of the community that their concerns will not be taken seriously, because the person who has moved out does not experience the same problems first-hand as the people who voted him/her into office. Tadesse *et al.* (2006) further state that the councillor relocated to an area that had facilities such as flush toilets, while they were lacking. The findings of Tadesse *et al.* (2006) could be explained through the Relative Deprivation Theory in the paragraph below.

According to van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010), as well as Muller (2013), the people make comparisons of themselves with others. If they realise that other people have more access to services, while they are living in poor socioeconomic conditions, they experience relative deprivation (Nel & Mitchell, 2019). In addition, Banjo and Jili (2013) state that the people wait for services to be rendered and later on they realise

that other communities are receiving services before them, whereas in their community there is no delivery of services. As a result, the communities feel that they are being deprived and therefore engage in violent protest (Allan & Heese [Sa]).

Bryant (2008), Langa (2011a) and von Holdt (2011a) found that the communities engaged in collective violence to make their areas ungovernable, after their disappointment with government officials who failed to honour scheduled meetings that they were invited to resolve community grievances. Moreover, in Langa's (2011a) research, the leaders are said to be inciting violence by making promises to the people yet failing to make them a reality. The government officials have been called liars who are quick to make promises but fail to fulfil them (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007).

When government officials make promises that they do not fulfil, the members of the community become angry and protest violently. The communities expected better services when the ANC led democratic government came into office in 1994 (Greenberg, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Burger, 2009; Nengwekhulu, 2009; Dau, 2010; Manala, 2010; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Akinboade *et al.* 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mathoho, 2013; Mbazira, 2013; Tau, 2013; van der Merwe, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; George Herald, 2017). During the election campaigns, the leaders promised the delivering of public services such as clean water, houses, and electricity; with their election campaign slogan termed 'a better life for all'. However, the democratic government is failing to provide basic services. As such, the communities hold the government to their promises of excellence, by engaging in violence, as they are tired of waiting for their fulfilment. Burger (2009) regards such promises to be a "recurring theme"; while Bond (2010:18) has termed these promises, "*talk left, walk right*".

The South Africans are well aware of what the Constitution mandates the government to provide to them. For example, Section 26(1) provides that the citizens should have access to adequate housing. While Section 27 (a) and (b) of the RSA Constitution, 1996 stipulates that the citizens have the right to access health care, water and even food. It can be argued that the communities expect more than what they are being offered, as the ANC slogan made an impression that by voting for them, their lives

would improve for the better as they would access services that they could not access during the apartheid government.

Tadesse *et al.* (2006), Dawson (2010), Salgado (2013) and Simelane (2019) report that people have been marginalised during the apartheid period. As such, some of these people fought against the apartheid government. The researcher asserts that they have hoped for a '*better life for all*', as the ANC slogans says in their campaigning posters. However, even during the democratic governance, the people continue to be marginalised; they lack access to adequate water and housing, amongst others. When people fight for their rights as stipulated in the Constitution, the police fail to understand and thus they use excessive force (Dawson, 2010). Furthermore, the current researcher puts forth that these people are motivated to protest violently by their unchanging circumstances, even during the time in which the government they elected is the one that governs.

Desai (2002) reports on some Indian people's suffering under the Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950) who were forcefully removed from their communities to settle in a place that offered them no hope for survival. Upon settling there, life was difficult, as they could not secure employment to feed their families (Desai, 2002). These people hoped that their situation would turn into a better one once the democratic government was in place, as their political campaign slogan was '*a better life for all*'. This slogan offered people hope, however, during the democratic regime they faced evictions from the very same government that they voted for when they failed to pay rents (Desai, 2002).

4.2.12 Normalisation of violence in societies

van der Merwe (2013) and Rapatsa (2017) state that violence in the society is seen as a normal response to deal with issues. The society sees violence as normal, as such, they do not condemn it. The communities encourage the use of violence by valuing the members of the community who successfully use it to send a message (van der Merwe, 2013). The people have a choice to act violently to force an outcome when they believe it will work. The decision is not made based on whether it is justifiable or not, as long as it is instrumental in certain situations, it is seen as valuable

(della Porta & Diani, 2006; van der Merwe, 2013). Akinboade *et al.* (2013) argue that once a culture of violence has transpired in a country, it can open a door for the future occurrences of violence.

The Parliament of the RSA (2009) concludes that the protests tend to be violent because of the reinforcement of violence being accepted in families and communities that often leads to a vicious cycle. Violence is accepted in the homes and communities motivate themselves to engage in violence when they have grievances. On the other hand, Bosi and Giugni (2012) argue that violence is culture-dependent, in that what is considered violent in one society may be acceptable in another culture. Furthermore, van der Merwe (2013) argues that the use of violence in inter-state conflict is acceptable, and is therefore supported by people from different cultures worldwide.

Furthermore, Kotronaki and Seferiades (2012) allege that the protests that encompasses violence in one community are likely to influence an outbreak of violent protests in other areas. When violence breaks out in one community, other communities with similar problems are more likely to follow and protest violently in their area. Kotronaki and Seferiades (2012) use Athens in Greece as an example to substantiate what they mean by violence erupting in one area and subsequently spreading to other areas. In the above-mentioned area, Kotronaki and Seferiades (2012) allege that when violent protests occurred, more than 50 cities in other countries as well as in Greece also copied and thereby engaged in violent protests as well.

4.2.13 Identity and culture of people

Identity and culture play a role in violent protests. Musitha (2016) states that the violent demands by the members of the community is depicted through protests and it stems from the anger that results from perceived ethnic discrimination. Meanwhile, Akinboade *et al.* (2013:468) put forth that, “*ethnic or racial cleavages that are reinforced by religious, linguistic or economic differences form specific threats to stability*”.

Tyabazayo's (2013) research found that the majority of people wished to remain in KZN because the clan that they belonged to dominated the KZN. Moreover, those who supported the incorporation to Eastern Cape stated culture and identity as the reasons. Furthermore, those who did not favour the incorporation to Eastern Cape highlight the differences in cultural practices. They state that their identity would be lost in KZN, for example, the province does not practice circumcision. They wished to remain in the province that promotes their identity and culture (Tyabazayo, 2013).

4.2.14 Dissatisfaction over service delivery

Violent protests are likely to manifest in the community when the government fails to provide adequate services such as water, sanitation, and electricity (Marais *et al.*, 2008; The Citizen, 2012; Abreu, 2014; Salgado, 2013; Breakfast *et al.*, 2016). The lack of access to water is violating the rights of the citizens. These rights are enshrined in South Africa's Constitution, 1996, Section 27 (b) which provides that the citizens have the right to access water. Moreover, the *Batho Pele* principle put in the picture that as citizens are contributing towards the revenue of the government, they are owed proof that improved service delivery is on the agenda. If such is not happening, the people choose to engage in violent protests.

Furthermore, Zama (2013) puts forth that the communities engage in service delivery protests because they see municipalities as their channel to reach the provincial and national government. The local government thus becomes the target of misdirected anger and frustrations (Zama, 2013; SALGA, 2015). van Vuuren (2012) argues that the people are dissatisfied with service delivery because the government takes time to finalise the tenders to provide services to the community. This dissatisfaction is evident in the number of violent service delivery related protests that occur in the country. Similarly, Atkinson (2007) points out that it was in 2005 when many towns experienced mass protests, demonstrations, petitions, marchers, and even violent confrontations, it was resulting from the failure to deliver services.

Muller (2013) indicates that the communities expect the places where they are residing at to be of a certain living standard. This standard should be equal in all communities, whether it is a shantytown, village, or a suburb. Bernstein and Johnston (2007:136)

note that in Phumelela, the failure to deliver services was related to “*the uncertain role of small towns in a changing South Africa, which no development strategy seems to address adequately*”. Another cause noted by the above-mentioned authors, that resulted in the failure to deliver services is the rapid migration of poor and unskilled people from farms and other rural areas. These people place an increase in demand on the services without contributing to the local tax base (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007).

Makgoba (2006) indicates that the local government has undergone major policy changes which brought with them the continuing removal of all racially defined municipalities that followed by the implementation of the demarcation process. This new system suggests that all the communities will get equal services, regardless of their race or ethnicity (Makgoba, 2006). Managa (2012) acknowledges that South Africa was successful in shifting from apartheid to democracy, but the author raises concerns about the challenges that still prevail even during democracy, these include, the lack of employment, poverty as well as inequality. These are some of the key factors, which culminated in the citizens taking to the streets in a violent manner, to raise their dissatisfaction over the problem of poor service delivery. The failure of the post-1994 government to meet its promises sparked unrests that manifest in service delivery protests that have spoiled the country for almost a decade (Managa, 2012). The government’s response to the crises using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach could have aggravated the problems, as communities have different issues for which they are fighting for (Managa, 2012).

Meanwhile, Ngwane (2011) attributes the failure of the democratic government to deliver adequate services to the apartheid government. The apartheid government created a situation, which resulted in the democratic government facing backlogs when it comes to delivering services to communities. The legacy of apartheid in South Africa is that the underprivileged communities are very poor to an extent that they are unable to pay for the services that the municipality renders to them (Koelble & LiPuma, 2010). The failure to make payments for services results in the provision of unsatisfactorily services (May, 2011a), that may in turn lead to violent service delivery protests (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Managa, 2012; van Vuuren, 2012; Salgado, 2013; Zama, 2013; Musitha, 2016).

According to Akinboade *et al.* (2013), the economists regard service delivery as an indication that the resources in the communities are being shared. The quality of services provided, and their availability are a key measure of good governance. Moreover, the provision of services unites the state and the citizens, as they indicate the health of the society (Akinboade *et al.*, 2013). The provision of services also determines the quality of life and alleviates poverty. When the members of the public have access to government services, they show continued support to the political leadership as they are being governed effectively (Akinboade *et al.*, 2013). Meanwhile, Musitha (2016) argues that when members of the community demand services in a violent way, that serves as a reflection that the communities are angry about the lack of service delivery.

Furthermore, Akinboade *et al.* (2013) state that in Africa, the provision of services has been entrusted to the government which has to finance amongst others the health services, education, clean water, and sanitation. Moreover, the provision of these services encourages development. Further, the above author stress that the government's failure to exercise the power entrusted in them, that includes service provision, leaves the citizens with the option to chant on the streets so that their voices can be heard. Botes *et al.* (2007b) state that in Phumelela there was no coherent system to measure the satisfaction of the services provided to the citizens as mandated by the White Paper on Local Government, 1998. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) stipulates that the national and provincial government departments have to evaluate their service standards at least once a year to enable them to know whether their service provision is improving or deteriorating.

Mbazira (2013) states that the privatisation in South Africa had a major impact on the provision of services to the public. The government took some services that it provided to the public and entrusted them to private companies. The government also came up with the policies meant to recover costs from the recipients of services and as such operated in a commercial manner. This resulted in a major impact as the government started increasing tariffs as well as enforcing stricter methods for cost recovery to make profits (Mbazira, 2013). In addition, Mbazira (2013) states that wealthy people can be able to afford constant tariff increment, but the poor marginalised citizens are

unable to pay for access to basic services, as such they are pushed to protest, and this may lead to collective violence.

For example, poor infrastructure can lead into violent protests. Atkinson (2007) states that the unavailability of infrastructure especially when it seems like other communities have access to such infrastructure can result in violent protests. To add on, Atkinson (2007) puts forth that infrastructure should not only be physically available, but it has to be maintained as well, as this might frustrate the members of the community. Sixty-five percent of residences in Banjo and Jili's (2013) study protested because of the lack of road maintenance as they needed damaged roads to be repaired. To add on, Atkinson (2007), Platinum Weekly (2012), Johnston and Bernstein (2007) as well as Mavungu (2011) also regard the poor state of infrastructure as some of the reasons why communities engage in social unrest.

On the other hand, the lack of housing, water and sanitation may result in people protesting violently. Bernstein and Johnston (2007) regard Phumelela as one of the first amongst municipalities to engage in municipal unrest due to services that were not delivered to the citizens' satisfaction. There was poor service delivery for water, sanitation and sewage waste ran down the streets, rivers, and dams (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). The dissatisfaction was coupled with a dysfunctional council that provoked the community to revolt (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). The above-mentioned community even in the democratic governance was still using the bucket system to relieve themselves (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). Tau (2013) also reports about the dissatisfaction with the use of the bucket system in the Protea South informal settlement. The current researcher states that during this democratic era, one cannot expect communities to be using buckets to relieve themselves. It is either they are provided with flush or pit toilets. The bucket system takes away the dignity of people who have to use it.

According to Chabalala (2017), a library at Akani High School in Tiyani Village in the Limpopo Province was torched. The motive was not known; however, the police suspected the torching to be linked to the ongoing protests by learners as well as the community members, demanding toilets for the school. The protests escalated into violence where roads were barricaded with stones and tree branches (Chabalala,

2017). On the other hand, the residents may engage in violent protests because of the lack of water supply or the unavailability of clean water (Ngangisa, 2014). In Wesselton (Banjo & Jili, 2013) and in Oukasie near Brits (Montsho, 2010), the people protested violently because of the lack of clean water that was regarded not to be safe for consumption.

The residents have been found to be dissatisfied with the provision of government houses [RDP] (Wines, 2005; Jili, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Tau, 2013; EWN, 2017a; George Herald, 2017; Goba, 2017). Some projects were said to be either incomplete or abandoned in the study of Banjo and Jili (2013). The RSA's 1996 Constitution indicates that all the people have a right to access adequate housing, and the state must strive to use its available resources to ensure that people are provided with adequate housing.

Desai (2002:19) further states that the people had been asked to pay for a bond that was way above what they could afford. As such the author puts forth that, "*the disciples of a better life for all were behaving as if poverty itself was a crime*". Through examining Desai's (2002) book, one can realise that the democratic government provokes people to protest violently, by not considering their social and economic circumstances when they pass policies.

4.2.15 Cross-border and demarcation grievances

Tyabazayo (2013) states that the demarcation of boundaries has never been a smooth road. In many instances, it resulted in disputes. The situation did not end in disputes only, Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Mavungu (2011), Limpopo Mirror (2013), Tyabazayo (2013), Kanyane *et al.* (2017) as well as Mabunda (2018) put forth that the disputes gave birth to conflicts that are accompanied by violence and even court battles. According to Griggs (1998), the disputes that were brought by the demarcation, moved from being mass protests to violence that included the burning and the destruction of properties, as well as land invasion. Some people were also killed.

Moreover, the boundary disputes are prevalent not only at the local level, but they are evident even at the provincial level, where people use violence when demanding to be placed in a certain province (Mavungu, 2011; Fakir & Moloji, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; Tyabazayo, 2013). Langa (2011a) uncovered that the residents of Azania Township protested violently after a long battle over demarcation. The place was falling under Mpumalanga and the residents wanted it to fall under Gauteng, the reason being that they were nearer to Gauteng, which was 78 km away as opposed to Nelspruit, which was 560 km away. The informants in Langa's (2011a) study indicate that their efforts to solve the demarcation had fallen on deaf ears, as such they were left with no choice except to show the government that they were serious by engaging in collective violence.

Griggs (1995) states that South Africa's incorporation into the Southern African Development Community [SADC] meant that the ten homelands that were in existence at that time had to be delimited into nine provinces. The municipalities also had to be reorganised and problems arose because of the delimitation and the reorganisation of the provinces and municipalities. Moreover, van Dijk and Croucamp (2007) state that violent protests represent the apartheid government's struggle with its citizens, which often results from the demarcation of the municipalities and provincial boundaries. Before the democratic government came into effect, there were boundaries put in place by the apartheid government. The democratic government decided to engage in the redrawing of boundaries that made some communities unhappy, as could be seen through the mass protests that resulted in violent confrontations between the citizens and the state.

According to Griggs (1995), the fight for territories was seen to be more prevalent in ANC dominated provinces, which challenged the NP to fight for the territories in which its power base lay. These areas had large numbers of supporters for the party. Another challenge that Griggs (1995) highlights in the demarcation of boundaries is that concerns were raised, and they were only based on the party's political power; while the environmental, economic, and cultural impacts were ignored.

Furthermore, the communities fought to fall in provinces or municipalities that seemed to be productive, offered economic development and job opportunities, as well as improved service delivery (Fakir & Molo, 2011; Mavungu, 2011; Ngwane, 2011). The provinces or municipalities that seemed to have economically depressed conditions are not favoured. The developmental issues are noticed when people refuse to be incorporated in certain areas, because these areas have poor infrastructure; and they want to be merged with areas that are better off and have the resources to provide them with quality infrastructure (Atkinson, 2007; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Platinum Weekly, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013).

Griggs (1998) argues that the problems that arise with demarcation have been brought by the apartheid government. Many of the places to be incorporated together have poor infrastructure as they were neglected by the apartheid government (Griggs, 1995). This government grouped people of the same race together to enforce political control over them. The Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950) was used to establish places that were regarded as homelands to group people by their ethnicity. When the democratic government came into power, it had an intention of affording people more access and power to land (Griggs, 1998). The way to go about that was to re-demarcate provinces and municipalities.

4.2.16 Eviction from houses, land invasion and the lack of houses to occupy

It is not only demarcation and cross border grievances that result in violent protests, as even the grievances resulting from land invasion result in violent clashes between the community and the police. Phakgadi (2018) reports about the grievances of Protea Glen (Johannesburg) residents who ran fighting battles with the police because of illegal land grabbing. People were injured in these clashes, while demonstrating their dissatisfaction with the government's failure to deal with land invaders, who occupied land illegally next to their homes (Phakgadi, 2018). When people are faced with a challenge of securing a land to occupy, they may demonstrate their frustration by revolting, as it was the case with Kenedy Road who did not have a land to occupy (Bryant, 2008).

Tadesse *et al.* (2006) found that the residents from Khayelitsha rioted to evictions. The citizens used force to return evicted people to their houses. In Mandela Park, the above-mentioned authors found that the residents reacted to the evictions by protesting violently. They regarded the evictions as the betrayal of the people, done by the “*black majority government*”, who was seen as having collaborated with the very same people who the protesters had helped to fight against during the apartheid struggle (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006:22).

The apartheid government is responsible for part of the problem as they created this situation when they moved people from their residential areas, based on their race. In this regard, Desai (2002) provides an encounter of people during the apartheid period who were forcibly evicted from their homes and placed in Chatsworth. Chatsworth is a town that is located at the outskirts of Durban and people have been dumped there based on their race through the application of The Group Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950). Their eviction witnessed during the apartheid period continued also during the democratically led government. However, during the democratic governance, they requested more time to obtain a court order to prevent the municipality from evicting them. Instead, the government refused to listen and decided to fire live ammunition at them (Desai, 2002). The residents were forced to defend themselves through collective violence.

People protest violently because they expect things to be better in the birth of non-racial democracy that abolished the Groups Areas Act (Act 41 of 1950) that compelled people of the same race to be grouped together in a particular area (Desai, 2002). In addition, people expect an end to forced removals and evictions. However, in 1994, the dream was short lived when the democratic government served eviction letters to 950 tenants who were behind in payments. To complicate matters, their water and electricity was cut off when they failed to pay, this was also followed by a tariff increase on electricity without a warning (Desai, 2002). Furthermore, Desai (2002) reports that the people from Chatsworth sold property such as televisions for half their value. This forced some girls in 1996 to turn into prostitution to pay the house rent.

The evictions were witnessed in other areas as per Desai's report (2002). In Tafelsig, Cape Town, the people were also evicted for the failure to pay their housing bonds (Desai, 2002). This led to mass uprisings. The democratic government responded to the mass uprisings by cutting water for the occupants (Desai, 2002). People engage in mass uprisings because they hoped for a change with the democratic led government. The government gives people more reasons to protest violently than to cooperate with the government.

Desai (2002) and Ngwane (2011) describe the response of the democratic government to the struggle to be brutal, wherein activists are labelled criminals. This is seen in their treatment, for example in Johannesburg, some activists were sent to Diepkloof prison that Desai (2002) labels as notorious in 2002. Live ammunition was fired at them by a mayor's bodyguard, who was only asked to report at a police station and thereafter released; while the activists were kept in prison for several days for cutting the water supply to the mayor's house (Desai, 2002). This is an indication that the activists are seen as criminals. To add to their mistreatment, the prosecutor refused to grant them bail. The activists were protesting to remind the mayor to honour the promise made to the elderly people. The promise was that the mayor would write off half of their arrears as they were paying a certain amount per month to their bill as per the agreement with the mayor (Desai, 2002). Moreover, these people had been promised "*a better life for all*" (Desai, 2002:15), as such they protested violently because they wanted to see the promises turn into action.

4.2.17 Ambiguous roles between the provincial and local government

The lack of clear roles between the provincial and local government may create conditions that are conducive for collective violence to erupt. While the local government may strive to ensure that it fulfils service delivery to the community, Steytler and Fessha (2007) point out that Schedule 4 and 5 of the 1996 South African Constitution fails to demarcate the functional areas of both the provincial and local government. The above-mentioned authors highlight a similarity between the functions of these two spheres of government. They share the same powers over the same functional areas (Steytler & Fessha, 2007).

An example identified by Steytler and Fessha (2007:88) on the overlap of the roles is on roads, where the responsibility of servicing roads is given to both the local and provincial government “*with the only distinguishable feature being the limitation of provincial or municipality*”. In this similarity, the provincial functional area covers a local operative area (Steytler & Fessha, 2007). This ambiguity of roles is the one that makes the local government to be targets of frustrated communities who lack knowledge about which sphere of the government is responsible for the maintenance of certain areas. To them the immediate available government is the one who has to take care of all the problems.

Furthermore, this lack of demarcation in areas of operation may result in the lack of clarity on who should cover the costs. In terms of the roads, Steytler and Fessha (2007) give an example of who should maintain a particular stretch of the road. Moreover, the different political parties may have different agendas, thus leading to conflict (Steytler & Fessha, 2007). The functional areas may be interpreted expansively when a municipality wants to assert its power. This is mostly motivated by the political interests of the party. At the same time, where a local government was providing a service, it may become unwilling to do so (Steytler & Fessha, 2007). The reluctance may lead to diminished service delivery that might frustrate community members who may riot against the local government.

This lack of clarity of roles may impede on service delivery as both levels may provide the same service that result in the “*duplication of services*”. On the other hand, it may result in a total lack of delivery of services, where they can blame each other when complaints arise from the citizens due to the failure to provide services (Steytler & Fessha, 2007). The residents will not know who to hold accountable for the failure to provide services. Furthermore, Steytler and Fessha (2007:92) note that, “*blame can be easily shifted from one government to the other*”. In support of the previous author’s arguments, Bernstein and Johnston (2007) highlight that the uncertainties and confusion between the roles and responsibilities of the local and provincial government contributed to the violent protests that erupted in Merafong City Local Municipality.

4.2.18 The mass communication media promote violent protests

Mass communication media platforms are considered important and influential in inciting violence during protests (Clutterbuck, 1986; Drury, 2002; Booyesen, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Bezuidenhout & Little, 2011). Furthermore, Drury (2002) puts forth that the mass media does not only contain the accounts of the protests based on the descriptions of the journalist, but it may also contain reported speech of politicians and even some members of the community. Similarly, Clutterbuck (1986) alleges that the television seeks to pollute viewers with public disorder, rather than restraining them. The news spread faster and with a more dramatic effect on a person's comfortable home. Moreover, instead of cooling off flames of conflicts, the mass media fuels it. The presence of cameras tends to promote violence as demonstrators tend to act more violently to catch the attention of the camera (Clutterbuck, 1986). In addition, Cammaerts (2012) alleges that the media tends to cover only protests that encompass violence.

Further, Greene (1974), Booyesen (2007) and Bryant (2008) argue that communication networks play a critical role in influencing revolutionary events that occur in other areas. When the event receives high media exposure, it seeks to influence other people, to also engage in violent protests in other areas. Booyesen (2007) and Bryant (2008) use the term 'snowballing' effect to explain how the media coverage promotes violent protests. The snowballing effect occurs when the media offers an extensive broadcast of protests and other communities follow the violent behaviour of protests shown or heard through the mass media (Booyesen, 2007; Bryant, 2008). Bryant's (2007) research found that the inhabitants near Kennedy Road also started *toyi toying* when they heard the news of revolt in Kennedy Road through the mass media, on their bus rides, work and even through stories told by people.

4.2.19 The police's violent response to protests

Sinwell *et al.* (2009), Beinart (2010), Berkhout and Handmaker (2010), Adang (2011), Bruce (2011), Dlamini *et al.* (2011), Langa (2011a), von Holdt (2011a), Goldstone (2012), Lewis (2013), Cronje (2014) and Twala (2014) state that when police officers use violent interventions to disperse a crowd of protesters, this does not stop them, but instead it often incites violence. The protestors therefore respond to the police's violence by also acting violently. Dawson (2010) states that the South African Police Service [SAPS] have been criticised for using excessive force to address crowds. The police have been regarded as "*trigger-happy*", "*savage and brutal*", in addition to being referred to as "*criminals in police uniforms*" (Dawson, 2010:105).

In certain instances, Dawson (2010), Dlamini *et al.* (2011), Langa (2011a), von Holdt and Alexander (2011), as well as Twala (2014) allege that the police have been seen randomly firing rubber bullets and tear gas on peaceful protesters or on protestors fleeing the scene. In addition, von Holdt and Alexander (2011) state that the shots also hit passers-by. This often led to violence, where members of the community retaliate against the police. Furthermore, Dawson (2010) explains that in one incident, the police continued firing shots even though the protestors were fleeing; this resulted in the death of one youth, while some were injured. Bryant (2008) found that in addition to using tear gas to disperse the angry crowd, dogs were also used in Kennedy Road.

Meanwhile, von Holdt (2011a), Dlamini *et al.* (2011) and Ngwane (2011) give an account of the violence that was fuelled by the police's violent tactics, where houses and buildings were torched in response to the death of the people who were shot by police officers during protests. In the situation described by von Holdt (2011a), the municipal properties and three houses belonging to councillors were torched. Moreover, following the death of a person that was shot by the police, the protestors became angry and torched another councillor's house who was suspected of being responsible for the death. According to Ngwane (2011), the local ANC offices in Intabazwe in Harrismith were burned in retaliation to the shooting of a young person during a protest. Furthermore, the research informants described the police's use of rubber bullets and tear gas to be the state acting as a sponsor of violence (Dlamini, 2011).

In another situation, the police conduct led to the eruption of violent protests. E-tv (10 September 2018) broadcasted acts of violence done by the Tshwane University of Technology [TUT] students during a protest. The police are accused in this instance of killing a student. Properties were vandalised, while cars were torched in response to the killing.

Breakfast *et al.* (2016) consider police brutality to be a serious challenge that is also prevalent in democratic countries. Schweingruber (2000) as well as Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) state that the police's use of brutality during peaceful protests may fuel anger, that may lead to violent protests, while their absence can provide a conducive environment for violence to manifest (Schweingruber, 2000; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). Furthermore, Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013) conclude that it is the police's action that promotes violence more than their absence.

von Holdt (2011a) alleges that the coming of the police officers from outside the local police area signals that the protest has to shift from a peaceful demonstration to a violent protestation. Similarly, the informants in Langa's (2011a) study indicated that their protests had been peaceful as they did not engage in any criminal behaviour such as looting because the local police were called to manage the situation. However, things turned out differently when the special units of the police were called in. The protestors highlighted that they cannot act violently in front of their local police because they know each other, but once strangers are called to manage the situation, which in this instance was the special unit, the situation changed. The special unit was described as uncaring as compared to the darling local police. The special unit just shoots at everyone, as such, the protestors retaliated and violence emerged (Langa, 2011a).

In addition, Langa (2011a) explains that protestors' anger was also fuelled by the heavy presence of the police who brought casspirs [big yellow police truck]. The casspirs are said to have reminded them of the apartheid time, as their presence suggests that they are not liberated, but are still adhering to the olden forms of oppression (Langa, 2011a). Furthermore, the police are reported to have used torture

to extract information from the people who are suspected to be the leaders of the protests or on the relatives of the suspects (Langa, 2011a; von Holdt & Alexander, 2011; van der Merwe, 2013; Makana, 2016). In addition, von Holdt and Alexander (2011) put forth that the police break in, in the homes of suspects and assault their family members.

According to Bruce (2011), the police's use of lethal force in South Africa has gained popularity since 2011, after the killing of Andries Tatane during demonstrations. Tait and Marks (2011) argue that during protests, the policing style that is used is increasingly becoming violent and not well coordinated. Tait and Marks (2011) suggest that the methods of crowd control seem to resemble those that were practised in the mid-1990s. South Africa was said to be moving towards the "*internationally acceptable methods of crowd control*", but it seems that these methods are being abandoned (Tait & Marks, 2011:15). Tilly (2003) puts forth that the police's use of force encourages people to engage in collective violence. The protesters respond to force by also fighting back. Moreover, Tilly (2003) recognises repressive force to offer an opportunity for protesters to engage in collective violence.

Dixon (2013) states that Dali Mporu who served as counsel for people who were injured, or those who had died or were arrested in the incident that occurred on 16 August 2012 at Marikana said there was a 'toxic collusion' between the police, the state, and the mine owners. By 'toxic collusion', the current researcher argues that the counsel was indicating that their engagement produced fatal results. Furthermore, Dixon (2013) highlights that it is not only in Marikana where police acted violently. The police were seen at times responding harshly to protests and "*politically charged incidents*" (Dixon, 2013:5). The act of the police using firearms to fight protesters occurred during the apartheid era (Simpson, 2010). In addition, Simpson (2010) alleges that for the apartheid government to fight against the continuation of the Vaal uprising, they answered protesters with armed response. The apartheid government succeeded in armed response as they controlled black urban areas by creating townships that were far from white areas and they ensured that access roads were few, which enabled monitoring.

According to Goldstone (2012), in Iran the government responded to street protests with violence. The protesters were requesting for the recounting of election votes, but instead the government acted as a dictator. The protesters were regarded as enemies of the state, as such the security forces were mandated to use brutality and even lethal force to fight them. Just like it is reported in South Africa by von Holdt and Alexander (2011) as well as van der Merwe (2013), the police used force to extract information from protesters and even in this case, the protesters are said to have been terrorised at midnight by the police.

Clutterbuck (1986) notes that some demonstrators may deliberately push the police to the limit, to provoke them to react. In addition, Burger (2009) points out that in certain instances, the police had no intention of using force, but they had to resort to it to stabilise the situation and restore order. They had to respond by arresting looters, as well as people who caused public violence and other crimes (Burger, 2009).

According to Ferreira (2011), the then Independent Complaints Directorate [ICD], now referred to as the Independent Police Investigative Directorate [IPID] indicates that police brutality during protests has become more prevalent and also it is challenging to curb because police officers are not willing to incriminate their colleagues. It is also difficult to identify the officers who are responsible for causing injury because when they are firing rubber bullets, they wear protective masks. Unlike live ammunition, the rubber bullets cannot be traced back to a specific weapon.

4.2.20 Lack of cooperation between the police and the protestors

The lack of police cooperation in protests may lead to the outbreak of violence. The residents from Gladysville gathered at their local police station to seek for police escorts during their march. Upon being turned down, the organisers decided not to go ahead with the protest and then return home. The protesters were disappointed and angry with the police's lack of cooperation. Instead of going home as their organisers had called off the protest, they moved away from the route that they were supposed to take and started to attack the shops owned by foreign nationals (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011).

Moreover, the protesters are guided on how to get permission to protest, while the police are guided on how to grant permission to the request as well as on how they should respond to illegal protests. For example, the RGA (Act 205 of 1993) was put in place to assist both the protesters and the police. The Collective Behaviour Theory of Smelser (1963) puts forth that the people are more likely to protest violently when important and legitimate channels to protest peacefully have been closed. It can be argued that the protesters at times do not wait to be granted a permission to protest because there is a channel to be followed that takes a long time in the issuing of a permit.

4.2.21 Failure to prosecute people who engage in violence during protests

When people who engage in violence during protests are not punished, there is a likelihood of the acts to be repeated or to be copied by other people. Mbazira (2013) attributes the causes of violent protests to the failure of justice. In addition, Nel and Mitchell (2019) indicate that the people who attack immigrants during unrests are not punished by the criminal justice system, even though arrests are made. The failure to adhere to the country's law such as that provided by the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 11(b) holds people who damage property during demonstrations liable for the damage. If such an Act is not enforced, people will continue to damage property during protests. The people from other communities may also engage in the same behaviour seeing that others have not been punished for it.

In Gladysville, Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) indicate that the people who had suffered a loss as a result of violent protests were asked to detail the value of the stock that was lost in the event. It is alleged that the police did not make any effort to recover the stolen goods. The current researcher views this form of inaction as promoting violence because the police failed to act by investigating. Even if they realise that their investigation would not yield results, it would have given the impression to the perpetrators and the targets that the police were willing to help. Such an impression would have served as a deterrent in forthcoming protests. In addition, an awareness would have been raised that violent acts may result in punishment.

4.2.22 Poverty and unemployment contribute to the eruption of violent protests

Poverty and unemployment play a significant role in violent protests. Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) argue that poverty and unemployment can make people uncaring and unreasonable towards other people. They have no regard for the norms and values of the society. As such, they are willing to break the law to ensure their own survival. They can organise violence against their competitors, such as by directing violence towards foreign nationals (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011). Moreover, they are readily available to partake in protests (Cilliers & Aucoin, 2016). Rosenthal (2010:246) states that South Africa is characterised by inequality, as such the poor people have organised themselves to protest “*against the violence of neoliberal capitalism and the retreat of the state*”.

4.2.23 Existence of crime in the community

The existence of crime in the community promotes community unrest. In Krugersdorp, the residents engaged in riots to fight the war against drugs. The protest erupted into violence where the houses that were believed to be used by drug lords were burnt and their shops were looted (CNS News, 2018a; EWN, 2018; Pijoos & Chabalala, 2018; SABC News, 24 January 2018). The police station also did not escape the wrath of the residents as it was set alight. The police had to use water carriers, stun grenades and even rubber bullets to restore the situation (CNS News, 2018b; SABC News, 24 January 2018). In a study conducted by von Holdt (2011b), the informants describe the police to be promoting criminal activities. The police are alleged to be accepting bribes from the suspects and from undocumented foreign nationals.

4.2.24 Wearing of disguises during protests

Adang (2011) argues that collective violence is more likely to occur when there are protesters who hide their identities by wearing balaclavas. These people are able to hide their faces from the media and the police, as such they are able to incite violence knowing that their deeds will not be linked to them. In Hamburg, the protesters masked themselves and set cars on fire as well as smashed the windows of some buildings (Eddy & Shimer, 2017; Oltermann, 2017). While in Greece, Loutous (2012) reports

that a group of youths were able to engage in collective violence during a clash with the police. They threw petrol bombs, smashed windows as well as looted shops as they wore masks to hide their identities. In South Africa, the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 8(7) prohibits people who are participating in a demonstration or gathering from wearing any mask, as this will make identification impossible.

4.3 WHO ARE PROTESTERS PUNISHING BY DESTROYING GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES

Musitha (2016) argues that the citizens are punishing the government by protesting violently. Concurrently, van der Merwe (2013) argues that burning state properties, such as clinics and libraries is actually punishing the state because these buildings are symbols of the state's authority. These buildings were built by the state to help the communities, when they are torched; the state has no alternative but to make financial provisions to repair the damaged buildings. Meanwhile, Steytler and Fessha (2007) as well as Mathoho (2011) argue that the public tends to forget or lack knowledge that some services are the responsibility of the provincial or national government, and not the municipal government.

Nevertheless, despite the local government not being its mandate to provide certain services; it becomes the target for venting frustration for the failure of the national and provincial government (Booyesen, 2009; Mathoho, 2011; Nyar & Wray, 2012; Zama, 2013; SALGA, 2015). For example, Section 155(3) (b) of the Constitution gives the national legislature the mandate to establish the criteria as well as the procedure to be followed in the demarcation of a municipality (RSA Constitution, 1996). In the case of Malamulele and Vuwani, the violent protests were directed at the local government (Mavungu, 2011; Chauke, 2013; Limpopo Mirror, 2013; Tiva, 2013; Paterson & Power, 2016; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017; Kgatle, 2018; Mabunda, 2018); whereas the LGMD Act (Act 27 of 1998) gives the MDB the power of determining and re-determining municipal boundaries.

Not only is the government affected by violent protests, the members of the community are also affected. For example, violence can have irreversible destruction on the human body (Crais, 2011); poor people fail to access health care when clinics are

burned as they lack money to consult private doctors or for paying for transport to access health care services elsewhere (von Holdt, 2011a).

4.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter showed that violent protests are encouraged by a number of factors that when combined give people reasons to riot. Some of the factors include, poverty, financial mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, and the failure of the municipality to deliver services (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Netswera & Phago, 2009; Goldstone, 2012; Lodge, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013). These factors provide South Africans with reasons to use violent protests as a form of public participation in government matters (Kotze & Taylor, 2010).

Atkinson (2007), Netswera and Kgalane (2014), and Underhill (2013) put forth that people demand the government to be effective, and its failure produce the expected results culminates into violent protests. During the apartheid period, people engaged in violent protests to make areas ungovernable (Ngwane, 2011). When leadership such as municipal managers only come to address protestors after an outbreak of violent protests, it serves as a testimony that it works (Booyesen, 2007). Violent protests are used as channels of communication, to convey the citizens' message to the government. This occurs because the government is seen as non-responsive to the needs and concerns raised through memorandums (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Booyesen, 2007; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Langa, 2011a; Matebesi, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Zama, 2013).

Furthermore, the government is accused of passing decisions without the citizens' engagement. The citizens are thus not allowed to take part in the decision making that affect their lives, as such people use violent protests as a form of participatory governance (Oldfield & Stokke, 2006; Booyesen, 2009; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Ngwane, 2011). This participatory governance is provided for by the RSA's Constitution, 1996, Section 152 (1) (e) and the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000), Section 16(1)(a) (i-v). In some municipalities, the citizens are allowed to participate in

government's decisions, but during implementation, their inputs are not considered (Dawson, 2010).

Violent protests occur because the society considers violence to be a normal part of life (Parliament of the RSA, 2009; van der Merwe, 2013; Rapatsa, 2017). Some protests are said to have been caused by political infights where candidates who did not make it to the election list find a way to revenge by inciting people to protest violently (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013). The Collective Behaviour Theory by della Porta and Diani (2006) confirms that a conducive political context makes it possible for people to take collective action.

von Holdt's (2011a) study found that some protest leaders motivate people to engage in violent protests in pursuit of their own agendas, such as opening doors for themselves to get tenders. In addition, Burger (2009); Martin *et al.* (2009); Manala, (2010); as well as Akinboade *et al.* (2013) state that criminals are provided with an opportunity to commit crime during unrests as they can loot, vandalise, and even burn properties. The political leaders incite violence by making promises of excellence, but fail to fulfil these promises (Greenberg, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Marais *et al.*, 2008; von Holdt, 2011a; Dau, 2010; Langa, 2011a; Mbazira, 2013). Government officials are also seen as arrogant by the public (Atkinson, 2007; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008); dysfunctional (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007) and as assisting only the people who are in their good books (Botes *et al.*, 2007b).

The following scholars, van der Walt (2005), Tadesse *et al.* (2006), Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Marais *et al.* (2008), Kotze and Taylor (2010), Managa (2012), van Vuuren (2012), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), Banjo and Jili (2013), Mbazira (2013), Muller (2013), Salgado (2013), and Ngangisa (2014) state that the failure of the democratic government to provide services results in violent protests. Meanwhile, Ngwane (2011) blames the failure of the current government to provide services on the apartheid government, as it created a situation, which resulted in the democratic government facing backlogs in service delivery.

There are also cross-border and demarcation issues that make people to protest in a violent manner. This happens when people are placed in the municipality or province that they do not want to fall under (Atkinson, 2007; van Dijk & Croucamp, 2007; Langa, 2011a; Ngwane, 2011; Tyabazayo, 2013). People also react to evictions through violent protests (Desai, 2002; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). Media tends to broadcast people engaging in violent protests, thus encouraging other communities with similar problems to use the same route (Greene, 1974; Drury, 2002; Booysen, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Kotronaki & Seferiades, 2012).

The police's use of brutality during peaceful protests may fuel anger and thereby turn the protest to be a violent one (Schweingruber, 2000; Desai, 2002; Tilly, 2003; Berkhout & Handmaker, 2010; Adang, 2011; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Bruce, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Lewis, 2013; Cronje, 2014; Twala, 2014). The police's use of violence during an outbreak of protests such as the firing of rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the crowd is blamed for escalating the situation into violence (Langa, 2011a; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011). Furthermore, the police are alleged to have shot randomly at people (Dawson, 2010), even those who were not protesting, but gathered for a different purpose (Twala, 2014). In addition to the use of tear gas, Bryant (2008) notes that dogs were also used to disperse protestors. von Holdt (2011a) and Langa (2011a) found that the protesters are unlikely to behave violently when the local police are called to manage the situation. However, once the special unit is called, the protesters can act differently (Langa, 2011a).

People also act violently during protests because they know that the possibility of punishment is minimal (Mbazira, 2013). In addition, Musitha (2016), and van der Merwe (2013) argue that when protestors burn state properties such as clinics, the state is thus punished, as these were built by the state. Similarly, Booysen (2009), Mathoho (2011), Nyar and Wray (2012), as well as Zama (2013) put forth that the local government is the one that feels the extent of the people's anger when they are frustrated with the failure of the national and provincial government.

CHAPTER FIVE

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

There are both positive and negative consequences of violent protests, with the positive effects being that the protesters at many times have achieved their goals (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Booysen, 2007; Herbolzheimer, 2009; Crais, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011). Violent protests may negatively affect the government, the communities as well as private companies. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) put forth that a violent protest is likely to affect the community in a negative way as it may divert the attention of the government away from issues that they have to deal with, such as service delivery, to address the collective violence that has just erupted.

Crais (2011) regards violence to be a force that has long-lasting irreversible consequences such as the destruction that is evident on the human body. SALGA (2015) states that the municipality is the one that is highly affected by violent protests as the infrastructure that is destroyed in the process belongs to the sphere of this government. On the other hand, von Holdt (2011a) argues that the citizens severely suffer the aftermath of the protests more than the government. When clinics are burnt, the poor people might not have money to consult private doctors.

5.2 NEGATIVE OUTCOMES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

5.2.1 Violence may cause fear in people

Violent protests may trigger fear in community members of being victimised during the outbreak of riots. EWN (2018) reports that some community members from Krugersdorp where houses suspected of drug dealing were burnt, feared for their safety. They also feared that their houses might be mistaken to be serving as drug dens and therefore set alight. According to Seferiades and Johnston (2012), the use of violent methods during protests to achieve a goal may alienate public opinion, more

especially when media coverage “demonises” the events. In this regard, violence may easily scare the community members who are not partaking in the protests and thus they refuse to join in the struggles (Seferiades & Johnston, 2012). Moreover, the majority may not favour violent tactics because they believe in demonstrating without engaging in any form of violence.

5.2.2 Loss of life and the injury of people

Violent protests can result in the loss of life. There are scholars who give an account of people that were injured or who died during an outbreak of violent protest (Desai, 2002; von Holdt, 2011a; Bruce, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Ngangisa, 2014). This section will report on some of the deaths that occurred during protests. In certain areas, some protesters and passers-by died after being shot by the police, by traffic officers and even by security guards when trying to disperse them (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Goldstone, 2012; Bruce, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Ngangisa, 2014; EWN, 2017a). During the eviction of the people in 1998, Desai (2002) reports that the situation turned into a confrontation with armed city council security personnel, where tear gas was thrown at a pregnant woman. This resulted in the woman giving birth to a deformed baby, while another woman who was injured during the confrontation died weeks later.

There are groups that protest using violence against their rivalries and this may result in the loss of life. For example, an Uber driver died from serious wounds when the car he was driving was set alight allegedly by a rivalry group which is suspected to be the Meter taxi operators in Pretoria as they had been fighting with Uber for a while (eNCA, 2017; Haden, 2017). Concurrently, Bruce (2014) also reports that an opposing group of protestors in Sebokeng fired shots that resulted in the death of a protestor.

Passers-by are also caught in the cross-fire of violent demonstrations (Magubane, 2014; EWN, 2017a; Goba, 2017; Daniel, 2018). During a protest, the security officers at Durban University of Technology [DUT] shot a student during confrontations (E-tv, 6 February 2019; News24, 2019; The Citizen, 2019). It is alleged that prior to the shooting, the students stoned buildings at the campus while fighting for funding delays

by the National Student Financial aid [NSFAS], accommodation and delayed registration processes (E-tv news, 6 February 2019; The Citizen, 2019).

In Gladysville, some protestors unintentionally caused the death of a person that they considered as a foreigner through their actions. They looted a shack belonging to the foreigner and set it alight, without noticing the presence of a person who was hiding from them under the bed (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011). Desai (2002:106) reports on the ENGEN workers' strike as "*crippling and violent*". During this strike, a young person was stabbed to death and others were beaten because they served as replacement labourers when the workers were on strike.

Both protesters and the police are reported to have been injured during the violent protests (Neuman, 2017; Daniel, 2018). In Hamburg, 196 police officers were reported to have been injured and many protesters were taken to hospital (Neuman, 2017; Oltermann, 2017). During the outbreak of protests, the protesters may suffer injury caused by the police through the use of rubber bullets to disperse the rioters (Reicher, 1984; Wines, 2005; Chauke, 2013; Montsho, 2010; Tau, 2013). Some people are injured because of the protesters for example, a Golden Arrow bus was stoned during a taxi strike that resulted in the injury of a woman in Cape Town (Evans, 2017). Further, Desai (2002) gives an account of a serious injury of a chief marshal when he tried to tell the masses to go back when they had pushed a metal gate to the ground.

The Star (2011) reports that the houses of a councillor and an ex-councillor were set alight. The most disturbing part about the burning of the houses is that in one of the houses, children were inside when it was set alight. Even pregnant women have been injured during violent protests as reported by EWN (2017b) as well as Thomas (2018) and this posed risks to the unborn babies.

5.2.3 The arrest of protesters

Some protesters have been arrested for; looting during protests, for public violence and for burning houses belonging to government officials or the burning of government offices (Wines, 2005; Da Costa & Carter, 2007; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Montsho, 2010; Selebi, 2012; News24, 2013; Tau, 2013; Bruce, 2014; Neuman, 2017). The arrest of

protestors for burning houses suspected of housing drugs and those that were also serving as brothels, has been reported by Pijoo and Chabalala (2018).

The arrest of protest leaders may fuel more violence. The arrest of the leaders resulted in the police's failure to calm the situation as the protestors changed their demands from what they were initially demanding to demanding the release of the leaders (Mlamla, 2018). Being arrested is not something good to be associated with because a successful conviction can result in a criminal record for the convicted offender, thereby limiting their opportunities. Instead of yielding good results, the violent protests may indirectly produce outcomes that the citizens were fighting against.

5.2.4 Loss of the economy

Community unrests may result in a huge financial loss when shops are looted; and government, as well as private buildings are torched (Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Mavungu, 2011; Bruce, 2014). In this regard, the government has to allocate more financial resources to rebuilt or renovate the community buildings that were destroyed in the process. For example, Platinum Weekly (2012:4) states that, "*An example can be noted on the Kanana and Moruleng protest where a bus company suffered a loss of 1.5 million after some of their busses were burned during an outbreak of violent protests*". Similarly, an estimation on the damage at both Malamulele (Chauke, 2013) and Vuwani (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017) is millions of Rands.

Furthermore, in Khutsong, Bernstein and Johnston (2007) as well as Matebesi and Botes (2011) report that the violent protests resulted in damages that amounted to R75 million both on private and public property. The municipality also experienced loss as they were unable to render services and this failure promoted the culture of non-payment of services (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). May (2011a) acknowledges that the non-payment of rates is nonviolent, but the consequences are not good, as it may result in the municipality failing to render services. The failure to deliver services may in turn lead to violent protests, as the literature indicates in Chapter 4.2.14 (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Managa, 2012; van Vuuren, 2012; Salgado, 2013; Zama, 2013; Musitha, 2016).

In Zwelihle, the protestors' anger led to the burning of the recycling plant (Molyneaux, 2018). The current researcher argues that there were people who were making a living by recycling materials. The destroying of the plant might have resulted in people failing to provide for themselves, as they would not be making money. On the other hand, it might take a long time to fix the damaged property. The owners of the plant also might have had to face unplanned financial losses.

Protesters do not only direct their anger on the relevant people; as even those who did not trigger their anger feel the wrath. For example, Johnston and Seferiades (2012) as well as Kanellopoulos (2012) report that in the 2008 Greek uprisings, not only the police vehicles were set on fire, because many stores and banks were completely destroyed. There were no relations between the stores, banks, and the source of their anger; nonetheless, they suffered the wrath of the protestors. In addition, Johnston, and Seferiades (2012) put forth that the rioters threw Molotov cocktails and stones at the stores. Likewise, looting occurred before the shops were set on fire. As a result, a massive economic loss was experienced.

Johnston and Bernstein's (2007) research found that small businesses are the ones that suffer the most during community unrests. Furthermore, in Khutsong, the businesses that suffered massively were those that are found in predominantly black townships as these areas could not be reached quickly by the police, as they were barricaded (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007). In contrast, the businesses in traditional white areas did not suffer that much when compared with the former.

The burial of people who die during the insurgence may have financial impacts on families. For example, the family of a boy shot at Nancefield station during the outbreak of violence, battled to raise money to bury their child. In addition, Goba (2017) reports that they were living in extreme poverty, where a family of nine were living in a two-room shack. As such, they desperately needed financial assistance to cover the funeral costs.

5.2.5 Loss of school time, disruption and endangering of human lives

Opp (2001) argues that by participating in protests, the protesters incur loss by spending time in the demonstrations. They lose time that they could make use of in other activities that are beneficial. Time is lost also when schools are disrupted during an outbreak of violent protests (Mavungu, 2011; Lekaba, 2014; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Clutterbuck (1986) argues that the right to peaceful protests is vital to liberal democracies because it provides a reasonable opportunity for people to bring their grievances into light, instead of using violent means. Nevertheless, this opportunity brings with it the disruption of community life and some elements of intimidation.

A German chancellor responded to the violent protests in Hamburg by indicating that the violent demonstrations endangered the lives of the police officers, security forces as well as those of the residents (Neuman, 2017; Eddy & Shimer, 2017). Violent protests may also disrupt community life when official vehicles that are supposed to render services are prohibited to enter the area and do some work. This was evident in Khutsong where community projects had to cease due to community unrests (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). An outbreak of violent protests disrupted the lives of immigrants who owned shops in Azania. These immigrants had to seek shelter from the police following the attack on their shops. After the event, some returned to their shops, while others left the area (Langa, 2011a). Meanwhile, the destruction of the councillors' houses during protests has been described as resulting in psychological damage (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007).

The learners experience educational loss during protests as there are sometimes prohibited from going to school. For example, the learners from Vuwani were denied the right to go to school, as such, they missed many valuable learning hours (MLFM, 14 September 2017). Similarly, in Krugersdorp, the evacuation of learners in schools occurred following an outbreak of violence during a protest (CNS News, 2018a). Likewise, Botes *et al.* (2007b) state that in Khutsong, the teachers used protests as a shield not to do their jobs as they sent children home. These teachers are accused of sending children home during protests, even though the protests had not prohibited them from going to school.

5.2.6 The effects of violent protests on service delivery and transport services

The torching and damaging of the transport system during an outbreak of protests may lead to people getting to work and events late. For example, the torching of the Rea Vaya Bus Station by Riverlea residents rioting for houses (Pijoo, 2017; SABC 2, 28 August 2017) and the torching of a bus during a taxi strike at Cape Town (SABC 2, 18 September 2017) left passengers stranded. Some people arrived late at their workplaces. In the latter incident, the other bus services decided to reduce the number of buses after a bus was set on fire (SABC 2, 18 September 2017). In addition, the Riverlea mob even barricaded roads with rocks and burning tyres (Pijoo, 2017). Community unrests often force drivers to seek alternative roads when the roads that they usually use are barricaded (Evans, 2017). This may result in delays and financial strain, as they have to put more money to cater for the unplanned extra kilometres that they have to travel. Traffic jams may also result, as people have to use limited roads (Wheels24, 2016).

When three Uber cars were set alight and the metered taxis were suspected of being involved in the crime (IOL News, 2017), a police spokesperson in Johannesburg said that it was unacceptable for people to use threats and violence over people's choice of transport (IOL News, 2017). The 1996 Constitution of the RSA, Section 21(1) indicates that all the people within the Republic have the right to move freely. Sometimes, the transport that offers services to the people is burned with the intention to scare away commuters from using specific transport services. This limits people in exercising their democratic right of moving freely as they are compelled to use a specific transport. SABC 2 News (11 September 2017) showed Uber cars burning as they were set alight by people who were in conflict with them who are allegedly the meter taxi operators from Pretoria (eNCA, 2017; Haden, 2017). This study argues that intention of burning the Uber cars was to scar commuters from using it.

The outbreak of unrest may affect the service delivery that occurs when the culture of non-payments surfaces during protests (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007). Moreover, during an outbreak of violent protests, Botes *et al.* (2007) state that in Khutsong, the protestors burned down pay-points as such, the municipal services were put at a

standstill. For example, when electricity pay points are burnt down, the municipality will not be able to sell electricity to communities.

5.2.7 The violence committed by the state may fuel more violence

The violence that is committed by the state has the likelihood of fuelling more violence by the community members. When people believe they are violently treated, they will in turn respond violently (Duncan, 2005; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Karamoko, 2011; Goldstone, 2012). Goldstone (2012) regards the violence perpetrated by authorities in democratic societies to be the most common reason of violence that is evident during protests. Similarly, Dlamini *et al.* (2011) state that violence is not only a traumatic experience to both the perpetrators and targets, but it can also fuel a cycle of ongoing violence. This can be seen through the response of the speaker from Kungcatsha on the burning down of his house (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011). Moreover, Duncan (2005) put forth that past violence if not resolved, is likely to manifest again, more especially political violence.

Karamoko (2011) highlights that the anger that is generated during violent protests may fuel further violent protests. To clarify this, the author explained using Andries Tatane's death. His supporters became angry and retaliated by setting the library and Home Affairs office on fire. The aggressive acts by the law enforcement officials may raise the likelihood that the protesters' anger will spill over into additional violent protests. Furthermore, Mogapi (2011) states that the killing of the above-mentioned deceased motivated the community to honour his memory by fighting back through violent means. Likewise, Goba (2017) reports that the death of a boy who was not part of a protest that turned violent, made the community of Holomisa informal settlement very angry. They ran away when the security officers fired shots at them, but upon learning about the death of the boy, they ran to the shop and managed to grab the accused security officer and beat him to death (Goba, 2017). Correspondingly, in Krugersdorp, the protesters retaliated by throwing stones and petrol bombs at the police. This occurred after the police had used violent means of dispersing the crowd; they fired rubber bullets, tear gas and stun grenades (Mitchley, 2018).

The violence that is seen occurring in communities can be regarded as the one that fuels violence in the educational system. CNS News (2018b) reports that the students from the Barberton Campus in Mpumalanga torched a vehicle while they were demanding the campus to enrol more students. This study argues that the students behaved in this manner as they had witnessed this kind of behaviour occurring in some communities. Meanwhile, Johnston and Seferiades (2012) report that some students from Athens in Greece marched to the police station where they hurled stones as well as insults at the police officers. This was in response to a police officer who shot and killed an unarmed young person.

Simiti (2012) states that there were riots that erupted in Los Angeles in response to the white jury who failed to prosecute four white police officers who were video recorded brutally beating a black motorist. The riots started in Los Angeles and spread to areas such as San Francisco, Seattle, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and Las Vegas. The residents in these areas also engaged in riotous behaviour to show anger at the racial divide within the American society (Simiti, 2012). Meanwhile, Johnston and Seferiades (2012) note that the violent protests that erupted in Exarcheia in Greece after the police shot and killed a young person spread to Thessaloniki and Patras. Moreover, Goldstone (2012) reports that when the state responds to peaceful protests with harsh and violent repression, especially when the issue affects the majority, it stands to lose its legitimacy with the general population. When more people feel threatened and betrayed by the state's reaction to peaceful protests, many people may join in to fight against the state's actions.

5.2.8 Violent protests may lead to the attack of immigrants

Ngwane (2011) and von Holdt (2011a) argues that the community protests seem to pave a way to violence that is directed to immigrants instead of the state. This is evident, when some public unrests pave a way to xenophobic attacks on immigrants (Burger, 2009; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Mottiar & Bond, 2012; Lekaba, 2014; Nel & Mitchell, 2019). In some instances, the community protests had an element of xenophobic attacks, which became a secondary form of companion to the main activity (von Holdt, 2011a).

Furthermore, Lekaba (2014) indicates that when South Africans are angry with foreign nationals who seized business opportunities in the country, they find an opportunity to vent their frustrations during insurgence. In this regard, when a violent protest erupts, especially on service delivery, the protestors vent their frustrations and anger on immigrants by looting and destroying their businesses (Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Langa, 2011a; Lekaba, 2014). Langa's (2011a) study reveals that during an outbreak of protests in Azania, the attacks on the shops that were owned by foreign nationals on the first day of the protests seem to have occurred on the spur-of-the-moment, where even the elderly people were seen looting. Tilly (2003) regards the events that occur spontaneously as opportunistic violence because the protestors in these events tend to feel greed and lust, and hence they loot from the shops.

Public unrests provide an advantage to grab high priced merchandise from foreign owned shops. In addition, the use of violence has also been justified as sending a clear message to the government that they were caring for immigrants more than the South African born nationals (Langa, 2011a). Moreover, Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) state that foreign nationals are blamed for drug pushing, and for taking wives as well as jobs from the South Africans. The study of Sinwell *et al.* (2009) reveals that some foreign nationals were publicly declared as evil. Karamoko (2011) notes the challenge in accurately measuring the extent to which immigrants and their property have been targeted during protests. Nevertheless, according to the previous mentioned author, the attack on immigrants seems to be more prevalent during protests.

von Holdt and Alexander (2011) argue that public protests have the ability to unite communities, while the attack on immigrants only causes divisions. How public protests united communities is evident from the findings of Bernstein and Johnston's (2007) research. The study reveals that a diverse group consisting of, for example, unemployed, school-age youth, different racial groups, and business people amongst others worked together in the struggle. Moreover, Kanellopoulos (2012) states that the 2008 Greek protests depicted the actions of solidarity in various cities. Furthermore, Desai (2002) puts forth that the protests in Mpumalanga against the installation of water meters united the people from different political structures and they fought with one voice. In addition, Reicher (1984) states that the participants in St. Paul riots acted together and spoke with one voice against what they considered as oppression and

harassment from the police, after the arrest of a member of their community. Moreover, they considered themselves as a collective mouthpiece (Reicher, 1984).

It is not only in South Africa where dissenters attacked immigrants during protests. Goldstone (2012) reports that in the Rodney King riots in Los Angeles, in the United States, the riots spread from black communities to downtown and they attacked immigrant Korean-owned businesses. In these riots, the protestors looted, destroyed, and torched stores and vehicles. von Holdt (2011b) argues that the attacks on foreigners may incite more violence, as the targets may respond with violence. The previous author's research found that in Trouble, which is a place situated at Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, the foreign nationals responded to the attack on their business by arming themselves with big and long machines guns. Research informants described the machines as something that they had never seen.

5.3. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter has highlighted that violence can cause fear in some members of the community (Seferiades & Johnson, 2012). On the other hand, people may die or suffer injury during the outbreak of violent protests (Reicher, 1984; Desai, 2002; Malapo & Ngubeni, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Magubane, 2014; Ngangisa, 2014; Haden, 2017; Neuman, 2017; Daniel, 2018). Some protestors died due to the police's violent actions, after they were shot with rubber bullets (Montsho, 2010; Goldstone, 2012; Bruce, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014); while some were injured or even died due to the rioters' actions (Desai, 2002; Evans, 2017; Haden, 2017). Goba (2017) states that the shooting of people during protests was also extended to standers. In addition, there were injuries that also occurred on the police (Reicher, 1984; Oltermann, 2017).

This chapter showed that some protestors had been arrested for public violence (Selebi, 2012; Tau, 2013); while millions of rands have also been lost when properties were burnt during unrests (Burger, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Mottiar & Bond, 2012; Platinum Weekly, 2012; Chauke, 2013; Bruce, 2014; Lekaba, 2014; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Some people could not even pay for their loved ones' funeral who died during the protests (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Chabalala, 2017; Goba, 2017). This chapter reflected that the violent protests have an impact on

service delivery, for example in occasions where an angry mob destroys pay points (Botes *et al.*, 2007b). The police's use of violent measures to disperse peaceful protesters may lead to violent confrontations, and the demonstrators might react violently (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Johnston & Seferiades, 2012).

Furthermore, the chapter also indicated that public protests have resulted in the violent attacks of immigrants (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; Mottiar & Bond, 2012; von Holdt, 2011a; Lekaba, 2014; Nel & Mitchell, 2019). The attack on immigrants caused divisions within the community (von Holdt & Alexander, 2011); while Desai (2002), von Holdt and Alexander (2011) as well as Kanellopoulos (2012) put forth that the community protests unite communities. Furthermore, Malapo and Ngubeni (2011) found that the immigrants were attacked during the outbreak of protests because they are believed to be selling drugs, and of taking the wives as well as jobs that belonged to the South African born nationals. Moreover, the protestors consider their actions to be justified when they attack the immigrants as they see the government as caring more for the immigrants than for them (Langa, 2011a).

CHAPTER SIX

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Social theory informs the researchers' understanding of issues which can assist them when making research decisions and it also make sense of the world around them (May, 2011b). The Collective Violence Theory is applied to this study of the violent protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani. The above-mentioned theory has been selected to explain the violent protests that occurred as a collective behaviour as the acts were not done by an individual, but by a group of people (Chauke, 2013; Tiva, 2013; Paterson & Power, 2016; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). According to Opp (2001), Tilly (2003), Adang (2011), as well as Littman and Paluck (2015), the definition of collective violence does not include the behaviour that is committed by an individual, but it refers to the behaviour by a group of people who act together for a common purpose. Drury's (2002) research found that the protestors used the term 'witch-hunt' to suggest that the individual whose behaviour is undesirable should be punished through collective action. Moreover, the members of the group have to act together to punish the perpetrator.

Tilly (2003) considers collective violence to be a form of contentious politics because the entire group benefits. The protestors engage in violent protests because they believe by doing so their voices will be heard. This is evident in Bryant's (2008) study where the participants highlighted that in several meetings that they held with the government, their voices were only heard after protesting, when they blocked a road. These protestors describe the event as "*the struggle is the voice of silent victims*" (Bryant, 2008:49).

Adang (2011) states that societies sometimes experience a random outburst of collective violence, which can emerge as urban riots or even soccer hooliganism. Reicher (1984) as well as Kotronaki and Seferiades (2012) share the same sentiment that riots share a common characteristic of bursting out unexpectedly. Simiti (2012), SALGA (2015), Breakfast *et al.* (2016), as well as Mooijman *et al.* (2018) found that

collective violence is spontaneous outbursts that result from the frustrations experienced by the community. Tilly (2003) compares collective behaviour to the weather; through the fact that they are both complicated, changing, and unpredictable. Vider (2004) agrees that collective violent behaviour is difficult to predict, hence researchers study crowd violence only after it occurred.

Oberschall (1994) and Opp (2001) point out that protests are likely to have a successful outcome when a large number of people attend them. According to Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), combined events and conditions are more likely to provide room that is conducive for collective violence. These conditions could be historical, political, or social among others. Beinart (1992) and Schneider (1993) allege that collective violence might be seen an expression of extensive conflicts that reflect the monopolising of power that it seeks to break.

In addition, Duncan (2005) states that collective violence is more likely to encourage reactive violence. This occurs because the behaviour is highly noticed. When people start to barricade roads, loot shops, or burn buildings, they make the behaviour noticeable as they live visible signs. An example of reactive violence is found in Bundy's (1987) research where the author gives an account of how police reacted to fighting amongst teenagers at schools by using force in Mexico. The use of force also attracted more reaction from other student revolutionaries who also met the brutal police's reaction. The group barricaded themselves from the police by hiding in schools. Furthermore, Bundy (1987) indicates that to defuse the situation, the military was called and shot at the revolting students, and that ended with several people dead; while the survivors were taken to prison, including the academic professors (Bundy, 1987).

Furthermore, Akinboade *et al.* (2013:465) state that when members of the community are dissatisfied with the government's service provision, they may engage in what is called "*collective voice pressure politic*"; where they engage in collective protests. According to Simiti (2012), research indicates that collective violence is likely to occur on the first days in which the riot has erupted. To support this statement, the author cites Martin *et al.* (2009) who note that during the proceeding of the riots, new actors join, wherein they take advantage of the situation. Kanellopoulos (2012) also notes

that the severity of the damage that protests cause is felt during the first three days. The previous author further states that in the 2008 Greece protests, there were no expectations that people would react to the police's killing of an unarmed youth in a collective violent manner.

