

**A Comparative Afrocentric Analysis of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa:
The case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe, 2010 to 2018**

By

Lebogang Tiego Legodi

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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in

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in the

Faculty of Humanities


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of the

University of Limpopo

Supervisor: Prof. K.B. Shai

2021



DECLARATION

I declare that **A Comparative Afrocentric Analysis of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe, 2010 to 2018** hereby submitted to the University of Limpopo, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Politics has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other university; that it is my work in design and in execution, and all material contained herein has been duly acknowledged.

Legodi, L.T. (Miss)

05.10.2021

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Surname, Initials (title)

Date

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To my family, I would love to thank my mother Nthabiseng Irene Legodi for always being the shadow beneath my wings. Your support and belief in me has always been a reservoir to draw inspiration whenever I felt depleted in terms of intellectual and other forms of strength. *Ke a leboga Kgokana'aka*. To my sisters, Mpho Elizabeth Legodi and Kabelo Mashila Legodi as well as my niece, Mogau Sebolaishi Legodi; I hope this work will serve as inspiration that you can indeed achieve anything you put your mind to. To the rest of the Legodi and Phahlane family, thank you for believing in me.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my father Mr Lesiba Stephen Legodi and my grandmother Sebolaishi Lucy Phahlane.

Abstract

This thesis analyses China's foreign policy towards Africa. Given that the rich literature on the discourse employs "traditional" theories such as realism, liberalism and social constructivism, the researcher employs an alternative theory of Afrocentricity on China-Africa relations. As an emerging theory in International Politics that is grounded and orientated in African value systems, Afrocentricity provides an alternative perspective in making sense of Global South relations. The study further makes use of case study design to make a comparative analysis of China's engagement in Africa. The two African states utilised as case studies includes Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively. The usage of two case studies allowed the researcher to showcase how internal politics of African states influence to some extent; China's engagements in the continent.


Despite the two China-Africa policy of 2006 and 2015, this thesis argues that China's relations with each African state is unique. The generalisation on several findings of China's engagement with one African state observed in the existing literature enforces the epistemic violence on the rest of African states in terms of the explanation and understanding of their bilateral relations with China. This is so because China's engagement with one state cannot be regarded as a microcosm of China's engagement with the rest of African states in formal diplomatic relations with it. Unlike the dominant theories that problematise China-Africa relations, Afrocentricity proposes a holistic approach on making sense of Sino-Africa relations.

The thesis comparatively explore China's foreign policy towards Zambia and Zimbabwe from the year 2010 to 2018. In doing so, qualitative approach was conducted. Data source triangulation was utilised in addressing the research problem to enhance the credibility and dependability of the study. The study made use of thematic analysis by analysing data by theme and sub-themes. The thesis finds that China's relations with African states is still a debated terrain with different views. The views can be quite misleading if focused on one specific state or project under study.

More so, China's engagements become more explicit when explored at both regional and continental context. The study further denotes the ignored reality that China does not only prioritise rich oil states in the continent. Instead, there are quite a number of interests pursued by China in Africa such as mineral resources; investments, markets as well as farming and commercial agriculture driving China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively. The thesis also reflects on China's extent of abiding to the principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Amongst the recommendations of this study and way forward is that future research on China-Africa relations could explore other African states in bilateral relations with it. This would assist in deviating from the generalised view of China-Africa relations which is not detailed and does not assist in showcasing comprehensive reality on the ground. Alternatively, scholars can consider the same case studies and make use of different delimitations to help detect if there is any gradual shift of China's foreign policy from the years focused in this study. Upcoming works can consider contributions of China-Africa relations from a non-western perspective such as Afrocentricity employed in this study.

Keywords: Africa; Afrocentricity; China; Foreign policy; Public diplomacy; Zambia; Zimbabwe



Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	Africa Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAF	Central African Federation
CCP	China Communist Party
CCS	Centre for Chinese Studies
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China- Africa Cooperation
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MMD	Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals

NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PF	Patriotic Front
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAIIA	South African Institute for International Affairs
SST	South-South Cooperation
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
TAZARA	Tanzania-Zambia Railway
UN	United Nations
UN	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU

Zimbabwe African People's Union

ZANU PF

Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

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Section A (General Perspectives)

Chapter 1: Contextual Orientation of the Study

1.1. Identification of the research theme

The People's Republic of China (PRC, hereinafter interchangeably referred to as China) is one of the leading economies in the world today, forming part of the Global South states. Because of its growing economy, China had to change its foreign policy as a way of adapting to the shifts occurring in the global community. It is for the above reason that China today positions itself as an active participant in the global arena, especially following its sanctions after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, and its admission in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the year 2001. From its "open door" policy, China's politics moved from the politics centred on ideology to that of economic cooperation, a total shift of Beijing (the administrative hub and capital of China) of just being a donor and bystander in world politics (Muekalia, 2004).

Although there has been a number of critiques by scholars, the media and the public at large with regards to China's sudden active participation at the global stage, it should be noted that the PRC has been treading carefully with its engagements with states in formal relations with it. Still adhering to the five principles of peaceful co-existence (hereinafter referred to as "The Five Principles") namely, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit as well as peaceful co-existence as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. China also had to consider external factors of states in bilateral relations with it influencing change in its foreign policy more than domestic ones (Zhu, 2010). Even in this case, it should be noted that external factors that prompted the changes in China's foreign policy have been beneficial to China.

Given that Sino-Africa relations date way back from the Ming Dynasty in 1368-1644, this study considers the Bandung Conference of 1955, where southern global states

came together to address their common challenges and stance against anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism (Zhu, 2010). It was from the 1955 conference that China established its first bilateral relations with already independent African states—with Egypt being the first (Adem, 2013). Be that as it may, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, which were part of Central African Federation (CAF), were invited to the conference but did not participate (Appadorai 1955, Tarling 1992, Khudori 2015 & Lumumba-Kasongo 2015). China's growing establishment of bilateral relations with African states became even more evident with the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000; a watershed moment in terms of continued relations between China and Africa.

Given that currently China is Africa's biggest trading partner, its presence in the African continent cannot be ignored, hence its engagements with the African continent has dominated both intellectual and public discourse. The questions about its presence, engagements, role and changes have centred this discourse. Despite this, China's relations with Africa has continued being understood through the usage of traditional theories of International Relations (IR) such as realism, liberalism and social constructivism (Rapanyane & Shai, 2020). It is worth noting that the researcher knows very little scholarly intervention to this growing discourse through the employment of theories from the Global South. In instances where the literature is available, it is somewhat western centred using traditional theories of IR, and generalised, failing to provide an African centred or Global South perspective on China-Africa relations. This study uses the year 2010 as a starting point in analysing China's relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe. The study ends in the year 2018. The historical significance of the periodical focus of this study, duration of eight years (2010-2018) is considered because in terms of China-Africa relations; the year 2010 marked a decade since the formation of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). It is important to note that during the selected period, China has already established relations with all African states with exception of Kingdom of Eswatini (hereinafter referred to as Eswatini). This is so because of the One China policy and Eswatini recognising the Republic of China (ROC) instead. When looking on the side of China, 2010 was in the middle of President Hu Jintao's second term and subsequently the coming into office of president Xi Jinping in 2013. In addition, Jinping was appointed for his second term as president of China in the year 2018. Delving into the two case studies, Zambia in 2010 had

president Rupiah Banda as president from the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). In the year 2011, the country had a change in political party rule with Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF) being president of the country. Following his death in 2014, Acting Vice President, Guy Scott took over until the presidential bi-election in the year 2015. President Edgar Lungu won and became president and 2018 captures his stance and role as Zambian president. Lastly, looking into Zimbabwe 2010 was already three decades of President Robert Mugabe as president of the country until his resignation in 2017 and President Emmerson Mnangangwa as the country's third president following political independence in the year 1980. The selected period and mentioned reasons are considered by the current researcher as adequate for painting a qualitatively rich picture of China's foreign policy towards selected African states. In particular, Zambia and Zimbabwe were chosen as the test cases for the proposed comparative study of China's foreign policy towards Africa. This is because China has established and maintained historic bilateral ties with the two Southern African countries, in spite of their radically different domestic politics (Mudavanhu, 2014; Leslie, 2016).

1.2. Research Problem

Currently, there exists a plethora of literature on China-Africa relations underpinned by state-centric theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism respectively (Botha, 2006 and Lumumba-Kasongo 2015). Given that rich existing literature employs traditional theories of International Politics the researcher makes use of alternative theory on the problem under study. There is no gainsaying that the 'traditional' theories of International Politics are influenced by Euro-American cultural value systems; hence the overly produced narrative of China-Africa relations. The researcher proposes the usage of an emerging alternative theory in IP from the South, which is African centred. This subaltern theory is poised to provide a different interpretation and enhance the existing literature; correcting the current epistemic violence in International Politics of abusing and misusing "traditional" theories that are "universalised", and unsilence the voices from the South, which are still emerging in International Politics.

1.3. Operational definition of concepts

This section conceptualises and contextualizes the two terms that will be used frequently in this study that is; foreign policy and diplomacy.

1.3.1. Foreign policy

The term foreign policy has no one linear definition. Hence, the researcher makes use of Heywood (2014), Plano and Otlon (1969:127) definition on what foreign policy entails. According to Heywood (2014:134) foreign policy refers, broadly, to attempts by governments to influence or manage events outside the state's borders, usually, but not exclusively, through their relations with foreign governments. Foreign policy-making involves the establishment of goals and the selection of means to achieve them. Heywood further goes on to explain that "in view of the increased interpenetration of domestic and foreign affairs in modern global politics, the term 'external relations' policy is sometimes preferred to foreign policy, allowing for interactions that take place on multiple levels and which involve multiple actors. At the very least, the realm of foreign policy can no longer be confined simply to relations between foreign ministers/ministries or between national diplomatic services. Plano and Olton (1969:127) assert, "the foreign office of any state be it an executive agency charged with the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is the vehicle through which the bulk of relations with other countries is conducted-other names for foreign office include foreign ministry, ministry of foreign affairs, and the department of state. It should be understood that foreign policy stems from public policy and emanate from public institutions (Brown & Roux, 2003).

To support this view Northenge (1968:15) defined foreign policy as simply an interplay between the outside and the inside. Foreign policy entails the means, strategies and approaches used by government of one state to achieve goals with other states governments and non-state actors (Du Plessis, 2006). Below, the researcher explains diplomacy, which is argued by Claassen (2014) to be an instrument of foreign policy which catalyses foreign policy objectives.

1.3.2. [Public] Diplomacy

Diplomacy remains the “engine room” of international relations
-Cohen (1998)

Similar to foreign policy, the concept diplomacy does not have one fixed definition and has evolved over time. Originally, the concept is derived from the Greek word *diploma*, which means folded document. Diplomacy is linked to the study of official hand writing and the idea of credentials confirming the claims of the bearer. In International Relations (IR), scholars such as James (1980:941) define diplomacy as the conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of accredited representatives and the use of those representatives to advance the interests of the appointing state. For the purpose of this thesis, it should be noted that in countries such as the United States [of America] (US), the term diplomacy is quite broad and is used synonymously with statecraft, foreign policy and international relations in general (Sharp, 1999: 37). It should be noted that the term diplomacy shifts beyond state and government and involves other actors in terms of scope, spectrum and dimension. As a tool of foreign policy, diplomacy lessens costs of achieving the state’s goals as it augments states legitimacy and attractiveness within the eyes of the international community (Nye, 2004:13).

There are different types of diplomacy and below the researcher unpacks public diplomacy as a tool of China’s foreign policy. Besides this, the researcher deems it necessary to unpack public diplomacy to differentiate it from other types in IR.

Public diplomacy includes communication by one government not directly to another government but to the public at large as a way of influencing their views on their own government. Rawnsley (2012:42) defines public diplomacy as “...dealing with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy, the cultivation of government’s public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communications between those whose job is communication, as

diplomats and foreign correspondents, and the process of intellectual communications”.

Vhumbunu (2019:170) acknowledges features of public diplomacy which have transformed the international relations landscape as:

1. *The inclusion of non-state actors in the conduct of diplomacy*
2. *Broadening the focus on targeted audience to influence not only the attitudes, perceptions, behavior of foreign publics but also the domestic audience*
3. *Understanding the needs, culture, tradition and peoples of other countries*
4. *Representing different views of the various players*
5. *Building and maintaining positive relationships through government-to-people interaction programs projects, exchanges and collaborations at home and abroad.*

Public diplomacy moves from state-centricity to include players such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society players and activists, multi-national corporations (MNCs), business community, private citizens, researchers and think tanks, universities, the media and non-state actors (Vhumbunu, 2019:170).

Public diplomacy presents an alternative approach of communication in international relations that broadens the receiving audience as it involves foreign representatives and foreign publics. As such, it tries to understand ways in which states forward information to the public and how that information is received. It is a formalised and institutionalised way of communication by governments as it presents important method to meet foreign policy goals and expand international relations.

It is important to note the difference between public diplomacy and propaganda as although the two have the same goals which is to influence public attitudes and opinion; they do not mean the same thing. Public diplomacy has been adopted as an alternative way of shifting from a state-centric approach. As such, public diplomacy is both an instrument of foreign policy (to inform foreign publics of national interests) and a method of diplomacy (to implement and meet foreign policy goals (Claassen, 2014:18).

1.4. Purpose of the study

1.4.1. The aim of the study

The aim of the study is to comparatively China's foreign policy towards Zambia and Zimbabwe from the year 2010 to 2018.

1.4.2. Objectives of the study

To achieve the above aim, the thesis delves into the following objectives:

- To describe China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective;
- To comparatively determine China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the new millennia;
- To locate China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe within a regional and continental context; and
- To comparatively reflect on the extent to which China abides by the five principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe.

1.5. Organisation of the study

Section A (General Perspectives)

The three chapters of this section covers the research question itself as well as steps undertaken to conduct the study. It also incorporates the dominant theoretical perspectives on the research objectives as well as the method that the researcher undertook to conduct the study.

Chapter 1: Contextual Orientation of the Study

This chapter brings about the background of the study as well as its aim and objectives. In addition, the operational concepts of the study are provided in this section.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter reviews the existing literature around the question under study. This is done carefully by examining theoretical orientations that informed the operationalization of the research for the existing works.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

This chapter deliberates on the method used when conducting this study. Aspects such as research design, data collection and sampling are incorporated in this chapter. More also, ethical considerations are addressed here.

Chapter 4: China's foreign policy towards Africa: A historical perspective

This chapter is a historical [re]presentation of China's foreign policy towards Africa. It incorporates the three periods of China-Africa relations detailing events that occurred throughout that shapes the relations in the period under review

Chapter 5: The symbiotic relations between China and Africa

This chapter examines the symbiotic relations between China and Africa. In interpreting the data, the chapter includes the thematic categories established by the researcher in making sense of the relations throughout time.

Chapter 6: China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe

This chapter provides a comparative analyses of China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively. The researcher introduces the history of the relations with the two states and then deliberates on China's key interests in each African state.

Chapter 7: China's engagement in Zimbabwe and Zambia within regional and continental context

This chapter considers China's engagement with Zambia and Zimbabwe beyond each sovereign state. That is, it delves on how China's engagements with the two African states within the regional and continental context underplays.

Chapter 8: China abiding to principles of peaceful co-existence in its relation with Zambia and Zimbabwe

This chapter reflects on the extent to which China abides to the principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe. The chapter considers the works of scholars who deliberated on the Five Principles as a whole and/or individually and then considers the views of informants interviewed in this study.

Chapter 9: General Conclusion(s)

This chapter summarises each chapter of the thesis and further concludes on the findings of each. It incorporates significance, implications as well as recommendations for future studies.

The next chapter reviews existing literature on China-Africa relations. This is done by carefully scrutinising the theoretical framework used in making sense of China-Africa relations.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

Literature review is the backbone which new research can be founded upon. Hart (1998:13) defines literature review as the selection of available documents (both published and unpublished) on the topic. The selected documents must contain information, data and evidence written from a particular standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic. More also, the literature selected and reviewed must state how it relates to what is being investigated, and the effective evaluation of the documents in relation to the present research. In addition, Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole (2013) simply explain that literature review involves searching for available literature on the problem under investigation. In reviewing literature that responds to the problem under investigation, it is important to note that literature on China-Africa is immense. Adem (2013:xvi) supports the above by stating that more articles and books on China-Africa relations have been written in the last 10 years than in the preceding 50 years, all combined.

In reviewing literature for this study, the researcher considers books, journal articles, dissertations and conference papers from disciplines such as Political Science, Economics, Public Administration and Sociology, *inter alia*. To be specific, the works of scholars who contributed immensely on the discourse is scrutinised. This includes scholars such as Shelton (2001), Taylor (2005; 2006a; 2007), Tull (2006) Alden (2007), Botha (2006), Large (2008), Le Pere (2007), Le Pere and Shelton (2007), Mohan and Lampert (2013), Simbao (2012), and Zhu (2010) Adem (2013).

Firstly, the chapter dissects literature that explores China-Africa relations broadly as a way of familiarising oneself with the ongoing themes on China-Africa relations. In the same breath, the researcher through the eye of a needle specifically reviews the literature that focuses solely on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations. This is done so as to expose the results and limitations of existing literature as the researcher

dissects the dominating theories underpinning the existing data on China Africa, particularly China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe respectively. It is worth noting that the reviewed literature is not done chronologically but classified according to the theories employed when conducting the work.

2.2. China-Africa Relations

2.2.1. The three dominating views on China-Africa Relations

Alden (2009) views China-Africa relations in three lenses: China as a development partner, as a competitor, and as a coloniser. Alden further states that China as a development partner is due to the increased establishment of bilateral relations between her and African states, as well as strategic and comprehensive strategic partnerships. China's South-South cooperation in the global South continues to be deliberate compared to the ideological and aid without attachment before the colonialism and political independence of African states. China as a competitor is showcased when she seeks raw materials to develop its economy further. In the same manner, African states seek human and infrastructural developments to compete in the global arena. The last lens of China as a coloniser is perceived when the exchange of raw materials perhaps for infrastructure is taking place. China is then regarded as the new coloniser that seeks to exploit African resources for 'mere' exchange of infrastructure or finished goods.

In the same breath, Adem (2013) accounts for China-Africa relations in three strands. Adem uses the relations in terms of the West's attitudes towards Africa. The first attitude is said to be Sino-optimism. This positive attitude summarises China's positive relations in the form of formal diplomatic relations and partnerships between China and African states. The second attitude of Sino-pragmatism refers to the sudden active participation of China in African states' domestic and international politics; somewhat portraying African states as bystanders lacking agency and threatening their own sovereignty and that of their regional organisations such as the African Union (AU). The third and final attitude that Adem (2013) uses to analyse China-Africa relations is Sino-pessimism, which is a negative view of China-Africa relations. This view is

prompted by the fact that China is re-colonising Africa in the 21st century, which attitude follows the 1800s colonisation of Africa by European powers.

The shared views by Alden (2009) and Adem (2013) are not entirely unique from those shared by quite a number of scholars who write on China-African relations. In fact, a lot of literature on China-Africa relations draws their understanding from the works of the two mentioned scholars. Due to their contribution on China-Africa relations, the works of Alden (2009) and Adem (2013) continue to build and shape our understanding of the role of the Chinese in Africa.

There no gain saying that the works of the above scholars which views China's relations with Africa as either the new coloniser, the developmental partner or competitor as Alden unpacks them is influenced by making sense of this relations through the traditional theory of IR. This is evident as the usage of the findings of Adem (2013) tends to now [re]produces the same findings with scholars such as Alden (2009) now making use of attitudes to makes sense of China-Africa relations.

Another literature that perpetuate the growing discourse of the Chinese being regarded as "the new coloniser" is that of Large (2008). In his work titled "Beyond "Dragon in the Bush: The Study of China-Africa relations" emphasises the need to study the under-researched relations between China and African states. This is because the relations between China and African states simply referred to as China being the dragon and Africa being the bush. The above view is projected and overly emphasised by Western media coverage. The USA is known to be observing carefully the growing relations between China and African states. This is done so as the USA is known for its advocacy for democracy and human rights. Unlike Washington DC (the USA administrative capital); China does not prioritise issues such as democracy and human rights. As such, the USA has been closely watching China's non-active role to African governments who continue to abuse their power and fail to respect amongst others human rights in the state they govern. Despite the foregoing observation, it is worth highlighting that even USA's commitment to the democracy and human rights cause is questionable due to its standards. At the end, it can be

deduced that the commitment of both China and USA to lofty and liberal goals such as democracy and human rights is below the par. The only difference is that USA has a propensity to at times use liberal goals to hide its strategic interests, which are normally based on economic imperatives (Shai, 2016).

The work of Large (2008) also, tends to portray Africa as a bystander which lacks agency in its relations with China. This is not a unique finding on Sino-Africa relations as there is a growing narrative in Sino-African literature that view Africa as a ground for further exploitation by the West or the East.

Scholars such as Taylor (2007) and Zhu (2010) have in their works piloted China's foreign policy towards African states from a historical perspective. Their works emanate from the Tiananmen Square events leading to the isolation of China in the international space. Both Taylor (2007) and Zhu (2010) state that the isolation of China after the events that took place at the Tiananmen Square gave China sufficient time to work on the country's public policy as well as the states' internal politics. This period of the Chinese's isolation and internal growing is known today as China's "looking in" policy. The western sanctions to China as well as the international neglect that China experienced has positively influenced her active participation after the upliftment of sanctions, as well as her inclusion in the WTO in the year 2001.

The above scholarly explanations provide an alternative perspective of China's foreign policy to Africa. That is, the emergence of concepts such as "looking in" policy by China as well as the emergence of "all weather friend" by Chinese and African states where African countries remaining a loyal ally to China when the state received a lot of critique by the West over the Tiananmen Square incident. It is for this reason amongst others that China felt like it owes its allegiance to African countries for their political support when its sovereignty and reputation in global politics was questioned.

Li, Liu, Pan, Zeng and He (2012) in their discussion paper titled "FOCAC Twelve Years Later: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Forward" deliberate on the triple transformation of China Africa relations from the 1960s to the 1980 and the current millennia. Li et al. (2012) state that China's triple transformation with Africa includes

the ideological emphasis was dropped in favour of neutrality in the domain, bilateral exchanges were no longer conducted exclusively through political channels but through economic, commercial, technological and agricultural circuits and shift in the area of cooperation from simple aid to 'win-win' strategy.

In as much as this section will look into China's foreign policy towards African states, it should be noted that Africans beyond the level of political elites have engaged China. As such, have to some extent negotiated, shaped and driven Chinese engagement. This is backed by the work of scholars such as Mohan and Lampert (2013). Although this work looks specifically into how Angola and its citizens have driven benefits with the relations with China.

Kuang (2008) explore the Chinese migration to Africa and how that has shaped the PRCs foreign policy with African states. In his special issue titled "The new Chinese migration flows to Africa" studies migratory movements from China to Africa. It is in this study that three kinds of migrants are known in this study that is (1) labour migration within the frame of public works realised by Chinese enterprise (2) An entrepreneurial migration composed of traders (3) proletarian migration in transit in Africa waiting for opportunities to go on to European countries. Kuang describes the above mentioned migrations and how they relate to the PRC's foreign policy towards Africa. The three major Chinese movements are either (1) temporary labour migration in connection with major public construction projects (2) Entrepreneurial migration-mainly connected with trade or (3) transitory proletarian migration.

With respect to Temporary labour migration, Chinese businesses operating in Africa are said to be active in exploitation of raw materials such as oil, minerals amongst others. The large public works projects are carried out in the framework of international bids or direct agreements between China and the countries concerned. The Chinese companies import the labour, managers and the necessary material for carrying out the work. At the end of the construction, most of the personnel go back to China. On entrepreneurial migration, there is a more widespread movement. Chinese merchants have migrated on a global scale in conjunction with China's rising products of consumer goods. Chinese shopkeepers are now found all over the world. Lastly,

Kuang delves into transit proletarian migration and states that along temporary labour migration associated with large public works and merchant migration is transit proletarian migration made up of persons seeking to sell their labour abroad and preferably in the economically developed countries. These migrants provide labour for the clothing industry, corner stores and restaurants. Some women are employed as maids in upper-middle class Chinese households.

Considering the above, the relationship between international migration and foreign policies has recently come under scrutiny as immigration policies are increasingly important issue for international relations. From this standpoint. It is interesting to see Chinese migratory trends alongside the orientations of China's African foreign policy.

Sun (2014) in his work titled "Africa in China's foreign policy" argues that China's approach to Africa meets the African countries' need for funding and infrastructure. Apparently, this is the reason why China's engagement in Africa is widely criticised (Sun, 2014:1). Studies of China's Africa strategy focused on China's economic interests in Africa, the role played by Chinese government and companies and the economic and social impacts such as activities on the ground. Because of China's economic interests in Africa, it has received critiques of its behaviour being regarded selfish and evil as its interest blurs it from improving governance and sustainable future (Sun, 2014:1). Nevertheless, it is argued that it is not the primary responsibility of China to improve governance in Africa. This should be the mission and vision shouldered by Africans. The little that China and other international partners could do in this regard is to support Africa's sound governance initiatives. The foregoing analysis should be understood with the context that democratic governance that is imposed/ exported and not brewed within is unsustainable. Sun further argues that China's interests in Africa's natural resources include four dimensions of national interest: political, economic, security and ideological. Africa's rich natural resources and underdeveloped market potential create abundant business potential for Chinese business players.

Sun further identifies China's political interests in Africa and states that Beijing identified Africa's newly independent nation states as a key group with which to unite. China saw natural common ground and sense of empathy with Africa as a result of

their shared historical experiences: Africa and China were both victims of colonisation by the capitalists and imperialists (Sun, 2014:3).

During the Cultural Revolution under the influence of radical revolutionary ideology, China provided large amounts of foreign aid to Africa, despite China's own domestic economic difficulties. This included the famous Tanzania-Zambia Railway: China supplied a zero-interest loan and the railway remains one of the largest foreign aid projects contributed to the establishment of diplomatic relations between a group of African countries and China (Sun, 2014:4). In terms of Africa's political importance, China's overarching goal historically has been diplomatic recognition from African nations and the establishment of official ties that strengthen the political legitimacy of the communist regime (Sun, 2014:4). China on diplomatic support and cooperation from African countries key issues in the international arena and multinational forums. China has relied on African countries support at the United Nations for its political agenda. In 1972, China learned of Africa's political importance and value when 26 African countries voted for PRC to resume its seat at the UN. African votes represented more than one-third of the countries who supported the resolution. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square events of 1989, Beijing was faced with serious international isolation and western sanctions. Again, it was six countries in Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique) that stepped up and saved China from the quagmire by inviting Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen to visit in August 1989.

In appreciation for this political favour, China was reciprocated by the making Africa the first destination of Chinese foreign ministries in the new year every year since 1991. China's political aspiration in its relationship is to end Taiwan's diplomatic presence on the continent. For Beijing, it is a matter of fundamental regime legitimating that Africa embraces the One China policy and accepts Beijing rather than Taipei as the only lawful representative of China. Currently, one African country maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan namely Eswatini. This partly explains why China does not have diplomatic relationship with China.

In terms of economic interests with Africa, Sun (2014) goes on to explain how the Chinese officials have consistently emphasised that, for the major part of the past

decade, China's goal in Africa has never been the economic benefits. Given the above political aspiration it is safe to argue that Beijing views Africa first through the lens of political rather than economic benefits. Chinese analysts argue that with or without the economic benefits, Africa would have been important for China (Sun, 2014 and Hananuer & Morris 2014). The six decades of Sino-African economic relations can be roughly be divided into three stages (Sun, 2014). From 1949 to 1979, China's economic activities in Africa were motivated by China's political agenda focused on providing economic assistance to newly independent African nation states to build diplomatic relations to support Africa's anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism struggle and win the PRC internationally. From 1979 to 1990s themed China's Reform and Opening Up, China's foreign policy shifted to supporting domestic economic development. The shift directly resulted in the gradual adjustment of China's priorities for its Africa policy from extracting political favours to "mutually beneficial economic cooperation" and from providing assistance to promoting "service contracts, investments and trade".