6.2 REASONS PROTESTERS ENGAGE IN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

According to Oberschall (1994), people have a choice of whether to participate in collective behaviour or not. Their choice is based on the rewards and the losses that their participation will yield. If they realise that there are certain gains that they cannot manage to get by themselves, but they can be acquired if the demand is made as a collective, they are likely to participate in collective action (Oberschall, 1994; Opp, 2001). Furthermore, Tilly (2003) states that people choose to participate in collective violence based on their own ideas of what they believe to be the proper and improper use of violent methods.

6.2.1 The influence of the apartheid regime on collective violence

Mogapi (2011) indicates that collective violence in South Africa is influenced by the traumatic past that was brought about by apartheid and the paradox of new democracy. According to Bloom (1996), if certain survival strategies tend to work for individuals today, tomorrow the people whom these strategies have worked for will tend to continue using these strategies. People repeat the past collective violence because it proved to work. Traumatic re-enactment is considered by the previous mentioned author to be a re-enactment of the traumatic past. Events are thus repeated because they seem to work (Bloom, 1996), hence the protestors use apartheid strategies because they have worked before, which implies that they can still work now. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) found a connection between the songs people sung during the apartheid regime and the songs people sing during the current protests. As such, they link the history of protests to the apartheid regime.

6.2.2 Collective violence is an effective mechanism

Collective violence is used because it has been instrumental in the past in influencing societal change (Schneider, 1993). Zeitz *et al.* (2009) state that people are more likely to engage in conflict after realising that such conflict will yield the desired outcomes. Dlamini *et al.* (2011) put forth that the members of the community of Kungcatsha celebrated the victory of a new leader to the council, after he won the by-elections. In their celebration, they sang struggle songs and *toyitoyied*. The above-mentioned authors further state that they were endorsing that collective violence works. della Porta and Gbikpi (2012) regard riots as a political tool that people use as an instrument for negotiations. In most instances, collective violence has proved to be effective and going in the direction that is desired by the participants. For violence to occur, there needs to be an actor as well as the target and the behaviour can only occur because of the interaction between these two (Adang, 2011).

von Holdt and Alexander (2012) argue that when examining Karl Marx's position, it appears that violence works as an effective tool of yielding good outcomes. When looking at the history of South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, it could be seen that it was necessary for some degree of force and violence from the oppressed to force the removal of the apartheid governance, as it did not remove itself, but it was removed by the people. Fanon (1963) argues that people who are exploited realise that they have to use all means available for liberating themselves, among the various ways available for them, force is the first one to be considered to achieve the goal. These underprivileged people discover that the only road to success is through the application of violence.

Dlamini (2011), von Holdt (2011a), Orderson (2012), and van der Merwe (2013) put forth that violence is a shared language that is understood by both the protesters as well as the state, bosses at work and even rivalry groups. In support of the above statement, Matebesi and Botes (2011) state that the Khutsong residents acted by engaging in collective violence to force the government to reverse its decision on the demarcation process. Furthermore, Marais *et al.* (2008) found that the members of the Phumelela community engaged in collective violence to force the government to act on their plea as other measures had failed. Meanwhile, von Holdt (2011a) gives an

account of what one participant said on how violence can be used as a way of calling the higher authorities. The participant said, “*The premier undermines us. He’ll see by the smoke we’re calling him*” (von Holdt, 2011a:27).

Furthermore, von Holdt (2011a) explains that the comment made by participant in the paragraph above is an indication that collective violence is a means of pushing the authorities to recognise that the powerless also have the ability to make their collective demands heard. The current researcher argues that by using the smoke to call the premier, it means they burnt government property so that when the premier sees it in flames, he will respond. The use of the smoke to call the leadership was also evident in the Alexandra protests that erupted on the 3rd of April 2019. The protestors burnt fires on the road as a way of calling their mayor to come and listen to their grievances (Simelane, 2019).

The burning, destruction, and the damaging of government properties seemed to work in a number of protests. Peaceful protests failed to attract the necessary response from the government, but collective violence seemed to work. It was able to bring even those that have been labelled to be uncaring officials who distanced themselves from the communities that they supposedly served (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Dlamini, 2011; Langa, 2011b). Thus, the smoke and the destruction of properties have been able to bring the government closer to the community (Dlamini, 2011). Seferiades and Johnston (2012) put forth that sometimes the protesters may plan to use violence to attract attention and also assure the public that they are committed to the struggle.

6.2.3 The influence of the leadership on protestors to act violently

Adang (2011) argues that any crowd can become a mob when the actions of the leaders suggest to the crowd that they have to act unruly during a confrontation. Schweingruber (2000) puts forth that the leaders are more likely to influence a crowd to become destructive. In addition, Diani (2012) states that collective action is promoted by the availability of the organisational infrastructure that is capable of stimulating confrontational forms of protests on a regular basis. With regard to the influence of the leadership to a crowd becoming unruly, Molapo and Ngubeni (2011)

as well as von Holdt (2011a) argue that the formal leadership of protests is quick to rebuke collective violence. They regard it to be the work of criminals, by so doing they are making themselves not to be blamed for the outbreak of violence.

On the other hand, Mogapi (2011) argues that mass meetings seem to offer an opportunity to engage in collective violence. These meetings are held mainly in stadiums where a large group of people congregate. In these large crowds of people, highly charged, unifying emotions may be prevalent and thereby offer opportunities for collective violence. Moreover, Bryant (2008) states that members of Kennedy Road decided to block the road after the failure by the councillor to come and listen to their grievances in a mass meeting. Meanwhile Desai (2002) states that during a mass meeting, the workers from ENGEN decided to march to the police station to verify if arrests had been made, where upon reaching the police station, they pelted stones and damaged windows. Similarly, the Chatsworth residents marched after a mass meeting and cut off the electricity of a councillor revenging the water and electricity that was cut off (Desai, 2002). The arguments brought by Bryant (2008), Mogapi (2011) and Desai (2002) clearly point out how people influence each other to engage in collective violence during mass meetings.

6.2.4 Relative deprivation

When members from disadvantaged groups feel that they are being deprived, they are more likely to become angry, which in turn leads to collective violence (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). When these people feel that their interests are not considered, they see collective violence to be the best instrument to use. It can be argued that the Malamulele and Vuwani residents felt that they were being disadvantaged by being demarcated into areas which they did not want, hence they engaged in collective violence. In von Holdt's (2011a) study, the participants indicated that violence was necessary. During the apartheid period, fighting against the state or the collaborators in the community was part of revolution of the apartheid struggle to relieve the relative deprivation experienced.

According to Hough (2008), when people are deprived of something, they find it necessary to revolt. They recognise collective violence as a mechanism that will result in them getting what they want from the government, which other people may already have. The above-mentioned author further states that the people who are deprived link this deprivation to frustration and alienation. Moreover, deprivation may be personal or may be a group experience, and the more severe and widespread the deprivation, the greater the possibility of collective violence (Hough, 2008).

According to Clutterbuck (1986), the freedom of speech allows people to bring their grievances to the government. Nevertheless, when persuasion through elected assemblies fails (such as ward councillors), the media and the right to demonstrate peacefully fail, and people become frustrated. Because of the frustration and the humiliation that is experienced when their request is not accepted, the dissenters may find the only option available after persuasion failed being to turn to indirect, illegal, or violent means to deal with the betrayal of trust (Clutterbuck, 1986; Jili, 2012).

6.2.5 Anger and frustration may promote collective violence

Anger and frustration may result in an unintended escalation of collective violence (Fakir & Moloji, 2011; Jili, 2012; Mchunu & Theron, 2013). Leonard *et al.* (2011) argue that when most members of the group are angry about treatment that they regard as unfair or unjust, their emotions can serve as an effective tool that motivates them to maintain social justice through collective violence (Leonard *et al.*, 2011). Furthermore, the afore mentioned scholars state that when groups view a situation as discriminatory, they will be motivated by acting collectively to counter the discrimination. The current researcher puts forth that these are the very same groups that are seen engaging in collective violence as they seek to avenge the actions that they regard as unjust, discriminatory, or unfair.

The collective motivation of acting violent when people are angry is evident in Reicher's (1984) study. The author explains that people came from their homes and joined in the attacks on police officers who did nothing to them. As a collective, they motivated and supported each other to engage in violence. Furthermore, Reicher (1984) explains that the people were not even there when the police did what

according to them was unjust by arresting an owner of a café and another man, during a raid to investigate allegations on the illegal selling of alcohol. As the owner and the other man were part of the community, the researcher opines that the residents were motivated to show solidarity by collectively attacking the police who were outsiders arresting members of their society.

6.2.6 Police's role in pushing protestors to engage in collective violence

Kirsten and von Holdt (2011) state that the police can play a major role in the outbreak of collective violence. This results from their absence from the scenes of protests as well as their use of collective violence against protesting citizens (Schweingruber, 2000; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). A crowd can engage in collective violence when they see police action as unreasonable. This could happen when the police apply force by using teargas and rubber bullets to disperse a crowd (Schweingruber, 2000; Adang, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Lewis, 2013; Cronje, 2014; Ngangisa, 2014; Twala, 2014; Mitchley, 2018). The use of force in peaceful protests may provoke the protestors to respond in a violent manner.

According to Reicher (1984), the activists who participated in St. Paul's riots describe themselves as the community, while the police whom they pelted stones at were described as outsiders. This explains their behaviour of pelting stones at the police and setting cars on fire. The opposition arrested the café owner whom they regarded as their own, as such they saw the act as an oppression, hence the need to fight against their oppressors with collective violence.

6.2.7 Failure to resolve long-standing grievances

Long-standing grievances of corruption have resulted in collective violence in Dlamini's (2011) study. The members of the community had raised concerns about corruption and poor service delivery for many years. Their grievances failed to attract the attention of the relevant office, as such they rioted. The very same community had also complained of nepotism and unacceptable employment practices (Dlamini, 2011). The municipality was also pointed at as excelling in tariff increases, and it was indicated that the municipality did not miss the date of these increases while members

of the community were failing to see the value of their money because they did not see what the money was being spent on (Dlamini, 2011). Mothoagae (2013) argues that people protest because they are tired of corruption and cannot sit back anymore and remain victims. They use protests to voice their concerns as they also contributed to the liberation from the apartheid government.

6.2.8 Collective violence can reassert young men's power

The research by Kirsten and von Holdt (2011) as well as that by Bandeira and Higson-Smith's (2011) reveal that young men are more likely to engage in collective violence. Furthermore, Dlamini *et al.* (2011) state that many of these young men that engage in violent protests are unemployed, live-in poverty and have no hope of their circumstances changing. Their circumstances frustrate them; they do not provide them with the opportunity to participate as full citizens in the economy and society (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011). Furthermore, the lack of economic means to start families or even to maintain girlfriends undermines their masculinity. Collective violence thus provides them with an opportunity to demonstrate their masculinity and reassert their power, as the economy does not provide them with such. In addition, when they participate in violent protests, they are then able to experience themselves as representing their communities by fighting on their behalf (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011).

6.2.9 Group dynamics and social networks

Group dynamics play a role in collective violence. Beinart (2010) states that where protests have an element of violence included, they are a by-product of group dynamics. This simply means that when a group of people have gathered, they are more likely to influence each other. Moreover, Simiti (2012) notes that riots bring a group of people together who might have never participated in formal or contentious politics. These groups may intensify the confusion that already exists about the political or non-political identity of rioters, meaning that the rioters might not be sure of whether they are politicians or not. Moreover, Simiti (2012:144) puts forth that riots, just "*like social movements does not occur in a social vacuum, but in communities with associational and informal networks*". They activate social ties, even though these ties may be informal and local, on the other hand, they may not be associated with any

broader networks that can help in providing resources that can help in the long-term to sustain mobilisation.

Schweingruber (2000) and Mooijman *et al.* (2018) state that when a person is in a group, he/she is easily absorbed. The group mind becomes a controlling factor in the individual who is within a crowd, the person is easily influenced to engage in mob violence. In addition, Littman and Paluck (2015) indicate that even people who have never engaged in violence can easily be recruited to participate in collective violence especially when they see people that they associate with engaging in the violence. Additionally, some may even engage collectively in the killing of people when people whom they know do such (Littman & Paluck, 2015).

Simiti (2012) notes that riots differ from social movements with regard to the assembling process which is considered to be more centralised in social movements as compared to riots. The author further states that collective violence can be easily promoted by the informal circulation of rumours through family and friends. Moreover, group dynamics in this regard play a significant role as rumours can be easily transmitted from one person to another within a group and thereby lead to collective violence. Vider (2004) states that rumours serve as an informal communication that may lead to collective violence. People who spread rumours “create their own versions of events” that lead to collective violent behaviour (Vider, 2004:157).

Riots may take place within a social movement’s cycle of protest and social movements may emerge from the riot events. Reicher (1984) explains the behaviour of St. Paul’s riots from an activist’s point of view that the riot was not organised, but it occurred spontaneously. In comparison, Rucht (2012) states that informal groups are more likely to use violence in their protests, unlike formal groups. This might be because in formal groups, the members are well known and the leadership is well recognised; while in informal groups, people are not well recognised, this implies that they cannot be punished for their actions.

Furthermore, della Porta and Diani (2006) state the importance of social networks in collective violence, as collective action may occur because of the people's connection. The link between people may encourage participation in collective action. Social networks can also develop when people become involved in collective action. These links can also encourage the participation of people in further collective action as they are connected to each other, and it becomes easier to engage in collective action with people they know (della Porta & Diani, 2006).

Moreover, social networks can build strong relationship between people who participate in collective action and thus make it possible for the participants to sustain the collective action over time. Tiva (2013) reports that the violence in Malamulele with regard to the demarcation began in 2013 and lasted until 2017. The community members were able to sustain their collective actions over a long period because of the social networks. They can be said to have been connected to each other, as such it was easier for them to engage in collective action over a prolonged period, as they gained encouragement and support from each other.

6.3 FORMS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

There are various forms of collective violence. This section will highlight some of the forms of collective violence, for example, scattered attacks and broken negotiations.

6.3.1 Scattered attacks

Seferiades and Johnston (2012) state that a scattered attack occurs as a by-product of, for example oppression and at the same time, it can occur simultaneously with non-violent actions. This occurs when protesting crowds engage in violent tactics to register their discontent. This is shown through property destruction. However, this is not a coordinated effort by many people who are protesting, as only one group participates in violence (low coordination). These scattered attacks are said to usually be strategic actions that are planned and are instrumentally rational (Seferiades & Johnston, 2012).

6.3.2 Broken negotiations

According to Seferiades and Johnston (2012), as well as Tilly (2003), broken negotiations occur when non-violent protests entirely turn violent because of the authorities' lack or response to peaceful protests. The people do not intend to act violent, collective violence thus becomes a by-product of the failure to reach agreements. Moreover, Tilly (2003) states that broken negotiations have the opportunity of causing much damage in activities that were not intended to be violent.

6.4 KEY ACTORS IN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

According to Greene (1974), revolutionary movements succeed when they mobilise masses from all walks of life, for example, when the movement comprises of workers, marginalised members of the society, and the middle class. Success is guaranteed when the revolutionary movements have support from external foreign states and are also appealing to sympathisers (Greene, 1974).

6.4.1 Unemployed youth and marginalised communities

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Langa (2011a), Platinum Weekly (2012), Mbazira (2013), as well as SALGA (2015) put forth that the unemployed youths who are frustrated by unemployment, experience poverty and lack access to opportunities are the ones in the forefront of collective violence. As these youths lack access to money, they find an opportunity to access free groceries during unrests. In addition, Platinum Weekly (2012), and SALGA (2015) state that the underprivileged communities are willing to embark on collective violence where they also vandalise properties. Mbazira (2013) argues that the organisers of the protests are able to appeal to the unemployed youth who are living in poverty to use them to express their frustration with the government who has not met their needs. Moreover, Mbazira (2013) acknowledges that other disgruntled members of communities are also part of the protests, however, the youth are more visible because they are the ones who engage in the running battles with the police.

According to Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), as well as Rucht (2012), the youth are more likely to use disruptive and violent ways. This is possibly because of the levels of energy they have, as such they are able to escalate collective actions into collective violence (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). Greene (1974) also highlights this trend of young males participating in collective violence, by stating that the followers of revolutionary movements tend to be young males who are unmarried.

Dlamini's (2011) study found that in Voortrekker, the young people were the ones who were seen to be engaging in the collective violence of destroying property. However, both young and old women were present in the major events of the burning of homes as well as that of municipal property. Nevertheless, the young men are the ones who were pointed out as responsible for the burning of properties (Dlamini, 2011). Furthermore, the key actors in the collective violence attended school together, played or watched soccer together and were drinking partners (Dlamini, 2011); hence, they were able to influence each other to engage in collective violence.

6.4.2 The role of students in public protests

Clutterbuck (1986) describes students to be people who join in protests movements because of the concern of the inequalities of modern life. After spending time in the movement for the struggle, they found protests and marches to have little effect. Many then decide to drop out of the movement, while some remain. Clutterbuck (1986) further states that those who remain make their demonstrations to be more disruptive and violent with the aim of attracting attention to their concerns.

Furthermore, Johnston (2012) states that the student movements as well as the youth movements are more likely to take part in collective violence and also in small, organised extremist dissenting groups that apply violent tactics. Loutous (2012:184) states that, "*high school students have been the most impressive and lively sections of the movement*" in Greek protests. These youths marched to the city centres, while some remained in their localities. The police became their targets, where in they pelted stones at the windows of a police station and other buildings that symbolise the state (Loutous, 2012).

6.5 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

6.5.1 Introduction

Social movements play an important role in collective violence (Desai, 2002; Buhlungu, 2006; della Porta & Diani, 2006; Bryant, 2008; Bond & Dugard, 2010; Rosenthal, 2010; Bosi & Giugni, 2012; Piven, 2012; Simiti, 2012). They can influence the use of disruptive behaviour during protests (della Porta & Diani, 2006). According to Narsiah and Maharaj (1999), in South Africa, social movements have become very important in the post-apartheid period to ensure that the state exercises democracy. Moreover, social movements also broaden and deepen civil society and even create institutions that increase democratic participation in governmental matters. della Porta and Diani (2006) put forth that the aim of social movements is not based only on changing policies, but also on influencing change on societal priorities in how the society functions.

Piven (2012) states that movements are effective when they are successful in persuading people to break the rules than to cooperate in an institutionalised social life. Effectiveness can be seen for example, when people from the informal settlement in Orange Farm engaged in collective violence where they damaged the PPMs and physically prevented employees from installing the PPMs (Bond & Dugard, 2010). The protests organised by social movements are likely to succeed because they are able to attract many people through social media such as Twitter and Facebook to form part of the protests' activity (Jost, Bonneau, Langer, Metzger, Nagler, Sterling & Tucker, 2018).

Bryant (2008) states that the very same people who fought against the apartheid government participate in protests in large numbers against the post-apartheid government that they elected into office. These people are dissatisfied with the new policies that were put in place by the democratic government. As such, they take to the street to protest (Bryant, 2008). Moreover, Desai (2002) reports on the social movement called the Durban Social Forum which was established in 2001 to protest against the South African government for hosting the showpiece world Conference against Racism in Durban. In Tafelsig, Cape Town, due to evictions with heavy force

that resulted in the injury of people, a group of people formed an Anti-Eviction Campaign (Desai, 2002).

6.5.2 Formation of social movements

Mbazira (2013) put forth that South Africa's protest history is inspired by strong social movements. Many protests, even though they appear to occur on the spur-of-the-moment, are usually well organised and planned during open public meetings (Mbazira, 2012). Ballard, Habib and Valodia (2006) state that the marginalised communities who are socially excluded and are the concerned groups about their well-being use social movements as mechanisms to influence change and claim recognition from the government. The social movements may result from the frustrations caused by the many problems which the government failed to address (Desai, 2002; Bryant, 2008). People regard this failure as broken promises and thereby start holding their own mass meetings and mobilise people to join in the struggle, as was evident in Kenedy Road. In their struggles, the informal kinship and friendship played a significant role in mobilising the people who were living in the settlement and beyond to join in the struggle (Bryant, 2008).

Furthermore, Bryant (2008) highlights that these people have developed into social movements and explains how Durban's Kennedy Road developed into *Abahlali base Mjondolo* [AbM] after being joined by other people from neighbouring settlements who were also not satisfied with the manner in which the government delivered services to them. Social movements can also develop when there are disputes about something. For example, Johnston (2012) reports that in Iran, a social movement called the Green Movement started when there were disputes about the Iranian elections in 2009. In Bushbuckridge, a social movement called Bushbuckridge Border Crisis Committee [BBCC] emerged to oppose the incorporation of their area into the then Northern Province after several attempts to oppose the incorporation seemed not to work (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999).

Social movements have been seen fighting for the interests of the marginalised communities, for example, Bond and Dugard (2010) report about the SECC that was formed to fight against the commercialisation of services such as the PPMs. The installation of such meters was met with resistance in Phiri and other areas such as the informal settlement in Orange Farm where the activists from the social movements destroyed the meters (Bond & Dugard, 2010). Some activists were charged with public violence as well as malicious damage to property when they fought against the installation of the PPMs, of which they realised that it will be an extra burden to the already marginalised communities (Bond & Dugard, 2010).

6.5.3 Collective identity

Reicher (1984) states that crowd behaviour has the ability to create a typical style of social identity. Meanwhile, Oldfield and Stokke (2006) assert that movements are able to organise campaigns because of their collective identity as a community-based movement. This identity serves as a source of strength. In Kennedy Road, Bryant (2008) reports that the social movement created a space that allowed poor people and those who were least educated to be heard, by allowing them to raise their opinions. This research thus argues that the recognition gave them a collective identity, as the illiterate could not be distinguished from the literate in their meetings. Moreover, given the opportunity, these people could be easily influenced to participate in collective violence because their voices are considered in social movements.

6.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter has highlighted that collective behaviour is by a group of people and it is not an individual act (Opp, 2001; Tilly, 2003; Adang, 2011; Littman & Palluck, 2015). The behaviour resembles the weather as it is unpredictable and complicated (Tilly, 2003; Vider, 2004). Collective violence is an effective tool to fight the oppressors, as it brings out the expected response (Fanon, 1963; Oberschall, 1994; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Zeit *et al.*, 2009; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; van der Merwe, 2013). Furthermore, von Holdt (2011a), Seferiades and Johnston (2012) as well as van der Merwe (2013) indicate that collective violence can be used as a

language to communicate, as it is well understood by both the protestors as well as the government.

For example, burning properties is operative in reaching the desired outcome. The smoke serves as a messenger that summons higher authorities to the community (Dlamini, 2011). Furthermore, relative deprivation is caused by frustration and the anger that results from the denial to be given something that others have, which results in collective violence (Clutterbuck, 1986; Hough, 2008; della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012). When people are frustrated and angry at the manner in which the government treats them, they see collective violence as a way to use to reassure themselves that they are important (Bond & Dugard, 2010; Leonard *et al.*, 2011).

This chapter also showed that the availability of the leadership plays a significant role in encouraging collective behaviour (Schweingruber, 2000; Adang, 2011; Diani, 2012). Moreover, the police's action can encourage collective violence when they use violent measures to disperse peaceful protestors (Schweingruber, 2000; Goldstone, 2012). The protestors react to the violence that is portrayed first by the police. On the other hand, the people wait for a long time for their issues to be resolved, and when the government fails to solve it, people become willing to participate in collective violence.

The wearing of disguises such as balaclavas may increase the people's participation in collective violence as they are unidentifiable (Adang, 2011). As collective violence has worked in the past, it gives protestors reasons to continue using it (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Mogapi, 2011). Young unemployed men, living in poverty may find collective violence to be a tool that can reassert their power (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011). As they hold a low status because of their circumstances, collective violence offers them an opportunity to show that they also have power. Moreover, through collective violence, the unemployed youth can access free groceries (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Langa, 2011a; Platinum Weekly, 2012; Mbazira, 2013); when they loot during unrests.

This chapter has also indicated that group dynamics can influence people's participation in collective violence. People within a group have the ability to influence each other to engage in collective violence (Beinart, 2010; Simiti, 2012). In a group, rumours can easily spread from one person to another, and this misinformation can result in collective violence (Simiti, 2012; Vider, 2004).

The chapter also highlighted examples of collective violence such as, scattered attacks and broken negotiations (Tilly, 2003; Seferiades & Johnston, 2012); which were also prevalent in the study areas. In addition to collective violence that just burst out unexpectedly (Tilly, 2003; Vider, 2004; Adang, 2011; Kotronaki & Seferiades, 2012), there are also social movements that are well organised to ensure that the state applies democracy (Narsiah & Maharaj, 1999); or adopts policies that are not biased (della Porta & Diani, 2006). Moreover, disputes can also result in the formation of social movements (Narsiah & Maharaj, 1999; Johnston, 2012). When the state fails to cooperate with the requests made by the social movement, the movement is not hesitant to engage in collective violence (Piven, 2012).

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explains the research methodology that was used in this study. This study used qualitative methods to collect data. Qualitative methods provided the research with information on the personal experiences of the people that were studied (Bless *et al.*, 2013; Patton, 2015). Mason (2002) puts forth that qualitative research requires a high and active engagement from the researcher. Bless *et al.* (2013) regard the qualitative methodology to be a research method that investigates a problem from the participant's view. The above-mentioned authors also consider the qualitative methodology to be flexible. Patton (2015) argues that the participants in qualitative research are afforded with an opportunity to report their views correctly and carefully on the questions that they are asked on their experiences.

The researcher began by conducting interviews and analysed them (May, 2011b). The themes that were generated from the interviews were used to develop questions for the focus group discussions. The benefit of choosing qualitative research is that it enabled the researcher to describe the actions of the participants in great detail (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The researcher argues that unlike in quantitative research, where participants are given fixed responses and are restricted to only select items suggested to them, qualitative research allows the researcher to understand the actions of the participants in terms of their own beliefs, history, and context (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Patton, 2015).

Moreover, instead of counting and quantifying patterns in behaviour, the research allowed for lengthy thick descriptions of events as they occurred (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). By providing lengthy descriptions, the events are placed in contexts that are understandable to the actors themselves (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The categories and concepts that are used by the actors themselves are used in the research to try to stay true to the meanings of the actors.

Furthermore, unlike quantitative research, qualitative research aims to provide an understanding of the meaning which research participants attribute to certain events (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The participants' age ranged from 18 years to 45 years. Purposive and snowballing sampling were used to select the participants. The ethics that were adhered to will be explained in this chapter. Only the participants who participated in the protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani formed part of this study.

7.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The phenomenological research approach was adopted in this study (Fouché & Schurink, 2011; Creswell, 2013). This approach was preferred because it enabled the researcher to describe the common meaning on the lived experiences of the violent protests for the participants (Creswell, 2013). This type of design was used because this study intended to explore the violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani. Babbie and Mouton (2011) state that an exploratory study can be done when a researcher seeks to examine a subject of study that is relatively new. Furthermore, Bless *et al.* (2013) state that exploratory research can be used where information about a particular problem is limited, and it is used to enable the research to gain knowledge about that problem. The information on violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani was limited, as the violent protests were seen to be occurring less when compared to Gauteng and other provinces (Lancaster, 2018).

Creswell (2013) justifies the exploration of a problem to be important because it studies a population, identifies variables that cannot be easily measured, it can even hear silent voices, unlike using predetermined information from the literature or relying on the research results from other studies. Furthermore, a detailed understanding of the issue can only be established by talking directly to people in their homes or places of work. This gave them an opportunity to tell their stories without being burdened by what the researcher expected to find (Creswell, 2013). The themes that emerged from the interviews were used to develop the questions that the participants responded to in the focus group discussions (Neuman, 2014a).

7.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The researcher collected data at the site where the participants in this study have experienced the problem that was being studied (Creswell, 2013), which in this case, was violent protests, where private and state properties have been destroyed in the process in Malamulele and Vuwani. Creswell (2013) explains that the researchers who embark on a qualitative study examine documents, observe behaviour, and interview participants. Sarantakos (2005), Babbie and Mouton (2011), and Creswell (2013) offer advantages of qualitative research, and, among others, qualitative research is naturalistic as it studies attitudes and behaviour that can be understood very well in their natural settings where they occur.

Furthermore, Sarantakos (2005) indicates that qualitative research is active, as it allows the researcher to collect information on the real interaction of people in areas where they live, work, or spend most of their time. It is subject-centred, it describes the life experiences of participants the way they have experienced and described it, as it occurred in their social settings. Moreover, qualitative research is informative and detailed, it presents detailed information that was gathered verbally (Sarantakos, 2005). It presents events as described by the participants, instead of using statistical formulas to report the findings (Sarantakos, 2005).

It is reflexive, "*it values the self-awareness of the researcher*" (Sarantakos, 2005:45). It is open; thus, the researcher went to the field to collect data, without having any ideas built in her mind. The researcher does not have to adhere to a specific design, as the focus and scope of operations are not limited (Sarantakos, 2005). It is flexible as it does not rely on fixed formats, the design, and methods of collecting data could be altered. It is also empathetic, the aim of qualitative research was not to measure people, but to understand them (Sarantakos, 2005).

Sarantakos (2005) also outlines the disadvantages of using qualitative research methods. It lacks efficacy, and it does not allow the researcher to determine "*the relationship of variables with the degree of accuracy that is required to establish social trends or to inform social policies*" (Sarantakos, 2005:45). It lacked representativeness, as data was obtained from a small sample, as such representative

results could not be produced. As the sample is not a representative of the target population, the generalisability of findings is impossible. The data that is produced does not allow comparisons to be made (Sarantakos, 2005).

The collection of qualitative data may pose some challenges, as Reicher (1984) points out that during the collection of data on the St Paul's riots, the black respondents were suspicious of the possible use of the collected data and also the researcher's motivations for studying the riots that occurred in the area. Despite the limitation of qualitative data that is highlighted by Reicher (1984) and Sarantakos (2005), the qualitative method remained the best method for this study as it allowed the researcher to collect thick descriptions of events as experienced and explained by the participants (Sarantakos, 2005; Babbie & Mouton, 2011).

7.3.1 Population and sampling method

Babbie and Mouton (2011) regard a population as the specified aggregation of the study elements of the target group where the researcher seeks to draw conclusions. The study population of this research were the residents from Malamulele and Vuwani in the Limpopo Province in Vhembe District. According to Bachman and Schutt (2015), the time or resources to study the whole population, or elements that the researcher is interested in is not available, instead a sample is studied. Malamulele was previously under the Thulamela Municipality, while Vuwani was previously under the Makhado Municipality (Mabunda, 2018). According to the 2011 Census Report, Malamulele has a population of 13,070 and the dominant language spoken in this area is Xitsonga (Frith, n.d.). It is located on the eastern side of the Luvuvhu River (MDB of South Africa, 2015). Vuwani has a population of 2,791 and the dominant language spoken is Tshivenda (Frith, n.d.).

Currently, both areas are under the Collins Chabane Municipality that was established after Malamulele violently protested for its stand-alone municipality that is separate from Thulamela. When Malamulele was granted its own municipality, some parts of the Makhado Municipality, including Vuwani, were incorporated in the newly established Collins Chabane Municipality (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017; Mabunda, 2018). The sampling methodology that this study employed was purposive and the snowballing

technique that falls under non-probability sampling. The descriptions of the sampling procedures that were utilised follows in the next section.



Map of Malamulele and Vuwani

Source: <https://www.google.com/search?q=thulamela+municipality+map&tbm=>

7.3.1.1 Non-probability sampling

Non-probability sampling was used to enable the researcher to select only those informants that had information about the protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The chances of any element to be selected was very limited and the researcher could not guarantee that the sample chosen actually represented the population (Bachman & Schutt, 2015). Even though non-probability sampling did not give all elements within the population an equal chance of being selected into the sample, the participants who had information about the problem were successfully selected. The researcher opted for the use of this sample because of the unavailability of the population list (Matthews & Ross, 2010; Bachman & Schutt, 2015), specifically, for this study.

- *Purposive sampling*

This study began with purposive sampling. The sampling procedure relied on the researcher's judgement on the participants who could partake in this study as they had valuable information (Neuman, 2014a). The participants who seemed to meet the criteria of this study (Morrow, 2005; Laher & Botha, 2012; Waller *et al.*, 2016), and were willing and able to answer questions relating to the objectives of the study were selected (Waller *et al.*, 2016). The criteria were being above the age of 18 years, residing in Malamulele or Vuwani and also having participated in the protests that erupted in these areas. Furthermore, this sampling procedure was able to select the participants who produced information and were difficult to reach, as this study required only the people who participated in the protests (Morrow, 2005; Neuman, 2014a). Neuman (2014a) states that the purposive sampling procedure can also be used in conjunction with snowball sampling.

- *Snowball sampling*

Babbie and Mouton (2011) and Sarantakos (2005) refer to this sampling procedure as a form of accidental sampling. Bless *et al.* (2013) consider snowball sampling to be a chain or referral sampling. This technique has a disadvantage of the sample not being representative of the population from which the sample is drawn. However, it has an advantage of getting hard to reach participants (Laher & Botha, 2012; Bless *et al.*, 2013; Bachman & Schutt, 2015; Waller *et al.*, 2016). In this research, the participants could be said to be hard to reach because it sought to collect data from participants who participated in the protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani and there was no available list of people who participated in the protests (Matthews & Ross, 2010).

According to Bryman (2004), Sarantakos (2005), Bachman and Schutt (2015), as well as Waller *et al.* (2016), when using the snowball sampling technique, the researcher identifies a few participants who meet the criteria of the sample (purposive sampling). After collecting data from these participants, the researcher asks them to recommend other participants who were relevant to the topic under study or those who fulfilled the

criteria of inclusion in the sample and were also willing to partake in the study. Moreover, the use of this sampling procedure was beneficial because data was collected from the same category of people (Matthews & Ross, 2010), who participated in the protests.

In this technique, Babbie and Mouton (2011) state that the sample ‘snowballs’ when each participant suggests the name of another person. The sample size increases just as snow increases when rolling down a slope (Bachman & Schutt, 2015). The use of this technique was beneficial as it led the researcher to relevant participants. The study began by interviewing the participants from both Malamulele and Vuwani and thereafter it collected data through two focus group discussions from the same area. The first focus group discussion was held in Vuwani, while the second focus group discussion was held in Malamulele. During the second focus group discussion, the participants were repeating the information already said by the interviewees in the first focus group discussions. It was then concluded by the researcher that a data saturation point has been reached (Sarantakos, 2005; Niewenhuis, 2016a).

Langa (2011a:57) used the snowballing technique in the study that explored “*community members’ understanding of collective violence on the basis of their knowledge, active involvement, and the ways in which their decision to toyi-toyi was shaped*”. The above-mentioned author used this technique to access key informants, where one informant was asked to refer the researcher to another informant. As this project was about the violent protests that occurred in the community of Malamulele and Vuwani, snowballing sampling was also utilised. The researcher in this study also used the same method to access some of the key informants.

7.3.2 Data collection

The data was collected through one-on-one, face-to-face in-depth interviews as well as through focus group discussions. Morrow (2005) argues that even if a number of participants have been interviewed, the use of one source has limitations, hence this study collected data through interviews and focus group discussions. The researcher conducted in-depth interviews with nine participants as well as focus group

discussions with 12 participants. Six participants for the focus group discussions were from Malamulele, while the other six were from Vuwani.

The interview schedule was self-designed, using semi-structured questions. Creswell (2013) argues that qualitative researchers do not rely on instruments that have been designed by other researchers. Saturation point was reached during the second focus group discussion when new interviewees seem not to produce additional information that differed from the one already given, it was an indication that the topic had been drained (Bless *et al.*, 2013; Bachman & Schutt, 2015; Niewenhuis, 2016a). Moreover, the information collected was rich enough for the objectives of this study to be covered.

The research by von Holdt *et al.* (2011) and Langa (2011a) used snowballing selection to identify informants to interview for their study. Another method which is of interest to the researcher that these researchers have used is the informal focus groups that were held in street corners, in taxis, at taverns, bars as well as in community water points. This form of focus group makes participants feel at ease as they are able to trust the interviewer and be sure that the interview is not a secret agent. This was done to yield rich information. The current researcher also wished to have employed the same method in focus group discussions. However, this study only conducted interviews in formalised settings.

Bryman (2004) states that qualitative researchers are also interested in the way people say things and not only in what they say. During data collection, the researcher was also interested in how things were said by the participants (Bryman, 2004). Hence, in the reporting, some of the direct quotes are included with participants only identified with numbers, instead of their names.

7.3.2.1 The interview

Mason (2002), Denzin and Lincoln (2003), Matthews and Ross (2010), Patton (2015), as well as Waller *et al.* (2016) consider an interview to be a conversation between two people, that is, the researcher and the participant in areas where personal and social interaction occur. The researcher asked questions that the participant responded to. Furthermore, Mason (2002) states that interviews are advantageous because they

have a flexible structure, where the researcher and the interviewee can develop themes that have not been developed prior to the interview, meaning that unexpected themes may emerge during the interview process. Moreover, Stewart and Shamdasani (2015) state that individual interviews can yield enormous information that a person might share individually, which might be uncomfortable to share in a group setting.

Similarly, Fontana and Frey (2003), Niewenhuis and Smit (2012) as well as Patton (2015) consider an interview to be a powerful tool that researchers can use to obtain rich descriptive data and that will enable the researchers and the society to understand the world as experienced by the participants. May (2011b) as well as Patton (2015) point out that interviews yield rich insights into people's experiences, opinions, values, attitudes, knowledge and even feelings. The interviews were conducted to collect data and not to change people's views (Patton, 2015).

The advantage of using interviews was that the interviewer was able to encourage the participants to open up and to probe (Semmens, 2011). Sarantakos (2005), Semmens (2011), Patton (2015) and Waller *et al.* (2016) provide the benefits of probing in an interview, including:

- ✓ to cover the themes that the researcher seeks to cover;
- ✓ to make it easier for participants to answer the questions;
- ✓ to seek further clarification on responses that were not clear;
- ✓ to collect rich and detailed information; or
- ✓ to encourage the participants to continue in responding to the questions.

- *Facilitating the interviews*

The researcher introduced the participants to the topic and explained what was expected from their participation in this study. She also gave the complete outline of the interview, including the ethical standards informed consent, and anonymity, confidentiality (Sarantakos, 2005; Waller *et al.*, 2016). The researcher directed a flow of conversation, where a semi-structured interview schedule was used to guide the flow of the conversation (Waller *et al.*, 2016). While conducting the interview, the researcher showed interest in the responses of the participants, the interviewer did

her level best to remain neutral and not be biased. Leading questions as well as those questions that gave suggestions on responses were avoided (Sarantakos, 2005).

The interview ended smoothly in a friendly manner. The researcher informed the participants that the areas that the research sought to cover had been covered and allowed them to make additions. Moreover, they were appreciated for contributing valuable information to the society (Waller *et al.*, 2016; Sarantakos, 2005). The researcher followed the same order of questions to ensure that all the questions had been asked to each participant (Bryman, 2004).

7.3.2.2 Focus group discussions

The researcher directed the discussion between six people per group. Bless *et al.* (2013) as well as Patton (2015) describe a focus group as consisting of a small number of people ranging from six to ten. Waller *et al.* (2016) recommend that the members who form part of the focus group discussions should range from six to eight participants. Niewenhuis and Smit (2012) as well as Niewenhuis (2016a) state that a focus group consists of five to 12 people. Similarly, Matthews and Ross (2010) recommend focus group interviews to consist of five to 13 people. Moreover, Stewart and Shamdasani (2015) prefer that the focus group discussion should consist of eight to 12 members.

Despite having six members for the group discussions, the research was able to produce as many perspectives on violent protests as possible from the participants (Niewenhuis, 2016a). This was possible as the facilitator encouraged full participation and interaction among members by follow-up questions and probing for clarification (Niewenhuis, 2016a). The researcher collected detailed information on the group's attitudes, perceptions and even experiences on the violent protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015; Niewenhuis, 2016a). The researcher selected people to be part of the focus group with the research aim taken into consideration. The people who were chosen for the focus group were from similar backgrounds (Patton, 2015; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015) as they had participated in the protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani.

Furthermore, the focus group discussions were favoured because group interactions are productive in widening the range of responses, whereby fellow participants can activate forgotten details (Niewenhuis, 2016a). Moreover, the researcher collected rich quality data on the participants' views, where the participants also got an opportunity to formulate their inputs based on the contributions made by the fellow participants (Patton, 2015; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). In this research, the participants were not expected to agree with each other, as their differing viewpoints were most welcome (Patton, 2015). The focus group was designed with the purpose of discussing the violent protests that erupted in Malamulele and Vuwani (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015).

Madriz (2003), Bryman (2004) as well as Matthews and Ross (2010) consider a focus group to be done collectively, unlike an interview where a single participant is interviewed at a time. It focused on the voices and experiences of several people at once. It provided the researcher with an opportunity to collect a large amount of information on the interactions and the views of people in a short period (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). Matthews and Ross (2010), Waller *et al.* (2016) state that focus groups are important tools for gathering data on people's attitudes, ideas, experiences and understanding. They are also good for exploratory research when a researcher is not clear about what the issues are likely to be with regard to the topic they are looking at (Waller *et al.*, 2016). The focus group was structured as a discussion rather than as a set of questions and the participants were encouraged to respond to each other. Moreover, the interaction between the group members is considered as a key to the success of the focus group (Waller *et al.*, 2016).

- *Facilitating the focus group discussions*

Before the meeting commenced, the researcher encouraged the participants to freely make their contributions without being worried about how the fellow research participants will think about them (Bless *et al.*, 2013; Niewenhuis & Smit, 2012; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). The setting of the focus group discussion was made to be an informal atmosphere to allow participants to relax and not to be distracted (Waller *et al.*, 2016). During the group discussions, offering cues was very helpful as

it helped the participants in articulating the answer (Bryman 2004; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015).

An atmosphere of trust and openness was established by assuring the participants that their names and recordings would not be known by a third party and by formulating the ground rules together with the participants (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). Moreover, they were told that their contributions were meaningful for the research (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). The researcher also gave them her full attention, consideration as well as showed them that she was interested by encouraging them to make comments (Matthews & Ross, 2010). During the discussions, the participants were seated around a table. This was informed by Stewart and Shamdasani's (2015) guidance that a table offers a protective barrier, establishes a sense of territoriality and personal space to make participants comfortable. Moreover, sitting around a table enabled the participants to see and hear each other (Matthews & Ross, 2010).

7.3.2.3 Semi-structured questions

A list of questions that were based on the research problem, aim and objectives of this study as well as the literature was drafted to gather useful information about the problem (Bryman, 2004; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). The interview guide directed the interview by assisting the researcher to ask the same questions to different participants, with the same words and sequence, while also allowing the researcher to probe for clarification (Bryman, 2004; Matthews & Ross, 2010; Patton, 2015). The interview guide for both the interviews and the focus group discussions were tested prior to its use, to determine if questions were phrased in a manner that the participants understood (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). When designing the questions, the following were considered (Bryman, 2004; Niewenhuis & Smit, 2012; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015):

- Questions that required participants to reply yes or no were avoided.
- Questions were phrased in simple language to ensure that the participants understand.
- Threatening and embarrassing questions were avoided.

- Ambiguous terms were not used.
- Long questions were avoided.

7.3.2.4 Probing

Both the interview and focus group discussions afforded the researcher an opportunity to probe. Probes are important as they enable the researcher to extract full information from the participants (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015); more especially when the researcher is not making suggestions on possible answers and also when not providing participants with a feeling that they should defend themselves (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015). The following three probing strategies were used:

- Detailed-oriented probes
The researcher asked questions such as “where” “what” “why” and “how” to understand the response given by the participants (Niewenhuis, 2016a).
- Elaboration probes
The participants were asked to elaborate more on the response that they had given (Niewenhuis, 2016a).
- Clarification probes
This was done to determine if the researcher’s understanding of a response was accurate and also to tell the participants that further information was required (Niewenhuis, 2016a; Patton, 2015).

7.3.2.5 Recording the data

Most interviews were audio recorded, while some were not because the informants were not comfortable about the recording part (Sarantakos, 2005; Niewenhuis, 2016a). Waller *et al.* (2016) support the non-recording of an interview when the researcher thinks it will have an effect on the responses that the participants provide and also when it will cause discomfort to the participants. In such cases, the researcher wrote down what the participants said. Before the researcher parted with the

participants, the written notes were reviewed to reflect on the interview, and most importantly to identify the gaps that were there in the transcription so as to seek further clarity when the participants were still present (Niewenhuis, 2016a).

On the contrary, the use of an audio recorder does not imply that notes should not be taken, therefore, strategic, and focused notes were taken during the collection of data (Patton, 2015). The notes taken on the field were typed immediately while they were still fresh in the researcher's memory (Niewenhuis, 2016a). Notes on the non-verbal cues and the physical movements of the participants during the collection of data were also written down (Steward & Shamdasani, 2015). Lacey and Luff (2007) also promote the use of non-verbal cues in the transcription of qualitative data.

Niewenhuis and Smit (2012) as well Niewenhuis (2016b) state that transcription is done best by the researcher, as non-verbal cues may mean something, for example, silence may be an indication that a participant is pausing for a thought. Gestures were also not ignored as they gave added meaning to spoken words. Similarly, Steward and Shamdasani (2015) state that the information collected on nonverbal response is crucial as it adds value to the information given verbally. Moreover, transcription was done verbatim, where every word that was spoken was written down (Niewenhuis, 2016). The reason for doing such was to ensure that the researcher did not misinterpret information (Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015).

7.3.2.6 Establishing rapport

Bachman and Schutt (2015) point out that the researcher should establish rapport with the participants, by considering beforehand how they will react to the interview and also by developing an approach that does not violate their standards for social behaviour. The researcher established a relationship with the participants, to maximise their participation and thus provide good data (Bryman, 2004; Creswell, 2013). The researcher visited the research sites more than twice before the data was collected from the first participant, to assure them that the information required from them was for research purposes only and nothing else. Moreover, the participants were treated with respect and as knowledgeable partners whose time was valued. During the

interviews, the researcher engaged in eye contact and not in behaviour that seemed distracting (Bachman & Schutt, 2015).

7.3.3 Data analysis

Thematic Content Analysis [TCA] was applied to analyse the data that was gathered through the interviews. It involved identifying themes or patterns that emerged in the data that were relevant to the research question (Kawulich & Holland, 2012; Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). TCA was preferred for the analysis of data collected through the interviews and the focus group discussions because it is flexible and can provide data that is rich and detailed (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The phrases and concepts that dominated were considered by checking the number of times that they were occurring (Patton, 2015).

Creswell (2013) describes the process of analysing data to involve organising the data, conducting a preliminary read-through of the database, coding and organising themes, representing the data, and forming an interpretation of them. The author regards the steps of analysing data to be interconnected and it forms a spiral of activities that relate to the analysis and representation of the data. The data that was collected in this study was analysed for the story it told in a narrative form (Creswell, 2013).

According to Babbie and Mouton (2011), data should be analysed or interpreted for the purpose of drawing conclusions that will reflect the interest, ideas, and theories that the study was based upon. The researcher has analysed the data by reflecting on the ideas of the participants and also by reflecting on the Collective Violence Theory that this study was based upon. The researcher did not rely on any software to help in data analysis. Weitzman (2003) states that a software can be able to provide a researcher with tools to help in analysing qualitative data, however, it has a limitation of not being able to do the interpretation for the researcher, just like the statistical package such as SPSS can do. Furthermore, Lacey and Luff (2007) indicate that a software cannot replace a human element, as it cannot think, reflect, or analyse the findings. The researcher used Braun and Clarke's (2006) TCA as a guideline when analysing data. The discussion that follows indicates how the data was analysed following the steps outlined by the scholars mentioned above.

7.3.3.1 Step 1: Familiarising with the data

The researcher came to the analysis with some prior knowledge of the data as it was personally collected by her (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The researcher immersed herself in the data to the extent that she was familiar with the depth and extent of the content (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Lacey & Luff, 2007). This involved the researcher reading and rereading the text as well as listening to the recorded interviews several times (Lacey & Luff, 2007; Niewenhuis, 2016b; Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). The researcher read the data repeatedly in an active way in search of meanings and patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At this stage, the researcher wrote down some notes based on the interviews and the focus group discussions (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017).

The data was read over and over again before coding began to identify recurring patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006), that could be a word, phrase, or sentence(s) (Kawulich & Holland, 2012; Niewenhuis, 2016b). The researcher read and re-read each sentence to get the meaning. Line to line data analysis was done. The researcher marked ideas for coding and went back to these ideas in the subsequent phases (Niewenhuis, 2016b).

7.3.3.2 Step 2: Generating initial codes

Inductive analysis was done whereby the researcher used line-by-line coding of the data (Niewenhuis, 2016b; Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). The researcher approached the data with specific questions in mind that she wished to code (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The coding was done manually; the researcher used highlighters to indicate potential patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Lacey & Luff, 2007). Potential themes were coded as many times as possible. Braun and Clarke (2006) suggest that the researcher has to code as many potential themes as possible because the researcher might be interested in these themes later. Creswell (2013) highlights that code labels emerge from several sources; it can be through the exact words as used by the participants and/or be names that the researcher has composed that seem to describe the information best.

7.3.3.3 Step 3: Searching for themes

Themes do not necessarily have to be identified during data analysis. They can be identified, according to Ryan and Bernard (2003) as well as Silverman (2000); before the data is collected, during the collection of data and also after the data has been collected. This phase began when the researcher had initially coded and collated the data; the list of different codes that had been identified across the data set was available at this stage (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The researcher sorted different codes into potential themes and collated all the relevant coded data extracts within the identified themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Lacey & Luff, 2007). The researcher started to analyse the codes and considered how different codes may be combined to form a comprehensive theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Following Braun and Clarke's (2006) advice, the name of each code and a brief description was written on a separate piece of paper to see how it could be organised into theme piles. The researcher tried to determine the relationship between the codes, between main themes and sub-themes within them (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Some initial codes were turned into main themes, while some were made to be sub-themes, some themes were combined, refined, and separated, while some were discarded (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At this stage, the research did not abandon anything, in case while the researcher was still busy analysing, some themes could be combined, discarded, or separated.

7.3.3.4 Step 4: Reviewing themes

This phase began after the researcher had devised a set of candidate themes and involved the refinement of these themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Some candidate themes were found not to be really themes as there was not enough data to support them. Some themes were merged into each other, while some have been broken into separate themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The collected extracts of each theme were re-read to check if they formed a clear pattern (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The sub-themes that did not fit in a theme were reworked to find another theme, to put extracts that did not seem to fit in an already existing theme, and some were discarded from the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). As coding is an ongoing organic process, the researcher coded additional data within themes that had been missed in earlier coding stages (Braun & Clarke, 2006). At the end of this phase, the researcher had an idea of how the themes fit together and the story that they told about the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

7.3.3.4 Step 5: Defining and naming themes

This phase occurred when the researcher had a thematic map of the data. The researcher defined and further refined the themes presented for analysis and analysed data within them (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The researcher achieved this by going back to the collated data extracts for each theme and organised them into a coherent and consistent account with accompanying narratives. The researcher identified what was interesting about the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

The researcher wrote a detailed analysis and also identified the story that was told by each theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A consideration was made on how each theme fit into the broader overall story that the data was telling, that was done in relation to the research questions as a way of ensuring that there was no overlap between the themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The researcher refined the themes by identifying whether or not a theme contained sub-themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

Braun and Clarke (2006) consider sub-themes as themes that are within a theme. These sub-themes are regarded as important in a large complex theme and that they demonstrate a hierarchy of meaning within the data. At the end of this phase, the researcher defined what the themes were and what they were not. As Braun and Clarke (2006) recommend that a reader will gain a sense of what the theme is about when the names are concise and punchy.

7.3.3.5 Step 6: Producing the report

This phase began when the researcher had a set of worked-out themes and involved it in the final analysis and write-up of the report (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The reason for using TCA was to enable the researcher to tell the complicated story about the data, this was done in a way that “*convinces the reader of the merit and validity*” of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006:23). The analysis in this research provides what Braun and Clarke (2006:23) call “*a concise, coherent, logical, non-repetitive and interesting account of the story the data tell within and across themes*”.

The writing provides enough evidence of the themes within the data as well as enough data extracts that are used to validate the occurrence of the theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The data was not written just for the sake of providing data, but the extracts were embedded within an analytic narrative to show the story the researcher was revealing about the data. The narrative analysis was written in a way that went beyond describing the data but made arguments in relation to the research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

7.3.4 Criteria to ensure quality of the study

To ensure the quality of this study, credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability were maintained. The following discussion outlines how quality criteria were ensured.

7.3.4.1 Credibility

Credibility can be maintained when the researcher has applied well-established research methods, having a research design that is aligned to the research objectives and also the theoretical framework that speaks to the research objectives and the methods of collecting data (Niewenhuis, 2016b). The research was conducted in such a manner as to ensure that the subject was accurately identified and described. In this manner, the subjects were residents from Malamulele and Vuwani who participated in the protests that had occurred in these areas. The researcher determined whether there was a match between the expressed views by the participants and the

researcher's reconstruction and representation of them (Schurink *et al.*, 2011). As such, the researcher described the events and used words as they were described and used by the participants.

Credibility was increased also by prolonged engagement (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The researcher collected data until saturation was reached (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). Moreover, persistent observation was done by constantly pursuing interpretations in different ways (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Morrow, 2005; Babbie & Mouton, 2011). Furthermore, the researcher familiarised herself with the research site so that unnecessary attention was not drawn towards her being a stranger (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The researcher visited the sites more than once, before data was collected to find the first participants who pointed the researcher to the next people to be interviewed and to form part of the focus group discussions. Prolonged engagement was also done to build trust between the researcher and the participants so that they could be sure about the true intention of the research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Anney, 2014), that it was for academic purposes and that it would help in formulating a model to resolve conflicts in an acceptable manner.

Moreover, Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that visiting the sites before the commencement of the interviews gives participants an assurance that anonymity will be honoured and that the researcher did not have any hidden agenda that would be served through the interviews and the focus group discussions. Rapport was also established through prolonged engagement. Moreover, visiting the site several times before the data was collected made the participants to be welcoming to the researcher (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Peer debriefing was beneficial in that the biases that the researcher might have had were examined, meanings were investigated and also so that the basis on which the researcher made interpretations could be clarified (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Peer debriefing was done with a colleague who was outside this study. The colleague had a general understanding of this study. The voices of the participants are included in the analysis and interpretation of the data (Anney, 2014). A member check was done, in this instance, the researcher went to the source of information and checked if the data corresponded with the interpretation to correct obvious errors (Morrow, 2005;

Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Anney, 2014; Niewenhuis, 2016b). Furthermore, the improvement of credibility was achieved by providing thick descriptions of the problem that was being studied, this was done to allow other researchers to be able to duplicate the study in other settings with similar conditions with Malamulele and Vuwani (Shenton, 2004; Anney, 2014; Niewenhuis, 2016b).

7.3.4.2 Transferability

Morrow (2005) as well as Babbie and Mouton (2011) regard transferability as a way to ensure that the findings of the study can be applicable in another context. To make transferability possible, the researcher provided adequate information about the context in which the investigation was carried out, to enable another person who is interested in transferability to make a judgement whether transferability would be possible in their environment or not (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Morrow, 2005; Bless *et al.*, 2013; Niewenhuis, 2016b).

The researcher collected sufficient detailed descriptions of data in context and reported them with sufficient detail and precision to allow the reader to make judgements on transferability. Schurink *et al.* (2011) recommend that using data from different sources can increase the transferability of the study; hence, this study collected data through interviews and focus groups to increase the chances of the transferability of the findings to other settings.

7.3.4.3 Dependability

The research followed a clear and thoughtful strategy, as evidence was provided that each step of the research process had been carefully followed (Bless *et al.*, 2013). This research provides readers with evidence that if this study can be repeated with similar participants, in the same context, the findings will be similar (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The researcher followed the research process through adopting a logical procedure that ensured that all the steps in this study could be easily audited (Schurink *et al.*, 2011).

The trustworthiness was verified and increased through triangulation; the researcher gathered as well as analysed data from two sources to gain different insights of the same problem being investigated (Shenton, 2004; Morrow, 2005; Lacey & Luff, 2007; Bless *et al.*, 2013; Niewenhuis, 2016b). The researcher collected data through interviews as well as through focus group meetings to increase the trustworthiness of this study. Interviews were used first and they were followed by focus group meetings with different participants from those interviewed to verify the information provided by the participants that were interviewed.

7.3.4.4 Confirmability

The researcher reports the findings of this study without being subjective (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). The reporting was not based on the researcher's preferences, but on the experiences and ideas as told by the informants without making any alterations based on what was favourable to her. According to Bless *et al.* (2013), the researcher has to ask whether the findings of his/her study can be confirmed by another researcher. The researcher provided evidence that corroborated the findings and interpretations by means of keeping an auditable trail of how the research process unfolded (Morrow, 2005; Schurink *et al.*, 2011).

7.4 ETHICAL ADHERENCE

Newsome (2016) states that ethics are considerations that a researcher has to make, while undertaking a study on the acceptable and unacceptable treatment of the participants. Moreover, Bless *et al.* (2013) consider ethics to be important as they protect people's rights from being abused by the researchers. Furthermore, Fontana and Frey (2003) advise researchers to take extra precautions so that the participants are not harmed while participating in a research project.

According to Babbie and Mouton (2011), ethical issues arise because human beings have to interact with each other and even with animals, which may result in a conflict of interest. Furthermore, what favours a particular person, may not necessarily benefit another one. Sometimes researchers harm participants without them intending to do so, in this regard, the researchers need to be aware of the events that are likely to

occur during the data collection period and even after data has been collected (Bless et al., 2013).

Creswell (2013) points out that in qualitative research, the ethical issues occur; prior to conducting the study, while collecting data and analysing, in reporting the data as well as in publishing the study. If the researchers do not adhere to ethics, they may cause emotional, physical, and even legal harm. The harm can go further to harm a person's career or and reputation (Neuman, 2014a). During the data collection process, the ethics were adhered to. The following ethical behaviour was observed in this study:

7.4.1 Institutional ethical clearance

Creswell (2013) recommends that prior to conducting a study, a researcher should seek approval to collect data. Semmens (2011) also states that all university-based projects have to go through a process of ethical clearance where a panel of experts will scrutinise the research methodology. Ethical clearance was obtained from TREC.

7.4.2 Voluntary participation and informed consent

The participants who took part in this study, were not forced as they voluntarily took part and consented to form part of this study (Matthews & Ross, 2010; Bachman & Schutt, 2015). Fontana and Frey (2003), Davies and Francis (2011) as well as Bless *et al.* (2013) put forth that the participants in a research project should be well informed about their participation and also consent to taking part. This involved telling them about the possible consequences that may arise due to their participation. Meanwhile, Neuman (2014a) states that getting the participants to consent to take part in a study is not enough if they are not fully informed of what the study entails. In this regard, the consent form was given to participants with full information about the aim of this study and what was required from them during the collection of data.

Bryman (2004), Matthews and Ross (2010), Bless *et al.* (2013), Creswell (2013), as well as Waller *et al.* (2016) advise researchers to respect the rights and dignity of the participants by disclosing the purpose of their study and also giving them adequate information so that they can make informed decision about their participation. This was stated during the ethical clearance as well as on the consent letters that were signed by participants. Moreover, the participants were informed of their liberty to withdraw their participation at any time. Their roles of participation were also clarified before the data was collected (Bless *et al.*, 2013). Furthermore, the potential harm associated with participation in this study was disclosed (Waller *et al.*, 2016). Moreover, a chance to withdraw from the study without any consequences was highlighted (Waller *et al.*, 2016).

The participants were given consent letters to sign to indicate that they have not been forced to take part in this study and that they understood the explanations provided to them (Sarantakos, 2005; Bless *et al.*, 2013). A statement containing adequate information about the nature of this research was read out to the participants. The statement was also given to them to read by themselves and sign, to indicate that they are consenting to take part in this study (Sarantakos, 2005). The participants were given the assurance that they can discontinue their participation without the obligation of explaining themselves (Shenton, 2004; Matthews & Ross, 2010; Bless *et al.*, 2013).

7.4.3 Anonymity, confidentiality, privacy, and respect

Anonymity was maintained by not divulging information that may expose the identity of the participants (Bryman, 2004; Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012; Bless *et al.*, 2013; Neuman, 2014a). For this research to be anonymous, the names of the participants were not required. The interview guides did not contain the names of the participants. Possible identifying information was altered to prevent the possible identification of the informants or their occupations (Bachman & Schutt, 2015). Furthermore, Sarantakos (2005) acknowledges that confidentiality is maintained when it is impossible to link information to a particular participant.

The informed consent letters were kept separately from the research instrument so that it could be impossible to link the names to the data (Sarantakos, 2005). The researcher promised the participants that the information that they provided for the project would be protected from unauthorised use (Akaranga & Makau, 2016). The researcher has fulfilled that promise by not allowing unauthorised people access to the information.

The confidentiality of the participants was maintained to protect the informants from harassment as well as from endangering their lives (Matthews & Ross, 2010). The research tried its level best to conceal the research sites. Bryman (2004) states that the participants may experience harm when the researcher fails to maintain the confidentiality of the records. This may also damage their reputations (Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012).

The participants have the right to privacy and that needs to be respected by the researcher (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). Bachman and Schutt (2015) argue that the researcher has the responsibility of protecting the subject's privacy and this can be done by locking records away to prohibit unauthorised persons access to the field notes. The creation of codes to identify each participant may also be used. Privacy was maintained by locking away the interview records. Names such as Participant one, and Participant two were used to identify the participants, instead of using their real names.

The research did not ask any sensitive or personal questions. Sarantakos (2005) explains that the researchers are digging into the private affairs of the participants when they ask personal or sensitive questions, which the participants are not comfortable to divulge. In this study, the participants were not required to report about their participation in criminal activities during the protests as well as the criminal actions that may have been committed by other members of the community during the protests.

7.4.4 Non-maleficence

Akaranga and Makau (2016) state that the concept of non-maleficence indicates that the researchers should by all means avoid harming the participants. Participants should only be exposed to a minimal risk of personal harm (Bachman & Schutt, 2015; Akaranga & Makau 2016). The harm can be but is not limited to physical, and emotional (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Neuman, 2014a). It therefore becomes the responsibility of the researcher to ensure that the participants are not harmed while taking part in a study (Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012).

Harm can occur when the researcher requests the participants to reveal information that they deem embarrassing or that can lead to anxiety (Akaranga & Makau, 2016). However, this research tried as much as possible not to expose the participants to any physical or emotional harm. The participants were not requested to divulge any information that they considered to be embarrassing or uncomfortable such as whether they had participated in the burning of properties or if they knew someone who was responsible for the burning of properties during the protests.

Bachman and Schutt (2015) state that every researcher should carefully consider how they can avoid causing harm to the participants. Moreover, Babbie and Mouton (2011) put forth that most often, the participants are asked to reveal deviant behaviour and the attitudes they feel are unpopular or personal characteristics that are demeaning as this information may make a person feel uncomfortable. The researcher avoided causing distress to the participants by not asking them whether they personally participated in looting, destruction or burning of property, or other deviant activities. However, questions on collective violence were asked as a group activity rather than as an individual activity. This was done to assure the participants that the researcher did not seek to determine if they have committed criminal offences during the demonstrations.

According to Sarantakos (2005), mental harm occurs when the research participants are subjected directly or indirectly to procedures that can make them feel uncomfortable. Babbie and Mouton (2011) state that the researcher must look for indirect dangers that may harm the participants psychologically and guard against

them. Researchers should not be placed in a “*highly stressful, embarrassing, anxiety-producing or unpleasant situations*” (Neuman, 2014a:72). This research did not ask participants if they had individually engaged in violent protest, it asked about participation in collective violence. This was to ensure that participants were not put at risk of arrest (Neuman, 2014a).

7.4.5 Deception

The participants were not deceived to take part in this study. According to Matthews and Ross (2010), Bless *et al.* (2013), Neuman (2014a), as well as Bachman and Schutt (2015), deception occurs when the researcher does not tell participants the true nature of the study due to fear that the participants may not take part in the study. Sarantakos (2005) argues that deception can also occur when researchers encourage individuals to take part in a study by hiding aspects of the research that they may find unwelcoming. Conducting research without the participants being aware of their participation is also regarded as deception by the afore-mentioned author.

The participants were told the true purpose of this study and not part of the truth as recommended by Akaranga and Makau (2016). This study did not involve participant observation, where the researcher has to participate in the study to collect data. The participants' behaviour was not observed, but dialogue occurred with the consent of the participants (Akaranga & Makau, 2016).

7.4.6 Respecting the participants' rights and their dignity

The researcher has to protect the participants' rights as well as maintain their dignity and self-respect. Their dignity can be protected when the researcher understands and respects their culture, by not asking culturally sensitive questions, including topics that are not permitted to be discussed in their culture (Bless *et al.*, 2013). Such questions were not asked in this study.

7.5 REPORT WRITING

For qualitative data collection, Bachman and Schutt (2015) advise that a researcher should just jot down brief notes to help in the report writing. The authors regard writing comprehensive notes as being disruptive when engaged in the field. It is advisable for the researcher to write comprehensive notes within 24 hours when they are no longer in the field to enable the recollection of what the short notes entail (Bachman & Schutt, 2015).

“Quotes should clearly be distinguished from the researcher’s observations and phrased in the local vernacular; pauses and interruptions should be indicated” (Bachman & Schutt, 2015:180). Direct quotations in the research report afford readers an opportunity to hear the exact words that the participants used in the research. *“In so doing the researcher amplifies the voices of respondents and illustrates some details of the process of data analysis”* (Bless *et al.*, 2013:239). Creswell (2013) points out that data collection and analysis as well as report writing are interrelated steps that occur simultaneously in a research project. Bryman (2004) recommends that a researcher should write the responses of the participants exactly as they are said to avoid errors.

7.5 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter explained the methodology that was used in this study. Qualitative methods were opted for, where in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were used to collect data. Qualitative research is informative and offers dense descriptions of events (Sarantakos, 2005). Interviews were chosen because they are carried out in natural settings where the behaviour has occurred (Sarantokos, 2005; Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Creswell, 2013).

The researcher was interested in understanding the participants’ actions from their own perspectives (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Bless *et al.*, 2013; Patton, 2015); hence the choice of qualitative methods. Focus group discussions were opted for because group participation broadens responses and forgotten information can be activated by the information provided by other participants within the group (Niewenhuis, 2016a;

Waller *et al.*, 2016). Semi-structured questions were prepared and guided by the aim and objectives of this study (Bryman, 2004; Stewart & Shamdasani, 2015).

This research adopted a phenomenological approach (Creswell, 2013) that sought to explore a relatively new subject (Babbie & Mouton, 2011) which was the violent protests that emerged in Malamulele and Vuwani. Data was collected from 21 participants. Nine participants were interviewed, while 12 informants participated in two focus group discussions. The focus group discussion was conducted with six participants from Malamulele and six from Vuwani. According to Bless *et al.* (2013) as well as Patton (2015), focus group discussions should consist of six to ten participants or six to eight participants (Niewenhuis & Smit, 2012). During the second focus group discussion, data saturation was reached as the participants were repeating the information that was said by others (Bachman & Schutt, 2015).

Non probability sampling, purposive and snowballing sampling were used to sample the target population. The research began with purposive sampling and thereafter utilised snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was used because the research needed information from those participants who met a certain criteria and were willing to participate in this study (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Laher & Botha, 2012; Neuman, 2014a; Waller *et al.*, 2016). The snowballing method was used when the researcher after collecting data from the first participants who were purposively selected, asked these participants to identify other participants who met the criteria of the sample (Bryman, 2004; Sarantakos, 2005; Bachman & Schutt, 2015; Waller *et al.* 2016).

Data was analysed through TCA, by considering the phrases and concepts that dominated the discussions (Patton, 2015). Braun and Clarke's (2006) six step analysis was followed where the researcher familiarised herself with the data, generated initial codes, searched for themes, reviewed themes, defined, and named themes, and lastly produced the report. To ensure the quality of this study, the following criteria were followed, credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. Ethics were also adhered to as ethical clearance was sought; participation was voluntary, and the participants consented to partake in this study. Confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy were maintained. Moreover, this study did not cause any physical or psychological harm to the participants.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS FROM IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

SECTION A: ANALYSIS OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter reports on the findings of the in-depth interviews and the focus group discussions. One interview lasted between 30 to 45 minutes. The researcher purposively selected the participants who seemed knowledgeable about the protests that turned violent in Malamulele and Vuwani and thereafter requested these participants to recommend (snowballing) other people who participated in these protests (Strydom, 2011b). The in-depth interviews were conducted between the 3rd and the 6th of January 2018. The participants were not selected because they were responsible for the protests turning violent, but they were selected because they had knowledge about these protests as they participated in them.

Rapport was established with the participants so that they could provide good data (Creswell, 2013). Moreover, the researcher established rapport while being neutral and non-judgemental (Patton, 2015). The data was analysed through TCA. The following six phases identified by Braun and Clarke (2006) were followed as explained in details in Chapter Seven:

- Step 1: Familiarising with the data
The researcher read and reread the collected data to a point where an understanding had been gained (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Bless *et al.*, 2013).
- Step 2: Generating initial codes
The texts that shared common characteristics was grouped together. Some coding was refined, developed, and even discarded (Bless *et al.*, 2013).

- Step 3: Searching for themes
The researcher examined the codes and those that fitted together were paired to form a theme (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017).
- Step 4: Reviewing themes
The preliminary themes that were identified in the previous step were modified after checking if they were making sense and there was the grouping together of all the data that was relevant to a specific theme (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017).
- Step 5: Defining and naming themes
The researcher checked what the themes were saying and also how the sub-themes related to the main themes (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017).
- Step 6: Producing the report

Ethics were adhered to in this study. Informed consent was obtained from the participants. Participation was voluntary, and the participants who were not keen to participate were not forced to do so (Matthews & Ross, 2010; Bachman & Schutt, 2015), even though they had been identified to be knowledgeable about the protests, because they acted within their rights to refuse participation. The rights to privacy were respected, where participants did not feel like sharing certain information with the researcher, they were not forced to divulge such (Sarantakos, 2005).

Furthermore, anonymity was maintained by not reporting on information that may result in the participants being identified (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012; Neuman, 2014a). This study did not cause any physical or psychological harm (Ogletree & Kawulich, 2012; Neuman, 2014a). In the reporting of the findings of this study, facial expressions and gestures are included in the report as recommended by some authors (Bryman, 2004; Bless *et al.*, 2013; Steward & Shamdasani, 2015; Niewenhuis, 2016b).

8.2 THEMES THAT EMERGED FROM THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

The themes generated in this study through TCA are guided by the questions on the interview schedule. The interview schedule is guided by the aim, objectives, and research questions of this study.

8.2.1 THEME 1: DEMOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

Interviews were held with six men and three women. The women seemed not to be interested in sharing information about the protests that occurred in their areas, while the men were interested. The study by Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Kirsten and von Holdt (2011), as well as Akinboade *et al.* (2013) found the highest number of people who engaged in protests were male. Similarly, Dlamini's (2011) research found that there were old and young women who were present in the major events of protests, where the burning of homes and municipal properties occurred. Nevertheless, fingers point at young men as culprits who are responsible for the burning of properties during protests. Botes *et al.* (2007a) found the protests to be attended by young men and women, however, the leadership was described as male dominated. The age range of the participants in this study was as follows:

Table 1: Age of participants who were interviewed

Age	Number
18-23	1
24-29	2
30-35	4
36-40	1
Above 40	1
Total	9

The study of Akinboade *et al.* (2013) found that there are no restrictions in terms of the age of people who participate in protests, as both young and old males were found to have participated in the protests when compared to females. Five participants who participated in this study were political activists as they belonged to a political party. The sections that follow report on the themes that emerged in this study.

8.2.2 THEME 2: FACTORS THAT ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL PROTESTS TO BECOME VIOLENT

The participants from Vuwani indicated that they engaged in violent protests because of the government's unresponsiveness, as they failed to consult them when they took the decision to incorporate them into Malamulele. The violent protests were also mentioned as a tool to communicate with the communities, as the government understand them much better than negotiations. Some participants regard personal interests, criminal intentions, and opportunity to be responsible for the protests to have turned violently.

8.2.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Lack of consultation and unresponsive governance

The participants in this study indicated that the government took the decision to incorporate them into Malamulele without consulting them. They also claimed that the MDB did not consider their inputs. They wrote a memorandum opposing the incorporation into Malamulele, but there was no response. Paterson and Power's (2016) report confirm that the residents of Vuwani wrote a memorandum refusing the merger, but there was no response. Furthermore, the participants in this study indicated that they wrote another memorandum where they requested the premier to come and hear their grievances. The participants stated that approximately 10 000 people attended the meeting, but the premier did not show up as requested, instead, he delegated someone to come and attend the meeting on his behalf. In this meeting, the community members did not do any damage. Upon the disappointment with the premier's failure to come, they requested a delegation from the office of the president to come and address their issues, but no one came.

They then went to the High Court to present their case. The court did not favour Vuwani on the decision to exclude itself from Malamulele. The residents came back and shut down shops, schools and even the police station. Learners were prohibited from going to school, as all schools were closed. The police's big car that they use when responding to riots was burned and this left them with inadequate manpower to prevent shops from being burnt. The protestors were then able to burn the shops. The study of Kanyane *et al.* (2017) confirm that the violent protests in Vuwani only erupted

after their request was turned down by the High Court. In Malamulele, the unresponsive government was mentioned to be responsible for the violent protests that erupted. The members of the community only rioted after the court turned down their objection to demerge.

The findings from Vuwani concur with Sinwell *et al.* (2009) who found that violent protests occurred in Mpumalanga when the then premier failed to come to an open forum. The leaders of the protests are said to have failed to control the protestors who were angry that the premier did not attend the meeting as well as the failure to fire the councillors whom they were accusing of misusing the prize money meant for the Mayoral Championship. Their frustrations were vented on a number of community buildings which were set on fire (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009).

Furthermore, Banjo and Jili (2013) report that in Siyathemba Township, the people only engaged in protests after they had written a memorandum of demands and failed to get a response from the government. Narsia and Maharaj (1999), as well as Mavungu (2011) put forth that the people of Bushbuckridge protested violently when they were fighting for the provincial boundary. They realised that the then Northern Province (currently known as Limpopo) could not provide for them, as they lacked electricity, hospitals, and water (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999). The people considered the refusal to be demarcated to the choice of their municipality as non-democratic and just as forceful as the apartheid government (Mavungu, 2011).

The people from Malamulele also fought the same war to be geographically located in an area where there was hope for service provision, which in this case was an independent municipality that is separate from Thulamela (Mokgopo, 2017; Mabunda, 2018). The people from Vuwani fought against the incorporation with Malamulele as they wished to remain in Makhado Municipality, because they believed they could get better services from Makhado than from Malamulele (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Below are the illustrations shared by the participants:

“We wrote a memorandum and there was no response. We called the premier, instead of coming, he delegated someone, about 10 000 people attended the meeting where we expected the premier to come and hear our grievances.

There was no damage done after this meeting. We then called the president, but he also did not come. We went to High Court to object the incorporation into Malamulele because we were not consulted about incorporation. Violence only occurred after the offices that we sought help from failed us (P 1).

The events that were described above by the above participant is what Seferiades and Johnston (2012) call broken negotiations, which are said to occur when peaceful means do not attract the state's response. The above citation from the participant indicates a failure in participatory governance. Goldstone (2012) states that the communities who feel that they have been betrayed by the government that they voted for by enforcing policies that they are not in agreement with, may protest to remind the government not to neglect the people who voted for them. During this time, the protestors feel that elections are distant, and only action is needed on the undesired policies (Goldstone, 2012).

The statement given by Participant one is supported by the South African Police Service (SAPS, 2016) that reports that a Pro-Makhado Task Team [PMTT] was established to fight against the decision of the MDB of merging Vuwani with Malamulele. Furthermore, the report states that after the efforts of the PMTT failed, the residents decided to approach the High Court in November 2015. The court also refused to demerge Vuwani from Malamulele (SAPS, 2016). The following comments were made:

“The marches started peacefully as the intention was never to damage properties, but to demand a municipality. When the request of the municipality was not honoured, the members of the community decided to block the entry points to Malamulele. There was a total shut down, where people from outside were prohibited to enter and those from Malamulele were not allowed to go out of the township” (P 5).

“When the community demands something from the government and the government takes time to respond to the request, the community lose trust in the government and start to engage in violent protestation. People think that

the government is in a comfort zone, it needs to be shaken by burning properties so that they can come down to respond” (P 4).

In the above citations, the initial intentions in both Malamulele and Vuwani were not to damage properties, but for their request to be honoured. Because this was a crowd, they were able to influence each other to behave in a violent manner that resulted in the destruction of properties. Reicher (1984) describes the events that occurred at Bristol’s St. Paul that resulted in collective violence to be motivated by a presence of a crowd. The author states that when a crowd has gathered, it is very easy to engage in collective violence. The members within the crowd are thus able to influence each other to behave in a certain manner that some individuals would not do on their own (Reicher, 1984). Moreover, Reicher (1984) considers an act of throwing stones to be a crowd behaviour only when many people join in the activity. If only one person throws a stone, that in itself is considered as an individual behaviour and not a crowd behaviour. The events that unfolded in Malamulele and Vuwani are thus considered as crowd behaviour, because it was not an individual act as many people participated in the protests.

The government’s failure to include communities in decisions affecting them causes violence (Matebesi & Botes, 2011). Matebesi’s (2011) study found that the residents of Khutsong engaged in violent protests because their leaders failed to consult them. The MDB decided to incorporate their cross boundary municipality into North West Province instead of their preferred Gauteng Province. The residents allege that the councillors knew about it but failed to give them the details. In support of the above authors, Kirsten and von Holdt (2011) put forth that if the government fails to consult the public in matters that affect them, the error will be addressed through violent protests. The following illustrations were made:

“The government has a tendency of delaying responses when it comes to addressing grievances of the society, this makes people to be impatient. People only want their demands to be addressed, when they feel nothing is being done, they become frustrated and start to be violent, to draw the attention they need. They believe that it is only when they are violent that their grievances will be addressed quickly” (P 7).

*“The big concern that Vuwani people had is that **we were not consulted** (strong emphasis was made on consultation) when the government decided to incorporate us into Malamulele, but we are not the ones that requested a municipality. When Malamulele went to court, they did not qualify to have their own municipality, they only qualified when part of Vuwani was included in their municipality” (P 1).*

“The Demarcation Board failed to include community members in decision making process, when deciding to include some parts of Vuwani into Malamulele. Decision was taken without the inputs of the community members” (P 9).

The failure by the government to listen and respond to the people about the choice of municipality in Malamulele and Vuwani resembles that of Khutsong. In the Khutsong demarcation grievance, the residents indicated their choice of province, as its local municipality borders fell in two provinces (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). The government failed to listen and respond. The failure left the community with the only option of making the area ungovernable by protesting violently (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). Similarly, Piven (2012) notes that violent tactics can be used for expressive reasons. They can be used strategically to recruit adherents, and they are inspirational as they reveal the vulnerability of the opposition and also demonstrate that people can be capable of rebelling (Piven, 2012).

Friedman (2006) argues that participatory governance is a form of formal mechanism, where the members of the community are given the opportunity to influence decisions that affect their lives. Mchunu and Theron (2012) argue that participatory governance allows the smooth implementation of governmental policies. In addition, accountability and the transparency of the government is thus realised through participatory governance. della Porta and Diani (2006) also indicate that participatory democracy is inclusive because the members of the community are afforded an opportunity to make their inputs when decisions are taken. If the Vuwani community members were complaining that there was no consensus reached between them and the government about incorporating them into Malamulele; this suggests that in the process, participatory governance was not considered.

Dlamini (2011) notes that the democratic regime offers citizens the freedom of assembly, speech, and association. The author further states that the protesters can gather in large numbers and hold public meetings, but unfortunately, the authorities who were supposed to listen to the grievances did not present themselves in these meetings. The resulting consequences of the absence of the authorities may cause anger that may promote violent mechanisms (Dlamini, 2011).

Desai (2002) gives an account of how unresponsive governance may lead people to dissent. In Mpumalanga when the people were told that the water meters would be installed, they requested exceptions to be made for the poor. However, the delegates refused by saying that no person was entitled for exceptions. The community members reacted to the installation of the meters by ripping them off and chasing away the contractors. This turned into running battles between the police and the community.

8.2.2.2 Sub theme 2: Violent protests serve as a communication tool to attract the attention of the government

Violent protests may be used to convey a message to the government. Seferiades and Johnson (2012) state that violent action is a form of interaction between competitors and their institutional environment, as it involves balanced negotiation as well as strategic creativity. Tilly (2003) agrees that collective violence is a form of a communication tool, even though the conversation is not a peaceful one, but brutal and at the same time one-sided. The participants in this study engaged in violent protests because they felt that the government did not care about them, hence their concerns were not addressed in a favourable way. They felt that the court also failed them. The following illustrations were shared:

“People think that being violent is the only language that the government understands. People feel that they are taken for granted, the government is not taking them seriously when they submit their grievances” (P 7).

“Community members became violent, only after they tried to reason with the government, but that did not help as the decision of incorporating Vuwani in Malamulele Municipality was not overturned. Even the courts failed the

community by not fulfilling their wishes. The people did not start by blocking roads and destroying properties, we even went to court to register our grievances. It was only after the court turned down the community's request that people started to destroy properties. Even the premier who was called to come and listen to the grievances did not show up (P 9).

*"People believe violent protests will force the government to process their grievances that are taking too long to be addressed. The notion that the **only language that the government understands is violent protests** [more emphasis was put on this, while the participant also demonstrated what he meant by using his hands] is trending, because people think that it is only when they become violent that the government will meet their demands" (P 7).*

Akinboade *et al.* (2013) found that at Lesedi, Emfuleni and Midvaal, the residents indicated that the only language that the government understood is riotous behaviour. The government only addresses grievances when protestors engage in violence. In von Holdt's (2011a) research, the participants mentioned that they engaged with the government at a peaceful level by submitting memos, but that yielded no results, therefore, the next step to be followed was to protest violently. Ngwane (2011) as well as Banjo and Jili (2013) share the same sentiments that to get the attention of the government, the citizens act violently by destroying properties. By so doing, their actions will be able to get the attention of the state, as they understand violence as a form of communication, rather than peaceful engagements and negotiations.

8.2.2.3 Sub theme 3: Personal interests, criminal intentions, and opportunity

The participants in this study highlighted that at times there are people who have personal interests that differ to the ones the community have. These people are interested in protests to turn violent because they benefit from the violence. They encourage violence to sabotage the protests so that it may look like the community were not fighting for the concerns raised, but for something else. von Holdt's (2011a) study found that there are protests leaders who are in pursuit of their personal agendas. These leaders encourage violence because they are angry that they are no longer getting tenders. Service delivery complaints thus become the shield that they

hide their true motives, and they also use them to open the doors for themselves to council contracts (von Holdt, 2011a). The following comment was made:

“Third parties have different concerns to the ones that the community have. You must remember that in protests, there are people who benefit from them. Some people will benefit while some lose, as such they take hold of protests. Some want to sabotage or discredit the struggle” (P 3).

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) argue that the looting that the protestors engage in during protests undermines the issues that the communities were complaining about. Moreover, Clutterbuck (1986) argues that the violence arising from frustration can be politically exploited. The exploiters may use the situation to their advantage. Below is the illustration shared by a participant:

“There are also people who have hidden agendas, these people find an opportunity to fulfil their desires and hide behind protests. These are the people who encourage protests to become violent” (P 7).

Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) indicate that while the leaders of the protests are fighting for the delivery of services, other interest groups see an opportunity to advance their own agendas. This was prevalent in the protests that occurred in Gladysville. According to Tadesse *et al.* (2006), in Mandela Park, external forces were suspected of destabilising South Africa by committing criminal offences and hiding behind the protests of the Anti-Eviction Campaign.

Meanwhile, Tyabazayo (n.d) found that in the Matatiele boundary disputes, the respondents who preferred KZN, indicated that, residents favouring the incorporation to the Eastern Cape, were driven by personal interests as they benefited from the government. The respondents supported their views by stating that during the opposition of the incorporation, they were speaking with one voice, but after they started benefiting from the municipality when they got positions of power, they changed their tune (Tyabazayo, n.d). The Collective Violence Theory also supports the notion that collective violence can occur because certain people want to fulfil their personal interests (Till, 2006).

Criminal intentions were also highlighted to have encouraged protests to turn violent in this study. Participants in this study said that some people participated in the protests to get an opportunity to loot. Further, they stated that looting and burning of shops indicate that the motive was not only about showing dissatisfaction with the decision of the MBD, but to steal school properties and from the shops. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) in their studies conducted in different areas found that people use protests as an opportunity to loot. Collective violent events that occur spontaneously make people greedy and they begin to loot from shops (Tilly, 2003). The following comments were made with regard to criminal intentions:

“Protests start with people who have common goals, along the way, some develop their own interest which has a criminal element in it, such as stealing in shops. Before they burned shops, they started by looting [the participant paused for two minutes], I think the purpose was no longer about protests, but to commit crime [the participant was busy biting a toothpick]. Another opportunity to commit crime was in the stealing of school properties and then setting the school alight to link the events to protests. I can say burning of schools after stealing properties also serves to destroy evidence that may link perpetrators to the crime” (P 5).

“Yaaah... some people come to protests without understanding the grievances. These people are the ones who found an opportunity to loot shops and hide behind the protests (P 6).

“There are people who want to score themselves something in the name of strike. These people will encourage the community to engage in strike so that they can use the opportunity to steal and fulfil their personal needs at the expense of the community” (P 8).

Burger (2009), Carrim (2010) as well as Akinboade *et al.* (2013) agree with the statement made by Participant 8 above that the criminals exploit the situation to enrich themselves. They use the opportunity to loot and disguise their deeds through protests. Mavungu (2011) and Kanellopoulos (2012) highlight that before the shops were burnt, they were looted. The current researcher argues that if the intention is to

show the dissatisfaction with the government actions or policies, looting gives the impression that the motive was to commit crime.

8.2.2.4 Section deductions

From the citations provided, there are many reasons that encourage peaceful protests. The researcher can suggest that, not only unresponsive governance and lack of consultation, amongst others, push the protests to escalate into violence, but group dynamics play a role as individuals are easily influenced when they are within a crowd, by the behaviour of other individuals (Reicher, 1984).

Reicher (1984) argues that a crowd is able to influence people to behave in a manner that they would otherwise not behave in on their own. In addition, Drury (2002) states that within the crowd, a minority can be able to 'hijack' the purpose of the crowd. The minority can convince the majority to move away from a peaceful protest to a violent one. With regard to consultation, Simpson (2010) puts forth that the apartheid government had realised after the eruption of the 1984 to 1986 uprisings that violence would not cease unless the black people were included in government decision making. However, in the democratic era, with the government that the people have voted for, the communities are still left out in decision making processes that concern their lives. For them to participate in government issues, not only as voters, but as decision makers, they are forced to protest violently so that their voices can be heard. The exclusion is also noted in the demarcation of boundaries (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Bernstein & Johnston 2007; Matebesi & Botes, 2011).

Narsiah and Maharaj (1999) refer to the struggle of the boundary of people in Bushbuckridge, by stating that when the dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of the people concerned, the people resort to violence as boundaries also have an impact on how they access resources. Similarly, Tyabazayo (2013) indicates that the violence that erupted because of the boundaries serves as an indication of the importance of boundaries to the people who live in these areas. Moreover, the demarcation that relates to boundary grievances in South Africa has something to do with identity (Tyabazayo, 2013).

Based on the statement mentioned by the scholar in the previous paragraph, the present author put forth that people who share the same norms, cultural practices or speak the same language want to live in the same area. Some people fight to be placed in certain boundaries where they think they will see development and growth of the economy (Ngwane, 2011). Moreover, Tyabazayo (2013) stresses that, the disputes that occur because of boundaries also reflect the problems experienced by communities, such as underdevelopment, inadequate services, and resources. When these violent protests occur, they bring the problems mentioned above to the attention of the authorities.

8.2.3 THEME 3: THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

Anger and frustration were mentioned in von Holdt's (2011a) research as the reason for burning the library. When people are angry and frustrated by their government, they express these feelings through burning of public properties. Similarly, Tsheola (2012) also identifies anger and frustrations to lead into violent protests, when people think the government is not concerned about their issues. This study highlighted the violent protests to have been caused by the lack of solidarity between the people from Vuwani and Malamulele, and also that the government failed to consult them about the incorporation. The pursuing of personal agendas and the government taking time to respond to grievances was also mentioned. Violent protests were also mentioned as a communication strategy. Poverty, lack of service delivery and frustrations also played a role in the eruption of violent protests.

8.2.3.1 Sub-theme 1: Lack of solidarity between protesting communities and consultation by the government

In this study, the participants from Vuwani mentioned that when Malamulele protested for their own municipality, they did not want to see a Venda speaking person around their area. As such, the people in Vuwani have used violence to indicate their disapproval of being incorporated in the municipality that rejected them in the beginning of its protests. In addition, participants indicated that the community members have not been consulted when the decision to incorporate them into Malamulele was taken.

The lack of consultation does not conform to the RSA's Constitution, 1996, Section 152 (a) and (e) which outlines the objectives of the local government to be that the government is responsible for ensuring the government's accountability to the local communities. In addition, the community members as well as the community organisations should be encouraged to get involved in matters pertaining to the local government. When people are not consulted, the constitutional mandate as stated above is not complied with. Hence, the communities remind the government about their constitutional rights by using violent protests to demand recognition. See the illustrations below shared by a participant:

“What made us not to favour the incorporation with Malamulele is that during their protests, they set boundaries, when they protested for their municipality. They did not want any Venda speaking person to set a foot in their area. When Vuwani was incorporated into Malamulele, we were not in good terms with them, as such we had to show our disapproval of being incorporated in their municipality” (P 1).

Concerning the participant's comment above that there was no solidarity between the Malamulele and Vuwani protestors; Ngwane (2011) states that protests are isolated from each other and there appears to be a lack of solidarity between protests from different areas. Furthermore, the above author argues that the isolation between protests makes it easier for the government to suppress the protests and use authority over communities that rebel. The Collective Violence Theory states that, when there is collective solidarity in protests, the people are no longer fearful to behave the way they want. The risk associated with their actions is removed from them (della Porta & Diani, 2006). This research argues that if the Malamulele and Vuwani communities were united during the protests, the damage would have been massive. Participants made the following comments:

“The Demarcation Board failed to include the community members in decision making process. Some parts of Vuwani were included without consulting us the affected members of the community. This resulted in members of the community resorting to violence” (P 9).

The Human Sciences Research Council [HSRC] (2005) states that the decision to re-demarcate is based on the hope that all communities will be entitled to the same standards of service delivery, while Jenkins (2010) argues that the public participation entail members of the public being involved in legislative processes. This research can conclude that there were weaknesses in public participation when Vuwani was incorporated into Malamulele as stated by the participants in the comments above. Mabunda (2018) put forth that the demarcation of boundaries is important as it makes things simple and stable. Moreover, it encourages the stable relationship between the people who are elected to represent the community (Mabunda, 2018).

8.2.3.2 Sub-theme 2: Pursuing of personal agendas

It was highlighted in this study that some people hide behind protests to pursue their own agendas. These people are the ones who are said to incite violence for their own gain. These people may coordinate destruction (Tilly, 2003), so that they can benefit from the situation. A participant said the following:

*“During protests you have people whom you do not know, as the leader. These people have different agendas to the one that the community have, as such protests go into a different dimension from the ones that were initially planned. **Community leaders and leaders of the protests do not call people to vandalise or burn properties** (more emphasis was made here). These people who want to pursue their own agenda are responsible for the violent acts that occurred in Vuwani” (P 3).*

Tilly (2003) put forth that, sometimes the leaders of the protests do not wish for violence to occur during protests, but the protesters might assume that violence will be beneficial by producing outcomes desirable to the group. von Holdt (2011a) states that the formal leadership defend themselves by rebuking collective violence. They shift the blame to criminals who were taking advantage of the situation to enrich themselves. Furthermore, Mandel (2002) states that the instigators of protests have no intention of carrying out the violent acts by themselves, they send out messages that will be most appealing to protestors to engage in collective violence. Furthermore, Mandel (2002) claims that these people have much social influence, including power

that they use to their advantage to instigate collective violence. See the illustrations below shared by the participants:

“There are political agendas to be achieved, during protests, some people put certain people in the fore front of the protests so that they can incite violence that will result in their personal gain” (P 4).

“The initial plan was a total shut down and not to be violent, but ma swi tiva kuri vanhu vanwanyani va tirhisa switereko ku va fikelela ku navela ka vona” [some people use protests to fulfil their desires] (P 8).

8.2.3.3 Sub-theme 3: Government taking time to respond

The violent protests in this study were also blamed on the government who takes time to respond to grievances. The failure of the government was found to have contributed to the violent protests (Jili, 2012). Comments were made that:

“When the government takes time to respond to grievances, people lose temper and resort to violence to force the government to respond (P 4).

“Protests that turn into violence are those that started a long time ago, without getting the necessary attention. When the government comes to address the community, it gives them false hope; as such, community members vent their frustrations by engaging in violence (P 3).

I blame the protests on the government; they should have listened to the concerns of the community. Because they decided not to listen, violence that was costly occurred. Infrastructures were destroyed along the way, schools burned, tar roads damaged; if only the government could have listened, the protests would have not escalated into violence (P 6).

Piven (2012) states that violence can be directed against the target group. Nevertheless, instead of the protesting group attacking people, they attack properties, for example, schools and clinics. These symbols are not the authorities against whom

the protestors are angry at, but they represent the state (Piven, 2012). The protestors may engage in violent tactics to acquire immediate material gain, or damage properties as a way of expressing their grievances (Piven, 2012). When citizens see the government not paying attention to the concerns raised, they become angry about the unresponsiveness of the government to their grievances and show their disapproval or dissatisfaction through violent protests (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Oldfield & Stokke, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Marais *et al.*, 2008; von Holdt, 2011a; Zama, 2013).

8.2.3.4 Sub-theme 4: Violence is the only means to attract the response of the government

The participants in this study indicated that violence serves as the only way that the government can be forced to respond. Tilly (2006) argues that collective violence becomes a way of interacting when other non-violent routines seem not to work. The following illustrations were made about violence being a mechanism that forces the government to respond:

“After the failure to include the community in decision making about the incorporation, efforts were made to oppose the decision. The government failed to consider the request of the community, this led to members of the community to regard violence as the only means to attract the response of the government”
(P 9).

“Some people got angry because the government seemed to be playing with them, as their demands for having a separate municipality away from Thulamela was not fulfilled immediately when the request was made. The people thought that if they maybe protested violently the government would listen to their demands **(P 8).**

8.2.3.5 Sub-theme 5: Poverty motivates people to engage in violent protests

Poverty was also blamed for the outbreak of violence during protests. Participants in this study indicated that people who are living in poverty see an opportunity to loot during protests. Poverty and unemployment may play a significant role in violent protests (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013). Bernstein and Johnston (2007) put forth that poverty also played a role in residents protesting violently in Phumelela. Rosenthal (2010) regards South Africa to be characterised by inequality that results in poor people organising themselves to fight against the violence that they see being perpetrated by the state. Nyirikindi (2007) also indicates that poverty results from unequal access to opportunities, where certain groups are marginalised and disempowered. The illustrations that were shared include:

“Poverty plays a role in protests that turn violently. Poor people see a loophole of alleviating poverty through stealing during protests” (P 5).

Crais (2011) acknowledges that poverty and inequality have risen in South Africa since 1994 when the first democratic elections were held. Poverty presents challenges to the government of South Africa and results in its failure to provide services to the people (Crais, 2011). Violence becomes the means of the marginalised communities to fight their oppressors, which in this instance is the government (Ballard *et al.*, 2006; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011). Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) state that poverty and unemployment may result in people being uncaring and unreasonable towards others. As such, they refuse to be governed by the norms and values that govern other members of the society. To ensure their survival, these people are willing to break the norms and values.

8.2.3.6 Sub-theme 6: Lack of service delivery

The lack of service delivery was also associated with the violent protests in Malamulele, as stated by participants in this study. Dau (2010) states that people protest violently when they are dissatisfied with the services provided to them. The provision of services is enshrined in Section 152(1) (b) of The Constitution of the RSA, 1996. The comments made during the interviews include:

“Tractors were burned because of poor service delivery by Thulamela Municipality. People became angry and burned things that they associated with Thulamela Municipality’s failure to deliver adequate services” (P 5).

When the government is seen as failing the people that voted for them in providing essential services, they use other arenas of engagement. These mechanisms happen to be violent protests that cost the state money as properties are damaged (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Dau, 2010; Kisten & von Holdt, 2011; Sebungwawo, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013; Bruce, 2014). Furthermore, Burger (2009), Dau (2010) and Jili (2012) blame service delivery failure to nepotism and corruption by local government officials. On the other hand, Mc Lennan (2009) and Ngwane (2011) attribute the failure in service delivery on the apartheid government which created the situation that makes the current government seem ineffective in the delivery of services. The apartheid government was only servicing white areas and leaving areas where black people live without being serviced. As such, they have left a huge gap in the areas that were not serviced that the current government has to fix (Ngwane, 2011).

8.2.3.7 Sub-theme 7: Anger and frustrations

Anger and frustrations have been mentioned to be responsible for the eruption of violent protests in this study. For example, when people are frustrated over unemployment, poverty, inadequate delivery of services and the lack of consultation, the frustration can easily turn from peaceful protests to violent protests (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Burger, 2009; Petrus & Isaacs-Martin, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Seferiades & Johnston, 2012;

Mbazira, 2013; Salgado, 2013; Zama, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014). Participants said the following:

“The court did not favour us, on the objection to incorporate us into Malamulele. The anger in response to the court’s objection escalated into violence where schools, shops and even the police station were shut down. Main roads were barricaded. The strong police car that they use to respond to protests was burned and shops were also destroyed” (P 1).

“Frustrations that people encounter when raising issues can lead them into burning schools (P 3).

“Frustrations make people to behave in a manner that results in the destruction of properties” (P 8).

8.2.3.8 Section deductions

This research found that the lack of consultation between the government and communities, as well as the lack of solidarity between Malamulele and Vuwani, contributed to the violent protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani. della Porta and Diani (2006) argue that social movements’ engagement in protests result in massive destruction because of the solidarity within the members as they share the same values. In this study, the participants from Vuwani indicated that there was no solidarity between them and the people from Malamulele. Had these communities united in their battle against the MDB, conclusion can be drawn that the aftermath could have been more damaging, unlike what is currently known about the damages. Ngwane (2011) confirms the lack of solidarity amongst protests in different areas. Furthermore, the above author states that the isolation makes it easier for the government to suppress them and become authoritative in dissenting communities.

Furthermore, the participants in this study highlighted that the people may encourage protests to turn violent for their personal gain. Tilly (2003) confirms that the people may promote the use of collective violence during protests because they personally want to gain, for example through looting or opportunities. Moreover, the failure of the

government to respond quicker to demarcation grievances has contributed to the outbreak of violence in this study. Jili (2012) notes that protests may erupt when the government take time to respond to grievances.

Griggs (1998) states that in certain areas where there were boundary disputes, there have been violent confrontations with security forces. The violent confrontations are also evident in this current study. Tilly (2006) puts forth that people can opt for violent tactics, when non-violent ones do not appeal to the state. Griggs (1998) further notes that in the demarcation disputes, not only did confrontations with the police occur, but bombings, arson attacks and even death occurred in areas where the disputes were not resolved to the people's satisfaction.

In this study, arson has been reported by the participants, but bombings have not been reported. Death was not reported by the participants in any area of this study, but it occurred in Vuwani, maybe the reason for the participants not mentioning it in this study is that the people who died were not participating in the protests or were not killed by the protesters or police. They died when their car hit a pipe that was used as a barricade during the protests and burst into flames (Makana, 2017). The afore mentioned author also reports that there were cars that were damaged in Vuwani during these protests by people who hid in the bushes and threw stones at the passing cars. With regard to the service delivery that the Malamulele participants alleged in this study that the Thulamela Municipality failed to provide, Musitha (2016) argues that data suggests that it was provided. The challenge is that the ward committees failed to inform the citizens about the services provided.

8.2.4 THEME 4: FACTORS PROMOTING THE DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTIES

Protesters destroy properties such as schools, roads and libraries that are essential to the survival of the community. A protester in Azania has reported that an attempt to burn the library was not a planned event, it just occurred at the heat of the moment when the protesters were battling and fleeing from the police (von Holdt, 2011a). This event suggests that the protesters did not intend to commit arson, it just happened at the spur of the moment. Moreover, Goldstone (2012) states that when the citizens feel that they are victims of abuse by the police and courts, their natural response will be to protest violently.

8.2.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Lack of interest in education and unemployment

The lack of education and unemployment have been highlighted in this study as some of the motivations that led the communities to destroy the much-needed properties that help them. Similarly, the studies by Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Molapo and Ngubeni (2011), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013), also found unemployment to have contributed to the outbreak of collective violence. The following statements were made:

“Not everyone likes going to school [the participant coughs and thereafter continues], those who are not interested in school are the ones that burn schools during protests. They even sent messages to the principals, announcing their intention to burn the school. Because they do not like going to school, they do not feel any pain of burning them, but focus on stealing food available at school for feeding scheme” (P 1).

“What I can say is that lack of education and unemployment, results in people damaging properties during protests. People who are hopeless, may join the struggle, such people have no knowledge of the damage that they cause [stopped and looked at the surroundings]. For example, when community members are fighting for something and end up damaging properties such as tractors, tomorrow, the very same people will be complaining about the roads

which are not cleaned [the informant paused to clear his throat]. The tools that are supposed to clean the roads have been damaged during a moment of anger” (P 3).

Unemployment may result in people protesting violently, more especially when it is coupled with other problems. Langa (2011a) found that the frustration over unemployment turned a peaceful protest into a violent one in Azania. Dau’s (2010) research uncovers that the people were frustrated with the lack of employment, while Thulamela had 158 posts that were not filled.

8.2.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Government’s failure to listen to grievances

The government, according to the informants of this study failed to listen to the concerns of the community members. As such, the citizens engaged in violent protests because they believed that this was the only way in which the government would be able to meet their demands when they acted violently. The following citations were shared:

“The government did not listen to the concerns of the community when we objected the incorporation of Vuwani to Malamulele. Even after concerns have been raised, the Municipal Demarcation Board did not reverse the decision (P 2).

“The Municipal Demarcation Board took the decision to incorporate Vuwani into Malamulele, without consulting us [the participant was busy scratching his head]. Just like I have said earlier, if consultation had taken place about the decision, some people would have not found the opportunity to loot and burn buildings. We would have objected the decision from the onset. By taking such a decision and failing to listen to the objection, some people found an opportunity to enrich themselves” (P 2).

“Leaders do not listen to the concerns of the community quickly. People come into a situation where they think blocking roads and damaging direction signage

boards will get them the attention they need from leaders. Once this is done, it is then that politicians come to listen to the concerns (P 5).

Based on the findings of this study, the participants seemed to be taking the issues of demarcation seriously. According to Griggs (1998), the boundaries influence people's lives, as these are places where they have to vote, and they give them a sense of identity and offer them access to services. Moreover, the boundaries group people who share the same culture and political belonging together. The disruptions through demarcations which may result in the separation of people who share common social, cultural, political belonging may also have a negative effect on their economic well-being (Griggs, 1998), hence these people engage in violent protests. Furthermore, Crais (2011) cites the minutes of a meeting of the 10th of March 1885 that indicates that the problem with boundaries is that they cut off people from their own drives. Based on Crais's (2011) citation from a meeting, the researcher can argue that the problem with boundaries did not emerge now, it has been an issue over centuries. The following was mentioned by participants:

"People believe that it is only when they destroy something that is connected to the government that will make the government to meet their demands and respond quickly" (P 7).

"There is this belief that for government to hear you, you must destroy properties [while rubbing hands]. There is a belief that government responds quicker...only when properties have been burned This has proven to work because once the properties have been burned, the politicians come down to hear the concerns of the people" (P 6).

According to Goldstone (2012), groups initiate violent protests when they feel that the only way in which their protests can have an impact is by engaging in violence. They believe that the government will only listen to their issues of concern when they engage in disruptive behaviour. Furthermore, these people are said to be responding to the state violence that is committed against them, they are thus giving the state the punishment it deserves (Goldstone, 2012). Furthermore, Goldstone (2012) states that the protesters destroy properties and even lives because by doing so, they believe it

is an indication that their issue of concern is very important and thus deserves an immediate intervention.

Moreover, Goldstone (2012) states that the burning of cars and stores as well as the throwing of stones at the police, are acts of rage that symbolise desperation. These acts are committed to serve as an indication that the protesters are also important as they have feelings that they have been devalued and also that they have been abused (Goldstone, 2012). These actions are thus sending a message to the government that the citizens have been hurt and thereby protest violently to show the government that they also have the power to fight back (Goldstone, 2012).

8.2.4.3 Sub-theme 3: Community members' lack of knowledge on addressing grievances

This study highlighted that the lack of knowledge in addressing grievances can result in residents destroying properties. This shows a weakness in participatory governance, as it involves the members of the community playing an active role in government matters (Jenkins, 2010). People might also not be aware of how expensive the property that they destroy is when they are angry. SALGA (2015) suggests that consumer education that familiarises citizens about government processes and procedures will reduce the frustrations of people. The lack of knowledge in this regard will make people protest violently, as they do not know where to direct their concerns. The illustrations that they shared include:

“People have not been taught the proper way of addressing grievances. They think burning properties such as schools will make them achieve their goals. They forget that by burning properties, they are the ones losing as the economy goes down due to such practices” (P 4).

8.2.4.4 Sub-theme 4: Violent protests were adopted from the apartheid struggle

The eruption of violent protests in this study was also blamed on the apartheid struggles. Khumalo (2014) notes that protests in South Africa have worsened, and they resemble the 1970s protests that were characterised by serious violence. Moreover, the above author notes that the slogans that were used during the apartheid regime such as “*burn, burn, burn*” have reappeared in current protests. These words suggest to protesters that the houses belonging to government officials as well as the government buildings that remind them of the apartheid period should be set alight. The illustrations shared include:

“Violent protests have been adopted from the ANC government during the apartheid struggles when they were fighting the apartheid government” (P 4).

Wines (2005) reports of the violent protests of Shantytown residents in Pretoria who burned a council member’s home and car while they were angry with limited access to government housing. Similarly, Ngwane (2011) points out that the communities barricaded roads, attacked government properties and burned houses belonging to the councillors. This was done to show the disapproval about how these councillors were not representing their interest. This is what Tilly (2003) regards as scattered attacks, wherein the protesters during collective violence damage symbolic objects or places that are related to the people whom they are angry with. Government officials may also be assaulted and or have their properties set on fire.

According to Twala (2014), the buildings and the houses of people who were seen as supporting the apartheid government were burned during protests. However, in Malamulele and Vuwani, there was no media report of houses belonging to individuals that were burnt, but there were reports of community buildings being burnt. The replica of the apartheid era as reported by the participants in this study area was through barricading roads, torching shops and burning government buildings.

8.2.4.5 Section deductions

This study found that some protesters destroy properties because they are not interested in education, and they are also unemployed. The study of Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Langa (2011a), Molapo and Ngubeni (2011), Managa (2012), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013) found that unemployment, when combined with other problems in the community is likely to result in people protesting violently. Informants of this study blame the government for the violent protests that erupted in the study areas. The government failed to listen to the concerns that they raised about the demarcation of their areas. Goldstone (2012) put forth that people respond to the government by engaging in collective violence as a punishment, for the violence that they regard as being committed by the state towards people.

The apartheid struggles are blamed for the current occurrence of protests, as participants in this research indicated that the protests have been copied from the struggles that occurred during the apartheid period. Ngwane (2011), von Holdt (2011a), Underhill (2013), Khumalo (2014), and Twala (2014) acknowledge that there is a resemblance of the current protests to the apartheid regime. For example, Bryant (2008) states that the very same people who fought against the apartheid government are the same people who protest violently in large numbers against the democratic government. These people fight the very same government that they put in office. Netswera and Kgalane (2014) indicate that people are more impatient with the democratic government, more that they were with the apartheid government.

8.2.5 THEME 5: WHO PROTESTORS ARE PUNISHING BY DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES

Some informants in this study reported that destroying government properties is a punishment to the government. While some view it as punishment to both the state and the communities, others see it as punishment to the communities only. von Holdt (2011a) reports that an attempt to burn a library did not succeed in Azania while the protesters were running battles with the police. Later on, some protesters returned and set the library alight. Interestingly, before they could do that, they started by stealing computers. The current researcher argues that this was not about punishing the government only, but an intention to commit a criminal offence was also prevalent.

8.2.5.1 Sub-theme 1: Protestors are punishing the government and themselves

Some participants in this study stated that not only is the government being punished, when government buildings are being destroyed, the communities also suffer the consequences. When buildings such as schools, clinics and libraries are burned, people suffer severely (von Holdt, 2011a). The following comments were made:

“When we destroy properties, we are hitting at the government and ourselves. The properties are there to serve us, destruction of properties affect both the citizens and the government. The funny part about destroying public properties is that those in power do not use them, only those who destroy these properties rely on them. It is the very same thing as shooting yourself in the foot when you are angry at someone and expect to be taken to the hospital” (P 7).

“When people burn properties, the government feels the pain, but little do they realise that they are in turn putting themselves at a disadvantage. For example, the FNB [First National Bank] moved away after it was burned in Vuwani. Small businesses which benefited as they saved transport money to go to town to deposit a small amount of money are forced to accrue expenses on transport to deposit money elsewhere” (P 1).

8.2.5.2 Sub-theme 2: By burning government properties, protestors are punishing the government

Some participants in this study pointed out that by burning government properties, the protestors are punishing the government. Musitha (2016) puts forth that the frustrations experienced by the communities should be directed towards the committees as they have been elected by communities to deliver services, instead of punishing the state such as in the destruction of buildings. Furthermore, the above-mentioned author states that by protesting violently, the communities are punishing the state. van der Merwe (2013) argues that the burning of state properties such as clinics and libraries is actually punishing the state, the author views burning these buildings as a symbolic disruption of the state's authority. Because they were built by the state to help the communities, when they are destroyed, the state has to cough more money to refurbish them. The following response was given by a participant:

“The government is being punished, especially when they block and burn roads. The government has to replace these damaged road” (P 2).

Booyesen (2009) points out that the local government feels the extent of people's anger when they are frustrated with the failure of the national and provincial government. In the case of Malamulele and Vuwani, the violent protests were directed at the local government, while the mandate to determine municipal boundaries lies within provincial MEC as stipulated in the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998). Section 12(1) gives the responsibility of demarcating municipal boundaries to the MEC for local government in the province through the application of the Demarcation Act, in cooperation with members of the MDB.

8.2.5.3 Sub-theme 3: By burning properties, community members are punishing themselves only

Some participants in this study are of the opinion that by burning properties, the communities are punishing themselves, as children are left with no schools. Protesters are thus solving a problem by creating another one by burning community buildings when they want a demerger. After the demerger has occurred, as it is the case in Malamulele where they demerged from Thulamela Municipality, funds were needed to refurbish or to replace the properties that they have destroyed when they were angry. The following comments were made:

“They are punishing themselves, when government schools are burned, children are punished; leaders take their children to private schools” (P 3).

“During protests, members of the community think they are punishing the government by destroying properties. It is only when the properties are needed that people realise that they did not punish the government, but themselves. For example, learners are no longer having classes and now it is the learners and parents who are affected and not the government. The bank that was assisting small businesses is gone and additional fees are accrued to access the bank elsewhere” (P 9).

“The communities are punishing themselves; people tend to hinder progress when they stop things that are not related to the protests. For example, when you are seeking a municipality and burn a school, the budget that was supposed to be used for what you are crying for, can be used to refurbish the school. All I can say is that community members are the ones who suffer great loss when people protest violently” (P 6).

Ngwane (2011) states that the activists agree that the protests are necessary to attract the government's response, but the negative side is that they hinder development. According to von Holdt (2011a), people severely suffer the aftermath of the protests. When clinics are burnt, poor people might not have money to consult private doctors.

8.2.5.4 Section deduction

The participants in this study highlighted that the destruction of properties was punishment to the government. Booysen (2009) and van der Merwe (2013) regard the act of destruction of state buildings such as clinics, libraries, roads to be a punishment to the state. According to van der Merwe (2013), the destruction disrupts the symbols of the state's effectiveness in service delivery. Moreover, the state has to bear the burden of allocating more funds to fix these problems. Even though the state's authority is disrupted through destroying or burning of such buildings, this study argues that the communities are the ones who suffer the most. Ngwane (2011) confirms that the protestors are aware that their activities hinder development even though they bring hope of attracting government response.

Some participants in this study described the destruction of buildings to be punishing the communities. Elderly women in von Holdt's (2011a) research described a clinic that was burnt as helpful to them, because it provided a facility where they obtained their chronic medication without having to walk long distances or pay transport. These women spoke positively about the clinic even though some described it as representing the apartheid regime (von Holdt, 2011). This serves as an indication that they have been affected by its torching.

8.2.6 THEME 5: ACHIEVEMENTS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

Participants in this study had mixed feelings about whether communities have achieved anything by engaging in violent protests. Some protesters feel that violent protests did not achieve any goal, while others indicated that they have achieved some goals.

8.2.6.1 Sub-theme 1: The violent protests did not achieve goals

Informants on this study indicated that the protests did not achieve goals. The current researcher argues that the protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani have not achieved the intended goal because by solving one problem, more losses were encountered. Griggs (1998) cites Griggs (1997) who states that the boundary conflict

that was seen in Bushbuckridge where residents fought to be incorporated into Mpumalanga Province, instead of the then Northern Province, resulted in the loss of tens of millions of rands as infrastructure was destroyed in the disputes. In the Bushbuckridge disputes, 15 schools were burnt to the ground (Griggs, 1998 cites Griggs, 1997). This study concludes that the burning of properties during protests does not benefit anyone, but it results in more losses on the side of the communities. The end of the protests marks the return of learners to schools but when schools are burned the learners do not have a shelter where they will learn. Comments were made that:

“By protesting violently, the community did not achieve anything, but instead suffered loss because properties have been burned” (P 1).

“Violent protests do not achieve goals, because when you are fighting for a tar road, and you burn schools. The government gives you the tar road, the violence has not paid off because you still have to wait for the schools to be refurbished, after getting what you were looking for. To me this is not victory” (P 4).

*“During the protests, it seemed like we would reach the desired goals, but the aftermath of the protests speaks the opposite that **violent protests did not achieve anything good** [emphasis were put here] but have negatively affected us as the properties that are supposed to assist us have been destroyed in the moment of anger” (P 9).*

8.2.6.2 Sub-theme 2: Protesters feel they have achieved something when the government comes down to listen to their grievances

When the government fails to come during peaceful protests but finds time to come during the outbreak of violence, it gives the impression that violence works. For example, a participant in von Holdt's (2011a) research indicated that they burned buildings so that 'the smoke' could alert the premier that he was being summoned. The protesters in this study protested peacefully, but the government officials never

came to address their concerns. They only came when the buildings were set alight, as the smoke had called them. Below are the illustrations shared by participants:

“To gauge if we have achieved our goals or not, we think we have achieved a goal, when politicians come down, to attend to our needs. If the concerned office comes to address the needs of the community, we feel we have achieved a goal” (P 5).

“Jaa, in our own terms, we think we have achieved our goals, the minute the government responds after violent protests. By so doing, the government [pause for few seconds] proves the perception to be correct, that to be heard you need to destroy government properties” (P 6).

“In Malamulele, I could say that the goal was achieved, members of the community were able to force the government to give in the demand of separate municipality away from Thulamela. The goal was achieved, even though it has implications for the community” (P 8).

When the government react to the crises in the community after the outbreak of collective violence, they are acknowledging that it works. Booysen (2007) found that leaders only addressed people when they are dissident. Bernstein and Johnston (2007) as well as Mbazira (2013) found the government to have only attended to the service delivery issues that communities complained about only after they had revolted.

8.2.6.3 Section deductions

There are mixed reactions about the achievements of the protests that become violent. Some felt they achieved a goal as a separate municipality from Thulamela was obtained in Malamulele, this indicates that the leaders listen more to violence. von Holdt's (2011a) research found that the protestors burned buildings so that 'the smoke' could serve as a signal that the government is being called to attend to community matters. The government in the above mentioned study came after the buildings were set alight, this serves as an indication that the government is highly moved by violence

and not memorandums. Some participants in this study felt that the collective violence did not achieve any goals, more especially in Vuwani where the separation from Malamulele did not materialise.

Booyesen (2007) and Ngwane (2011) found the leadership to have visited the community only after an outbreak of collective violence. Kotze and Taylor (2010) as well as Langa (2011a) found violent protests to be a language that protesters used to call the government. Furthermore, the afore mentioned authors indicate that the language delivered the message to the government as the community had expected when they came down to listen and also attend to the grievances. In Malamulele, collective violence resulted in the granting of the stand-alone municipality as requested. Opp (2001) considers violent protests to be an effective tool to make the government to attend to community matters. In addition, Bernstein, and Johnston as well as Mbazira (2013) found the government to have provided services to the communities when they engaged in violent protests.

8.2.7 THEME 7: RESPONSE OF PROTESTERS TO THE DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS

The participants in this study have indicated that the destruction of government buildings pains the government and also makes them feel that their grievances have been registered by the authorities. Some participants indicate that they regretted after the events had taken place.

8.2.7.1 Sub-theme 1: Protestors regret their actions

Some participants in this study regret seeing the buildings on fire. Ramjee and van Donk (2011) point out that the use of violence during protests is not fair and it is not even helpful to the protesters. Instead of capturing the response of the relevant authorities, it diverts their focus to the violence that is occurring. Drury (2002) states that group violence is a mechanism that people can use to liberate themselves. This suggests that when a person is in a crowd, they may engage in violent protests as it is believed to be a mechanism that works. Reicher (1984) points out that collective behaviour just needs an initial encouragement for it to start. When one person throws

a stone to destroy properties, another finds encouragement from the initial act and joins the action. A participant mentioned the following:

“During the time the buildings are set alight, there are no feelings of pain. For example, when someone is playing soccer and gets injured, there is no feeling of pain at that moment, the pain is felt after when the person is relaxing. Even with us, we felt the pain only after the buildings were burned, especially when we wanted to use them. The bank where people used to go and deposit money without having to pay for transport is closed, we feel pain now because we have to incur financial expenses” (P 1).

In the riots described by Reicher (1984:11), the author states that a participant yelled “*brick it*”, then the crowd followed by pelting stones at the police cars. This indicates that people in a crowd are motivated by each other to behave in a certain manner that they would otherwise not behave in when they are alone. Crowd encouragement is thus necessary for collective violence. Tilly (2003) supports that people can be motivated to engage in collective violence by following one person who starts a violent act. The author describes an event where the police were responding to an incident and got attacked because a person who, at some point, was mistreated by the police threw a bottle at them. Other people at the scene also engaged in collective violence by throwing stones, wood, metal, and bottles at the police and even at the vehicles that were passing by (Tilly, 2013). Some of the illustrations shared by participants:

*“Witnessing the burning of buildings is what I regret even today. If you are a true leader... **You should not allow communities under your leadership to engage in that** [the participant put more emphasis on this]. *If you burn buildings, what will happen after the protests? Look at the weather today, [it was a chilly weather] it is cold, imagine learners having to learn in this weather without a roof” (P 3).**

von Holdt (2011a) argues that in the event where collective violence has occurred in the community, the formal leadership is fast to reprimand the collective violence. They blame the acts on criminals and as such take the blame away from themselves. Schweingruber (2000), Adang (2011) as well as Diani (2012) through the Collective

Violent Theory indicate that the leaders have an influential role in encouraging collective violence. Below are the illustrations made by the participants:

“At the time, we feel it is right... collectively, but individually when we are alone, we feel the pain. There is no normal person who feels good after burning government properties. It is painful to us when we realise that properties that were supposed to be helping us have been burned, like the burning of schools” (P 4).

“At that moment, it feels like a goal has been achieved, but later on it is hurtful because, much needed community properties are destroyed. People encourage each other to destroy properties, as there is a belief that these properties represent the government. To them, the smoke that comes from burning properties indicates an accomplishment to the goal. To those who attended the protest, they did not waste their time for nothing; it was beneficial as something had happened” (P 9).

It is not surprising that a participant in this study associates the burning of properties to the accomplishment of goals. von Holdt (2011a) states that the burning down of a building symbolises a disruption of the authority, which in this case is the ANC led government. It also demonstrates the anger and the grievances that the communities have. The above statement is also supported by Johnston and Seferiades (2012) who state that in Greece the protestors barricaded roads, attacked local police officers, and even set government buildings on fire. These buildings symbolised the authority of the government, which in this case was represented by the police who shot a young person and instantly killed him while they were patrolling (Johnston & Seferiades, 2012). The citizens vented their anger by destroying something that belonged to the authority that angered them. Police vehicles are reported to have been destroyed completely in the attacks (Johnston & Seferiades, 2012).

8.2.7.2 Sub-theme 2: Protestors feel they have registered their grievances

The participants in this study felt that they had made an impact on the government when they burned the community properties. A participant in von Holdt's (2011a) research said that the protestors burnt down homes as a punishment to those who represent the local authorities. They feel that these people have betrayed the residents' needs. Comment made with regard to punishing the government:

“The protestors feel that they have registered their grievances with the government. It serves as a memorandum that will reach the government to respond. They regard burning of buildings as the last resort for their grievances. When they see a place burning, they think the protest is moving forward” (P 6).

8.2.7.3 Section deductions

Some activists in this research said that they regret seeing buildings on fire, while some said that it is only those who care about the government that feel the pain. Those who regret the events might have participated in collective violence because of being in a crowd, that in turn influenced them to behave in a certain way (Reicher, 1984; Tilly, 2003). Some participants in this research stated that the grievances have been registered when the buildings are burned. The burning of buildings serves as an indication that the state authority has been disrupted (van Holdt, 2011a). Just like what has been mentioned in the following studies, namely, Dlamini (2011) and von Holdt (2011a) which note that the smoke serves as a messenger by notifying the authorities that their presence is required.

8.2.8 THEME 8: THE USE OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AS A TOOL

Many participants in this study felt that collective violence is not an effective mechanism of addressing grievances, even though in Malamulele it yielded a positive response.

8.2.8.1 Sub-theme 1: Collective violence does not work

Some of the participants in this study believe that collective violence is not a good mechanism of demonstrating dissatisfaction, disagreement, grievances, and concerns. Moreover, collective violence was seen as ineffective especially because the communities used it to solve one problem by creating more problems. The following comments were made:

“Collective violence does not work. Violent activities that people engage in do not benefit the community but take it backward. If people are looking for a clinic and burn schools, this is one step forward and three steps backward as this hinders the progress of the community” (P 5).

“As I have indicated, violent protest is attached to criminality. People plan to strike but cannot plan to destroy buildings beforehand. It happens when they are on the scene. Collective violence cannot work, it is criminals who plan to use protests to achieve their criminal intentions” (P 5).

*“No, there must be another way that can be used to achieve desired goals. **Violence is not the answer** [strong emphasis was put here], it is just that people are not patient, and they only want things to be done their own way” (P 7).*

Piven (2012) states that violence on its own right can be regarded as a force, however it might not achieve the goals that the movement or protesters strive to achieve. For example, when properties are destroyed along the process, the communities will suffer when there is a need to use such properties. Women in von Holdt's (2011) study were unhappy about the burning of the clinic. This is an indication that some people regret

the actions that they engaged in. Children lose valuable learning time when there is a total shut down, as they are prohibited from going to school (Botes *et al.*, 2007). Moreover, the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 8(6) prohibits people from engaging in violence when they are protesting.

8.2.8.2 Sub-theme: Collective violence can be an effective tool to force outcomes

Some protestors in this study believe that collective violence can yield desired outcomes as it makes the government to respond quicker. In Malamulele, it was seen as effective, even though the destruction of properties is regretted, hence the participants did not recommend it to be used by other communities. The findings of the study of Opp (2001) give the impression that violence worked in different circumstances. The Collective Violence Theory indicates that collective violence works, and, in most instances, it produces the desired outcomes (Fanon, 1963; Schneider, 1993; Zeitz *et al.*, 2009; della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012). Furthermore, the scholars indicate that the protesters engaged in collective violence because it worked where other mechanisms seem to have failed. In addition, Fanon (1963) and Reicher (1984) indicate that the people who felt oppressed have used it to fight against their exploiters.

Dlamini (2011) puts forth that through collective violence, the residents from Voortrekker generated a response from the officials who seemed to be uncaring and also distanced from the community that they served. Collective violence has been used successfully to force the powerful to respond to collective demands. Thus, 'the smoke' has been able to bring the government closer to the community (Dlamini, 2011). The study by Tadesse *et al.* (2006) report that the riotous behaviour that resulted in damage to private and public property was found by protesters to be the only method that can attract the attention of the authorities. The following illustrations were made about using collective violence to force outcomes:

"In Malamulele, it worked because a separate municipality was granted. But I suggest that imbizos should be held time and again, so that community leaders can listen to the concerns of the community before these concerns turn into

frustrations. When people are frustrated, it is easy for them to lose their minds. They can influence one another to engage in violence” (P 8).

“Collective violence can be used to achieve goals in certain circumstances. It works, but I would not recommend it as it result in injuries and destruction of properties. Its consequences are not good. The government can be forced to fulfil the wishes of the community, but the aftermath of collective violence can last for a very long time” (P 9).

It is not only the participants in this study that view collective violence as a mechanism that attracts responses from the higher offices as Tadesse *et al.* (2006) indicate that the government officials only go to see what the people are complaining about after they have caused havoc. This statement suggests that the government officials are not moved by words of mouth that tell them about the complaints of the public, but they are moved by collective actions that cause terror. Crais (2011:150) provides evidence that suggests that violence works to achieve the desired goals by indicating that in South Africa, *“new agricultural patterns emerged out of violence, particularly extensive cultivation and reliance on maize”*.

8.2.8.3 Section deductions

Collective violence was regarded by participants in this study as a mechanism that is effective to compel the crisis driven government to respond positively. At the same time, it was not seen to be a good method to use, even though it brings positive response, because of the destruction that it results in (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Booysen, 2007; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Langa, 2011a; Ngwane, 2011; Mbazira, 2013). Studies by Opp (2001) and Tadesse *et al.* (2006) found collective violence to have worked in different communities and circumstances.

Violent protests were not recommended by the participants in this study because of the negative impact that they have. Some protestors have been arrested for public violence (Da Costa & Carter, 2007; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Montsho, 2010; Selebi, 2012). People have been injured (Reicher, 1984; Desai, 2002; Montsho, 2010); some even died during the outbreak of violent protests (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Molapo & Ngubeni,

2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Goldstone, 2012; Magubane, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Ngangisa, 2014). Furthermore, small businesses experience hardships during the outbreak of violent protests (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007).

Children lose valuable learning time as they are prohibited from going to school (Botes *et al.*, 2007b). Violent protests may result in even more violence. Simiti (2012) states that the violent protests that erupt in one area are more likely to influence other areas who also have similar problems to engage in violent protests as well. In some studies, foreign owned shops have been attacked during the outbreak of violent protests (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Mottiar & Bond, 2012; Lekaba, 2014).

8.2.9 THEME 9: PREVENTION ON THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTIES

8.2.9.1 Sub-theme 1: Community involvement in projects

Participants in this study suggested the inclusion of community members in community projects such as construction. Moreover, their involvement was regarded to be beneficial in that they will have some sense of ownership of community properties. Community members cannot destroy properties if they contributed towards building it. They will regard these properties as theirs because they played a significant role to ensure that the buildings are erected. Dau (2010) states that public participation is crucial as it gives community members a sense of ownership. Furthermore, the services that are provided are valued as the input of the community is also considered. See the comment made below by a participant:

“Community members should be involved in construction; it will make them feel a sense of ownership. They should be hired to work on such projects. Even tomorrow, they will know that such properties belong to them. Protestors cannot destroy old schools because they were built by their own hands” (P 1).

von Holdt (2011a) states that a participant has indicated that the protesters burned the properties because they regard them as belonging to the municipality. This simply means that the community do not feel a sense of ownership, as to them the buildings represent the municipality and not the community. This may be due to what the participants in this study have indicated that when community members are not part of the community projects, they will not feel a sense of ownership. When they engage in protests, they will not hesitate to destroy such properties that they regard as municipal properties and not as theirs.

Mathekga (2007) concludes that the local government should encourage members of the community to be involved in government matters in their operation and management style. This will make them feel a sense of ownership. Participatory governance should be seen not only as a means whereby the members of the community are at the receiving end of services, but they should be active participants in the process (Mathekga, 2007).

8.2.9.2 Sub-theme 2: Community leaders could play a role in preventing violent protests

Informants in this study suggested that the community leaders should play a role to prevent violent protests. It was also highlighted that the politicians should stop making promises that are difficult to achieve in a short space of time. The office bearers should listen and account to the people that voted for them. They should form a close relationship with the community so that it will be easier for the community members to raise concerns. Moreover, regular feedback should be provided to communities so that they can know the local government's activities.