China had its eyes in Africa for its market potential. Chinese manufacturing industries enjoy unique advantage of producing textiles, electronics and other products at a relatively low price which fits the market demand of its less-developed African countries. When the demand for Chinese goods shrank from stagnant Western economies, China's export industries had to resort to alternative market to fill the void (Sun, 2014:6). China seeks to upgrade its industrial economy and move up in the global supply chain, Africa, with its vast and untapped labour resources is identified as the ideal location for China's labour-intensive industries. By relocating low-skilled jobs and more capital-intensive, high tech industries and jobs to improve its own development model and quality (Sun, 2014:6). The Chinese government actively promotes investment in Africa through concessional loans, commercial loans and regular and preferential export buyer's credits (Sun, 2014:7).

Sun (2014: 9-10) in respect to China's security interest in Africa adds that there are several types of security threats for Chinese nationals on the ground. Attacks of Chinese projects due to labour disputes and illegal activities by Chinese companies include:

- October 2010, unrest at Collum coal mine in Zambia led to local mining workers being shot and wounded by Chinese managers and three Chinese being injured.
- August 2012, Chinese manager was killed following a pay dispute at the Collum Coal mine in Zambia.

At the state level, domestic political turmoil and regime changes inside African countries have created the most serious threat to the safety of Chinese investment and nationals. China's security interests in Africa are mostly defensive and aimed at protecting its existing economic interests and citizens. The failure to protect the former jeopardises China's economic benefits from Africa, which China needs to fuel domestic growth.

Lastly, Sun touches on China's ideological interests in Africa and assert that historically, during the Cold War and before China's reform and opening up, ideology had been the main factor determining China's policy towards African countries. This ideology-driven policy resulted in massive aid to Africa despite China's own economic difficulties and was gradually abandoned after 1979. Since then, China no longer uses ideology, communism, socialism or capitalism to determine its relationship to political parties and countries in Africa. Instead, it has developed broad relations with all African countries that embrace the One China Policy. Beijing would like to see anti-western, non-democratic governments grow and prosper in Africa, simply because they help validate China's political system and mitigate its international isolation by showing that western democracy is not a universal value and that the western democratic system does not have to apply in every country. Therefore, any success of authoritarian governments in Africa, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe and the DRC are in and of themselves seen as constituting support for the legitimacy of the CPP (Sun, 2014:120). Sino-African economic relations are at a historical high since 1949. These include rising security threats to Chinese citizens present in Africa, the negative impacts of the mercantilist policy of China over Sino-African relations, and the reputational risks generated by Chinese actors over-emphasising economic benefits and neglecting Africa's long term needs.

The next section looks into the works of scholars who view China-Africa relations from a binary perspective. That is China being either good or bad to Africa. This includes the findings of scholars such as Keenan (2009) and Le Pere (2008).

2.2.2. Binary views on China-Africa relations: Cure or Curse/ Friend or Foe

The new millennia came with a sudden boom of critique on China-Africa relations where there was a growing binary understanding of Sino-Africa relations. This “sudden boom” should be understood with the availability of news to the people; making it easier for the public to have informed opinions on Sino-Africa relations. Not only that, the literature produced in the 2000s received immense critique as most of the work was influenced extensively by the Western media following China’s forging of diplomatic relations with majority of African states (Malone 2008; Blair 2005).

Using terms that define China-Africa relations as either a cure or curse or China as a friend or foe; this section will review literature of scholars who regarded China- Africa relations as either good or bad. It is also worth mentioning that this binary view is fuelled by the need to study China-Africa relations from the politico-economic perspective. This however is relevant and cannot be shied away as since the millennia, Chinese imports, companies and citizens have flooded the African continent (Cisse 2012, Alao 2014 and Chun 2014).

Botha (2006) in his dissertation titled “China in Africa: Friend or Foe? China’s contemporary political and economic relations with Africa” explores China’s interest in the African continent after the end of the Cold War with two dominating views on China-Africa relations at the time. One view was on China’s increasing involvement in Africa being beneficial and the second being on whether there are negative consequences. Botha’s work attempts to answer to the two above questions by exploring the nature of China’s political, economic and aid relationships with the African continent from four countries, namely: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Sudan. Botha (2006) argues that China’s interests in Africa are motivated primarily by

economics and diplomacy were Africa's vast source of resources feed China's growing manufacturing base and source of energy security. Also, Africa is China's important destination for affordable goods. On diplomacy, China positions itself as an important power in the international system and promotes own views and policies within multilateral organisations where Africa plays key role in institutions with "one-country-one-vote" arrangements. China attempts to court African governments in order to secure access to Africa's vast resources as well as to garner support for its policies in the international arena.

Botha posits that China-Africa relations fits within a realist explanatory framework where China's engagement with Africa is based on strategic political and economic considerations. Despite China's negative involvement in Africa, the paper argues that blame should also be shifted to corrupt African governments and elites who operate within a framework of neo-patrimonial politics which exacerbates corruption and mal-governance on the continent. Botha's work only focuses on the economic interest of China in Africa and fails to find reasons of China's presence and sudden active participation in the African continent.

In addition, scholars such as Jiang (2009), Zhu (2010) and Shinn (2009) critique the rise of China in Africa and their pursuit of resources in the African continent. For instance, Zhu (2010) and Shinn (2009) review China's energy diplomacy and that because of its growing industrialised state, China strategically establishes bilateral relations with oil rich countries in Africa irrespective of the internal politics of that particular state. For instance, with Sudan China went on to build oil refineries despite the international sanctions imposed on Sudan following it violating the human rights of its citizens (Legodi, 2019). Larry and Morris (2014) as well as Le Pere (2007) also contributed to the discourse of China's oil diplomacy in the African continent. Le Pere (2007) and Larry and Morris (2014) however in their works look at how China's oil diplomacy is used in exchange of providing infrastructure to African states.

Hanauer and Morris (2014) also commented on the similar colonial behaviour of the Chinese in Africa. The two scholars state that Chinese companies dump their produced products to Africa for consumption. This happens despite the fact that they

are affordable. But they put local business out of the market as they fail to compete with the cheap products of the Chinese. Not only that, the Chinese also sell military equipment and weapons to some of Africa's terrorists to fuel the ongoing civil wars and coups in the African continent. This in itself clashes with China's adherence to not interfering in domestic politics of states but being more of a third party as long as it does not hinder with the interests of China in that particular state. Large and Patey (2014) trace how China has over the years used the exchange infrastructure to African states for raw materials. A number of infrastructural projects such as roads, railways and airports project in Africa were constructed by Chinese companies.

Drawing from the above literature on China-Africa relations; one cannot ignore the primary interest of China in establishing bilateral and multilateral relations with African states and Africa's regional organisations such as Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the continental organisation such as the AU. As it is tradition in IR, states pursue first their national interest. This is the case with China's quest for resources and energy diplomacy in Africa.

It must be known that there are other factors that lure China to establish relations with African states. Hence, bilateral relations between China and Africa is not only evident in rich resource countries only but also states which do not have abundance minerals. To focus only on China's energy diplomacy is to commit an injustice to China's role and motivations to forming bilateral relations with other states which are significant in China's way of wanting to isolate Taiwan as per the One China policy. Not only that, China's primary interest in Africa is not just oil and minerals but include the potential of Africa being ideal market for their manufactured goods. Considering the above scrutinised literature on China-Africa relations, the next section will then provide a comparative exploration on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations. The reason for that is because, the rich existing literature on China-Africa relations turns to put a blind eye to the domestic politics of African states which are in bilateral relations with China.

In as much as there is a forum on China Africa relations namely FOCAC as well as China's specific policies on Africa, it should be significant to note that not all African states recognise PRC as the rightful China as per the "One China" policy. It must be emphatically taken into consideration that there exist the kingdom of Eswatini, a monarch state in Southern Africa which does not recognise the PRC. As such, Eswatini is in diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC). This is important to note as both Zambia and Zimbabwe (case studies in this research) and Eswatini have a shared membership in SADC. Not only that, China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations stems way before formal diplomatic relations where established.

As such, the following section reviews literature that solely focuses on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations respectively. This helps in making sense of China's challenges and opportunities with the two African states.

2.3. A comparative exploration of literature on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe through the eye of a needle

This section inspect specifically literature that deliberates on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations as a way of providing a foundation on the comparative exploration that will results afterwards. For instance, the work of scholars who contributed immensely on China-Zambia such as Mwanawina (2008), Hampwaye and Kragelund (2013), Sun (2014), Bwalya (2013), Lubinda and Jian (2018) and Rapanyane and Shai (2019). Similarly, those who contributed on China-Zimbabwe discourse such as Edinger and Burker (2008), Mvutungayi (2010), Anshan and Ronning (2013), Chun (2014), Sun (2014) and Mano (2016) is explored.

2.3.1. China-Zambia Relations

Mwanawina (2008) in his study titled "China-Africa Economic Relations: The case study of Zambia" gives a historical exploration of China-Africa using Zambia as a case study. Mwanawina states that the relationship can be traced back to pre-independence of present day Zambia (Mwanawina, 2008:1) arguing that there are three episodes of China-Africa relations. The first being from the year 1949 to 1979 were China

supported the liberation and independence struggle of Zambia. This China did by providing assistance to Zambia's struggle for independence through aid for economic re-construction and consolidation of national independence. Reciprocally, Zambia supported China in the international arena. The second episode is from the year 1979 to 1999 wherein the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank sponsored structural adjustment and liberalisation programmes and the adoption of multi-party democratic system in Africa. China on the other hand, was emerging from social and economic crises following the Cultural Revolution. As such, it had not adopted the "Open Door" policy economic reforms to put economic development at the centre of national development strategy in 1991, through the "Going out" policy, initiated Africa as a major target for economic and political cooperation. This meant that traditional aid shifted to preferential loans, contract bidding for construction and direct investing in Africa. Third episode is from 1999 to present date were African countries prioritised wealth creation, poverty reduction, peace and stability, promotion of economic development and achievement of the MDGs. This was done collectively by African states for common purpose such as the creation of NEPAD and AU.

Mwanawina's study fulfils its aim of addressing China-Africa Economic relations. However, Zambia as a case study was partially explored as the engagement emphasised China-Africa relations more. This Mwanawina did indicate that engagement between China-Zambia is not well known as there is little data on the subject. As such, this work is more detailed on China-Africa and leaves a gap for a thorough exploration on Zambia as a case study.

Hampwaye and Kragelund's (2013) book chapter titled "Trends in Sino-Zambian Relations" explores China's long term economic growth and revitalisation of its interest in Africa especially Zambia. The chapter analyses China's growing role in Zambia especially its shifting discourses and the "real" influence Chinese actors have in Zambia. The two authors trace Sino-Zambia relations from the establishment of the two's formal bilateral relations in 1964 and the importance of trade and economic relations in the millennium. Zambia's late President Levy Mwanawasa who coined the phrase China as an "all-weather friend" witnessed drastic change as what was supposed to be mutual benefit between the two ended up being regarded as a sudden flooding of cheap, low quality Chinese goods on the Zambian market. Not only that,

Chinese companies were accused of providing bad working conditions and low wages. As a result, the Chinese were regarded as the bad enemy of the people. The chapter focused on changing trends of relations between China-Zambia relations in the past decades from establishment of formal bilateral relations and demonstrates how trajectories of relations change over time.

Bwalya's (2013) chapter titled "China-Zambia relations" gives a historical approach in analysing the nature of China-Zambia economic relations in terms of trade and investments and how the two countries are benefiting from the relationship. The study analyses secondary data and suggests that China-Zambia relations can be improved for the benefit of both countries. Bwalya concludes that the two countries have been benefiting from their relations with a number of problems that are not insurmountable. More also, the two states have been supportive of each other on international issues despite China being accused of being the new "coloniser" in Africa. Bwalya adds that Sino-Zambia relations appear to grow stronger and beneficial with Zambia becoming one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. Bwalya concludes that there is a need for Zambia to articulate clear investment policies that can be implemented and monitored in a transparent and efficient manner to benefit all Zambians. Hence, the Chinese cannot be the only ones to be blamed for bad labour relations and other industrial ills in Zambia as they operate in a country with weak regulatory framework.

Rapanyane and Shai (2019) in the article titled "China's foreign policy towards Zambia within the context of BRICS" reflect on China-Zambia relations during Xi Jinping's tenure. The study brings about a historical account of China's foreign policy towards Zambia using Afrocentric theoretical framework. Rapanyane and Shai (2019) argue that China's foreign policy towards Zambia is best understood when located within a historical and BRICS context. More also, the study explores China-Zambia's growing political and economic interrelation. This article focus extensively on Zambia's work in Chinese companies under constrained conditions, ill treatment and poor remuneration (Rapanyane & Shai, 2019: 424-425). In terms of bringing about a historical account on China-Zambia relations, the study traces the two states' relations from the 1970s especially during the Tanzania-Zambia railway project that was emphatically funded by China. The article goes on into the 1980s to examine the shift of China's foreign

policy where the two authors argue that China's policy blueprints shifted from "economy serves diplomacy" to "diplomacy serves economy". These sentiments are well articulated in Anshan's (2012) work where the two authors (Rapanyane & Shai) have cited and agree with. The article also looks into China's Africa Policy after the inception of FOCAC (Rapanyane & Shai, 2019: 427-428). In the final analysis of the article, the authors acknowledge the firms that are today becoming fast non-state actors in China's foreign policy especially in the context of China-Zambia relations and Africa as a whole. Rapanyane and Shai's article is relevant especially as it provides an alternative theoretical framework of Afrocentricity in making sense of China-Zambia relations today. However, in as much as the study claims to explore China's foreign policy towards Zambia during Xi Jinping's term in office, this desktop study delves more on the experiences of Zambian workers in Chinese companies. With the research methodology employed herein, the authors do not deliberate in anyway how China's foreign policy towards Zambia in the context of BRICS came about. This of course is the downfall of the study as the findings appear to be more of a historical account of China in Zambia and the impact of the Chinese's firms on employing Zambians shape contemporary China foreign policy.

In their article, Lubinda and Jian (2018) focus on how Sino-Zambia relations manifests itself in investments. The analysis showcases how China-Zambia strong geo-political and strategic relations over decades and how the establishment of FOCAC in 2000 deepened the relationship through aid, special concessions, debt relief, scholarship provision of education and medical training personnel and infrastructural investment projects. The article has reviewed Chinese investments and highlights challenges that need to be corrected to maximise China-Zambia relations so as to enhance regional integration. China has contributed immensely on job creation in Zambia. This was done through infrastructural projects such as roads, bridges, hospitals, schools and stadiums in Zambia. It is because of the latter projects that China today enjoys unprecedented influence in Zambia (Lubinda and Jian, 2018:206). Also, China views Zambia as an important energy and raw material supply source (Lubinda and Jian, 2018:206). The article provides a background of Zambia-China relationship from pre-independence and how the two governments supported one another with the monumental construction of the Tanzania- Zambia Railway (TAZARA) as the

cornerstone of Sino-Zambia relations. The article comments on the fact that Zambia is first to establish diplomatic relations with China in Southern Africa after independence. The authors go on to expose how China-Zambia relations have been reciprocal and that is, China assisting Zambia with liberation and independent political movements while Zambia supported newly founded PRC in its diplomatic endeavors especially in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) membership bid. The authors further deliberated on how the relations between the two states first focused on political alliance to economic cooperation (Lubinda and Jian, 2018:208). After the establishment of FOCAC in 2000, China-Zambia relations upgraded from a new strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership were massive developments in the area of cooperation, trade, cultural and educational exchange have been achieved.

2.3.2. China-Zimbabwe Relations

This section explores literature that looks into China's relations with Zimbabwe. It should be noted that the relations between the two states, just like that of China-Zambia dates way back before formal diplomatic relations were established in 1980. More also, scholars who write on the relations of this two Global Southern states do so by also including the historical foundations of the two states so as to make sense of the current standing. For example, Chun (2014) in his occasional paper on China-Zimbabwe relations explores the two dominating perspectives in literature that seeks to understand relations between the two Global Southern states. In his work Chun responds to the question of whether China-Zimbabwe relations could be regarded as the model of China's relations with African states especially during President Robert Mugabe's rule.

Chun draws his conclusion by having gone through a historical review of China-Zimbabwe relations; that is making sense of China's support of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) from Zimbabwe's liberation struggle against colonialism and racial oppression (Chun, 2014:5). He also explored what he regards as the three developmental phases of China-Zimbabwe relations. The first being China-Zimbabwe

support for the national liberation struggle in the 1960s to the 1980s. Chun includes the conditions that China-Zimbabwe forged comradeship with China supporting Zimbabwe with military support during Zimbabwe civil war also known as the Rhodesian Bush War of 1965. Chun covers issues such as China training Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) guerillas, the military wing of ZANU.

The second development was in the 1980s to 2000s when Zimbabwe obtained its political independence and official diplomatic relations formed immediately (Chun, 2014:17). Following the diplomatic relations between the two states was loans, projects, state visits and construction of hospitals and sports stadium in the 1980s (Chun, 2014:7). What cemented the relations between the two states according to Chun was Zimbabwe's support to China following the Tiananmen Square controversy where China's international image was tarnished. But Zimbabwe defended China together with other developing states and Mugabe argued that they support China's right to defend its sovereignty, refusing to join the anti-China campaign. Economically, China-Zimbabwe relations were strengthened by China's constitution and Zimbabwe's radicalised land reform in 2000 where reports on violence perpetrated by ZANU-PF against its opposition during elections were evident. Not only that, this was followed by USA, European Union (EU), United Kingdom of Britain (UK) and other member states of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe.

The third development was from the year 2000s to 2013 where China's sudden shift to Africa for political support and economic opportunities was evident (Chun, 2014:8). With FOCAC reinforcing China-Africa relations came loans from China to Zimbabwean government through investment project in different sectors of the economy. Chun (2014:9) covers the three pillars of China-Zimbabwe relations, namely strategic and diplomatic relations, economic relations and social and cultural relations. With strategic and diplomatic relations, Chun includes the growing positive ties between the two states through high level exchanges. Economically, he looks at the financial and diplomatic support by China To Zimbabwe following the African state's failed economy but appreciation of the 'Look East' policy in 2003 (Chun, 2014:10). Chun states that China undertook to support the Zimbabwean government by making available

moderate amounts of aid, grants, export credits and concessional loans as well as technical and economic assistance (Chun, 2014:20).

Having acknowledged the rich literature on China-Zimbabwe relations that cuts across political and economic dimensions Chun also does the same when unpacking whether China-Zimbabwe could be regarded as a model of China-Africa relations. In addition, Chun notes the close social and cultural exchanges between China and Zimbabwe. However, did not include them in his work because of the space constraints.

In concluding his work, Chun finds that China-Zimbabwe relations is neither a 'microcosm' of China-Africa relations nor support for a rogue state or pariah regime (Chun, 2014:21). He states in his conclusion that China-Africa relations in general have transformed from a monocycle (political and/or ideological links from the 1950s to mid-1990s) to a bicycle (with an economic dimension added since the mid-1990s) and then to a four wheeled vehicle (with peace and security as well as social exchange dimensions added at the end of the 2000s) (Chun, 2014:23).

Mvutungayi's (2010) masters dissertation titled "China in Zimbabwe: Exploring the Political and Economic Impacts of Chinese Engagement in the Zimbabwean Crisis" focuses on the years 2000 to 2009, which he claims catches the essence of Zimbabwean crisis evidenced through the worst socio-economic and political challenges of the African state post its independence. Mvutungayi further argues that following Zimbabwean economic downfall resulted deteriorating human rights where a number of western states and organisations which were deemed Zimbabweans 'traditional' donors and trading partners withdrew their economic and political support. From the isolation of Zimbabwe following sanctions from the West, China came in to become a significant actor and partner of Zimbabwe during its time of need. Through China's principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states, China offered Zimbabwe both economic and political support. Mvutungayi (2010, ii) states that "China provided Zimbabwe with several trading arrangements, aid, loans, investments and diplomatic support in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during its crisis period".

Mvutungayi's work covers what he describes as the Zimbabwean crisis where he unpacks the causes of the crisis in Zimbabwe from the social contract, government policies, land reform and violence as well as western sanctions. He further explains that the above mentioned crisis had a dire impact on the economy of the state, political repression, poverty, health, sanitation and infrastructure. He also inspects the external actors or influencers of China's crises and here he includes states and organisations such as the USA, UK, EU as well as those from the African continent such as the AU, SADC, Third World and China. Mvutungayi goes on to then make sense of China's active engagement in Zimbabwe following the country crises. In doing so, he first explores the historical and contemporary China's engagement with Zimbabwe from the genesis of the two states relations to the relations even during Zimbabwe's crisis. He then looks into Zimbabwe's 'Look East' policy where Zimbabwe turned to China for support especially following its isolation and sanctions from the West. Mvutungayi delves into cooperation arrangements between the two states where he unpacks how Zimbabwe became a recipient of Chinese aid, loans, investment projects in strategic areas of the state's economy such as mining, agriculture, energy sector, construction and infrastructural utilities as well as the defence and military. Lastly, Mvutungayi then looks into the effects of China's increased engagement in Zimbabwe's economy, diplomatic support, military relationship, political situation and China model in Zimbabwe and Zimbabwean perspectives on China's involvement in the country.

Mvutungayi adds that China has been overly criticised by Western powers for its willingness to support 'despotic' regimes in African countries such as Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Since the turn of the millennium, China has displayed a refreshed interest to relate with Zimbabwe in direct contrast to the Western disengagement from the country. In the midst of a declining economy and an increasingly volatile political environments the West began to withdraw their support and resources from Zimbabwe to show their displeasure with President Mugabe led government policies (Mvutungayi, 2010:4).

Mvutungayi's work assumes that it was the West's withdrawal from Zimbabwe which prompted the Zimbabwean government to seek renewed relations with China. At the same time, it was perhaps the pulling out by the West from Zimbabwe which presented China with an opportunity to re-establish its relationship with an old ally. The study examines the nature of China-Zimbabwe relations in terms of aid, investments and

diplomatic political support to Zimbabwean government. The study also explores the local expectations and responses by Zimbabwean elites, business community and general population to escalating China's involvement in the country.

Zimbabwe's precipitous fall from a regional 'bread basket' to a malnourished 'basket case' became a matter of concern not only to its African neighbors but also to the international community at large. Mvutungayi employs a realist theory as a dominant theory in IR where China's behaviour in relation to Zimbabwe is analysed. Unlike a lot of studies on China-Zimbabwe relations that employs the realist perspective as a lens to make sense of the problem under study, Mvutungayi's work is not limited to the states interest or the elite and government community but also includes response by Zimbabwean local nationals on the Chinese increased presence in their country.

Edinger and Burker's (2008) report on China-Zimbabwe analyses economic and commercial ties between the two nations. The report explores the impacts of the relations by looking into China's aid profile investment footprint and trade relations with the landlocked Southern African country- Zimbabwe. The two authors argue that Zimbabwe have received immense pressure from home with the land redistribution in 2000 and abroad with its military intervention in Mozambique during the year 1982 to 1992 and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the request of President Laurent Kabila, Mugabe became quite unpopular in the West (Edinger & Burke, 2008:2). This report states how the decline in Zimbabwe's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in light of isolation from traditional investors and decreasing donor assistance led to Harare's (capital city and administrative hub the government of Zimbabwe) quest for alternative partners. This includes Iran, Libya, India and DRC (Edinger & Burke, 2008:2).

The report delves into China-Zimbabwe close military relations, Zimbabwe as a recipient of Chinese aid with China assisting in sectors such as agriculture, mining, energy, infrastructure and social development projects. This is done through grants, export credits and concessional loans through technical and economic assistance. Grants are non-repayable financial facilities including food, aid and agricultural equipment's for moral development projects. Loan agreements include those of free loans for the construction of Zimbabwean National Sports Stadium in Harare awarded

by China's Export and Import Bank (EXIM Bank). EXIM Bank is active mainly for construction and infrastructure projects across the African continent. In their conclusion, Edinger and Burke assert the western media coverage of both China and Zimbabwe is heavily biased and increasingly unreliable. While Beijing is increasingly sensitive to international perception, majority of Africans view China in a positive light (Edinger and Burke, 2008:26).

Mano (2016) in his work look into how the media and locals view China's investment in Africa. This is an alternative perspective as most work on China-Africa or China-Zimbabwe specifically looks into China's economic presence in Harare. His work focuses on China's soft power perceived and received in Zimbabwe by analysing views of 'ordinary' citizens in Harare on China's intervention in their country. The work of Mano (2016) provides a unique account of China-Zimbabwe relations. The work of Mano (2016) challenges the well-known claims that locals in Zimbabwe are benefiting from China's interventions. Mano discloses from his research that non-official perspectives are critical on Beijing's actions and policies claiming that they are narrowly benefiting China and Zimbabwe's elites. The nationals' further state that China's intervention is contradictory, unethical, short term and exploitative. Such tendencies places Beijing's economic and political interest over ordinary people's human rights.

China's public diplomacy on the continent is perceived by some Africans negatively as China's use of power and veto is thought to have seriously undermined the cause of democracy in Zimbabwe and Darfur. Mano's work addresses the gap between reality and perception of Chinese power as it interacts with civic groups and ordinary Zimbabweans.

Mano (2016:7) and Li Anshan et al. (2013:25) share the same sentiments that China's soft power or public diplomacy in Zimbabwe and other African countries in multisided and evident in areas such as health, culture, Confucius institutes, environment, interparty communication, mass media, cultural exchanges, tourism and, youth development programs, *inter alia*. It is because of the above that China has enhanced

its “media influence in Africa to challenge false Western sponsored international media reports about China-Africa cooperation and issue news reports reflecting China’s perspectives. The negative perception of China is evident in African countries’ such as Nigeria and South Africa; this is partly attributed to business investment rivalry and negativity in Western media reports.

Mano uses the allegory of the blind men and the elephant to make sense of the engagement between China and Zimbabwe in this regard. The fieldwork for this study consisted of purposefully sampled respondents on their ‘opinions’ and views of Chinese interventions in Zimbabwe and the extent media reports on how Zimbabwe benefit from its relation with China. The work by Mano on whether or not Zimbabwe is benefiting from these relations with China was viewed largely in economic terms. With many respondents arguing that Chinese intervention in Zimbabwe is economically motivated, China benefits at the expense of Zimbabwe.

Majority of the responses in this study argued that Zimbabwe-China relations are not mutually beneficial and that China was using Zimbabwe to service its own markets: exploit natural resources of Zimbabwe and sustain its booming economy. A tiny percent of the respondents argues that China-Zimbabwe relations are beneficial as China plays a part in reviving the Zimbabwean economy and providing locals with needed economic resources including jobs and cheaper commodity. In concluding this study Zimbabweans described China as ‘parasitic’ and others as ‘the new colonial master’. The dominant Western international media and its likeminded local counterparts of course influence this view extensively.

2.4. Theoretical Perspectives

This section explores dominant theories in IR. The theories are, namely: realism, liberalism and social constructivism. After the exploration of the above mentioned theories, a nexus is established as the researcher explains the theory of Afrocentricity as a theoretical framework for this study. Keynes (2014) describes theory as a kind of

abstract or generalised thinking that seeks to explain, interpret or evaluate something. Heywood (2014:55) further explains three types of theory as follows:

- *Explanatory theory sometimes called ‘descriptive’ or ‘empirical’ theory explain why, and under what circumstances, events happen or developments unfold.*
- *Interpretive theory sometimes referred to as ‘constitutive’ theory imposes meaning on events or issues, attempting to understand, rather than explain, the world.*
- *Normative theory sometimes termed ‘prescriptive’ or ‘political’ theory prescribes values and standards of conduct, it deals with what ought to be, rather than what is.*

Given the above purposes of theory in IR, the next section will provide a brief overview of realism, liberalism and constructivism as the traditional and/or dominant theories of IR.

2.4.1. Realism

The theory of realism in IR became prominent during the Second World War (1939-1948). The theory is associated with scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Thomas Hobbes. The theory of realism emphasises competitive and conflictual sides of international relations (Antunes & Camisao, 2017). According to this theory, the principal actor in international relations is the state (Antunes & Camisao, 2017:15). States are principal actors in international relations and other bodies such as individuals and organisations have limited power. Niccolo Machiavelli focused on how the basic human characteristics influence the security of the state, leaders’ primary concern is to promote national security. Morgenthau argues that every political action is directed towards keeping, increasing or demonstrating power. Realists focus too much on the state as a solid unit, overlooking other actors and forces within the state and ignoring international issues not directly connected to the survival of the state. For realists, the highest goal is the survival of the state. Realism continues to provide valuable insights and remains an important analytical tool in IR.

Realism as a dominant theory in IR which studies states behavior in relation to others is guided by the survival of the fittest. Realists perceive the international system as anarchic and states has no permanent friends and/or permanent enemies. States

behaviour is dictated by natural interests and at times override values and norms such as human rights, democracy and rule of law. States interests change with time to adjust to the changing nature of the international system. According to realists, there is no higher or sovereign authority in the international system to regulate states' behavior. Realism perceives international economic cooperation as a "zero-sum game" in which "the gain of one party necessitates a loss of the other party". During Zimbabwe crisis, issue of democracy, human rights and the rule of law became the main reference of western criticism of the Zimbabwean government. Amongst the cons of realism is how the theory fails to acknowledge the role played by non-state actors during Zimbabwean crisis. In terms of Zimbabwe, inter-governmental organisations such as United Nations (UN), EU and the Commonwealth of Nations engaged in human rights advocacy.

2.4.2. Liberalism

The theory of liberalism is also regarded as one of the traditional theories of IR. Liberal theory which is often used interchangeably with idealism gained momentum after the First World War (1914-1918). After the First World War, scholars having been influenced by the works of political philosophers such as John Locke wanted to build an optimistic utopian world. Liberalism is concerned with constructing institutions that protect individual freedom by limiting and checking political power. In addition, liberals are for developing a political system that allows states to protect themselves from foreign threats without subverting the individual liberty of its citizens (Meiser, 2017).

Liberalism recognises that there is a sphere of individual rights that should be respected. As a traditional theory of IR. Liberalism begins with the idea that individual rights come first (Ethridge & Handelman, 2013:30). Liberalism focus on how best we can create a just and peaceful international order. It's organising principle being interdependence which argues that two or more international actors rely on each other for provision of goods and services. It is interdependence that decreases conflict by encouraging harmony of interests that is shared goals through cooperation.

Liberalism has been the traditional foil of realism in IR theory as it offers a more optimistic worldview, grounded in a different reading of history to that found in realist scholarship (Meiser, 2017:22). Liberals emphasise the wellbeing of the individual as the fundamental building block of a just political system. The main concern of liberalism is to construct institutions that protect individual freedom by limiting and checking political power. While these are issues of domestic politics, the realm of IR is important to liberals because a state's activities abroad can be a strong influence on liberty at home. Liberals are particularly troubled by militaristic foreign policies. Related to this, their primary concern is that war requires states to build up military power. Liberals' core problem is how to develop a political system that can allow states to protect themselves from foreign threats without subverting the individual liberty of its citizenry.

2.4.3. Social Constructivism

Social constructivism emphasizes values, norms, identities and new concepts to explain problems under study. The theory is associated with scholars such as Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie, Richard Ashley, Emmanuel Adler, Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink and Peter Katzenstein (Zhu, 2010:15). Social constructivists argue that international norms and values are socially constructed. As such, it is norms that help shape behaviours of states whose identities may change as a result of changing circumstances. Zhu (2010:15) argues that states are self-interested but continuously define what that means. For instance, China came out with concepts such as "peaceful rise" which brought about an entirely new approach in international politics. Considering the fact that nothing is static as such things change especially norms and approaches in IR the theory of constructivism suggest that China will modify its strategies to maximise its national interests (Zhu, 2010: 16).

Scholars have also employed the theory of constructivism to make sense of China's changing identities and how that has shaped Beijing's national interests (Matambo, 2020). Social constructivism as a cogent approach in IR has allowed scholars to interpret actors in the international system to practice their agency rather than

passivity. As a theory that has been gradually growing in IR; social constructivism has introduced a social bent to international politics. Unlike realism and liberalism, social constructivism is driven by the social structure in which actors are embedded (Adler, 2013). It is worth noting that constructivism does not dismiss the possibility of self-interests and the pursuit of power. But it merely states that the development of identities and interests is endogenous to social relations among actors (Matambo 2020; Checkel 1998:324).

The arrival of constructivism in IR is associated with the end of the Cold War. This should be understood within the context that realism and liberalism are generally deemed to have failed to provide meaningful explanation of predicting and shaping the post-Cold War world order. Social constructivism argue that the social world is of our making (Onuf, 1989). Social constructivism view knowledge and the world/reality as socially constructed (Theys, 2017). Such reality is not fixed but change over time depending on the ideas and beliefs that actors hold. Social constructivists further argue that “anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992). As such, anarchy can be interpreted differently depending on the meaning that actors assign to it (Theys, 2017: 37). Social constructivists have identities and interests at the center of their theory. As such, they argue that states have multiple identities that are socially constructed through interaction with other actors.

Social constructivism has evolved as mainstream IR paradigm with ontology, epistemology and methodology as its core tenets (Jung, 2015). Social constructivists have focused on the examination of nonmaterial factors such as norms, ideas, knowledge and culture, stressing in particular the role played by “collectively” held or intersubjective ideas and understanding on social life in IR (Finnermore & Sikkink, 1998). Social constructivists believe that international relations are made up of social factors, which can exist only by human engagement (Adler, 1997). Social constructivism takes a “sociological perspective in world politics, emphasizing the importance of narrative as well as material structures and the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:259). Social constructivists in IR argue that state identity shapes its interests, preferences and

behaviours; what Hopf (1998:175) states as following in the identity of a states implies its preferences and consequent actions.

Social constructivism has succeeded in broadening the theoretical contours of IR by exploring issues of identity and interests. Social constructivists have demonstrated that their sociological approach leads to new and meaningful interpretations of international politics. Social constructivism is concerned with underlying conceptions of how the social and political world works (Checkel, 1998: 325). Social constructivists' question the materialism and methodological individualism upon which much contemporary IR scholarship has been built (Checkel, 1998:326).

2.5. Theoretical Framework: Afrocentricity

This research adopts the theory and paradigm of Afrocentricity to serve as a lens for this study. Afrocentricity formally postulated by Molefe Kete Asante (1990 and 2003) and developed by scholars such as Karenga (1988), Riviere (2001), Modupe (2003) and Mazama (2003) is an intellectual theory that seeks to study the ideas and events from the African standpoint. Unlike state-centric theories of realism, liberalism and social constructivism, Afrocentricity is still an emerging theory in International Politics and not so popular in the discipline (Moloi-Mvulane 2012, Shai & Molapo 2015, and Shai 2016). Although having received attention in other disciplines such as Philosophy, Literary Studies, Psychology, Indigenous Knowledge Systems, Social Work and Linguistics; this study seeks to employ the theory of Afrocentricity as an alternative theoretical and contextual lens for comparatively analysing China-Africa relations especially China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe in particular. Unlike Eurocentricity, Afrocentricity does not impose itself as universal. But rather regards itself as an alternative voice that centres Africa and African experiences amongst the already existing voices in International Politics. Ground, orientation and perspectives are the key elements of Afrocentricity and they are embraced as the analytical categories of this study. In this context, grounding is a process of learning which is centred on Africans, their history and continent. On the other hand, orientation is about the pursuit of intellectual interest in Africa and forming psychological identity based on that. Meanwhile, perspective is about self-awareness and viewing the world with African interests with the quality of both grounding and orientation (Modupe, 2003:62-

63). The distinctive theoretical approach of this thesis is the employment of Afrocentricity. Unlike the dominant theories that problematise China-Africa relations, Afrocentricity proposes a holistic approach on making sense of the relations. This is done by drawing insight from literature and scholars who make use of alternative theoretical approaches and critique of Western approaches.

2.6. The nexus between Realism, liberalism, constructivism and Afrocentricity

The discipline of IR is dominated by western theories. This is because of amongst other reasons, the discipline itself is founded in the West. Hence, the reviewed literature above on China-Africa relations mostly made use of what is regarded as the “traditional” theories of IR. It is because of the detected gap of not having studies on China-Africa relations having employed alternative theories different to the traditional ones that the researcher introduces such a subaltern alternative theory to this subject. Afrocentricity does not seek to erase the available literature but enhance it and provide a voice of Africans and African insight which is grounded, orientated and gives an alternative perspective on China-Africa relations.

2.7. Summary

At this point, it is apparent that the existing body of literature on China-Africa relations is produced and understood from what is believed to be the traditional theories of IR. The traditional theories namely realism, liberalism and social constructivism are perceived to be the conventional theories as the discipline of IR itself is a Western product. Hence, its canons are extensively influenced by the Euro-American cultural worldview. Despite having scholars in Africa or of African origin, there has been little literature known to the researcher on China-Africa relations that makes use of alternative theories from the Global South especially with Africans and Africa at its centre of analysis. By proposing the employment of the theory of Afrocentricity, this chapter detects a gap in knowledge especially on the ongoing discourse on China-Africa relations. The researcher familiarised herself with the various problems,

questions and results under study and used previous research results as a starting point of new research. Various gaps in knowledge and weaknesses in previous studies were detected. For this reason, this study seeks to build on and improve such defaults. The literature review in this chapter discovered connections, contradictions and other relations between different research results by comparing various investigations. The advantages and disadvantages of various research methods employed by scholars on the topic under investigation were highlighted.

The next chapter focuses on research methodology and design of this study. This include data collection and analysis.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction

Research methodology is simply understood as the science of studying how research is done and this chapter provides the systematic way that the research problem was solved. In sum, the chapter is basically a broadcast of steps undertaken by the researcher in studying the research problem. In conducting this study of comparatively analysing China's foreign policy towards Zambia and Zimbabwe from the year 2010 to the year 2018, the researcher firstly explains the difference between research paradigm and methodology. This is followed by a deliberation by the researcher on the research paradigm and methods that informs this study. Secondly, the chapter outlines the research design, sampling technique and size, data collection, data analysis and quality criteria utilised in this study. Finally, ethical considerations and limitations of the study are explained to signify the ethics and challenges confronted by the researcher when conducting the study and how the hindrances influence the research findings.

3.2. Research paradigm and methodology

The concept of paradigm and methodology are used interchangeably in the social sciences and the two do not mean the same thing. Thomas Kuhn (1962) who coined the term paradigm asserts that it means a philosophical way of thinking. In agreement with Kuhn, Guba and Lincoln (1994) state that a paradigm is the basic belief system that guides the researcher not only in choices of methods but in ontological and epistemological fundamental ways. In addition, Mackenzie and Knipe (2006) state that the term paradigm is used to describe a researcher's worldview. Kivunja and Kuyini (2017:26) further argue that a worldview could be understood as the perspective, or thinking, or school of thought, or set of shared beliefs that inform the meanings or interpretation of research data.

On the other hand, we have methods that are influenced by paradigms. For instance, in the social sciences, there are three basic research approaches namely quantitative approach, qualitative approach and mixed methods. The quantitative approach is based on the measurement of quantity or amount and the qualitative approach is concerned with qualitative phenomena (Kothari, 2004). Mixed methods refer to the usage of both qualitative and quantitative approach. It is in that regard that this study made use of qualitative research methodology to explore China's foreign policy towards Africa. Qualitative research approach allows the researcher to examine human behaviour in the social, cultural, and political contexts in which they occur (Kothari, 2004).

3.3. Afrocentric methodology

Having deliberated above on the difference between research paradigm and research method. It is significant to note that the researcher employed the Afrocentric research paradigm and methodology. Mkabela (2005) and Shai (2016) denote that Afrocentric methodology is a re-enforcer of qualitative approach. Suffice to say that Afrocentric methodology has been explained by scholars such as Asante (1990 & 2003), Mazama (2003), Mkabela (2005). The above scholars note that Afrocentric paradigm is one way of viewing the world and unlike the Eurocentric 'worldview', it does not assume a universal stance. But rather an alternative perspective that centres the researcher and the 'studied' so as to understand the context being 'studied'. In simple terms, Afrocentric paradigm and methodology allow the researcher to study China-Africa relations from the perspective of the researcher.

Mazama (2003) deliberates on the central aspects of the Afrocentric paradigm. She notes that amongst the central aspects of Afrocentric paradigm is: (i) cognitive aspect covers the metaphysical, sociological and exemplars (ii) the structural aspect that looks at the community structure and lastly (iii) the functional aspect which deliberates on the production of knowledge not for its own sake but for the liberation of Africans themselves. It is in that regard that basic research methods in the social sciences such

as qualitative research, quantitative research and mixed methods are conventional in Euro-North America simply because they are alien to the lived experiences of Africans.

The research for this thesis 'questions' the normalised epistemological foundation of the Euro-North America episteme through a critique of method. The relations between China-Africa have been historically studied from a Eurocentric perspective, side-lining the views from the Global South which both China and Africa belong to. This is critical as the thesis is informed by the necessity to shift the geography of reason by agreeing with Mignolo (2011) that all thinking is located and it is important to understand the African subject in its location and the location of articulation (Sithole, 2014).

Having questioned, the normalised basic research methods in the social sciences, it is imperative to note that this chapter does not entirely 'dismiss' the Euro-North America canon methodologies. But rather challenges their ineffectiveness in revealing the power structures that temper with the contribution to the body of knowledge by the African subjects in their own terms as Grosfoguel states that knowledge is always situated. This research further agrees with Zeleza as cited by Zondi (2018) that methods and methodology are epistemic and social constructs whose intellectual, institutional and ideological configurations are mediated and mapped by the unyielding demands of historical geography. It is for that reason that Mkabela (2005), Shai (2016) and Zondi (2018) deliberate that method excludes, disconnects and silences.

Methods are constructed in situations that are marked by power relations, ideological agendas, class motivations, patriarchal considerations, imperial designs and ethical challenges (Zondi, 2018). Gordon calls it the paradox of method against method, it is not just rethinking methods. But also unthinking them as at times dominant methodologies hide, complicate and deceive (Zondi 2018; Sithole 2014 & Gordon 2010). As a way of 'unsilencing' views from the Global South, this thesis makes use of an alternative research method in the form of Afrocentric methodology to broaden the field of IR so as to incorporate a more just and representative understanding of international relations. Afrocentricity as a methodology not only generates new orientations towards interpreting data but ultimately employs research that is fruitful and liberating for African people.

3.4. Research design

A research design is defined as 'the strategy for a study and the plan by which the strategy is to be carried out (Cooper & Schindler, 2006:159). As such, it is worth noting that in quantitative research, there are four common research designs namely observation, correlational, developmental and survey. Contrarily, qualitative research has five common designs namely ethnography, phenomenological study, grounded theory and content analysis and case study (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005). Due to the qualitative research methodology employed in this study, the researcher made use of case studies as a research design. Case studies are common in Medicine, Education Studies, Political Science, Law, Psychology, Sociology and Anthropology. Amongst the reason case studies are common in the above mentioned disciplines is because of how case studies allows the researcher to have an in-depth knowledge of the individual, program or event studied (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005:135). When employing case study as a research design, researchers sometimes focus on a single case because unique or conceptual qualities can promote understanding or inform practice for similar structures. In other instances, researchers study two or more cases- often cases that are different in certain key ways-to make comparisons, build a theory, or propose generalisation. Such an approach is called a multiple or collective case study. This study made use of two case studies namely the case studies of the Zambian state and Zimbabwean state. The adoption of two case studies was to detect commonalities and differences on how China relates to specific African states instead of proposing generalisation which has been evident in a lot of studies on China-Africa relations.

Building up on the multiple-case design selected on the issue in question, Yin (1984) points out that there are three types of case study research, namely: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. This study is primarily descriptive but contains elements of exploration and explanation. It is descriptive as it provides a detailed and comparative account of China's foreign policy towards Zambia and Zimbabwe within the period 2010 to 2018. With regards to exploratory, the study explores China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations'; addressing Neumann's *what* question of China's primary interests nationally and internationally with Zambia and Zimbabwe (Neumann, 2003:30). Finally, the explanatory elements in this study explain China's changing foreign policy towards Africa answering the *why* question of China's sudden active

participation in Africa, particularly in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Neumann, 2003:31). This study uses comparative case study design to analyse China's foreign policy towards Zambia and Zimbabwe. The employment of case studies is poised to allow the researcher to conduct intensive study with a view to detecting unique features between China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe, which is different from Beijing's relations with the entire African continent, and to gain an in-depth approach on the ongoing China-Africa relations.

3.5. Sampling


We have two types of sampling namely probability and non-probability sampling. Probability sampling also known as random sampling or chance sampling refers to everyone in the population having an equal chance of inclusion in the study. It includes simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling and cluster sampling (Salkind, 2012:96-102). On the other hand, non-probability sampling referred to as purposive sampling or judgement sampling is done by the researcher by deliberately selecting the people to participate in the study who would constitute typical representative of the whole population. Nonprobability sampling strategies include convenience sampling and quota sampling (Salkind, 2012:102-103).

Following the distinction between probability and nonprobability sampling, this study made use of purposive sampling as the researcher knows the type of participants relevant to the study. It is also imperative to note that because of the nature of the research problem, the researcher purposefully sampled participants who are knowledgeable on the study in question.

3.6. Size of sampling

The size of sampling refers to a number of people to be selected from the population¹ (Kumar, 1999). When selecting the sample size², the researcher was careful not to choose a sample size too small or big but optimum. An optimum sample³ is one which fulfils the requirements of efficient representativeness, reliability and flexibility. Issues such as costs and budgetary constraints were taken into consideration when deciding the sample size.

At the start of this research, the researcher intended to interview at least fifteen participants based in South Africa for this study. The intended sample size was because of not having a lot of people knowledgeable in the politics of China-Africa relations in South Africa. More also, the sample was influenced by issues such as cost and money as well as considerations for resources at the disposal of the researcher especially during the global pandemic of COVID-19.



Author's illustration

¹ Population refers to the targeted group of persons the researcher wants to study

² Sample size refers to the number of participants whom information is sought from

³ A sample can simply be referred to as a group within a targeted population that is selected by the researcher to obtain the relevant information on the study undertaken.

3.7. Data Collection

When conducting a study, there are two types of data that a researcher can collect as a way of addressing the research problem. These two types of data are referred to as primary data and secondary data. Primary data refers to data collected for the first time and has not been used before whereas secondary data refers to published and unpublished data which has been collected before and used by other researchers. As such, there are different methods of collecting primary and secondary data. Primary data can be collected through observation, interviews, questionnaires and schedules (Kothari, 2004: 96). On the other hand, secondary data can be collected from books, journals, magazines and newspapers, reports and publications either from universities or historical documents (Kothari, 2004:111). In this study, the researcher made use of both primary and secondary data. This employment of multiple types of data was ideal in addressing the research problem under study. The usage of two different methods of collecting data is referred to as triangulation and below the researcher unpacks what triangulation means and deliberates further on the two methods used to collect data in this study.

3.7.1. Triangulation

Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods or data sources in research. It is used to develop a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon. As such, there are four types of triangulation, namely: (i) method triangulation (ii) investigator triangulation (iii) theory triangulation and (iv) data source triangulation (Patton, 1999). This research made use of data source triangulation by collecting data through semi-structured interviews and documents review (Denzin, 2017). This study made use of data source triangulation to enhance the credibility and dependability of the study (Denzin, 2017). Below are the two types of data methods used by the researcher to respond to the research questions.

3.7.1. Semi-Structured Interviews


This study gathered data from oral informants through semi-structured interviews (annexure 2) with the interview guide. The researcher first invited participants via email to participate in the study. Initially, participants were meant to respond to the interview questions sent to them via email elaborately of which three did. However, due to lack of time, one participant requested a face-to-face interview and six informants requested a session either via Skype or Zoom due to lack of time to respond in writing. The Skype or Zoom sessions took at least 20 minutes and the longest being an hour exact. The researcher asked permission to record the session for transcription later, which the participants agreed to and that was done. Three participants responded elaborately on the interview guide forwarded by the researcher via email.

The table below displays the location of participants at the time data was collected. As already mentioned, the researcher initially wanted to interview participants based in South Africa who are knowledgeable on the study in question. However, due to global pandemic of coronavirus also referred to as COVID-19, the researcher invited participants well equipped to respond to the study located in various countries. Not only that, participants who opted to respond using questionnaire guide were willing to engage further with the researcher when seeking clarity either via e-mail or Whatsapp platform.

Face-to-face Interview (1)	Skype/Zoom Interviews (8)	Responses on Questionnaire Guide via Email (3)	Total (10)
South Africa (1)	South Africa (2) Zimbabwe (1) Germany (1) United States of America (1) Malaysia (1)	South Africa (2) United States of America (1)	

3.7.2. Document Study

In addition to the semi-structured interviews, the researcher collected data from secondary sources gathered from academic literature in the form of books and journals. More data emanated from media publications and internet articles, publications from South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), Institute of Global Dialogue (IGD), Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Centre for Chinese Studies to enhance the credibility of the findings.



Author's illustration

3.8. Data analysis

Thematic analysis was conducted in this study by analysing data by theme and sub-themes. As this study made use of existing literature and conducted semi-structured

interviews with respondents who are well informed and specialise on foreign policy, China's foreign policy, African history and politics; the researcher identified emerging themes and patterns before, during and after data collection. As thematic analysis took place simultaneously with data collection, the researcher detected patterns on the information gathered and used the provided themes to build a valid argument. Similarly, content analysis was done by the researcher on the secondary data collected. This was done by using the current body of literature together with the new data to formulate theme statements.

3.9. Quality Criteria

3.9.1. Use of sufficient verbatim quotations

Direct quotations from the original source of reports were sourced to provide a clearer context for the reader on how the researcher interpreted what the respondents expressed.

3.9.2. Ensuring data saturation

Due to the usage of semi-structured interviews, the researcher acquired abundant data from the respondents without unnecessary disruptions or limitations to ensure that data saturation for the research topic at hand is reached.

3.9.3. Credibility, Dependability and Confirmability

Credibility in qualitative research is an imperative factor in ensuring the trustworthiness of the study. In ensuring that the data collected through interviews was credible, the researcher checked whether the raw data collected from informants is congruent with reality and existing literature. In response to dependability, the researcher undertook intensive literature review to gather sufficient knowledge on China-Africa relations so that the study can be scrutinised. Lastly, confirmability as a trustworthy factor assisted

with ensuring that the data collected with informants are their experiences and not what is preferred to be their truth by the researcher.

3.10. Ethical considerations

Dencombe (2005:175) defines ethics in research as what ought to be done and what ought to not been done. In addition, Cooper and Schindler (2006:116) define ethics as 'norms or standards of behaviour that guide moral choices about our behaviour and relationships with others. Cooper and Schindler (2006) further mention that amongst the identified unethical activities in research are the following:

- Violating non-disclosure agreements.
- Breaking participant confidentiality.
- Misrepresenting results.
- Deceiving people.
- Invoicing irregularities.
- Avoiding legal liability

Below are the ethical guidelines considered by the researcher when undertaking this study.

3.10.1. Permission to conduct the study

This study was granted a clearance certificate by the University of Limpopo's Turfloop Research and Ethics Committee (annexure 1) which was applied for by the researcher to ensure that the ethical standards of the institution are maintained during the operationalisation of this study.

3.10.2. Informed consent and voluntary participation

Informed consent as explained by Kumar (1999:192) implies that “subjects are made adequately aware of the type of information you want from them, why the information is sought, what purpose it will be put to, how they are expected to participate in the study, and how it will directly or indirectly affect them”. Participants were informed that participation in the study was voluntary and they can end participation any time they opt otherwise (annexure 2). The researcher made it known to the participants that they have the right to participate, discontinue or decline at any given time during the process. Consequently, participants were asked to sign an informed consent form if they want to participate in the research to showcase their understanding to take part.

3.10.3. Anonymity and Confidentiality

The rights to privacy were respected by the researcher as it guarantees the protection of participants’ rights and retains the credibility of the study. Given that this study is not secretive, the researcher consented with participants at the start of the interview if they want to be quoted directly with their names or not.

3.10.4. Avoiding harm

The researcher assured participants that there will be no physical or emotional harm associated with participation in the research for this thesis. Hence, this is a political study. However, it was indicated beforehand that if participants felt victimised by the research questions, they could withdraw anytime from participating and if there is a need, the researcher would refer participants to relevant counselling.

3.11. Limitations of the study

Limitations of the study refer to constraints confronted by the researcher when conducting the study. This may include but not limited to the methodology and research design that may influence the overall findings of the study. Below are the number of limitations confronted by the researcher in this study.

3.11.1. COVID-19

Due to a global pandemic of coronavirus also referred to as COVID-19, the researcher had to rely mostly on interviews being done online. The researcher conducted six online interviews via Skype and Zoom respectively. This was because of the need to take precautionary health measures including but not limited to the maintenance of social distancing and observance of lockdown conditions such as restricted movement. As such, only one face-to-face interview was done.

3.11.2. Cancellation and postponement of interviews

As a built-up from the previous limitation (section 3.11.1. on COVID-19) a number of interviews were cancelled. For example, the response below of an identified participant captures the context for the cancellation and/or postponement of the some of the interview appointments.

Participant 1:

Hi Lebogang, I have a deadline for work and waiting for an urgent work call. Can we postpone our call to after 8 August? Meantime I can give you some other experts for interviews. Sincere apologies but covering for a colleague and the workload is overwhelming this week and I am moving from Malaysia next week. After 8 August, I will be settled and in your time zone.

3.11.3. Identified participants not interested

Given the type of sampling used by the researcher, which is purposive in nature, a number of participants identified were either not interested in participating in the study or felt that they were not well informed to participate in the research.

The following are some of the responses from identified participants:

Participant 2:

Thank you for reaching out. I am suitably intrigued by your research interests. However, I must decline your request as I am not an expert in this area. I do know a very clued-up Zambian Political Science PhD candidate (UK-based) who I think you would do well to connect with. If you are keen on that, please drop me a WhatsApp text using the number in my email signature below.

Participant 3:

Your doctoral research topic sounds interesting and topical, however, I would not be the right participant in your study as though, my focus area is China-Africa economic engagement, I do not have any detailed understanding of the contexts of Zambia and Zimbabwe in respects to China's foreign policy.

3.11.4. Lack of time

Given that the researcher had to rely solely on interviews done either online or the participants replying elaborately on the semi-structured interview guide, the number of identified participants declined to take part due to lack of time and back-to-back meetings.

For instance, a suitable participant from the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) identified by the researcher replied:

Participant 4:

Regrettably, my schedule is extremely loaded at present hence will not be able to participate in an interview.

3.11.5. Non-response to emails

The researcher did identify the relevant sample for the study however a number of participants did not reply to the email of invitation to this research.

3.11.6. Internet glitches

Given that the researcher conducted most of the interviews online using applications such as Skype and Zoom, the researcher encountered the challenge of internet glitches during interviews. This affected the flow of the participants when responding to some of the questions as well as the flow of the entire interview. It must be noted that at times, during transcription of the interview, the researcher identified sections where the participants were not audible either because of the glitches or the device microphone.