Bryant (2008) states that the Kennedy Road settlers protested violently when their leaders did not fulfil the promises that they had made during the election campaigns. After they were put in office, these promises were forgotten. To remind them about these promises, the citizens revolted. The failure to include community members in government matters may result in members of the community revolting (Booyesen, 2009, Mautjana & Makombe, 2014). In addition, the promises that the leaders make but fail to account for afterwards are associated with the members of the communities

revolting (Greenberg, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Dau, 2010; Langa, 2011a; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013). The following illustrations were shared:

“Those who are put in office by the community, such as councillors, should listen to the concerns of the community; they should be accountable. Politicians should refrain from making empty promises as these lead to violent protests” (P 5).

“Community leaders should form a close relationship with the members of the community, so that it will be easier for them to raise their grievances. On the other hand, the leaders should give regular feedback on where they are in addressing the concerns, this will serve as an assurance to the community that their grievances are being addressed. If no feedback is given, the community members may think that leaders do not take them seriously and thereby start to destroy properties” (P 8).

When leaders fail to account for the promises that they have made, the citizens remind them by engaging in violent protests (Burger, 2009; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Manala, 2010; Jili, 2012; Platinum Weekly, 2012). The councillors are seen as unaccountable when they do not consider the issues raised by the communities, as they are also seen as people that cannot be trusted and those that the members of the community cannot form a relationship with (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Manala, 2010). Moreover, Draai (2010) indicates that mutual relationships can be formed between councillors and communities, when councillors constantly interact with community members.

8.2.9.3 Sub-theme 3: Showing people the impact of protesting violently

The participants in this study suggested that people should be shown the impact of protesting violently. Furthermore, security measures should be tightened as well when community members start to protest. Johnston and Bernstein (2007) report that small businesses suffer massively during the outbreak of violent protests. This study argues that such reports need to be shared with members of the community so that they can know the consequences of their actions. The following remarks were made:

“The government should show people the impact of protesting violently and at the same time tighten security measures (P 2).

“Vanhu va fanele va lemukisiwa leswaku ku kombisa ku vilela loku ku katsaku madzolongwa, ku va tlherisela endzhaku eka ku phakeriwa ka vukhorhokeri”
[People should be alerted that protesting violently takes them backward in terms of service delivery]” (P 5).

8.2.9.4 Sub-theme 4: Educating people

The participants in this study proposed that political teachings and the teaching at schools can help to reduce violent protests. In addition, the community meetings should also inform the community about the value of community properties. Mofolo and Smith (2009) indicate that the municipal councils should hold regular meetings with the members of the community to inform them about the functioning of the municipality and even rates that they have to pay for service provision, for example the rates levied for sanitation or water supply. The comments that were made are:

“I think people [while scratching his head] should be taught politically on what to do when they have grievances to which the government is failing to respond. During community meetings, people should be taught not to destroy community properties as it takes time for the government to supply them with such resources. The community will suffer while waiting for the replacement or refurbishment. At school level, children should be taught at young age that government properties should never be destroyed” (P 4).

“Members of the community should be taught about the value of properties in their lives, maybe through that they may realise that destruction of properties when they are angry puts them at a disadvantage. When schools are destroyed in the process, after winning the battle, children have to go to school. When classes have become ashes, where are children going to learn?” (P 9).

8.2.9.5 Sub-theme 5: Quick response to grievances and cooperation

Beinart (1992) argues that violence is very difficult to break once it starts. It is better for the government not to wait for the violence to erupt. The participants in this study indicated that collective violence does not need a mass as a few people can be able to cause massive destruction to properties. As such, the government should respond immediately to grievances even when the people who have grievances appear to be few. Kanyane *et al.* (2017:72) concur with the findings of this study by stating that “*voices of dissent should not be underestimated as they have a potential to ruin a community, in this case, in the form of the learners’ future*”. The comments that were shared by the participants in this study were as follows:

“The government should not underestimate the capacity of people but should respond quicker before destruction takes place. Even when people are few, they can be able to cause destruction” (P 6).

“The government should not wait for an instance where members of the community protest. They should try to fix the situation before it goes to an extent of protesting. It is easier to control the situation from becoming tense before a protest erupts. Once a protest erupts, the likelihood of people influencing each other to engage in violence is very high (P 10).

This research argues that the government should not allow protests to start in the first place. In support of the previous statement, Schweingruber (2000) states that the danger of a crowd is that people get influence from others, as such they may behave in certain ways that they cannot behave in when they are alone.

8.2.9.6 Sub-theme 6: The role of the police

The participants in this study advised that the police should be deployed to protect buildings that are likely to be destroyed. According to Kirsten and von Holdt (2011), the police’s absence in protests may lead to the destruction of properties; while at the same time their presence may escalate protests to become violent. Meanwhile, Mchunu and Theron (2013), as well as Sebola (2014) also state that the police

presence in public protests may result in protestors behaving violently. In addition, the confrontations between the police and the protesters are more likely to occur when the police apply excessive force that is not even required. Concerning the role of the police in preventing the destruction of the community property, the participants said the following:

“Police should try to establish properties that are most likely to be destroyed and guard them” (P 8).

“They should also deploy police to protect public properties that are likely to be destroyed in the process” (P 6).

8.2.9.7 Section deduction

Participants in this research recommended that the local members should be hired during the construction of government buildings so that they can have a sense of ownership. The research of Mathekga (2007) and Dau (2010) are in support of the above stated recommendation. Furthermore, participants in this research argued that when these properties are about to be destroyed; the members of the community who took part in constructing these buildings will remind their fellow citizens the hardship they encountered when they erected such buildings. Moreover, they will serve as deterrent agents. If community members are not involved, they will regard the property as belonging to the government and thus not be bothered when it is destroyed (von Holdt, 2011). Dau (2010) also indicates the importance of public participation.

The politicians are advised not to make promises that they cannot fulfil to get votes. The community members may remind them to fulfil their promises, of which failure may result in collective violence (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Manala, 2010). Moreover, the participants in this study stated that the government should speedily respond to grievances and not wait to a point where the buildings are set on fire. The police have a role of identifying buildings that are likely to be targeted and guard them. Regular meetings could be used by municipal councils to provide information to residents (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). Violence is better dealt with by ensuring that a protest does not occur at all (Beinart, 1992), because once a protest is allowed to occur, an

individual in a crowd could be easily influenced by others to engage in collective violence (Schweingruber, 2000; Seedat *et al.*, 2010).

8.2.10 THEME 10: MECHANISMS TO CHANNEL PEOPLE TO PEACEFUL PROTESTS

Friedman (2006) states that *imbizos* can be a mechanism that the government could use to test public preferences. In the case of Vuwani, this research argues that the government could have avoided the destruction of properties by determining whether the members of the community are in favour of the incorporation or not. Meanwhile, Tadesse *et al.* (2006) support the use of *imbizos* by indicating that the community members and government officials could come together to discuss the service delivery needs as well as the challenges experienced in the community.

8.2.10.1 Sub-theme 1: Addressing grievances at first step

The research participants advised the government that the grievances should be addressed the first time they are noticed, rather than waiting for a protest to erupt and then respond. Once a protest has started, the people are more likely to rebel. Moreover, the demands of the people should be met. The following comments were made:

“I think the biggest mechanism to ensure that protests are going peacefully is to address challenges in the first step. The grievances should be addressed, even before people can think of protesting because a protest may turn out to be violent” (P 1).

“As long as the government does not meet the demands of the people, there is no way that people can protest peacefully” (P 7).

In support of the comments made by participants in this study Botes *et al.* (2007) advise that grievances should be addressed as soon as they are known; because if they are left unresolved, they may reach a stage where they are no longer manageable. The participants in Langa’s (2011a) research indicated that the

government only listens to the community during election campaigns when they need their votes. Meanwhile, Goldstone (2012) warns that the people should not only be promised democracy when their votes are needed. Democracy should serve as a rule of law that is promised equally and it should also be used for the citizens' protection; because when people believe that they are denied this democracy, they will in turn respond by protesting violently.

8.2.10.2 Sub-theme 2: Avoid making empty promises

Participants in this study advise the politicians to refrain from making empty promises because the citizens hold them accountable for the promises they make. Manala (2010), Platinum Weekly (2012) and Lekaba (2014) state that during election campaigns, the politicians make promises of excellence, as they need votes. After the elections, the citizens hold the politicians accountable to fulfil these promises, as failure to fulfil these promises results in violent protests (Dau, 2010). The following comment is noted:

“Politicians should avoid making empty political promises. When politicians want to win votes, they promise the impossible. Political promises are very dangerous; people stick to them” (P 2).

8.2.10.3 Sub-theme 3: Constant engagement with communities

The constant engagement with the members of the community was also highlighted by participants in this study, as a mechanism that can work to reduce the motivations of engaging in violent protests. The people will have a platform where they can raise their concerns on what they expect from the government. The councillors should also play an active role; where they should listen to the concerns of the communities under their care and pass them over to the relevant office so that they can be addressed.

Kotze and Taylor (2010) point out that the communities engage in protests because they are not given other options to engage with the government. As such, they use protests to engage the government. Moreover, feedback should be given timeously even when councillors think the information is not important. The respondents in

Mpehle's (2012) study indicate that the politicians decide what the communities want without consulting them. Therefore, they bring in programmes that are not addressing the needs of the communities. The following comments were made by participants in this study:

“Constant engagement with members of the community can work; people will have a platform to tell the government of their expectations. On the other hand, the government should try its level best to meet the expectations quickly” (P 2).

“I think structures within the community leadership such as councillors are the mouthpiece of the community. As such, the community should be taught on how to use them to convey dissatisfactions. There should be engagement between different political structures as the government is made of different political structures. If they allow grievances to escalate to an extent where people burn buildings, by the time they get response, buildings are already destroyed, and it is extremely difficult to replace or refurbish such damaged buildings” (P 4).

“Consultation with regard to what the community wants should be taken, instead of the government or community leaders taking decisions without involving members of the community. Feedback should be given all the time, even when the community leaders think that the information that they have is not valuable. To them [referring to the leaders] it might not be valuable, but to community members, it can serve as an assurance that their concerns are receiving the attention that they deserve (P 8).

8.2.10.4 Sub-theme 4: Educating people about the value of properties

The need to educate people about the importance of public properties was highlighted to be necessary by the participants in this study. The leadership should call *imbizos*, where members of the community can participate in government matters as well as learn about the impact of destroying properties when they are angry. The following comments were made:

“People must be educated that buildings should not be burned, because they belong to them. Community members should be taught when they are in large numbers, such as imbizos, mayoral and MEC imbizos because these are public participation forums. Office barriers can also call people within their jurisdiction to teach them proper manners of handling grievances” (P 5).

“I think the best way is awareness, people should know that government properties belong to them, and they should treat them as such. They should be taught that when they are looking for something, destruction of properties is not a best mechanism” (P 6).

The former ANC Gauteng provincial secretary David Makhura stated in an interview with Tau (2014), that the police alone will not be able to prevent protests from turning violent. A more compressive response that the former provincial secretary recommends is to educate the community about the effects that the destruction of community properties such as clinics, libraries, amongst others take the community backward. When these properties are damaged, the government has to allocate more funds to rebuild, instead of focusing on other projects.

8.2.10.5 Sub-theme 5: Punishing perpetrators of violence during protests

Punishing people who destroy properties was recommended in this study. Interestingly, Mogapi (2011) is against the punishment of perpetrators in violent protests and recommends that the government should instead listen to the concerns of the communities and do its level best to solve them. The apprehension and sentencing of the perpetrators are just a waste of resources as it will not change the situation that led to the eruption of the protests in the first place. The following illustration was made:

“Those who openly destroy properties, should be punished to set an example that destroying of properties will not be tolerated” (P 6).

8.2.10.6 Section deductions

The teaching about the value of government and private properties was highlighted to be important in this study. In this regard, the researcher adds that the teaching should cover the costs of replacement as well as the effects on the government budget for the community to make an informed decision before they engage in the destruction of property. Participants in this research suggest that the grievances should be addressed immediately when they have been brought to light, instead of waiting until the protests emerge. A protest poses a challenge of turning into a violent revolution (Goldstone, 2012; Cronje, 2014). Furthermore, it was proposed that the politicians should come down to listen to the people, not only when their votes are needed, as per the research findings of Langa (2011a) and Goldstone (2012).

The politicians should not make promises when they need votes but fail to fulfil them when they have been elected into the office, as members will hold them accountable for those promises and thereby engage in violent protests as they require a governance that is accountable (Dau, 2010; Manala, 2010; Lekaba, 2014). Moreover, participatory governance should be promoted, where community members are given the space to constantly engage their leaders (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). In this form of engagement, the members of the community are the ones to tell the government what they want (Chenwi & Tissington, 2010); instead of the leadership imposing what they think is best for the community (Mpehle, 2012).

The punishment of perpetrators was highlighted in this study as a mechanism to deal with the perpetrators of violence during protests, however, Mogapi (2011) regards it as a waste of state resources. Because even when perpetrators are punished, the problem will not solve itself. This research also advice that the ward councillors should constantly consult their members to hear their concerns, challenges, hopes or grievances and solve them immediately. If these problems cannot be solved urgently, they should inform the members of the public about the delays (Zama, 2013).

8.2.11 THEME 11: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

This study found that during the eruption of violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani, the schools were burned, as such the children were left with no shelter to protect them from unfavourable weather conditions at school. The learners' records were also destroyed (Evans, 2016; Paterson & Power, 2016). The properties that helped the community were destroyed, for example the bank in Vuwani and the schools, to name just a few as stated by the participants in this research. A concern was raised also that the destruction of these properties is very painful as the government takes time to fix them. During the events, the children were left with nothing to do as such they engaged in sexual activities that resulted in unplanned pregnancies. Crais (2011) as well as Tilly (2003) state that the violent protests may produce long-lasting consequences that cannot be reversed. Meanwhile, Ngwane (2011) acknowledges that violent protests hinder development. The participants highlighted the following negative consequences of violent protests in the study area:

“Properties that help the community get destroyed along the way, like an FNB bank was destroyed. Small business owners who want to make small deposits on regular basis are unable to do so. They have to travel to town, even though they want to make small deposit” (P 1).

“There is high pregnancy rate of grade 9 to 12 learners. These learners had nothing to do during the time when the schools were burned and thereby engaged in sexual activities. The community is bleeding due to unplanned pregnancies, you see [pointing to a learner who was passing by and being pregnant], these children are still young to be mothers. Children have also changed; they are violent than before because of these violent protests” (P 3).

“It takes time for the government to replace properties that are destroyed during protests, the community suffer while waiting for the replacement or refurbishment” (P 4).

Bandura (1977) and Collins (2013) put forth that the children who are exposed to violence during their upbringing, whether the exposure was through witnessing violence or being victims, are more likely to adopt these strategies as an acceptable means of solving problems and thereby engage in violent tactics as adults to solve problems. Moreover, the children who grow up in environments where violence was not the norm are unlikely to use violence in their adulthood to solve conflicts (Bandura, 1977; Collins, 2013).

8.2.11.1 Sections deductions

The children were exposed to the violent behaviour that was used during protests. The children who are exposed to violent behaviour tend to learn to also relate to other people in a violent manner (Bandura, 1977; Collins, 2013). When the schools were set alight, the school records were also destroyed (Paterson & Power, 2016; Evans, 2016, Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Participants in this study alleged that some learners have fallen pregnant, as they had nothing to do during the unrest. The destruction of properties may divert the attention of the state from service delivery as the government has to concentrate on the aftermath of the violent protests (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

8.2.12 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

Most participants were below the age of 40 years. The males were more interested to participate than the females. This study found that the people engaged in violent protests because of the government's failure to consult them on decisions that affected them as well as failure to respond to grievances. The grievances were resulting from boundary disputes. Both areas where this study was conducted were fighting for demergers, Malamulele was fighting to be demerged from the Thulamela Municipality, while Vuwani was fighting to be demerged from the Malamulele Municipality. The studies of Narsia and Maharaj (1999), Fakir and Moloji (2011), Mavungu (2011), Ngwane (2011), as well as Tyabazayo (2013) found that the communities want to belong to areas where there is economic development, service delivery and resources.

Participants in this study said that in Vuwani, the situation escalated into violence only after the Limpopo premier was summoned to come but did not attend the meeting. A report compiled by SAPS (2016) also indicate that the violence only erupted when the premier failed to attend a community meeting that he was invited to in 2015. Jili (2012) highlights that the people become impatient when the state fails to provide what they have asked for. In this research, the government failed to grant Malamulele a stand-alone municipality, as such they engaged in collective violence. To curb the violence that had erupted in Malamulele, the government then responded by merging Vuwani with Malamulele. The merging of Vuwani to Malamulele was also welcomed by protests that escalated into collective violence in Vuwani (SAPS, 2016).

Violent protests were highlighted as communication tools that the residents used to send a message to their leaders to force them to act on their grievances. Protests become violent when the state fails to recognise as well as attend to the demands of the people (Opp, 2001; Tilly, 2003; Pearce, 2008; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Fakir & Moloji, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Seferiades & Johnson, 2012; Akinboede *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mchunu & Theron, 2013). Participants in this study stated that personal interests, criminal intentions and opportunity were some of the motivational factors that escalated peaceful protests to turn violent. Clutterbuck (1986), Tadesse *et al.* (2006), Tilly (2006), Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Molapo and Ngubeni (2011), Mavungu (2011), as well as von Holdt (2011a) found that the politicians exploit the situation for their personal gains, while some people used the opportunity to loot (Burger, 2009; Carrim, 2010; Akinboede *et al.*, 2013). The Collective Violence Theory also considers leaders to play an influential role in encouraging collective violence (Schweingruber, 2000; Adang, 2011; Diani, 2012).

Poverty was regarded as a contributory factor to the outbreak of violent protests in this study. Poor people see an opportunity to advance themselves through looting. Moreover, poverty and unemployment may result in people acting violently during protests, more especially when it is accompanied by other problems (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Langa, 2011a; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Managa, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013). Similarly, Rosenthal (2010) as well as Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) put forth that poor people may use violent protests to fight against the violence that they consider to be committed by the state.

The lack of consultation by the government in the demarcation process, pursuing of personal agendas; government taking time to respond to grievances, lack of service delivery and even anger and frustrations were pointed out by participants in this study to have contributed to the unrest. The failure to deliver adequate services has been found to have motivated the protests to become violent in the following studies (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Dau, 2010; Sebungwawo, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013; Bruce, 2014; Musitha, 2016). Manala (2010) as well as Kotze and Taylor (2010) state that people want to see the government that they fought for providing services for them. The 1996 Constitution of the RSA, Section 152(1) (b) mandates the government to provide services to the residents. The following scholars (Reicher, 1984; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bryant, 2008; Burger, 2009; Leonard *et al.*, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Petrus & Isaacs-Martin, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Mbazira, 2013; Salgado, 2013; Zama, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014) argue that anger and frustrations, for example over unemployment, or the lack of consultation when decisions are made can easily turn peaceful protests to violent protests.

Participants in this study regard the act of destroying government properties as a punishment to both the state and the communities. Some consider it as punishment to the state only. Booyesen (2009), van der Merwe (2013) and Musitha (2016) regard the violent activities that are committed by protesters as a punishment to the state. Nevertheless, some participants believe people are punishing themselves when they burn or destroy state property. Ngwane (2011) and von Holdt (2011a) put forth that destroying government properties hinder development and progress, even though they may attract the government's response.

Some participants in this study regret the use of violence during protests. The use of violence during protests is not helpful to residents (Ramjee & van Donk, 2011). Reicher (1984) points out that collective behaviour just needs an initial encouragement for it to start. When one person starts the initial act, other people are thus encouraged to follow the same path. Some protestors in this study believe that collective violence can yield desired outcomes as it makes the government to respond quicker. The following scholars support that collective violence works because it produces the expected outcome and the response tends to be quicker (Fanon, 1963; Reicher, 1984;

Schneider, 1993; Opp, 2001; Drury, 2002; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Booysen, 2007; Zeitz *et al.*, 2009; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Ngwane, 2011; della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012; Wehmnhoerner, 2012; Mbazira, 2013).

Collective violence was not recommended by the participants in this study to indicate dissatisfaction, anger, disagreement, grievances, and concerns because of the negative impacts that it has for communities. It solves one problem by creating more problems. Some protesters have been arrested for public violence as noted in the study of Da Costa and Carter (2007), Sinwell *et al.*, (2009), Montsho (2010), Selebi (2012). Moreover, Crais (2011) as well as Tilly (2003) state that violent protests may produce long-lasting consequences that cannot be reversed. Bandura (1977) and Collins (2013) put forth that the children who are exposed to violence during their upbringing, tend to use these strategies as an acceptable means of solving problems.

The destruction of properties may divert the attention of the state from service delivery to fix the destructions caused by collective violence (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). It was suggested by participants in this study that in community projects such as construction, the community members should be involved so that they can have some sense of ownership of community properties. Mathekga (2007) and Dau (2010) also recommend the involvement of community members in community projects. This will help in making the community to have some sense of ownership, thereby play a role in reducing the destruction and torching of community buildings during protests. von Holdt (2011a) states that the protesters burned the properties because they regarded them as belonging to the municipality.

The participants in this inquiry saw political leaders as making promises they fail to fulfil. Manala (2010), Disoloane and Lekonyane (2011), Langa (2011a), Goldstone (2012) as well as Lekaba (2014) state that the councillors make promises, especially on service delivery, but once elected, they do not honour these promises. As such, the members of the community want them to account for the promises made. The failure results in residents taking to the street to protest violently (Desai, 2002; Greenberg, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mc Lennan, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Booysen, 2009; Dau, 2010; Manala, 2010; Kotze & Taylor, 2010;

Langa, 2011a; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013; Lekaba, 2014; Mautjana & Makombe, 2014).

Participants in this investigation advise the government to address grievances immediately, rather than waiting for the protests to erupt and then respond. Once protests emerge, the people are more likely to be uncontrollable and thus act violently (Botes *et al.*, 2007b; Goldstone, 2012; Cronje, 2014). Furthermore, Beinart (1992) argues that violence is very difficult to break once it starts. It is better for the government not to wait for violence to erupt, and then try to regulate it. Schweingruber (2000) and Seedat *et al.* (2010) argue that in a crowd, a person can be easily influenced to behave in a violent manner, something that they cannot do on their own.

SECTION B: ANALYSIS ON FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS

8.3 INTRODUCTION

This section gives a report on the findings of the focus group meetings that were conducted in Malamulele and Vuwani. The focus group meetings were held with two groups, one from Malamulele and the other one from Vuwani. A total of 12 respondents participated in the focus group meetings as there were six participants from each area. The meetings took place between the 15th and the 17th of April 2019. The focus group meetings lasted between one hour thirty minutes to two hours. The participants were purposively selected because they had knowledge about the violent protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani. Snowballing sampling was also used as after purposively selecting the participants, the researcher asked them to direct her to other people who participated in these protests (Strydom, 2011b). Data was collected through focus group interviews consisting of six participants and it was analysed through TCA as explained in Chapter 7 and 8.1. Ethics were adhered to as explained in Chapter 7 and in 8.1. Nonverbal cues are also included in the report writing on the focus group. Fontana and Frey (2003) highlight the importance of including nonverbal cues such as facial expressions.

8.4 FINDINGS FROM THE FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS

8.4.1 THEME 1: BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION OF PARTICIPANTS

The age group of participants ranged from 18 to 40 years. Fakir and Moloji (2011) as well as Jili (2012) mention the drivers of protests to be the youth. Group A consisted of four males and two females, while group B consisted of three males and three females. Cilliers and Aucoin (2016) regard young males who are coming from low socioeconomic backgrounds to be the people behind violent protests. The following studies have found protests to be attended by more men than women (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Salgado, 2013). The age range of the participants in this study is as follows:

Table 2: Age of participants who form part of the focus group interviews

Age	Number
18-23	6
24-29	2
30-35	1
36-40	3
Above 40	1
Total	12

8.4.2 THEME 2: CONCERNS ABOUT THE PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOUR DURING PROTESTS

Participants in this study said that the total shut down of the area in Vuwani was necessary, to show the government that they are not happy with the arranged marriage with Malamulele. Protestors blocked entry and exit points to show the government their dissatisfaction with the demarcation of both Malamulele and Vuwani. However, they regret stopping children from going to school. Fakir and Moloji (2011) found that the people were not pleased about the violence that included the destruction of property during protests in Siyathemba. However, they understood that the people were frustrated by not getting a positive response, hence they resorted to violence to make their voice heard.

8.4.2.1 Sub-theme 1: The total shut down of their area

The participants in this study acknowledge that their participation in violent protests was based on the fact that they wanted to show the government that they could stand for themselves against practices that they considered as unfair. In support of their participation, della Porta and Diani (2006) put forth that collective action can be taken by people when they believe it will bear fruits. Smelser (1963) argues that when people have a tangible belief that they have been treated unfairly, a stage for collective action to take place is set. Mirafteb (2006) states that the public only uses the space of engagement with the government when it will give them what they want. However, when they realise that through engagement, they are not getting any positive response, that is when they will reject the use of these spaces and take other routes. The following comment was made by participants:

“Shutting down of government offices and shops are good practices, to show the government that we are not happy with the failure to separate us from the marriage with Malamulele, that was decided upon, without our approval” (P 12).

Similarly, a participant in the study by Kanyane *et al.* (2017) considers the merger with Malamulele as a marriage whereby a wife is being chosen for a person against his will. Moreover, a community member in Baberton, spoke to SABC 2 news after the eruption of violent protests (SABC 2 news, 02 March 2020), the community member said that they did not want the marriage with Mbombela anymore, they wanted a divorce. The community of Baberton in Mpumalanga was also protesting against the MDB.

Furthermore, the participants in Kanyane *et al.* (2017) blame the government for the eruption of the violent protests. They said the government had pushed them beyond their limit, and they protested violently because the state failed to listen to them. Makana (2016) as well as Tshikhudo (2016) report that the total shut down and the violence that was depicted was because the High Court had turned down the request of Vuwani against the incorporation in Malamulele. As such, the people had to walk long distance to access transport to work and schools were also closed. Furthermore, Makana (2016) indicates that the residents then decided to block roads with stones

and tree branches. The children were affected as they were prohibited to attend school (Makana, 2016; Kgatle, 2018). A participant said the following:

“If we did not stop children from going to school, barricaded roads, the government would have not listened to us. They are not interested in our well-being, hence in many instances, they tend to be deaf when we try to communicate with them, peacefully [the participant’s face showed anger when he said this”] (P 17).

Musitha (2016) states that the “total shutdown”, included preventing children from going to school. This research argues that when children are prohibited from going to school, learning is affected, which in turn affect the progress of the children. The research by Sinwell *et al.* (2009) found that there was a total shut down in the area of the study, where the learners were prohibited from going to school and the adults were prohibited from going to work. Taxis were also prohibited in the township. When negotiations failed between the government and the citizens, violence becomes the other language that could communicate the citizens’ message clearly to the state (Tilly, 2003). The following remarks were made:

“Amongst the things that we did, to show the government our anger, prohibiting children from going to school is not something that we are proud off” (P 15).

“We did what we did, because the government did not give us a choice, it was either we blocked entries and exit point, shut down all activities and burned schools, so that the government can take us seriously. When we protested peacefully, without showing any signs of anger, the government did not listen or pay any attention” (P 11).

“The language that the government understands is not the spoken or written one, they understand action. You must also demonstrate to them what you mean, violent protests are a way of showing the government that we are not happy with how they treat us; our concerns are not considered. So, shutting down areas is a good way of demonstrating that we are not happy about the decision taken by the government” (P 12).

Booyesen (2007), Bryant (2008), Ngwane (2011), Orderson (2012), Banjo and Jili (2013), van der Merwe (2013), as well as Nembabula (2014) argue that a violent protest is the language that protesters use, as it is well understood by the government. Moreover, Kotze and Taylor (2010) add that violent protests seek to convey a message from the disgruntled communities to the government.

8.4.2.2 Sub-theme 2: Blocking of entry and exit points

The participants in this study regard the blocking of entry and exit points as a mechanism to send a message to the government. Roads were blocked so that the people could not enter or leave the areas. This concurs with Bryant's (2008) study where the residents blocked a road to make their voice heard. In a protest in Cape Town, the protestors barricaded a road by burning tyres and also with rocks (Evans, 2018). Tilly (2003) indicates that collective violence becomes useful when the message communicated verbally or through memorandums is not well understood by the government. The comments that were made are:

“Blocking of roads, burning of properties, send a clear message to the top, that people who voted for them are not happy with how they do things” (P 10).

“Our government does not understand words, they understand actions, words are meaningless. It is only when we engage in violence that the government pretends to listen” (P 17).

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) found that the protestors at Voortrekker burned tyres to barricade access roads. While in KZN, the protestors blocked the N3 road as they believed that would bring change in the complaint about the rising fuel prices (eNca, 2018). Atkinson (2007) found that King Williams Town's residents barricaded the road by burning tyres. They were revolting against the mayor who failed to keep the promise that were made. The study of Sinwell *et al.* (2009) found that the barricades were only erected after the police had shot people with rubber bullets and used teargas to disperse even the people who were not protesting. After barricading the area, the immigrants felt the wrath of the people when they looted in their shops (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009).

The participants in SALGA's (2015) research highlighted ethnicity as an issue that affected the municipal's demarcation in Malamulele and Vuwani. Mathoho (2013) argues that in both localities, there was tribalism where one ethnic group did not want to be led by the other. In Vuwani, the residents barricaded the roads because they did not want to form part of the new established municipality in Malamulele (Kgatlé, 2018). Moreover, the previous author alleges that tribalism made the people of Vuwani not to agree to the merger. Furthermore, the author states that the Tsonga-speaking villagers in Vuwani did not have a problem with the merger. Only the Venda-speaking villagers had a problem with the merger, hence Kgatlé (2018) argues that it was tribalism that motivated the people in Vuwani not to agree to the merger.

In addition, the listeners from MLFM allege that the people from Vuwani who were against the merger with Malamulele might not want Tsonga people to be the ones controlling the municipality (MLFM, 30 August 2017). Whereas, in Malamulele, the participants indicated in Mabunda's (2018) research that they were not motivated by tribalism to close the roads, while they were demanding their stand-alone municipality. Moreover, in this study, the participants in both areas did not mention tribalism to be the reason for their demarcation grievances. Akinboade *et al.* (2013) put forth that divisions based on ethnicity or race affect the solidarity of the community. Tribalism is not needed in the society; the government should do its level best to eradicate it if there is any. El-Zoghbi (2008) reports that ethnic tensions in Burundi between the Hutu and the Tutsi resulted in instability and violence. It is alleged that the Hutu killed the Tutsi population (El-Zoghbi, 2008). Thousands of people were killed between the early 1970s and mid 1990s because of these ethnic tensions where one group did not want to be led by the other (El-Zoghbi, 2008).

Fakir and Moloji's (2011) study found that the people in Siyathemba were not happy to be incorporated to Mpumalanga; they violently fought to be reincorporated back to Gauteng Province. Contrarywise, the people from Bushbuckridge violently fought to be reincorporated back to Mpumalanga Province (Mavungu, 2011). The reasons for the people in Siyathemba (Fakir & Moloji, 2011), and the reason for the people in Bushbuckridge were the same (Mavungu, 2011). Their reasons were not based on ethnicity as per the findings of the study by Kanyane *et al.* (2017) and Kgatlé (2018);

but they were based on; the physical proximity, services rendered by the province as well as the accessibility of the provincial offices (Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Mavungu, 2011).

Furthermore, Fakiri and Moloi (2011) report that the people from Siyathemba and Balfour Town in Mpumalanga violently fought to be reincorporated into Gauteng. They considered the choice of their province to be better resourced in terms of service delivery and employment opportunities (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Mavungu, 2011). It is worth noting that the people from Bushbuckridge wanted to be incorporated into Mpumalanga (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Mavungu, 2011); the province that was rejected by both Siyathemba and Balfour (Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Mavungu, 2011). In Mabunda's (2018) study participants said they were pushed by, amongst others, service delivery and discrimination in employment opportunities. Furthermore, Kgatle (2018) as well as Kanyane *et al.* (2017) also mention the fear of not receiving services in the new established municipality as one of the reasons that made people from Vuwani not to agree to the merger.

8.4.2.3 Sub-theme 3: Burning and destroying properties

When people are angry with their leaders they burn and also destroy properties. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) found that the community members destroyed and burned government buildings. They were angry when the town council failed to account for missing funds. Meanwhile, Abreu (2014) reports that the Zithobeni residents in Gauteng stormed a satellite police station in their area and set it alight. This study found that protestors also destroyed and burned government properties when the MDB failed to give Malamulele a stand-alone municipality and to demerge Vuwani from Malamulele. Comments made by participants were:

“To me, destruction of properties is not something that one could be proud of, but anyway we did it, to show the government that we are not happy with what they were imposing on us. By refusing to separate us from Thulamela to us it meant that there was no democracy, but leadership that uses dictatorship and does not to listen to the people who voted for them. If they wanted us to remain in Thulamela against our will, where is that democracy we fought for?” (P 19).

“It is not good for the community to show their anger by destroying properties. I am not happy about us showing the government that we are angry, while at the same time, we destroy properties that meant to serve us and our children”
(P 20).

The participants regard the use of violent protests to fight against the decision of the MDB as an exercise of their democratic rights. Mpehle (2012) considers democracy to be exercised when people are allowed to vote for the people whom they want, so that they can represent and also serve them, while also guaranteeing their basic human rights. Greene (1974) puts forth that the protesters tend to attack visible forms of government authority, for example, torching schools, clinics, libraries, barricading and burning roads. These infrastructures are immediately available to be destroyed by angry mobs, to indicate their anger towards the state. The illustrations shared include:

“We were exercising our democratic right, that we voted for, even though we regret the burning of properties, but we showed our leaders, that we are the ones that put them in power. We will fight them if they decide to forget. The unrest would have not happened if the government listened to us the moment, we raised our concerns” **(P 21).**

Tilly (2003) puts forth that if the parties fail to reach a conclusion in their negotiations, the by-product of such failure could be collective violence. The people who had no intention of engaging in collective violence may do so when they fail to get the attention or response that favours them from the government. SALGA (2015) puts forth that during the outbreak of protests, the communities burn properties such as clinics, hoping that they will be taken into consideration.

8.4.2.4 Section deductions

Bringing the areas to a standstill was regarded by the participants in this study as a way of showing the government that the community has the power to stand for themselves against unfair practices. Collective violence is opted for because the protesters believe it is fruitful (Smelser, 1963; della Porta & Diani, 2006). This research found that children were prevented from going to school while the adults were

prohibited from going to work. Lekaba (2014) points out that during violent protests, the schools are disrupted and public facilities such as libraries are burned.

This study found that protestors barricaded roads so that the people could remain within the area and not go to school or to work. People barricade roads with the hope that they would be listened to (Atkinson, 2007; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). In Malamulele and Vuwani, the people also burned and destroyed properties so that they could be listened to. The following studies found people to have burned and destroyed properties that symbolises the state's authority when they were angry (Greene, 1974; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Fakir & Moloji, 2011; van der Merwe, 2013; Khumalo, 2014). When other mechanisms fail, violence seems to be the only option available to force the government to respond (Booyesen, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Ngwane, 2011; Orderson, 2012; Banjo & Jili, 2013; van der Merwe, 2013; Nembabula, 2014). Furthermore, people fought violently against the demarcation of their area as they preferred to be merged with better resourced areas (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Fakir & Moloji, 2011; Mavungu, 2011).

8.4.3 THEME 3: FACTORS THAT LEAD A PEACEFUL PROTEST TO BECOME VIOLENT

In this study, the people from Malamulele and Vuwani engaged in collective violence with the hope that they would achieve their desired outcomes. For Malamulele, it was to get a standalone municipality, while Vuwani were fighting against the merger with Malamulele. Oberchall (1994) states that the people choose to participate in collective violence by considering whether they can achieve something or whether they will lose when they are arrested for their actions. Moreover, if they realise that what they want can only be achieved collectively and not as individuals, they are more likely to participate in collective violence (Oberchall, 1994). Jili (2012) found that some protests turned violent because of anger and frustrations amongst others.

8.4.3.1 Sub-theme 1: *The government is at a comfort zone; it needs to be shaken*

The participants in this study indicated that they had no intention of protesting violently, they blamed the government for pushing them to the edge. Furthermore, they indicated that they did not start by burning properties, they started by barricading roads and when the government did not respond, they took the protests to a higher level, that is when the burning of the properties was done. The following comments were made:

“We were not intending to engage in violence, we only opted for it when we saw that peaceful mechanisms failed. Our government does not listen, we wrote memoranda to the government, but the memos failed to attract government’s attention. It is only actions that attracted government to respond” (P 19).

“What protestors do is to barricade entry and exit routes; Properties were only burned when the government failed to listen after blocking roads” (P 13).

“Together, us and the government, we understand violence to mean seriousness” (P 14).

Netswera and Kgalane (2014) state that the people engaged in violent protests so that they can get urgent attention. The community in Johnston and Bernstein’s (2007) research is said to have complained for four years without getting a response, as such the members of the community resorted to violence and confrontations with the police. Furthermore, the community as described by the participants did not wish to engage in violence; but it resorted to it after peaceful engagement with the government failed (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007).

Some participants in this current study viewed the refusal to vote as punishment to the government. Correspondence by Molefe (2019) reports that certain places in Vuwani had been locked down as residents threatened violence a day before the elections were held. Kotze (2006) indicates that the strategy to boycott elections is not new as even in 2006’s municipal elections the disgruntled communities made a call for the elections to be boycotted. The illustrations that were shared include:

“Voting is for communities who are happy with the government, we have no reason to vote, we are angry” (P 12).

As Malamulele was granted its standalone municipality, this study argues that the refusal to separate Vuwani from Malamulele made protesters to experience relative deprivation. Relative deprivation according to Muller (2013), van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2010) occurs when members of the community compare the benefits or services that others are receiving to what they are getting. If they believe that others are receiving more than what is given to them, they experience relative deprivation. Further, this study argues that the comment made by Participants 10 and 12 serve as an indication that the Vuwani residents experienced relative deprivation, because the plea for the demerger of Malamulele from Thulamela Municipality as requested was granted, while the demerger of Vuwani from Malamulele [Collins Chabane Municipality] was revoked. Below is a comment made by a participant:

“They refused to separate us from Malamulele, voting will mean that we are happy with what the government is doing to us, we need to show them that we are not happy” (P 10).

The refusal to vote concurs with Manala (2010) who states that community members are tired of being used by political leaders to put them in offices. When in offices they forget to provide services to the people who voted for them. Arguably, the likelihood of participating in violent protests is thus increased. Narsiah and Maharaj (1999) point out that the people attach certain meanings to their territories, hence they fight political and emotional tension for their boundaries. These boundaries influence the material conditions of their lives. Moreover, Griggs (1998) and Mabunda (2018) regard boundary demarcation as something that give inhabitants not only a sense of identity, but also a place where they can vote.

The people may decide to boycott elections and act violently when they are merged with an area that they do not identify themselves with. This could be seen for example in the violent protests that erupted in Bushbuckridge when the area/municipality was placed in the then Northern Province, while their preference was Mpumalanga (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Mavungu, 2011). Furthermore, the people of Bushbuckridge

believed that by falling in the Northern Province, which is currently called Limpopo, they will be excluded from certain benefits that they could only obtain from Mpumalanga (Narsiah & Maharaj, 1999).

8.4.3.2 Sub-theme 2: Personal interests, criminal intentions, and opportunity

Participants in this study said that some people see an opportunity to advance their agendas through mobilising unrest in communities. Johnston and Bernstein's (2007) research found that some politicians who were veterans of the ANC lost seats to become ward councillors. The loss coupled with being side-lined by the party found the politicians an opportunity to deal with their disgruntlement by mobilising the community to revolt. Similarly, the research by Sinwell *et al.* (2009) found that the people who moved from one political party to another were blamed for the collective violence. These people are alleged to have encouraged protests to escalate into collective violence so that the local leadership could be seen as ineffective, ahead of the local elections, thereby giving them the opportunity to win seats as councillors. Oberschall (1994) argues that people may engage in collective action because of selective incentives. In this instance, a protester knows that apart from gaining incentives that all people will get, the participant will also get something different such as a post. The following illustration were made:

“Protests turn violently for a number of reasons; some people use the situation to benefit themselves” (P 11).

“There are political leaders who gain from protests turning violently. They incite violence to make the current local leaders, such as councillors, to look like failures, who are not capable to manage communities under their leadership” (P 11).

Furthermore, the protests have been described as mechanisms that offer opportunities for individuals to loot (SALGA, 2015). Fakir and Moloi (2011) found protesters to have engaged in criminal activities while they were fighting to be reincorporated to the province that they had been removed from. The protestors indicated in this study that even law-abiding citizens can be motivated to loot during an outbreak of violent

protests when they see other members of the community looting. Tilly (2003) argues that when violent protests occur suddenly, they can lead to opportunistic violence, where greed overcomes people and they loot merchandise from shops. The following citations were shared:

“But [pause for a minute as if the participant was thinking] even law-abiding community members can steal during protests. This happens when those with criminal intentions break into shops to steal, community members join in, because an opportunity to loot has arisen” (P 14).

“Criminals are the one, who encourage community members to steal during protests. They give them an opportunity, that is difficult to turn down. Suppose at home, there is no meat, and a shop has been opened during an outbreak of protests. People are busy collecting food and here I am, passing them running with mixed portions, wors and beef, I am likely going to join. The chances of me deciding to walk away are 2 over 10” (P 12).

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) report that the protesters burned a library, and their efforts did not succeed. After they had dispersed in the evening, some protesters returned and stole computers and other valuable items. Based on the statement made by the above authors, the researcher supports the views of participants in the current study that sometimes people who promote collective violence during protests are not doing it for the community, but for themselves. If in the study mentioned above the intention was only about incorporation into Gauteng, a question can be raised about the protesters' return, not only to burn the library, but to steal. Furthermore, a conclusive argument is made that their intention was not to show the government that they are angry, but to steal and burn to destroy evidence. The following remarks were made:

“Not only political leaders benefit from violent protests, people with criminal intentions may also encourage protests to turn violently. It is easier to break in shops, during protests, as it will look as if it is part of the struggle, while the intention was to steal” (P14).

“Once shops are broken in and looted, it will look as if it was part of the protest, while criminals are the ones behind the breaking of shops and looting. Other community members, who have never or ever thought of committing a crime, might join in when the opportunity presents itself” (P 11).

Littman and Paluck (2015) state that violent groups have the ability not only to engage in violence themselves, but also to motivate other members of the society to engage in violence. In this instance, they might convince community members that looting during protests is an acceptable behaviour, as it shows the government how angry the people are. People who are not violent can be easily influenced by other group members who are inclined to crime (Littman & Paluck, 2015).

Tilly (2003) states that people engage in collective violence where they vandalise properties, loot or even injure other people such as the police or those who do not support the protest. This collective violence occurs because an opportunity to engage in such acts is available. Under normal circumstances where protests are not available to offer them such opportunity, the individuals would not collectively engage in such behaviour (Tilly, 2003).

8.4.3.3 Sub-theme 3: Violence attracts the government’s response

The participants in this study claimed that the government responded quicker in other areas, only after they engaged in violent protests. They regard peaceful protests as ineffective, as such an element of violence was added in their protests. They also indicated that they would not have acted violently if the government had taken them seriously. Furthermore, memoranda, peaceful marchers and petitions were considered unimportant as they failed to produce desired outcomes as required. Wehmnhoerner (2012) alleges that the mine workers in Rustenburg constantly used violence in their strikes because they believed it worked. Furthermore, the mine workers used violence in their negotiations. In addition, the above stated author also indicates that violence in South Africa is used in many places during negotiations. Participants supported this by saying:

“In some areas, the government responded quickly when residents blocked roads, but in our situation, we were not taken seriously” (P 15).

“Violence would have not occurred if the government took us seriously, the first time when we raised our concerns. We started peacefully, but when we realised that we were hitting a rock, we then developed mechanisms to demolish that rock” (P 21).

“Peace alone at times does not produce results [the participant shaking his head]. There is a saying that says actions speak louder than words. That is true, with our government, actions speak, words are meaningless. We started by delivering the memorandum peacefully, but nothing happened. In the memorandum, words were written, so when we realised that we were not getting the democratic response that we were looking for, we mandated actions to speak for us and indeed our actions paid off. We were given our own municipality, separate from Thulamela, as we desired” (P 17).

Ngwane’s (2011) study found that the president came twice to address people in Balfour after they engaged in collective violence. Botes *et al.* (2007a) found that the violent protests work because after the community used them as a form of engagement, service delivery improved, as well as communication between the community and the ward councillor. Narsiah and Maharaj (1999) put forth that the BBCC was successful in persuading the government to reverse the incorporation of Bushbuckridge from the then Northern Province, through the use of collective violence. This research submits that when the government only respond favourable after an outbreak of collective violence, this serves as an indication that collective violence can be used as a tool to persuade the state.

Some communities end up resorting to violence when they have long-standing grievances that the government has failed to resolve. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) found that a community of Azania wanted to be incorporated to Gauteng, they wrote memoranda and even protested peacefully. After realising that it was more than ten years and nothing had happened with their request, they then decided to confront the government in a violent manner. The protestors indicated that the violent protests

occurred because the government failed to cooperate with the community. The following comment was made:

“If the government cooperated with the community, the moment grievances were raised, there would have been no need for the community to protest violently. The government is responsible for turning a peaceful protest to becoming a violent one” (P 18).

8.4.3.4 Section deductions

Hough (2008) puts forth that cultural cleavage includes racial and ethnic divisions that are worsened by the immigration of foreigners or even by internal immigration. According to Tiva (2013), the Malamulele Township residents claimed that development was concentrated only in Thohoyandou. The people who are dwelling in Thohoyandou are Venda speaking people and Malamulele Township’s highest ethnic group is Tsonga speaking people. This study alleges that the ethnic divisions that Hough (2008) refers to might have been prevalent in Malamulele and Vuwani as well.

People seek urgent attention from the government, as such they engage in collective violence to get the attention they desire (Netswera & Kgalane, 2014). With regard to demarcation, Mabunda (2018) indicates that the demarcation of boundaries makes it possible for people to know where they vote. They even attach meanings to it, hence there is a willingness to fight violently for their territories (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999). In Vuwani, the participants indicated an intention to boycott elections. This strategy of boycotting elections by disgruntled communities also occurred in other areas where the inhabitants were fighting for their territories (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Mavungu, 2011). Similar with other studies, in this study, the following has been mentioned to motivate violent protests: personal gains such as employment, lack of service delivery, criminal intentions, demarcation grievances, amongst others (Oberchall, 1994; Tilly, 2003; Botes *et al.*, 2007a; Fakir & Moloj, 2011; Mavungu, 2011; SALGA, 2015).

8.4.4 THEME 4: CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

There are a number of factors that participants in focus group meetings have indicated to be the causes of violent protests, these include unresponsive governance, failure of the government to consult communities, violence being a communication tool, personal interests, criminal intentions, lack of service delivery and also promises that are not fulfilled.

8.4.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Unresponsive governance

For the outbreak of the protests in this study, the participants blamed the government. Lancaster (2018) regards protests to be used by people as a form of participation, where the political participation can manifest into a violent protest. As the participants have blamed the government for failing to listen to them in this study, the researcher therefore states that the violent protests were used as a form of political participation to engage the government. The illustrations that were shared include:

“Violent protests are caused by the government; the government fails to listen to the people who put them in power. You can talk as much as you can, to show that the government does not listen, they will not deliver as requested. We are tired with the government that is unresponsive, we voted for them. We therefore expect them to deliver and what we see is not delivery, but ignorance, silence and inactivity of the government on community matters that in turn affects the members of the community” (P18).

The research of Barichievy *et al.* (2005) found that the community under Buffalo Municipality was well supported by ward committees. However, access to officials and even government processes was difficult. The current researcher can call this lack of access to government process as what participants described as an unresponsive government. The fact that the people have voted makes them need access to their leadership and government officials. The following remarks were made:

“We feel betrayed, the government failed to respond to our concerns about being incorporated to Collins Chabane Municipality. This is very unfair on our side, how can the government, that we voted for, betray us just like that” (P 10),

“We put the government in power, so, we expect them to take instructions from us, not the other way around” (P 9).

The participants in Dlamini *et al.* (2011) state that violence would have not occurred had the premier and the mayor come to address their concerns after receiving them. This is similar to von Holdt’s (2011a) findings where protesters said the premier failed to come and therefore, they engaged in violence while waiting for a higher authority than the premier. In line with the studies indicated above, it can be concluded in the current study that the members of the communities also felt frustrated when the leaders that they have called did not come.

Protesters sometimes make it impossible for the leadership that they want to see to come and address them. Pearce’s (2008) study found that the concerned group made a call for the councillor to address them, but at the same time threatened his safety. In response to the threat, he had to be taken back home for his safety. Moreover, von Holdt (2011a) found that smoke symbolises a message of being summoned by the communities, as stated by participants in the research. Furthermore, in the above-mentioned study, the participants mentioned that they burned buildings so that the smoke could serve as a call that the premier is wanted. Below is the illustration made by the participant:

“The government is to blame, in our situation, it failed to respond to our memorandum, as requested. The premier also failed to come and listen to our grievances, after we had written a memorandum requesting him to come and meet with us” (P 10).

Johnston and Bernstein’s (2007) research found that the community members in Phumelela engaged the government for over a year before they engaged in protests, however, their grievances were not attended to. As such, these grievances made their way to protests that turned violent. Furthermore, Johnston and Bernstein’s (2007)

report states that for the protests to turn violent in Phumelela, governance issues directly and indirectly played a role. Furthermore, the council is said to have failed to fulfil its function to make efforts for regular formal communication. The report mentioned above also notes that in Merafong, a letter was submitted to MDB about the disapproval of being incorporated into the North West Province. However, their request was turned down, as such they revolted to get the state to respond to their request (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007). della Porta and Diani (2006) note that people tend to act collectively when they share the same concerns in the community.

According to Tyabazayo (n.d.), the respondents confirmed that public participation was conducted in the incorporation of Matatiele to Eastern Cape, however, they stated that their views were not considered. This led the above-mentioned author to conclude that participation is only done because the government is obliged to do so. The 1996 Constitution of the RSA Section 152(1) (a) mandates the government to allow the public to participate in government proceedings.

8.4.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Lack of consultation

The failure of the government to consult the members of the community is also associated with the outbreak of the violent protests. Manala (2010) highlights that people who are not consulted with government matters use violent protests to voice their dissatisfaction and demands. When it comes to boundaries, the people can run fighting battles with the police and set buildings alight (Griggs, 1998). When consultation does not happen during the demarcation process, the members of the community become disgruntled. This happens because people attach meanings to their territory; define their social groupings and receive services based on their boundaries (Narsiah & Maharaj, 1999; Griggs, 2000). Hence, when people are not consulted when demarcation occurs, they are more likely to use violence to defend their territory (Griggs, 1998). It therefore becomes important for the government to include communities when decisions about boundaries are made (Matebesi & Botes, 2011). The participants made the following comments:

“Most of the times, the government does things, on their own, without consulting the community. They also take decisions that satisfy them and not the

community that they are serving. What satisfies the community, is ignored in many instances” (P 21).

“We were not consulted about the incorporation; we were just informed about it” (P 14).

“Our inputs did not matter; the government did not give us the opportunity to raise our concerns” (P 14).

Ngwane (2011) indicates that the people fight demarcation processes for them to belong in a place that will offer them economic development as well as improve their lives. Meanwhile, Mabunda (2018) states that Malamulele was having its municipality called Livhubu-Xingwezi and it was merged with Greater Thohoyandou to become Thulamela after the apartheid regime. Furthermore, the above-mentioned author states that when the merger occurred at the time, no proper consultation took place.

Mabunda (2018) further states that the reason for the merger was for Thulamela to have a dense population to improve amongst others service delivery and job creation. Because there was no proper consultation at that time, the members of the community notified the government about their dissatisfaction years later (Mabunda, 2018). The failure by the government to respond led the Malamulele people to revolt. Chenwi (2011) notes that the government tends to use the apartheid system, where decision making was only done by the government, without the members of the community.

8.4.4.3 Sub-theme 3: Violence is a form of communication strategy

The participants view violent protests as a form of communication strategy that can send a message to the government. The government was seen by the participants to be responding when people have used violent mechanisms. It can be stated that, violence serves as a communication strategy with the government. According to Cronje (2014), the government tends to reward violence. This occurs when communities who are protesting violently are given what they are crying for or when the government increases efforts to deliver in areas where residents have burned community buildings such as libraries. This sends a message to other communities

that for the state to respond, violence is required. Breakfast *et al.* (2016) indicate that people feel that they have run out of options of convincing the government on what they want. As such, they protest, where their protestations include pelting stones at the police, looting, burning tyres while singing songs that were sung during the liberation struggles. The participants highlighted that:

“Our government does not hear words, you speak to them, they hear nothing, but when you act violently, they see it. It is only anger that government understands, anger has an ability to channel people in a particular direction. People can only burn properties when they are angry, as they have indicated their grievances, but no one listened” (P 17).

*“Once roads are blocked, travellers are inconvenienced, as they have to use alternative routes, which also inconveniences their plans. They serve as people to deliver our message, **that we are serious** [the tone of the participant sounded very serious]. They deliver the message very well when they are inconvenienced with the blockage” (P 11).*

“They understand violent demonstrations more than peaceful protests. Violent protests reach the government very fast, like wildfire in winter season, unlike just marching and delivering petitions” (P 15).

8.4.4.4 Sub-theme 4: Personal interests and criminal intentions

Nembabula (2014) reports an interesting finding from a research project about how the shifting of power encourages violent protests. The participants in the study stated that the people who are at the forefront of violent protests are those who were in leadership positions, such as the ward councillors. When they are voted out of office, they realise that their voices are ignored the way they ignored others when they were in the position of leadership (Nembabula, 2014). Lekaba (2014) blames the eruption of violent protests on a breakdown of communication between the ward councillors and the members of the community. In addition, Lekaba (2014) states that ward councillors implement projects without consulting the members of the public. The participants supported this by saying:

“Those who are in the leadership are afraid that their power will be taken away from them, and some of their wrongdoings may come to light” (P 10).

“New municipality means new leadership, and the leaders from this side are not sure how they will be treated in the newly established municipality” (P 11).

Political infights can result in violent protests (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Paradza, Mokwena & Richards, 2010; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Piper & von Lieres, 2016). The fight is for personal gains such as access to tenders, high salaries, positions, hiring of relatives or increasing supporters to vote for them (Manala, 2010; Mavungu, 2011; Twala, 2014). In support to the statement above, Paradza *et al.* (2010) as well as Cronje (2014) state that protests are likely to happen around elections, particularly when the candidate list has been released. The supporters of a particular candidate tend to show their support by motivating people to protest so that the current people in position may seem incompetent (Cronje, 2014; Piper & von Lieres, 2016). Moreover, the Collective Violence Theory by Tilly (2006) argues that the members of the community may respond to the personal interest shown by the leaders through violent protests. In this regard, the participants said the following:

“We did not intend for the protest to escalate to that point, it just happened because we were angry at the government. But it was not only anger that prompted people to behave in a manner that they did. Some people have personal interest that they wanted to fulfil” (P 10).

“Even those who did not make it to the election candidate list might want to make the current local leadership look like failures” (P 21).

The studies by Atkinson (2007), Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Burger (2009), Kotze and Taylor (2010), Kirsten and von Holdt (2011), Managa (2012), von Holdt and Alexander (2012), Goldstone (2012), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013) found corruption to be one of the causes of violent protests. In this current study, the participants did not directly mention corruption, but indicated personal interest as one of the causes of violent protest. The current researcher can conclude

even though the participants did not directly say that some of the personal interest has to do with corruption, such as politicians acquiring tenders that they do not deserve. Moreover, the participants indicated that some political leaders in Vuwani were responsible for the escalation of peaceful protests into violence as they were afraid that some of their delinquent behaviour can come into light. It can be concluded that some of these delinquent behaviours were about corrupt activities.

A participant in Tyabazayo's (2013) research alleges that the people favouring the incorporation of Matatiele to Eastern Cape were motivated by personal interest. They are said to have benefited from the government because at the beginning of the disputes, they were speaking in one voice with the rest of the community members, but later on, they changed their story. In addition, they were also given positions of power.

Lekaba (2014) notes that the gap between communities and their local leadership such as ward councillors, opens a room whereby opposition parties capitalise on the situation. They deliberately give wrong information to the communities, so that there can be chaos (Lekaba, 2014). The South African National Civic Organisation [SANCO] has been mentioned to have been used in the disruption by the ANC politicians (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011). The intention is to embarrass the local state so that the regional body can come and intervene (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011). By so doing, the candidates who made it to the list will appear as incompetent to the ANC as well as to the communities that elected them.

People with criminal intentions are likely to drive protests to become violent. Martin *et al.* (2009) put forth that the new actors in protests take advantage of the situations. It can be argued that these are the people who do not know the concerns that the protesting group have but they join because they have seen an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, by for example, engaging in criminal activities such as looting. In addition, the criminal activities can be linked to corruption. Managa (2012) put forth that corruption opens the door for poverty, that in itself leads to criminal activities. The participants in this study believed that some of the criminal activities that occurred during the protests were encouraged by people with criminal intentions, and not the protesting communities. The following comments were made:

“The community torched buildings, and created a total shut down. Looting might have been done by protesters, but I think criminals are the ones that opened the door that attracted members of the community to loot, knowing that the blame would be levied on the protesters. We were crying for a standalone municipality, separate from Thulamela and not for a pair of Nike shoes or other properties. The timing to loot was good, but I don’t think protesters are to be blamed” (P 19).

“Jaa, well, some people use protests to loot, so that it will look like anger motivated them to steal” (P 9).

Lekaba (2014) states that looting was attributed to gangsters who found opportunity to loot during protests so that their actions can be blamed on the protests. In Mooi River, Booysen (2018) explains that the protestors torched and looted 23 trucks. If the intention was to register their grievances, it becomes surprising that a large number of trucks were looted. Further, Booysen (2018) conclude that the protests were systematically planned to run concurrently with the strike of South African truck drivers so that they will find the trucks unattended.

8.4.4.5 Sub-theme 5: Lack of service delivery

The participants from Malamulele have highlighted service delivery to be a concern to them, hence they wanted a demerger, that they even used violent methods to ensure that it happens. Mabunda (2018) supports the above stated finding by mentioning that people wanted the demerger because Thulamela Municipality was huge, as a result, it faced challenges in service delivery, especially to areas around Malamulele. The above-mentioned author further states that the municipality offices were far from Malamulele, and that resulted in limited access and the inability of residents to forge a relationship with the municipality. Breakfast *et al.* (2016) point out that people are likely to engage in violent protests when the government fails to deliver basic services in their communities. The participants supported this by saying:

“We really needed to be separated from Thulamela, because service delivery under that municipality was meant only for areas that are near their offices and

not for us who are located far from them. It took them many years to fix the potholes that were at the roads going to Giyani, but in areas near Thulamela, potholes were not there as they had been fixed. Service delivery under that municipality was very bad” (P 19).

“Thulamela Municipality took a long time, to fix problems experienced in our area. Hence, we wanted to be separated from them, and have the municipality that we can call our own, because it would serve our interests, without compromise” (P17).

Tapscott (2007) states that because citizens have been disappointed with the lack of service delivery on housing, amongst others, they are therefore forced to use other channels of raising their voices, as other forms of participatory forums have failed to produce good results. Manala (2010) put forth that the lack of service delivery serves as a push factor for communities to protest violently. In Siyathemba, Fakir and Moloji (2011) state that the people fought to be reincorporated to Gauteng, their reasoning included unemployment and a deteriorating structure that they experienced in Mpumalanga Province. They believed that they would be served best if they had been taken back to the province that they had been taken from.

Johnston and Bernstein’s (2007) report found that the council had split, as such service delivery deteriorated. This was highlighted to be in the forefront of community grievances when the protests erupted. Jili’s (2012) research in Wesselton found that 90% of the participants blamed violent protests on the inadequate delivery of services that was coupled with the lack of job opportunities.

8.4.4.6 Sub-theme 6: Unfulfilled promises

The failure to fulfil the promises that the politicians made was linked to violent protests. The participants in this study indicated that they had voted for the government and expected the government to serve as well as fulfil the promises made. In the research by Johnston and Bernstein (2007), the participants stated that the municipality promised the community that their problems would be addressed, however the promises were not fulfilled as nothing was done about it. Similarly, Booysen (2007)

indicates that the government makes promises to the people and when they fail to fulfil these promises, violent protests are used to serve as a reminder. Fakir and Moloji (2011), Malaquias (2011) and Jili (2012) state that people engage in violent protests due to the frustration that results from the government's failure to deliver services or listen to people's demands. The participants supported this by saying:

"They [referring to the government] must deliver services, failure to do so angers people, who then vent their frustration on properties that did not cause them the anger. It is high time that the government should fulfil promises they make during election campaigns. They promised us heaven and earth, but after we have put them in power, they sit comfortably and forget about the promises they made to the people" (P 15).

"Promises is all we hear, but delivery, dololo, so what can we do? The government needed to be reminded of the mandate that we gave them when we voted. We were reminding them that they have to serve the interests of the community and not government officials' interests. You can talk on a loud hailer, as much as possible, the government will not hear it. But as soon as you damage roads, torch schools and barricade roads, you are more likely to attract the attention desired. We got the attention of the government after protesting violently" (P16).

8.4.4.7 Section deductions

Similar to this study, the following scholars (Martin *et al.*, 2009; Manala, 2010; Paradza *et al.*, 2010; Cronje, 2014; Lekaba, 2014; Nembambula, 2014; Twala, 2014) found personal interests, criminal intentions, and opportunity to have contributed to violent protests. Additionally, Nembabula (2014) indicates that protests are likely to occur towards local government elections. Drury (2002) and Crais (2011) argue that people who do not make it to the election candidate list encourage people to protest violently. According to Smelser (1963), at times collective violence occurs because one person acted in a violent way, thereby encouraging other people to act in that manner. This person sets the motion for violence to occur but does not wish to be the one leading the people to violent actions.

Smelser (1963) further states that violence may be encouraged by a leader who has just risen spontaneously. Furthermore, there might be people with an interest in capitalising on the violence. This refers to the people mentioned by the participants in 8.4.4.3 that they encourage violence to occur because they have personal interests such as fighting the people who are in leadership so that they can look weak. Protests are also used as a form of political participation, when people see the government as unresponsive (Lancaster, 2018). Service delivery was highlighted in this research to have pushed people from Malamulele to protest violently for an independent municipality.

The failure to consult citizens and also to respond adequately may encourage community unrest (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Manala, 2010). For example, the wish of people under Merafong Local Municipality of being incorporated in the province of their choice was not responded to and thus resulted in collective violence. Just like Vuwani, where the residents disagreed with the incorporation, they protested violently (Paterson & Power, 2016; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, the government is seen as rewarding violence by responding only after collective violence manifested (Cronje, 2014).

8.4.5 THEME 5: FACTORS THAT PUSH COMMUNITY MEMBERS TO DESTROY PROPERTIES

The participants in this research indicated that the burning of properties was not a planned event, it happened in a heat of the moment when they were angry. This is similar to von Holdt's (2011a) finding where participants indicate that they did not plan to burn, but it occurred spontaneously when they were in running battles with the police. Meanwhile, Clutterbuck (1986) argues that mob violence does not occur more often, but it can develop quickly. Lor (2013) states that government buildings are burned by the very same people who are served inside these buildings. The lack of education and unemployment were also blamed for the eruption of protests in this study. In addition, the government was also blamed for failing to listen to the concerns of the citizens. The media was also highlighted as encouraging violent protests as when communities that are protesting violently are shown on television, the other members of the community also tend to adopt those strategies.

8.4.5.1 Sub-theme 1: Burning of properties is not planned, it just happens spontaneously

The participants in this study indicated that the burning of property was not planned, it just happened spontaneously. Similarly, Reicher (1984), Schweingruber (2000), Tilly (2003), della Porta and Diani (2006), Atkinson (2007), Mogapi (2011), von Holdt (2011a), Mbazira (2013), SALGA (2015), Breakfast *et al.* (2016), Mooijman *et al.* (2018) state that violent behaviour during protests was not planned, it occurred spontaneously. Reicher (1984) explains the behaviour of St. Paul's riots from an activist's point of view that the riot was not organised, but it occurred spontaneously. Comments shared by participants include:

“The violent part of the events was not planned to accompany the protests, it just happened within a short moment. The community cannot just have planned that when they woke up, they were going to burn schools. It just happened at that moment when people were angry” (P 19).