3.11.7. Not finding the optimum sample in South Africa

At the start of the research, the ideal sample was meant to be participants who reside in South Africa due to financial constraints and accessibility of such participants. Following the lockdown in South Africa and lockdown of most countries in the world, the research diversified the participants and did not limit the sample to those residing in the country only. It must be noted that invitation to participants was sent out to researchers and scholars alike in South Africa. Due to some of the limitations mentioned above, the researcher used the opportunity to pursue even more informed respondents on China-Africa beyond the South African borders.

3.12. Summary

This chapter has outlined the difference between a research paradigm, research methodology and research design. The researcher went on to deliberate on the research paradigm and method employed in this study. It has also showcased the step-by-step methods employed by the researcher in addressing the research problem. This includes the research design, type of sample technique, data collection, data analysis, quality criteria and ethical considerations. Finally, the researcher provided the challenges and limitations encountered during the study.

The following chapter will describe China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective. This will allow the researcher to broadcast a bird's eye view of the relations between China and Africa and how such relations have evolved to even shape and influence contemporary relations.

Chapter 4: A [Re]presentation of China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective

4.1. Introduction

This chapter [re]presents a detailed account of China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective. This is done by detailing the relations into three phases. The phases are arranged chronologically and contemplates on events that shaped Sino-Africa relations. In [re]presenting such relations, the researcher uses the Bandung conference of 1955 as a point of departure until the formation of FOAC and events that occurred thereafter.

4.2. The Three Periods of China-Africa relations

In [re]presenting the themes on China-Africa relations, the researcher made use of different time periods. The first period being China-Africa relations in the 1950s until the year 1970. In the period 1950s until 1970s (herein after referred to as the first period), the researcher provides a historical [re]presentation of China-Africa relations from China's establishment as a sovereign state in 1949 and the subsequent wave of decolonisation of African states thereafter. The section also covers key events during the first period such as the Bandung conference of 1955, the Non-Alignment Movement, the Group of 77 (G77) as well as the Chinese Cultural Revolution of 1966 until 1967 respectively.

Secondly, the author deliberates on China-Africa relations from the year 1971 until the 1990s (herein after referred to as the second period). In the second period the author incorporates a historical perspective of the drift between Sino-Soviet relations as well as the admission of China in the UNSC. In addition, the end of the Cold War in the year 1991 as well and what that meant for China-Africa relations is deliberated under this section.

Third and lastly, the author covers China-Africa relations in the 2000s until 2020 (herein after referred to as the third period). This period includes the incorporation of China back into the WTO in the year 2001. More also, the establishment of FOCAC is also covered in this section.

4.3. China-Africa Relations in the First Period

As mentioned above, this section will present China-Africa relations from the 1950s to the year 1970. In as much as contact in the form of trade between the two dates as back as the first millennium AD, this study will use the birth of China in 1949 to unpack its relations with Africa (Venkataraman & Gamora, 2009). The period 1950s to 1970s is regarded as the first phase or liberation phase in making sense of China-Africa relations (Zezeza 2014). For instance, Zezeza mentions that in the 1950s to 1970s both China and Africa were still positioning themselves and were occupied with asserting their national identities.

4.3.1. The Bandung Conference of 1955

“[The Bandung conference] was the first unity meeting in centuries of black people.....The number one thing that was not allowed to attend the Bandung conference was the white man. He couldn’t come. Once they (Africans and Asians) excluded the white man, they found that they could get together. Once they kept him (the white man) out, everybody else fell right in line. This is the thing that you and I have to understand. And these people who came together didn’t have nuclear weapons, they didn’t have jet planes, they didn’t have all of the heavy armaments that the white man has. But they had unity.”

Malcolm X (1963)

The quote above by Malcolm X, a well-known activist born in the USA compliments then President Surkano of Indonesia’s view during the Bandung conference who in his speech pronounced the conference as “the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples’ in the history of humankind” (Archarya, 2014).

The Bandung conference of 1955 had representatives from both Asia and African states. It is worth noting that the representatives of the above mentioned conference incorporated both old and new states from the two continents. This is so given the wave of decolonisation that was taking place in the first period of China-Africa relations. The conference was meant to address common interests and concerns of both continents as well as having the participating states agreeing on means to achieving economic, cultural and political cooperation (Alden & Alves 2008; Adem 2013).

24 Asian and African states who participated at the conference: Afghanistan, Cambodia, People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, State of Vietnam and Yemen.

Asian states	African states
Afghanistan	Egypt
Cambodia	Ethiopia
People's Republic of China	Gold Coast
Iran	Liberia
Iraq	Libya
Japan	Sudan
Jordan	
Laos	
Lebanon	
Nepal	
Philippines	
Saudi Arabia	
Syria	
Thailand	
Turkey	
Democratic Republic of Vietnam	

State of Vietnam	
Yemen	

Bandung challenged the existing international economic, political, racial and cultural order. The conference comprised of weakest actors at the time in the global community in terms of economic, political and military components of power. The PRC championed processes associated with decolonisation with African, Asian, Latin American peoples against imperialism (Thomas, 2013). Except Latin America, these states of the Third World had a common past, common attitude and shared the same intellectual baggage of nationalism, anti-colonialism, propensity towards non-alignment. Bandung was an important milestone in the evolution of non-alignment as a basis for third world solidarity. Amongst the important aspects of the community is the inclusion of China back into the international community.

Amongst the shared struggles by both Asian and African states which were tabled at the conference included the need to fight colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, world peace which did not entirely mean siding either with the Western or Eastern blocs given the height of the Cold War at that time. It is for that reason that at the conference an expression of anti-colonial Afro-Asian nationalism as well as feelings of protest at the persisting predominance of the white race and the subordinate position of new nations had to take in the world economy and international politics. The conference participating states agreed on the need to intensify economic and cultural cooperation amongst themselves as well as industrialised countries. In doing so, a declaration in the form of a final communique was agreed upon which comprised of ten principles of peaceful coexistence.

The 10 principles adopted at the 1955 Bandung Conference:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations.

2. *Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.*
3. *Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small*
4. *Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.*
5. *Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations.*
6. (a) *Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular interests of the big powers.*
(b) *Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.*
7. *Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.*
8. *Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the united nations.*
9. *Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.*
10. *Respect for justice and international obligations.*

The ten principles of peaceful coexistence adopted at the conference embodied what is referred to as the “spirit of Bandung”. This spirit lived on and later gave birth to two international conferences namely the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and the G77.

4.3.2. The Non-Alignment Movement

The NAM and the G77 (which is explained in detail under 4.3.3.) can be considered the Bandung Conference's true successors. The NAM has been established in 1961 as a grouping of nations outside the UN system. NAM was concerned with political and military questions relating to the East-West conflict and to international security especially on the question of peace. Not only that, NAM was meant to tackle other problems relating to economic development and cooperation on a North- South basis.

Since its formation, NAM has established itself as an autonomous group both in an East-West and in a North- South context. Its policy was largely keeping aloof from bloc politics, military pacts and Cold War rivalries. Thus, Cold War may be called a

reference point of Non-alignment But not its reason for existence. NAM does not and did not require politico-ideological or social-structural differentiation from the two blocs, nor does it require uniformity in these respects within the movement (Irene, 2018).

4.3.3. Group of 77

The G77, which fulfilled its promise to be the major constituency within the United Nations system was established on 15 June 1964 at the conclusion of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Its founding was the result of a collective perception on the part of developing countries that they shared their most common problems and of the recognition of the need for joint action in accordance with the principles and objectives of United Nations Charter, in the face of the inequitable pattern of international economic relations. Although the membership of G77 has now risen to 132 countries, including China, with the admission of South Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina to its ranks in 1994, the original name is still retained because of its historic significance. The evolution of the G77 is intimately linked with the United Nations system and remains a clear manifestation of the importance that the latter attaches to multilateral co-operation.

The Bandung conference had no follow-up or any mechanism to implement the proposals of this historic Conference until 1962, when the G77 developing countries was set up. The Bandung Conference was, therefore, a harbinger of things to come for the G77. Originally the G77 was a group of seventy five Afro-Asian countries (Japan and New Zealand initially not members).

The G77 is a creation of a 'unity amongst diversity'. It is not a homogenous group with nearly identical economic problems, social environments, needs and capacities. Nevertheless, almost all of the members have one thing in common: they were nations who were subjected to colonialism in one way or the other and were newly emerged independent states who needed development. The G77 therefore proceeded to create a broad setting of objectives to address common problems.

4.3.4. Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)

China's Cultural Revolution is said to have begun in the year 1964 until the year 1969. It was during this period that China was cut from the West as well as the rest of the world (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). It is worth noting that the revolution occurred after the establishment of the NAM as well as the G77. Despite this, the revolution went on until the second period of China-Africa relations. Regardless of what was going in China, in the year 1969 Beijing reached an agreement to proceed with the financing the TAZARA project (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). The TAZARA project began in the year 1970 until 1975, two year ahead of schedule (Thomas, 2013). This continuation of the TAZARA marks both Tanzania and Zambia as China's oldest allies in Africa. After the five year revolution, China was recognised by few African states as opposed to before the revolution. More also, trade between Sino-African states declined and loan to African states by China also dried up (Thomas, 2013).

The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 changed the direction of China's policy and behaviour as the promise of a sustained Chinese initiative in Africa did not materialise. Similar to its foreign policy globally, China's relations with Africa were curtailed. Its image of "turning in-ward" was further enhanced by the recall of all its ambassadors to Africa (except to Cairo, capital and administrative hub of Egypt).

4.4. China Africa relations in the Second Period

Scholars refer to the mid1970s to the 1990s as the second phase of China Africa relations. This period is known to be the years during the mid to the end of the Cold War. It was at this stage that major political and economic reforms took place.

4.4.1. Sino-Soviet Relations Drift

Drawing from the first period of China-Africa relations, from the momentous event of the Bandung conference as well as its two successor international organisations,

namely: NAM and G77 to the Cultural Revolution; a sudden drift between China and the Soviet Union was evident. It is because of the above mentioned events that China began positioning itself as an alternative partner from neither the West nor East to African states. China's formation of diplomatic relations with African states was a sudden drift between China and the Soviet Union whom at the past collaborated in advancing revolutions in Africa. The sudden Sino-Soviet drift contributed to the demise of Afro-Asian solidarity as China wanted to forge an anti-Soviet and anti-white bloc with African states and African leaders deemed this approach counterproductive. It is worth noting that Africa was a battleground for China-Taiwan rivalry with the USA assisting Taiwan with forging relations with as many African states as possible.

Given that in the 1950s, the struggle for independence of African countries, turned to one of struggle between the West (led by the USA and capitalist ideology) and the East (led by the former Soviet Union with socialist ideology) to turn them on to their respective ideological camps, which, once again, very sadly continued even after these countries attained independence from their colonial masters. The intense competition between China and Soviet Union for influence in Africa should also be seen along this line. China was a 'Pariah' in the community of nations. China sought to extend its tentacles by attempting to lure African and Asian countries to its side at the Bandung conference. Therefore, the beginning of China's interaction with Africa was political in nature. Hence, its aspiration to consolidate its relations with African countries was unquestionable (Larkin 1971: 5-8).

China not only proclaimed its intention of non-interference as a cardinal principle in its foreign relations, it also intended to woo the newly independent states of Africa and other parts of Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, where a significance cannot size of Chinese live, and Latin America towards its side by opposing USA imperialism and thereby attempted to garner support for its membership in the UN. Principles of peaceful co-existence first appeared in a Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet which was signed in Peking on 29 April 1954.

4.4.2. People's Republic of China admitted in the UN 1971

Following the Sino-Soviet drift simultaneously with China-Taiwan rival taking place, China managed to be admitted in the UN. This was in the year 1971 whereby Beijing obtained one of the five permanent seats in the UNSC replacing Taiwan. This is partly due to 26 African states support in the UN General Assembly. Chinese officials recognised that, with its numerical advantage in the UN General Assembly and anti-colonial perspective, independent African states held the key to removing the Republic of China from its status as occupant of the coveted permanent seat on the UNSC. China's Africa policy now had to develop on two fronts: against USA imperialism and Soviet revisionism (Alden & Alves, 2008).

4.4.3. Tiananmen Square 1989

In the year 1989, student led protests in China calling for democracy, free speech and media occurred. This protest resulted in a massacre by the Chinese government. In the world, reactions in the form of economic, trade, political and other sanctions imposed on Beijing took place. This was so by western powers in particular the USA.

The isolation of China in global politics enriched it with more time to improve and forge strengthened relations with its neighbouring states. As such, what was meant to tremble the Chinese as per the sanctions imposed by western powers allowed China to grow extensively. This is more so evident when looking at the improvement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the period. The sanctions imposed on China were later uplifted with Japan in 1990s being the first to do so and other states following thereafter (Zhu, 2010).

Another important event that occurred at this time influencing China–Africa political relations was the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989. While many Western governments were critical of China's actions at Tiananmen, a number of African countries such as Namibia, Burkina Faso, Botswana and the North African countries either supported or did not oppose China on this issue, bringing China and these

countries closer together at a time when the former's relations with the West had deteriorated (Shelton & Paruk, 2008).

4.4. China Africa relations in the 2000s to 2020

4.4.1. Admission of China in the WTO

Flowing from the sanctions on China, which incidentally equipped it to be a key player in world politics, was the re-admission of China in the WTO in the year 2001. This was so following years of exclusion and negotiations with the USA back in the organisation.

It was in the 2000s that China's economic growth was booming. As such, needed to expand trade and investment. This is what the Chinese managed to do over the years and that is, being able to achieve its policy objectives without 'intentionally' threatening the USA or disrupting the world economy of the time.

4.4.2. Formation of FOCAC

FOCAC as a platform was established to create equal dialogue based on realistic and pragmatic principles between China and African countries. It is for that reason that it has evolved to become a flexible yet strategic mechanism through which China and Africa can cooperate. It is worth noting that in many ways it lacks transparency and, despite growing and developing, needs to further develop in order to take full advantage of the changing world situation and the Africa-China relationship. The development of FOCAC capitalised on a lengthy China-Africa relationship, which saw political support, financial aid and infrastructure assistance, even during times of economic hardship. After the 1990s, the relationship began to evolve in response to changing needs and an altered world situation, including the implementation of the United Nations' consolidation measures, redevelopment of China's aid mechanisms and an increase of Chinese investment in and trade with Africa. At the same time, mechanisms were established for high-level contact between Africa and the USA, France and Japan, but China was not considered. This led to separate suggestions from African leaders, Chinese scholars, and Chinese financial institutions for the

development of a multilateral forum for China and Africa. The AU became a member of FOCAC in 2010. But as yet African states have not come to a consensus on the AU's role in FOCAC. Due to the absence of an overarching body for coordination and follow up of African countries, each African country has developed its own processes for dealing with follow up actions, and for communication with China and other FOCAC members. South Africa and Ethiopia are the only African countries with follow-up committees (Grimm, 2014).

The FOCAC was established in 2000, as a multilateral platform for exchange and cooperation between China and African countries that have shared formal diplomatic relationships. The forum straddles various fields of cooperation including politics, economics, social issues, culture and the environment. Since 2000, there have been four ministerial conferences, held every three years, alternatively in China and a host African country. The ministerial conferences and follow-up actions have led to a deepening of the cooperation between China and African countries and development of the FOCAC mechanism. Since its establishment in 2000, the Forum has evolved as a method of influencing the development of China-Africa relations and South-South cooperation mechanisms, and has made a number of achievements. However, a number of questions exist about the role of FOCAC. These questions cover a wide area, including intention for establishment, the participants and operation of the Forum. Other questions are around the processes on Africa's involvement; the successful aspects of FOCAC from the perspective of sustainable development; and the opportunities and problems with FOCAC. FOCAC was established to create a platform for dialogue based on respectful, equal, mutually beneficial, realistic and pragmatic principles. The Forum has evolved from a loosely organised structure into a flexible but strategic mechanism that can influence the China- Africa relationship and South-South cooperation (Shelton, 2008).

A number of questions exist around its participation and decision-making mechanisms, as well as the history and creation of the Forum itself. Based on literature review, quite a number of factors contributed to the establishment of the Forum. Since the 1990s, the rapid development of the existing relationship between China and Africa necessitated the establishment of the Forum. Other factors included international

economic globalisation; increased awareness by senior African officials of the benefits of a close working mechanism between China and Africa; and the desire by Chinese policy makers to establish a China-Africa strategic partnership. The relationship between China and Africa is long-standing, stable and friendly. This has resulted in the solid foundation on which FOCAC was built. The history of China-Africa relations is structured within a framework of equal treatment, respect for sovereignty, and mutual development, and China and Africa have long offered support for one another. Since becoming a FOCAC member in 2010, AU has assisted in coordinating African countries and in opening a separate channel of communication with China through FOCAC (Li et al., 2012).

In 2000, FOCAC was established to serve as the chief instrument of engagement between China and Africa. FOCAC was the first official summit that institutionalised Sino-African ties (Seifudein, 2013). This 'new' partnership between China and Africa was from its inception viewed by scholars such as Brautigam (2010) as a 'win-win situation' for both actors.

This momentous event for China and Africa was critiqued by western states such as the USA, UK and France as China's imperialistic aim in Africa. Thomas (2013:216) asserts that China is Africa's largest trading partner with the Chinese investing heavily in Africa in the form of factories, farms, retail shops and oil wells.

For Sino-Africa, FOCAC is meant to be a platform for equal dialogue based on realistic and pragmatic principles between China and African countries.

Every after three years, FOCAC hosts summits to deliberate on Sino-Africa relations. The first summit in the year 2000 was held in Beijing, China when Jiang Zamin was president. This first gathering of its kind for China-Africa relations was graced by a number of African states presidents.

In 2000, an agreement was reached that there should be a three year action plan to boost Sino-Africa trades and investment. China subsequently cancelled debts owed by African states to China. It further increased development aid to Africa and encourages Chinese to invest in Africa. It could be argued that the amount of Africa's debts cancelled by China is a just a drop in the ocean when compared with the benefits that Beijing derives from its engagement with the continent (Zhao, 2014).

In 2003, FOCAC summit was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with Hu Jintao as president of China. The summit was centred on the rhetoric of South-South solidarity and China as the largest trading partner and Africa as the largest developing economy. The 2003 summit was centred on political cooperation and socio-economic developments. Chinese officials committed to opening China's markets to African exporters and apply tariff exemptor. The latter was not a blanket approach. Hence, the opening up of China's markets is not un-conditional. It comes with a tacit expectation for Africa to do the same. At a distance, this arrangement may appear to be of mutual value. But it is asymmetrical in terms of the flow of economic dividends due to the unequal economic power relations between China and Africa (Shai, 2016).

Sectors such as tourism were granted the Approved Destination Status (ADS) in African states such as Mauritius, Kenya, Seychelles, Zambia, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe to allow Chinese tourists to visit. This was also the case with the agricultural sector, which was targeted sector as per the Addis Ababa action plan (2004-2006).

In infrastructural development, China financed roads and railways building in many African countries contributing to their social and economic development. On investments, the facilitation of joint investments by Chinese and African enterprises and the exchange of experience in business management was evident. This is so considering the private, small, and medium sized enterprises operating in Africa and China. China's central government face challenges in attempts to control the wave of private entrepreneurs and of success and sometimes driven more by profits than

business ethics in Africa. In some investments, less has been done for skills transfer or human resources development of Africans. This is so given the fact that local entrepreneurs fail to compete with Chinese small and medium sized enterprises.

In 2006, the summit took place in Beijing and was graced with 48 African presidents and head of states. The summit also marked the 50th anniversary of China-Africa relations and was declared the year of Africa. It is also worth noting that the year 2006 was regarded as the year of Africa by Chinese leadership since it marked the formal establishment of China with African states especially Egypt in 1956.

It was in 2006 that the watershed movement received more attention. China in the three year action plan included:

- Doubling aid to Africa
- Establishing a China-Africa Development Fund(CADFund) to boost Chinese companies' investments in Africa
- Providing preferential loans and preferential buyer's credits to African countries
- Cancelling debts for 31 African countries
- Opening China's market for exports to African countries
- Building hospitals and schools in rural areas in Africa

It was also in 2006 that the publication of China's white paper towards Africa formalised China's engagement in Africa. In 2009, the summit was held in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. This was during the height of global financial crisis. Declaration to promote open and free trade and investment between China and Africa was adopted.

In 2012, the summit was held in Beijing. The 5th ministerial conference prioritised issues such as (1) political affairs and regional peace and security (2) cooperation in international affairs (3) economic cooperation (4) cooperation in the field of development (5) cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation. All of the above prioritised issues are captured in the preamble of the meeting held. It is worth noting that in the Beijing Declaration, both sides deliberated on improving the position

of developing countries in the world so as to balance power amongst states in the world. The latter should be understood in the context of states needing to recover from the global financial crisis at that time (Fernando, 2014).

It is worth noting that in the year 2012, China had established bilateral relations with 50 African states except four namely Burkino Faso, Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe as well as Gambia, which at the time maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Shinn & Eisanman, 2012:98). In 2015, the summit was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. Under the theme 'China-Africa Progressing Together: Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development'; a form of consolidating solidarity and cooperation between China and African people was enforced.

This was so following the commitment by the two sides to usher a new blueprint to realise opportunities for future mutual development as well as to contribute to promoting world peace, stability and development of Africa and China.

Given common challenges and interests by two sides, the summit was used to observe mutual beneficial results in the 15 years of FOCAC establishment. Amongst issues tabled at the summit includes (1) the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development as a universal, transformative and integrated development plan (2) the need to provide greater attention to issues of development in the international community and the need to give priority to supporting the resolution of difficulties and challenges faced by developing countries (3) strengthen South-South cooperation using China-Africa cooperation as a model for manifestation (4) oppose trade protectionism in all forms and to be in favour of advancing the WTO Doha Development Round negotiations and safeguarding the development of an open world economy (5) the need to reform the existing international financial system and establish a fair, just, inclusive and orderly international financial system, reaffirm commitment to the One China policy amongst others (Haifang, 2015).

In 2018, the summit was held in Beijing. The FOCAC summit was held in Beijing with the Beijing Action Plan of 2019 to 2021 which deliberated on issues such as (1) political cooperation (2) economic cooperation (3) social development cooperation (4) cultural

and people-to-people exchanges (5) peace and security cooperation (6) peace and security cooperation (7) international cooperation as well as FOCAC institutional development.

4.5. Summary

This chapter [re]presented a historical perspective of China's foreign policy towards Africa. The researcher divided China-Africa relations into three periods. The first period covered the Bandung conference of 1955, the NAM, G77 and the Cultural Revolution. The second period covered the Sino-Soviet drift, the admission of China in the United Nations as well as the Tiananmen Square incident. Lastly, the third period looks into the admission of China back into the WTO in 2001 as well as the establishment of FOCAC in the same year. The sections unpack the ministerial summits held since FOCAC establishment until the 2018 Beijing summit.

The next chapter introduces the second section of the study. Processes of analysis such as codes, categories established by the researcher as well as profiles of participants are included in the next chapter.

Chapter 5: Examining the symbiotic relations between China and Africa

5.1. Introduction

The relations between China and Africa have throughout time been received differently by those residing in the continent and the global community at large. It is for that reason that this chapter examines the symbiotic relations between China and Africa and how scholars have made sense of these relations. This is done by simultaneously examining the findings from the interviews conducted as well as the existing literature by scholars. Firstly, the researcher unpacks types of thematic categories established to make sense of the relations. Secondly, the views of participants and literature through the usage of data source triangulation is employed to deliberate on the findings. Lastly, the researcher summarises the chapter on different perspectives in understanding China-Africa relations.

5.2. Thematic categories


As data analysis in qualitative study occurs as early as the data is collected, the researcher noted three thematic categories when busy collecting data and doing the analysis for the study from the interviews conducted. These categories serve as lamplights for the researcher in making sense of the views shared by the participants of this study. It is worth noting that when doing in-depth analysis, these categories were established from the initial codes. Even though the researcher established thematic categories from the codes emanating from the interviews, she also noticed that the themes established became limiting to the views of participants as some of the findings became fluid when unpacked during data collection to the extent that it contradicts the initial view of participants. This is detailed as the researcher dissects the findings below.

As mentioned in the introduction, the researcher developed three themes namely mutualism, parasitism as well as competition. Concepts that aligned with each theme were grouped together and discussed in detail. For instance, under the category of mutualism, the researcher brought together concepts drawn from participants who

view the relations between China and Africa in a beneficial and positive way. Under the category of parasitism, the views of participants who had negative views as per concepts detected from the interviews were grouped together. Lastly, participants who made use of concepts which are neither positive nor negative and used their backings to not view the relations as such were grouped together under the competition theme.

In explaining the themes below, the researcher adopted terms which explain symbiotic relationships. This is so because of how such terms are unique but equally relevant in grouping the concepts identified during data collection and analysis, respectively. For instance, symbiotic relationship which can simply be explained as relations between two or more [states] in an environment [globe]. According to the themes above, mutualism can be defined as states benefiting from each other. Parasitism refers to when one state uses the other to survive and having the other one not benefiting from the relations. Lastly, competition refers to when two or more states belonging to the same grouping [Global South] but limited by various factors in the global system use each other to survive and get by.

The gear below demonstrates the three themes from codes drawn from the interviews by the researchers on the symbiotic relations between China and Africa:



Source: Author's own illustration

5.2.1 Mutualism

As mentioned above, mutualism herein refers to relations where both states mutually benefit. It is in that regard that the researcher grouped the views of scholars who made use of concepts which could refer to the relations between China and Africa as mutual relations. From the interviews conducted, the following participants viewed China-Africa relations as mutualistic. For instance, researcher respondent 4 (2020) states that:

...ideally relations between China and Africa present a good opportunity for African countries to have an alternative development partner compared to the relationship that they have with the West but in practice what we have realised is that African countries, (mainly African leaders) have engaged with China in a more selfish manner as they do not involve the masses. They do not involve the citizens on potential benefits and potential deals between China and Africa.

Ojakorotu and Kamidza (2018) also pointed out the close economic and political relationship the Zimbabwean elites have with China at the cost of the interest of the people of Zimbabwe. Researcher respondent 4 (2020) perspective of viewing China as an alternative development partner from the West compliments and reinforces the argument of scholars such as Tull (2006) who assert that China's increased involvement in Africa throughout the years presents an alternative to Africa from the West especially with China's offering of aid without preconditions to Africa.

Dating as far back as the political independence by African states, the West has been willing to aid African states with certain conditions. However, given the increased involvement of China in the African continent, China (unlike the West) has been willing to aid Africa. As such, this diplomatic support has been well received in a manner that supports the argument made by researcher respondent 4 (2020) of viewing China as an alternative to the West. Despite the mutualistic relations on China-Africa relations, researcher respondent 4 (2020) make mention of the fact that African leaders engage the Chinese in a selfish manner by not involving the masses they are representing especially on the potential benefits and deals on China and Africa relations.

Although mentioned, the view above does not entirely scrap out the mutualistic relations between Sino-African states. Instead, it highlights the fluid relations and pragmatic analysis of how the relations between the two cannot be rigidly defined. In as much as the relations in terms of state-to-state may be that of good intent, the reality of having the “elite” or African leaders abusing their engagements for personal gains in majority of African states especially Zimbabwe is a challenge.

In perhaps addressing the cons of such mutualistic relations between China and Africa, researcher respondent 4 (2020) proposes joint cooperation by African states to bargain better with the Chinese. This is so given the fact that China’s strength economically and otherwise gives it an upper-hand in its relations with individual African states. As such, the formation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) is said to be another reason for China to negotiate with the continent as a whole. This of course, compliments Africa’s desire to unite and negotiate as a collective instead of individuals. Despite such a desire, the establishment of the African Union (AU), which is a successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), has been argued by scholars to have not been forthcoming as far as uniting African leaders to bring beneficial deals with China (Li et al. 2012). Hence, the argument that Africa has not been able to make use of its engagement with China through FOCAC to bring about opportunities for its people.