“In the destruction of the properties, it is not like it was planned, just like the burning of the bank, no one planned it. It just happened, at that moment when adrenalin was high. I don't know whether people were excited or angry when they did that” (P 14).

8.4.5.2 Sub-theme 2: Lack of interest in education and unemployment

The participants in this study blamed uneducated people and those who are unemployed to be the ones that acted violently. Cilliers and Aucoin (2016) indicate that in South Africa the youth unemployment rate is high. Furthermore, the above-mentioned authors put forth that the local residents who are unemployed are readily available for mobilisation, participation in protests as well as for demonstrations. Their participation is further increased by the availability of food hampers, t-shirts, and other incentives that they could get. Similarly, Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) as well as Dlamini *et al.* (2011) state that young men find an opportunity to reassert their masculinity through violent protests. It makes them feel they have also contributed to

the well-being of the community. The following comments were made by the participants:

“For me I think it was done by people who are not educated as an educated person would have thought about the consequences of their actions” (P 13).

*“Unemployed people have all the time they need, as **they have nothing to do.** They can destroy properties during protests, as they are bored. Destroying property can make them feel that they have contributed something to the community” (P 15).*

“If you have nothing to wake up for, destroying properties can give you reasons to wake up during protests. You will also have something to do” (P 12).

According to Banjo and Jili (2013) as well as Muller (2013), people who feel deprived are more likely to engage in violent protests. For this study, the people who are not educated or not employed are deprived. As such they are more likely to encourage violence during protests as they are bored by not having commitments such as going to work. That will give them a purpose in life. Lancaster (2018) puts forth that the protests demonstrate the challenges of the people of South Africa to access their democratic rights such as access to basic services and to employment.

8.4.5.3 Sub-theme 3: Government’s failure to listen to grievances

The participants in this study blamed the government for the outbreak of violence. They stated that the government failed to address grievances. This left them with no option but to take their grievances to the street which escalated to collective violence. Moreover, it was seen as effective because it was able to remove the apartheid government. The illustrations that were shared by participants:

“Sometimes actions are needed, so that the government can listen. The destruction and the burning of properties was not good at all, but the government left us with no choice but to protest violently” (P 17).

“The only way that people know to address grievances, is through the destruction of properties. It worked in many instances; it drove the apartheid government out. Even in other areas, during the democratic regime, violence has been used successfully, during protests to force the government to listen” (P13).

Mothoagae (2013) states that people have contributed to the realisation of democracy in South Africa, as such, they use protests to communicate their grievances when they see the government, they have voted for engaging in corrupt activities. Furthermore, they cannot continue to be victims and just watch without doing anything, while they have the power to do something, as they have done it before during the apartheid struggle. Meanwhile, Lor (2013) puts forth that during the protests, the libraries are burned because they are a symbol of oppression or because they are located inside the building which the protesters intended to destroy. Comments shared by participants:

“When you just only make noise, to the government it sounds like a song of a person who is bored and composes a song to take away the boredom. Action is what is easily recognised” (P 16).

“People do not like to engage in violence, but we are forced by circumstances, the government understands action more than words. The burning of properties and other violent activities are not what we wished for, but when it comes to the government, they take that seriously, as such, the goal of making them listen was achieved” (P 19).

Desai (2002) gives an account of the violent protest that erupted in Durban when the then president failed to come and receive a memorandum but sent a lower ranking official to receive it. According to the above-mentioned author, the people in Durban only dissented when the president did not appear as requested. They viewed the failure as being undermined and that their concerns were not serious enough to warrant the coming of the president.

The participants in the research by Bryant (2008), Jili (2012), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), Banjo and Jili (2013), as well as van der Merwe (2013) regard violent protestation to be a clear and well understood language by the government. Talking and negotiations do not show seriousness in the eyes of the government. A participant supported this by saying:

“Honestly, engagement is not a well understood language, the government understands the language of chanting and singing in the street, while at the same time barricading roads with tree branches and burning of tyres. That is when the government starts to show interest in community issues” (P 16).

8.4.5.4 S Sub-theme 4: Lack of knowledge in addressing grievances

The lack of knowledge on how communities can engage the government came as a result of poor access to information (Vivier, Seabe, Wentzel & Sanchez, 2015). Furthermore, the members of the public do not know how the government’s processes and functions are (Vivier *et al.*, 2015). In this research, the lack of information was mentioned by the participants as a push factor for them to revolt against the government. This contravenes Section 118 of the 1996 Constitution of the RSA, that affords citizens the opportunity to be part of the legislative processes. This lack of access to government processes was also evident in the study by Barichievy *et al.* (2005). Illustrations shared by participants:

“The only way we know to be helpful in addressing grievances is violent protests. Other mechanism of successfully persuading the government are not known to us” (P 16).

“The power was seen through destroying properties, that mechanism still works today. It worked in other communities, we hoped that it would work here, but the government, did not give us what we wanted. This is what we know to be a way of solving problems and attracting government’s recognition” (P 10).

8.4.5.5 Sub-theme 5: Violent protests have been adopted from the apartheid struggles

Lekaba (2014) and Nembambula (2014) regard violence as a culture that has been adopted from the apartheid period. In addition, Lekaba (2014) states that the violence has been used in the apartheid era, where it attracted the international community to force the then government to give all the South Africans equal rights irrespective of their race. The participants in this study acknowledge that the current use of violent protests is encouraged by the past history of apartheid. The illustrations that were made include:

“The apartheid government was driven out of power through violent protestation, where properties have been burned as an indication that people were not happy in the manner in which they were governed” (P 16).

“Anyway, violent protests did not start with us, during apartheid regime they worked, democracy was won only through violent protests, as peaceful protests failed to win democracy. It worked before we also took the same route that the people engaged the government to win democracy” (P 17).

Netswera and Kgalane (2014) state that violent protests have been used during the apartheid period to remove the then government as some people felt that it was not representing them. Tadesse *et al.* (2006) support the above author by stating that the apartheid struggles were motivated by the marginalised society who were not allowed to participate in the decision-making process. Moreover, during apartheid, people were protesting in demand of their human rights and in pursuit of democracy (Netswera & Kgalane, 2014).

8.4.5.6 Sub-theme 6: Influence from the media

The media was also mentioned in this study as being responsible for the outbreak of violent protests. It tends to show communities who engage in violent protests than communities who engage in peaceful demonstrations. Moreover, the government tend to act once the violence is shown on television and when political analysts start to make comments. Beinart (1992) claims that the media is responsible for the escalation

of violence. During the outbreak of violent protests, violent actions are captured, which at the end will be seen by millions.

Clutterback (1986) as well as Netswera and Kgalane (2014) state that violent protests attract the attention of the mass communication media especially when the news is sensationally presented (Bezuidenhout & Little, 2013). Greene (1974), Drury (2002), and Mogapi (2011) concur with the above-mentioned authors by stating that the high coverage of violent protests in the media promotes more violent protests by other groups. Moreover, Booysen (2007) and Bryant (2008) put forth that the media promotes a snowballing effect, where communities follow the examples of other communities who engaged in violent protests as it was shown on television, newspapers or broadcasted on radio. Comments made by participants:

“We have seen communities protesting violently on television. We did just like that, our actions also received the attention of the media and people saw how unfair the government was for us, as such, the government listened. The violent protestation helped us to achieve the goal of having a stand-alone municipality” (P 18).

“Once violent demonstrations are captured on television, political analysts and others start to talk about it, the government is then forced to act” (P 20).

“We engage in violent protests because we saw other communities engaging in it, and the government responded” (P 21).

8.4.5.7 Section deductions

The lack of knowledge was also highlighted as one of the reason the protests escalated into violence in this study. Vivier *et al.* (2015) state that people lack access to information about the government, as such, they do not know how to engage it. The participants indicated that they opted for the use of violent protests as it was used during the apartheid government. Carrim (2010) puts forth that the use of violent protests has been copied from the apartheid struggle. Steenkamp (2012) alleges that the communities that experienced violent conflict over a long period of time seem not

to have effective peaceful methods of resolving conflicts. When these people experience conflict again, they tend to use the very same violent methods that they used previously.

The mass communication media was also regarded to have contributed to violent protests in this study, as it tends to show and report on the violent nature of the protests (Beinart, 1992). Accordingly, della Porta and Diani (2006) indicate that the mass media and actors who participate in protests are thus able to attract those who will sympathise with the dissidents. Furthermore, the people who have played a role in the realisation of democracy, when they are not given the attention they need, they revolt (Mothoagae, 2013). Some protests only happened after their leaders had been called but failed to come. The failure to honour an invite is seen as disrespect by the residents (Desai, 2002; Pearce, 2008).

8.4.6 THEME 6: WHO PROTESTERS ARE PUNISHING BY DESTROYING GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES

Some participants in this research indicated that violent protests punish both the community and the government. The community will have to wait for some time for the refurbishment of the damaged properties, while the government has to spend more money on things that they had already spent money on. Some believed that the community is punished more because while the government has to spend more money for refurbishment, the emotional scars remain with the community.

8.4.6.1 Sub-theme 1: The protestors are punishing themselves and the government

The protestors stated in this study that by destroying properties, both the community and the government are punished. Carrim (2010) considers the acts of violence that people perpetrate during protests to be acts of destruction and at the same time as acts of self-destruction. The following statements were made:

“When protests occur, it is easy for people to encourage each other to engage in violence, because at that time, it seems like the government is being punished. But when as an individual you are alone, without the group that made

you to believe that the destruction of property was an acceptable manner to show your anger, that is when it hits you most, that not only is the government punished, but you and your children as well have been punished” (P 21).

“Not only are protesters hitting at the government when they destroy properties, us the community are highly affected than the government. The schools that are burned in the protests, are the very same schools that our own children go to. Not only does the government suffer, we suffer the most” (P 18).

8.4.6.2 Sub-theme 2: Community members are punishing themselves only

Some participants regarded violent protests as punishment to the self and not the government. Mooijman *et al.* (2018) acknowledge that protests can bring change that is desired, but they can also bring destruction to the protesting community. Furthermore, Kanyane *et al.* (2017) found that violent protests resulted in psychological trauma that emanates from the threats of violence and intimidation of people who do not wish to participate in the protests. The witnessing of the burning of schools was also found to be traumatising to the learners, more especially because they could not do anything to stop the fire (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Comments shared by participants:

“We thought we were punishing the government, we realised after wards that, we are the ones being punished instead [coughs]. The education of the government officials’ children has not been interrupted by the violent protests” (P 13).

“Community properties are part of our lives, when people are angry, they do not realise the damage that they are causing to the community. It feels as if the goal of punishing the government has been achieved. It is only afterwards that we realise that we feel more pain than the government does. Properties can be refurbished or replaced, but the emotional scars [showed serious concern], will be experienced by us and our children for a long time. Our lives and emotions are attached to these properties, they are ours and not the government’s. I feel saddened about what has happened in our community” (P 13).

8.4.6.3 Section deductions

The participants indicated that violent protests punish the community more than the government. Moreover, it was indicated that the members of the community do not plan to burn property during an outbreak of a protest, it just happens at the heat of the moment when the adrenaline is high. This concurs with the findings of the following researchers Reicher (1984), Schweingruber (2000), Tilly (2003), Atkinson (2007), Mogapi (2011). Breakfast *et al.* (2016) and Mooijman *et al.* (2018). In addition, an individual's behaviour is likely to change in the presence of a crowd (Reicher, 1984; Schweingruber, 2000; Drury, 2002; Tilly, 2003; Adang, 2011). A person may easily be persuaded to participate in group violence.

8.4.7 THEME 7: ACHIEVEMENTS OF PROTESTING VIOLENTLY

The participants in violent protests tend to regret their actions afterwards. Some informants in this study think goals have been achieved, while others regret the actions that resulted in the destruction of property. Griggs (1998) states that people do not want interference in their boundaries. While fighting for boundaries, people have run confrontation battles with the police and also committed arson. The above-mentioned author paints a picture of people's willingness to fight for their boundaries even though the effects thereof are not good. As it has been stated by the participants in this research that the children can learn to use violent tactics.

8.4.7.1 Sub-theme 1: *The protestors regret their actions after engaging in violence*

The participants indicated that they regretted their actions only after they had engaged in violence. Kanyane *et al.* (2017) found that the teachers and learners were traumatised by seeing their schools burning, even though they were not the ones that burned the schools. Moreover, there was no schooling for three months. In Khutsong, Mavungu (2011) also reports that there was no schooling for three months during an outbreak of protests. The following comments were made:

“It is very easy for children to learn to be violent when they see adults behaving violently. The children of government officials, whose parents seats at the

provincial level, as they are the one to respond to demarcation of areas, are not attending the local schools, that have been set alight, or even using the roads that have been damaged in the protests” (P 16).

“Protesting violently does not yield good results, it takes us backward. Instead of the government, continuing where they left off, with community projects, now, they have to start, with the ones that the community has destroyed” (P 14).

“Violent protests can tear communities apart, there used to be soccer tournaments between the surrounding villages, but after the outbreak of the violent protests, some villages do not see eye-to-eye with one another. This affects children because they are no longer playing soccer, with the nearby areas as they used to do. They are afraid that they may be attacked when in another village because of differing viewpoints about these protests. Some favoured the violence to occur, while some were against it” (P 19).

8.4.7.2 Sub-theme 2: Violent protests can achieve goals

The protestors feel that the engagement in violent protests make the goal to be achievable. In support of this study’s finding, a participant indicated in Tyabazayo’s (2013) research that by engaging in violence, the government has been taught to include community members when making major decisions. In addition, the participant also stated that the community members through the grievances have learned that they have a right to protest and march. Mbazira (2013) concurs with the above statement, as a project to repair the potholes was only done after the people had protested violently. Opp (2001) puts forth that people choose to engage in violent protests, as it provides them with goods that they can only get by protesting violently. The participants stated that:

“We feel we have made the government to respond, but we are not proud with the trail that we left behind in the process. We have achieved a goal, but on the other hand, we got punished because children now do not have classes where they can learn” (P 17).

“The goal is achieved, but I hope, that in future, the government will listen. Other communities should not go through what we went through to get the attention of the government” (P 20).

8.4.7.3 Section deductions

Some participants regretted the use of violence in their protests only after it had occurred while others felt the use of violence had made them achieve their goal, but they were not in favour of its use. Similarly, Opp (2001) reports that through violent protests, people achieved goals that they could only acquire in a group when they engaged in violence, for example, free groceries that can be obtained through looting. Furthermore, violent protests were described in this current study to be causing pain to both the community and the government.

8.4.8 THEME 8: RESPONSE OF PROTESTERS TO THE DESTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS

Some informants of this study indicated that protestors regret their actions only after they have engaged in violence; while others think both the government and the community feel the pain. There were participants who think the protestors feel they have registered their grievances by destroying government buildings.

8.4.8.1 Sub-theme 1: The protestors regret afterwards

The participants indicated that they regret the destruction of properties after it had occurred. Even though the participants in this study indicated that they regret the use of violence in their protests, the study by Kanyane *et al.* (2017) found that the residents of Vuwani considered their use of violence to be rational, as it brought changes that were needed by members of the community. This statement is also supported by Mooijman *et al.* (2018), who indicates that violence can bring change and destruction at the same time. Moreover, Langa (2011a) found that the protestors justified their use of violence as a way to get the government to act on the requests made. Illustrations shared by participants:

“Well, burning buildings is fine, at the time when it occurs. During the time, we felt like the government and the supporters would feel the pain and not us. Hence, we did not try to do something to stop the buildings from being torched. We only realised the damage afterwards. At the time when it occurred, it felt right” (P 13).

“At the time, it felt like a message was sent, the smoke was a message to the government, as memoranda failed to deliver the message that we wanted them to get, but the effects speak in opposition to the message that was sent” (P 19).

8.4.8.2 Sub-theme 2: Both the government and the community feel the pain

Both the government and the protesters were said to be feeling the pain, especially as it takes time for the government to refurbish the damaged property. In Vuwani, Kanyane *et al.* (2017) indicate that during the time in which the study was conducted, the schools had not been refurbished, even though it was more than a year after the schools have been burned. Furthermore, the authors state that the government had to incur the financial burden of replacing or refurbishing physical infrastructure and resources. The community was highly affected as the destruction of state property causes emotional pain. The current researcher can therefore argue that this is an indication that violent protests affect both sides. The government had to spend money to refurbish schools, while the learners could not use their classes as they had been reduced to ashes. Comments made by participants:

“The government does feel the pain because they have to refurbish the damaged buildings that have been burned. But because community buildings are the ones that have been burned, the community is the one that feels the pain the most” (P 11).

“Children get to be exposed to unfavourable weather conditions at schools, while waiting for the government to fix the damage” (P 10).

8.4.8.3 Sub-theme 3: *The protestors feel they have registered their grievances*

Some participants in this research indicated that the protestors feel they have registered their grievances, even though the route that they took was painful. von Holdt (2011a) and van der Merwe (2013) consider violence to be well understood by the government and the protestors. For example, in von Holdt's (2011a:27) study the participants indicate that, "*The premier undermines us. He'll see by the smoke we're calling him*". This study argues that the comment made by a participant in von Holdt's (2011a) research serves as an indication that the protestors regard smoke as a signal that notifies the leaders that they are summoned. Similarly, Simelane (2019) put forth that in the violent protests that erupted in Alexandra on the 3rd of April 2019 things such as tyres and papers were burned so that the smoke would serve as a messenger to send a signal to the mayor that his presence was required. Comments made by participants include:

"It is painful to go through that, but it paid off at last. We have our own stand-alone municipality and are no longer depending on those who did not care about us" (P 17).

"Jaa, it is true, we are benefitting from the violent route that we took, but eish [scratching his head], it is hard, really hard, it causes pain" (P 18).

8.4.8.4 Section deductions

Some participants regretted the use of violence in this research. The consequences of the violence were described to have been felt by both the government and the residents. While collective violence was described as a mechanism that made the government to listen; it also caused emotional pain. Dlamini *et al.* (2011) and Kanyane *et al.* (2017) indicate that the violence that is committed during the outbreak of protests results in pain to both the perpetrators and the targets. Moreover, the pain is more felt by the community as compared to the government, the government only has to fix or replace damaged property, whereas the community experiences the emotional trauma of seeing the buildings burning and having to pass through the ashes of burned buildings for some time (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017).

8.4.9 THEME 9: THE USE OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS

Some participants indicated that collective violence works in certain circumstances, while some said it does not work. Some participants considered it to be an effective tool that can be used to achieve the desired outcomes. Collective violence was also blamed on the police.

8.4.9.1 Sub-theme 1: Collective violence works in some situations and not in others

Collective violence is seen as a mechanism that works only in certain situations. For example, Malamulele was granted its own municipality, while the merger with Vuwani was not revoked. The following studies indicate that collective violence has been used successfully by disgruntled communities Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Ngwane (2011), della Porta and Gbikpi (2012), Banjo and Jili (2013) as well as van der Merwe, (2013). However, in Vuwani it did not work as the demerger with Malamulele did not happen, even though the schools had been damaged, and the children could not go to school for three months (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Citations from the participants include:

“There are many sides of the coin, it works, it does not work. In some areas, after people engaged in collective violence, the government was forced to deliver what people wanted” (P 12).

“Well, I can say collective violence works, but in certain circumstances. In Malamulele, it worked. It is only in Vuwani where it failed” (P 15).

“There were many efforts made, to have the Municipal Demarcation Board’s decision revoked. When all these failed, some people felt that collective violence might be the answer, but it did not achieve what the community had anticipated. But I could say, collective violence works, it is only in Vuwani where it failed, but in other communities it worked very well. People got what they were asking for, from the government” (P 11).

8.4.9.2 Sub-section 2: Collective violence can be an effective tool to force outcomes

Some participants in this study indicated that collective violence worked, but the events that unfolded were regarded as traumatising. Dlamini *et al.* (2011) and Kanyane *et al.* (2017) describe the events that happened during the outbreak of violence during the protests as traumatic. Banjo and Jili (2013) as well as van der Merwe (2013) indicate that the leaders came to address the communities only after they revolted. The participants highlighted that:

“It worked, but the events that occurred during that time were traumatising to those of us who saw them happening” (P 16).

“Collective violence works, the government listened to the concerns when there is an element of violence added to the protests” (P 17).

The focus group in Johnston and Bernstein’s (2007) report is an indication that violence works. After the members of the community protested violently, they saw improvements in the complaints management system as well as on how officials communicated with the members of the community. Furthermore, it became easier for the community to access the managers and the councillors. This was achieved through violent confrontations with the government and thus proved to communities that violence works.

8.4.9.3 Sub-theme 3: The police are responsible for collective violence

A blame was raised on police as the ones that made situations to become violent during protests. Manala (2010) sees police’s actions as a fuel that promotes more violent protests. This notion is supported by Galtung (1990) who states that violence can result in more violence. Furthermore, Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) found that protesters barricaded roads with burning tyres, a councillor’s house was set alight and government buildings destroyed. This occurred during a mass meeting, wherein a stay-away was decided upon on allegations of the town council’s financial mismanagement. The violence only started when the police used massive force to disperse the crowd, where teargas and rubber bullets were shot at people (Bandeira

& Higson-Smith, 2011). In line with the studies above, the following was said by the participants:

Sometimes the police response to community protests that are not violent incites violence. For example, the police may find people, maybe holding a meeting and then decide to scatter them with tear gas. This may lead to the community to react to the provocation, collectively, by throwing stones at them. In other areas, people also set police vehicles alight because they [referring to the police] lacked a good approach to situations which had not become violent” (P 18).

“The police encourage violence when they attack people who are not violent. These people may decide to participate in protests in the future and also encourage violence as a pay back to what was done to them, while they have not done anything to deserve the punishment they got” (P 21).

Makana (2016) indicates that the police went to some houses and beat up people so that they could tell them who the protest leaders were in Vuwani. Furthermore, Makana (2016) reports that the police smashed windows in certain houses during the night, they even shot some people who were asleep with rubber bullets. Similarly, Bundy (1987) reports about the police’s use of violence to address nonviolent people as encouraging protests to become violent. Furthermore, Bundy (1987) states that police in Mexico came to intervene in the quarrel between teenagers who were in high school. Instead of serving as mediators, the police used violence to stop the fight. The use of repressive measures made other students to be angry and they decided to march in protest against state violence. The police had an opportunity to resolve the matter in peaceful negotiations, but they chose to disperse the crowd with brutality (Bundy, 1987). Meanwhile, Thomas (2018) argues that in South Africa, people who are fighting for freedom are responded to in a violent manner.

According to Burger and Omar (2009), the police’s use of rubber bullets to disperse crowds has been labelled as aggressive. The police tactics are also compared to the mechanism that was used by apartheid police to disperse protesters. Moreover, the above-mentioned authors suggest that the police’s use of rubber bullets should be

used as a last resort; only when negotiations between the police and protesters have failed (Burger & Omar, 2009).

8.4.9.4 Section deductions

Some participants indicated that collective violence could result in the reaching of desired outcomes. Collective violence has worked in certain circumstances, as problems such as service delivery and boundary disputes have been solved (Fanon, 1963; Oberschall, 1994; Narsiah & Maharaj, 1999; Opp, 2001; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Zeit *et al.*, 2009; Dlamini, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012). Furthermore, the leadership came to address the people only after they engaged in collective violence (Banjo & Jili 2013; van der Merwe, 2013).

Some participants said that the police were responsible for the violence that occurred during their protests. In support of the participants' views, Galtung (1990) as well as Manala (2010) regard police actions as a fuel that promotes more violence during protests. They use massive force to disperse crowds that are nonviolent (Bundy, 1987; Burger & Omar, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). The police are reported to have used torture to extract information from the members of the community whose place had experienced violent protests (Langa, 2011a; van der Merwe, 2013; Makana, 2016).

8.4.10 THEME 10: PREVENTION OF DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTIES DURING PROTESTS

The participants indicated that the destruction of properties can be prevented by including the members of the community in local projects. The leadership and the police also have a role to play, while politicians are advised to refrain from making promises that they cannot fulfil. A quick response to grievances has also been mentioned.

8.4.10.1 Sub-theme 1: Community involvement in community projects

The participants regarded the involvement of community members in projects that are done in their community as a deterrence against the destruction of community property. According to Draai and Taylor (2009), the RSA Constitution, 1996, Section 152(1) makes a requirement to the local government to encourage and also to involve communities as well as organisations in local government matters. The involvement of the community in government projects will be complying to the above-mentioned Section of the constitution. The following statements were made:

“Community members should also be hired in these projects to build a sense of ownership. You cannot decide to burn your house, because you spent time and money building it” (P 13).

“Well, they are not directly losing money, but they would have used their strength and time to ensure the success of these projects. If it was my uncle who was part of the project, I would think twice before I destroy it. It would remind me of his hard work and dedication towards the project. I would as well, have convinced other people to think about how destroying property is also destroying the strength of one of our own” (P 11).

8.4.10.2 Sub-theme 2: The local leadership could play a role

The local leadership, especially ward councillors were regarded as people that could play a role to minimise protests from taking place in their communities. Jili (2012) recommends that the local leadership should play a role that will minimise the occurrence of violent protests in communities. The ward councillors should learn to put the needs of the people first, before their own. The role of local leadership in curbing violent protests was described as follows:

“Ward councillors should play a significant role, they should update community members about the projects that will take place in the community, instead of the community members only seeing a project when it starts” (P 11).

The participants in Johnston and Bernstein’s (2007) research highlighted that the protests could be prevented when officials become accountable to the people they served. Vivier and Wentzel (2013) found that the members of the community are unwilling to forge a relationship or even to interact with the leadership in the local government. This occurs because they do not trust their ward councillors or think that they do not care about the problems experienced by community members (Vivier & Wentzel, 2013). Furthermore, the councillors were described as people who do not consider the issues raised by the community. In Khayelitsha they were even described as criminals who can burn a person’s house if a person is differing with them in the meetings (Vivier & Wentzel, 2013). Other comments made by participants:

“Our government, in most instances, is not able to inform the community about the costs of building certain structures, because the people awarded the tenders, are their friends who charged unreasonable prices. As such, that information cannot be shared with the people. If people know how expensive it is to build schools, by government announcing tenders and allocating them fairly, communities will be aware of the costs, this might make them to think of other ways than to vandalise or torch buildings” (P 19).

“In community meetings, ward councillors could share with us the cost of a particular project, and also remind people that by destroying it, more will be lost by the community than by the government” (P 11).

The ward councillors were also described in Vivier and Wentzel’s (2013) study as people who disappear after they have been voted for. Furthermore, they were said to use the seats to escape poverty as they earn an income in the elected position. Moreover, they were described as people who also move from where they have been staying, before they were elected, to a more developed area, leaving the people who have voted for them in under-developed areas (Vivier & Wentzel, 2013). This study suggests that ward councillors should establish a good relationship with the members of the community that is based on respect and trust. Moreover, they should take the concerns of the community and address them so that the community will not be left with an option of using other mechanisms such as violent protest for their voices to be heard.

8.4.10.3 Sub-theme 3: Politicians should refrain from making empty promises

The leaders were seen by the participants in this research as making promises but fail to fulfil them. In support of the above study finding, Disoloane and Lekonyane (2011) state that the councillors make promises, especially on service delivery, but once elected, they do not honour these promises. As such, the members of the community want them to account for the promises made and the failure thereof results in violent protests (Desai, 2002; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013; Tau, 2013; Lekaba, 2014). The following are comments made by participants:

“I am worried about promises that leaders make during election campaigns. We are promised a better life for all, but once in power, it is a better life for politicians, their families, and their friends, who benefit from the government. Community members who put them in these seats are thus forgotten. It looks like they are important only when their votes are needed, but not good enough to receive services” (P 12).

“This is becoming a slogan for politicians to make promises but fail to fulfil them. We vote to get better services and not to be forgotten” (P 10).

With regard to the comments above made by participants, Desai (2002), Kotze and Taylor (2010), as well as Manala (2010) argue that the communities expect to see a ‘better life for all’, as promised by the election campaigns. Arguably, when they do not see that happening, they protest violently. They want the politicians to be accountable for the promises of excellence that they make when campaigning for elections. Atkinson (2007) puts forth that people are likely to engage in violent protests when they are not satisfied with the service delivery rendered by the government, while Mottiar and Bond (2012) state that people engage in violent protests in a fight for their rights to a better life. Moreover, Mottiar and Bond (2012) indicate that these fights have been successful in most protests that occurred in Durban. After an eruption of violent protests, a participant in Bandeira and Higson-Smith’s (2011) research stated that the government leaders were responsible for the outbreak of violent protests as they make promises but fail to honour them.

8.4.10.4 Sub-theme 4: The government should respond quicker to grievances

The participants indicated that the other mechanism for government to reduce the motivations of people to protest violently is by responding quicker to grievances. Failure may result in violent protests as can be seen in the study by Tadesse *et al.* (2006), Bernstein and Johnston (2007) as well as Matebesi and Botes (2011). The 1996 Constitution of the RSA, Section 195(1) (e) indicates that the people’s needs have to be responded to, while at the same time encouraging the public to play a role in policy-making (Piper & von Lieres, 2016). The following remarks were made:

“The government should also respond quicker to grievances; they should not take it lightly and wait for the destruction to happen and respond afterwards” (P 12).

“If the government could make it their mission to explain their challenges to the community, before they think of protesting, communities will not have any motivation of destroying the properties that serve them” (P 21).

“Protests that seem not to be threatening can grow to be something big, and difficult to contain. Immediately, the authorities hear about a threat to protest, they should not take it lightly, they should start acting by coming to listen to the community” (P 15).

8.4.10.5 Sub-theme 5: The police could play a role to minimise violent protests

The police are also regarded in this study as people who have to play a significant role to ensure that protests do not become violent. It has been noted that when police use violent tactics to disperse the protesting crowd, instead of it dispensing, they fuel violence. And at times the protests are non-violent, but when they fail to act appropriately, violence occurs (Beinart, 2010; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; Twala, 2014). The heavy presence of the police in peaceful protests contributes to the escalation into violence as reported by Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011). While Sinwell *et al.* (2009) and Dawson (2010) put forth that the protestors start to engage in violence only after the police have used repressive measures to quell the protests, such as in the use of rubber bullets and teargas. The following comments were made:

“The police should be trained on how to respond to protests, many times protests that are peaceful turn into violence because police are inadequately trained. When they see people gathering, they respond by throwing tear gas, instead of entering into negotiations with them” (P 16).

“Come to think of it this way, police beat you up for something that you do not know, next time when there is an outbreak of protest, you will participate, and also engage in the looting and destruction of properties, so that the next time the police beat you up, at least you will have gotten your share” (P 18).

The guarding of government property as well as private institutions such as shops was recommended in this study. The participants in Johnston and Bernstein (2007) blamed the police for the destruction of properties. They indicated that the police did not play an adequate role to ensure that public and private properties are protected in the protests. In this research, a participant said the following:

“During the outbreak of protests, the police should guard government properties, as well as private properties like shops, as they are likely to be targeted” (P 14).

8.4.10.6 Sub-theme 5: At school level children should be taught at a young age not to destroy community properties

The participants indicated that children should be taught at a young age, in schools about the value of properties to enable them to know the costs that is associated with fixing the damaged properties. Bandura (1977) states that the children learn behaviour that is portrayed in their physical environment by copying and imitating how people live. Moreover, they are not born with the nature of being violent, they learn it through observation. In line with Bandura’s (1977) arguments, the current researcher puts forth that when adults protest while also engaging in violent acts, even children will behave in such a manner at home, school and also with their peers. The following comments were made by the participants:

“At school, learning can happen at a very young age. Given the number of protests that occur in South Africa, schools can have a curriculum where children are taught, how to handle conflicts without resorting to violence” (P 13).

“Parents should also stop fighting in front of children, especially unnecessary quarrels, so that children can learn good behaviour” (P 15).

8.4.10.7 Section deductions

As people have been denied economic, social, and political rights, they hoped that what they have experienced before democracy was in the past and hoped for a better future. However, they did not see a better future as they had expected after they voted for their choice of government (Nengwekhulu, 2009). In support of the above statements, participants stated in this study that the government should stop giving people false hope by making promises. The leaders should also play a role of putting the interests of the community first, and the government must respond quicker to

grievances. The failure to respond quicker to grievances has resulted in collective violence (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Matebesi & Botes, 2011).

The ward councillors can also update the members of the community on projects that are currently taking place. In addition, the participants also indicated that community members should be hired in community projects. The police should not encourage people to act violently during protests by using massive force in protests that are peaceful. Acting violently does not calm the situation, it promotes violence (Pearce, 2008; Dawson, 2010; Bless & Higson-Smith, 2011).

8.4.11 THEME11: MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTS

Imbizos, addressing grievances immediately they are known, constant engagement and the training of the ward councillors were regarded by participants in this research as mechanisms that could channel residents to protest peacefully. Vivier *et al.* (2015) indicate that the government have various platforms that are able to make direct communication possible with communities, these include but are not limited to *imbizos* and citizen forums. The channels are facilitated through the ward committees and the Community Development Workers [CDWs].

Furthermore, Vivier *et al.* (2015) note that the challenge that is there in the community and the state is that they do not hold conversations; their communication tends mostly to be a one-way channel which can only be able to deal with service delivery challenges and not other matters. The participants in Johnston and Bernstein's (2007) research advised that the protests be prevented by ensuring that what the leadership and the communities have agreed upon in meetings is respected and adhered to.

8.4.11.1 Sub-theme 1: The use of imbizos

The study by Vivier *et al.* (2015) found that there are number of communication platforms that the government can use to communicate with communities. In this study, the participants recommended the use of *imbizos*, where the government and the public can be able to communicate with one another. In the *imbizos*, the community

will be able to tell the government how it can serve them best. Comments made are as follows:

“We have ward councillors who are voted for, and being paid by the government, they should do their level best that in each quarter, they call imbizos to determine how the community wants to be served, and also give report of their achievements, failures and even future plans. This should be done before the members of the community get angry, because once they are angry, it is not easy to talk them out of the situation” (P 20).

“Imbizos should be held constantly, so that the government leadership and its people can share common understanding, instead of the community and leaders playing against each other” (P 15).

8.4.11.2 Sub-theme 2: Addressing grievances at first step

The participants have suggested that the leadership should address grievances before they result into protests. Once grievances have pushed people to protest violently, it gets difficult to talk them out of the situation, even when there is a solution that is already in the pipeline for what they are complaining about. For the fact that the leadership waited for them to protest and give them such information will look like they are just trying to calm the situation. The illustrations that were made are:

“The leadership only start talking when people are already on the streets, chanting. By then, it will not be possible to take people out of the streets and explain the challenges to them. Even if there are valid explanations, the fact that the leadership did not come down to people to talk to them and waited for them to act before they could brief them, will make the situation even worse” (P 10).

“Once people are protesting, it is not easy to convince them to put the tools down, engagement should be done timeously. Delays should be explained as soon as they are known” (P 15).

Mofolo and Smith (2009) as well as Carrim (2010) state that people will be more understanding if they are well-informed by councillors or officials about the challenges that are being experienced in community developments, and they are also less likely to protest. Just offering an explanation will not be sufficient, speedy, and correctional measures should be sought (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). Zama (2012) recommends that feedback on grievances be given timeously; the leadership should inform the public about the issues raised even if they have not resolved them. This will help in assuring the members of the community that their issues are taken seriously and when resources are available, they will be addressed.

8.4.11.3 Sub-theme 3: Constant engagement with communities

The participants indicated that the violent protests can be reduced when there is constant engagement between the government and the members of the community. According to Chenwi (2011), meaningful engagement allows both members of the community to disagree on certain matters and later on to reach a joint decision that will help to improve the community. Furthermore, Chenwi (2011) states that meaningful engagement ensures that people whose rights have been violated are included in the formulation of solutions to the problem. Moreover, it is encouraged because it will help the government in providing plans and programmes that are relevant to the members of the community (Chenwi, 2011). The following statements were made:

“Our government usually communicates information once the destruction has taken place. Communication should be something that the government does on monthly basis, or even per quarter, this will show the people that the government cares about them and busy attending to their problems. Improving how the leadership communicates with the community plays an important part in fostering relationship between the community and government officials. Lack of engagement makes the community feel unwanted by the government, as such, they will protest violently to get the attention of the state” (P 12).

“Once people start protesting for the fixing of potholes, even if you come to show them the approved budget and the contractor for the job, they are not

going to believe it. Once they have taken to the street, they cannot be easily convinced that what they are looking for is just around the corner” (P 16).

According to Disoloane and Lekonyane (2011), the government should not take decisions that impact communities on its own. The community should be given an opportunity to make suggestions. The participants in Jili’s (2012) study highlight constant meetings between the government and the public as effective measures to reduce the motivations of engaging in violent protests.

8.4.11.4 Sub-theme 4: Training of the ward councillors

Some participants indicated the need for training of ward councillors so that they can be able to serve the communities. Similarly, Mofolo and Smith (2009) recommend the training of staff members by their managers, to be able to attend to complaints and take actions speedily. The following was mentioned by the participants:

“These ward councillors also need training, they should not be left to figure things on their own, after being voted for, without being taught the necessary leadership skills, and how they should relate to the community” (P 21).

“Some people are voted into power because they are able to talk, as such communities see them as leaders based on that, but when it comes to serving, they tend to fail. Some of them, with training, can be able to stand on their own and serve the community best” (P 18).

8.4.11.5 Section deductions

Imbizos and constant engagement that is meaningful have been recommended to assist the government and the community to talk to one another and thus able to fix problems. Meaningful engagement offers the hope of solving problems, because members of the community are included in the solution (Chenwi, 2011). In addition, Jili (2012) argues that constant meetings will address community problems that may lead to group violence. Moreover, grievances should be addressed immediately, before they escalate into violent protests, because once violence breaks out, it is

difficult to defuse. People are more likely to understand when information is provided by officials and are unlikely to be motivated to protest (Mofolo & Smith, 2009; Carrim, 2010). In addition, ward councillors and managers should be trained to effectively assist members of the community (Mofolo & Smith, 2009).

Vivier and Wentzel (2013) found that the ward councillors were regarded as criminals that can kill people with opposing views. They were also regarded as people who run away from people who voted for them to live in more advanced areas. The participants in the current study advised the politicians against making promises of excellence, as they fail to keep them. People are reported to fight for the promises of service delivery made during elections campaigns through collective violence (Desai, 2002; Marais *et al.* 2008; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). Furthermore, the participants indicated that the leaders could play a significant role by being transparent. They can provide the costs of buildings and buying furniture, amongst others. Moreover, the children could be taught at a young age about the costs of properties to deter them from destroying community property.

8.4.12 THEME12: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENT PROTESTS

The participants indicated that the learners had to be exposed to bad weather conditions as classes had been destroyed. The economy was affected as shops were closed and potential investors were scared off. Furthermore, the children also learned to be violent and found time to engage in delinquent behaviour that left some girls expecting children that they did not plan for. Kgatle (2018) acknowledges that school time, during which learners would have been learning, was lost during the outbreak of the violent protests in Vuwani. Furthermore, it was not possible for learning to take place at that time as the environment was not conducive for learning.

8.4.12.1 Sub-theme 1: Children exposed to bad weather conditions

The torching and destruction of buildings resulted in learners not having a place where they can learn. They were thus affected by bad weather conditions. Tilly (2003) states that collective violence leaves visible traces that will require a lot, such as money and time to fix or clean up the damage. The following was said by the participants:

“Schools have been destroyed in the process; children have to learn under the trees” (P 17).

“The torching of schools are major problems. Children are left with no shelter where they can learn” (P 11).

8.4.12.2 Sub-theme 2: Violent protests affect the economy

Violent protests have been described to negatively affect the economy. They have a potential to scare potential investors and the fixing of the damaged properties requires a lot of money. Kanyane *et al.* (2017) state that 20 schools and a post office amongst others, were torched in Vuwani. As the roads were also barricaded with stones, that also damaged the tar road. Furthermore, the damage in Vuwani has been estimated to be R175m, while mobile classrooms also cost the state R27.2m (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). The result is that government has to spend more to fix the properties that have been destroyed. Below are the illustrations shared by the participants:

“Shops were closed during the protests because of looting, as such we had to spend money in order for us to go and buy food at Giyani, which is a distance away from us. While in our township, we were not spending for transport, when we wanted groceries, we just walked on foot to get what we needed” (P 21).

“Looting will scare people who were about to establish businesses in our area, this will also backfire on us, because our people who are not employed, will remain unemployed” (P 19).

“Fixing properties that have been destroyed requires time and money, that would have been dedicated to other community projects” (P 12).

8.4.12.3 Sub-theme 3: Children engage in delinquent behaviour and also learn to be violent

The participants indicated that the children found time to engage in delinquent behaviour and also learnt to use violence to solve conflicts. Some even fell pregnant. von Holdt (2011a) highlights the suffering that was evident at the end of protests, for example, buildings were burned, and shops were looted. Ngwane (2011) states that the violent protests hinder development. In some instances, the schools could not be attended for months (Botes *et al.*, 2007; Mavungu, 2011; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). The following was said:

“Some of the consequences are to remain for ever, like the girls who fell pregnant. They are children who also have children and they have to take care of these children” (P 15).

“Some girls are pregnant, because they were left unattended during protests, as schools had been closed by protesters” (P 10).

The participants in SALGA’s (2015) research state that the youth learn to be violent and also to loot during violent protests. They looted after they saw adults looting and also started acting violent after witnessing the adults (Bandura, 1977). Moreover, Clutterbuck (1986) and Loutous (2012) put forth that the students are more likely to engage in violence during protests. This violence can then be normalised (van der Merwe, 2013; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). The following illustrations were made:

“Acting violently in front of children may make them think that the best mechanisms of resolving conflicts are through violence” (P 14).

“Our children learned how violence helps a person to reach the desired goals. It is not surprising that there are more cases of learners acting violently towards their teachers” (P 18).

“Let’s just hope that our children are not going to protests violently against us, we were with them when we were protesting. They saw the level of violence

that we engaged in; it will not be surprising that when we have different views to them, they break glasses” (P 20).

8.4.12.4 Section deduction

This study found that the children are exposed to unfavourable weather conditions when schools are burned during an outbreak of violent protests. The economy is also heavily affected. The children also learn to be violent (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, this study also found that the children also find time to engage in delinquent behaviour with the resulting consequences of unplanned pregnancies.

8.4.13 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

The focus group meetings were held with two groups from Malamulele and Vuwani with a total number of 12 participants, six from each area. The age group of participants ranged from 18 to 40 years. Fakir and Moloji (2011) and Jili (2012) mention the drivers of protests to be the youth. Similar to the study by Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Kirsten and von Holdt (2011), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), as well as Cilliers and Aucoin (2016) found males to be more likely to participate in violent protests; especially from the low socioeconomic backgrounds (Cilliers & Aucoin, 2016).

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) as well as Fakir and Moloji (2011) found that people burned and destroyed properties when they were angry. Greene (1974), Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Fakir and Moloji (2011), von Holdt (2011a), van der Merwe (2013), as well as Khumalo (2014) put forth that when people are angry, they can burn properties that symbolise the state’s authority. Similar to the following studies (Atkinson, 2007; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; SALGA, 2015; Evans, 2018), this study found that people barricade roads with the hope of attracting the response of the government. Tilly (2003) put forth that, if parties fail to reach conclusion in negotiations, the by-product of such failure could be collective violence.

Bringing the areas to a standstill was regarded by participants as a way of showing the government that the community has the power to stand for themselves against unfair practices. There was a total shut down where roads were blocked, people were

prevented from going to work and children were prevented from going to school. Similar to the study of Sinwell *et al.* (2009), Fakir and Moloji (2011), Mavungu (2011), Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Lekaba (2014), as well as Musitha (2016) public facilities such as schools and libraries were torched. In support of the participation in protests (Fanon, 1963; Smelser, 1963; della Porta & Diani, 2006; Zeitz *et al.*, 2009; Crais, 2011; Dlamini, 2011; Collins, 2013; Muller, 2013) state that collective violence is opted for because protesters believe it is fruitful.

The participants in this study blamed the government for pushing them beyond their limit, they protested violently because the state failed to listen to them. When other mechanisms fail, violence seems to be the only option that is available to force the government to respond (Booyesen, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Ngwane, 2011; Orderson, 2012; van der Merwe, 2013; Nembabula, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014). Furthermore, the government is seen as rewarding violence by responding only after collective violence is manifested (Cronje, 2014; Breakfast *et al.*, 2016). Miraftab (2006) states that the public only uses the space of engagement with the government when it will give them what they want.

Similar to the study of Narsia and Maharaj (1999), Fakir and Moloji (2011) as well as Mavungu (2011), the demand for the MDB to review their decision on both areas of the study were motivated by amongst others service delivery, employment opportunities. Breakfast *et al.* (2016), Tapscott (2007), Manala (2010), Fakir and Moloji (2011) as well as Jili (2012) point out that people are likely to engage in violent protests when the government fails to deliver basic services in their communities. Criminal intentions such as looting have been highlighted as motivation factors for violent protests in this research; this is supported by Tilly (2003), Martin *et al.* (2009), Fakir and Moloji (2011), Lekaba (2014). When violent protests occur suddenly, they can lead to opportunistic violence, where greed overcomes people and they steal goods from shops (Tilly, 2003). Lancaster (2018) regards protests to be used by people as a form of political participation. This study found that Malamulele engaged in violent protests to get a standalone municipality, while Vuwani was fighting against the merger with Malamulele. Violence is opted for when the government fails to address the concerns of the people (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

The failure of the government to consult members of the community is also associated with the outbreak of the violent protests in this study. Bernstein and Johnston (2007) and Manala (2010) highlight that people who are not consulted on government matters use violent protests to voice out their dissatisfaction and demands. The participants in this research indicated that they had voted for the government thus they expected the government to serve as well as fulfil the promises made.

Moreover, it was indicated in this study that the members of the community do not plan to burn property during an outbreak of a protest, it just happens at the spur of moment. This concurs with the findings of the following researchers (Reicher, 1984; Schweingruber, 2000; Tilly, 2003; Atkinson, 2007; Mogapi, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Mbazira, 2013; Breakfast *et al.*, 2016; Mooijman *et al.*, 2018). In addition, an individual behaviour is likely to change in the presence of a crowd (Reicher, 1984; Adang, 2011; Schweingruber, 2000; Drury, 2002; Tilly, 2003). A person may easily be persuaded to participate in group violence.

The participants indicated that they opted for the use of violent protests as they were used during the apartheid government. Violent protests are encouraged by the past history as they were used against the apartheid government (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Carrim, 2010; Lekaba, 2014; Nembambula, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014). Furthermore, the people have played a role in the realisation of democracy, therefore, when they are not given the attention they need, they revolt (Mothoagae, 2013).

The participants stated in this research that by destroying properties, both the community and the government were punished. Carrim (2010), Dlamini *et al.* (2011), Mooijman *et al.* (2018) as well as Kanyane *et al.* (2017) consider the acts of violence that people perpetrate during protests to bear consequences on both the community and the government. The community will have to wait for some time for the refurbishment of the damaged properties, while the government has to spend more money on things that they have already spent money on. The study of Kanyane *et al.* (2017) found that violent protests resulted in psychological trauma that emanates from the threats of violence and intimidation of people who did not wish to participate in the protests.

Even though the participants indicated that they regret the use of violence in their protests, the study by Kanyane *et al.* (2017) found that the residents of Vuwani consider their use of violence to be rational, as it brings the changes that are needed by the members of the community. Fakir and Moloji (2011) as well as Langa (2011a) found that people were not pleased about the violence that occurred during the protests, but they justified its use based on the frustration of not getting a positive response to have pushed people to engage in collective violence, to get the attention of the state. Furthermore, Mooijman *et al.* (2018) agree that violence can bring change and destruction at the same time.

Bundy (1987), Galtung (1990), Burger and Omar (2009), Manala (2010) as well as Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) indicate that the police's use of violence to address nonviolent people encourages them to retaliate by being violent. Rubber bullets should only be used as a last resort mechanism, when negotiations have reached cul-de-sac (Burger & Omar, 2009). Some participants in this study stated that collective violence can result in reaching desired outcomes. Collective violence has worked in certain circumstances and problems such as service delivery and boundary disputes have been solved (Fanon, 1963; Oberschall, 1994; Narsiah & Maharaj, 1999; Opp, 2001; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Zeit *et al.*, 2009; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; della Porta & Gbikpi, 2012).

The participants in this study regarded the involvement of community members in projects that are done in their community as a deterrent method against the destruction of community property. Hiring them will bring a sense of ownership, as such they will not destroy something that is theirs. According to Draai and Taylor (2009), the 1996 RSA Constitution, Section 152(1) makes a requirement to the local government to encourage and also to involve communities as well as organisations in local government matters. Moreover, the local leadership, especially ward councillors, were regarded as people that could play a role to minimise protests from taking place in their communities. Jili (2012) recommends that the local leadership could play a role at minimising the occurrence of protests that are violent in communities by putting the needs of the people ahead of theirs. They should also respond quicker to grievances.

Furthermore, Chenwi (2011) states that meaningful engagement ensures that the people whose rights have been violated are included in the formulation of solutions to the problems. Moreover, it is encouraged because it may help the government in providing plans and programmes that are relevant to the members of the community (Chenwi, 2011). In addition, Jili (2012) argues that constant meetings will address community problems that may lead to group violence. It was suggested that the grievances should be addressed immediately when they have been brought to light, instead of waiting until protests emerge. A protest poses a challenge of turning into a violent revolution (Goldstone, 2012; Cronje, 2014).

Mofolo and Smith (2009), as well as Carrim (2010) state that people will be more understanding if they are well-informed by councillors or local officials about the challenges that are being experienced in community developments. Just offering an explanation will not be sufficient, speedy, and correctional measures should also be sought (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). Furthermore, some participants in this research indicated the need for the training of ward councillors so that they can be able to serve the communities. The participants also indicated that the leaders could play a significant role by being transparent. Ward councillors can also update members of the community on projects that are currently taking place. Similarly, Mofolo and Smith (2009) recommend the training of staff members by their managers, to be able to attend to complaints and take actions speedily.

The torching and destruction of buildings results in learners not having a place where they can learn. They are thus affected by bad weather conditions. Tilly (2003) states that collective violence leaves visible traces that will require a lot, such as money and time to fix or clean up the damage. The participants indicated that children find time to engage in delinquent behaviour and also learn to use violence to solve conflicts. The youth learn to be violent and also to loot during the outbreak of protests (SALGA, 2015).

8.4.14 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

In both the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions held at Malamulele and Vuwani, most participants were below the age of 40 years. The males were more willing to share information with the researcher. Notably, the following researchers found young males from low socio-economic background to participate in violent protests as compared to females (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Fakir & Moloji, 2011; Jili, 2012; Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Cilliers & Aucoin, 2016). In the current study, the males were more willing to participate than women. A conclusion can be drawn that even in this study areas, more males than females participated in violent protests.

Nine participants were interviewed, while 12 participants were recruited to form part of focus group discussions in two groups. Six participants were coming from each area where they were purposively selected to form part of the sample, based on their knowledge and participation in the public protests that occurred in Malamulele and Vuwani. After purposively selecting participants, the researcher asked the participants to point to other people (snowballing) who participated in these protests (Strydom, 2011b). The data collected through interviews and focus group discussions reached a saturation point during the second focus group discussion when no new information emerged, and the participants repeated information that was said by other participants. Data was analysed through TCA. Ethics were adhered to during the collection and analysis of data.

This study found that the grievances in both the communities were resulting from the demarcation of their areas by the MDB. They were both fighting to be demerged with an area which they did not want to be part of. According to Narsia and Maharaj (1999), Fakir and Moloji (2011) as well as Mavungu (2011), the communities want their areas to be merged with areas where there is service delivery, and employment opportunities.

Similar to the study of Desai (2002), Pearce (2008), Sinwell *et al.* (2009) and von Holdt (2011a), this study found that in Vuwani, the residents began to engage in violent protests when the provincial premier did not make it to the meeting as requested by

the residents. Furthermore, the SAPS (2016) reports that the failure of the premier to grace the community meeting in 2015 eventually led to violence. Collective violence only occurred when the premier did not come to the meeting that he was invited to. The failure to honour an invite was seen as disrespect by residents, who then engaged in protests to force recognition as well as to register their grievances (Desai, 2002; Pearce, 2008; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; von Holdt, 2011a).

It is apparent from the findings of this study that the grievances that resulted in collective violence stemmed from the demarcation issues. The people's use of collective violence to fight against the demarcation of boundaries was stated in the research by Griggs (1998), Narsia and Maharaj (1999), Bernstein and Johnson (2007), Bernstein and Seferiades (2007), Sinwell *et al.* (2009), Matebesi (2011), Mavungu (2011). The participants in this research indicated that there was no consultation when Vuwani was incorporated into Malamulele, hence they protested violently. Mavungu (2011) indicates that when consultation between the government and the community is limited, the relationship will be strained. Mabunda (2018) recognises the role boundaries played in fostering a stable relationship between community members.

This study found that when engagement failed to produce the expected outcomes, collective violence was used as a communication tool to convey a message. Similarly, the following scholars found citizens to have used collective violence as a form of consultation, engagement, and participatory governance (Desai, 2002; Tilly, 2003; Matebesi, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Seferiades & Johnson, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013). The situation in Vuwani and Malamulele can be regarded as a result of broken negotiations because the people did not start by engaging in collective violence. They used peaceful means of engagement with the government, when that did not bring the desired outcome, the use of collective violence was considered. Broken negotiations occur when people use peaceful means of engaging the government and that fails to bring desired outcomes (Desai, 2002; Tilly, 2003; Seferiades & Johnson, 2012).

The exclusion of people from decision making processes has been noted during the demarcation of boundaries (Narsia & Maharaj, 1999; Bernstein & Johnston 2007; Langa, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Matebesi, 2011). In this current study, the lack

of consultation by the government in the demarcation process has been highlighted to have pushed people to protest violently. They were angry and frustrated by the government's refusal to give them what they wanted and also by demarcating their areas without including them in the decision-making process.

Personal interests where people use violent protests to reach their political goals and those who encourage protests to become violent for them to get an opportunity to loot have been highlighted in this study. Similarly, some people have encouraged protests to become violent because they saw an opportunity to loot (Clutterbuck, 1986; Burger, 2009; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Tilly, 2006; Carrim, 2010; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

The participants indicated that the government was slow in responding to grievances, hence protestors use collective violence to attract the government's urgent response (Oldfield & Stoke, 2006; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Atkinson, 2007; Bryant, 2008; Jili, 2012; Zama, 2013). Unemployment plays a role in people resorting to violent protests, as highlighted in the following studies (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Managa, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013). The participants in this study indicated that violent protests have been successfully used during the apartheid regime. Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Kotze and Taylor (2010), Langa (2011), Molapo and Ngubeni (2011), Managa (2012), Akinboade *et al.* (2013), as well as Banjo and Jili (2013), indicate that the current struggle in the democratic regime resembles the struggle during the apartheid period. This is said based on the violent acts perpetrated and even the songs that are sang during violent protests being similar.

SALGA (2015) as well as Kgatle (2018) argue that it was tribalism that motivated people in Vuwani not to agree to the merger. However, in this study, the participants did not mention tribalism to be the reason against the merger. Mabunda's (2018) research found the participants to not to have been motivated by tribalism to close roads while demanding their stand-alone municipality. They were pushed by, amongst others, service delivery and the discrimination that was used in employment opportunities. Furthermore, Kanyane (2017) as well as Kgatle (2018) also mention the

fear of not receiving services in the new established municipality as one of the reasons that made people from Vuwani not to agree to the merger.

Studies found foreign owned shops to have been attacked during the outbreak of violent protests (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Fakir & Moloji, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Mottiar & Bond, 2012; Lekaba, 2014). In this study, there was no mention of xenophobic violence towards foreign owned shops. Littman and Paluck (2015) state that violent groups have the ability to also motivate other members of the society to engage in violence.

Some participants in this study stated that the grievances were registered when the buildings were burned. The burning of buildings serves as an indication that the state authority has been disrupted (van Holdt, 2011a; Johnston & Seferiades, 2012). Just like what has been mentioned in the following studies, Dlamini (2011), and von Holdt (2011a), 'the smoke' serves as a messenger, notifying the authorities that their presence is required. Furthermore, the participants in this research indicated that the government should speedily respond to grievances and not to wait until a point where buildings are set on fire. Moreover, the police have a role of identifying the buildings that are likely to be targeted and guard them. The politicians should not make promises when they need votes but fail to fulfil them when they have been elected to the office, as members will hold them accountable for those promises and thereby engage in violent protests as they require a governance that is accountable (Dau, 2010; Manala, 2010; Lekaba, 2014).

CHAPTER NINE

A MODEL OF RESOLVING MOTIVES OF ENGAGING IN VIOLENT PROTESTS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the model that can be used to resolve motivations for people to engage in protests. Carrim (2010) considers protests to be an important measure of the quality of democracy, as such the strategies should not be aimed at removing them entirely, but at reducing the number of times they occur. To reduce the motivation of engaging in violent protests there must be a number of strategies and different role players (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). In the application of these strategies, the literature that is presented in this chapter indicates that the government is the one that should play a major role. Dalarna and Hatungimana (2011) state that the most effective way of addressing a problem is through a proper diagnosis of the problem. In Burundi, many attempts have been made to resolve conflicts, but they remain unresolved (Dalarna & Hatungimana, 2011). The afore mentioned author suggests that the failure to solve the problems can be blamed on the use of wrong measures.

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) put forth that collective violence can be prevented at the national level of the government, and by using long-term strategies, especially when the government can create policies that deal with amongst others inequality, unemployment, poverty as well as the adequate provision of services. These problems are the ones that are more likely to cause frustration for the people. Dealing with them will reduce the motivations of violent protests. Failure in democracy results in collective violence, just like during the apartheid period when people saw confrontations as the only way to address their problems (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bryant, 2008; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; Underhill, 2013; van der Merwe, 2013; Bruce, 2014; Khumalo, 2014; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014).

9.2 MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO REDUCE VIOLENT PROTESTS

9.2.1 Identifying early signs and the source of conflicts

It is important for the officials to identify early warning signs that may result in protests (Botes *et al.*, 2007b; SALGA, 2015). In support of identifying early warning signs, Adang (2011) put forth that collective violence can be prevented by identifying possible frictions and by solving them before they escalate into violence. Communication with participants will avoid misunderstandings about the measures that are put in place by the state to address problems. In Merafong, the participants stated that there were early signs that indicated that the members of the community wanted to engage in protests that would turn violent (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007).

Furthermore, Botes *et al.* (2007b) state that ward committees and ward councillors should be the first to identify grievances that may push people to engage in violent protests. In addition to ward councillors, SALGA (2015) also recognises that the CDWs may assist in identifying the early warning signs that may result in protests. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) highlight the importance of alerting community structures, before an outbreak of a protest or the likelihood of a protest turning violent. In this current study, the participants indicated that once a protest is allowed to occur, it becomes difficult to restrain it from turning violent. As such, a protest should be prevented from occurring in the first place. The report by Botes *et al.* (2007b) also highlights that after identifying the early signs, the community leaders should try their level best to destabilise the situation, because once a protest starts, it becomes difficult to contain.

Pre-protest rallies as well as meetings indicate the prevalence of a problem in the community, as such they should be seen as early warning signs (Botes *et al.*, 2007b) that violence may erupt if the community's grievances are not attended to. Moreover, Botes *et al.* (2007) suggest that the National Intelligence Agency [NIA] should have ability to diffuse the anger that relates to government's service provision. The SAPS should be aware of the protests that may threaten the stability of the communities (Botes *et al.*, 2007b) and thus put measures in place to prevent the eruption of violence.

Tyabazayo (2013) advises that before a plan can be implemented of resolving the conflicts, the underlying causes of these problems should be identified. For example, Griggs (2000) recommends that conflicts can be reduced when better boundaries are put in place, as they will improve access to resources. The current researcher put forth that if the identified problem is about boundaries, let it be sorted out, instead of fixing something else that does not relate to the boundaries.

In some cases, people resort to violence because of painful past experiences that make it difficult for them to move forward. They may be experiencing what is called collective trauma. When the causes of a problem are identified, it will help in instances where collective trauma is experienced by assisting the community to deal with their anger (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

9.2.2 Addressing the citizens' concerns

According to Mogapi (2011), the government should not waste energy and resources on apprehending the perpetrators as well as "*identifying the third force*". Instead, the government should listen to the concerns of the community and find solutions. This should happen immediately after the concerns have been raised, Furthermore, in Krugersdorp where violent protests popped out in response to the high incidence of crime, some women in the suspected drug houses that were burned were found to be in possession of drugs, passports and syringes (Pijoos & Chabalala, 2018). Considering what had been found, this study recommends that when the community members are raising concerns, it is the task of the responsible officers to validate the claims to reduce the motives for community members to engage in riots.

Furthermore, the interests of communities should be put first. The government should not wait for many years without resolving grievances. In Bushbuckridge, the cross-boundary issue was addressed ten years after the people had raised it (Mavungu, 2011). In 2005 when the government decided to do away with cross-boundary municipalities, that was only then that the residents of Bushbuckridge were placed in the province of their choice (Mavungu, 2011).

9.2.3 Acknowledgement of peaceful protests and creating a platform for peaceful protests

van der Merwe (2013) advises that the government should acknowledge peaceful protests, and they should not see them as “*message of low intensity*”. Moreover, the author states that the government tends to recognise protests that are accompanied by violence than peaceful ones. The current researcher thus states that by taking peaceful protests seriously and by responding to them, there will be a reduction in the frustrations that might lead people to start protesting violently.

Dlamini *et al.* (2011) report that the community members of Kungcatsha protested peacefully for more than two years without getting a response. Langa (2011a) found that the government did not acknowledge the peaceful protests that occurred in Azania as the memos that had been submitted to them had not been responded to for many years. This research therefore recommends that a peaceful protest should be acknowledged from the onset by responding to grievances.

When the government only responds after a protest has escalated into violence, it signifies that only violence can move them. For example, Tadesse *et al.* (2006) indicate that the government settled the issue of the Mandela Park residents in Khayelitsha with regard to housing only after they damaged public and private properties. This indicated to people that violent protestation is taken seriously, as compared to nonviolent protestation.

Mogapi (2011) indicates that the people might be attracted to protests because they seem to work, as the media gives a full coverage of them, and the politicians give them attention. The above-mentioned author advises that collective violence can be addressed by providing alternative, peaceful, and collective action that will have similar effects. The current researcher argues that this entails the politicians responding to peaceful protests before violence erupts, so that people could know that the government takes peaceful protests into consideration.

Griggs (1998:30) advises that, “*a properly structured referendum allows citizens the opportunity to express a democratic will that may differ from their representatives*”. Moreover, referendums may make the citizens feel responsible for the decisions taken at the end as their voices are also given a platform to be heard. As such, they will not see the need of participating in violent protests as the decision will also reflect their views. Griggs (1998) notes that the politicians do not prefer the use of referendums because they have no desire of including the members of the community in the decision-making process. They prefer dictatorship whereby it is only the leadership that makes the decisions without the public’s input, but these decisions are also binding to the citizens. Moreover, the citizens tend to make their decisions that their representatives are not in support of hence they exclude them in the decision-making processes so that only the solutions that favour them could be taken (Griggs, 1998).

Johnston and Bernstein (2007) report that the protests leaders in their research indicated that they have been denied a platform of protesting peacefully. This occurred when according to them, they applied to protest, but the police turned their request down. The police are said to have denied having received the application to hold a protest, as such the community members hijacked the peaceful plan that was put in place by the leadership of the protests. The community members became stubborn and engaged in violence. They burned tyres as well as vandalised property (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007).

9.2.4 Local officials’ intervention

The community leaders who are not working for the government can play a crucial role in the prevention of violent protests. Langa (2011b) reports that in Bokfontein, two community leaders opposed service delivery protests in their community as they promoted a culture of violence. They believed the *toyi-toyi* taught people to be violent, as such they never allowed protests to occur in the first place. These leaders stated that protests do not help; instead, they destroy community property. The leaders were opposed to protests even though the community did not have access to basic services such as electricity, water, and housing (Langa, 2011b). Given their socio-economic condition, one would expect the community to engage in violent protests. Instead, they did not engage in any form of protests as these were despised by their leaders.

Karamoko (2011) suggests that the local government officials should not rely on the national government officials to come and consult with the protesters, but they should be the ones to establish effective lines of communication with their communities. The residents should be responded to when they raise grievances, so that they will not perceive acts of violence and destruction as a way in which their pleas can receive attention (Karamoko, 2011; Jili, 2012). Furthermore, Jili (2012) indicates that the members of the community can be encouraged not to protest violently when the ward councillors put the people's needs first.

Meanwhile, Nyirikindi (2007) states that for the people to benefit, the councils should embark on monitoring projects that are taking place in their community. If possible, they can also facilitate self-help projects that will be beneficial to their communities, instead of just waiting for the government. For example, in areas where they are using pit toilets, instead of waiting for the government to build toilets, the council can take the initiative of helping communities to do it for themselves as waiting might take too long. This could be possible when the government offers them training on doing things for themselves.

Tadesse *et al.* (2006) advise that the ward councillors must be encouraged to understand the power relations between the government and the community to enable them to develop creative ways to resolve unequal power balance. Furthermore, holding discussions with the communities will enable the community to understand the reasons behind the policies and the constraints that the government operate under. This will help reduce frustrations that can make them to take to the streets in a violent manner.

In the Thulamela Municipality, the participants mentioned that the municipality should regularly perform routine maintenance, instead of waiting for the problem to occur and then opt for remedial maintenance as this inconvenienced them (Dau, 2010). Furthermore, the participants in SALGA's (2015) research state that the people are more likely to listen to ward councillors that speak collectively and not independently. When they speak as a unity, they are able to cover areas which one councillor could have left out, as such they close the gap that the residents can use to capitalise on their dissatisfaction.

Dau (2010) recognises the ward councillors as having important roles to play in their communities. They serve as a bridge between the citizens and their municipality (Paradza *et al.*, 2010). As such, they have to encourage the members of the community to participate in their municipalities and they also have to educate the public on how the municipality operates. The consultation with the members of the community will offer an opportunity to identify the issues that matter the most to the members, thereby putting an effective plan of action in the pipeline to solve the problems.

Furthermore, consultation will be a good reflection of the local government that it represents the people that it serves. Moreover, the decision taken will be supported by the community as they will have been part of the decision-making process. In this regard, they will own up to the decisions which they played part in and thereby reduce the motivation to protest violently. Dau (2010) puts forth that dictatorship is a motivating factor for communities to engage in violent acts. In Kimberley, Daniel (2018) reports that peace negotiations failed to be achieved because the mayor addressed the crowd while inside the building, instead of meeting with them face to face outside. The leaders should be trained on negotiation skills, such as learning to address a crowd face to face, instead of hiding inside buildings as that may fuel more anger.

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) recognise the role played by the local leaders in collective action to be very important in reducing the motivations of people to engage in collective violence. Some ward councillors are described as people who stand for elections and disappear once they are elected (Vivier & Wentzel, 2013). They are regarded as greedy because they use their seats to escape poverty. This is seen through them moving from where they have been residing before they were elected to positions to more advanced areas, leaving behind people who voted for them in impoverished communities (Vivier & Wentzel, 2013). The government should be firm on ward councillors who do this, so that the members of the community are not given reasons to revolt against the government as they may see the government using them to acquire seats and forget about them once they are elected.

9.2.4.1 *The role of ward committees*

The ward committees according to Mgwebi (2010), were established so that they could serve as a bridge between the community and the local municipality. Furthermore, they are tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that there is a communication between the two. Despite them being established to assist, the challenge is they are chosen by the ward councillor (Mgwebi, 2010). As such, they choose people who are coming from the same political party as them, who, therefore, lack an independent voice, which make them not to represent their communities (Mgwebi, 2010). The government is urged to teach ward councillors to select ward committees that are inclusive of all the political parties. Barichievy *et al.* (2005) argue that committees become inclusive when the leader does not choose people who belong to the party that he/she belongs to but chooses a committee that represents all the parties that are found within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

The White Paper on Local Government 1998 indicates that the new Housing Bill mandates municipalities, *“to ensure that, within the frameworks of national and provincial legislation and policy, all inhabitants in their areas have access to adequate housing. This is to be achieved through the setting of housing delivery goals, the coordination of housing development and the identification and development of appropriate land”*. The researcher suggests that if there is an adherence to the new Housing Bill, some of the motivating factors for people to engage in protests where they also destroy property will be reduced.

9.2.5 Problem-solving workshops

Tyabazayo (2013) argues that when violence seems to repeatedly occur, such cycles of violence can be solved through problem solving workshops. Bloom (1996) states that violence is likely to repeat itself because people who experienced it are traumatised. In conflict situations, these people use violence to defend themselves as they believe that it can work for them. Furthermore, Tyabazayo (2013) stresses the support for problem-solving workshops by indicating that post-traumatic stress is unlikely to go away. If it is not addressed, even if resolutions are reached, the people are likely to further engage in conflicts. In problem-solving workshops, the causes that

led to the violence are discussed, rather than looking at the symptoms that manifested these problems (Tyabazayo, 2013).

9.2.6 Improving participatory governance

Citizen participation can serve as an effective measure to reduce the frustrations that make communities protest violently. Mbuyisa (2013) advises that meaningful participation should be put in place to allow communities to hold a dialogue with the government to voice their grievances. Tadesse *et al.* (2006) argue that community participation will enhance the government's capacity not only to deliver appropriate services, but also to ensure that the services rendered to the public are needed. This will reduce the need for the public to respond violently to policies that they are not in favour of, as they will have played a role in policy formulation.

Furthermore, Carrim (2010) and Mbuyisa (2013) regard anger, frustration, hopelessness, and alienation from the government to be driving people into violent protests. Moreover, meaningful participation in South Africa is seen as vital, because during the apartheid period, the African, Coloured, and Indian communities were excluded from participating in government decision making processes (Mbuyisa, 2013). Moreover, the people should be treated as equal partners, whereby the government will give them the opportunity to participate in decision making processes where their inputs also count (Mbuyisa, 2013).

Friedman (2006) regards participatory governance as a means whereby community members who would otherwise be ignored have a voice to raise their concerns. Papadakis (2006:1) acknowledges that participatory governance is, "*a central element of socially sustainable developments because it is a means which various stakeholders affected by the same issue can sit together to decide inter alia on policies and projects that are acceptable to all*". This will be beneficial because all the parties will be able to raise their concerns with regards to the policies or projects to be implemented and also identify the ones to be prioritised (Nyirikindi, 2007), rather than one party deciding for the other, which in turn may lead to mass action in the form of violent protests.

According to Handmaker (2010), the 1996 Constitution of South Africa allows citizens to challenge the government so that it can be accountable to the people it serves. Furthermore, the Constitution also makes it an obligation for the citizens' engagement in policy making as well as in its implementation of programmes (Handmaker, 2010). When the government demonstrates a willingness of being progressive, the citizens have to support these efforts. However, the government seems not to be adhering to the Constitutional mandate, as it can be seen in the eruption of several protests that turned violent that the communities are not included in the decision-making processes (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Manala, 2010; Matebesi & Botes, 2011).

Furthermore, Matebesi and Botes (2011) argue that the violent protests that occurred in Khutsong have some lessons that can be learned to avoid similar incidences. These lessons are that the national government should revisit its role in demarcation as well as its boundary dispute processes. Another lesson to be learned is that in the process, the state failed to establish a partnership with the community who could have influenced the final decision of the demarcation process, which in this case was Merafong residents (Matebesi & Botes, 2011). Moreover, Matebesi and Botes (2011:18) argue that the national government could have played an important role before the violent protests erupted, by addressing the "*conflicting viewpoint between the state and the community*". What could be noticed with regards to the violent protests in Khutsong is that the state failed to acknowledge the community members as partners in decision making. This could also be said for Vuwani as consultation was very limited (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017).

Friedman (2006) points out that the participation in formal governance does not seem to yield good results. The author elaborates by indicating that the battle in government policy to distribute anti-retroviral [ARVs] medication to people living with AIDS was not won through formal governance mechanisms, but through activists exercising the rights that the Constitution affords them to make demands on the government to provide the medication. Botes *et al.* (2007b) point out that the absence of regular meetings for the ward committee is a sign of trouble. Moreover, the minutes of the meeting should be kept safe (Botes *et al.*, 2007b) as these will come in handy when the members of the community want to know what the ward committee is doing about their grievances.

9.2.6.1 Promotion of active participation

Bauer (2009:31) notes that for municipalities to function adequately, the citizens should actively participate to “*ensure maximum democratic accountability of the elected political leadership for policies they are empowered to promote*”. This means that the public should be given an opportunity to contribute to a policy during the time it is developed and after it has been developed. Their contributions on the policy should not be allowed for the sake of them having said something, but their views and preferences should be reflected in the policy. Based on Bauer’s (2009) point of view, one wonders whether the MDB explained clearly to the Malamulele community the reasons for refusing a separate their municipality from Thulamela in their first application.

Meanwhile, for Vuwani, Kanyane *et al.* (2017) found that the consultation between the members of the community and the MBD was not sufficient to conclude the process of demarcation. In addition, Cameroon (2006) and Kanyane *et al.* (2017) argue that the citizens were not given sufficient time to make their submissions in the demarcation process of their areas. Bauer (2009) explains that the participation should not be limited to specific individuals, but the entire community should be entitled to participation. The researcher suggests that by adhering to Bauer’s (2009) arguments, conflict can be limited in communities.

The representatives and the community members could play a significant role when there is an engagement between them and the government officials. The government policies, programmes and plans for the community could be explained to the community by the government officials. This in turn will afford the community and their representatives an opportunity to make inputs on government policy and implementation (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006).

Pretorius and Schurink (2007) favour the promotion of the participation of communities in national as well as provincial government programmes. By having the members of the community participating in government programmes, they will be able to inform the government about the programmes that are urgently needed to promote their social and economic development. If the government operates separately from the

communities, they might bring in programmes that are not urgently needed by the communities and thus create dissatisfaction that may lead to communities taking to the street, which may result in the destruction of property. Moreover, Mbecke (2014) argues that a culture of good governance can be promoted at local level, when the public is encouraged to participate in government matters.

Furthermore, Barichievy *et al.* (2005), give an account of a successful active participatory governance in Msunduzi Municipality in Pietermaritzburg. To ensure consultation with the citizens, a team of councillors and government officials visited the wards under that municipality to hear the needs of the community. Moreover, the Ward Committees have been recommended by the Local Government Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), Section 72 to improve the participation of the people in government matters (Mchunu & Theron, 2013).

Maphunye and Mafunisa (2008:467) suggest that amongst the various models of public participation, the *Realism* Model is the one that will best fit South Africa. They regard this model to be the most effective as it allows “*consensus to be reached at round table*”, where the affected stakeholders and interested parties will work together to reach an agreement. Jenkins (2010) states that effective participation in legislative processes is essential. The public must be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in the legislative processes. The researcher supports the above-mentioned author by stating that when policies are made where communities have participated and their views have been considered, the communities will not have reasons of protesting violently as the decisions will have been made with them included.

9.2.6.2 *Discouraging passive participation*

To prevent members of the community from destroying resources that help them, which are also limited, they should not be passive recipients of services (Rasila & Mudau, 2012). Passive participation is described by Williams (2007) to be a form of participation whereby the citizens are only recipients of information, in this instance, they are not invited to make their own inputs when decisions are taken, but they are simply told what the government has decided or what has already taken place.

Furthermore, the government should not alienate the citizens by limiting their participation to elections only (von Lieres, 2007).

Moreover, when spaces for participation are not created, Tapscott (2007:89) puts forth that the citizens will create their own spaces for participation, that will be through violent protests. By doing so, Tapscott (2007) states that they will be returning to the apartheid struggle that ensured the removal of the apartheid government from the office. Mautjana and Makombe (2014) found that community participation was done for the municipalities to be seen as complying with legislation, as they were treating citizens as passive participants, instead of them being given the right to make choices and decisions based on their needs in the community. Moreover, the citizens should be given the privilege of choosing projects that are important to them as well as choosing the best one (Mautjana & Makombe, 2014). The current researcher argues that if they are given the opportunity to make their own choices, this will reduce the motivations that may push them to protest violently.

Dawson's (2010) research found that the community members boycotted meetings because of not being provided with conducive information. They made contributions which are ignored during implementation. The participants accuse the government officials of holding meetings for the attention of the media, so that it can seem as if consultation has occurred (Dawson, 2010). This study suggests that the government officials should not waste the people's valuable time by calling them to meetings only for their recommendations not to be considered during implementations. In the meetings, they should be given valuable information as the 1996 South African Constitution, Section 32(a) gives people the right to access governmental information.

Mautjana and Makombe (2014) found that in the Aganang, Molemole, Polokwane and Lepelle-Nkumpi municipalities, the community members come in large numbers to participate in the IDP process, however, they are denied active participation. This arena serves as one for information-sharing and consultation; and not for citizens to make their inputs. Moreover, the above-mentioned study found that the designated groups, for instance the women and the farming community are deliberately excluded from these processes. The IDP processes are for compliance purposes (Mautjana & Makombe, 2014), and they are not a platform that allows the members of the

community to choose what is best for them as mandated by the 1998 White Paper on Local Government.

Moreover, Matebesi and Botes (2011) conclude that the public participation process in Khutsong failed because the government was not open and also because the decision that was taken was not favourable to the members of the community. The above authors point out that public involvement cannot yield good results if the government is not willing to consider all the views that the public express. Moreover, *“public participation in the legislative process, which the Constitution envisages, is not supposed to be at the receiving end of democracy but is meant to be an integral part of the process”* (Matebesi & Botes, 2011:18). When there is a failure in the system, the members of the community are provoked to protest violently. This research therefore suggests that the motivation to engage in violent confrontations could be avoided if the government considers all the views of the community. The public should be given the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Their contribution should be taken seriously when making decisions.

Mathekga (2007:13) alleges that as a result of the past experience of apartheid, *“people have adopted a ‘wait and see attitudes”*. They expect the government to give them services, without them giving input. They are said not to be attending forums and other ward meetings which the government uses as platforms to communicate the programmes that it intends to embark on (Mathekga, 2007). It is imperative for ward councillors and other community leaders to encourage the members of their community to attend community meetings. This will enable them to give inputs on the services to be attended to first and those that can be addressed later. Paradza *et al.* (2010) found that the people were not attending meetings because of the failure to deliver services as expected. To encourage people to participate meaningfully, the government should try its best to meet reasonable needs.

Moreover, Maphunye and Mafunisa (2008:469) warn that the members of the community should move away from the *“mentality of dependence”*. Such instances occur when members of the community or social groups fail to recognise the importance of *“positive collective action”*. Instead, they relax thinking that once they have voted, they should relax and wait for the next election period because their

chosen political representative will take decisions on their behalf (Maphunye & Mafunisa, 2008). This study concludes that this is where the problem starts because the representatives will not know the decisions that will be best for the communities, as such the members of the community may take to the street violently to demand favourable decisions, while in the first place they did not suggest their opinions to their leaders. It is very important that as soon as possible, the political offices such as ward councillors, and mayors should meet with the community to agree on the forums which they will use to discuss the issues that affect the community, rather than waiting until a problem has surfaced.

In OR Tambo, Zama (2012) found through the focus group discussions that service delivery failed because the ward councillors did not communicate effectively with the community members. They communicated the plan of actions to members of the community after they had been submitted, which means that the ward councillor did not adhere to the “bottom-up approach to development”. Chenwi and Tissington (2010) put forth that meaningful engagement entails bottom-up participatory governance. Based on the above findings by Zama’s (2012) study, the researcher puts forth that the road to solve community problems is very long, however, certain things need to be done that will give the assurance that their problems are being considered:

- The citizens should be the ones who identify the issues that need to be attended to. The ward councillors should not decide on the issues that need to be solved first, but they should give the community the chance to own up to the community programmes by them suggesting what should be done.
- The ward councillors should build a strong relationship with the community leaders such as the pastors, business people, traditional leaders and political leaders from other parties so that they will help to mobilise the community in the projects that are taking place. This will help with the cooperation of the public and the ward councillors.

9.2.6.3 Promoting the citizens' participation through road shows and imbizos

Barichievy *et al.* (2005) found that participatory governance was more effective when 'roadshows' are brought to the community. These 'roadshows' allow the government and the citizens to talk about specific issues that affect people. Furthermore, the above author also uncover that there is cooperation among the members of the community when decision making power is shared. Manala (2010) favours the participation of the people in government matters. The afore mentioned author argues that when the members of the community are given the opportunity to participate, they will serve as the monitors for the administrative projects. The other benefit noted by the author is the promotion of a good relationship between the communities and their local government.

The government officials should act on the outcomes of the *imbizos* because the members of the community expect them to do so (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). The afore mentioned authors warn that the *imbizos* raise public expectations that their concerns will be addressed, but if they are used only to promote political agendas without addressing public concerns, they lead to increased dissatisfaction. The current researcher recommends that the officials should not call *imbizos* just to make it seem like they are working. They should try to implement some of the resolutions as speedily as possible to demonstrate to the members of the community that they value their contributions because increased dissatisfaction may result in collective violence (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Matebesi, 2011; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Tyabazayo, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Tiva, 2015; Makgopo, 2017).

Mbazira (2013:275) concludes that the protests are not only resulting from frustration with service delivery, but "*the failure of the local governments to take into account the voices of the local communities in decision-making processes*". Booyesen (2009) acknowledges the failure in participatory governance. The above-mentioned author indicates that the government has hosted events such as *imbizos* by the presidency to expose the government officials and the public representatives to the frustrations that the community members experience when their grievances are not attended to, so that they can be responsive to the needs of the community. The current researcher

suggests that the *imbizos* could work as a platform of improving the responsiveness of the public officials and their representatives. The *imbizos* should not be initiated by the presidency, but by the local government.

The local government through the ward councils and the community liaison officers should be the ones that call the *imbizos* so that the members of the community can feel that they also have a role to play in these forums. The members of the community may feel some sense of ownership that they are part of the process when the platforms are initiated locally rather than nationally. Moreover, the members of the community will know the people who call them and can also be held accountable if they do not take their pleas forward. The ward councillors could also use these *imbizos* to make themselves known to the community members. In Vivier and Wentzel's (2013) study, the participants have indicated that they do not have a responsibility of making themselves known to the ward councillors, but the ward councillors have a duty of making themselves known to the citizens, as they have been voted for.

Zama (2012) found that even though in Tshwane there were mechanisms in the form of *imbizos*, a ward committee, suggestion boxes and council meetings to ensure public participation; only 34.5% of the community members regularly participated in the community activities. Their reasons for the lack of participation were varied, these included amongst others the inadequate distribution of invitations to the meetings, and the lack of feedback on the grievances raised in the previous meetings not being given while the same problem still existed. Based on Zama's (2012) findings, this research proposes that when municipalities intend to hold a meeting, they should do the following:

- Announce the meeting in time and if possible, schedule their meetings for the whole year so that the members of the public will know when meetings are to be held.
- Announcements should be made in local newspapers, radios and even in schools so that the children can pass the information to their parents.
- By giving continuous feedback, the members of the community can realise that on certain matters, it is not the local government that is failing. The provincial

or the national government is the one to fix it. This in turn will build a mutual relationship whereby the members of the community will know the operational power limitations of the local government.

- Complaint boxes should be distributed in local government offices.

9.2.6.4 Participation through consultation and meaningful engagement before decisions are implemented

According to Tadesse *et al.* (2006), a public space and accessible governance should be created to enable the members of the community to participate in government policies. Tadesse *et al.* (2006) further state that the dissatisfaction and violent conflict can be reduced through public participation in policy decision making. The government should not implement decisions without the community stakeholder's buy-in (Maphunye & Mafunisa, 2008). When people participate in policies, they will be aware of what is happening. There will be no need to protest violently. Moreover, Mbuyisa (2013) argues that the community members will engage in violent protests as long as they can draw the attention of the leaders to attend to their concerns.

The government should be aware that public participation involves several steps *inter alia* negotiations, public *imbizos*, debates and consultation (Maphunye & Mafunisa, 2008). In addition, Nembabula (2014) states that by encouraging the communities to participate in governance matters, accountability and responsible governance will be promoted. This will in turn remove the need for communities to defend themselves as people use collective violence when they feel oppressed (Fanon, 1963).

Booyesen (2009), Dawson (2010), Matebesi and Botes (2011) as well as Ngwane (2011) found violent protests to have occurred because of the lack of meaningful engagement between the community and the government. Meaningful engagement offers the members of the public a space to voice their concerns and frustrations. The problem occurs when in some instances, consultation takes place, but the suggestions made by the the community are not indicated in the final decisions. In this current study, the participants indicated that they were not consulted when Vuwani was merged with Malamulele. Makana (2016) reports that the people from Vuwani mentioned that there was no consultation between the community and the government

about their incorporation to Malamulele, hence they engaged in violent protests. Chenwi (2011) put forth that the government has to consider the views of the community in the implementation of policies and programmes.

Furthermore, Chenwi and Tissington (2010) allege that the outbreak of protests clearly indicates that meaningful engagement is not considered by the government. The citizens do not have a voice in government matters. The government should not consult Community-Based Organisations [CBOs] and claim that consultation has taken place as CBOs do not fully represent the community (Chenwi & Tissington, 2010). By meaningful engagement, both the government and the community should sit down to talk and listen to one another. In their engagement, they should try as much as possible to understand each other's viewpoint so that the best decision could be taken by both.

For example, when the government intends to evict people, they can sit down with them to reach a common understanding before the evictions occur (Chenwi & Tissington, 2010). This will reduce the motivations for violent protests. In the study areas of this research, if consultation was maximised, the members of the community would have been channelled away from violent protests. In this regard, consultation before the incorporation should have taken place (Chenwi & Tissington, 2010). Paradza *et al.* (2010) found that the Randfontein Municipality has multiple ways of facilitating public participation. These mechanisms ensure that they reach out to the residents and even the rate payers. The mechanisms that they use include monthly meetings, *imbizos*, suggestion boxes, press releases, sectoral meeting road shows and even ward committee meetings. Therefore, the current researcher recommends for the above measures to be used in communities to minimise violent protests.

Matebesi and Botes (2011) found that the participants believe that the public referendums and *imbizos* that were facilitated by independent organisations, for example the Independent Electoral Commission [IEC] or the Institute for Democracy in South Africa [IDASA] would have served to reduce the conflict that led to the masses protesting violently. However, the respondents stress that the intermediary should have assisted before the decision to include Merafong in the North West Province was taken at the national level. On the other hand, a decision that was not supported by

the majority should not have been taken by the government. Somerville (1952:161) states that, “*if government is the servant of the people*”, it should reflect in the manner in which it governs people. Its exercise of power has to reflect the will of the people that it serves.

The findings of Matebesi and Botes (2011) indicate the importance of including community members in decision making to avoid violent demonstrations. Meanwhile, Maphunye and Mafunisa (2008) state the importance of constant interaction between political office bearers and community members. Dawson (2010:128) supports the above-mentioned authors by indicating that the communities want “*more participatory forms of governance*” where they will play a vital role in decision making process that affect their wellbeing. By doing so, the leaders will be able to ensure that the needs of the community are thus considered in decision-making as well as in the implementation process. The current researcher suggests that this will limit the motivations of citizens to engage in riotous behaviour of destroying property.

Chenwi and Tissington (2010) put forth that meaningful engagement is very important to occur between the government and the community. Meanwhile, Rasila and Mudau (2012) point out that the communication between the government and the community fails because the government just imposes on the people and does not reach an agreement with them. The government adopts a one-size-fits all approach, hence it fails because the communities do not desire the same level of service (Rasila & Mudau, 2012). Meaningful engagement should not be one sided, as each party should have a chance to make its own recommendations, the community will thus be offered an opportunity to get involved in the development of their communities (Chenwi & Tissingto, 2010; Rasila & Mudau, 2012; SALGA, 2015).

Furthermore, meaningful engagement occurs when the government and community talk as well as listen to one another so that they can be able to reach a common goal, before the government implements or evaluates certain programmes (Chenwi & Tissingto, 2010; Chenwi, 2011). The government should be accountable, responsive, and open as indicated by participatory democracy. The current author states that participatory democracy will reduce the motivations for people to engage in violent protests.

Roodt and Stuurman (2011) point out that the South Africans showed interest in participatory democracy and development after the first democratic election in 1994. This is evident from the activities that the people have engaged in when they were not included in issues that affect them. The Khutsong residents took violent action to register their concerns (Matebesi & Botes, 2011), in which they managed to force the government to incorporate them in the province that they desired.

Moreover, the participants in the above paragraph indicated that the national government, from the beginning, should not have turned down their wishes and chose to take a decision that the residents were not in agreement with (Matebesi & Botes, 2011). Even in Malamulele, this research found that they were granted their own municipality only after they destroyed and burned buildings. Section 195(e) of the Constitution of RSA compels the government to ensure that the members of the public participate in the legislation and other processes. The public should also have access to the media and be included in committee sittings (The Constitution of the RSA, 1996).

Oldfield and Stokke (2006) allege that the state institutions refused to meet the MPAEC to hear their concerns, in turn the MPAEC protested by putting the evicted families back into their homes. Instead of the government addressing their concerns, the leaders of the struggle were subjected to harsh treatment as they were arrested and incarcerated for lengthy periods. Moreover, the police used violence during the evictions and repossession of property. This strategy of arresting those who are at the forefront of protests dates back to the apartheid period. Simons (1997:181) puts forth that the apartheid government used imprisonment as a method of “*removing resisters from the battlegrounds in their communities*”.

In line with the paragraph above, to avoid violent protests, the government has to come down to listen to the concerns of the community instead of arresting their leaders so that they can find a possible solution together. When the solution is coming from both sides, the motivation for engaging in violent protests will be reduced. For example, Falch (2008) states that a continued lack of political dialogue, coupled with the attempts made by the ruling party to monopolise power have made it difficult for the rival groups to reach a power-sharing agreement to end the civil war in Burundi in 2004.

Friedman (2006) warns the ruling party that for the community to have voted for them it does not necessarily mean that the voters support the policy of the elected party. The current researcher states that the government should allow members to indicate policies and decisions that they do not agree with prior to approval. For example, the participants in Vuwani have indicated that they were not part of the decision to incorporate Vuwani to Malamulele, hence they resisted the decision through violent actions.

Kgatle (2018) puts forth that the government should not implement decisions without consulting the public. Furthermore, the author states that had the MDB consulted the people of Vuwani about the merger with Malamulele, they would have known the standpoint of the people, unlike informing them once the decision had been taken. Consultation should not be done because its procedural to do so. The raised concerns should also be taken into consideration. In Khutsong, the residents were of the view that when the community was consulted about the issue of demarcation, it was for their expressed views to be taken into consideration. But the concerns raised in the consultation were not taken into consideration and this led to the members of the community protesting violently (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). Dawson (2010) found that the participants from Doornkop complained of the ward councillors who came to meetings while they had already taken decisions without listening to the people that elected them into office. If meetings are not held for the sake of consulting the members of the community, but they are held to dictate to them, the community will be motivated to protest violently if they do not support the decision taken.

Bernstein and Johnston (2007) advise the government to give the needs of the citizens respect to reduce the motivations of resorting to violent protests. People should receive explanations on how the municipality operates and even on the reasons why they have to pay for basic services such as sanitation, garbage removal, and water supply (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). Similarly, Botes *et al.* (2007b) indicate that when there are differences in terms of level of the services to be provided, the leadership should exercise honesty and transparency to reduce the tensions that may lead to violent protests. This was said because at times, for example, it might be costly to install an infrastructure where there is rocky soil (Botes *et al.*, 2007b). In this regard, the

communities should be given such information before they become angry at the government.

On the other hand, Platinum Weekly (2012) argue that illegal gatherings are not the only way to resolve concerns. A solid and transparent partnership between the local municipalities, councillors and community representatives could assist in avoiding unnecessary protests. The LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000) Section 12(3) requires municipalities to consult communities before passing a by-law. The by-law should be published in the newspaper so that the people can make their inputs. Those who cannot read should be assisted by municipal workers in writing down their comments to ensure participatory governance (Barichievy *et al.*, 2005). Furthermore, Draai and Taylor (2009) support the above-mentioned authors' argument by stating that public participation and even consultation is recommended by the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000) in Chapter 3. When people are allowed to make representation and comments in government matters, the motivations to engage in violent protests will be removed.

According to Rowe and Frewer (2004), public opinion can also be sought through questionnaires and focus groups. This will give citizens an opportunity to be part of the decision-making process to voice out what they require from the government. According to the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, the communities should be given a platform to have a voice in municipal budgeting. Furthermore, the White Paper states that the people should be made aware of the process of prioritisation so that they will know why resources are allocated on certain things and not on others.

9.2.6.5 Encouraging participation of less visible, vulnerable, and marginalised groups in the community

Less visible, vulnerable, and the marginalised groups of the community should be included in meaningful engagement (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). Barichievy *et al.* (2005) state that the local government is more democratic when ordinary citizens are invited to form part of the decision-making process. These groups, according to Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) include amongst others, shop owners, silenced young women and men as well as older people. Shop owners are affected during violent protests as their shops are looted, thus they could be given a platform to explain

to the people how collective violence harms their business. Furthermore, the elderly and children can explain how violence scares them (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

Tadesse *et al.* (2006:8) indicate that “*participatory governance aims to involve the public in governance processes regularly and formerly*”. These people will help in identifying the challenges that they face in the community and seek solutions which will serve as monitors and also calculate the effectiveness of the implemented intervention plans (Rasila & Mudau, 2012). The people from all segments of the society should be encouraged as well as supported to participate, especially the underprivileged groups (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Skenjana & Kimemia, 2011). Participation should include the illiterate, educated and those who are earning less (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). The afore mentioned authors warn against the promotion of wealthy and well-connected people only to participate in policy making, as people should be encouraged to participate irrespective of the level of their income or education.

Tapscott (2007) encourages the municipalities to promote the participation of marginalised and excluded groups in communities. The marginalised people have been found to use protests to demand recognition from the government (Ballard *et al.*, 2006; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Mbazira, 2013; Salgado, 2013; Netsera & Kgalane, 2014). Such groups include for example women who are reluctant to participate in community matters because of issues regarding the responsibilities that they have in their families and the lack of transport (Tapscott, 2007). Moreover, the municipalities are encouraged to “*adopt inclusive approaches to fostering community participation*”, this could be achieved by “*including strategies aimed at removing obstacles to, and actively encouraging, the participation of marginalised groups in the local community*” (Tapscott, 2007:84).

Tadesse *et al.* (2006) indicate that the mass-based organisations and the anti-apartheid struggle emerged from a marginalised society which was not allowed to participate in decision making processes during the apartheid period. Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011), Langa (2011a), Platinum Weekly (2012), Mbazira (2013), as well as SALGA (2015) state that these groups were expected to adhere to what they were told without question. The current researcher argues that to avoid violent protests, the

members of the community should form part of the decision-making process. They should not be treated like people during the apartheid period who were expected to adhere to policies without firstly agreeing to them.

Furthermore, Tapscott (2007) notes that people in rural areas have little understanding on how the local government operates, as such only a few people participate in local governance issues. Based on this, this research recommends that the community leaders should hold workshops to teach their members how the local government works, so that they will know the tasks of the local government and its limitations in operations. In addition, the government should apply the modern participatory planning that Mautjana and Makombe (2014) regard as emphasising consultation between the government and the community members who are experts on what will benefit them the most. Traditional planning should be avoided, as it is seen as a process that sees members of the community as beneficiaries (Mautjana & Makombe, 2014). This means that the members of the community are not afforded a platform to suggest what is suitable to them. Moreover, participation should include members of the community, instead of being professionalised, where members of the community are not included, but where different government departments are the ones that play a role in the decision-making process (Mautjana & Makombe, 2014).

Moreover, Mautjana and Makombe (2014:58) advise that participation should occur at different stages of the planning process, where the members of the community will be involved in the identification of needs, *“preparation of plans or the formulation of policies, implementation and evaluation”*. SALGA’s (2015) research found that public participation can be the best mechanism to reduce the people’s frustration that may result in violent protests, especially when it is coupled with consumer education that teaches people about government processes as well as its procedures.

Salgado (2013:17) concludes that violent unrests during protests result from long standing alienation by large sections of the community. *“When such marginalisation becomes the norm, and communities are robbed of active citizenship, the resulting levels of frustration may lead to the notion that the only way to make their voices heard is through the use of headline-grabbing violence”*. Matshabaphala (2014) notes that people who feel that they are not considered as important on matters that affect them

will protest to make their voices heard. The above-mentioned author suggests that good governance will be possible through the members of the community participating in issues that affect them, as well as the government being open to the citizens on its activities.

9.2.6.6 Promoting participation through social movements

According to Thompson (2007), von Lieres (2007) recognises the role of social movements to be important in ensuring public participation, by using the Treatment Action Campaign [TAC] as an example of a social movement that ensures meaningful participation. The TAC successfully won the case in court against the government's failure to offer treatment to people living with HIV/AIDS. The current researcher suggests that the government can promote social movements to mobilise public participation in government matters, this will in turn reduce the motivations to engage in violent protests as people will be a part of the decision-making process. Moreover, people are unlikely to demonstrate violently to the decisions that were taken by the government, together with them.

9.2.6.7 Improving the citizens' participation through community development workers

Mubangizi (2009) states that the government can improve participatory governance by hiring CDWs who will play an important role in supporting the society so that they can be familiar with state policies and practices. Moreover, they can also help communities to raise concerns with regard to government policies and practices. Moreover, Disoloane and Lekonyane (2011) state that the CDWs can assist the government to check if there is a progress made in service delivery within the communities. Moreover, they should serve as a bridge to close the gap between the services provided by the government and the communities (Disoloane & Lekonyane, 2011).

9.2.6.8 Promotion of citizens' participation through employment

Zama (2012) states that with South Africa being one of the best countries that preaches to be practising democracy, the country has to do more to ensure that the public participates in governmental activities so that the democracy can be reflected. Dau (2010) suggests that for the government to encourage public participation, it must issue tenders so that the community members will be employed. The current researcher does not concur with Dau's (2010) suggestion to maximise public participation, because Manala (2010) alleges that some people who have been awarded tenders in the Limpopo Province disappeared with millions of rands to build RDP houses, while others did shoddy work.

The researcher has reasons to believe that if someone is able to run away with such an amount of money, even the people who were hired on those projects have not been paid. Therefore, the researcher suggests that the government should not award these projects anymore as they only benefit the minority and not the majority. These projects should be taken back to the hands of the people, and this will occur when they are government-owned projects where people will be employed permanently or on temporary contracts to ensure accountability. This will also improve public participation and avoid the situation where members of the public point fingers at the government because of the projects that they paid an individual for, but failed to complete these projects.

9.2.7 Promotion of responsive governance

Draai (2010) considers responsive governance to occur when the government fosters an interactive relationship with the community. A community worker in the research by Tadesse *et al.* (2006) indicates that the riots will not have erupted if the officials had responded to the complaints, instead of ignoring the concerns by putting them on their desks and not attending to them. Moreover, they should have interacted with the members of the community in a respectful manner. This research argues that interacting with the members of the community members in a respectful manner gives the members hope that their concerns are receiving the necessary attention.

Dawson (2010) found that the people expect their councillors to be responsive to their needs. They want councillors who listen to them and not decide on what is best for the community without including them in the deciding process. Furthermore, the participants described a good councillor as someone who forges a good relationship with the members of the community (Dawson, 2010).

Meanwhile, in Krugersdorp, the protesters are reported to have given the police an ultimatum of getting rid of drug lords or to see more protests (EWN, 2018). The protests that the people were referring to were riotous, as they had already vandalised and looted shops as well as torched several houses that were suspected to be drug dens. In Phumelela, a participant indicated in Bernstein and Johnston's (2007) research that the incidences that led the members of the community to protest violently could have been avoided if there were officials who were accountable to the people. In this area, Bernstein and Johnston (2007) highlight that the citizens' complaints had not been responded to. Similarly, Jili's (2012) study found accountability of the government to the mandate given to them as one of the solutions to quench the thirst for violent protests.

Corruption and malpractice have been highlighted as some of the causes of violent protests (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Marais, 2008; Burger, 2009; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Manala, 2010; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Mbazira, 2013). The 1998 White Paper on Local Government states that financial reporting can be used as an opportunity to minimise corruption and malpractice.

9.2.8 Improving communication with communities

Karamoko (2011) acknowledges that communication can reduce the alienation that the protesters often feel towards the local government, as they will know that it is an effective tool of raising concerns with the government instead of violent uprisings. It can also reduce the perception that the government officials are corrupt and that they withhold services that are supposed to be rendered to the communities. Karamoko (2011) allege that the available data suggests that protests are likely to increase if the communities perceive government officials as not fulfilling their promises of service delivery made during election campaigns.

Tissington (2013) states that some of the grievances result from the failure to communicate. The above-mentioned author further indicates that the government at some point fails to explain and give information about government matters. For example, in giving away RDP houses, there are processes that are followed. If the authorities just assume that people understand without giving them information, that results in grievances. The government should give out information timeously and not just to assume that community members understand. Draai and Taylor (2009) as well as Bozo and Hiemer (2012) also stress the importance of giving out information to communities. According to the LGMS Act (Act 32 of 2000), the information should be circulated in the communities within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

There are various ways in which the citizens can be consulted about the changes that the government intends to implement. The DPSA's *Batho Pele* suggest that consultation can be done through customer surveys, campaigns, *imbizos* as well as workshops. Before the government implements a decision such as a demarcation process, the citizens can be asked to answer customer surveys where the government can determine whether the community supports the decisions that the government intends to take. In the *imbizos*, the community will be able to make recommendations on what they expect the government to do instead of taking to the streets whereby as a collective, they can influence one another to destroy government property that is meant to service them.

9.2.8.1 Communication before implementation

Karamoko (2011) as well as Zama (2013) suggest that the violent protests can be prevented in the future if the municipalities strengthen their communication with the residents with regards to developmental issues and the delivery of services. Disoloane and Lekonyane (2011) also stress on effective communication between the ward councillors, ward committees and the community that elected them so that they can represent them. The residents should be informed about the achievements and also the delays that relate to the provision of services (Zama, 2013).

Meanwhile, Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) report that during a process of relocating community members in SlovoView whose shacks were built on the water supply pipe that needed to be fixed, there were violent protests because of communication failure. When the members of the community went to present their petition, instead of the councillor coming to receive it, they were greeted by the police who removed them from the premises. They responded to the police violence by burning a police car as well as a car that belongs to the South African Broadcasting Corporation [SABC]. The councillor acknowledged that the violence broke out because of the failure to communicate with the people who were to be relocated. If communication had taken place in time (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011), the people would not have been motivated to resort to violence to reject the removal. If communication had been made prior to the event taking place, the people would not have protested violently because the pipe that was to be serviced was there to help the community members and not the government.

9.2.8.2 Communication about measures to deal with community concerns

It is very important for officials to communicate with communities from time to time so that the communities will know what is happening with regards to their concerns. Adang (2011) puts forth that the best time to deal with collective violence will be to prevent friction from the onset. This entails communicating with the participants to avoid misunderstandings about the measures that are being taken by the government to solve their problems. The limits of their behaviour should also be clarified. The measures that will be taken during transgression should also be made clear (Adang, 2011).

Furthermore, Mc Lennan (2009) and Ngwane (2011) argue that the damaging effects of the apartheid government makes it difficult for the democratic government to meet the local demands of providing services to the citizens. In line with the above authors' argument, the current researcher submits that the ruling party should not make itself look like it is able to meet all the demands of the communities. Where it is failing to meet the demands, the government should communicate with the citizens that it is striving to fill the gap left by the apartheid system in the delivery of services.

Communication can help the community to realise that the government is busy doing something, but there is still a long road to travel to meet the service standards.

9.2.8.3 Communication through imbizos, newsletters and door-to door campaigns

In this study, the participants recommend the use of imbizos that will enable the government and the public to communicate. The community will get an opportunity to tell the government their needs and concerns, so that they can find a solution together (Rasila & Mudau, 2012). There are various platforms that the government can use to communicate with the citizens as per the findings of the study by Vivier *et al.* (2015). Moreover, people prefer to interact directly with the government representatives (Vivier *et al.*, 2018). The use of *imbizos* to communicate as suggested by the participants in the current study will enable the government and communities to have a direct engagement (Vivier *et al.*, 2015).

Pretorius and Schurink (2007) state that the communication between the state and the community should operate on conventional and strategic levels. On a conventional level, media forums such as “*newsletters, interactive websites, fillers and forums for regular meetings*” should be sought to improve the communication strategies to avoid grievances from turning to violent demonstrations (Pretorius & Schurink, 2007). The strategic level relates more on government officials. Pretorius and Schurink (2007:27) suggest the use of “*economies of scale services, legislative innovation, development frameworks as well as institutional interventions*”.

Meanwhile, Mofolo and Smith (2009) indicate that the communication with the residents should be simplistic, reader friendly and must be written in the languages that are spoken within the community on pamphlets and brochures. They should be accompanied by graphics or illustrations to articulate the message. Moreover, the accessibility of such information could be made possible when the pamphlets or brochures are made available in various areas where people congregate, such as in different churches, libraries, community halls, schools, municipal offices, local Non-Government Organisations [NGOs], schools, amongst others (Mofolo & Smith, 2009).

To fix the events that led to violence at Slovoview, the councillor initiated a door-to-door campaign to give people true information instead of keeping quiet and allowing some people to feed the affected people with false information that led to violent protests (Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011). This proves to work as people will not resist if they are well informed beforehand. This research recommends the use of door-to-door campaigns by the government to stabilise the situations that may lead to the eruption of violence. The councillors should come down and do this campaign to give the people information so that they are not ill-informed by other people who may have intentions of causing disorder.

9.2.8.4 Monthly feedback

Musitha (2016) states that the communities should be given monthly feedback by the ward committees as required by the legislation. This study argues that if the Malamulele community had received communication about the services that occurred in their area, they would have known about it. In line with Musitha's (2016) statement, this study further argues that they would not have used violence when demanding for their standalone municipality as one of the concerns that was raised was the lack of service delivery in Malamulele by the Thulamela Municipality (Tiva, 2015; Musitha, 2016; Mokgopo, 2017; Mabunda, 2018).

In Malamulele, the participants stated that the reason they wanted to move away from Thulamela is because there was no service delivery. On the other hand, Musitha (2016) rejects that reasoning by stating that the services were delivered, as the data indicates. People think services were not rendered because the ward committees failed to disseminate information about the services provided (Musitha, 2016). The current researcher therefore suggests that the government should ensure that the ward committees are trained so that they will know how to disseminate information.

A breakdown in communication has also been found to be prevalent by Bernstein and Johnston (2007) with the outbreak of violent protests that occurred in Phumelela. Moreover, the finding from SALGA's (2015) research was that communication is the best mechanism of avoiding grievances as informed communities tend to understand.

On the other hand, when they are not happy with what they are being told, they can raise concerns at once, without having to demonstrate violently in the streets.

9.2.8.5 Community information centre

Communication mechanisms can be improved by setting up community information centres. This will enable the provision of information to communities in a format and language that they understand. By making this information easily accessible to the members of the community, it will encourage participation in policy decisions that affect their wellbeing (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006), and thus reduce the frustration that may lead to violent demonstrations.

9.2.8.6 Communication through radios and newspapers

The media can play a crucial role to promote people's participation in policy making as well as in its implementation (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). Just as the media is able to attract people to participate in violent protests, after seeing the media broadcasting such (Greene, 1974; Drury, 2002; Booyesen, 2007; Bezuidenhout & Little, 2011; Mogapi, 2011), the very same tools such as the radio can be used to promote the people's participation in democracy (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006). By participating, the people will have less motivation to engage in violent protests.

Moreover, the media can be used to promote engagement on a regular basis, by promoting communication between the government and the communities (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Pretorius & Schurink, 2007). Furthermore, it can educate communities and provide them with access to information (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bozo & Hiemer, 2013). Once there is communication, the government will be able to inform the communities the likely turnaround time when things will be fixed, and this will promote peace and cooperation amongst the two instead of divisions that result in the community demanding accountability by engaging in violent protests.

Furthermore, the information should be communicated with the citizens that the non-payment for services affects delivery as the funds that are to be paid could be injected into the development of the communities (Dau, 2010), instead of waiting for the people

to damage properties and thereafter be given such information. Sometimes the protesters engage in violence because of being misinformed, in cases where this misinformation is highlighted, the door-to-door campaigns can set the record straight as was the case in Slovoview (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

9.2.9 Addressing political and administration issues

By addressing political and administration issues, the motivation for engaging in violent protests can be reduced. According to Kirsten and von Holdt (2011), the motivation to engage in violence can be reduced by a wide scale of strategies for social and economic inclusion that will address unemployment and poverty as collective violence is also fuelled by it. Meanwhile, Kotze and Taylor (2010) as well as Breakfast *et al.* (2016) argue that the factors that contribute to inadequate or no service delivery at the local government are political and administrative in nature. These factors include the lack of skills and resources, poor policy implementation, corruption, nepotism, and political infighting within the ruling party. This political infighting is seen as responsible for the government's failure to deliver services, which in turn motivates the citizens to revolt against the local government. This study therefore recommends that the government should employ skilled people who will serve the interest of the community.

Pretorius and Schurink (2007) stress the importance of government administrators from changing from an administrative attitude and placing more emphasis on the implementation of projects and the delivery of services to disadvantaged communities. Similarly, Nengwekhulu (2009) alleges that the public officials saw people as nuisances, as such, they do not deserve to enter government offices, but they must end only at the reception areas. This makes it impossible for the members of the community to have an interaction with the public officials. Consequently, the people have been provided with the services that they did not benefit from due to alienation (Nengwekhulu, 2009).

Furthermore, Barichievy *et al.* (2005) found that the ward councillors were accused of not caring about the interest of the community but chose to push the agenda of their own political party. According to Muller (2013), the communities are likely to show cooperation if they believe that power is shared equally. This occurs when

communities see resources as sufficient and that all communities have equal access to these resources. If power is not shared equally, a competition over scarce resources may emerge that will lead to conflicts, and ultimately the conflicts will result in violence (Muller, 2013). If these issues are addressed, the members of the community could lack the motivation to protest violently.

9.2.9.1 Improving service delivery

Cronje (2014) states that violent protests can be eliminated when the delivery of services is improved. People are impatient with the government for failing to deliver services, hence they protest violently (Jili, 2012). Moreover, Jili (2012) indicates that nepotism can be dealt with when services are delivered fairly and without bias to all the people according to the RSA Constitution, 1996, Section 195(1) (d). Draai (2010) points out that service delivery can be realised when the spheres of the government cooperate with each other as they depend on each other to succeed.

Furthermore, Disoloane and Lekonyane (2011) point out that meaningful change in South Africa can be realised only when the living conditions of the people are improved by affording the people an opportunity to access basic services. Meanwhile, Jili (2012) argues that the government should take note of the fact that service delivery is not a privilege, but a right to every South African citizen. The citizens should be taught that this right is accompanied by responsibilities, wherein the citizens are expected to pay for the services that they received so that there can be sustainability.

Pretorius and Schurink (2007) suggest that developing a model for the sustainable delivery of services to communities will reduce the frustrations that the communities have. The authors propose that the local government, as it is the one that is working more closely with the communities as compared to other spheres of the government should ensure in their governance of the local municipalities that democracy and accountability should be exercised. Services are to be provided to the communities in a viable manner, and the community members should be inspired to involve themselves in matters that pertain to the local government. They went further to suggest that the municipalities have the duty to develop and manage their

administration as well as budget and plan in a manner that ensures that the basic needs of the community are prioritised (Pretorius & Schurink, 2007).

When it comes to service delivery, The 1998 White Paper on Local Government notes that the active participation of the citizens is needed on four levels which are, as voters, as citizens who participate in the policy process, as consumers and service users and lastly, as resource mobilisation. The White Paper indicates that most of the citizens' contact with their local government is at level three, where they interact with the municipality through the consumption of municipal services. As such, the municipalities are advised to be responsive to the needs of the citizens as well as of the businesses who are the consumers of the municipal services. They have to improve the management of the customers as well as provide good services that will build an environment that is conducive to economic and social development (The White Paper on Local Government, 1998).

Kotze and Taylor (2010) suggest that the failure to solve issues that hinder the delivery of basic services will continue to make protests a form of political engagement, whereas there are ward committees that can serve the purpose of engagement with communities. Furthermore, the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, also indicates that the services should be accessible to the people. Where an imbalance has been noticed, such imbalances should be addressed by developing a new infrastructure or by upgrading the existing one to ensure that all the citizens have access to the minimum level of services. On the other hand, the services should be easy and convenient to use.

9.2.9.2 Implementing a complaint management system

In municipalities, a central complaint-management system has to be put in place to enable the members of the community to know where to address their problems as well as know whom they should get the feedback from (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Mofolo & Smith, 2009). The *Batho Pele* principle under 'redress' suggests that the government departments and municipalities should have a complaint handling system (DPSA, 1998). Failure to implement a complaint management system may result in collective violence. For example, in Phumelela the community members

engaged in violent protests because of the lack of a complaints management system (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Botes *et al.*, 2007b; Marais *et al.*, 2008).

Moreover, the frontline staff members who were expected to handle such problems were said to be unavailable most of the time. In addition, when they were available, they were described to have been rude and arrogant towards the citizens (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Mavungu, 2011). As such, the members of the community became frustrated when their concerns were not addressed and started directing their complaints to the municipal managers and other managers (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007). This kind of treatment mentioned by the previous scholars, encouraged the members of the community who were angry and frustrated to use every available means to fight back their mistreatment, which could also be through group violence (Mavungu, 2011).

Face-to-face meetings, telephonic and computer network where people can leave voice notes of their complaints and even complaints boxes have been suggested to be placed in strategic areas within the buildings of the municipality to help in identifying the shortcomings in the services rendered (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). Therefore, the current researcher suggests the implementation of a complaints management system that is well functioning in government departments as well as in municipalities. Additionally, the officials who will be receiving the complaints should be adequately trained on how they should communicate or deal with the clients, who, in this regard, are the citizens. A communication system such as telephone lines should be maintained at all times to ensure that they are functioning to assist the clients who will be make telephonic queries. Emails should also be responded to timeously to ease the frustration of the community members.

According to Marais *et al.* (2008), the municipal officials from Phumelela acknowledged during an interview that the pace in addressing complaints was very slow. People report problems more than once before they could get a response. This kind of behaviour contributes to community unrest as the *Batho Pele* principles indicate that people should be put first. The principle 'redress' indicates that there should be a mechanism that is put in place so that the dissatisfaction from the members of the community can be recorded (DPSA, 1998). If dissatisfactions are

recorded, the government officials will be able to know whether they meet the demands of the communities.

9.2.9.3 Responding to queries

Not responding to queries may lead to violent protests. In Kungcatsha the members of the community engaged in violent protests when the town council failed to respond about the missing large amount of money. The community held a mass meeting wherein they gave the town council the opportunity to explain the whereabouts of the missing sum. Upon failure to offer explanations, the members of the community called for a stay away. The stay away resulted in the burning of tyres to barricade roads and the torching of the councillor's house, the library, and the community hall (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011).

The Kungcatsha protesters indicated that the premier of Mpumalanga and the district mayor should have addressed the problem immediately when they received the complaints. If they had done so, the members of the communities will not have had any motive for engaging in violence to ensure that their pleas are attended to (Dlamini *et al.*, 2011). The state should hold the leaders accountable if they fail to respond to queries that result in violence.

9.2.9.4 Refraining from making empty promises

Violent confrontations can be avoided by politicians refraining from making promises that they cannot achieve. Botes *et al.* (2007b) as well as Mc Lennan (2009) put forth that during the protests, the members of the community, especially at local level complain about the government's failure to keep its promises of delivering services. Thus, the members of the community feel betrayed by the failure. Marais *et al.* (2008) also found that the research participants complain about the promises that the government makes but fails to keep. The report by the Parliament of the RSA (2009) advises that the politicians should refrain from making empty promises as these promises create unrealistic expectations for the members of the community.

Mavungu (2011) reports that after the people from Merafong made submissions against the incorporation of their municipality into North West Province, they were given a green light that it will happen. Later on, after they held a celebration of their victory, they were told that the government is still going on with the decision to incorporate them into North West. This is a broken promise that the government has made to the people. Furthermore, Mavungu (2011) indicates that the people engaged in collective violence. To prevent the people from damaging properties, the government should not make promises that are favourable to the community only to change in the last minute as this encourages the members of the public to revolt.

9.2.9.5 Assessment before implementation

An assessment before implementation will help to overcome the challenges that could be met after implementation where resources would have been lost by then. Dau (2010) states that certain services should not just be implemented because the government wants to implement them, they should assess whether they will be sustainable where they want to implement such services. In the above-mentioned author's research, the participants indicate that the people in the rural areas cannot afford PPMs. Such services should be freely available to people in these communities. According to Bond and Dugard (2010), Phiri and other areas like the informal settlement in Orange Farm welcomed the installation of PPMs with resistance. The activists from the social movements destroyed the meters. This research puts forth that if the government had assessed the affordability before implementation, they would not have seen these violent acts that resulted in the state losing money.

9.2.9.6 Credit control mechanism

Some services are not provided freely, but citizens have to pay for such services for sustainability. With regard to the provision of services, Abreu (2014), and Atkinson (2007) put forth that the communities protested violently because of the high municipality bills that led them to being frustrated as they could not afford to pay these bills. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government compels municipalities to take appropriate credit control mechanisms to ensure that services such as water and electricity are metered regularly so that the correct bill can be levied at consumers.

On the other hand, the consumers have to receive regular and accurate bills in the format that is easily understood. Moreover, for households that will not be able to pay for the services, there should be targeted relief that is put in place to assist them. The 1998 White Paper on Local Government further states that for the households who can afford to pay, but choose not to, the appropriate measures should be taken to deal with them. By adhering to the recommendations of The White Paper on Local Government, 1998, some of the motivational factors that push communities to destroy property that is meant to serve them will be eliminated.

9.2.9.7 Eradicate unemployment, nepotism, and corruption

The eradication of unemployment, nepotism and corruption can be beneficial as it will reduce the motivations to engage in violent protests. Cronje (2014) notes that improving service delivery is not only enough to eliminate violent protests, but once services have also been improved new expectations that will be difficult for the state to fulfil will emerge. Cronje (2014) suggests that in addition to service delivery, the people should be given jobs so that they can work and reduce their dependency on the state.

Where nepotism has been experienced in the community, the members will protest violently. In Wesselton, the participants indicated that only people who are members of the ruling party, relatives and friends of the councillors are entitled to employment (Jili, 2012). In addition, participants also mentioned Job bribery as a reason for protesting. To reduce collective violence, the government has to ensure that they employ only qualified people in suitable positions. In addition, employing qualified people will also improve service delivery (Dau, 2010). Langa (2011a) found that the frustration over unemployment coupled with poverty led a service delivery protest into “full-blown” collective violence in Azania.

Dau (2010) found that in Thulamela there were 158 vacant posts. Some people were frustrated over unemployment, while other places did not fill vacant posts. Dau (2010) further states that when there are vacant posts, some people are overburdened and as such neglect certain obligations. This leads to services that are below standards, that may push residents to protest violently. This study suggests that existing positions

should be filled by qualified people. Because just filling it with unqualified people will be another motivation to protest violently (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Burger, 2009; Dau, 2010; Jili, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013). Moreover, the government should not pay people who are not doing their work as community members regard that as corruption and nepotism (Johnston & Bernstein, 2007).

9.2.9.8 Implementation of Integrated Development Planning (IDP)

Dau (2010) notes that the IDP seem to be a good strategy of reducing the motivations to engage in violent protests, as it improves service delivery. The author states that since its implementation, more citizens gained access to water, sanitation, and better housing. Meanwhile, Mautjana and Makombe (2014) found that the public's participation in IDP in the Polokwane Municipality was done as a feedback-giving mechanism, while the Aganang Municipality youth claim that they were not involved in the final decision-making process. The researcher therefore recommends that the government ensures full the participation of the people in IDP projects so that they can own these projects and thereby desist from destroying them.

9.2.9.9 Implementation of the Batho Pele Principle

According to Mofolo and Smith (2009), when the *Batho Pele* Principles are implemented broadly, it will curb the motivations that people have to protest, more especially, when the implementation is directed at addressing the collective needs of the people and not to cater for an individual's need. In the study conducted by Jili (2012), the participants indicate that violent protests could be curbed when the *Batho Pele* Principles are practised. The *Batho Pele* Principles can improve the accountability of the government as well as the citizens' participation in government matters (Jili, 2012). It also promotes the good conduct of municipal employees by advising municipalities to provide employees with a code of conduct (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). Arrogance and even the bad treatment of the people by public officials have served as a motivation, especially when combined with other factors, for people to protest violently (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Johnston & Bernstein, 2007; Marais *et al.*, 2008; Leonard *et al.*, 2011).

Mubangizi and Tshishonga (2013) state that *Batho Pele* promotes a public service that not only offers consultation with citizens, but also allows the citizens to make feedback on services provided to them, so that improvements can be made. Paradza *et al.* (2010) found that the Khara Hais Municipality in the Northern Cape Province has put the people first by adopting a customer-oriented approach, whereby the ratepayers are treated as customers. There is also a service desk for them to raise their complaints when they feel the services provided are not at the standard that they require.

Moreover, there is a flow of information between the community, the councillors, and the municipality (Paradza *et al.*, 2010). Furthermore, instead of taking those who are failing to pay their rates to court, that was costly on both sides, they resorted to reaching an agreement on how the debt can be paid. As a bonus, those who were able to clear their debts within three years were entitled to a 50% discount. Paradza *et al.* (2010) also indicate that this has improved the relationship that the municipality has with the citizens.

9.2.9.10 Demarcate roles of local and provincial government clearly

Steytler and Fessha (2007:104) conclude that the unclear demarcation of roles between the provincial and local government “*tend to hide lines of responsibility; the public does not know who is responsible for what function*”. Unclear roles make it possible for blame to be shifted from one government to another when there is a failure to deliver services (Steytler & Fessha, 2007). The authors state that there should be a clear demarcation of powers and functions between the provincial and local government. This may serve to make the government that is responsible for the delivery of certain services to deliver as required and thus reduce the frustrations that the citizens may have and thereby engage in violent mass action.

9.2.9.11 Solving of political infights

Political infights should be dealt with, as they contribute greatly to the outbreak of violent protests. According to Bernstein and Johnston (2007), during the time in which Phumelela engaged in violent protests, the council consisted of 14 members. These

members were coming from different parties, 11 were from the ANC, while the other three were from the DA, Ratepayers' Association and Freedom Front. The above-mentioned authors highlight that within the ANC there were divisions that resulted in the council failing to meet. When a meeting date was set, one amongst the two factions stayed away. As such a quorum was never reached, which means no decision could be taken, and no policies or budgets could be approved (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007).

9.2.10 The role of the community during an outbreak of protests

Much of the responsibility to ensure that there is no outbreak of violent protests proposed in this model is levied with the government. This does not mean that the community does not have a role to minimise violent protests.

9.2.10.1 Open communication with the police

Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) put forth that the community should have open communication with the police. In addition, they should build a relationship with them, this will ensure that they do not react aggressively towards the protestors. Moreover, the police will not have a need to call a backup when protests occur. Information sharing will allow the police to be well prepared for a protest, as they will know when the protest is to take place and the routes that the protestors will use (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011); and thereby desist from acting aggressively.

9.2.10.2 Controlling of crowd and guarding of community buildings during protests by local citizens

The community should be motivated to take responsibility for their protests, by giving them the mandate to control the crowd. This will decrease tensions and there will be no need for the police to come in. The community marshals will help by keeping the protestors focused on their goal and not to act violently, especially when women are used to monitor the protest (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

A listener at MLFM (30 August 2017) phoned to comment on the violent protests at Tiyani school. The listener advised that during the protests, the members of the community should take charge of their property by changing shifts in guarding the community's property. He further stated that, sometimes outsiders are the ones who burn community property to tarnish the image of a particular community. Based on the advice by the listener, the current researcher recommends that the government should deploy more police officers to guard properties when a protest erupts, instead of putting more efforts on chasing perpetrators who damage community property.

9.2.10.3 Removal of targets

The removal of targets that can make protesters to boast about their achievements can also help. In Azania, the respondents have highlighted the difficulty of identifying people who loot foreign owned shops. However, informing the shop owners about the potential strike seemed to be fruitful as only a few foreign owned shops have been looted on the second round of protests (Langa, 2011a). The police should try its level best to inform immigrants who own shops in the area where a strike can occur to vacate the area with their goods to prevent looting. By removing things that can make community members to enjoy engaging in violent protests, and by having access to free groceries, it may reduce the motivation of engaging in such. If they benefit from looting, the violent protests can occur more often for them to access free merchandise.

9.2.11 Power-sharing agreements

Falch (2008) states that the attempts to bring contending parties in Burundi for negotiations over power-sharing had been a failure. This happened because during the signing of the agreements to share the power amongst the rivals in 1994, 2000 and 2004, not all the parties were included to sign the agreement (Falch, 2008). The conflict was between the Hutu and the Tutsi group. This signing was meant to end the ongoing civil war between the two rebel groups. Because not all the parties were included, the exclusion provoked the emergence of prolonged armed conflict. On the other hand, the primary reasons that resulted in the civil war were not addressed (Falch, 2008).

The current researcher thus suggests that to end grievances all the parties should be included, for example with the issue of the demarcation, the informants from Vuwani mentioned that they were not asked whether they would like Vuwani to be incorporated to Malamulele and also how the process of demarcation would unfold (Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, the study by the above-mentioned authors also found that the suggestions made to the MDB about the demarcation process were also not considered. Cameroon (2006) alleges that at times the MDB fails to listen to the concerns that the members of the community raise regarding the demarcation of their areas.

In Siyathemba, just like in Vuwani, the research participants indicate that there was no proper consultation when the MDB took the decision of removing them from the Gauteng Province and incorporate them into Mpumalanga Province, as such, they also protested violently (Fakir & Moloji, 2011). If there was a consultation, maybe the people from Vuwani who saw the advantage of being incorporated into Malamulele would have considered the incorporation and probably reasoned with other people to see the advantage of it. Cameroon (2006) recognises the limited time that communities are given to respond to the demarcation suggestions of their areas. Jili (2012) states the importance of participation of all the relevant stakeholders in the demarcation process and also the considerations of the views that are made to avoid people using violent means when their territories are demarcated without proper consultations.

9.2.12 Refrain from labelling of protesters as criminals

Langa (2011a) warns the commentators and the government officials from labelling protesters as hooligans and even as criminals. The violent nature of the protesters should be studied to be understood, based on the context of that community as causes are unique for each case. The author further states that, for some communities, for a number of years they sought non-violent methods, but when such seemed not to work, as a last resort, they opted for violence to register their grievances (Langa, 2011a).

9.2.13 Legislation governing protests

The community leaders as well as the police should not just assume that the citizens are fully aware of the legislation that governs the protests, and how the legislation works.

9.2.13.1 Awareness of legislation governing protests

According to Tait and Marks (2011), sometimes when communities want to engage in protests, they fail to adhere to legislation such as the RGA (Act 205 Of 1993). This legislation requires groups that seek to engage in protests to apply; instead, the protests take a spontaneous form. The police regard such protests as illegal because proper application has not been done; therefore, the protests fail to conform to the requirement of the law. If an application has been made, the police and the group leaders can sit together to plan on the mechanism of managing the public gathering (Tait & Marks, 2011). The awareness of this legislation needs to be brought to the attention of the people. Seferiades and Johnston (2012) state that non-institutional collective action is not irrational, but instead their retreat from the proper channels and that they reflect a deficiency prevalent in the systematic channels.

9.2.13.2 Quick granting of protest permits and adherence to legislation

Seferiades and Johnston (2012) argue that the process of obtaining formal permits when people want to engage in protests plays a role in moderating protests from escalating into violence. When people are granted permission, they will be in charge of their own behaviour. This will be achieved when the protesters are given the liberty to plan their routes and times. According to the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), the protest leaders have to assign marshals whose names are provided in the application. They are also expected to indicate how they will control the participants from engaging in unruly behaviour for them to be granted a police escort and traffic management that will ensure the safety of protesters and the public (Seferiades & Johnston, 2012). Declaring how they will control unruly behaviour will compel them to behave in an acceptable manner. By so saying, the government should grant protests leaders the permission to protest so they will know what is expected of them to ensure the best

behaviour of the protesters. If their applications to protest are turned down, it will discourage them from tightening measures that ensure their members to be at their best behaviour. A negotiated management model should be practised to ensure that the protests do not to escalate into violence.

According to the RGA (Act 205 of 1993), Section 11(b), the people who participate in demonstrations are liable for the payment of damage to property that resulted from their actions. People should be made aware about this Act and that contravening it will lead to punishment. Furthermore, the people who are responsible to ensure that the Act is followed should cooperate with the group that needs to protest. Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) as well as Bandeira and Higson-Smith (2011) report that in Gladysville, the protestors gathered at the local police station to seek a police escort.

The marshals and organisers were also there to ensure a peaceful protest. Their requests were turned down because the station commander who was supposed to authorise the police escort was not available. The reports are not clear on whether the demonstrators had applied 48 hours prior to the march, as the RGA (No. 205 of 1993), Section 9(c) mandates. However, they had marshals to ensure that the gathering was to proceed peacefully according to Section 8(1). The researcher recommends that in such cases where the organisers have not applied, but have enough capacity to ensure peaceful proceedings, the police should assist in escorting them.