The second participant under the mutual category of viewing China and Africa relations is researcher respondent 6 (2020). When asked his view on China-Africa relations, the respondent traced the relations as far back as the late 1950 with China signing trade agreements with African countries such as Algeria, Somalia, Sudan as well as Morocco. These trade agreements were at the time amongst China’s economic efforts to explore Africa as well as expand its interests. The relations of China with Africa overtime have reflected a clear cultivation of ties in the economic, military and technical areas. Researcher respondent 6 (2020) argues that China’s relations with Africa are good for as long as both sides benefit from the multilateral agreements signed in between Africa and the second biggest economic power in the world.

So far, it is clear that the participants considers the history that continues to shape Sino-Africa relations. Researcher respondent 6 (2020) does so by tracing the relations as far back as the 1950s all through to the current with FOCAC being the watershed of China-Africa relations. Researcher respondent 6 (2020) in his analysis however delves more on the economic benefits of China-Africa relations and that is evident with how he articulates the availability of China in Africa and exploring the economic interests thereof. As such, it is worth mentioning that both China and Africa are important to each other. With regards to Africa, it needs Chinese investment, especially in infrastructure and social services to alleviate the continent's perennial limitations. On the other hand, China needs Africa's markets for its products. The relationship is one that could be mutually beneficial if the two parties could negotiate in good faith and transparently. As the relationship stands, China is benefiting more, though it does not carry sole responsibility for this lopsided reality. Africa also needs to be more responsible in terms of governance and modalities for negotiation (researcher respondent 1, 2020).

The mutualistic benefit between China and Africa has been the cornerstone of relations and has ever since created an ideal environment to continue such relations. Of course, the latter should be understood within the context that China is Africa's key strategic partner. This has been the case since the year 2000 when the world was disregarding Africa and looking at it as almost a donor recipient (researcher respondent 2, 2020). Not only that, the world perception around that time around Africa was not positive and Africa was already been seen as through the challenges, death disease, distraction it is experiencing (Alden 2008; Van Staden et al., 2018).

In highlighting the pursuit for mutualistic relations between China and Africa, China's institutionalisation of FOCAC provided both political and economic opportunities in terms of growing cooperation within the continent (researcher respondent 2, 2020). The Chinese saw Africa's population and growing market as an opportunity to internationalise some of their companies (Zhu, 2010). African leaders were even encouraging China to invest in the continent as it benefitted the continent's economic growth (researcher respondent 2, 2020). China is an important actor and partner in the African continent as it has even become the continent's biggest trading partner.

Although not Africa's biggest source of foreign investment Beijing has showcased its importance and willingness as a buyer of African products. Similarly, China has broadcasted its desire in the continent as an important market for its products particularly manufactured products (Tull, 2006).

Despite the renewed respect by the AU in China-Africa relations, Global South engagement has experienced its fair share of good times, tension and over the last couple of years, increased cooperation (researcher respondent 3, 2020). Of importance is the historic, economic, military, socio-cultural as well as political relations between Sino-Africa relations. Nevertheless, each of the above takes place differently with respect to each Africa state depending on the relations with China. In some of the ways, the good includes knowledge transfer-student migration and mobility especially the wave of student migration in the 1960s and numbers increasing of African students heading to China. The reason for such a growing huge student migration being the generosity of Chinese scholarships to African students, pledge from FOAC from 2018-2021 that talk about it (Cisse, 2012).

In terms of trade, Africa has been an important aspect due to the availability of labour hence Chinese state enterprises heading to different African for different interest (researcher respondent 3, 2020). As illustrated by researcher respondent 3 (2020) in their comment on China-Zambia:

For Zambia there has been mining, infrastructure development and natural resources, manufacturing, labour, small shop investors and numbers show there has been a peak. Tourism has been something that brought China-Africa cooperation. Every states from the US are willing to have to China in their state because the Chinese are lucrative spenders. Chinese are biggest investors/buyers.

The participants above described in detail how they view China-Africa relations. Such mutualistic relations between Sino-Africa relations where not entirely new as there are several scholars who share the sentiments of the participants above. It is in that regard that concepts from the interviews conducted formed the theme mutualism to

categories the views of scholars who view China-Africa relations as good beneficial relations.

Below the researcher unpacks the second theme categorised as parasitism. The thematic category of parasitism was established following the concepts of participants in the study who viewed the relations between China and Africa as that which did not entirely benefit both parties.

5.3.2. Parasitism

Moving on to the second theme namely parasitism two of the participants argued that the relations between China and Africa could be said to be having one gaining at the expense of the other. For instance, lecturer respondent 1 (2020) argued that China-Africa relations is a pessimistic one. The respondent went further to mention that just like the West which are the former colonisers in Africa, there is no imperialist that is better. The relationship between China and Africa perceived to be exploitative with China benefitting alone (lecturer respondent, 2020). For the fact that there are cases where China ended up wanting to possess national assets of African countries that failed to pay the debts, and investing just so to exploit the mineral resources of African states, Beijing should not be seen as a better “coloniser” in Africa. In the same vein, journalist respondent 1 (2020) sentiment on China-Africa relations are similar to those of lecturer respondent 1 (2020) and he states:

... China's intervention or relationship with African states is exploitative. In fact, China's interventions in Africa have in a sense reminded the West that there is certain ways of dealing with African countries. African countries need investments from different parts of the world irrespective of whether such investment comes from China, the USA or elsewhere.

Lastly, the thematic category of competition comes from the concepts drawn from two participants who did not subscribe entirely to either the positive or negative way of viewing China-Africa relations. That is, instead of using regarding the relations as

either good or bad, the participants made use of terms that unpacks Sino-Africa relations as neither.

5.3.3. Competition

Instead of viewing China-Africa relations as either mutualistic or parasitic, journalist respondent 2 (2020) states that the Sino-Africa relations is very complex and multifaceted. This is argued to be because of having evidence in the form of projects that can attest to the mutualistic relations between the two. Similarly, there have been engagement that can support the parasitic relation between Beijing and African states. As such, the relations between the two is even today, complex to be narrowed down to either being strictly good or strictly bad.

Sharing the same sentiments with journalist respondent 2 (2020), is researcher respondent 5 (2020) who comments that the relations between China and Africa should be viewed holistically. This is so given the dynamics of the relations throughout the evolution of the two's relations. From the first phase namely the liberation phase for both China and Africa, the second phase being the post Chairman Mao and coming also Deng era and lastly the third phase being the current where China is going into the world/globalising. Sino-Africa relations has its ups and downs as showcased with Guangzhou issues, such as allegations of racism against Africans (researcher respondent 5, 2020). It is for that reason amongst others that the FOCAC became a forum where issues like racism and tensions can easily be resolve. Challenges between the two are no longer prolonged and as such easily dealt with through the forum. Even with the issues such as covid-19 in African countries, questions on the debt trap which is a western notion since it is debt generally are addressed, allowing the relationship to be sound and the state of affairs are quite clear going forward. The views of researcher respondent 5 (2020) as similar to those of scholars such as Taylor (2007) and Zhu (2010) who argue that although most studies on China-Africa relations focus so much on Africa needing China; China as well needed the support of African states due to its isolation in global politics.

5.4. Summary

The views on China-Africa relations are not uniform. Be that as it may, the interviews conducted portrays how the relations between China and Africa have been understood. From the dominant theme of mutualistic relations as per the findings of the interviews conducted, the participants argued that the relations between China and Africa seem to be benefiting both parties. On the other hand, participants who viewed the relations between China and Africa as parasitic as per the concepts drawn from negative connotations such as pessimistic, imperialistic and exploitative. Lastly, two participants argued that China-Africa relations does not subscribe to either the good/bad or mutual/parasite narrative. The last pair of participants were grouped under the theme “competition” in understanding China-Africa relations. This is because the participants made use of terms such as complex, multifaceted, holistic as well as dynamic to unpack the relations.

The next chapter compares what determines China’s national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe

Chapter 6: China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the new millennia

6.1. Introduction

This chapter determines China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the new millennia. In doing so, the researcher firstly provides an overview of China's interests in the two states. Secondly, special focus is given to China's key interests in the two African states adopted as case studies for the research of this thesis. The Chinese interests covered in this chapter are as per the findings from interviews conducted. This includes mineral resources, markets, farming and agriculture as well as investments. The above is done comparatively to display similar and different interests of China in each African state.

6.2. An overview of China's interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe

China's national interests in the African continent can be traced as far back as its "going global" strategy in the beginning of the 21st century (Alden, 2007). This was so because of how it managed to grow internally as well as having strong relations with its neighbouring states. Following its inclusion in the WTO in the year 2001 and its "booming" economy, it then saw the need to internationalise beyond its region in Asia and the African continent was ideally available (Cheru & Obi, 2011).

To glance closely in the context of its relations with Zambia, China's national interests in this African state could be traced from the Global South's fight against colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. When the first project of TAZARA was proposed and implemented in the late 1970s, it was so because of the Chinese support of the Global Southern states fight against colonial rule and wanting to establish an alternative railways from that of apartheid SA route (Edoho 2007, Marks 2006 & Large 2008).

Despite the costly project of the TAZARA to China at the time, the railway signified the partnership between China and Zambia respectively.

A number of participants in the study shares the above sentiment. For instance, when drawing specifically on China-Zambia relations, researcher respondent 5 (2020) mentions how Lusaka has always occupied a special space within Chinese Africa policy. Researcher respondent 5 (2020) mentions that *...It was in Zambia were Mwalimu Julius Nyerere approached the World Bank, IMF including Britain, USA and others to get funding to establish the TAZARA.* The latter should be understood within context of crisis within SADC Africa countries at the time were apartheid SA and SA transport diplomacy, controlled and still controls the entire region (April & Shellon, 2014). Researcher respondent 5 (2020) comments:

Zambian goods had to head off in Durban and go via rail to Zambia, sometimes Apartheid SA will switch off to say no rail goes to Zambia and at the time Tanzania and Zambia were helping the liberation movements and others in Southern Africa, ZANU-PF and Frelimo. Kenneth Kaunda and Nyerere approached China and the Chinese demonstrated one their very first outside China rail project at the time when they were not that strong, very weak as a matter of fact they were poorer than weak here in Africa in terms of technology, human capital but they sacrificed coming here and some of them died because of Malaria and all sorts of staff. They got the know-how and material and they funded TAZARA. That in itself gives you a sense that in the first phase when they were going global, bigger SOEs, there is knowledgeable capital so in the 2000 as they were going out.

Researcher respondent 3 (2020) agrees with researcher respondent 5 on the assistance of the Chinese to Zambia especially on constructing the railway. This is so given the fact that immediately after the independence of Zambia in the year 1964, China became instrumental in the construction of the TAZARA railway that brought together and enabled better trade for three countries namely Tanzania, Zambia as well as China. It is for that reason that even today, TAZARA continues to display how infrastructural aid between China and Africa dates as far as the formal diplomatic relations between Sino-Africa. With Zambia in particular, the TAZARA allowed

Zambian copper to be easily shipped out between African states as well as China itself.

In the context of Zimbabwe, China's interests as well stems back from the fight against colonialism. In Zimbabwe, the Chinese were even funding and training the Zimbabwean liberation movements of the time against European imperialism. The relations between China and Zimbabwe as such would be incomplete if limited and made sense of starting from the 2000s. Lecturer respondent 1 (2020) states *...If you go to the liberation struggle history of Zimbabwe, you will note the two liberation movements namely the ZANU and the ZAPU parties.*

During the time of liberation struggles, ZAPU was supported by Russia and ZANU mainly supported by China (Alao, 2014; Chipaike & Mhandara, 2013). Following the 1990s with ZANU taking power, its relations were quite cordial despite the support it received from Beijing during the armed struggle. It was only after the 2000s that China's presence in Zimbabwe could not go unnoticed as Zimbabwe's was facing sanctions from the West respectively (Chun, 2014). In the 2000s, relations between China and Zimbabwe were argued to be because of the land reform issues while others argued that the relations were more on human rights problems (Edinger and Burker, 2008). With the souring of relations between Zimbabwe and the West soured, Harare had to sought new allies and as such China was more than willing to step in. hence, the pursuit of what is termed the Look East Policy by Zimbabwe.

Journalist respondent 2 (2020) like lecturer respondent 1 (2020) traces China-Zimbabwe relations as far as the liberation struggle in making sense of their national interests in the Africa state. This he argued to be because of China's support of Robert Mugabe since the liberation movements. Following the resignation of Mugabe in the year 2017 which marked almost three decades in power, it was argued that the envisioned "all-weather friends" between China and Zimbabwe would end (Ojakorotu & Kamidza, 2018). Journalist respondent 2 (2020) comments that before the coup, Constanino Chiwenga who was the former army general at the time, flew to Beijing to seek some form of assurance from China and its relations with Zimbabwe even after the coup.

Researcher respondent 5 (2020) also mentions that China-Zimbabwe relations is ideological. This is so because even as early as the first phase of relations between the two and Zimbabwe's political independence that followed in the year 1980, Harare was leaning more to its former coloniser namely Britain. However, due to the crisis post 1990 and the rise of MDC and structural adjustment programme, Zimbabwe's economy started declining and China been cautious in terms of antagonising western countries (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011).

Researcher respondent 2 (2020) asserts that:

[China] ...always had a close relationship with Zimbabwe whether you look at it from support Zimbabwe's fight against colonialism to the present day. In Zimbabwe where the country was undergoing political and economic challenges, China played an important role in supporting some aspects of the economy. When Zimbabwe's economy was struggling, China was one of the actors that Zimbabwe saw as a source of credit. Even when Zimbabwe was spearheading the Look East policy, China was actively involved in assisting Zimbabwe that was under Western sanctions targeting specific individuals but also certain state owned companies in Zimbabwe.

The next section focuses on China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the new millennia. The following interests are namely mineral resources, markets, farming and commercial agriculture as well as investments are discussed in detail.

6.3. Mineral resources

China is interested in both Zambia and Zimbabwe mineral resources. In terms of Zambia, China pursued its quest for copper with Lusaka as it was more of a familiar terrain. As the history of the relations between the two has been deliberated on above, the pursuit of copper by China in Zambia was quite central. This is so given that Africa at the time was coming out of the Cold war, economic structural adjustments in which Kaunda defeated 1991 opposition and power (researcher respondent 5, 2020).

Researcher respondent 5, 2020 argues that China had an upper hand in Zambia and the relationship was solid. He further comments:

...when SA Anglo moved out of Zambia in most of the copper mines, the Chinese picked up some of those mines at a very cheap price and turned them around. This is a decision Anglo America rejects even now. China-Zambia relations became stronger with Zambia benefitting a strong deal from the relationship.

In agreement, journalist respondent 2 (2020) states that China is largely focused on strategic resources such as copper and iron ore. This should be understood in the context of China being important to Africa as a whole. Zambia as an individual African state is no longer that important to China (journalist respondent 2, 2020). This is so because of what China buys from Africa is 70 percent oil, mineral and timber. Most of them comes from 10 countries. So Zambia being one of them with minerals (journalist respondent 2, 2020).

Since the 2000s, China did not have many choices as to where it could go to buy things and “internationalise” (Zhu, 2010). The Asian state resorted to Africa because of amongst other reasons, the countries low barriers to entry, lack or no high irregular obstacles, low cost compared to Europe and USA which were expensive and complicated at the time ((journalist respondent 2, 2020). As an alternative to the the USA and Europe, Africa was eager for investments and engagement from foreign states such as China which had the necessary resources and means such as capital. This is even evident today with its initiative of Belt and Road that privileges them to trade and access different regions across the world (Rapanyane & Shai, 2019).

Because Africa has been valued in economic terms, such perception has gradually changed since the 2000s. That is, the perception that Africa being viewed only through the economic lens. Since the time of colonialism, the continent’s labour and resources have been exploited (Sun, 2014). However, with the active role of the China in the continent, Africa’s political power such as votes at the UN, IMF and the World Bank has deemed it more valuable than the mineral oil and timber, which they can buy from anywhere else across the world (journalist respondent 2, 2020).

In the case of Zimbabwe, China's relations with Harare is defined by the domestic crises of corruption and other ills evident in Zimbabwe's domestic politics (Zhao, 2014). Be that as it may, China's relations remain critical due to the USA and Europe sanction on Zimbabwe hence the phrase "all-weather friend" relevant in the two's diplomatic relations (journalist respondent 2, 2020). Contrarily, lecturer respondent 1 (2020) on China's investment in Zimbabwe argues:

China never invests enough in Zimbabwe to help get it out of its quagmire. It is okay for China to invest in Zimbabwe but it would not invest so much that Zimbabwe would come out of its economic problems. It may have been a good friend but I think it also had a measured approach. China even brings in labour into Zimbabwe despite Zimbabwe still having capability of providing that labour, which tells you that it pursues self-interest.

The above comment displays how unlike before, China is calculative in its relations with African states. The blanket approach of China been viewed as an investor assisting its fellow Southern states is not a reality in the context of Zimbabwe. Beijing treads carefully on where to invest and to what extent. This is so given its role now as an established power in global politics (Mohan & Lampert, 2013). To safeguard its interest, China does interfere in the domestic politics of Zimbabwe and this is argued even to be the case with Mugabe's toppling following the coup that occurred when the army general came back from China (lecturer respondent 1 (2020)).

Zambia on the other hand is facing difficult and competition with Western countries. In as much as the attention has become ambiguous, China has instead massively invested in in Zambia's industry (researcher respondent 5 (2020)). These is so given Zambia's low base and Chinese ports settling there and farming hence, the heightened scholarly attention on the subject. Not only that, China's presence in the Zambia airports which is equally dominated by a lot of propaganda and anti-China sentiments makes it difficult to distinguish reality from false information hence, the relationship between China and Zambia of recent, quite rocky (researcher respondent 5 (2020)).

China's foreign policy with African states is underpinned by certain principles. Hence, Beijing stressing issues of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states in bilateral relations with it. In the case of Zambian copper mines and resources, China's interest and investments approach is argued to be multi prompt strategy where they use their state owned enterprises to extend its credit (lecturer respondent 1, 2020).

6.4. Markets

Chun (2014) states that China trades arms, mineral resources and raw materials with Zimbabwe. He states that the trade patterns between the two is characterised by the export of raw materials in return for manufactured goods (clothing, textiles and shoes, vehicles (cars, busses, tractors and aircraft) electrical machinery and other equipment (Chun, 2014:15-16). Adding on to the manufactured goods, the scholar mentions that the flooding of Chinese low-quality goods into the Zimbabwean markets have become a source of relief to majority of its buyers. It is worth noting that the Zimbabwean customers although complain about the quality of the goods, local business people complain about being forced out of business as the products are cheaper.

Alao (2014:8) supports the above view by stating in his work that between 2003 and 2013, China's economic and commercial links to Zimbabwe became so extensive and diversified that hardly any aspect of Zimbabwean life did not feel the Chinese impact. He further mentions that due to this magnitude links, Zimbabwe experienced extensive Chinese influence ranging from mining, construction and agriculture to telecommunications, retail and hospitality Alao (2014:8).

Researcher respondent 1 (2020) on China-Zambia claims that there is nothing exceptional about China's foreign policy towards Zambia. Instead, it is a manifestation of China's general policy towards Africa. Beijing's policy towards Africa and Zambia in particular, is couched on colonial-era sentiments when the two ranged themselves against colonial and foreign oppressors. What has changed since the year 2000 is the increasing presence of China and Chinese citizens through massive investment and Chinese entrepreneurs plying their trade on the African continent (Legodi & Shai, 2019).

Similarly, in its relations with Zimbabwe, “China’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe is imperialistic in nature (lecturer respondent 2, 2020). This is so because of how China brings substandard goods to Zimbabwe especially clothes and this in return destroys Zimbabwe’s textile industry (Hanauer & Morris, 2014). Some Chinese substandard goods have been described as ‘Zhingzhongs’ because they do not last long (lecturer respondent 2, 2020).

6.5. Farming and commercial agriculture

When coming to farming and commercial agriculture, China has been actively present in Zambia (Hampwaye & Kragelund, 2013). Even with the shift in political party system from one party to multi party, Beijing’s agricultural engagements especially on the exchange and shift from subsistence to commercial farming cannot go unnoticed (researcher respondent 3, 2020).

In the case of Zimbabwe, China has been following carefully the contested Land Reform Program that drove out whites and the concomitant sanctions that following in 2002 especially from America (researcher respondent 4, 2020). This was immediately followed by Mugabe’s formal announcement of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy in 2003 whereby the country’s development focus was now channelled to the East despite the lack of formal document signed between the two (researcher respondent 4, 2020). Not only that, such a shift in focus proved to have made it difficult for Zimbabwe to account to its people and on the other hand, privilege China to doing more business and gaining massive profits (Edinger & Burker, 2008; Grimm, 2014).

6.6. Investments

The Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) is a key player in extending credit to states that finances infrastructural project (lecturer respondent 1, 2020). China Exim Bank give aid, interest, free loans, and buyers’ credit to countries but at the same time encourage Chinese private sector to go and invest in some of those places (Fernando, 2014).

This is so because of Beijing wanting to access such markets for its booming economy, further its “going out” policy, and “internationalise” strategy (Zhu, 2010). In doing so, African remains a testing ground for its companies. Before Chinese can internationalise and go to Europe and other places, Africa is utilised as an experimental ground for some of those companies on whether they can compete in those places and if successful then they then look beyond the African continent (lecturer respondent 1, 2020).

Researcher respondent 1 laments that it does not matter whether China or Europe, any foreign player on the African continent is interested in natural resources however; China’s presence in states such as Zambia and Zimbabwe is not limited solely on that. This is because in the latter states, there exist a diversity of activities by China. This includes constructions, manufacturing, small traders as well as services sector. As such, Beijing’s presence is quite broad and strategic especially when engaging with its African partners (Alden, 2009).

When looking specifically into China’s engagement with Zimbabwe, one detects how the Asian state was the only one willing to trade with Harare without political conditions because of its non-interference policy (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) hence the growing importance of China in Zimbabwe after the 2000s. The political crises in Zimbabwe urged the need for new partners to enhance engagement and China thus came in to help advantage Zimbabwe (Chipaike, & Mhandaara, 2013). The engagement between the two has since the year 2000 intensified and supported by FOCAC despite the confrontational approach by the West towards Zimbabwe (researcher respondent 2, 2020).

6.5. Summary

This chapter examined China’s national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe. The researcher further compared Beijing’s interests in the two African states and as such detailed the drivers’ namely: mineral resources, investments, markets as well as farming and commercial agriculture. It is from the foregoing chapter that the researcher can comment on the fact that unlike the rich existing literature that argues on China prioritising rich oil states in the continent, there are other countries in bilateral relations

with China which have alternative interests such as those mentioned above and that is the case with the two states of Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The next chapter will locate China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe within regional and continental context

Chapter 7: China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe within a regional and continental context

7.1. Introduction

This chapter seeks to locate China's engagement with Zambia and Zimbabwe within a regional and continental context. This is done by comparing drivers in both African states at regional and continental level. Importantly, historical significance of the two African states to China is taken into consideration to provide clear driving forces in both regional and continental context. In doing so, the researcher firstly deliberates on regional and continental context referred to in this study. More also, the researcher unpacks the findings on what China pursues from both states beyond their respective state borders.

7.2. Regionalisation and continental context

Keating (2011:4) asserts that all meanings of what constitute a region are relative to the nation-state but do not question the state standing as the authoritative definer. As such, this section acknowledges regions as functional systems such as economic, cultural, historical as well as political systems. In addition, Song (2007: 67) asserts that regionalisation emerges as a widespread phenomenon in which nation states build and consolidate cooperation among neighbours in the same region. From the above explanation of regionalisation, it is safe to mention that for regionalisation to take place, states in close proximity have to take collective measures to cope with problems of global governance amongst others (Song, 2007).

On the other hand, continental context herein refers Africa. The researcher is cognisant of the two available policies on China Africa relation in the year 2006 and 2015 respectively. Worth noting is the fact that China has connections with African states through its support for various regional and continental organisations (Alao, 2014).

7.3. Detecting China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe

Having deliberated above on what regionalisation and continental context mean in this study. The researcher then locates such engagement by delving on the views of participants in the study. Lecturer respondent 1 (2020) states that China's engagements in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the regional and continental contexts are driven by its national interests. These interests include economic, agriculture and mining amongst others. In agreement, researcher respondent 4 (2020) also mentions that in both case studies, China is prompted by business interests and that includes the need to exploit natural resources especially minerals in both states.

The above views are not astonishing, this is because of state's key drivers have always informed relation in regional and continental level. China's key drivers in Zambia and Zimbabwe do not entirely shift when engaging at SADC region but instead Beijing rather establishes a lucrative platform for its participation to deepen its relations and easily access its national interests respectively (Legodi & Shai, 2019).

Researcher respondent 3 (2020) however argues that China in Zambia is prompted by the need to test its foreign policy initiatives. The respondent further argues that:

...the political and economic stability of Zambia portrayed over time in its relations with China on the regional and continental context is highly motivated by the socio-economic and political stability of the African country. Today Zambia is perceived as a stable African country with least but prosperous democratic elections held on a five-year basis.

According to the Global Innovation Index (GII) report of 2018, Zambia is a country, which is economically and political stable. At least standing at 54 out of 126 countries on the grading of global countries on economic and political stability in 2018. Zambia as a middle-income African country has been classified as one of the countries with a good record of adhering to international law and had been rated as number 80 out of the 126 countries rated by the GII. This report was read and put to the public at the event which was organized at Roosevelt Island (Cornell University Campus) by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in New York (researcher respondent 3, 2020).

Researcher respondent 2 (2020) shared the same sentiments of researcher respondent 6. The researcher when questioned on what prompts China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe mentions the need by China to have and establish stable partners for its peaceful rise in global politics. This is because of the security that comes with having a reliable partner for trade and selling of products with ease. China wants reliable partners whom very much fit within China's conceptualising of FOCAC. This will enable them to strengthen the political and economic ties as well as to strengthen the people-to-people relations (Du Plessis, 2014; Fernando, 2014). Researcher respondent 2 (2020) mentions the importance of people-to-people relations that goes beyond states relations. Such ties strengthen relations and stability between relations as opportunities in the form of joint research or inviting students from Zambia and Zimbabwe to study in China consolidate relations between Beijing and Africa.

Although researcher respondent 6 (2020) mentions that amongst Beijing's key proponents in Zambia is driven by the need for a stable partner; the respondent in the case of Zimbabwe argues that China in this case is as mentioned in chapter 7 is equally driven by its national interests. The respondent states that China continues to explore Zimbabwe's mineral industry despite the political and economic instability in that African state. Researcher respondent 6 (2020) further states that despite all the instabilities in Zimbabwe, China still engages with it. Even the Chinese were at the time aware that their interests were not threatened under the pro-longed administration of Mugabe and even now under Mnangagwa's administration (Kambudzi, 2013; Ojajorotu, & Kamidza, 2018).

Zambia's seminal player was displayed immediately after its independence where its role in the regional and continental context fight against colonial and settler rule in Southern Africa was evident (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). At the 2007 EU-Africa Summit in Portugal, Zambia's president from 2011 to 2008, the late Levy Mwanawasa, explained that Africa deepened its relationship with China because the West had turned its back on Africa (researcher respondent 1, 2020). Thus, as a continent, Africa sees itself as more related to China through a common history and Western qualified/conditional engagements (Muekalia, 2004). Zambia, like other countries in

Southern Africa, is rich in land and mineral resources and this is another incentive for China to make inroads into the region (Lubinda & Jian, 2018). Some parts of Southern Africa, such as South Africa and Mozambique have coastal resources that might be important for China's Belt and Road Initiative, thus, creating a good impression in the entire region could help China's long-term plans (Vhumbunu, 2019).