Molapo and Ngubeni (2011) criticise the lack of cooperation from the police to assist, they state that the available officers should have phoned the station commander to authorise an escort. It is imperative for the leadership to be on high alert so that they can pick on the possibility of a protest to turn violent and cancel it. According to Molapo and Ngubeni (2011), the organisers of a protest in Gladysville realised the possibility of a protest turning violent after the failure to obtain a police escort. As such, they cancelled the march. This study views this as a good practice of not allowing the situation to turn badly and try to correct the aftermath.

9.2.14 The policing of protests

9.2.14.1 The police should strive to build a relationship with the people at all times

The police's role should not start only when there is an outbreak of a protest. For example, Tilly (2003) gives an account of a police's response to an incident that ended in violence. A person who once received harsh treatment from the police threw a bottle at them. Other people followed by throwing whatever they could get, such as stones, wood, and metal. They even attacked passing vehicles. The collective violent behaviour was influenced by the police's mistreatment of a person on another occasion (Till, 2003). As such, the police should treat people in an acceptable manner, so that they are not motivated to use collective violence when they have an encounter with the police officers at other times. Reicher (1984) notes that a person can be influenced to act in collective violence while in the presence of others. By failing to treat people in an acceptable manner, this research, therefore submits that the police are breeding violent people who will attack them when they get an opportunity.

9.2.14.2 The police's responsibility towards citizens

The police are very important in the prevention of peaceful protests from turning violent as noted in some studies (Berkhout & Handmaker, 2010; Adang, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Twala, 2014). The police should be taught that they have a responsibility towards citizens. According to Ferreira (2011), van Wyk the former ANC Member of Parliament [MP] admitted that the citizens have the right to protest. The police have the responsibility of ensuring that the protests should not become dangerous for the citizens. The researcher supports the suggestion by adding that if the police who are called to assist during the protests are constantly made aware about their responsibility of ensuring the safety of citizens during protests, much violence can be avoided.

Bruce (2011) put the responsibility of avoiding the use of lethal weapons during protests on police organisations. Furthermore, these organisations should constantly engage with their members concerning the standards that they should uphold when they resort to the use of force and lethal weapons (Bruce, 2011). In addition, the police

should be encouraged to adhere to the policies, not because failure will result in punishment, but because it will give them a good reputation (Bruce, 2011).

9.2.14.3 Training of specialised local police officers to diffuse protests

Langa's (2011a) research found that the protests turned violent because the special police unit was called in, which reacted by shooting everyone. The participants indicated that they would not have behaved violently in front of their local police, as they had a relationship with them. This unit of the police was seen as a representation of apartheid policing and also it was said to be harassing as well as using maximum force against the protesters (Langa, 2011a). The participants added that the demonstrations are less likely to be violent if the local police officers that are known to the community are the ones assigned to respond to the situation (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Langa, 2011a). Based on Langa's (2011a) findings, this study suggests that the local police officers should be called to calm the situation before the special police units are called to the scene. This unit should be used only as a last resort, after the local police officers would have failed negotiating with the community to restore peace.

Furthermore, Seferiades and Johnston (2012) argue that fear and anger may play a role for the police to respond in violence when they recognise threats. The police who are coming from outside the local jurisdiction may have long-term emotions such as hatred and resentment to specific groups (Seferiades & Johnston, 2012). When there is a specialised group, sessions to deal with their emotions can be directed to specific people, where they will timeously receive counselling to deal with the circumstances that they were faced with. Moreover, the protesters are unlikely to ruin their relationship with the local police by engaging in violence during protests (Langa, 2011a).

Tilly (2003) states that the protesters can engage in collective violence, where they loot in the presence of police because they are outnumbered. The training of more police officers who do not use repressive methods to diffuse protests is imperative. Having a few police officers may not stop people from looting and damaging properties. Moreover, the police may be trained to build a network of informers and

collaborators, instead of using repressive force. This can assist them in gaining access to protest leaders and enter into bargains about the routes that they will use to avoid damage to properties and harm to people.

9.2.14.4 Exclusive negotiations

Exclusive negotiations result in continuing conflicts. This could be witnessed from Burundi's peace negotiations, where the parties which were in conflict were not included during the negotiations. As such, the fight against the government army continued instead of ceasing (Falch, 2008). Where the government wants to implement something, they should include the members of the community so that they support the initiative, rather than feeling alienated and thereby protest violently.

Meanwhile, Simpson (2010) states that in South Africa, the apartheid government has acknowledged after the 1984 to 1986 uprisings that by excluding blacks in decision making at the national level violence will not cease, but it will become a permanent fixture in the country's political life. It is surprising that during democracy the government still excludes the members of the community in decision making, as noted during demarcation grievances (Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Botes, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011); while the apartheid government acknowledged that for peace to be maintained, the people should be included. Even though the inclusion of all races in South Africa, whose age qualified to vote only took place in 1994 national elections, however, during post 1994 certain groups are excluded in decision making.

9.2.14.5 The police's crowd management mechanism

Netswera and Kgalane (2014) state that for the successful prevention of protests, the political and electoral training of people is necessary and more importantly, the training of the police. Moreover, Omar (2006) states that South Africa's transition to democracy also meant the transformation of the police from using the repressive styles used during the apartheid regime, to more cooperative policing that has the will to serve the public. Therefore, the police need to have good crowd management skills as poor crowd control mechanisms can incite violence (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Langa, 2011a; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Twala, 2014). In Banjo

and Jili's (2013) research, 4% of the protesters claimed that sometimes the police were the cause of the violent aspects of protests. Mandel (2002) puts forth that when parties that are involved in conflict retaliate, violence is more likely to escalate. The police's use of aggressive methods to disperse protesters by using teargas and rubber bullets is more likely to result in the protesters responding through violence (Pearce, 2008; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Dawson, 2010; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Twala, 2014).

Tait and Marks (2011) argue that 40% of the victims who are injured during protests were not involved in such marches or demonstrations, as they were just bystanders. The incidents where protesters die due to the involvement of the police, such as the death of a school teacher and community leader, Andries Tatane in Ficksburg, can be considered a tragic example of a peaceful protest which the police responded to aggressively (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Karamoko, 2011). Mandel (2002) indicates that people are more likely to engage in collective violence during protests, when the victim is a leader that they respect. Just like in Tatane's case, the members of the community retaliated with violence following his death (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Karamoko, 2011). The incidents of shooting protesters may make a place ungovernable, instead of restoring order, as it was the case with the death of Tatane. The members of the community started to engage in violence following his death (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011).

In certain instances, the police have been seen to be randomly shooting on protesters. The police also shot at a protester who was running away from them (Sinwell *et al.* 2009). At other times the police have been seen to be shooting and throwing teargas at gatherings of people who were not protesting but were in one place for a particular purpose or holding a meeting (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Twala, 2014). In the case of Marikana, where 36 mine workers were killed during a strike, the autopsies reveal that most of the deceased were shot at the back (Wehmnhoerner, 2012). This research therefore concludes that they were shot while they were running away from the police, hence they were shot at the back. Sebola (2014) considers the police action in Marikana to be a form of police brutality that attracted international publicity.

Breakfast *et al.* (2016) indicate that crowd management can be successful if it is handled by well-trained police officers who are able to communicate with the protesters. During protests, the crowd is already angry, the police in this regard should avoid destructive conflict. Modise, Dlamini, Simelane, Malinga, Mnisi and Ngobeni (2013) state that the crowd controllers need to consider a number of factors when dealing with a crowd that is likely to be violent. They have to find out the motivations behind the gathering, the risks, and the threats that the crowd pose, who the leaders of the crowd are, and the cultural, situational, social, and psychological factors that resulted in the crowd resorting in acts of violence (Modise *et al.*, 2013).

In line with the above paragraph, the police should be trained on how to handle a protesting crowd. When police negotiate with protesters not to damage property during their demonstrations, the community are more likely to see the value of preserving property during protests. They should stop responding with violence to people who are in gatherings and who have not done anything that is violent or showing intentions of engulfing in violent confrontations.

The police can also offer to escort an illegal peaceful protest. Sinwell *et al.* (2009) found that the members of the community did not engage in violence when the police did not act violently towards them but offered them an escort to where they were going, even though they did not apply for the march to take place. This is a good strategy that the police could adopt, they should not just use violence on people who are not acting violently.

Bruce (2011) recommends the police to control crowds that are unarmed or pose no threat by warning them verbally. Moreover, the safety of bystanders should be taken into consideration, in case the police are pushed to use lethal force (Bruce, 2011) as many bystanders have been shot in the process. Furthermore, the challenge of policing protests is not only experienced in South Africa. Other countries have also used mechanisms that resulted in the injury of both the police and the public. In Hamburg, the police used water cannons and teargas to control an angry crowd (Oltermann, 2017), and this fuelled further violence.

Tait and Marks (2011) argue that 40% of the victims who were injured during the protests were not involved in such marches or demonstrations as they were just bystanders. Cronje (2014) notes that the shooting and killing of a number of protesters in a single incident is a clear indication that the police have not been adequately trained to respond to protests. Furthermore, Tait and Marks (2011) state that the police need proper training on how to handle protesting communities. Tait and Marks (2011) recommend the police to take note of the legislation governing the policing of gatherings and the standards of policing that require them to protect the protesting crowds as well as bystanders.

Dawson (2010) recommends that the government should make greater efforts to address the police officers who are called to restore order during the outbreak of violent protests and also to understand how dissidents should be policed from their own perspective. This research puts forth that this will enable the police management to understand the challenges that the police face in the restoration of order. As such, they will be able to develop a crowd control mechanism with the police included. This will ensure compliance of peace restoration, instead of the use of excessive force, as the police themselves will have been involved in the development of crowd management mechanisms.

Schweingruber (2000) recommends the use of “*the negotiated policing style*” instead of escalated force during the eruption of violence. In this policing style, the police have to show a high tolerance for the disruptions that occur during protests (Schweingruber, 2000). In escalated force, the police arrest even those who are not doing anything violent. They do not tolerate even minor disruptions and also use massive arrests. They confront protestors by the use of force and also apply massive force to disperse the protesters.

Smith (2012) advises that the police should react to civil disobedience not with violent tactics, but they should adopt ‘negotiated accommodation’. In ‘negotiated accommodation’, the police engage protesters before or during the time when protests take place. Moreover, the police should allow protesters to secure visibility of their protest. In doing so, they should allow a certain level of disruption, such as temporary road blockages (Smith, 2012), instead of arresting protesters.

Furthermore, Smith (2012) puts forth that the ability of the police to engage in good negotiations will enable them to protect third parties as well as the participants of the protest. They will be able to gather information about the intentions of protesters which will be useful to prevent the outbreak of violence (Smith, 2012). In addition, while favouring engagement in 'negotiated accommodation', the above mentioned author acknowledges that a small number of protesters can cause serious disruptions. In the current study, the participants highlighted that a protest should not be allowed to occur in the first place as it becomes difficult to prevent from turning violent.

9.2.14.6 Punishment of police officers who shoot unarmed citizens

The police should be taught to serve the public and not to fight against it. Bruce (2011) states that the police are able to get away with murder when they have shot unarmed people. They are able to manipulate evidence or temper with the crime scene. Furthermore, the prosecutors are said to "*soft-peddle*" cases against the police who have shot unarmed citizens, simply because they work closely with them (Bruce, 2011). Moreover, the ICD who is tasked to work with such cases has limited financial resources to address the problem (Bruce, 2011). The punishment of the wrong doers can serve as a good lesson on how the police need to conduct themselves during protests. This should be a cooperated effort between the ICD and the prosecutors.

9.3 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

A number of strategies requiring various role players have been recommended (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). Nevertheless, mostly the literature indicates that the government is the one that should play a major role in reducing the motivations of people to engage in collective violence (Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). The government should deal with amongst others inequality, nepotism, corruption, malpractice, unemployment, political infighting, poverty, and the inadequate provision of services. These problems are the ones that are more likely to cause frustration to the people who then vent their frustration on public and private property (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Marais, 2008; Burger, 2009; Dau, 2010; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Disoloane & Lekonyane, 2011; Langa, 2011a; Jili, 2012; Cronje, 2014). Moreover, proper diagnosis of the problem is required

to reduce violent protests (Botes *et al.*, 2007b; Adang, 2011; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Tyabazayo, 2013; SALGA, 2015).

Ramjee and van Donk (2011) state that the structures and the processes in South Africa that people can use to express their voice have failed for those who are in marginalised and impoverished conditions. Furthermore, the government has to recognise that the terms of engagement need both the state and the public to be successful (Maphunye & Mafunisa, 2008; Chenwi & Tissington, 2010; Handmaker, 2010; Ramjee & van Donk, 2011). This can be possible when participatory governance is promoted, as it ensures that there is meaningful engagement between the public and the government, where the concerns of the citizens are also considered in decision making processes and they help by bringing projects that are relevant and needed by the community (Friedman, 2006; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Nyirikindi, 2007; Pretorius & Schurink, 2007; Bauer, 2009; Dawson, 2010; Jenkins, 2010; Mogapi, 2011).

Moreover, participatory governance will be more effective when all the sectors of the society are included, such as the less visible groups (silenced young women and men), marginalised (impoverished communities), and vulnerable groups (the elderly, children, shop owners) (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011). Participatory governance will play a significant role in channelling the citizens to raise their concerns with the government, instead of protesting violently, as it will open doors for communication (Tapscott, 2007; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Mbazira, 2013; Salgado, 2013; van der Merwe, 2013; SALGA, 2015).

Friedman (2006) as well as Mautjana and Makombe (2014) argue that as government officials are there specifically to serve the interest of the community, they should seek to convey choices in a manner that will make the audience understand their options. The citizen's participation, regular communication and access to information between the government and the citizens could be achieved through radios, road shows, *imbizos*, door-to-door campaigns, suggestion boxes, forums, pamphlets or brochures (Barichievy *et al.*, 2005; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Botes *et al.*, 2007b; Pretorius & Schurink, 2007; Mofolo & Smith, 2009; Paradza *et al.*, 2010; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Rasila & Mudau, 2012; Bozo & Hiemer, 2013; Musitha, 2016; Vivier *et al.*, 2018).

Some of these communication methods such as *imbizos*, forums and road shows could be helpful in finding solutions that serve the interests of the community and not the government (Friedman, 2006; Adang, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Rasila & Mudau, 2012; Zama, 2013; Vivier *et al.*, 2015).

The government should acknowledge peaceful protests by making efforts to meet with the protesters before they are encouraged to act in a violent manner and negotiate the possible mechanisms of dealing with their grievances (Oldfield & Stokke, 2006; Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Adang, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Karamoko, 2011; Mogapi, 2011; Mavungu, 2011; Jili, 2012; Mbuyisa, 2013; van der Merwe, 2013). The community leaders should play a significant role by forming a good relationship with the citizens and by meeting with them to discuss the problems and the solutions, instead of dictating to the community on what should be done (Dau, 2010; Musitha, 2016). Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Marais *et al.* (2008), as well as Mofolo and Smith (2009) recognise that a complaints management system within the municipalities can offer the citizens an arena to raise their grievances in an acceptable manner.

Community participation should not be done for the sake of municipalities to be seen as complying to the legislation, as the views of the public should reflect on the implementation of these decisions (Tadesse *et al.*, 2006; Williams, 2007; Booysen, 2009; Dawson, 2010; Chenwi, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Rasila & Mudau, 2012; Matshabaphala, 2014; Mautjana & Makombe, 2014; Makana, 2016). The failure to include the members of the community in decision-making and in implementation has resulted in violent protests. The research of Bernstein and Johnston (2007), Draai and Taylor (2009) as well as Kgatle (2018) point out that decisions are passed without proper consultation with the residents. Demarcation grievances have escalated into violence because the members of the public whose areas were demarcated have not been included in the demarcation of their areas or when included their inputs were not considered in the final decision (Cameroon, 2006; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Botes, 2011; Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Matebesi & Botes, 2011; Mavungu, 2011; Kanyane *et al.*, 2017). Matebesi and Botes (2011) advise the government to revisit its role in demarcation as well as in boundary dispute processes and also establish a partnership with the community to get their views.

The police's use of aggressive methods of using teargas and rubber bullets to disperse protesters is more likely to result in protesters responding through violence (Pearce, 2008; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Dawson, 2010; Bandeira & Higson-Smith, 2011; Karamoko, 2011; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Twala, 2014). Schweingruber (2000), Bruce (2011) and Smith (2012) advise the police to react to civil disobedience not with violent tactics, but to adopt 'negotiated accommodation', by engaging the protesters before or during the time when the protests take place. The police need to be trained on good crowd management, as poor crowd control mechanisms can incite violence (Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Banjo & Jili, 2013; Netswera & Kgalane, 2014; Twala, 2014). Seferiades and Johnston (2012) argue that the process of obtaining formal permits to protest plays a role in moderating protests from escalating into violence. When people are granted permission, they will be in charge of their own behaviour. Workshops could be held to familiarise people with regard to the RGA (Act 205 of 1993).

CHAPTER TEN

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

10.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the summary, conclusions as well as the recommendations that this study makes. The recommendations are made based on the findings of this study and the literature review. This study explored the motivational factors for the people in Malamulele and Vuwani for engaging in violent protests. Violent protests are prohibited by Section 8(6) of the RGA (Act. 205 of 1993) as well as by the Constitution of the RSA, 1996, Section 17. The above-mentioned Acts prohibit people from assembling and presenting petitions while armed or in any other violent manner. They are allowed to assemble, demonstrate, picket or present petitions in a peaceful manner while unarmed (RSA Constitution, 1996).

10.2 MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY

The following are the major findings of this study:

10.2.1 Peaceful protests tend to become violent because of:

- Lack of consultation and unresponsive governance;
- Violent protests serve as communication that attracts the government's response;
- Personal interests and criminal intentions (the opportunity to loot) encourage peaceful protests to become violent.

10.2.2 Causes of violent protests were:

- Government's failure to adequately consult community members with regard to the demarcation of their areas;
- Personal interest and the opportunity to loot that protests presented;

- Violent protests are the only means to attract government's response, it is a communication strategy;
- Unresponsive governance to grievances that are pointed out through peaceful protests, such as submitting memos;
- Unfulfilled promises by the government to the citizens;
- Poverty and unemployment;
- Lack of service delivery;
- Anger and frustrations.

10.2.3 Factors that encouraged the destruction of properties during protests were:

- Lack of interest in education and unemployment;
- Government's failure to listen to grievances;
- Community members' lack of knowledge in addressing grievances;
- Violent protests are adopted from the apartheid struggles;
- Burning of property is not planned, it just happens spontaneously;
- Influence from the media.

10.2.4 Who protesters are punishing by destroying community properties

- They were punishing the government and themselves;
- They were punishing the government only;
- Only the community is punished by destroying properties.

10.2.5 Achievements of violent protests were:

- Violent protests were only regarded as a success when the government came down to listen to the people's grievances.
- Violent protests have been said to not have achieved any goal as community properties were destroyed.

10.2.6 Response of protesters to the destruction of government property

- Protestors regretted their actions only after engaging in collective violence;
- Protestors feel they have registered their grievances.

10.2.7 The use of collective violence as a tool

- Collective violence works in some situations and not in others;
- Collective violence can be an effective tool to force outcomes;
- Police response to protests results in violence.

10.2.8 Prevention of the destruction of property

- Community involvement in projects and educating people about the value of community properties;
- People could be shown the impact of protesting violently;
- The government should not implement decisions in communities without proper consultation and meaningful engagement;
- Politicians should refrain from making empty promises;
- The opportunity to participate in decision-making should be opened equally to all members of the society;
- The government should respond quicker to grievances;
- Children could be taught at a young age not to destroy community property;
- The police could play a role in minimising peaceful protests from turning violent.

10.2.9 Mechanisms to channel people to peaceful protests

- Addressing grievances at first step;
- Refraining from making empty promises;
- Constant engagement with communities;
- Educating people about the value of community property;
- Punishing people who engage or encourage public violence during protests;

- Workshops for politicians such as ward councillors should be held to teach them to tolerate each other, instead of using their political differences to cause rifts among community members.

10.2.10 The aftermath of violent protests

- The property that helps the community gets destroyed;
- Violent protests affect the economy;
- Children are exposed to bad weather conditions at school;
- Children engage in delinquent behaviour and also learn to be violent.

10.3 Recommendations

The recommendations are based on the findings of this study as well as on the findings from the literature. van der Merwe (2013) argues that people resort to physical violence when they feel that the doors for communication are closed. This study therefore recommends that the government through ward councillors should try by all means not to implement decisions in communities that are not favoured by the majority to avoid frustrations that may escalate to collective violence. Moreover, workshops could be held for the public, ward committees, NGOs and other stakeholders to give them information about the new services that have been introduced (Mofolo & Smith, 2009). This will reduce the need for the community to fight the government through violent protests, as they will be aware of what is happening in their community. Community members could also be given an opportunity to choose what suits them best, instead of the government choosing what it believes is best for the community.

Cameroon (2006) as well as Kanyane *et al.* (2017) indicate that the challenge in demarcation is that people are given limited time to make comments on the proposal. The members of the society also do not understand how the process of demarcation works. Furthermore, Cameroon (2006) states that the people fail to acknowledge that the MDB is not bound to consider the proposals that people make when determining boundaries, when these proposals do not conform to the Board's framework. In this regard, meaningful engagement and consultation should occur before implementation.

Falch (2008) and Manala (2010) suggest that for peace and stability to be achieved in the community, the state power should be inclusive and the opportunity to participate should be opened equally to all the members of the society. When people are allowed to participate in government matters, the motivations to engage in violent protests will be reduced.

Furthermore, the government officials should fulfil the promises that they make during the election campaigns. In addition, the politicians such as councillors should be workshopped so that they learn to tolerate each other, instead of using their political differences to cause rifts among community members. When decisions are taken, proper consultation should be done. As soon as community members show signs of engaging in protests, the government should try to find the cause of the grievance and respond to it immediately before the situation escalates into violence. Görgens and van Donk (2011) identify NGOs to be important in curbing violent protests, as they can serve as watchdogs on government activities, by monitoring government performance so that the government can be accountable to the citizens that put them in power.

10.4 CONCLUSIONS

While corruption was highlighted as the cause of violent protests (Atkinson, 2007; Bernstein & Johnston, 2007; Burger, 2009; Kotze & Taylor, 2010; Kirsten & von Holdt, 2011; Goldstone, 2012; Managa, 2012; von Holdt & Alexander, 2012; Akinboade *et al.*, 2013; Banjo & Jili, 2013), there was no mention of it in the study area. Instead, the participants mentioned the following to be the causes of collective violence in the study area: unresponsive governance and lack of consultation; violence used as a communication tool; personal interest, criminal intentions, and opportunity; poverty and unemployment; lack of service delivery; anger and frustrations.

In this study, some participants mentioned that the violent protests have been copied from the apartheid period. Bloom (1996) as well as della Porta and Diani (2006) put forth that when people have used a strategy and it worked before, they will use it again. Hence, the participants in this study thought of using strategies that were used in the past. Some studies have also reported the emergence of xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals (Burger & Omar, 2009; Sinwell *et al.*, 2009; Bandeira & Higson-

Smith, 2011; Dlamini *et al.*, 2011; Fakir & Moloi, 2011; Molapo & Ngubeni, 2011; Ngwane, 2011; von Holdt, 2011a; Mottiar & Bond, 2012; Lekaba, 2014), however, the participants in this study did not mention any xenophobic occurrences.

Using Hough's (2008) explanation about relative deprivation, this research argues that because Malamulele was the first to engage in collective violence in the fight for a standalone municipality and managed to get it, when people from Vuwani failed to get the government to demerge them from Malamulele through memorandums and peaceful protests, they saw it as relative deprivation. As such, Vuwani also engaged in collective violence to make their collective demand for a demerger from Malamulele to be heard. SALGA (2015) and Kanyane (2017) highlight ethnicity to be an issue that affected the municipal demarcation in Malamulele and Vuwani. Even though ethnicity is an issue in the demarcation of the study areas as indicated by the authors above, Kanyane *et al.* (2017) put forth that the demarcation processes were able to bring the communities together, especially those that were separated by the apartheid system on racial grounds.

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ANNEXURE A: LETTER OF CONSENT

LETTER OF CONSENT

Dear Participant

A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS IN MALAMULELE AND VUWANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE.
--

My name is Olinda Ruth Chabalala, and I am registered with the University of Limpopo. I am doing research on the above-mentioned topic in fulfilment for the requirement of a PhD Degree in Criminology.

For participating in this study, please note the following:

- Participation is absolutely voluntary, and you are allowed to withdraw at any time if you do not wish to continue with this study.
- Your responses are confidential, and your name will not be disclosed to anyone.
- Your responses will also not be linked to your name; the researcher will respect your right to anonymity.
- There is no obvious psychological and physical harm associated with participating in this study.

If you are willing to participate in this study, please tick in the appropriate box:

The nature of this study has been explained to me by the researcher	Yes	No
I was not forced to be part of this study, I participated willingly	Yes	No
I give consent to the audio recording of the discussions	Yes	No
I was told of my right to withdraw my participation at any time if I do not wish to continue anymore and that there is no penalty for my withdrawal	Yes	No
I give consent to the researcher to publish the findings, without revealing my identity	Yes	No

Yours sincerely

Ms Chabalala OR

Participant's signature

ANNEXURE B: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE GUIDE

<p>A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS IN MALAMULELE AND VUWANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE.</p>

SECTION A

1. Why do some protests that start off peacefully turn violent?
2. What were the causes of violent protests at Malamulele and Vuwani?
3. Why do community members destroy properties that serve the community such as schools and libraries to achieve a goal?
4. Are protesters hitting out at the government when they destroy government property during protests?
5. What do communities feel they have achieved by protesting violently?
6. How do protesters feel when they see buildings being destroyed?
7. Can collective violence be used as a productive tool to achieve desired goals?
8. What do you think can be done to prevent the destruction of property?
9. Which mechanisms that can be used to channel residents to peaceful protesting?

Thank you for your cooperation

XIYENGENKULU C: PAPILA RA MPFUMELELO

PAPILA RA MPFUMELELO

Eka munghenelwa

**NDZAVISISO WA SWIVANGELO LESWI HLOHLOTELAKA SWIVILELO SWA
MADZOLONGA EKA MALAMULELE NA LE VUWANI, EXIFUNDZENINKULU
XA LIMPOPO.**

Vito ndzi Olinda Ruth Chabalala. Ndzi xichudeni eYunivhesithi ya Limpopo, naswona ndzi endla ndzavisiso hi nhlokomhaka leyi yi nga laha henhla leswi ku nga ku hetisisa Digiri ya Dyondzo-Criminology ya PhD.

Vanghenelwa va dyondzo leyi va fanele ku lemuka leswi landzelaka:

- Ku ngenela dyondzo leyi a swi bohi naswona ma pfumeleriwa ku tihumesa nkarhi wun'wana ni wun'wana loko mi nga ha tsakeli ku ya emahlweni na dyondzo leyi.
- Tihlamulo ta n'wina ti tekiwa tanihi xihundla naswona vito ra n'wina a ri nga humeseriwi ehandle hambi ko va njani.
- Tihandlakambirhi tihlamulo ta n'wina a ti nga hlanganisiwi na vito ra n'wina hikuva mulavisisi u ta hlonipha mfanelo yo hlayisa vito ra n'wina tanihi xihundla.
- A ku na ku vaviseka emiehleketweni kumbe emirini loko nga erivaleni loku yelanisiwaka ni ku ngenela ka n'wina eka ndzavisiso lowu.

Loko u tsakela ku ngenela ndzavisiso lowu, kombisa hi ku veleka gwaju ethlelo ka nhlamulo leyi u hlawulaka yona:

Mulavisisi u ndzi hlamuserile xikongomelonkulu xa ndzavisiso lowu	Ina	E-e
A ndzi sindzisiwangi ku teka xiphemu eka ndzavisiso, ndzi ngenela hi ku tsakela ka mina	Ina	E-e
Ndza pfumelela ku va mbhurisano wa hina na vanghenelwa kuloni wu kandziyisiwa	Ina	E-e
Ndzi hlamuseriwile hi lunghelo ra mina ro ni nga teka xiboho xo ka ni nga ha yi emahlweni na ndzavisiso lowu nkarhi wun'wana na wun'wana loko ni nga ha ri na ntsakelo naswona a ku na xigwevo xo endla tano	Ina	E-e
Ndzi nyika mulavisisi mpfumelelo wo paluxa ndzavisiso lowu kambe a nga humeseli ehandle vuxokoxoko bya mina	Ina	E-e

We wena loyi a tshembhekaka

Ms Chabalala OR

Nsayino wa munghenelwa

XIYENGENKULU D: SWILETELO SWA NHLOKISISO

NDZAVISISO WA SWIVANGELO LESWI HLOHLOTELAKA SWIVILELO SWA MADZOLONGA EKA MALAMULELE NA LE VUWANI, EXIFUNDZENINKULU XA LIMPOPO.

XIYENGE A

1. Hikokwalaho ka yini ku kombisa ku vilela kun'wana ku sungula hi ku rhula ivi ku hela hi madzolonga?
2. Xana hi swihi swivangelo swa ku kombisa ku vilela swa madzolonga eka Malamulele na le Vuwani?
3. Hikokwalaho ka yini swirho swa miganga swi onha tinhundzu leti tirhelaka miganga ku fana ni swikolo na tilayiburari hi xikongomelo xo humelerisa xikongomelo xa vona?
4. Xana vakombisakuvilela va vavisa mfumo loko va onha nhundzu ya mfumo hi nkarhi wa ku kombisa ku vilela?
5. Xana mi vona mi fikelela yini loko mi endla ku kombisa ku vilela hi ndlela ya madzolonga?
6. Xana mi ti twa njhani loko mi vona miako yi ri karhi yi onhiwa?
7. Xana madzolongantlawa ya nga tirhisiwa tanihi xitirho xo fikelela swikongomelo leswi lavekaka?
8. Xana mi vona leswaku ku nga endliwa yini ku sivela ku onhiwa ka nhundzu hi nkarhi wa ku kombisa ku vilela?
9. Xana ku nga tekiwa magoza muni yo hlohlotela vaaki leswaku va kombisa ku vilela handle ka madzolonga?

Ntirhisano wa n'wina wa nkhesiwa

SIATARI-NYENGEDZEDZWA LA E: LUŊWALO LWA THENDELO LUŊWALO LWA THENDELO

Kha Mudzheneleli

**THODISISO YA ZWITUTUWEDZI ZWA MIGWALABO YA DZIKHAKHATHI
MALAMULELE NA VUWANI, VUNDUNI LA LIMPOPO.**

Dzinga Janga ndi Olinda Ruth Chabalala. Ndi khou ita thodisiso yo disendekaho nga thoho yo bulwaho afho ntha hu u todou fusha thodea dza digiri ya PhD kha Criminology.

Uri vha dzhenelele kha thodisiso ino, vha humbelwa uri vha dzhieze nzhele zwi tevhelaho:

- U dzhenelele kha thodisiso a zwi kombetshedzwi, vhone vhane vha tou nanga nahone vho tendelwa u dibvisa tshifhinga tshinwe na tshinwe arali vha pfa vha si tsha funa u bvela phanda na thodisiso ino.
- Phindulo dzavho ndi tshidzumbe nahone dzina javho a li nga do bulwa kha muthu na muthihi.
- Phindulo dzavho a dzi nga do livhanywa na dzina javho, mutodisise u do thonifha ppanelo yavho ya u dzumba vhune havho.
- A hu na khuvhalo i vhone lwa muhumbulo kana lwa nama yo badekanywaho na uyo ane a do dzhenelele kha ngudo ino.

Arali vha tshi khou takalela u shela mulenzhe kha ino tshodiso, kha vha zwi sumbedze kha kubogisi kwo teaho afho fhasi:

Muṭodiso o ṅalutshedzwa nga ha mvelo ya tshodiso yawe.	Ehe	Hai
A tho ngo kombetshedzwa u shela mulenzhe kha ino tshodiso, ṅe muṅe ndo tou nanga u dzhenelela.	Ehe	Hai
Ndi ṅea thendelo ya uri ipfi ṅa ṅi rekhodiwe musi ndi kha nyambedzano na muṭodiso.	Ehe	Hai
Ndo vhudzwa uri ndi na pfanelo ya u dibvisa kha ino tshodiso tshifhinga tshinwe na tshinwe tshine nda pfa uri a thi tsha funa u bvela phanda na u shela mulenzhe kha tshodiso na uri a hu nga vhi na masiandaitwa a si avhudi kha ṅe arali nda dibvisa kha tshodiso.	Ehe	Hai
Ndi ṅea muṭodiso thendelo ya u andadza mawanwa a tshodiso fhedzi vhuṅe vhu ha tshidzombe.	Ehe	Hai

Wavho

Tsaino ya Mudzheneleli

SIATARI-NYENGEDZEDZWA LA F: MBUZISO DZA INTHAVIUWU

**ṬHOḌISISO YA ZWỊTỤTỤWEDZI ZWA MIGWALABO YA DZIKHAKHATHI
MALAMULELE NA VUWANI, VUNDUNI LA LIMPOPO.**

KHETHEKANYO YA A

1. Ndi ngani migwalabo i tshi thoma nga mulalo ya vho fhela nga dzikhakhathi?
2. Zwivhango zwa migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi Malamulele na Vuwani ndi zwifhio?
3. Ndi ngani vhadzulapo vha tshi tshinyadza zwiimiswa zwi shumelaho lushaka sa zwikolo na dzịlaiburari u swikelela ndivho dza migwalabo yavho?
4. Vhagwalabi vha vho livhanya tshinyadzo iyo ya ndaka nga kha vhugwalabi havho kha muvhuso?
5. Vhagwalabi vha vhona hu na zwifhio zwe vha swikelela nga kha migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi?
6. Vhagwalabi vha dipfa hani musi vha tshi vhona ndaka kana zwiimiswa zwo tshinyadzwa nga migwalabo yavho ya dzikhakhathi?
7. Vha vhona dzikhakhathi i ndila ya khwinesa kha u swikelela thodea dzine vhadzulapo vha gwalabela dzone?
8. Vha vhona hu tshi nga itwa mini u thivhela u tshinyadzwa ha ndaka?
9. Ndi afhio maga ane a nga tevhezwa hu u todou swikelela migwalabo ya mulalo?

Ndi a livhuwa tshumisano yavho.

ANNEXURE G: INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS

PARTICIPANT ONE

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...We wrote a memorandum...there was no response **[thereafter?]**...we called the premier...instead of coming...he delegated someone...**[Is it a problem for the premier to delegate?]**...no...but...we wanted to speak to him **[Why specifically him?]**...We wanted him to come and hear our grievances...**[and then?]**...about 10 000 people attended the meeting...where we expected the premier to come and hear our grievances...there was no damage that was done after this meeting...we...then called the president...**[Then what happened?]**...but he also did not come...we went to High Court...**[For?]**...to object the incorporation into Malamulele...**[why?]**...because we were not consulted about the incorporation...**[Can you explain the violence that took place in your area?]**...Violence only occurred after the offices...that we sought help from failed us...**[WHAT WERE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...The court did not favour us on the objection...on incorporating us to Malamulele...what made us not to favour the incorporation with...Malamulele is that...during their protests...they set boundaries when they protested for their municipality...They did not want any Venda speaking person...to set a foot...in their area...when Vuwani was incorporated into Malamulele...we were not in good terms with them...as such we had to show our disapproval of being incorporated in their municipality...**[How did you show this disapproval?]**...The anger in response to the court's objection...escalated into violence...where schools...shops and even the police station were shut down...main roads were barricaded...**[Is that all?]**...the strong police car that they use to respond to protests...was burned and...shops were also destroyed...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...Not everyone likes going to school...(the participant coughs and thereafter continues)...those who are not interested in school...are the ones that burn schools during protests...**[why do you think they lack interest in school?]**...They even sent messages to the principals...announcing their intention to burn the school...because...they do not like going to school...they do not feel any pain of burning them...but focus on stealing food

available at school for feeding scheme...**[why are you against the incorporation?]**...The big concern that Vuwani people had...is that **we were not consulted**...(strong emphasis was made on consultation)...when the government decided to incorporate us into Malamulele...but we are not the ones that requested a municipality...when Malamulele went to court...they did not qualify to have their own municipality...they only qualified when Vuwani was included in their municipality...**[Even though you were not consulted, why did you find it difficult to agree to the incorporation?]**...Because teachers...from Vuwani were prevented to go to work in Malamulele...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...When people burn properties...the government feels the pain...but little do they realise that they are in turn putting themselves at a disadvantage...for example...the FNB (First National Bank) moved away after it was burned in Vuwani...small businesses which benefited as they saved transport money to go to town...to deposit a small amount of money...are forced to accrue expenses on transport to deposit money in town...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...The community did not achieve anything...but instead suffered loss...because properties have been burned...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...During the time the buildings are set alight...there are no feelings of pain...when someone is playing soccer...and gets injured...there is no feeling of pain at that moment...the pain is felt after when the person is relaxing...even with us...we felt the pain only after the buildings were burned...especially when we wanted to use them...the bank where people used to go and deposit money...without having to pay for transport is closed...we feel pain now because we have to incur financial expenses...when we go to town...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...Yes...it makes people to respond in time...those in authority are crisis driven...they are more likely to respond...when there is a crisis...unlike when there is none...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...Community members should be involved in construction...(the participant paused for a minute) **[How will this prevent the destruction?]**...It will make them feel a sense of ownership...they should be hired to work on such projects...even tomorrow..they will know that such properties belong to them...**[is that so?]**...protesters cannot destroy

old schools...because they were built by their own hands...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...I think the biggest mechanism to ensure that protests are going peacefully...is to address challenges in the first step...the grievances should be addressed...even before people can think of protesting...because a protest may turn out to be violent...**[what else can be done?]**...municipalities should provide resolution at first resort...before people take further steps...of seeking the help of the court.

PARTICIPANT TWO

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...There was no response from the government...(paused for a minute) ...we wanted the premier to come down here...to listen to the concerns of his people...**[then what happened?]**...We became angry because of this treatment and things got out of hand...where properties have been damaged...by angry people...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...The inclusion of Vuwani into the new...Lim 345...that was done without consulting us...**[Suppose you were consulted, would you have supported the incorporation?]**...No...**[So what purpose will the consultation have served?]**...We would have raised our concerns...before they took a decision...that now makes us look like bad people...in the news...people hear about the bad deeds the community committed...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...As for Vuwani...the Municipal Demarcation Board took the decision to incorporate Vuwani into Malamulele...without consulting us...(the participant was busy scratching his head)...Just like I have said earlier...if consultation had taken place...about the decision...some people would have not found the opportunity...to loot and burn buildings...we would have objected the decision from the onset...by taking such a decision...and failing to listen...to the objection....some people found an opportunity to enrich themselves...**[How did they enrich themselves?]**...They looted food...and other valuables...**[Are you saying looting was wrong?]**...Definitely...the idea was not to benefit through looting...but to show the government that...we are not happy about their decisions...now the looting makes us look like...the purpose was to gain and not to demonstrate...aahhh this

government of ours...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING OUT AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...The government is being punished...especially when we block and burn roads...**[Why do you say so?]**...the government has to replace these damaged roads...it was done also to get the attention from the office of the premier...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...Nothing...but the message has been sent...to the government...even though they failed to listen...to the concerns of the community...when we objected the incorporation of Vuwani to Malamulele...even after concerns have been raised (the participant was busy touching his chin)...the Municipal Demarcation board did not reverse the decision...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...Destroying of the buildings was meant to hurt the government...and the supporters of LIM 345...both the government and the supporters felt the pain...**[Why do you think the government felt the pain?]**...They had to allocate further funds...to replace the damaged property caused by their ignorance...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...No...collective violence does not work...because by engaging in violence... people are transgressing rules...the protests did not achieve anything...we are still incorporated with Malamulele...which is **dysfunctional**...(the participant's tone when he said dysfunctional it sounded like he was mocking Lim 345)...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...The government should show people the impact of protesting violently...and at the same time tighten security measures...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...Politicians should avoid making empty political promises...**[Why do you say so?]**...When politicians want to win votes..they promise the impossible...they promise to take the people...to paradise...by delivering excellent services...political promises are very dangerous...people stick to them...constant engagement with members of the community can work...people will have a platform...to tell the government of their expectations...on the other hand...the government should try its level best to meet the expectations quickly.

PARTICIPANT THREE

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...Concerns of third parties...**[Why do you say so?]**...Third parties have different concerns...to the ones that the community have...you must remember that...in protests...there are people who benefit from them...some people will benefit...while some lose...as such they take hold of protests...they want to sabotage or...discredit the struggle...**[WHAT WERE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...During protests you have people whom you do not know...as the leader...these people have different agendas...to the one that the community have...as such protests go into a different dimension...from the ones that were initially planned...**community leaders and leaders of the protests do not call people to vandalise...or to burn properties** (the participant's tone was strong on this emphasis)...then who are the people who come with these agendas? (the participant asked a rhetoric question)...these people who want to pursue their own agenda...are responsible for the violent acts that occurred in Vuwani...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...What I can say is that lack of education and unemployment...results in people damaging properties during protests...people who are hopeless...may join the struggle...such people have no knowledge of the damage...that they cause (stopped and looked at the surroundings)...for example...when community members are fighting for something...and end up damaging properties...such as tractors...tomorrow...the very same people will be complaining about the roads...which are not cleaned (the informant paused to clear his throat)...The tools that are supposed to clean the roads...have been damaged during a moment of anger...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...They are punishing themselves...**[why do you say so?]**...when government schools are burned...children are punished...leaders take their children to private schools...Information gets destroyed along the way...when schools are burned...**[What else?]**...Children have to learn under the trees...and exposed to bad weather conditions...such as rainy days...and heat...frustrations that people encounter when raising issues...can lead them into burning schools...**[WHAT DO**

COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]...The main objectives of protests are not to destroy properties...but to achieve a goal...for example...torching a school does not make communities achieve their goals...protests that turn into violence are those that started a long time ago...without getting the necessary attention...when the government comes to address the community...it gives them false hope...as such...community members vent their frustrations...by engaging in violence...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...Witnessing the burning of buildings is what I regret even today...**[why do you regret?]**...If you are a true leader...**You cannot allow communities...under your leadership to engage in that...**(the participant put more emphasis on this)...if you burn buildings...what will happen after the protests...Look at the weather today (it was a chilly weather)...it is cold...imagine learners having to learn in this weather without a roof...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...No...it cannot work...people did not get what they are looking for...even though they burned schools...I understand that the government is crisis driven...they are more likely to respond to crisis...but burning government properties should be discouraged...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...Local leadership should be allowed to give...a...direction...if there is no direction...protests are likely to occur...for example...in Vuwani...the task team that was leading the protests was disbanded...**[Would it have been possible for the task team to prevent the situation from escalating into violence?]**...At least they would have talked to the people...the extent of the violence would have been reduced...**[Really?]**...one voice...under one leadership...help to make things simpler...**[Which mechanisms that can be used to channel residents to peaceful protesting?]**...Sometimes it is not the community members that we should pay attention to...focus should also be on the authorities...**[Why should focus placed on authorities?]**...they are part of the problem...who create problems and fail to resolve them...the authorities should be proactive about the community concerns...and intervene in the situation...**[What else can you tell me?]**...There is high pregnancy rate of grade 9 to 12 learners...these learners had nothing to do during the time...when the schools were burned and...thereby engaged in sexual activities...the community is bleeding due to unplanned pregnancies...you see (pointing to a learner who was passing by and being

pregnant)...these children are still young to be mothers....children have also changed...they are violent than before because of these violent protests.

PARTICIPANT FOUR

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...When the community demands something...from the government...and the government takes time to respond to the request (the participant paused for a minute while looking at his phone) ...the community loses trust in the government and starts to engage in violent protestation...People think that the government is in a comfort zone..it needs to be shaken...**[how can the government be shaken]**...by burning properties so that they can come down to respond...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...When the government takes time to respond to grievances...people lose temper and resort to violence...to force the government to respond...**[Why do they resort to violence instead of other methods?]**...There are political agendas to be achieved...during protests...**[Why do they use protests to achieve political agendas?]**...Some people put certain people in the forefront of the protests...so that they can incite violence...that will result in their personal gain...this is politics hey...you will only benefit...if you know how to play your cards...and not just playing...but playing very well...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...Violent protests have been adopted from the ANC government during the apartheid struggles...when they were fighting the apartheid government...after these fights...people have not been taught the proper way of addressing grievances...they think burning properties...schools...clinics will make them achieve their goals....they forget that by burning properties...they are the ones losing...you see this economy of ours is something else man...once the economy goes down due to such practices...it will be difficult for it to pick up...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...People hold negative perceptions...by thinking that burning government property will make the government respond quicker...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...They think the government is at comfort zone...it needs to be

shaken...(using his arms to demonstrate the shaking)...property has to be burnt...so that the government can come and listen to people's grievances...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...At the time, we feel it is right...collectively...but individually...tjooo...when we are alone...hey...we feel the pain...it is like a knife penetrating inside the heart...there is no normal person who feels good after burning government properties...it is painful to us when we realise that properties that is supposed to be helping us...are burnt...like the burning of schools...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...Violent protests do not achieve goals...because when you are fighting for a tar road...and you burn schools...the government gives you the tar road...the violence has not paid off...because you still have to wait for the schools to be refurbished...after getting what you were looking for...to me this is not a victory...it takes time for the government to replace properties that are destroyed during protests...the community suffers while waiting for the replacement or refurbishment...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...I think people (scratching his head)...should be taught politically...what to do when they have grievances...to which the government is failing to respond...**[How should this teaching take place?]**...During community meetings...people should be taught not to destroy community properties... as it takes time for the government to supply them with such resources...eish...the community will suffer while waiting for the replacement or refurbishment...at school level...children should be taught at young age that government properties should never be destroyed...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...I think structures within the community leadership...such as councillors are the mouthpiece of the community...as such the community should be taught... how to use them...to convey dissatisfactions...there should be engagement...between different political structures...as the government is made of different political structures...if they allow grievances to escalate to an extent where people burn buildings...by the time they get response..buildings are already destroyed and it is extremely difficult to replace or refurbish such damaged buildings...

PARTICIPANT FIVE

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...The marches started peacefully...as the intention was never to damage properties...but to demand a municipality...when the request of the municipality was not honoured...the members...of the community decided to block the entry points...to Malamulele...there was a total shut down...where outsiders were prohibited to enter...and those from Malamulele were not allowed to go out of the township...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...Protests start with people who have common goals...along the way...some develop their own interest...which has a criminal element in it... such as stealing in shops...**[Why do you say so?]**...before they burned shops...they start by looting...(the participant paused for a minute)...I think the purpose was no longer about protests...but to commit crime...(the participant was busy biting a tooth pick) ...another opportunity to commit crime was in the stealing of school properties...and then setting the school alight...to link the events to protests...I can say burning of schools after stealing properties...also serves to destroy evidence...that may link perpetrators to the crime...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...Leaders do not listen...to the concerns of the community quickly...people come into a situation where they think blocking roads... and damaging direction signage boards...will get them the attention they need from leaders...**[But, does it work?]**...Once this is done...it is then that politicians come to listen to the concerns...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING OUT AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...Aaah... for me...I think...by burning properties...they are not punishing the government...but themselves...**[Is that so?]**...For example...when they want a clinic and burn schools...they are punishing themselves...because when the clinic is built...the government still has to refurbish the damaged school...this causes the problem of more backlogs...in terms of the services that is to be provided to them...by fixing one problem...another one has been created...**[What do communities feel they have achieved by protesting violently?]**...To gauge if we have achieved our goals or not...we think we have achieved a goal...when politicians come down...to attend to our needs...if the concerned office...comes to address the

needs of the community..we feel we have achieved a goal...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...Just because their wish was not fulfilled...they were using emotions...and not thinking straight...they are doing the acts in anger...they think this can be a solution...to draw the attention of leadership...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...As I have indicated...violent protest is attached to criminality...**[Why do you think so?]**...People plan to strike...but...cannot plan to destroy buildings beforehand...it happens when they are on the scene...**collective violence does not work** (the participant put strong emphasis on this)...it is criminals who plan to use protests...to achieve their criminal intentions...violent activities that people engage in do not benefit the community...but take it backward...**[Why do you think so?]**...If people are looking for a clinic and burn schools...(paused for few seconds)...this is one step forward and three steps backward...as this hinders the progress of the community...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...*Vanhu va fanele va lemukisiwa leswaku ku kombisa ku vilela loku ku katsaku madzolongwa...ku va ttherisela endzhaku eka ku phakeriwa ka vukhorhokeri...*(People should be alerted that protesting violently takes them backward in terms of service delivery)...Those who are put in office by the community...such as councillors...should listen to the concerns of the community...they should be accountable...**[How should they account?]**...Politicians should refrain from making empty promises...as these lead to violent protests...*vanhu va lava ku vona switshembiso leswi swi nga endliwa hi nkarhi wa nhlawulo swi humelele...varhangeri va tshembhisa vanhu tilo na misava...va tlhela va tsandzeka ku humelerisa switshembiso swa vona...*(people want to see the promises that are made during political campaigns become a reality. During these campaigns, leaders promise people heaven and earth, but fail to fulfil these promises)...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...People must be educated that buildings should not be burned...because they belong to them....community members should be taught when they are in large numbers...such as imbizos...mayoral and MEC *imbizos*...because these are public participation forums...office barriers can also call people within their jurisdiction...to teach them proper manners of handling grievances...

PARTICIPANT SIX

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENTLY?]...Yaaah...some people come to protest without understanding the grievances...these people are the ones who found an opportunity...to loot shops and...hide behind the protests...people who strike...tend to infringe on the rights of others...**[Why do you say so?]**...For example...closing schools...and...stopping people from going to work...people tend to hinder progress...**[how?]**...by putting on hold things that are not related to the protest...a hospital cannot stop to function...because people want to protest...people cannot decide when to fall sick...or give birth...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...I blame the protests on the government...they should have listened to the concerns of the community...because...they decided not to listen...violence that was costly occurred...**[Why do you say it was costly]**...Infrastructures were destroyed along the way...schools burned...tar roads damaged...if only the government could have listened...the protests would have not escalated into violence...tractors were burned... because of poor service delivery...by Thulamela Municipality...people became angry and burned things that they associated with Thulamela Municipality's failure to deliver adequate services...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...There is this belief that for government to hear you... you must destroy properties...(while rubbing hands)...there is a belief that government responds quicker...only when properties have been burned...**[Is that so?]**...This has proven to work...because once the properties have been burned...politicians come down to hear the concerns of the people...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING OUT AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...The communities are punishing themselves...people tend to hinder progress when they stop things that are not related to the protests...for example...when you are seeking a municipality...and burn a school...the budget that was supposed to be used for...(pause for few minutes)...what you are crying for...can be used to refurbish the school... all I can say is...community members...are the ones who suffer great loss...when people protest violently...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...Jaa...in our own

terms...we think we have achieved our goals...the minute the government responds...after violent protests...by so doing...the government...(pause for few seconds)...proves the perception to be correct...that to be heard...you need to destroy government properties...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...The protestors feel that they have registered their grievances...with the government...**[really?]**...it serves as a memorandum...that will reach the government to respond...they regard burning of buildings as the last resort for their grievances...When they see a place burning...they think the protest is moving forward...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...Activities that people engage in...do not benefit the community...they hinders progress...people should learn to be patient...the properties that they burn today...will be needed tomorrow...you burn a clinic today...because you need a school...tomorrow you have a sore throat...where will you go...it takes the community backward...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...The government should not underestimate the capacity of people...but...should respond quicker...before destruction takes place...even when people are few...they can be able to cause destruction...as such...the police should not underestimate few numbers of people...**[why?]**...well...it does not need a large number of people to torch or to destroy property...the government should respond quicker...before people start thinking of destroying property...they should also deploy police...to protect public properties...that are likely to be destroyed in the process...such as schools...as they seem to be the targets of protests...in many communities...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...I think the best way is awareness...people should know that government properties...belong to them and they...should treat them as such.... they should be taught that...when they are looking for something...destruction of properties is not the best mechanism...those who openly destroy properties...should be punished...to set an example...that destroying of properties will not be tolerated...

PARTICIPANT SEVEN

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]

...People think that being violent..is the only language that the government understands... **[Why do you say so?]**...People feel that they are taken for granted...the government is not taking them seriously when they submit their grievances...the government has a tendency of delaying responses...especially when it comes to addressing the grievances of the society...this makes people to be impatient...people only want their demands to be addressed...when they feel nothing is being done...they become frustrated and start to be violent...to draw the attention they need...they believe that it is only when they are violent that their grievances will be addressed quickly...there are also people who have hidden agendas...**[Why do you say so?]**...These people find an opportunity to fulfil their desires...and hide behind protests...these are the people who encourage protests to become violent...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**

...Some people saw the opportunity to destroy government property...and loot shops because they were hungry...the exact cause of people to become violent...is not clear...but I suspect that people from outside Malamulele are responsible for the protests to turn violently...**[Why do you say so?]**...These people might have influenced the protests to become violent...for their personal gains...**[What type of gains?]**...Looting in the shops...they might have come and pretended to be part of the struggle...while their intentions were to steal from the shops...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**

...People believe that it is only when they destroy something...that is connected to the government...that will make the government to meet their demands...and respond quickly...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...When we destroy properties...we are hitting at the government and ourselves...the properties are there to serve us...destruction of properties affect both the citizens and the government...the funny part...about destroying public properties...is that...those in power do not use them...only those who destroy these properties rely on them...it is the very same thing as shooting yourself in the foot...when you are angry at someone...and expect to be taken to the

hospital...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...They believe violent protests will force the government...to process their grievances...that are taking too long to be addressed...the notion that the only language that the government understands is violent protests (more emphasis was put on this, while the respondent also demonstrated what he meant by using his hands)...is trending...because people think that it is only when they become violent...that the government will meet their demands...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...Not all protestors want to engage in violence...some people do not care...especially those who do not understand the damage...that they cause...those who know the importance of properties...are unlikely to participate in the destruction...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...No there must be another way...that can be used to achieve desired goals...violence is not the answer (strong emphasis was put here)...it is just that people are not patient...and they only want things to be done their own way...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...Prevention measures can be implemented by cooperation from the government...**[how?]**...when the government is not cooperative...people become frustrated and destroy properties...when their demands are not met...lack of cooperation will always result in the destruction of properties...because it seems like it is the only way...that the government understands...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...As long as the government does not meet the demands of the people...there is no way that people can protest peacefully...**[Why do you say so?]**...The fact that the government...only acts after people have protested violently...has dominated in people's mind...**[Why do you think so?]**...in many places where people protested peacefully...the government seemed not to care...but as soon as they engaged in violence...the government responded...

PARTICIPANT EIGHT

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...There are people who want to score themselves something...in the name of strike...these people will encourage the community to engage in strike...so that they can use the opportunity...to steal and fulfil their personal needs...at the expense of the community...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...The initial plan was a total shut down...and not to be violent... but *ma swi tiva kuri vanhu vanwanyani...va tirhisa switereko...ku vava fikelela ku navela ka vona* (some people use protests to fulfil their desires)...but some got angry because...the government...seemed to be playing with them...as their demand for having a separate municipality... away from Thulamela was not fulfilled immediately...when the request was made. The people thought that if they...maybe protested violently...the government would listen to their demands. ...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...People think that they must poke the government...where it will hurt...in order to achieve their goal...this is only done...when the government and the community...do not see things the same way...frustrations make people to behave in a manner that results in the destruction of properties...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...Protestors think that they are hitting at the government...but they are the ones hurting themselves and...expect the very same government to take them out of the misery they have caused themselves...after they have burned schools...when protests end...children need their classes to learn...because...classes have been burnt in a moment of anger...the community expect the government to build them more classes...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...In Malamulele...I could say that... the goal was achieved...members of the community were able to force the government...to give in to the demand the of separate municipality... away from Thulamela...the goal was achieved...even though it has implications for the community...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...There are those people...who tell themselves that...they just want to destroy property and loot...obviously...those ones won't feel a

thing...because...they enjoy...what they are doing...**[Is that so?]**...They are gaining something out of the destruction of property...**[Something like?]**...enjoyment...those who loot shops...they get property that they did not...spent a cent to buy (with an angry tone)...they can get food...clothes...shoes and other things...it is just that...when it comes to furniture...they will not be able to carry (the participant said this while laughing)...they hide behind protests...to do their evil deeds...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...In Malamulele...it worked...**[Why do you think so?]**...because a separate municipality was granted...but I suggest that *imbizos*...should be held time and again...so that community leaders...can listen to the concerns of the community...before these concerns turn into frustrations...when people are frustrated...it is easy for them to lose their minds...they can influence one another to engage in violence...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...Police should try to establish properties that are most likely to be destroyed...and guard them...community leaders should form a close relationship...with the members of the community...so that it will be easier for them to raise their grievances...on the other hand...the leaders should give regular feedback...on where they are in addressing the concerns...**[How is that beneficial?]**...This will serve as an assurance to the community...that their grievances are being addressed...if no feedback is given...the community members may think that...leaders do not take them seriously...and thereby start to destroy properties...**[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...Consultation with regard to what the community wants...should be considered...instead of the government...or community leaders taking decisions...without involving members of the community...feedback should be given all the time...even when the community leaders...think that the information that they have is not valuable...to them (referring to the leaders) it might not be valuable...but to the community members...it can serve as an assurance that their concerns are receiving the attention that they deserve...

PARTICIPANT NINE

[WHY DO SOME PROTESTS THAT START OFF PEACEFULLY TURN VIOLENT?]...Community members became violent...only after they tried to reason with the government...but that did not help...as the decision of incorporating Vuwani in Malamulele Municipality...was not overturned...even the courts failed the community...by not fulfilling their wishes...the people did not start by blocking roads...(paused for seconds)...and destroying properties...we even went to court to register our grievances...it was only after the court turned down...the community's request... that we started to destroy properties...even the premier who was called to come and listen to the grievances did not show up...**[Was that a problem?]**...Yes...people felt that he should have come...**[But, what impact his presence would have made?]**...It would have showed us...that we are taken into consideration...our grievances are being listened to...by not coming...we...were undermined (the participant's face showing disappointment)...**[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS AT MALAMULELE AND VUWANI?]**...The Demarcation Board failed to include...the community members...in decision making process...some parts of Vuwani...were included without consulting us...the affected members of the community...this resulted in members of the community resorting to violence...after the failure to include the community...in decision making about the incorporation... efforts were made to oppose the decision...the government failed to consider the request...of the community...this led to members of the community...to regard violence...as the only means to attract the response...of the government...**[WHY DO COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL?]**...They believe that...by protesting violently...the government will respond...to their grievances...when other channels such as petitions seemed to have failed...to attract positive response...properties were destroyed...in Vuwani...so that the government...would realise that the public...is not happy about the decision...of the Demarcation board...**[ARE PROTESTERS HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY DURING PROTESTS?]**...During protests...members of the community...think they are punishing the government...by destroying properties...it is only when the properties...are needed...that people realise that they did not punish the

government...but themselves...for example...learners are no longer having classes...and now...it is the learners...and parents who are affected...and not the government...the bank that was assisting small businesses is gone...and additional fees...are accrued to access the bank elsewhere...**[WHAT DO COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY?]**...During the protests...it seemed like we would reach the desired goals...but the aftermath of the protests...speaks the opposite...**[Why do you think that?]**...**violent protests did not achieve anything good** (strong emphasis was put here)...but have negatively...affected us as the properties...that are supposed to assist us...have been destroyed in the moment of anger...**[HOW DO PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED?]**...At that moment...it feels like a goal has been achieved...but later on it is hurtful...**[Why do you later feel the pain?]**...because...much needed community properties are destroyed...people encourage each other to destroy properties...as there is a belief...that these properties represent the government...to them...the smoke that comes from burning properties...is indicates an accomplishment...to the goal...to those who attended the protest...they did not waste their time for nothing...it was beneficial...as something had happened...**[CAN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS?]**...Collective violence can be used to achieve goals...but only...in certain circumstances...it works...but I would not recommend it...**[Why would you not recommend it?]**...it result in injuries...and destruction of properties...its consequences...are not good...the government can be forced to fulfil the wishes of the community...but the aftermath...of collective violence...can last for a very long time...it will take time...for the properties...that have been destroyed...in the process...to be fixed...or replaced...**[WHAT DO YOU THINK CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY?]**...members of the community should be taught...about the value of properties in their lives **[How will this help prevent the destruction of properties?]**...maybe through that...people...may realise that destruction of properties when they are angry...puts them at a disadvantage...for example...when schools are destroyed in the process...after winning the battle...children have to go to school...when classes have become ashes...where are children going to learn? **[WHICH MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL RESIDENTS TO PEACEFUL PROTESTING?]**...The government should not wait...for an instance where members of the community

protest...they should try to fix the situation...before it goes to an extent of protesting...it is easier...to control the situation...from becoming tense...before a protest erupts...**[Why do you think so?]**...Once a protest erupts...the likelihood of people influencing each other to engage in violence is very high...

ANNEXURE H: LETTER OF CONSENT (FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION)

LETTER OF CONSENT

Dear Participant

A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS IN MALAMULELE AND VUWANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE.
--

My name is Olinda Ruth Chabalala. I am registered with the University of Limpopo; I am doing research on the above-mentioned topic in fulfilment for the requirements of a PhD Degree in Criminology.

For participating in this study, please note the following:

- Participation is absolutely voluntary, and you are allowed to withdraw at any time if you do not wish to continue with this study.
- Your responses are confidential, and your name will not be disclosed to anyone.
- Your responses will also not be linked to your name, the researcher will respect your right to anonymity.
- There is no obvious psychological and physical harm associated in participating in this study.

If you are willing to participate in this study, please tick in the appropriate box:

The nature of this study has been explained to me by the researcher	Yes	No
I was not forced to be part of this study, I participated willingly	Yes	No
I give consent to the audio recording of the discussions	Yes	No
I was told of my right to withdraw my participation at any time if I do not wish to continue anymore and that there is no penalty for my withdrawal	Yes	No
I give consent to the researcher to publish the findings, without revealing my identity	Yes	No

Yours sincerely

Participant's signature

Ms Chabalala OR

ANEXURE I: FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS

A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS IN MALAMULELE AND VUWANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

SECTION A

1. Gender of participants
2. Age

SECTION B

This question seeks to examine if respondents find the behaviour to be acceptable or not.

3. How worried are you about people's behaviour during protests?

- 3.1 Total shut down
- 3.2 Blocking of entry and exit points
- 3.3 Burning and destroying properties

Questions under this section seek to determine why protests start peacefully and turn violent.

4. Why do protests start peacefully and then turn violent?

- 4.1 The government is at a comfort zone; it needs to be shaken
- 4.2 Protests are politically exploited to become violent.
- 4.3 Criminal intentions and opportunity
- 4.4 Violence attracts government's response

Questions under this section seek to examine the causes of violent protests in Vuwani and Malamulele.

5. What are the causes of violent protests?

5.1 Unresponsive governance

5.2 Lack of consultation

5.3 Violence is a form of communication strategy

5.4 Personal interests, criminal intentions, and opportunity

5.5 Lack of service delivery

5.6 Unfulfilled promises, anger, and frustration

The following questions seek to understand why protestors tend to damage properties that assist the community to achieve a goal.

6. Why do community members destroy properties that serve them such as schools and libraries to achieve a goal?

6.1 Burning of properties is not planned, it just occurs spontaneously

6.2 Lack of interest in education and unemployment

6.3 Government failure to address grievances

6.4 Lack of knowledge in addressing grievances

6.5 Violent protests have been adopted from the apartheid struggles

6.6 Influence from the media

The following questions seek to find out who the protesters are punishing by destroying properties that assist the community.

7. Are protesters hitting at the government when they destroy government properties during protests?

7.1 Punishment to self and the government

7.2 Punishing the government

7.3 The community members are punishing themselves

The following questions seek to determine what communities feel they have achieved by protesting violently.

8. What communities feel they have achieved by protesting violently

8.1 Regretting

8.2 Violent protests are enjoyed by people who lack motivation

8.3 The goal has been achieved

Questions below seek to determine how protesters feel when they see buildings being destroyed.

9. How protesters feel when they see buildings being destroyed

9.1 The people regret afterwards

9.2 Both the government and the people feel the pain

9.3 Protestors feel they have registered their grievances

9.4 People with criminal intentions do not feel the pain

The following questions seek to assess whether collective violence can be used as a productive tool to achieve desired goals

10. Collective violence can be used as a productive tool to achieve desired goals

10.1 Collective violence does not work

10.2 Collective violence can be an effective tool

10.3 The police are responsible for collective violence

The following questions seek to determine how destruction of properties can be prevented during protests.