In the case of Zimbabwe, the ruling party, ZANU-PF, which was relying on China's largesse to wage war against the settler government in what, was then Rhodesia has been expecting such assistance even post political independence (researcher respondent 1, 2020). The relations occurs at a time when China seeks resources for its industrialising economy and Zimbabwe's search for lucrative relations to cushion the crushing blow of sanctions from the West (Zondi & Bhengu, 2012). It is also noteworthy that South Africa has mainly excused Zimbabwe's dangerous political environment (Alden & Alves, 2008). Thus, China's close relationship with Zimbabwe puts it on the same political side as strategically important partners in southern Africa, mainly South Africa researcher respondent 1, 2020).

Building on China's key driver as tackled in Chapter 6, Zambia's strategic minerals fuel China's engagements in regional and continental context as well. This does not entirely disregards the fact that most of the copper and iron ore that China is in need from does not come from Zambia (journalist respondent 2, 2020). Journalist respondent comments:

...Zambia is not the primary supplier of copper and iron ore to China, South America is. However, Lusaka as the secondary supplier has other interests such as infrastructure and construction opportunities.

In Zimbabwe, China has no specific interest that it benefits which it cannot access somewhere else. However, relations between the two can be said to be because of the history, legacy as well as ideology that continue to shape their relations even today (journalist respondent 2, 2020). Unlike states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, where China needs the cult and tint as essential minerals accessible in the DRC, that is not the case with Zimbabwe.

Exploring further on what prompts Zambia's engagement at regional level is the country's environment, labour force, infrastructure, energy, poor transportation on air as well as unutilised sea level (researcher respondent 5, 2020). All the latter mentioned challenges by Lusaka enables China to step in and explore how it can further their interests and when successful, replicate it in the rest of other country. It is for that reason that Zambia continues to be China's foot base. The researcher respondent 5 (2020) further states:

Zambia is not just Zambia, it is Zambia within SADC and there are quite an number of grips when it comes to air, energy as well as certain issues to understand such as peace in Zambia depends on regional peace.

The respondent above highlights how interconnectedness the region and pivotal role of Zambia becomes central to China's approach as well as continental. It is for that reason that China moves into SADC to understand that aim (Zondi & Bhengu, 2012). The interconnectedness of the region allows China to have a broad eye bird view of the continent and then zoom into specific country with the understanding of each specific country in that regional industrialisation hence, regional documents, continental visions such as agenda 2063 are critical for China (Ashan et al., 2012).

Zambia as an individual state is small hence China's policies and engagement in Africa speak to a regional plan that broadens business beyond specific countries. For instance, in terms of markets, Zambian population is small and therefore Beijing's interest extends to the region as a whole by making supply chains and value chains easy in other states with SADC region (researcher respondent 5, 2020). The said benefits, which China plays at the regional spill over to the continent as well.

China's engagements building up from key drivers in Zimbabwe, one considers the not so equal trade and relations between the two. A closer look at Chinese geopolitical presence in Africa shows that it is concentrated mostly in countries with natural resources such as oil, minerals and land. In countries such as Zambia or South Sudan, the Chinese have been openly imperialistic due to the unfair trade (lecturer respondent 2, 2020).

Despite the dominating propaganda in its engagements with Zambia, China ended mortgaging Zambian projects to the loans that were given to the Lusaka

administration. (lecturer respondent 2, 2020). China's engagement in Africa is economic and profits are argued to be their objective.

7.4. Summary

This chapter moved beyond state-to-state relations between China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe and considered the two African states importance to China within a regional and continental context. Still having the key drivers spearheading Beijing's interests, the researcher's finding includes China's need to have a stabilised world order to continue growing in global politics. Despite the fact that China has throughout located its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe from continental context. Hence, the China-Africa policy of 2006 and 2015 respectively.

The next chapter reflects on the extent to which China abides by the five principles in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively.

Chapter 8: The nexus between China's five principles of peaceful co-existence and its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe

8.1. Introduction

This chapter reflects on the extent to which China abides by the principles of peaceful co-existence. This is done by making a comparative analysis of Zambia and Zimbabwe as the selected case studies. First, the researcher unpacks what are the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Secondly, the researcher reviews the works of scholars who explored how the five principles have shaped China-Africa relations. Lastly, the researcher then makes a comparative reflection of the extent of how China abides to the principles in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe.

8.2. The five principles of peaceful co-existence espoused by China

The five principles of peaceful co-existence namely non-interference, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefit, mutual non-aggression, peaceful coexistence (hereinafter referred to as “the Five Principles”) have throughout China's existence as a sovereign state shaped its international relations. The Five Principles which are traced as far back as the year 1954 when the then Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru came together to seek ways of reducing border tensions and improve Sino-Indian relations. Since then, China proposed the principles in the Bandung conference that took place a year later in 1955 and have then shaped Global South and the emerging NAM that followed (Tull 2006: 461 and Hess & Aidoo 2010). Given that the current researcher has already deliberated on the history of China-Africa relations in chapter 4, the next section explore the works of scholars who solely debated on how the Five Principles have impacted China's relations in Africa.

8.3. The Five Principles: Rhetoric or Reality?

The view on whether or not China abides to the principles of peaceful-coexistence in its relations with Africa has been challenged throughout time. This has been the case because of amongst others, China's shift in its foreign policy. According to Kambudzi (2013:40) China has throughout time decided to not interfere in other countries' internal affairs especially those of developing countries (Kambudzi, 2013:40). This stance by Kambudzi is not said to be the case according to scholars who deliberated on that. For instance, Alden and Large (2013) in their work explore the evolving policy by China towards peace and security in Africa. The two scholars tap into a less familiar terrain by scholars in IR in understanding China's foreign policy towards African countries post-conflict. The two scholars' work is significant given the presence of China in post-conflict African states such as Angola, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and their willingness to provide investments, commodity-backed loans in such economies. Given the reluctance of "traditional" loans such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) amongst others; China has been readily available to finance such African states and provide rapid outlay of finance and construction of vital infrastructure.

Alden and Large (2013:17) have thus devised an approach towards post-conflict environments and fragile states on African affairs in recent years. The two scholars argue that China's lack of sensitivity to any post-conflict and fragile states is becoming a notable gap. From the above work, it is safe to agree with Alden and Large (2013) that indeed there exist less literature on China post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Africa. Western scholars uphold China as political counter-current, resisting the tide efforts to render state sovereignty conditional on human rights, turning a blind eye to everything from elite corruption to violent persecution of opposition on the part of African regimes. Leading critics characterize China's involvement on the continent as mercantilist at best and devoid of moral content at worst. Beijing has expressed longstanding rhetorical support for peace and development in Africa as part of its projection of China as benevolent power engaging in peaceful development (Alden & Large, 2013).

In addition, Berhe (2013:3) in his work cautions on China-Africa relations from the perspective of whether or not it is driven by genuine spirit of South-South cooperation.

Large (2012) looks into China's role in Darfur and Sudan conflicts between the year 2005 and 2011 respectively. This is so because of Sudan being critiqued to be the defining China engagement in Africa. As such, the scholar looks into China's role in a broader spectrum of conflict related areas in Africa including post-conflict structuralism (Large, 2012:5). Large argues that China faced a changed, fluid set of political circumstances as it sought to conduct a managed transition to a two Sudan engagement while maintaining a policy of treating both as interdependent equals.

Hess and Aidoo (2010) examine the historical origin and development of China's advocacy of the principles of non-interference. In its African foreign policy, the two scholars look at the interaction of Sino-Africa relations in the last fifty years and how the principles shaped China's decisions especially with its interest in the continent having been shifted. With African resources and markets as the driving forces for its growing economy, China is argued by the two to have used non-interference as its foothold in the continent. Amongst the key findings of the above scholars is that China's usage of non-interference in the continent has been limited due to regional instability and anti-China populism in the continent.

Hess and Aidoo (2010:357) state that unlike the West which prods Africa to implement neoliberal reforms as demanded by proponents of the Washington consensus, Beijing instead emphasises the principle of non-interference, mutual benefits, and 'win-win' relationships. Chinese leaders place importance on sovereign equality of all countries and offer to meet even the weakest of states on equal footing, respecting every government rights to determine its own domestic policies. Given the African continent history of colonialism, the policy of non-interference has been received well by African leaders and general. Hess and Aidoo (2010:35) simplify what constitute acts of intervention or interference as following:

- (i) Using armed intervention or the threat of force to disrupt the political, social or economic order of another state or change its political system.

- (ii) Using direct armed intervention or subversion to undermine the stability of another state.
- (iii) Allowing one's own territory to be used by rebellious or secessionist movements to indirectly subvert the stability or institutions of another state.
- (iv) Arming or otherwise supporting rebellious or secessionist movements or mercenaries within another state's territory.
- (v) Employing hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening in the internal affairs of another state or undermining its stability.
- (vi) Using one's power and influence to prevent a state from freely determining its own political, social and economic development. This includes the unsanctioned (by the United Nations) use of economic blockades to interfere in a foreign state's internal affairs.

Pang (2013:46) states that China has reiterated that its non-interference principle will be maintained, because it has long underpinned its approach to the developing world and the Global South. Given the changing world politics, Beijing is said to participate as a responsible stakeholder particularly in Africa (Zoellick, 2005). Hence Pang (2013:46) argue that China is neither simply maintaining the principle, without taking action against conflict and crises in other countries, nor abandoning the principle to become a fully engaged actor. Rather China is adopting a new approach which combines non-interference with conditional intervention. Pang (2013:48) argue that China is caught in dilemmas. That is, being reluctant to participate, process or support international collective action organised or sponsored by the West or clearly oppose intervention imposed by other powers. In terms of China being one of the permanent members of the UNSC with veto power, it has been hesitant to apply such veto power to intervene in other powers at the UNSC. The use of veto power in the UNSC is interpreted by China as "hegemonic interventionism but in the name of humanitarian intervention" (Pang, 2013:50).

Chipaike and Mhandara (2013: 153) state that China's non-interference policy, which is premised on respect for the sovereignty of independent countries and the equality of states in the international system, is directly mirrored by Zimbabwe's foreign policy principles, which aim to advance the same ideals. China itself is not a democratic country by western liberal democratic standards, and neither is Zimbabwe. This

congruence in domestic and foreign policy automatically created the basis for mutual cooperation and support at all levels.

Due to these concerns, Hanauer and Morris (2014: 22-24) notes that non-interference acts both as a means of deflecting international criticism of its own domestic policies as well as a policy that frees China from involving itself in the messy and complicated internal crisis that continue to plague Africa. African leaders typically refrain from criticising China in return. Some scholars voice criticisms of China's principles of engagement, arguing they "effectively legitimise human rights abuses and undemocratic practices under the guise of state sovereignty and 'non-interference.'" with the notion that African problems "should be solved by Africans themselves," free from outside intervention and imposition of values, judgment, and ideology. On this point, Chinese scholars distinguish "intervention" from "involvement" or "diplomacy." The key difference, according to one Chinese scholar, is that the latter involves "consent from either Africans themselves or from international institutions such as the U.N. or AU." From China's perspective, non-intervention is intertwined with China's role in promoting human rights and economic development on the continent. Beijing perceives Western-led criticisms of Chinese human rights abuses in Africa as misguided and part of a larger effort to demonise Chinese policies abroad. Berhe (2013) further argues that China's foreign policy should be led by policy of non-interference and should by no means be interpreted as indifference to African problems and realities. Kambudzi (2013:21) states that China based its relations with Africa on peaceful co-existence and foreign aid without strings. This was totally different to the west whom provided African states with pre-conditioned aid. Chinese leaders launched the popular notion of China as the world's largest developing country and Africa as the continent with the largest number of developing nations. It is worth noting that China's aid policies also helped garner the support of African leaders – who were most attracted to the idea that economic assistance could be given without strings attached.

The next section will then reflect on the views of respondents who have deliberated on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe relations respectively. This is done due to the fact that although China claims to abide to the Five Principles; internal affairs of African

states in relations with it have proven over time to influence China's role and [in] consistency to the Five Principles.

8.4. Comparative reflection on China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe

China is argued to be preaching the Five Principles because of not wanting other states to interfere in its domestic politics (Zhu, 2010). As such, it has argued to be abiding to the principles in states that are in relations with it due to wanting them to reciprocate when the West and the global community claim to interfere in its internal affairs. China has been consistent and remains so is China's engagement to the world (researcher respondent 2, 2020). Researcher respondent 2 (2020) assert that China claims to adhere to the principles in its engagements with states such as Zambia and Zimbabwe and wants the mentioned states to reciprocate as Beijing equally has its own domestic challenges that might ring an alarm to the international community to want to step in (Aidoo & Hess, 2015).

Following Zimbabwe's sanctions by the West for human rights abuses rigging of elections, targeting certain individuals, China has utilised the non-interference principles to continue its relations with it (Kambudzi, 2013). Despite critics by scholars of China wanting to destabilise world politics, Beijing remains adamant in its adherence to The Five Principles (Aidoo & Hess, 2015). With Western media claiming that such firm stance on adhering to The Five Principle only benefits Zimbabwe's governing elites, China claims to allow the people of Zimbabwe to sort out their own issues (Ojakorotu & Kamidza, 2018).

When engaging civil society groups, one denotes the concerns on debts owed by Zambia and Zimbabwe to China (researcher respondent 2, 2020). When governments of latter countries take loans but do not target the production sector then those activities will not lead to economic growth (researcher respondent 4, 2020). When the Chinese BRI was introduced in 2013, it became an additional layer in the relationship as China committed about a trillion dollars to the BRI but at the same time under FOCAC China has committed about 60 billion over a 3-year period (researcher respondent 4, 2020). China is an important actor with relatively strong relations with Zambia. As such, Zambia with partners within the EU, is not a singular player but

amongst other external actors and that is important for Zambia to increase its options so that it is not only entirely dependent on either the East or West (Bwalya, 2013).

In its relations with Zimbabwe, Beijing has been criticised extensively by the West for adhering to the 'non-interference' principle during the country's political crises (Chipaike & Mhandaara, 2013; Jenjekwa, 2018). Researcher respondent 4 (2020) mentions that China do not interfere in issues of any country so for the West that one is a non-starter that is why they are blamed for promoting authoritarianism and dictatorship. Researcher respondent 4 (2020) states:

...the one thing that I have heard people complaining about is the way Chinese entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe or other African countries treat local people. This should be blamed on China as a country and demand them to intervene in such cases.

China in this regard needs to step in; such wrongful treatment by Chinese companies and entrepreneurs should be addressed as it threatens peaceful relations between Beijing and African states (Rapanyane and Shai, 2020). For China to solely practice agency when its business interest is under threat showcases a parasitic stance that has no regard on people-to-people relations (Lubinda & Jian, 2018).

Lecturer respondent 1 (2020) deliberates on how the Five Principles are understood and further mentions that China does abide to the principles in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively. Commenting further on China-Zimbabwe, Lecturer respondent 1 (2020) states that China adheres to The Five Principles. It may not necessarily be sponsoring internal uprising but in politics, the sponsoring of candidates and political parties expressing preferences of one political player over the other, in Zimbabwe it is quite visible especially looking at the transition and/or coup that took place; it is difficult not to finger China in the whole process.

Another respondent whom even when deliberating on the type of relations between China-Africa argued that the relations are competitive assert that *...to Zambian, Edgar Lungu and to the Chinese yes [China is abiding to the Five Principles] but to the people in Washington DC? No!.*" Journalist respondent further went on to state that a lot of people in Zambia see the Chinese as very destructive. These displays how the question of whether China adheres to The Five Principles is subjective. It all depends

on how you see the presence of the Chinese in Africa as a whole. Some people see the presence of the Chinese in Africa as all bad (Marks, 2006; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). Others see the Chinese as a source of investment, opportunities and largest trading partner that will be all good (Botha, 2006; Large, 2013). The latter is subject to ones interpretation as to whether you think China's presence is constructive or destructive (researcher respondent 2, 2020). The above sentiments were shared by journalist respondent 2 (2020) on China-Zimbabwe. The respondent states:

...the Americans say [China] in Zimbabwe is helping an oppressive government, it is not protecting human rights, civil rights and that Chinese support is contributing to that. On the other hand, others say without the Chinese there would be no source of investment in Zimbabwe

The question of non-interference in by China in Zimbabwe swings both ways. Although not favoured by others such as Britain and the US, it has assisted in the provision of relief to the people of Zimbabwe who are the ones experiencing these sanctions. Researcher respondent 5 (2020) also agrees to the fact that China abides to the Five Principles in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe. On China-Zambia, respondent mentions that like any other relationship, relations between Zambia and China is not solely defined by Zambia but by regional and continental global factors as well (Zondi & Bhengu, 2012).

Similar to China-Zambia, researcher respondent 5 (2020) states that the question of whether China adheres to The Five Principles depends on the dynamics in Zimbabwe. For instance, in the 2017 coup, the question of whether the "all-weather friends" between China and Zimbabwe will continue after Mugabe was topical. However, since then there has been a sustained interaction between China and Mnangwaga led government in Zimbabwe with a few challenges (researcher respondent 5, 2020). Africa comes as a bulk of friends given the challenges it is going to face. With a young population, Africa is the future, whether its technology or market base. All this phenomenon requires more interaction and more business coming and that will sustain relations with China/Zambia/Zimbabwe (researcher respondent 5, 2020).

On the other hand, two respondent argues that China is not abiding to the Five Principles. Lecturer respondent 2 (2020) states:

...the Chinese are bent on having an upper hand in its relations in Zimbabwe and interfering in the internal politics of Zimbabwe. It is also alleged that China had a big hand in the November 2017 coup that saw long-time dictator Robert Mugabe removed from power. China is displaying a 'big brother' attitude towards Zimbabwe.

Researcher respondent 6 (2020) argues that China in its relations with Zambia does not abide to the principles. The respondent laments that ZESCO which is Zambia's state-owned enterprise producing Zambia's electricity is exchanged for a loan reimbursement. This follows Zambia failure to repay its loans to China. This does not promote peaceful co-existence, as loan defaults are going to be paid through the acquisition of Zambia's lion's share of national corporations (researcher respondent 6, 2020). The same observation was detected with the Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC), which was already under the command of China and illustrates how ZESCO was already negotiated to be handed over to China (researcher respondent 6, 2020).

The major difference is that with China's engagement with Zimbabwe is that, of recent, Beijing has a lot more at stake when political or economic instability looms. These must be understood in the context that Beijing is Zimbabwe's largest investor and Africa's biggest trading partner. Therefore, China is prompted to protect its interests. Currently in Zimbabwe, China is peacefully co-existing and this is observed to be an unusual case, given that the US and the UK had a reduced presence because of sanctions (researcher respondent 6, 2020).

8.5. Summary

This chapter reflected on the extent to which China abides to the Five Principles in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe. This was done firstly by considering the history of the Five Principles and how it is understood by Beijing. The researcher then considered the views of scholars who deliberated on the principles as a whole and/or

individually. From the findings, it is safe to state that the debate on whether China abides to the Five Principles has not been uniform with others arguing that it has been where else others arguing otherwise.

The next chapter provides a general conclusion of the study

Chapter 9: General conclusion(s)

This chapter presents a conclusion on a comparative Afrocentric analysis of China's foreign policy towards Africa using Zambia and Zimbabwe as case studies from the year 2010 to 2018 respectively. In responding to the aim of the study, the researcher had to meet the following objectives namely (1) to describe China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective; (2) to determine China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the new millennia; (3) to locate China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe within a regional and continental context; and (4) to comparatively reflect the extent to which China abides to the 5 principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe.

9.1. Summary of findings

The first chapter presents the research problem that prompted the study. That is, to explore China's foreign policy towards Africa using Zambia and Zimbabwe as case studies. The researcher problematised the need for an alternative theory hence the employment of Afrocentricity. In addition, this chapter conceptualised key concepts such as foreign policy, diplomacy as well as public diplomacy to be more specific which are concept used throughout the study. Lastly, the chapter detailed the organisation of the study thereof.

The second chapter looked into the existing literature that unpacks relations between China and Africa. The researcher even visited specific literature that dealt with China-Zambia and China-Zimbabwe; that is the case studies used to comparatively look into China-Africa relations. Realism, liberalism and social constructivism were studied as dominating theories used by scholars to make sense of China-Africa relations. The researcher then unpacked the proposed theory of Afrocentricity as an alternative theory in making sense of China-Africa relations.

The third chapter presents the method employed by the researcher to unpack the problem under study. That is, Afrocentricity as a research paradigm and methodology is explained. The researcher further unpacked the type of research design, sampling, size of sampling amongst others to showcase the key participants in the study. Data

source triangulation was used to include both documents and interviews. Specific quality criteria such as the use of sufficient verbatim from interviews as well as ethical considerations such as permission to conduct study from the University of Limpopo was granted. In this chapter, the researcher included the limitations of the study such as the cancellation and postponement of interviews, lack of time, non-response to email in the midst of the global pandemic of COVID-19 at the time data was collected.

Chapter 4 represented the history of China-Africa relations using the three phases. In the first phase, the researcher included the NAM, G77 and the Cultural Revolution. In the second phase, the researcher included the Sino-Soviet drift, the re-admission of China in the UN as well as the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Lastly, the researcher explored the third phase of China-Africa relations. This was started off from the admission of China in the WTO to the formation of FOCAC in the year 2000.

Chapter 5 examines the symbiotic relations between China and Africa. From the thematic categories of mutualism, parasitism and competition drawn from the interviews initial codes and now themes. The researcher unpacks the different perspectives of participants coupled with the available literature on how China-Africa relations have been viewed throughout time.

Chapter 6 delves specifically on China's interests in both Zambia and Zimbabwe. The researcher comparatively dissects what determines China's interest in Zambia as well as what determines China's relations in Zimbabwe respectively. In doing so, the researcher finds key drivers such as mineral resources, markets, farming and commercial agriculture as well as investments.

In chapter 7, the researcher locates China's relations with both Zambia and Zimbabwe from the regional perspective. From the findings, the key drivers still inform this chapter however the findings are then looked into beyond the states limits.

Lastly, chapter 8 comparatively reflect on the extent to which China abides by the five principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe. The researcher ponders on the five principles as espoused by China. The researcher then explores the already existing literature on the extent to which China abides to the principles. Lastly, the researcher delves into the views of the participants on China's

adherence to the five principles in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively.

9.2. Main Findings

9.2.1. To describe China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective
In describing China's foreign policy towards Africa from a historical perspective, the researcher established themes from the interviews conducted. The views of respondents were validated as per the quality criteria stipulated under chapter 3.9 with the already existing literature. From this chapter, the researcher finds that China's relations with African states is still a debated terrain with different views. For instance, the codes detected by the researcher led to the researcher into formulating at least three categories namely mutualism, parasitism as well as competition. The researcher finds that in as much as participants argued that relations between China-Africa could be either beneficial, exploitative or competitive; such stance tended to be fluid and not entirely supporting the stance mentioned at the beginning. It is due to such fluidity that the researcher concludes that in as much as relations between China and Africa dominates scholarly as well as public discourse, the generalised stance on the relations is solely on one's attitudes towards Beijing. More also, views on China-Africa relations can be quite misleading if focused on one specific state or project under study.

9.2.2. To comparatively determine China's national interests in Zambia and Zimbabwe in the new millennia

This chapter highlights the ignored reality that China does not only prioritise rich oil states in the continent. Instead, there are quite a number of interests beyond oil pursued by China in Africa. In this case, the chapter broadcasts China's interests of mineral resources, investments, markets as well as farming and commercial agriculture. The above interests are said to be China's key drivers in Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively.

9.2.3. To locate China's engagement in Zambia and Zimbabwe within a regional and continental context

This chapter moves beyond Zambia and Zimbabwe as sovereign states and locates China's need to engage with the two states in both regional and continental level. In terms of regional context, the researcher finds that China considers the need for a stabilised environment for it to grow; this is well known as China's "peaceful rise". It further sees regionalisation of African states ideal for its large populations and finished goods. With regards to continental context, through its institutionalised China Africa policy of 2006 and 2015 (see annexure 3 & 4), China finds Africa as a relevant friend and partner in the global community. Unlike the West, African states do not entirely see Beijing as a threat to the already existing hegemon in the form of the USA.

9.2.4. To comparatively reflect on the extent to which China abides by the five principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Lastly, this chapter reflects on China's extent of abiding to the principles of peaceful co-existence in its relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively. With most respondents arguing that China does abide solely because of not wanting others to interfere in its internal affairs. It is safe to mention that the West is the one politicising China's so called support for "pariah" states in the African continent. Not only that, even the public on the ground who seem to not benefit from the presence of the Chinese and Chinese companies vocalise their dissatisfaction and such views are supported by opposition parties. The Chinese claims to adhere to the Five Principles and the elites supporting their stance. In the case of state-to-state relations; the Five Principles are evident however when taking it to the people as well as critique of Western media that is not the case. What also emerges from the foregoing analysis is that China's relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe are largely framed through the foreign policy parameters of Beijing. The explanation of this painful reality lies in the unequal power relations between China and African states such as Zambia and Zimbabwe.

9.3. Significance of the study

This study applied an alternative theory to complement the existing body of literature on China-Africa, China-Zimbabwe and China-Zambia relations. The researcher having noticed how the existing body of literature on China-Africa employs state-centric theories that are influenced by Euro-American worldview saw the need for an alternative view. More also, the employment of “traditional” theories on China-Africa relations have somewhat reached saturation as they continue to produce and reproduce the same findings of the problem under study. This study then employed a theory that is African centred; providing a bottom-up approach on China’s relations with Zambia and Zimbabwe instead of assuming that China-Africa relations can be generalised to all African states.

9.4. Recommendations for future study

Since this study made use of two case studies namely Zambia and Zimbabwe to comparatively explore China’s relations with Africa; future research could explore other African states in bilateral relations with China. This would assist in deviating from the generalised view of China-Africa relations which is not detailed and does assist in showcasing comprehensive reality on the ground. Alternatively, scholars can consider the same case studies and make use of different delimitations to help detect if there is any gradual shift of China’s foreign policy from the years focused in this study. Lastly, upcoming works can consider contributions of China-Africa relations from a non-western perspective such as Afrocentricity employed in this study.

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Annexure 1



University of Limpopo
Department of Research Administration and Development
Private Bag X1106, Sovenga, 0727, South Africa
Tel: (015) 268 3935, Fax: (015) 268 2306, Email: Anastasia.Ngobe@ul.ac.za

TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

PERMISSION LETTER

Date: 05 November 2019

PROJECT NO: TREC/18/2019 [NEI]

Project title:

Title: A Comparative Afrocentric Analysis of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe, 2010 to 2018

Researcher: LT Legodi

This serves to confirm that the abovementioned study involves secondary use of data and has no ethical implication. After review of the study protocol, the Turfloop Research Ethics Committee (TREC) hereby grants the researcher permission to proceed with their research.



PROF P MASOKO
CHAIRPERSON: TURFLOOP RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

The Turfloop Research Ethics Committee (TREC) is registered with the National Health Research Ethics Council, Registration Number: REC-0310111-031

Finding solutions for Africa

Annexure 2

Title of the Project:

A Comparative Afrocentric Analysis of China's Foreign Policy towards Africa: The case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe, 2010 to 2018

Legodi Lebogang Tiego, University of Limpopo, 076 232 3136

A brief description of the project:

The study is part of my Doctor of Philosophy in International Politics. The participants will take part in unstructured interviews which will take no longer than 1 hour on their knowledge on China-Africa relations. The participants will receive no reimbursement for participation in this study.

Consent:

I hereby consent to participate in the above research project. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may change my mind and refuse to participate or withdraw at any time without penalty. I may refuse to answer any questions or I may stop the interview. I understand that some of the things that I may say may be directly quoted in the text of the final report and subsequent publications, but my name will not be associated with that text unless I opt otherwise.

I hereby agree to participate in the above research:

_____	_____	_____
Participant	Print name	Date
_____	_____	_____
Researcher	Print name	Date
_____	_____	_____
Witness	Print name	Date

Guidelines to Unstructured Interviews

Researcher:

Informant:

Occupation:

Date of Interview:

Guiding Questions

1. What is your view on China-Africa relations?
2. How would you describe China's foreign policy in relation to Zambia since the year 2000?
3. How would you describe China's foreign policy in relation to Zimbabwe since the year 2000?
4. What do you think is China's primary interests in Zambia in the recent past or since 2010?
5. What do you think is China's primary interests in Zimbabwe in the recent past or since 2010?
6. What prompts China's engagement in Zambia in the regional as well as continental context?
7. What prompts China's engagement in Zimbabwe in the regional as well as continental context?
8. Is China abiding to the principles of peaceful co- existence in its relations with Zimbabwe?
9. Is China abiding to the principles of peaceful co- existence in its relations with Zimbabwe?

Annexure 3

List of Interviewees

Lecturer(s)

- (i) Lecturer Respondent 1 is an Academic Manager and Senior Lecturer in Public Management. The respondent was purposefully selected because of his contributions on Zimbabwean politics. The respondent commented on China-Zimbabwe as it is his area of interest.
- (ii) Lecturer Respondent 2 is Chair and Associate Professor with expertise in African politics, culture and education, democratic transitions and development in Southern Africa, African political economy, African conflicts, and conflict resolutions in Africa. The respondent was identified due to his insightful contribution in Zimbabwean politics. The informant responded to the questionnaire guide forwarded via Email and only commented on China-Zimbabwe relations, as it is his area of speciality.

Journalist(s)

- (i) Journalist respondent 1 is a journalist, living and working in Berlin, Germany. His interests include China's involvement in Africa and how it is potentially contributing to a change to EU and USA Africa strategies. The respondent particularly commented on China-Zambia as his area of speciality and did not comment much on China-Zimbabwe relations.
- (ii) Journalist respondent 2 is co-founder of a media initiative that explores China's engagement in Africa. Respondent has over 25 years of journalism experience at many of the world's leading media companies including Cable News Network (CNN) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) among others.

Researcher(s)

- (i) Researcher respondent 1 is a senior researcher with his primary field of research on the increasingly important Africa-China relationship. Respondent's work focuses mainly on the non-state perspective and appraisal of Africa-China relations.
- (ii) Researcher respondent 2 is an executive director with a joint Doctor of Political Science programme. The respondent also co-founded a non-profit organisation dedicated to the promotion of academic, expert and public understanding of global politics.
- (iii) Researcher respondent 3 is an analyst with work experience in governments, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as well as international organisations, UN agencies International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in programme formulation, implementation and monitoring.
- (iv) Researcher respondent 4 is a PhD candidate in Anthropology and African Studies and has written extensively on Zimbabwean's livelihoods and Look East Policy.
- (v) Researcher respondent 5 is a co-director and expert in foreign policy. Respondent holds a PhD in International Relations and has undertaken extensive research on Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, with a special focus on infrastructure investment opportunities.
- (vi) Researcher respondent 6 is an MA candidate in International Politics and has written extensively on China's foreign policy towards Africa.

Annexure 4

China's African Policy

January 2006

Foreword

The first few years of the new century witness a continuation of complex and profound changes in the international situation and further advance of globalization. Peace and development remain the main themes of our times. Safeguarding peace, promoting development and enhancing cooperation, which is the common desire of all peoples, represents the irresistible historical trend. On the other hand, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in the international situation are on the rise. Security issues of various kinds are interwoven. Peace remains evasive and development more pressing.

China, the largest developing country in the world, follows the path of peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. China stands ready to develop friendly relations and cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to contribute to peace, stability and common prosperity around the world.

The African continent, which encompasses the largest number of developing countries, is an important force for world peace and development. China-Africa traditional friendly relations face fresh opportunities under the new circumstances. By this African Policy Paper, the Chinese Government wishes to present to the world the objectives of China's policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.

Part I:

Africa's Position and Role

Africa has a long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge potential for development. After long years of struggle, the African people freed themselves from colonial rule, wiped out apartheid, won independence and emancipation, thus making significant contribution to the progress of civilization.

Following their independence, countries in Africa have been conscientiously exploring a road to development suited to their national conditions and seeking peace, stability and development by joint efforts. Thanks to the concerted efforts of African countries and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)/the African Union (AU), the political situation in Africa has been stable on the whole, regional conflicts are being gradually resolved and economy has been growing for years. The NEPAD has drawn up an encouraging picture of African rejuvenation and development. African countries have actively participated in the South-South cooperation and worked for the North-South dialogue. They are playing an increasingly important role in international affairs.

Africa still faces many challenges on its road of development. However, with the persistent efforts of African countries and the continuous support of the international community, Africa will surely surmount difficulties and achieve rejuvenation in the new century.

Part II:

China's Relations with Africa

China-Africa friendship is embedded in the long history of interchange. Sharing similar historical experience, China and Africa have all along sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle for national liberation and forged a profound friendship.

The founding of the People's Republic of China and the independence of African countries ushered in a new era in China-Africa relations. For over half a century, the two sides have enjoyed close political ties and frequent exchange of high-level visits and people-to-people contacts. Our bilateral trade and economic cooperation have grown rapidly; cooperation in other fields has yielded good results; and consultation and coordination in international affairs have been intensified. China has provided

assistance to the best of its ability to African countries, while African countries have also rendered strong support to China on many occasions.

Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common development-these are the principles guiding China-Africa exchange and cooperation and the driving force to lasting China-Africa relations.

Part III:

China's African Policy

Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been an important component of China's independent foreign policy of peace. China will unswervingly carry forward the tradition of China-Africa friendship, and, proceeding from the fundamental interests of both the Chinese and African peoples, establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa, featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. The general principles and objectives of China's African policy are as follows:

- Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respects African countries' independent choice of the road of development and supports African countries' efforts to grow stronger through unity.
- Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African countries' endeavor for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperity of China and Africa.
- Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other's just demand and reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.
- Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa will learn from and draw upon each other's experience in governance and development, strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health.

Supporting African countries' efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.

The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support China's great cause of reunification. China stands ready to establish and develop state-to-state relations with countries that have not yet established diplomatic ties with China on the basis of the one China principle.

Part IV

Enhancing All-round Cooperation Between China and Africa

1. The political field

(1) High-level visits

China will maintain the momentum of mutual visits and dialogues between Chinese and African leaders, with a view to facilitating communication, deepening friendship and promoting mutual understanding and trust.

(2) Exchanges between legislative bodies

China favors increased multi-level and multi-channel friendly exchanges on the basis of mutual respect between China's National People's Congress (NPC) on the one hand and parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African Parliament of the AU on the other, for the purpose of deepening understanding and cooperation.

(3) Exchanges between political parties

The Communist Party of China (CPC) develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.

(4) Consultation mechanisms

Mechanisms such as national bilateral committees between China and African countries, political consultation between foreign ministries, joint(mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and mixed committees on science and technology should be established and improved, so as to institutionalize dialogue and consultation in a flexible and pragmatic manner.

(5) Cooperation in international affairs

China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. China supports African nations' desire to be an equal partner in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to making the UN play a greater role, defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, establishing a new international political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit, promoting more democratic international relationship and rule of law in international affairs and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

(6) Exchanges between local governments

China's Central Government attaches importance to the exchanges between local governments of China and African countries, vigorously supports twin province/state and twin city relationship aimed at facilitating bilateral exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.

2. The economic field

(1) Trade

The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate African commodities' access to Chinese market and fulfill its promise to grant duty-free treatment to some goods from the least developed African countries, with a view to

expanding and balancing bilateral trade and optimizing trade structure. It intends to settle trade disputes and frictions properly through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultation, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. Efforts will be made to encourage business communities on both sides to set up China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are ripe, China is willing to negotiate Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with African countries and African regional organizations.

(2) Investment

The Chinese Government encourages and supports Chinese enterprises' investment and business in Africa, and will continue to provide preferential loans and buyer credits to this end. The Chinese Government is ready to explore new channels and new ways for promoting investment cooperation with African countries, and will continue to formulate and improve relevant policies, provide guidance and service and offer convenience. African countries are welcome to make investment in China. The Chinese Government will continue to negotiate, conclude and implement the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation with African Countries. The two sides should work together to create a favorable environment for investment and cooperation and protect the legitimate rights and interests of investors from both sides.

(3) Financial cooperation

To further develop China-Africa cooperation in the area of finance, the Chinese Government will support the effort of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and cooperation with their counterparts in African countries as well as regional financial institutions in Africa.

(4) Agricultural cooperation

China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation and exchanges with African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the cooperation in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of

agricultural and side-line products. China will intensify cooperation in agricultural technology, organize training courses of practical agricultural technologies, carry out experimental and demonstrative agricultural technology projects in Africa and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program.

(5) Infrastructure

The Chinese Government will step up China-Africa cooperation in transportation, communication, water conservancy, electricity and other infrastructures. It will vigorously encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in the building of infrastructure in African countries, scale up their contracts, and gradually establish multilateral and bilateral mechanisms on contractual projects. Efforts will be made to strengthen technology and management cooperation, focusing on the capacity-building of African nations.

(6) Resources cooperation

The Chinese Government facilitates information sharing and cooperation with Africa in resources areas. It encourages and supports competent Chinese enterprises to cooperate with African nations in various ways on the basis of the principle of mutual benefit and common development, to develop and exploit rationally their resources, with a view to helping African countries to translate their advantages in resources to competitive strength, and realize sustainable development in their own countries and the continent as a whole.

(7) Tourism cooperation

China will implement the program of Chinese citizens' group tour to some African nations and, grant more African countries, as they wish and as far as feasible, Approved Destination Status for out-bound Chinese tourist groups. China welcomes citizens from African nations for a tour of the country.

(8) Debt reduction and relief

China is ready to continue friendly consultation with some African countries with a view to seek solution to, or reduction of, the debts they owe to China. It will urge the

international community, developed countries in particular, to take more substantial action on the issue of debt reduction and relief for African nations.

(9) Economic assistance

In light of its own financial capacity and economic situation, China will do its best to provide and gradually increase assistance to African nations with no political strings attached.

(10) Multilateral cooperation

China is ready to enhance consultation and coordination with Africa within multilateral trade systems and financial institutions and work together to urge the UN and other international organizations to pay more attention to the question of economic development, promote South-South cooperation, push forward the establishment of a just and rational multilateral trade system and make the voices of developing countries heard in the decision-making of international financial affairs. It will step up cooperation with other countries and international organizations to support the development of Africa and help realize Millennium Development Goals in Africa.

3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects

(1) Cooperation in human resources development and education

The Chinese Government will give full play to the role of its "African Human Resources Development Foundation" in training African personnel. It will identify priority areas, expand areas of cooperation and provide more input according to the needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results.

Exchange of students between China and Africa will continue. China will increase the number of government scholarships as it sees fit, continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance project to help develop Africa's weak disciplines. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides.

(2) Science and technology cooperation

Following the principles of mutual respect, complementarity and sharing benefits, China will promote its cooperation with Africa in the fields of applied research, technological development and transfer, speed up scientific and technological cooperation in the fields of common interest, such as bio-agriculture, solar energy utilization, geological survey, mining and R&D of new medicines. It will continue its training programs in applied technologies for African countries, carry out demonstration programs of technical assistance, and actively help disseminate and utilize Chinese scientific and technological achievements and advanced technologies applicable in Africa.

(3) Cultural exchanges

China will implement agreements of cultural cooperation and relevant implementation plans reached with African countries, maintain regular contacts with their cultural departments and increase exchanges of artists and athletes. It will guide and promote cultural exchanges in diverse forms between people's organizations and institutions in line with bilateral cultural exchange programs and market demand.

(4) Medical and health cooperation

China is ready to enhance medical personnel and information exchange with Africa. It will continue to send medical teams and provide medicines and medical materials to African countries, and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical personnel. China will increase its exchanges and cooperation with African countries in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria and other diseases, research and application of traditional medicine and experience concerning mechanism for public health emergencies.

(5) Media cooperation

China wishes to encourage multi-tiered and multi-formed exchange and cooperation between the media on both sides, so as to enhance mutual understanding and enable objective and balanced media coverage of each other. It will facilitate the communication and contacts between relevant government departments for the

purpose of sharing experiences on ways to handle the relations with media both domestic and foreign, and guiding and facilitating media exchanges.

(6) Administrative cooperation

China will carry out exchange and cooperation with African countries in civil service system building, public administration reform and training of government personnel. The two sides may study the feasibility of setting up a mechanism for personnel and administrative cooperation.

(7) Consular cooperation

China will hold regular/irregular consular consultations with African countries during which the two sides may have amicable discussions on urgent problems or questions of common interest in bilateral or multilateral consular relations in order to improve understanding and expand cooperation. The Chinese side will work with Africa to facilitate personnel flow and ensure the safety of their nationals.

(8) People-to-people exchange

China will encourage and facilitate the exchanges between people's organizations of China and Africa, especially the youth and women, with a view to increasing the understanding, trust and cooperation of people on both sides. It will encourage and guide Chinese volunteers to serve in African countries.

(9) Environmental cooperation

China will actively promote China-Africa cooperation in climate change, water resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other areas of environmental protection by facilitating technological exchange.

(10) Disaster reduction, relief and humanitarian assistance

China will actively carry out personnel exchange, training and technological cooperation in the fields of disaster reduction and relief. It will respond quickly to African countries' request for urgent humanitarian aid, encourage and support

exchange and cooperation between the Red Cross Society of China and other NGOs on the one side and their African counterparts on the other side.

4. Peace and security

(1) Military cooperation

China will promote high-level military exchanges between the two sides and actively carry out military-related technological exchanges and cooperation. It will continue to help train African military personnel and support defense and army building of African countries for their own security.

(2) Conflict settlement and peacekeeping operations

China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.

(3) Judicial and police cooperation

China is prepared to promote exchange and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and law enforcement departments. The two sides may learn from each other in legal system building and judicial reform so as to be better able to prevent, investigate and crack down on crimes. China will work together with African countries to combat transnational organized crimes and corruption, and intensify cooperation on matters concerning judicial assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects.

China will cooperate closely with immigration departments of African countries in tackling the problem of illegal migration, improve exchange of immigration control information and set up an unimpeded and efficient channel for intelligence and information exchange.

(4) Non-traditional security areas

In order to enhance the ability of both sides to address non-traditional security threats, it is necessary to increase intelligence exchange, explore more effective ways and means for closer cooperation in combating terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, transnational economic crimes, etc.

Part V:

Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and Its Follow-up Actions

Launched in 2000, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has become an effective mechanism for the collective dialogue and multilateral cooperation between China and Africa and put in place an important framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long-term stability, equality and mutual benefit.

China attaches importance to the positive role of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in strengthening political consultation and pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, and stands ready to work with African countries to conscientiously implement the Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation-Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004-2006) and its follow-up action plans. China will work with African countries within the framework of the Forum to explore new ways to enhance mutual political trust, promote the comprehensive development of pragmatic cooperation, further improve the mechanism of the forum, and try to find the best way for furthering cooperation between the Forum and the NEPAD.

Part VI:

China's Relations with African Regional Organizations

China appreciates the significant role of the AU in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and promoting African solidarity and development. China values its friendly cooperation with the AU in all fields, supports its positive role in regional and international affairs and stands ready to provide the AU assistance to the best of its capacity.

China appreciates and supports the positive role of Africa's sub-regional organizations in promoting political stability, economic development and integration in their own regions and stands ready to enhance its amicable cooperation with those organizations.

Annexure 5

China's second African policy paper

The Chinese Government published its first Africa policy paper in 2006. Over the past decade, the policy has been carried out fully and effectively, playing an important guiding role in the all-round development of China-Africa relations. This year marks the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The Second FOCAC Summit will be held in South Africa in December. As the first China-Africa summit to be hosted on the African continent, it will be a landmark event conducive to strengthening China-Africa unity and spearheading China-Africa cooperation.

Against this backdrop, the Chinese government wishes, with release of its second Africa policy paper, to further clarify China's determination and goodwill to develop friendly and cooperative relations with Africa and expound the new vision, approach and measures of China's Africa policy under the new circumstances with the aim of guiding the multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between China and Africa in the years to come.

Part I. Establishing and Developing Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative China-Africa Partnership and Consolidating and Bolstering the Community of Shared Future between China and Africa

China and Africa have always belonged to a community of shared future. Over the past five decades and more, they have always been good friends who stand together through thick and thin, good partners who share weal and woe, and good brothers who fully trust each other despite changes in the international landscape. The traditional friendship between China and Africa is deeply rooted in people's minds and has become an invaluable asset for both. China and Africa have long valued sincerity, friendship and equality, which constitute the underlying rationale for China-Africa relations to grow stronger with time. Based on this tradition, China and Africa will be committed to mutually beneficial cooperation and common development under the new circumstances, adding new substance and injecting inexhaustible impetus to China-Africa relations.

In 2006, the Chinese government proposed a new type of China-Africa strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange. In the past decade, China and Africa jointly formulated and implemented a series of major measures to deepen cooperation, which greatly promoted the rapid development of their friendly and cooperative ties across the board. Political mutual trust between China and Africa has been strengthened. Their coordination and cooperation in international and regional affairs have become closer. Their pragmatic cooperation has borne abundant fruit. China has been Africa's largest trading partner since 2009. In 2014, China's trade volume with Africa rose to four times that of 2006. People-to-people and cultural exchanges have flourished with nearly 3 million visits made between China and Africa every year, garnering greater social and popular support for China-Africa friendship. The scope and depth of China-Africa exchanges and cooperation has been unprecedented. China's contribution to Africa's economic growth has significantly increased.

Tremendous changes have taken place in China and Africa in the past decade, with both shouldering new development tasks. China is striving to achieve the "two centenary goals" and realize the Chinese dream of great national renewal in accordance with the strategy of completing the building of a moderately prosperous society in all respects, comprehensively deepening reform, advancing law-based governance and applying strict party discipline. Africa is committed to accelerating its industrialization and modernization and forging ahead to fulfill the dreams outlined in Agenda 2063. Both the Chinese dream and the African dream aim to enable people to live a more prosperous and happier life.

The development strategies of China and Africa are highly compatible. Given their respective strengths, China and Africa need each other for cooperation and development. Rare historic opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation and common development have emerged. China's comparative advantages in development experience, applied technology, funds and market can help Africa overcome the two major bottlenecks constraining its development -- backward infrastructure and inadequate professional and skilled personnel. They can also help Africa translate its natural and human resources advantages and potential into a driving force for development and benefits for people's livelihoods, thereby speeding

up industrialization and agricultural modernization, and doing a better job in pursuing economic independence as well as self-reliant and sustainable development and achieving lasting peace and stability.

The international situation has undergone dramatic changes over the past decade. The transition to a multi-polar world has gained momentum. The rapid development of emerging markets and developing countries has become an irresistible trend in history, making them a pivotal force for safeguarding world peace and promoting common development. The UN has adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, mandating the realization of inclusive and sustainable development in all countries. Africa has become one of the continents with the fastest economic growth and greatest development potential. It is an important player on the stage of world politics, a new growth pole for the global economy and a center of human civilization with diverse cultures. China has risen to become the world's second largest economy. It is an active player in the current international system that has helped build it and contributed to it. The current global governance system, however, has yet to fully accommodate the changes. There is a need to increase the representation and voice of developing countries including China and African nations in international affairs. China and Africa should make the most of their advantages in political mutual trust and economic complementarity to push for the all-round development of China-Africa cooperation, strengthen South-South cooperation, promote North-South cooperation, and set a good example for the development of a new model of international relations centered on mutually beneficial cooperation.

China-Africa relations have now reached a new historical starting point. Given their shared development tasks, highly compatible strategic interests, and broad prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation, the Chinese and African people will advance side by side with an ever-growing sense of purpose. China is willing to work with African countries to build and develop a China-Africa comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, win-win economic cooperation, mutually enriching cultural exchanges, mutual assistance in security, and solidarity and coordination in international affairs. China is devoted, as are African nations, to promoting an all-round development of China-Africa friendly cooperation, working together to pursue development and fulfill dreams, jointly delivering more

benefits to Chinese and African people, and making greater contributions to world peace, stability, development and prosperity.

Part II. Upholding the Values of Friendship, Justice and Shared Interests and Adhering to the Principles of Sincerity, Practical Results, Affinity and Good Faith

Enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries has always been the cornerstone of China's independent foreign policy of peace, as well as China's firm and longstanding strategic choice. Under the new circumstances, China will adhere to the principles of its Africa policy -- sincerity, practical results, affinity and good faith, uphold the values of friendship, justice and shared interests, and push for new leapfrog growth of its friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with Africa.

"Sincerity" means China insists on the principles of equality, mutual trust, solidarity and mutual support, and will always be Africa's most trustworthy friend and sincere partner. China respects African countries' independent choice of the way to development as well as their practices and efforts to promote economic and social development and improve people's living standard. It stands ready to exchange governance experience with African countries on the basis of equality and voluntarism, and promote mutual understanding and acceptance of and learning from each other's political system and development path. China has always sincerely supported Africa's development. It never interferes in African countries' internal affairs, never imposes its will on them, and attaches no political strings when providing aid to Africa. On issues involving each other's core interests and major concerns, China will enhance communication and coordination, mutual understanding and mutual support with African countries, and safeguard the common interests of both.

"Practical results" means that China aims to achieve practical and efficient results, seeks cooperation and mutual benefits, upholds the principle of honoring commitments with real actions and results, implements the guidelines and measures for mutually beneficial cooperation with Africa to the letter, and strives to realize the common development of China and Africa while helping Africa achieve independent development. Adhering to the traditional Chinese philosophy of "building a nest to attract the phoenix and teaching people how to fish," China will support African

countries' efforts in infrastructure and human resources development to help them overcome these two major bottlenecks that have long been constraining Africa's development, and promote China-Africa industrial alignment and capacity cooperation to facilitate Africa's industrialization and agricultural modernization. China will adhere to the idea of pursuing peace through development and promoting development by maintaining peace, and support Africa's efforts to seek independent and sustainable development, resolve African issues in an African way, and play a more constructive role in regional hotspot issues.

"Affinity" means the hearts of Chinese and African people are connected, and they will live together in harmony, promote inter-cultural dialogue, and enhance exchanges of ideas, policy alignment and mutual understanding to provide a solid popular and social basis for China-Africa friendship. China will strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Africa in education, science, culture, health and other social and cultural fields, expand exchanges between Chinese and African people, increase think tank, university and media exchanges, and support sub-national contacts and cooperation. Chinese and African employees working on each other's soil will be encouraged to get along well with local people, and seek coexistence and common prosperity. The Chinese government encourages Chinese enterprises and citizens in Africa to care more about the well-being of local people and repay local society, create a good environment for the Africans working, studying and living in China, and constantly extend and consolidate the social basis of China-Africa friendship.

"Good faith" means China cherishes good faith and settlement of problems in an appropriate manner. It views and promotes China-Africa relations from strategic and long-term perspectives, and seeks joint efforts with Africa to create a good environment for friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation. China stands ready to strengthen policy coordination and communication with African countries, adheres to the principles of mutual respect and win-win cooperation, faces squarely and sincerely the new developments and problems confronting their relations through equal and friendly coordination, and ensures that both sides benefit from sincere, friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Upholding the values of friendship, justice and shared interests is a hallmark of China's policy toward other developing countries. While valuing friendship and justice as well

as shared interests, China places more importance on the former. The core principle is to connect assistance to developing countries, including those in Africa, for their independent and sustainable development with China's own development, achieve win-win cooperation and common development, and promote more balanced, inclusive and sustainable development of the world at large. China will never repeat the past colonial way in its cooperation with Africa and never pursue development at the cost of Africa's natural and ecological environment or long-term interests.

Providing support and assistance to African countries for their independent and sustainable development conforms to the interests of both African people and the people of the entire world, and is the common responsibility of the international community. While engaging in cooperation with Africa, China always respects and protects the fundamental interests of African countries and their people, upholds fairness and seeks justice for Africa. It also pursues mutual benefit and win-win results, and sincerely supports and assists Africa in its efforts to realize peace, stability and development.

The one-China principle is the political precondition and foundation for the establishment and development of China's relations with African countries and regional organizations. The Chinese government appreciates the fact that African countries abide by the one-China principle, support China's reunification, and refuse to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan. China is committed to developing friendly cooperation in an all-round way with all African countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

China appreciates the constructive actions of the international community to support and assist Africa in realizing lasting peace and sustainable development. It will strengthen coordination and cooperation with other countries as well as international and regional organizations on the basis of the "Africa-proposed, Africa-agreed and Africa-led" principle and with an active, open and inclusive attitude. China will explore tripartite and multilateral cooperation in Africa so as to jointly contribute to peace, stability and development on the continent.

Part III. Promoting the All-Round Development of China-Africa Cooperation

1. Enhancing political mutual trust

(1) Intensifying high-level exchanges

While bringing into play the role of high-level exchanges in providing political guidance, China will maintain the momentum of frequent mutual visits and dialogue between Chinese and African leaders, with a view to facilitating communication on bilateral relations and major issues of common interest, solidifying traditional friendship, and bolstering political mutual trust. China advocates mutual understanding and support on issues involving their respective core interests and major concerns. It calls for safeguarding shared interests, pursuing development together, and deepening cooperation. All these aim to lay a solid political groundwork for the development of bilateral relations between China and individual African countries as well as the overall China-Africa relationship.

(2) Boosting experience sharing in governance

China is of the view that countries should respect and support each other's efforts to explore and improve development paths and political systems suited to their national conditions. It is ready to engage in a variety of experience-sharing programs with African countries. Through these programs, they will draw wisdom from each other's civilizations and development practices, increase exchanges of governance experience, and promote common development in accordance with the principles of communication on an equal footing, mutual learning, and shared progress.

(3) Improving intergovernmental consultation and cooperation mechanisms

China will make the most of the coordinating role of bilateral mechanisms such as political consultations between foreign ministries, joint (mixed) committees on trade and economic cooperation and high-level economic and trade cooperation mechanisms, and mixed committees on science and technology. It will further diversify and improve intergovernmental dialogue and consultation mechanisms to promote China-Africa intergovernmental dialogue and cooperation.

(4) Promoting exchanges in various sectors including those between legislative bodies, consultative bodies, political parties, the military and local governments

In keeping with the purpose of deepening understanding and cooperation with mutual respect, China favors increased multi-level, multi-channel, multi-form and all-

dimensional friendly exchanges between the National People's Congress of China and organizations such as the parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African Parliament. These will help further substantiate the China-Africa comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership.

China stands for expanded and strengthened exchanges between the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and relevant institutions such as African national parliaments, the Pan-African Parliament, the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (AU), and the economic and social councils of individual African countries.

The Communist Party of China stands ready to expand and deepen diverse forms of exchanges and cooperation with friendly political parties and organizations in African countries based on the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It is committed to exploring a new platform for collective communication and dialogue with the aim of enhancing mutual understanding and friendship and deepening exchanges of governance experience. This will also enable them to better understand and recognize each other's governance systems and philosophies, learn from each other, improve governance capacities together and contribute to the development of state-to-state relations.

Efforts will be made to maintain the momentum of mutual visits between Chinese and African military leaders, and push for strengthened policy dialogue and increased exchanges between young officers.

China supports the establishment of an increasing number of twin province/state and twin city relationships between China and African countries in a bid to strengthen ties between Chinese and African local governments and facilitate exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.