11. Measures to prevent the destruction of properties during protests

11.1 Community involvement in community projects

11.2 The role of local leadership

11.3 Politicians should refrain from making empty promises

11.4 At school, children should be taught at young age not to destroy community properties

11.5 The government should respond quicker to grievances

11.6 The role of the police during an outbreak of protests

Question below seeks to determine mechanism that can be used to channel communities to protest peacefully.

12. Mechanisms that can be used to channel residents to peaceful protest

12.1 The use of *imbizos*

12.2 Addressing grievances at first step

12.3 Constant engagement

12.4 Training of the ward councillors

This question seeks to determine the consequences of violent protests.

13. The aftermath of violent protests

13.1 Children are exposed to bad weather conditions

13.2 Violent protests affect the economy

13.3 Children engage in delinquent behaviour and also learn to be violent

XIYENGENKULU J: PAPILA RA MPFUMELELO WA MBULAVURINSANO NA NTLAWA WA VANGHENELWA

PAPILA RA MPFUMELELO

Eka munghenelwa

NDZAVISISO WA SWIVANGELO LESWI HLOHLOTELAKA SWIVILELO SWA MADZOLONGA EKA MALAMULELE NA LE VUWANI, EXIFUNDZENINKULU XA LIMPOPO

Vito ndzi Olinda Ruth Chabalala. Ndzi xichudeni eYunivhesithi ya Limpopo naswona ndzi endla ndzavisiso hi nhlokomhaka leyi yi nga laha henhla leswi ku nga ku hetisisa Digiri ya Dyondzo-Criminology ya PhD.

Vanghenelwa eka dyondzo leyi va fanele ku lemuka leswi landzelaka:

- Ku ngenela dyondzo leyi a swi bohi naswona ma pfumeleriwa ku tihumesa nkarhi wun'wana ni wun'wana loko mi nga ha tsakeli ku ya emahlweni na dyondzo.
- Tihlamulo ta n'wina ti tekiwa tanihi xihundla naswona vito ra n'wina a ri nga humeseriwi ehandle hambu ko va njhani.
- Tlhandlakambirhi, tihlamulo ta n'wina a ti nga hlanganisiwi na vito ra n'wina hikuva mulavisisi u ta hlonipha mfanelo yo hlayisa vito ra n'wina tanihi xihundla.
- A ku na ku vaviseka emiehleketweni kumbe emirini loko nga erivaleni loku yelanisiwaka ni ku ngenela ka n'wina eka ndzavisiso lowu.

Loko u tsakela ku ngenela ndzavisiso lowu, kombisa hi ku veleka gwaju ethlelo ka nhlamulo leyi u hlawulaka yona:

Mulavisisi u ndzi hlamuserile xikongomelonkulu xa ndzavisiso lowu	Ina	E-e
A ndzi sindzisiwangi ku teka xiphemu eka ndzavisiso, ndzi ngenela hi ku tsakela ka mina	Ina	E-e
Ndza pfumelela ku va mbhurisano wa hina na vanghenelwa kuloni wu kandziyisiwa	Ina	E-e
Ndzi hlamuseriwile hi lung'helo ra mina ro ni nga teka xiboho xo ka ni nga ha yi emahlweni na ndzavisiso lowu nkarhi wun'wana na wun'wana loko ni nga ha ri na ntsakelo naswona a ku na xigwevo xo endla tano	Ina	E-e
Ndzi nyika mulavisisi mpfumelelo wo paluxa ndzavisiso lowu kambe a nga humeseli ehandle vuxokoxoko bya mina	Ina	E-e

We wena loyi a tshembhekaka

Ms Chabalala OR

Nsayino wa munghenelwa

XIYENGENKULU K: SWILETELO SWA NHLOKISISO NI NTLAWA WA VANGHENELWA

NDZAVISISO WA SWIVANGELO LESWI HLOHLOTELAKA SWIVILELO SWA MADZOLONGA EKA MALAMULELE NA LE VUWANI, EXIFUNDZENINKULU XA LIMPOPO.

XIYENGE A

VUXOKOXOKO BYA MUNGHENELWA

1. Rimbewu ra munghenelwa
2. Malembe

XIYENGE B

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kambisisa loko vanghenelwa va vona matikhomelo ya kombisa ku vilela hi ku tirhisa madzolonga ya amukeleka.

3. Xana wa vilerisiwa hi matikhomelo ya vanhu loko va kombisa ku vilela?

- 3.1 Ku pfala tindhawu
- 3.2 Ku pfala magondzo yo nghena no huma endhawini
- 3.3 Ku hisiwa na ku onhiwa ka nhundzu

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kongomisiwile ku twisisa swivangelo leswi endleka ku kombisa ku vilela kun'wana ku sungula hi ku rhula ivi ku hela hi madzolonga.

4. Hikokwalaho ka yini ku kombisa ku vilela kun'wana ku sungula hi ku rhula ivi ku hela hi madzolonga?

4.1 Mfumo wu tshuxeke ngopfu, wu lava ku dzinginisiwa

4.2 Va n'watipolotiki va na nhlohotelo eka ku kombisa ku vilela ka madzolonga

4.3 Vugevenga na ku kumeka ka ndlela yo vuyeriwa

4.4 Madzolonga ya pfuneta ku va mfumo wo angula swikoxo

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kambisisa swivangelo swo va vanhu va tirhisa madzolonga ku kombisa ku vilela eVuwani na le ka Malamulele.

5. Xana hi swihi swivangelo leswi endlaka ku va vanhu va kombisa ku vilela hi ku tirhisa madzolonga?

5.1 Mfumo a wu hlamuli swikombelo

5.2 Mfumo wo endla swilo wu nga twananangi na vaaki

5.3 Madzolonga ya tirhisiwa tanihi ndlela yo vulavurisana na mfumo

5.4 Ku va munhu a ta vuyeriwa eka ku tirhisiwa ka madzolonga hi nkarhi wo kombisa ku vilela

5.5 Ku kayivela ka vukhorhokeri

5.6 Vaaki va hlundzukisiwa hi switshembhiso leswi endlwaka swi tlhela swi nga fikeleriwi

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kambela swivangelo leswi endlaka leswaku vanhu va onha tinhundzu leti nga na nkoka eka vona loko va kombisa ku vilela.

6. Hikokwalaho ka yini swirho swa miganga swi onha tinhundzu leti tirhelaka miganga ku fana ni swikolo na tilayiburari hi xikongomelo xo humelerisa xikongomelo xa vona?

6.1 Vakombisaku vilela a va pfapfarhuti ku hisa tinhundzu, swo tshika swi humelerile swi nga languteriwangi

6.2 Ku pfumaleka ka dyondzo na mintirho

6.3 Ku tsandzeka ka mfumo ku tisa swintshuxo eka swivilelo

6.4 Ku pfumelaka ka vutivi byo lunghisa swikoxo hi muganga

6.5 Ku kombisa ku vilela ko katsa madzolongwa ku dyondziwe eka madzolongwa lama nga tirhisiwa ku kombisa ku vilela hi nkarhi wa xihlawuhlauwu

6.6 Vuhangalasi bya mahungu swi hlohletela ku tirhisiwa ka madzolongwa hi nkarhi wo kombisa ku vilela

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kongomisiwile ku twisisa loko vakombisaku vilela va vavisa mfumo loko va onha nhundzu ya mfumo hi nkarhi wa ku kombisa ku vilela.

7. Vakombisaku vilela va vavisa mfumo loko va onha nhundzu ya mfumo hi nkarhi wa ku kombisa ku vilela?

7.1 Vakombisaku vilela va ti vavisa vona hi voxwe va tlhela va vavisa mfumo

7.2 Va vavisa mfumo ntsena

7.3 Muganga wu tivavisa wu ri voxwe

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kongomisiwile ku kambisisa loko vakombisakuvilela va fikelele swo karhi hi ku kombisa ku vilela hi ku tirhisa madzolongwa.

8. Vakombisakuvilela va ehleketa leswaku va fikelela yini hi ku tirhisa madzolongwa?

8.1 Va tisola endzhaku ka swona

8.2 Ku kombisa ku vilela ka madzolongwa ku tsakisa vanhu lava va nga tiyimiselangi nchumu evutonwini

8.3 Ku navela ka vona ku fikeleriwini

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kambisisa matitwele ya vanghenelwa hi ku onhiwa ka nhundzu loko va kombisa ku vilela.

9. Xana mi ti twa njhani loko mi vona miako yi ri karhi yi onhiwa hi nkarhi wo kombisa ku vilela?

9.1 Va tisola endzhaku ka swona

9.2 Ku vava ku twa hi mfumo na vanhu va muganga

9.3 Va titwa va tivise mfumo leswi va titwisaka swona

9.4 Vanhu lava va nga na makungu yo endla vugevenga hi nkarhi wo kombisa ku vilela a va vavisiwi hi ku onhiwa ka nhundzu

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kambisisa loko vanghenelwa va vona madzolongantlawa ya nga tirhisiwa tanihi xitirho xo fikelela swikongomelo leswi lavekaka.

10. Xana madzolongantlawa ya nga tirhisiwa tanihi xitirho xo fikelela swikongomelo leswi lavekaka?

10.1 Madzolongantlawa a ya na mbuyelo lowunene

10.2 Madzolongantlawa ya nga tisa mbuyelo lowunene

10.3 Swiendlo swa maphorisa hi swona swi hlohloleka madzolongantlawa

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kongomisiwile ku twisisa leswi nga endliwaka ku sivela ku onhiwa ka nhundzu hi nkarhi wa ku kombisa ku vilela.

11. Xana mi vona leswaku ku nga endliwa yini ku sivela ku onhiwa ka nhundzu hi nkarhi wo kombisa ku vilela?

11.1 Ku katsiwa ka vanhu va muganga eka tiphurojeke ta muganga

11.2 Varhangeri va muganga va nga tlanga xiphemu

11.3 Van'watipolotiki a va tshiki ku tshembisa swilo leswi va nga taka va nga swi fikeleli

11.4 Eswikolweni vana a va nyikiwe dyondzo yo tshinya eka ku onhiwa ka nhundzu ya muganga va ha ri vantsongo

11.5 Mfumo a wu hlamuli swivilelo hi ku hatlisa

11.6 Maphorisa a ma pfuneti ku lwisana no onhiwa ka nhundzu hi nkarhi wa ku kombisa ku vilela

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kongomisiwile ku kambisisa magoza lama nga tekiwaka ku hlohlotela vaaki leswaku va nga kombisi ku vilela hi ku tirhisa madzolonga.

12. Magoza lama nga tekiwaka ku hlohlotela vaaki leswaku va nga kombisi ku vilela hi ku tirhisa madzolonga.

12.1 A ku endliwe swividzo

12.2 Swikoxo a swi langutisiwi swi nga se ya ekule

12.3 A ku ve na mihlengeletano ya nkarhi na nkarhi exikarhi ka muganga na mfumo

12.4 Vakhaselara a va leteriwi ku rhangela muganga

Swivutiso leswi landzelaka swi kongomisiwile ku kambisisa switandzhaku swo kombisa ku vilela hi ku tirhisa madzolonga.

13. Xana hi swihi switandzhaku swo kombisa ku vilela hiku tirhisa madzolonga

13.1 Vana va kumeka va dyondza ehandle eka maxelo yo ka ya nga tsakisi

13.2 Ku kombisa ku vilela ka madzolonga ku veka ekhonomi eka xiyimo xo ka xi nga tsakisi

13.3 Vana va dyondza mahanyelo yo ka ya nga tsakisi

Ntirhisano wa n'wina wa nkhesiwa

ṲHUMETSHEDZWA L: LUṲWALO LWA THENDELANO (NYAMBEDZANO NA TSHIGWADA TSHA VHADZHENELELI VHA ṲHODṲISISO)

LUṲWALO LWA THENDELANO

Kha Mudzheneleli

ṲHODṲISISO YA ZWIṲUṲUWEDZI ZWA MIGWALABO YA DZIKHAKHATHI MALAMULELE NA VUWANI, VUNDUNI ṲA LIMPOPO.

Dzina Ṳanga ndi Olinda Ruth Chabalala. Ndi khou ita ṲodṲisisa malugana na Ṳoho ya ṲhodṲisiso yo bulwaho afho nṲha hu u Ṳoda u fusha Ṳhoda dza digirii ya Vhudokotela kha Muhasho wa Criminology.

Uri vha shele mulenzhe kha ṲhodṲisiso iyi, kha vha dzhiele nzhele zwi tevhelaho:

- U shela mulenzhe kha ṲhodṲisiso iyi a si khombekhombe nahone vho tendelwa u dibvisa kha ino ṲhodṲisiso tshifhinga tshinwe na tshinwe tshine vha pfa vha tshi funa.
- Phindulo dzavho dzi do vha tshiphiri na dzina Ṳavho a Ṳi nga do bulwa kha muthu na muthihi.
- Phindulo dzavho a dzi nga do Ṳumanywa kana u livhanywa na dzina Ṳavho, muṲodṲisisi u do Ṳhonifha ppanelo yavho ya uri dzina Ṳavho Ṳi vhe Ṳa tshidzumbe.
- A hu na khuvhalo i vhonekhalo kha muhumbulo na kha muvhili ine vha do Ṳangana nayo nga nṲhani ha u dzhenelela havho kha ino ṲhodṲisiso.

Arali vha tshi khou takalela u shela mulenzhe kha ino tshodiso, kha vha zwi sumbedze kha kubogisi kwo teaho afho fhasi:

Muṭodisisi o ṅalutshedzwa nga ha mvelo ya tshodiso yawe.	Ehe	Hai
A tho ngo kombetshedzwa u shela mulenzhe kha ino tshodiso, ṅe muṅe ndo tou nanga u dzhenelela.	Ehe	Hai
Ndi ṅea thendelo ya uri ipfi ṅa ṅi rekhoḍiwe musi ndi kha nyambedzano na muṭodisisi.	Ehe	Hai
Ndo vhudzwa uri ndi na pfanelo ya u ḍibvisa kha ino tshodiso tshifhinga tshinwe na tshinwe tshine nda pfa uri a thi tsha funa u bvela phanda na u shela mulenzhe kha tshodiso na uri a hu nga vhi na masiandaitwa a si avhuḍi kha ṅe arali nda ḍibvisa kha tshodiso.	Ehe	Hai
Ndi ṅea muṭodisisi thendelo ya u anḍadza mawanwa a tshodiso fhedzi vhuṅe vhu ha tshidzombe.	Ehe	Hai

Wavho a fulufhedzeaho

Tsaino nga Mudzheneleli

Ms Chabalala OR

ṬHUMETṢHEDZWA M: MBUDZISO DZA ZWIGWADA ZWO NANGWAHO

**ṬHOḌISISO YA ZWIṬUṬUWEDZI ZWA MIGWALABO YA DZIKHAKHATHI
MALAMULELE NA VUWANI, VUNDUNI ḲA LIMPOPO.**

ZWIDODOMBEDZWA ZWA VHUṆE

TSHITEṆWA TSHA A

1. Mbeu ya Vhadzheneleli
2. Miṅwaha

TSHITEṆWA TSHA B

**Mbudziso ino i ṭoda u sengulusa uri vhafhinduli vha vhona vhuḍifari ha
vhagwalabi vhu tshi ṭanganedzea kana vhu sa ṭanganedzei naa.**

3. Vha vhilahela u swika ngafhi nga vhuḍifari ha vhathu musi vha tshi khou gwalaba?

- 3.1 Uri hu nga vha na u valwa tshoṭhe ha ndisedzo ya tshumelo.
- 3.2 Uri hu nga valwa magondo oṭhe, hu nga vha a u dzhena na a u bva.
- 3.3 U fhisa ha ndaka.

Mbudziso fhasi ha tshiteńwa itshi dzi ɥoda u ɗivha uri ndi nga migwalabo i tshi thoma nga mulalo fhedzi ya vho shanduka dzikhakhathi.

4. Ndi ngani migwalabo i tshi thoma nga mulalo fhedzi ya vho shanduka dzikhakhathi?

4.1 Muvhuso wo ɗigeɗa, u tea u dzinginyiswa.

4.2 Hu na vho rapolotiki vho no shela mulenzhe kha uri migwalabo i vhe ya dzikhakhathi.

4.3 Mavemu a shumisa migwalabo sa tshikhala tsha u vusa pfudzungule.

4.4 Dzikhakhathi dzi ita uri vha muvhuso vha fhindule.

Mbudziso fhasi ha tshiteńwa itshi dzi ɥoda u ɗivha zwivhangi zwa migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi Vuwani na Malamulele.

5. Zwivhangi zwa migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi ndi zwifhio?

5.1 U sa fhindula ha vhavhusi.

5.2 U sa davhidzana na vhatu.

5.3 Dzikhakhathi sa ndila ya vhudavhidzani.

5.4 U ɥoda u ɗifusha, vhuvemu na zwikhala zwa u ɗibveledza.

5.5 ɥhahalelo ya ndisedzo ya tshumelo.

5.6 Pfulufhedziso dzi so ngo swikelelwaho, u sinyuwa na mbiti.

Mbudziso dzi tevhelaho dzi ɔɔa u pfesesa uri ndi ngani vhagwalabi vha tshi tshinyadza ndaka dzine dza thusa vhadzulapo u swikelela ndivho dzavho.

6. Vhadzulapo vha tshinyadza ndaka dzine dza thusa lushaka sa zwikolo na dziɔaiburari u swikelela ndivho yavho.

6.1 U fhiswa ha ndaka zwi vha zwi so ngo tou anganywa, zwi sokou itea.

6.2 U shaya dzangalelo kha pfunzo na u shaya mishumo.

6.3 U kundelwa ha muvhuso u dzhiela nzhele zwililo zwa vhatu.

6.4 ɔhahelero ya ndivho malugana na u tandululwa ha zwililo zwa vhatu.

6.5 Migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi yo dzhiwa u bva kha u lwela mbofholowo tshifhingani tsha muvhuso wa tshiɔalula.

6.6 ɔhuthuwedzo u bva kha vha u aɔadza mafhungo.

Mbudziso dzi tevhelaho dzi ɔɔa u tumbula uri vhagwalabi vha khou ɔɔa u vhaisa vhone nga u tshinyadza ndaka dzi thusaho lushaka.

7. Vhagwalabi vha khou rwa muvhuso musi vha tshi tshinyadza ndaka dza muvhuso zwenezwi musi vha tshi khou gwalaba.

7.1 Vha khou dihuvhadza vhone vhaɔe na muvhuso.

7.2 Vha khou laɔisa muvhuso.

7.3 Vhadzulapo vha khou dihuvhadza vhone vhaɔe.

Mbudziso dzi tevhelaho dzi tɔɔa u wanulusa uri ndi zwifhio zwine vhadzulapo vha pfa uri vho zwi swikelela nga migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi.

8. Zwine vhadzulapo vha pfa uri vho zwi swikelela nga migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi.

8.1 U ɔisola.

8.2 Migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi i takalelwa nga vhathu vha si na tɔtɔhuwedzo vhutshiloni havho.

8.3 Tshipikwa tsho swikelelwa.

Mbudziso dzi tevhelaho dzi tɔɔa u tumbula uri vhagwalabi vha ɔipfa hani musi vha tshi vhona zwifhato zwi tshi khou tshinyadzwa.

9. Zwine vhadzulapo vha ɔipfisa zwone musi vha tshi vhona zwifhato zwi tshi khou tshinyadzwa.

9.1 Vhathu vha a ɔisola ngavhuya.

9.2 Muvhuso na vhathu vha pfa vhuɔungu.

9.3 Vha pfesesa uri zwililo zwavho zwo pfala.

9.4 Vhathu vho anganyaho zwa vhuvemu a vha pfi vhuɔungu nga hazwo.

Mbudziso dzi tevhelaho dzi tɔɔa u sengulusa uri migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi nga lushaka i nga vha tshishumiswa tshi vhuedzaho zwivhuya kana u swikelela zwipikwa naa?

10. Migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi nga lushaka i nga vha tshishumiswa tshi vhuedzaho zwivhuya kana u swikelela zwipikwa.

10.1 Migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi nga lushaka a i vhuedzi.

10.2 Migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi nga lushaka i nga vhuedza.

10.3 Mapholisa a na tshandɔ kha u bvelela ha migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi.

Mbudziso dzi tevhelaho dzi ƙoƙa u sengulusa uri u tshinyadzwa ha ndaka hu nga thivhelwa hani musi hu na migwalabo.

11. Maga ane a nga dzhiwa u thivhela u tshinyadzwa ha ndaka musi hu na migwalabo.

11.1 U shela mulenzhe ha lushaka kha thandela dza lushaka.

11.2 Vha muvhuso wapo kana vuhosini vha nga thusa.

11.3 Vho rapolotiki vha tea u ƙutshela u fulufhedzisa zwine a vha nga iti.

11.4 Tshikoloni, vhana vha tea u funzwa vha tshi kha ƙi vha vhaƙuku uri vha so ngo tshinyadza ndaka dza lushaka.

11.5 Muvhuso u tea u fhindula zwililo zwa vhatu nga u ƙavhanya.

11.6 Mapholisa vha na mushumo wa ndeme une vha tea u ita musi hu na migwalabo.

Mbudziso ine ya vha afho fhasi i ƙoƙa u swikelela nƙila ine i nga shumiswa u ƙuƙuwedza vhadzulapo u gwalaba nga mulalo.

12. Nƙila dzine dzi nga shumiswa u ƙuƙuwedza vhadzulapo uri vha gwalabe nga mulalo.

13.12.1 Ndeme ya madzulo a lushaka.

12.2 U tandulula thaidzo zwenezwo i tshi kha ƙi tou bva u vhighwa.

12.3 Vhudavhidzani vhu sa gumi vhukati ha vhadzulapo.

12.4 U pfumbudzwa ha vharangaphanda vha lushaka.

Mbudziso i tōda u sumbedza masiandaitwa a migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi.

14. Masiandaitwa a migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi.

13.1 Vhana vha sala vha khomboni ya mutsho u si wavhuḏi.

13.2 Migwalabo ya dzikhakhathi i kwama zwa makwevho (ikonomi) nga ndila i si yavhuḏi.

13.3 Vhana vha ḏidzhenisa kha vhuḏifari vhu si havhuḏi na dzikhakhathi.

ANNEXURE N: TRANSCRIPTIONS OF FOCUS GROUP A DISCUSSION

[HOW WORRIED ARE YOU ABOUT PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOUR DURING PROTESTS?]...Shutting down of government offices and shops are good practices...to show the government that we are not happy...with the failure to separate us from the marriage with Malamulele...that was decided upon...without our approval (P 12)...amongst the things that we did...to show the government our anger...prohibiting children from going to school...is not something that we are proud of (P 15)...**[Then why did you stop children from going to school?]**...The government pushed us beyond our limit...we did not have a choice...all activities had to shut down...to indicate to the government that we were not happy...with them taking decisions without including us (P 13)...We did what we did...because the government did not give us a choice...it was either we blocked entries and exit point...shut down all activities...and burned schools...so that the government can take us seriously (P 11)...being a saint does not make the complaints to reach the government (P 12)...**[What do you mean by being a saint?]**...When we protested peacefully...without showing any signs of anger...the government did not pay any attention (P 11)...Where have you ever seen the government...taking people seriously...(pose for a minute)...who just handed out a written memorandum...without engaging in any action...to show that they are not happy...about something? (P 14) (the participant showed some seriousness in his face when he said this)...The language that the government understands...is not the spoken or written one...they understand action...you must also demonstrate to them what you mean...violent protests are a way of showing the government that...we are not happy...with how they treat us...our concerns are not considered...so shutting down areas...is a good way of demonstrating...that we are not happy about the decision taken by the government (P 12)...At the end of the day...burning of government properties...will register the complaint to the government (P 11)...**[How did that register your complaint?]**...It showed how serious we were...with the concerns raised (P 13)...People cannot choose to burn properties during protests just for the fun of it...In Vuwani...it was done so that the government could come down and listen (P 15)...The community have tried to engage the government...but all those efforts failed....the only thing left was to show the government...that we were serious (P 12).

[WHY DO PROTESTS START PEACEFULLY AND THEN TURN VIOLENT?]...

Protests turn violently for a number of reasons...some people use the situation to benefit themselves (P 11)...**[how?]**...There are political leaders...who gain from protests turning violently...they incite violence to make the current local leaders...such as councillors look like failures...who are not capable to manage communities under their leadership (P 11)...Not only political leaders benefit from violent protests...people with criminal intentions may also encourage protests to turn violently....it is easier to break in shops...during protests...as it will look as if it was part of the struggle...while the intention was to steal (P 14)...**[Is that so?]**...Well...once shops are broken in and looted...it will look as if it was part of the protest...while criminals are the behind the breaking of shops and looting...other community members...who have never or ever thought of committing a crime...might join in when the opportunity presents itself (P 11)...What protestors do...is to barricade entry and exit routes...properties were only burned when the government failed to listen...after blocking roads (P 13)...Jaa...well...stealing usually is for those who intended to commit crime (P 15)...They hide behind protests and break in shops...to steal (P 12)...Our grievances had nothing to do with the shops...but with the government...So mostly...criminals are the ones to steal...and not community members...(P 13)...But...(pause for a minute as if the participant was thinking)...even law-abiding community members...can steal during protests...this happens when those with criminal intentions...break into shops...community members join in...because an opportunity to loot has arisen (P 14)...**[In other words, community members do not intend to steal, but can do so when given the opportunity?]**...Yes...it is not easy...to just pass a shop that has been opened...with people who are taking groceries...and no one to stop (P 12)...To resist the temptations...of entering and taking what others (pauses)...are taking...while the door is opened...is difficult (P 14)...Criminals are the ones...who encourage community members...to steal during protests...they give them an opportunity...that is difficult to turn down...suppose at home there is no meat...and a shop has been opened...during the outbreak of protests...people are busy collecting food...and here I am...passing them running with mixed portions...wors and beef...I am likely going to join...the chances of me deciding to walk away are 2 over 10 (P 12)...In some cases...criminals steal during protests...and burn afterwards...to conceal evidence (P 10)...People will think...that it was community members...who stole and burned...while the community was not

involved in that (P 14)...But...it will look like the community was involved...as the acts were carried out...when there was restlessness in the community (P 13)...Jaa...at that time...(pauses for a minute)...the shoe size fits the foot...everyone will believe that protesters...are the ones who set the properties alight...while criminals did that...and burned afterwards to discard evidence (P 15)...**[Does violence attract government response?]**...It does...together...us and the government...we understand violence...to mean seriousness (P 14)...Sometimes peaceful demonstrations...marches do not move the government (P 11)...**[What moves the government?]**...Blocking of roads...burning of properties...send a clear message to the top...that...people who voted for them are not happy...with how they do things (P 10)...I don't even think...we have to vote...the government has to know that we mean business (P 13)...Voting is for communities...who are happy with the government...we have no reason to vote...we are angry (P 12)...They refused to separate us from Malamulele...voting will mean that...we are happy with what the government did...to us...we need to show them...that we are not happy (P 10)...**[Do you think refusing to vote will make the government to listen?]**...We tried to barricade roads...to force the government to listen...but that failed...we are left with no option...except to boycott elections (P 13)...In some areas...the government responded quickly when residents blocked roads...but in our situation...we were not taken seriously (P 15)...It is not like we don't want to vote...what can we do when the government fails us...we lost hope in our votes bringing change...in our situation (P 10).

[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS?]...We did not intend for the protest to escalate to that point...it just happened...because we were angry at the government...but...it was not only anger...that prompted people to behave...in a manner that they did...some people have personal interest that they wanted to fulfil (P 10)...**[Who benefits when a protest becomes violent?]**...Those who are in leadership positions...are afraid that their power will be taken away from them...and some of their wrongdoings...may come to light (P 10)...New municipality means new leadership...new rules...and the leaders from this side...are not sure how they will be treated in the newly established municipality (P 11)...**[What about criminal intentions?]**...Jaa...well...some people use protests to loot...so that it will look like anger...motivated them to steal (P 9)...While it is not anger...but they themselves...who had criminal intentions... and hide behind protests (P 12)...The

government is to blame...in our situation...they failed to respond to our memorandum...as requested...the premier also failed to come to listen to our grievances...after we had written a memorandum...requesting him...to come and meet with us (P 10)...You are right...(the participants said this with some energy)...the government can make people angry...when they fail to attend...to the request made by the people...or to show an interest to solve the grievances raised (P 11)...They failed to serve us...as promised during elections...they make promises...but fail to make the dreams become a reality...or even to make an attempt to...(P 9)...They understand violent demonstrations...more than peaceful protests...violent protests reach the government...very fast...like wild fire in winter season...unlike just marching...and delivering petitions (P 15)...It serves as a reminder that...the government should not take decisions...without consulting the people that are affected (P 12)...We were not consulted about the incorporation...we were just informed about it (P 14)...Our inputs did not matter...the government did not give us...the opportunity to raise our concerns (P 14)...Once roads are blocked...travellers are inconvenienced...they have to use alternative routes...which also inconveniences their plans....They serve as people to deliver our message...that we are serious...they deliver the message very well...when they are inconvenienced with the blockage (P 11)...We feel betrayed...the government...failed to respond to our concerns...about being incorporated to Collins Chabane Municipality...this is very unfair on our side...how can the government...that we voted for...betray us just like that (P 10)...We put the government in power...so...we expect them to take instructions from us...not the other way around (P 9)...They must deliver services...failure to do so angers people...who then vent their frustration on properties...that did not cause the anger...it is high time...that the government should fulfil promises...they make...during election campaigns...They promise us heaven and earth...but after we have put them in power...they sit comfortably and forget about the promises they made to the people (P 15).

[COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL]... Unemployed people have all the time...they have nothing to do...they can destroy properties during protests...as they are bored...destroying property can make them...feel that they have contributed something to the community (P 15)...**[What are**

these contributions?]...That they helped the community when registering their grievances...to the higher offices (P 15)...if you have nothing...to wake up for...destroying properties...can give you a reason to wake up...during protests...you will also have something to do...that will make you feel...that you are part of the community (P 12)...In many instances...the government responded only after properties were destroyed...or set alight (P 10)...The apartheid government was driven out of power...through violent protestation...where properties have been burned...as an indication that...people were not happy...in the manner in which they were governed (P 16)...Yeah...the apartheid government did not...just remove itself...the power of the people...through *toyi toyi*...took it out (P 11)...The power was seen through destroying properties...that mechanism...still works today...it worked in other communities...we hoped that it would worked in here...but the government...did not give us what we wanted...this is what we know...to be a way of solving problems and attracting government's recognition (P 10)...The only way we know to be helpful...in addressing grievances is violent protests...other mechanism of successfully persuading the government...are not known to us (P 16)...In the destruction of properties...it is not like it was planned...just like the burning of the bank...no one planned it...it just happened...at that moment...when adrenalin was high...I don't know... whether people were excited...or angry when they did that (P 14)...For me...I think it was done by people...who are not educated...as an educated person would have thought about the consequences...of their actions (P 13)...The unemployed are also bored...they can be motivated enough to do such...**[Why do you think they can be motivated to destroy properties during protests?]**...You see...the bank was not beneficial to them...they had no use of it...as they were not getting any money...to make transactions...at the bank...like going to make deposits or withdrawals...the government has to learn...to listen to the people...instead of waiting for damages...to occur...and then respond afterwards (P 10)...If the government had listened...burning and destruction of properties...would have been avoided (P 14)...The only way that people know to address grievances...is through the destruction of properties...it worked in many instances...it drove the apartheid government out...even in other areas...during the democratic regime...violence has been used successfully...during protests to force the government to listen (P13).

[PROTESTORS ARE HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES DURING PROTESTS]...Not only is the government that is being punished...when properties are destroyed (the participant paused for a minute)...the bank was also destroyed...now we are the ones that suffer...as we are no longer able to deposit money in here...we have to travel (P 15) (participant 10 interrupts)...even for small things...we have to travel some kilometres away...to get help elsewhere...this is not good at all (P 10)...The burning of the bank...affects many people...in one way or another (showing an angry face) (P 11)...**[Was the government punished when the properties were burnt or destroyed]**...Well...it seems like that...the government has to replace the damaged properties...but with us...on the other side...we have challenges in using these resources...while waiting for the government to fix (P 14)...We thought we were punishing the government...we realised afterwards that...we are the ones being punished instead (coughs)...the education of the government officials' children has not been severely interrupted by...the violent protests (P 13)...It is our children...who have been punished...they were exposed to bad weather conditions...in their schools...because schools were torched...during the protests...people acted in a wrong manner (P 14)...The pain...is more felt by the community...than the government (P 10)...the government only loses money...emotionally...we are the ones affected...we feel the pain...that we have created...ourselves (P 11)...Community properties are part of our lives...when people are angry...they do not realise the damage...that they are causing to the community...it feels as if the goal...of punishing the government has been achieved...it is only afterwards...that we realise that...we feel more pain...than the government does...properties can be refurbished or replaced...but the emotional scars (showed serious concern)...will be experienced by us...and our children...for a long time...our lives and emotions are attached to these properties...they are ours...and not the government's...I feel saddened about what has happened...in our community (P 13)...When the properties are burning...it seems like the battle has been won...but afterwards...the pain is unbearable...it hit us back (P 12)...It is true...that the government has to use money...to replace the damaged properties...but with us...it is a pain that we have to live with daily...for a long time (P 10).

[WHAT COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY]...Protesting violently does not yield good results...it takes us backward...Instead of the government...continuing where they left off...with community projects...now...they have to start...with the ones that the community has destroyed (P 14)...During protests...it is not only the community...that destroys properties...even criminals do that...they loot...thereafter...burn the shops to discard evidence (P 15)...Youth who have nothing to do...do not feel any pain...as they have more time available...and nothing to do (P 12)...**[Who are these youths?]**...Those who ran away from school...and want nothing to do with it...they enjoy destroying properties...and hide behind protests...they have nothing to do most of the time...so when protests erupt...they use the opportunity...to destroy properties (P 12)...We have attached our emotions in these properties...they are part of our lives...when they are intentionally destroyed...because of anger...protesters feel no pain at that moment...but afterwards...it is very painful...to those of us who care...about community property (P 13)...Just imagine...leaving your home...and going to shops to quickly buy something...and only to find that...it is not operating...because it was burned during protests (P 14)...Even though...we have seen the shops torched...when we get home...we tend to forget about it...but the next day...when we want to buy...that is when...the reality hits us (P 13)...Even when we had seen the shops burning...we go to buy the next day...I went to the shop...the day after I saw it burning...to buy something...I went there...even though I had seen it burning...I thought it was just a nightmare...that I would wake up from...when I got there...that is when I realised...the seriousness of the problem...that we created for ourselves...those whom the community intended to punish...do not buy at the shop that was burned...as such we are the ones...who feel the consequences...of the actions...performed in anger...and not the government (P 11)...During the events...that led to the destruction...and burning of properties...we were made to believe that...we were punishing the government...only afterwards did the pain hit us...more than the government...we were trying to punish (P 15)...Violent protests can tear communities apart...there used to be soccer tournaments...between the surrounding villages...but after the outbreak of the violent protests...some villages do not see eye-to-eye with one another...this affects children...because they are no longer playing...with the nearby communities...as they used to do...they are afraid...that they may be attacked...when in another village because of differing

viewpoints about these protests...some favoured the violence to occur...while some were against it (P 19).

[HOW PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED]...You only realise later that...the crowd has acted wrongly...when burning buildings...you don't even realise that something bad is happening...only later when you are alone...that you realise that people have acted badly (P 14)...The government does feel the pain...because they have to refurbish the damaged buildings...that have been burned...but...because community buildings...are the ones that have been burned...the community is the one that feels the pain the most (P 11)...**[Why do you think community members feel more pain than the government?]**...The government does not use the schools that have been burned...it is the community that use them...our children go there for education (P 15)...Children get to be exposed to unfavourable weather conditions at schools...while waiting for the government...to fix the damage (P 10)...Well...burning buildings is fine...at the time when it occurs...During the time...we felt like the government and the supporters would feel the pain and not us...hence...we did not try to do something...to stop buildings from being torched...we only realised the damage afterwards...at the time when it occurred...it felt right (P 13)...Do you think the government feels...as much pain as we do...right now? (the participant was asking a rhetoric question)...No...they don't feel anything...it us who feel the effects...of the violent actions (P 11)...I would say that...actually...most people feel the pain...including the government...but...to a lesser extent...When buildings are burned...those who witnessed it...by being there...or by passing by...even our children feel much pain (P 14)...It is only those who torched buildings...who feel no pain...**[Why do you say so?]**...Because they benefited from it...by looting...they do not feel anything...the mass are affected by the burning of buildings (P 10)...We regret to have witnessed the buildings being burned...even though...the burning has registered our complaints...to the government (P 13)...I wish there was a better way...to reach out to the government...instead of burning buildings...just to make a mark (P 14).

[COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE CAN BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS]...Well...I can say collective violence works...but in certain circumstances...in Malamulele...it worked...It is only in Vuwani where it failed (P 15)...In Malamulele it worked...they were favoured, unlike us...luck was not on our side...properties have been destroyed...but nothing tangible came out of it (P 13)...Not only in Malamulele...there are areas where collective violence has worked...the government was forced by the community to listen (P 10)...There are many sides of the coin...it works...it does not work...in some areas...after people engaged in collective violence...the government was forced to deliver what people wanted (P 12)...It worked in some areas...but not in Vuwani...or maybe we did not do...enough...enough to attract the government's response (P 14)...With me...I think collective violence works...maybe our timing was wrong...we should have engaged in collective violence just a few months before the elections (P 10)...Jaa...in this way...the government would have been forced to listen (P 11)...For protests to yield results...you don't just wake up and act...you need to be strategic...in terms of the timing (P 12)...But I think...mostly...community members do not favour collective violence...criminals...are the ones that exploit the situation...that channel communities...to engage in collective violence (P 14)...**[What do criminals do to influence community to engage in collective violence]**...When they start by acting first...other members of the community also follow...in this way...they end up engaging in collective violence (P 15)...I agree with that...if you are a community member...who happens to pass near a shop during protests...and you see a group of people breaking in shops...and coming out with expensive goods...mostly...you are not likely to think clearly...but you will just take part...in the looting and also get the share of the goods (P 10)...You will think about consequences later...most probably...when you hear about the incidence on the news...or when people talk...about it (P 11)...There were many efforts made...to have the Municipal Demarcation Board's decision revoked...when all these failed...some people felt that collective violence might be the answer...but it did not achieve what the community had anticipated...but I could say...collective violence works...it is only in Vuwani where it failed...but in other communities it worked very well...people got what they were asking for...from the government (P 11)...Collective violence in here...did not bring results...as we have anticipated...but the government now knows...that people can take extreme measures...to register their problems (P 13)...Maybe we should

have done...more than what we did (P 12)...Maybe if we did more...the government would have listened and revoked the decision...of incorporating us...with Malamulele (P 15)...It is true...we did not engage in much action...that attracted the government to listen (P 10)...Collective violence can work...maybe in our situation...it is not collective violence that failed...maybe the people are the ones that failed...look...in certain situations...the government responded positively (P 15)...But in ours...the response was not at all good (P 14)...It is not the strategy that failed...the people failed by not doing enough...to ensure victory...I could also say that criminals played a role...but even the community...engaged in collective violence...we were not fortunate enough to be listened to (P 14)...Maybe..we did not do enough to challenge...the government to see that we meant business (P 13)...In some situations...people get what they were looking for...it worked...it is only few cases where collective violence does not show good results (P 11)...But either way...collective violence worked successfully in certain cases...even though it did not work in our case (P 15)...I can believe that it works...sometimes and not always (P 13).

[MEASURES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTIES DURING PROTESTS]...At school...learning can happen at a very young age...given the number...of protests that occur...in South Africa...schools can have a curriculum where children are taught...how to handle conflicts without resorting to violence (P 13)...But this is not only for teachers...parents at home should also play a role (P 14)...Parents should also stop fighting in front of children...especially unnecessary quarrels...so that children can learn good behaviour (P 15)...During an outbreak of protests...the police should guard government properties...as well as private properties like shops...as they are likely to be targeted (P 14)...Leaders should stop being ignorant...they should take threats to protests very seriously...and come down to listen to the grievances...that community members have (P 11)...Protests that seem not to be threatening can grow...to be something big...and difficult to contain...immediately...the authorities hear about a threat to protest...they should not take it lightly...they should start acting by coming to listen to the community (P 15)... I am worried...about promises that leaders make...during election campaigns...we are promised a better life for all...but once in power...it is a better life for politicians...their families and their friends...who benefit from the government...community members who put them in these seats...are thus forgotten...it looks like they are important...only

when their votes are needed...but not good enough...to receive services (P 12)...This is becoming a slogan for politicians to make promises...but fail to fulfil them...We vote to get better services...and not to be forgotten (P 10)...Voting for us is useless...what are we voting for...to be oppressed further...(with an angry face)...**[What other mechanism that can be used to prevent the destruction of properties during protests?]**...Ward councillors should play a significant role...they should update community members...about the projects that will take place in the community...instead...of the community members only seeing a project when it starts (P 11)...Not only that...but community members should also be hired...in these projects...to build a sense of ownership...you cannot decide to burn your house...because you spent time and money building it (P 13)...**[With community members, how will involvement in projects stop them from destroying properties because they do not lose money when these projects are destroyed]**...Well...they are not directly losing money...but...they would have used their strength and time...to ensure the success of these projects...if it was my uncle who was part of the project...I would think twice...before I destroy it...it would remind me of his hardwork and dedication towards the project ...I would as well...convinced other people to think about how destroying property...is also destroying the strength of one of our own (P 11)...are put in those positions by the community...they did not vote for themselves...to be there...they should not pass any project...or take decisions without consulting the community (P 13)...*Imbizos* should be held constantly...so that the government leadership and its people can share common understanding...instead of the community and leaders playing against each other (P 15)...Grievances should be listened to...and resolved immediately...when they are brought to light...taking a long time to resolve grievances may result in violent protests (P 14)...**[What if the solution to solve the grievance is not the one that can be implemented immediately, it requires time?]**...That is not a problem at all...as long as there is communication between the leadership...and the people...the problem with our leaders is that they do not communicate with us...when they experience challenges in certain areas...they want to communicate when people are already angry (P 14)...It is not easy to negotiate with a community that is angry...and ready to act (P 11)...The leadership only start talking...when people are already on the streets...chanting...by then...it will not be possible to take people out of the streets...and explain the challenges to them...even if there are valid explanations...the fact that the leadership

did not come down to people...to talk to them...and waited for them to act...before they could brief them...will make the situation even worse (P 10)...To add to that...people will think that the leadership is deceiving them...because they should have come earlier to address the problems...instead of waiting for protests to occur...then that is when they want to engage meaningfully with the people (P 12)...Once people are protesting...it is not easy to convince them...to put the tools down...engagement should be done timeously...delays should be explained as soon as they are known (P 15)...Our government usually communicates information once the destruction has taken place...communication should be something that the government does on monthly basis...or even per quarter...this will show the people...that the government cares about them...and busy attending to their problems...improving how the leadership communicates with the community...plays an important part...in fostering relationship between the community and government officials...lack of engagement makes the community feel unwanted...by the government...as such...they will protest violently to get the attention of the state (P 12). In community meetings...ward councillors could share with us...the cost of a particular project...and also remind people that by destroying it...more will be lost by the community than by the government (P 11).

[THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENT PROTESTS]...The torching of schools are major problems...Children are left with no shelter where they can learn (P 11)...Acting violently in front of children...may make them think that...the best mechanisms of resolving conflicts...is through violence (P 14)...Fixing properties that have been destroyed...requires time and money...that would have been dedicated to other community projects (P 12)...Some girls are pregnant...because they were left unattended during protests...as schools had been closed by protesters (P 10)...Some of the consequences are to remain for ever...like the girls who fell pregnant...they are children themselves...who also have children...and they have to take care of these children (P 15)...Their education might also be compromised...because they are now not only learners...but teen mothers (P 15)...But it takes us backward...the protests have ended...and schools have been destroyed in the process...our children are greatly affected...it works...but (pauses for a minute)...I would not advise people to take that route...there are many things that people can do to show the government that they are angry (P 13).

ANEXURE O: TRANSCRIPTIONS OF FOCUS GROUP B DISCUSSION

[HOW WORRIED ARE YOU ABOUT PEOPLE'S BEHAVIOUR DURING PROTESTS?]...It is not good for the community to show their anger...by destroying properties...I am not happy about us...showing the government...that we are angry...while at the same time...we destroy properties...that meant to serve us and our children (P 20)...However...we managed...to show the government...that we are not happy...with the refusal...to separate us from Thulamela Municipality...so that we can have our own municipality...that is not controlled by them (them referring to Thulamela) (P 18)...To me...destruction of properties is not something...that one could be proud of...but anyway...we did it...to show the government that we are not happy...with what they were imposing on us...by refusing to separate us from Thulamela...to us it meant that there was no democracy...but leadership that uses dictatorship and does not listen to the people...who voted for them...if they wanted us to remain in Thulamela against our will...where is that democracy we fought for (P 19)...It is our democratic right...to belong to a municipality...that we want to belong to...the government should stop...forcing communities to do things that pleases them...and not the community (P 16) (there was some anger in the participant's face when he said this)...if we did not stop children from going to school...barricaded roads...the government would have not listened to us...they are not interested in our well-being...hence in many instances...they tend to be deaf when we try to communicate with them...peacefully (P 17)...We were exercising our democratic right...that we voted for...even though we regret the burning of properties...but we showed our leaders...that we are the ones that put them in power...we will fight them...if they decide to forget...the unrest would have not happened...if the government listened...to us...the moment...we raised our concerns (P 21)...I only blame the government...for not listening...until the situation got out of hand...the government pushed us...to behave in a manner that still surprises us (P 18)...Our government does not understand words...they understand actions...words are meaningless...It is only when we engage in violence...that the government pretends to listen (P 17).

[WHY DO PROTESTS START PEACEFULLY AND THEN TURN VIOLENT?]...We were not intending to engage in violence...we only opted for it...when we saw that peaceful mechanisms failed...our government does not listen...we wrote memoranda to the government...but the memos failed to attract government's attention...it is only actions...that attracted government to respond (P 19)...If the government cooperated with the community...the moment grievances were raised...there would have been no need for the community to protest violently...the government is responsible for turning a peaceful protest to becoming a violent one (P 18)...Anyway violent protests did not start with us...during apartheid regime...they worked...democracy was won...only through violent protests...as peaceful protests failed to win democracy...it worked before...we also took the same route...that the people engaged the government...to win democracy (P 17)...Honestly...engagement is not a well understood language...the government understands the language of chanting...and singing in the streets...while at the same time barricading roads with tree branches and burning of tyres...that is when the government starts to show interest...in community issues (P 16)...Violence would have not occurred...if the government took us seriously...the first time when we raised our concerns...we started peacefully...but when we realised that...we were hitting a rock...we then...developed mechanisms to demolish that rock (P 21)...Peace alone...at times...does not produce results (the participant shaking his head)...there is a saying...that says...actions speak louder than words...that is true...with our government...actions speak...words are meaningless...we started by delivering the memorandum peacefully...but nothing happened...in the memorandum...words were written...so when we realised that we were not getting the democratic response...that we were looking for...we mandated actions to speak for us...and indeed our actions paid off...We were given our own municipality...separate from Thulamela...as we desired (P17)...Peaceful marches...petitions...memorandas...do not attract government response...you are not going to find the government...reacting to communities that are just chanting and submitting memoranda...the government is shaken only...by communities...who act...in our situation...we started at the lower level...by submitting memoranda...when the government did not act upon the memos...we took it to another level...that is when we started to block entry and exit points...later on vandalised and torched buildings...After that...the government listened...and did what was right (P 18).

[WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF VIOLENT PROTESTS?]...Government is the major shareholder...in the eruption of violent protests...that we see in our communities (P 19)...**[Why do you see them as a major shareholder in the eruption of violent protests?]**...We really needed to be separated from Thulamela...because...service delivery under that municipality...was meant only...for areas that were near their offices...and not for us...who are located far from them...It took them many years...to fix the potholes...that were at the roads...going to Giyani...but in areas...near Thulamela...potholes were not there...as they had been fixed...service delivery under that municipality was very bad (P 19)...Thulamela Municipality took a long time...to fix problems...experienced in our area...hence we wanted to be separated...from them...and have the municipality...that we can call our own...because it would serve our interests...without compromise (P17)...Violent protests are caused by the government...the government fails to listen...to the people who put them in power...you can talk as much as you can...to show that the government does not listen...they will not deliver as requested...we are tired with the government that is unresponsive...we voted for them...we therefore expect them to deliver...and what we see is not delivery...but ignorance, silence and inactivity of the government...on community matters...that in turn affects the members of the community (P18)...Most of the times...the government does things...on their own...without consulting the community...they also take decisions that satisfy them...and not...the community that they are serving...what satisfies the community...is ignored in many instances (P 21)...Promises is all we hear...but delivery...dololo...so what can we do?...the government needed to be reminded...of the mandate...that we gave them...when we voted...we were reminding them that they have to serve the interest of the community...and not government officials' interest...you can talk on a loud hailer...as much as possible...the government will not hear it...but as soon as you damage roads...torch schools...and barricade roads...you are more likely to attract...the attention desired...we got the attention of the government...after protesting violently (P16)...The community torched buildings...and created a total shut down...looting might have been done by protesters...but I think...criminals are the ones that opened the door...that attracted members of the community to loot...knowing that the blame...would be levied on the protesters...we were crying for a standalone municipality...separate from Thulamela...and not for a pair of Nike shoes...or other properties...the timing to loot was good...but I don't think protesters are to be blamed

(P 19)...**[Who should take the blame for looting]**...Other forces...like criminals...who wanted to gain something from the situation (P 16)...Even those who did not make it to the election candidate list...might want to make the current local leadership look like failures (P 21)...Our government does not hear words...you speak to them...they hear nothing...but when you act violently...they see it...It is only anger that government understands...anger has an ability to channel people in a particular direction...people can only burn properties when they are angry...as they have indicated their grievances... but no one listened (P 17).

[COMMUNITY MEMBERS DESTROY PROPERTIES THAT SERVE THE COMMUNITY SUCH AS SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES TO ACHIEVE A GOAL]

Sometimes actions are needed...so that the government can listen...the destruction and the burning of properties was not good at all...but...the government left us with no choice...but to protest violently (P 17)...The violent part of the events was not planned to accompany the protests...it just happened within a short moment...the community cannot just plan that...when they woke up...they were going to burn schools...it just happened...at that moment when people were angry (P 19)...**[If the actions were not good, but why did you choose them?]**...Ooh...about that...we have seen communities protesting like that...on television...the government only responded when they engaged in violence...hence..we took the same route (P 16)...The government is to blame...and not the community...we did...what we did so that they can listen...they pushed us to act violently...if we did not do that...do you think they would have listened (P 18) (showing some seriousness in the face)...The government failed to respond to the request...no matter how much we knocked at their door...they did not respond...we realised that when we torched buildings...they would listen...(P 21)...Indeed they listened...when we were not angry and doing nothing...they also did not care...but when we acted violently...they listened (P 16)...We have seen communities protesting violently on television...we did just like that...our actions also received the attention of the media and people saw how unfair the government was for us...as such...the government listened...the violent protestation...helped us to achieve the goal of having a standalone municipality (P 18)...Once violent demonstrations are captured on television...political analysts and others...start to talk about it...the government is then forced to act (P 20)...People do not like to engage in violence...but we are forced by circumstances...the government

understands action more than words...the burning of properties and other violent activities are not what we wished for...but when it comes to the government...they take that seriously...as such...the goal of making them listen...was achieved (P 19)...When you just only make noise...to the government it sounds like a song...of a person who is bored...and composes a song to take away the boredom...action is what is easily recognised (P 16)...We engage in violent protests...because we saw other communities...engaging in it...and the government responded (P 21)...We act violently...to reach desired goals...not because we want to...but our government encourages us...to act violently...by ignoring to address our challenges...in most cases...the government only responds when peaceful protests...have escalated into violence (P 16)...We wrote memoranda...we went to the media...to talk about our concerns...under the Thulamela Municipality...the government did not listen to any of that...but after we protested violently...they did not only just listen...but they gave us...the standalone municipality as demanded (P 19)...To achieve a goal...sometimes...we need to show...how serious we are...by destroying properties...but at times...it backfires on people (P 18)...We negotiated for a stand-alone municipality far too long...but when our words were followed by actions...I can say a goal was achieved...even though what happened...is not something that one can decide to wake up and do...or to be proud of (P 16).

[PROTESTERS ARE HITTING AT THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DESTROY GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES DURING PROTESTS]...Not only are protesters hitting at the government...when they destroy properties...even us...the community...are highly affected...than the government...the schools that are burned in the protests...are the very same schools that our own children go to...not only does the government suffer...we suffer the most (P 18)...When protests occur...it is easy for people...to encourage each other to engage in violence...because at that time...it seems like the government is being punished...but when as an individual...you are alone...without the group that made you to believe...that the destruction of property...was an acceptable manner to show your anger...that is when it hits you most...that not only was the government punished...but you and your children as well...have been punished (P 21)...But still...in some way...the government is also punished...just as the community is punished...the government has to allocate more funds...to refurbish buildings which they thought...they were sure...that they were

done with (P 17)...It is not good at all...the burnt buildings were built for us..to use...our actions are an indication...that we are not grateful...when we are angry...we forget about the good things...and destroy them...forgetting that tomorrow is another day...we will still need those buildings (P 16).

[WHAT COMMUNITIES FEEL THEY HAVE ACHIEVED BY PROTESTING VIOLENTLY]...We feel we have made the government to respond...but...we are not proud...with the trail that we left behind...in the process...we have achieved a goal...but...on the other hand...we got punished...because children now do not have classes...where they can learn (P 17)...The goal is achieved...but I hope...that in future...the government will listen...other communities should not go through...what we went through...to get the attention of the government (P 20)...We forced the government to listen...but I am not proud...with us achieving our goal...through the use of violence...what example are we setting for our children (P 19)...It is very easy for children to learn to be violent...when they see adults behaving violently...The children of government officials...whose parents' seats at the provincial level...as they are the one to respond to demarcation of areas...are not attending the local schools...that have been set alight...or even using the roads...that have been damaged in the protests (P 16)...We won our standalone municipality...but the mechanism that we used...to force the government...is not good at all...this does not only show the government's failure...but it depicts us...as a violent community...I hate the route in which we took to achieve our goal...if there was a way that we can use to change that...I would take the opportunity...now...when you visit people...and they get to know where you are coming from...they talk about the violent nature of our behaviour (P 21)...Even our children who are attending school outside of this township...they are known as such...little mistake...they are reminded of their community...that engages in violence...to achieve their goals (P 18)...It happened...but there is nothing to be proud of (P 16)...With me I am not ashamed of what we did...the government left us with no choice...but...to do what we did to get a municipality...that is no longer under the people...who did not care about our well-being...but paid attention only to areas that were near them (P 17).

[HOW PROTESTERS FEEL WHEN THEY SEE BUILDINGS BEING DESTROYED]...At that moment it feels like a goal has been achieved...but the next day...when you pass on the street...you see ashes of what is left of a school...it causes pain...to some of us...who wish for children to be educated (P 21)...At the time...it felt like a message was sent...the smoke was a message to the government...as memoranda failed to deliver the message...that we wanted them to get...but the effects speak in opposition...to the message that was sent (P 19)...I was not impressed...to see buildings being torched...but the government left the community with no choice...if they responded quicker..we would have not experienced what we had experienced (P 17)...It is painful to go through that...but it paid off at last...we have our own standalone municipality...and no are longer depending on those who did not care...about us (P 17)...Jaa...it is true...we are benefitting from the violent route that we took...but eish (scratching his head)...it is hard...really hard...it causes pain (P 18)...Not forgetting...throwing stones at the police...who responded by throwing tear gas...just like a cat and mouse chase (P 19)...Similar events that occurred in the apartheid regime...June 16 1976...seem to have repeated itself (P 19)...When people are angry...they don't have fear...I never thought that people from this township...can engage in running battles with the police (P 17)...At that time...we were brave and united...(P 16)

[COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE CAN BE USED AS A PRODUCTIVE TOOL TO ACHIEVE DESIRED GOALS]...It worked...but the events that occurred during that time...were traumatising...to those of us...who saw them happening (P 16)...I wish communities did not have to go through that...I am pleading with the government...to respond to the grievances...before they erupt into some form of violence (P 19)...Collective violence works...the government listens to the concerns...when there is an element of violence...added to the protests...(P 17)...Criminals also get an opportunity...to enrich themselves during protests...by looting (P 21)...These criminals are the ones that exploit the situation...they start the violence...to get an opportunity to loot...other community members follow...because an opportunity has opened for everyone...to loot (P 20)...Sometimes the police response...to community protests that are not violent...incites violence...for example...the police may find people...maybe holding a meeting...and then decide to scatter them with tear gas...this may lead to the community...to react to the provocation...collectively...by throwing stones at them...in

other areas...people also set police vehicles alight...because they referring to the police) lacked a good approach...to situations which had not become violent (P 18)... The police encourage violence when they attack people who are not violent...these people may decide to participate in protests in the future and also encourage violence as a payback...to what was done to them...while they have not done anything...to deserve the punishment they got (P 21)...It would be good that the collective unity that was seen...during this protests...could be seen again...this time not engaging in collective violence...but doing something that benefits the community...the collective violence that was seen...during the protests...produced good results...but it is not good for community...to be united by violence...good things such as competitions for children...such as dramas...drum majorettes...dances as we used to have them in the past...can be revived to unite people...in the community (P 17)...During our time...the government was uniting people...by sponsoring traditional dances...drum majorettes and many more at school...these are the things that should unite the community...and not collective violence (P 16).

[MEASURES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTIES DURING PROTESTS]

...The government should start listening to the people...that they serve...if they do so...people will not be motivated...to engage in violence (P 18)...If the government could make it their mission...to explain their challenges...to the community...before they think of protesting...communities will not have any motivation...of destroying the properties that serve them (P 21)...People should also be taught...about the value of property... because they destroy properties...due to a lack of knowledge...on the costs that are levied on these properties (P 17)...Our government...in most instances...is not able to inform the community...about the costs of building certain structures...because the people awarded the tenders...are their friends...who charged unreasonable prices...as such...that information cannot be shared with the people...if people know how expensive it is to build schools...by government announcing tenders and allocating them fairly...communities will be aware of the costs...this might make them to think of other ways...than to vandalise or torch buildings (P 19)...Hungry people are not easily convinced...those who are unemployed...are the ones who have criminal intentions...when they hear that a protest is going to happen...all they think of...is to devise strategies to loot...we cannot blame them for that...it is the circumstances...that push them to use the

opportunity...when it comes (P 20)...The government should create more employment opportunities...and not tenders...as they only benefit the minority (P 17)...Yes...that will reduce the number of people...who are angry at the government...angry people are dangerous...they can recruit others to engage in violence during protests (P 16)...**[What role should the police play?]**...The police should be trained...on how to respond to protests...many times...protests that are peaceful turn into violence...because police are inadequately trained...when they see people gathering...they respond by throwing tear gas...instead of entering into negotiations with them...some people were terribly beaten by the police...they were unable to walk for some days (P 20)...Come to think of it this way...police beat you up for something that you do not know...next time when there is an outbreak of protest...you will participate...and also engage in the looting and destruction of properties...so that the next time the police beat you up...at least you will have gotten your share (P 18)...Properties that are likely to be destroyed..can be guarded by the police (P 17).

[MECHANISMS THAT CAN BE USED TO CHANNEL COMMUNITIES TO PROTEST PEACEFULLY]...Negotiations seem to be a best option...both the government and the community...should sit to work out...a solution...that will reduce the thought of engaging in violence (P 17) **[What happens if what the community wants is not achievable at that moment, will negotiations still work?]**...Communication is the best solution...if the government communicates with the communities frequently...some of the things that motivates people to engage violently...will be addressed (P 16)...We have ward councillors...who are voted for...and being paid by the government...they should do their level best...that in each quarter...they call *imbizos*...to determine how the community wants to be served...and also give report of their achievements and failures...and even future plans...this should be done before the members of the community are angry...because once they are angry...it is not easy to talk them...out of the situation (P 20)...These ward councillors also need training... they should not be left to figure things on their own...after being voted for...they must be taught...the necessary leadership skills...and how they should relate to the community (P 21)...Some people are voted into power...because they are able to talk...as such communities see them as leaders...based on that...but when it comes to serving...they tend to fail...some of them...with training...they can be able

to stand on their own and best serve the community...(P 18)...To some people...leadership skills come naturally...but some need some help...on how to manage...and they do manage with necessary support...what I am saying is...I also support that...people who are chosen to lead...should be trained...so that they can do their best...in communities (P 17)...That will reduce the community wanting to protest violently...sometimes...communities engage into violent protests...because there is a broken relationship...between them and the government representatives...but if they are shown...on how to maintain good relationships...some of the issues that motivates people to protest violently...will be solved...before protests occur (P 19)...Once people start protesting for the fixing of potholes...even if you come to show them...the approved budget and the contractor for the job...they are not going to believe it...once they have taken to the street...they cannot be easily convinced...that what they are looking for will happen soon (P 16)...In this regard communication is very important...people should know about the challenges of government...in providing them with certain services...before they become impatient (P 20)...Impatient people are dangerous...they can easily influence others...not just to protest...but to protest...while at the same time destroying properties (P 19).

[THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIOLENT PROTESTS]...Schools have been destroyed in the process...children were left with no shelter (P 17)...Information...about the progress of the children...in schools were destroyed (P 16)...Shops were closed during the protests...because of looting...as such we had to spend money...in order for us to go and buy food at Giyani...which is a distance away from us...while in our township...we were spending less for transport...when we wanted groceries...we just walked on foot to get what we needed (P 21)...Looting will scare people...who were about to establish...businesses in our area...this will also backfire on us...because our people who are not employed...will remain unemployed (P 19)...Who can wish to establish a business...in an area where people loot shops...when they are angry with their government? (P 20)...Our children learned how violence...helps a person to reach...the desired goals...it is not surprising...that there are more cases of learners acting violently...towards their teachers (P 18)...Let's just hope that...our children are not going to protest violently...against us...they were there when the protests took place...they saw the level of violence that emerged...it will not be surprising...that

when we have different views with them...they break glasses (P 20)...Children have lost time in schools..that they should have used for learning (P 17).

ANNEXURE P: TURNITIN PLAGIARISM REPORT

motivational factors for violent protests

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ANNEXURE Q: LANGUAGE EDITORIAL LETTER 1



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Private Bag X1106, Sovenga, 0727,
South Africa Tel: 015 268 2502
Email: valery.mashiane@ul.ac.za


10 October 2020

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: THESIS EDITING

This serves as proof and confirmation I, Mmetlane Valery Mashiane, edited the thesis titled “**A Study of Motivational Factors of Violent Protests in Malamulele and Vuwani, Limpopo Province**” by **Olinda Ruth Chabalala**, student number **9910533**. Further, I confirm that unless changes on the afore-titled document have been effected after the editing, I am content that all grammatical errors of this thesis have been eliminated.

Yours Faithfully



Mrs M. V. Mashiane
(Editor)

ANNEXURE R: LANGUAGE EDITORIAL LETTER 2



You Write. We Edit. You Love it.

15 November 2021

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: CONFIRMATION OF LANGUAGE EDITING SERVICES: OLINDA RUTH CHABALALA

I confirm that I have done language editing for OLINDA RUTH CHABALALA's thesis titled:

A STUDY OF MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF VIOLENT PROTESTS IN MALAMULELE AND VUWANI, LIMPOPO PROVINCE

The thesis now conforms to the University of Limpopo's language editing standards.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Lynn N Sibanda Moyo".

Lynn N Sibanda Moyo

Tel: 011 050 0376

Mobile: 071 989 0983

Email: lynn@lovetoedit.co.za

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ANNEXURE S: ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE



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TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
ETHICS CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

MEETING: 10 July 2020

PROJECT NUMBER: TREC/394/2017:PG - Renewed: 10 July 2020

PROJECT:

Title: A study of motivational factors of violent protests in Malamulele and Vuwani, Limpopo province

Researcher: OR Chabalala

Supervisor: Prof J Barkhuizen

Co-Supervisor/s: N/A

School: Social Sciences

Degree: PhD Criminology and Criminal Justice

PROF P MASOKO

CHAIRPERSON: TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

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Note:

- i) This Ethics Clearance Certificate will be valid for one (1) year, as from the abovementioned date. Application for annual renewal (or annual review) need to be received by TREC one month before lapse of this period.
- ii) Should any departure be contemplated from the research procedure as approved, the researcher(s) must re-submit the protocol to the committee, together with the Application for Amendment form.
- iii) PLEASE QUOTE THE PROTOCOL NUMBER IN ALL ENQUIRIES.

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