2. Deepening cooperation in international affairs

China will further enhance exchanges and cooperation with African countries in international institutions such as the UN and on other international occasions. It will maintain communication and coordination with African countries on prominent international and regional issues. It stands for mutual understanding and support on

major issues concerning their respective state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and development interests, while safeguarding their shared interests as well as those of developing countries.

China will work in concert with Africa to uphold the international order and system underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It is firmly supportive of increasing the representation and voice of developing countries in the international governance system. Supporting comprehensive reform of the UN, China maintains that priority should be given to increasing African countries' representation and voice in the UN Security Council and other UN agencies to address the injustices Africa suffered historically. It is committed, as African nations are, to defending the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, upholding international fairness and justice, and making the world order more just and reasonable.

China calls on the international community to continue to step up the global economic governance reform-in particular, to deliver the promised IMF quota reform as soon as possible-so as to increase the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries. It calls for strengthened dialogue between the G20 and Africa and is supportive of Africa' s participation in G20 affairs.

China will join hands with Africa to call on members of the international community to realize that they are all in the same boat and should therefore share rights and responsibilities. In this spirit, it calls for efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development adopted at the UN Sustainable Development Summit, strengthen all countries' capacities for development, ameliorate the international environment for development, optimize development partnerships and improve development coordination mechanisms. All these aim to achieve balanced, sustainable and inclusive growth, jointly create a path of development that is fair, open, comprehensive and innovative, realize common development and advance the common interests of mankind. China will continue to uphold and advocate the principles such as equality, mutual trust, win-win results, solidarity and cooperation while promoting South-South cooperation at a higher level, in a broader scope and on a larger scale under the new circumstances.

China reaffirms the fundamental role of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in the international response to climate change. It agrees to jointly maintain the solidarity of developing countries, while upholding the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, especially the principles of equity, "common but differentiated responsibilities" and respective capabilities. It is resolved to work for the establishment of an equitable, reasonable, cooperative and mutually beneficial international climate management system, and promote all-round, effective and sustained implementation of the UNFCCC. China has taken note of the progress made in the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. It agrees to jointly safeguard the interests of developing countries and push for the convention's full and effective implementation.

3. Deepening economic and trade cooperation

(1) Helping boost Africa's industrialization

China will make prioritizing support for Africa's industrialization a key area and a main focus in its cooperation with Africa in the new era. Allowing industrial alignment and capacity cooperation to play a leading role in bringing about overall development will help accelerate the industrialization in Africa, thereby providing a solid foundation for Africa's economic independence as well as self-reliant and sustainable development. In light of their national conditions, development needs and feasible international rules, China will vigorously support the efforts of African countries to improve their "soft" and "hard" environment for investment and development, optimizing laws and regulations on and government services for attracting and protecting foreign investment, and removing the two major bottlenecks impeding development, namely, backward infrastructure and inadequate professional and skilled personnel. Efforts will be made to promote industrial alignment and capacity cooperation between China and African countries in an orderly fashion, with the aim to facilitate Africa's industrialization and economic diversification, and increase the level of production, living standards and employment in African countries. China is supportive of African countries' development of special economic zones, industrial parks and science and technology parks to attract investment and talents. It will guide, encourage and support the efforts of Chinese enterprises to jointly build economic and trade cooperation zones in Africa

to serve as important platforms for promoting China-Africa industrial capacity cooperation and attracting more Chinese enterprises to invest in Africa, build production and processing bases and localize their operations in Africa, contribute to the increase of local employment, tax revenue and foreign-exchange income, and promote the transfer of industries and technologies.

While sticking to the values of friendship, justice and shared interests, win-win cooperation, the principles of openness and inclusiveness, and market-based operation, China will give priority to building pilot industrial capacity cooperation demonstration zones in African countries with appropriate conditions. China will work together with chosen African countries to bring into full play their governments' role in guidance, coordination, management and service, increase exchanges of experience in macroeconomic management, and innovate on the cooperation mechanisms in investment protection, finance, taxation, customs, visa, immigration and exchanges of police officers to help African countries enhance capacity building in law enforcement and improve management and services. They will also work in concert to achieve an early harvest in their industrial capacity cooperation, accumulating development and cooperation experience, providing a demonstration effect and playing a leading role in bringing along cooperation with other African countries.

(2) Helping boost Africa's agricultural modernization

China will prioritize support for Africa's agricultural modernization in its cooperation with Africa in the new era, with increased input and expanded cooperation to help African countries resolve the development problem of this basic industry that has a bearing on their national economy and people's livelihoods as well as economic independence. China is willing to share its experience and technology in agricultural development with African countries, and supports their efforts to improve their agricultural technology and techniques to produce and process agricultural, livestock and fishery products. This will help them build an agricultural value chain and increase independent grain production capacity to boost food security, enhance the competitiveness of cotton and other specialty industries in the world, generate more income and improve the livelihood of farmers. China will improve and continue to carry out agricultural technology demonstration projects in Africa, implement the High-Quality and High-Yield Agriculture Demonstration Project, bolster research and

development, promotion and extensive use of seeds, send senior agricultural expert teams and agricultural vocational training teacher teams, and expand the scale and effect of training in agricultural management and technology. It will build and improve bilateral mechanisms for agricultural cooperation with Africa, give play to the strengths and roles of each side, and strengthen supervision and evaluation of cooperation projects to increase the quality and level of cooperation. China will encourage and promote China-Africa trade in agricultural products. It will encourage and support Chinese enterprises to engage in crop farming, grain storage, stockbreeding and fishery, and invest in the processing of agricultural products in African countries, helping create more jobs for local people, increase the added value of local products and generate more foreign-exchange income, and boosting Africa's agricultural modernization. China will also help African countries promote irrigation techniques, effectively use water resources, and improve their capacity to prevent floods and combat droughts.

(3) Participating in Africa's infrastructure development across the board

China will encourage and support Chinese enterprises and financial institutions' expanded involvement in infrastructure development in Africa, give full play to the role of policy-based finance, and innovate on investment and financing cooperation models. While sticking to market-oriented operation, as well as the principles of overall cooperation with emphasis on selected areas and a focus on benefits, China will encourage and support the efforts of domestic enterprises to adopt various models to participate in the construction of railways, highways, telecommunications networks, electric power facilities, regional aviation networks, harbors, water works and other infrastructure projects as well as water resources development and protection in Africa. They will also be encouraged and supported to participate in investment, operation and management of these projects. It will encourage bilateral cooperation in the planning and designing, construction, technical standards, supervision, large equipment utilization, and management and operation of the projects.

China stands for pushing forward infrastructure and industrial development in Africa in a coordinated way, with a focus on intensive operation and economies of scale. It will prioritize support for the construction of infrastructure facilities for special economic zones, industrial parks, science and technology parks, etc., to provide favorable

conditions for Africa' s industrial development and China-Africa industrial capacity cooperation. It will facilitate cross-border and cross-regional connectivity in infrastructure to help accelerate the process of African integration.

(4) Strengthening China-Africa financial cooperation

China will give full play to financing platforms and tools, which include preferential loans and other means of policy-based finance, the China-Africa Development Fund, special loans for African small and medium-sized enterprises, the Africa Growing Together Fund, China-Africa industrial cooperation fund, and the BRICS' New Development Bank, and seek innovation in its financial cooperation with Africa. It will support the efforts of Chinese financial institutions to increase exchanges and seek co-financing cooperation with their counterparts in African countries and African regional and global financial and development institutions, and support Chinese and African financial institutions in establishing joint-stock banks based on commercial principles. China will strengthen currency cooperation between the central banks of the two sides, discuss with African countries the arrangements for expanding cross-border local currency settlements and currency swaps, and encourage Chinese and African enterprises to settle their trade and investment in local currencies. It will also support reciprocal establishment of financial institutions, and increase support to financing insurance. China will step up coordination and collaboration with African countries in international financial organizations and mechanisms to improve and reform the current international financial system and increase the representation and voice of developing countries.

(5) Promoting the facilitation of China-Africa trade and investment

China will encourage more African commodities to enter the Chinese market and continue to grant zero-tariff treatment to 97 percent of taxable items from the least developed countries that have established diplomatic relations with China, according to the implementation of exchanged notes by both sides. Both Chinese and African enterprises are encouraged to make the most of harbor advantages to build regional logistics and wholesale centers. China will strengthen quality control of the goods exported to Africa and build more sales channels, reinforce cooperation in inspection and quarantine with African countries, and jointly crack down on counterfeit or

substandard import and export goods. China will boost customs cooperation with Africa, increase information exchange, mutual recognition of supervision and mutual assistance with law enforcement, jointly combat commercial fraud and create a law-abiding and convenient trade environment. China will help African countries enhance capacity building in customs, inspection and quarantine, provide support to improve trade facilitation, and help boost trade within Africa. China will continue to support the development of the African Free Trade Zone and regional integration, and discuss the establishment of institutionalized trade arrangements with countries and regional organizations in Africa.

While aligning Africa's needs with China's advantages and adhering to the principles of equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, China is committed to improving the quality and efficiency of China-Africa economic and trade cooperation, helping Africa speed up its industrialization and agricultural modernization, and encouraging and supporting the efforts of Chinese enterprises to expand and optimize their investment in areas such as industry, agriculture, infrastructure and energy in Africa. It will continue to provide concessional loans and export credit insurance support to qualified projects and moderately increase the concessional nature of its concessional loans.

(6) Bolstering resource and energy cooperation

On the basis of the principles of win-win cooperation, green development, low-carbon emissions and sustainable development, China will expand and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation in resources and energies with African countries. It will help African countries strengthen their capabilities in exploration, development and processing of resources and energies, increase the added value of their primary products, create more local jobs, generate more foreign-exchange income, and turn their resource and energy endowment into achievements in sustainable development and benefits that can be shared by African people. China will innovate on the models of resource and energy cooperation with Africa, and expand whole-industry-chain cooperation in energy and mining sectors. It will support the construction of national or regional power grids in Africa, boost cooperation with Africa in the development of renewable energy and low-carbon, green energy such as wind power, solar power and

hydropower, and promote rational development and utilization of renewable energy sources in Africa in order to serve Africa' s industrialization.

(7) Expanding cooperation on the marine economy

China will help fully tap into the abundant marine resources and development potential of relevant African countries and support them in strengthening capacity building, planning, designing, construction and exchange of operation experience in marine fishing, offshore aquaculture, seafood processing, maritime transportation, shipbuilding, construction of harbors and harbor industrial parks, exploration and development of offshore oil and gas reserves, as well as management of the marine environment. It will support the efforts of Chinese and African enterprises to carry out mutually beneficial cooperation in various forms. It will also help African countries develop the marine economy in light of local conditions and explore new areas for Africa' s economic growth and China-Africa cooperation, so that African countries' abundant marine resources can better serve their national development and bring more benefits to their people.

4. Strengthening development cooperation between China and Africa

(1) Continuing to increase development assistance to Africa

As the largest developing country, China has provided assistance to African countries for a long time and will continue to do so within its capability. China has also received support and assistance from African countries in a timely manner whenever it is stricken by a big natural disaster. It stands ready to continue to provide and gradually increase emergency aid and necessary assistance to African countries in a spirit of sharing weal and woe and standing together through thick and thin with the latter. While providing the assistance in light of its own financial capacity and economic situation and the pressing needs of African countries, China sticks to the principles of no political strings attached, non-interference in others' internal affairs and no demands imposed on others. China will come up with innovative assistance models and optimize assistance conditions. China's assistance will be primarily used in the areas of human resources development, infrastructure, medical care and health, agriculture, food security, climate change response, desertification prevention and control, and wildlife and environmental protection, and for humanitarian purposes, with

the aim to help African countries alleviate poverty, improve people's livelihoods and build up capacity for independent development.

China will honor its promise to exempt the intergovernmental interest-free loans borrowed by the relevant least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing countries in Africa that are not returned when they mature at the end of 2015.

(2) Supporting Africa in strengthening its public health system and capacity building

Drawing on the experience in joint fight against Ebola and malaria, China will deepen and expand health cooperation with Africa. It will strengthen communication with Africa on medical and health policies, and support Africa's efforts to strengthen its public health and disease control and prevention system and capacity building. China will actively participate in the preparation for the establishment of an African Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and assist African countries to improve the level of laboratory technology and deliver training to medical personnel, with a focus on assisting in prevention and control of non-contagious chronic diseases, malaria and other insect-borne infectious diseases, cholera, Ebola, AIDS, tuberculosis, and other preventable infectious diseases and newly emerging diseases. By making full use of its own strengths, China will support, on a priority basis, the efforts of African countries to enhance their core capacity in border health quarantine, build infectious diseases monitoring stations, provide medical services to women and children, and improve the departments and services in the existing medical facilities. China will continue to support African countries in health infrastructure development. It will continue to send medical teams to African countries, launch cooperation between counterpart Chinese and African hospitals, and enhance exchanges and cooperation between modern and traditional medicine with a focus on improving local medical services. It will also continue to promote the "Brightness Action" campaign to provide free cataract operation and other short-term free medical services. China stands for increasing paired exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African medical institutions and drug administration agencies, and supports their cooperation with international and regional organizations such as the World Health Organization and the African Union. It will encourage Chinese pharmaceutical enterprises to invest in Africa in a bid

to lower the cost of medicines in Africa and increase the affordability of medical and pharmaceutical products in Africa.

(3) Expanding cooperation in education and human resources development

China will expand cooperation in education with Africa, supporting educational development in the continent. It will provide more input in light of the social and economic development needs of African countries so as to achieve greater results, and help train more much-needed professionals for African countries, in particular, teachers and medical workers. While enhancing exchanges and cooperation between education administration agencies and institutions on both sides, China will continue to implement the "African Talents Program", gradually increase the number of government scholarships for applicants in African countries, and encourage local governments, institutions of higher learning, enterprises and social organizations to set up scholarships. It welcomes more African young people to study in China, encouraging and supporting them to play a bigger role in the pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa. China will encourage colleges and universities on both sides to establish partnerships, support exchanges between Chinese and African teachers and students, and magnify the effect of the 20+20 Cooperation Plan for Chinese and African Institutions of Higher Education. Following the principle of integrating learning and knowledge application, China will scale up cooperation in teacher training and vocational education with African countries with the aim to expand the channels for human resources development.

(4) Sharing and popularizing the experience in poverty alleviation

Poverty is the common challenge confronting China and Africa. China will fulfill its promise to the international community to support the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It will actively implement the Program for Strengthening China-Africa Cooperation on Poverty Reduction issued by China and the AU, strengthen China-Africa poverty alleviation cooperation, give play to the role of international poverty alleviation platforms such as the International Poverty Reduction Center in China jointly established by China and the United Nations, and encourage and support governments, academic institutions, enterprises and non-governmental organizations on both sides to carry out diverse forms of experience

exchanges and pragmatic cooperation on poverty alleviation. These will facilitate the sharing of China's successful experience in achieving large-scale poverty reduction by alleviating rural poverty through development. China will strengthen cooperation on demonstration projects to support African countries in enhancing their capability of independent poverty alleviation and development.

(5) Stepping up science and technology cooperation and knowledge sharing

China will continue to push forward implementation of the China-Africa Science and Technology Partnership Plan, and encourage strengthened science and technology exchanges and cooperation between China and African countries in the fields of agriculture, water resources, energy, aviation and aerospace, telecommunication, environmental protection, desertification prevention and control, medical care and marine sector. It will support African countries in building up their capacity in science and technology, and work with them to set up joint laboratories, joint research centers, and science and technology parks in key areas. It will continue to sponsor outstanding young African scientists to conduct short-term research in China, step up training on applied technology and relevant policies, and jointly establish advanced-technology application and demonstration bases. China will promote the dissemination of China's science and technology research results and the popularization and application of advanced and applied technology in Africa.

(6) Enhancing cooperation on climate change and environmental protection

China will boost and consolidate cooperation with Africa under the UNFCCC and other relevant mechanisms, and push for both sides to carry out consultations, exchanges and cooperation projects in relation to addressing climate change. China will innovate on cooperation areas, deepen pragmatic cooperation, and work in concert with Africa to enhance the capacity for tackling climate change. China stands for closer policy dialogue, and closer bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation with Africa in the area of environment. It calls for strengthened cooperation in education and personnel training on ecological protection, environment management, pollution prevention and control, bio-diversity and water resources conservation, and the prevention and control of desertification, as well as in demonstration projects in these areas. It will push forward environment-friendly industrial capacity cooperation and

transfer of applied technology. While enhancing exchanges on environmental protection laws and regulations, China will engage in dialogue and cooperation on the conservation of endangered species of wild fauna and flora, step up intelligence sharing and capacity building in law enforcement, and crack down on transnational organized crimes related to endangered wildlife trafficking. While implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and dealing with other related international affairs, China will strengthen communication and coordinate positions with African countries, in a bid to work together to promote the protection and sustainable exploitation of global wild fauna and flora.

5. Deepening and expanding cultural and people-to-people exchanges

(1) Expanding exchanges and cooperation in culture and sports

China will maintain the momentum of high-level contacts, and implement bilateral cultural cooperation agreements and their implementation plans. Encouraging and supporting African countries for Chinese-language teaching, China will continue to set up more Confucius Institutes in African countries, and encourage and support the opening of Chinese cultural centers in Africa and African cultural centers in China. It will support the holding of the "Year of China" events in Africa and the "Year of an African Country" events in China, raise the profile of the "Chinese/African Cultures in Focus" events, and enrich the program of China-Africa mutual visits between cultural personnel and the China-Africa Cultural Cooperation Partnership Program, with the aim to achieve better results in cultural exchanges. China stands for respect of each other's cultural diversity, and will promote China-Africa cultural inclusiveness and common prosperity, thereby enhancing understanding and friendship between Chinese and African people. In addition to promoting exchanges between cultural institutions and personnels, China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in cultural industry and personnel training.

According to the principle of focusing on key areas and doing things within its capability, China will strengthen exchanges and result-oriented sports cooperation with African countries and continue to provide assistance to support the development of sports in African countries.

(2) Expanding tourism cooperation

China will work with African countries to provide convenience in visa application and other services to facilitate travels by their nationals to their respective countries and regions, support tourism promotion activities in each other's countries and regions, encourage airlines on both sides to open more air routes and operate more flights between China and Africa, and expand personnel exchanges and visits. China welcomes and is willing to give positive consideration to applications of qualified African countries for Approved Destinations Status for outbound Chinese tourist groups, and support Chinese and African enterprises to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation in tourism infrastructure development, thereby improving and optimizing the environment for tourism.

(3) Broadening cooperation on press, radio, film and television

China will push forward diverse forms of exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African media outlets, creating necessary conditions for this purpose and providing guidance and convenience. Dialogue and consultation between relevant government departments will be strengthened for the purpose of deepening media cooperation, enhancing cyberspace management and sharing experience in handling the relations with media, with a priority given to support capacity building of African media. Support will be provided for the sound development of the China-Africa Press Center, with the aim to increase objective and balanced media coverage on the development of China and Africa and on China-Africa relations so as to promote mutual understanding and recognition between Chinese and African people. China will encourage Chinese and African media organizations to step up cooperation in areas such as journalism studies, personnel training, content exchanges and joint news gathering and production, and new media. China will strengthen technological exchanges and industrial cooperation with Africa on radio, film and television, and encourage connection and contacts between Chinese and African radio and TV broadcasters. It will continue to promote the digitization of radio and TV broadcasting in Africa, provide related financing, technical support and personnel training, and encourage Chinese and African enterprises to engage in joint venture cooperation.

(4) Encouraging exchanges between academia and think tanks

China will encourage Chinese and African universities to carry out joint studies to enhance research strengths of both sides. China will actively implement the China-Africa Joint Research and Exchange Plan and the China-Africa Think Tanks 10+10 Partnership Plan. It will support Chinese and African research institutes and think tanks to engage in multi-forms of exchanges and cooperation, such as joint researches, seminars, and publishing of books. Priority support will be given to joint researches and result sharing in areas that are conducive to promoting China-Africa friendly cooperation, such as governance, development paths, industrial capacity cooperation, and comparison of cultures and laws.

(5) Enhancing people-to-people exchanges

China will continue to enhance people-to-people exchanges to increase mutual understanding between Chinese and African people and push forward cooperation on improving people's livelihoods. It encourages the implementation of the Proposals on China-Africa People-to-People Exchanges and Cooperation, China-Africa People-to-People Friendship Action and China-Africa People-to-People Friendship and Partnership Program, and supports non-governmental organizations and social groups to engage in diverse forms of friendly exchanges and public benefit activities.

It will promote exchanges between Chinese and African youths and contacts between Chinese and African government departments for youth affairs and youth organizations of political parties, and promote exchanges between outstanding youths from all walks of life in China and Africa. It will encourage and guide Chinese young volunteers to go to African countries to deliver volunteer services, and engage in poverty alleviation, education assistance and other activities.

China will continue to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Africa to promote gender equality, deepen exchanges between women's organizations and high-level dialogue on women's issues, maintain good cooperation on multilateral women's affairs, and work with Africa to promote women's cause in China and African countries. It will continue to provide necessary assistance to African countries to benefit women and children, and strengthen cooperation in skills training.

China will engage in exchanges with Africa in such areas as service systems for persons with disabilities and social security policies for them. For this, efforts will be

made to step up cooperation in areas including rehabilitation, education, employment, social insurance, and development-oriented poverty reduction.

China will intensify friendly exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African trade unions.

6. Promoting peace and security in Africa

(1) Supporting Africa in realizing peace and security

China supports African countries' efforts in independently resolving their continent's issues in their own way. Based on the principles of respecting the wills of African countries, not interfering in African countries' internal affairs and observing the basic norms governing international relations, China will play a constructive role in maintaining and promoting peace and security in Africa. It will explore means and ways with Chinese characteristics to constructively participate in resolving hot-button issues in Africa and exert a unique impact on and make greater contributions to African peace and security. The Special Representative of the Chinese government on African Affairs will continue to play a contributing part.

China will strengthen dialogue and consultation with African countries and regional organizations on peace and security issues, pursue the principle of securing peace through development and promoting development with peace, and implement the consensus on achieving common, cooperative, comprehensive and sustainable security. It will support the efforts by African countries, the AU and sub-regional organizations to build capabilities in safeguarding peace and stability in Africa, and other relevant efforts. It will implement the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security and continue to provide, within its capabilities, support to Africa for its development of collective security mechanisms such as the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises.

China will uphold justice and safeguard the common interests of Africa and developing countries in multilateral organizations such as the UN. China attaches great importance to and supports the UN's important role in safeguarding peace and stability in Africa, and will continue to support and expand its participation in the UN's efforts in Africa aimed at maintaining and building peace.

(2) Deepening military cooperation

China will further strengthen military exchanges and cooperation with African countries. It will deepen military-related technological cooperation and carry out joint military training and exercises. China will scale up training of African military personnel according to the needs of the African side, and innovate on the training methods. It will continue to help African countries enhance their capacity building in national defense and peacekeeping to safeguard their own security and regional peace.

(3) Supporting Africa in confronting non-traditional security threats

China will strengthen cooperation with Africa in intelligence sharing and capacity building, and improve capabilities to confront non-traditional security threats together with African countries. It will support the international community's efforts to crack down on piracy, continue to send naval vessels to participate in the missions for maintaining navigation safety in the Gulf of Aden and in waters off the coast of Somalia, and assist African countries in ensuring navigation safety in the Gulf of Guinea.

China will support the efforts of African countries and regional organizations in improving counter-terrorism capabilities and fighting terrorism, and help African countries develop their economy and root out the causes of terrorism, with the aim to safeguard regional security and stability and promote long-term peace and sustainable development in Africa. It will strengthen counter-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with the AU and priority countries in the region.

7. Strengthening exchanges and cooperation in consular, immigration, judicial and police areas

China will support institutional arrangements for the facilitation of personnel exchanges with Africa and guarantee the expansion of friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation and orderly personnel exchanges between the two sides.

China will work with African countries to establish more consular organizations in each other's territory in a planned manner. It will strengthen consular consultation with African countries for both sides to have amicable discussions on urgent problems or issues of common interest in bilateral or multilateral consular relations. China stands

for closer exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African immigration departments to fight illegal immigration, supporting African countries to strengthen capacity building in enforcement of immigration-related laws.

China stands ready to promote exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and African judicial and police departments and the two sides may learn from each other in legal system development and judicial reform. It will support the efforts of Africa to strengthen capacity building in riot control, maintenance of stability and law enforcement. It stands for concrete and effective measures by both sides to protect the safety, rights and interests of personnel and organizations from the other side on their own soil.

China will work with African countries to enhance cooperation in judicial assistance and extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects. They will expand cooperation in signing judicial assistance treaties, cracking down on crimes, and pursuing fugitives and recovering criminal proceeds. They will work in concert to crack down on cross-border crimes and ensure the order of and the just and legal rights involved in trade and economic and personnel exchanges. It calls for the two sides to increase communication and cooperation in the areas of jail management, community correction, drug rehabilitation and transfer of convicted persons.

Part IV. FOCAC and Its Follow-up Actions

Since its establishment in 2000, FOCAC has become an important platform for collective dialogue between China and Africa and an effective mechanism for their pragmatic cooperation, thanks to the efforts of both sides. In the past 15 years, China and Africa have co-hosted the Beijing Summit and five ministerial conferences, drawn up a series of important programmatic documents on cooperation, and promoted the implementation of measures supporting African development and deepening the friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two sides, reaping fruitful results.

China and Africa have held dialogues through equal-footed dialogue mechanisms such as the Ministerial Conference, the political consultation between Chinese and African foreign ministers on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly sessions, the Senior Officials Meeting, and the consultation between the Secretariat of the Chinese

Follow-up Committee of FOCAC and the African Diplomatic Corps in China, further enhancing mutual understanding and political mutual trust. The forum has served as a platform for all-round pragmatic cooperation, pushing for leapfrog increase in China-Africa trade and mutual investment and promoting mutual benefit and common development. The forum has been a bridge for closer people-to-people exchanges and friendship between China and Africa, promoting bilateral exchanges in all areas, and consolidating and expanding the social and popular support for the friendship between China and African countries. It has helped enhance communication and collaboration between China and African countries in the international arena, facilitating them to work together in safeguarding the overall interests of the two sides and developing countries.

China is willing to work with African countries to enhance the mechanism building of the forum, expand areas and ways of cooperation, enrich mutual cooperation, promote the establishment and improvement of sub-forum mechanisms in the fields of industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, human resources development, industrial capacity cooperation, finance, science and technology, education, culture, health, poverty reduction, law, locals, youth, women, people-to-people exchanges, think tanks and media, and deepen cooperation in relevant areas. All these are aimed at enabling China-Africa cooperation to be more pragmatic and effective and achieve more tangible results under the framework of the forum, thereby bringing greater benefits to the Chinese and African people.

Part V. China's Relations with African Regional Organizations

China values and supports the AU's leadership in building a united and strong Africa and promoting African integration, its centrality in safeguarding peace and security in Africa, as well as a bigger role for the organization in regional and international affairs. It appreciates and supports the AU's adoption and implementation of Agenda 2063 and its first 10-year plan. The creation of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the AU in 2014 has taken China-AU relations to a new stage. China is ready to increase high-level exchanges with the AU, give full play to the China-AU strategic dialogue mechanism, and enhance political dialogue and mutual trust. It will promote cooperation with the AU in areas such as development planning, experience sharing in poverty reduction, health, peace and security, and international affairs.

China appreciates the positive role of African sub-regional organizations in promoting peace, stability and development in their respective regions. It stands ready to strengthen friendly exchanges and cooperation with these organizations, and support their capacity-building efforts.

China is eager to establish and improve various dialogue and cooperation mechanisms with the AU and sub-regional organizations in Africa, thereby enhancing China-Africa cooperation at both regional and sub-regional levels in a wide array of fields including political affairs, the economy, trade and culture.